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It is difficult when writing the acknowledgments for 
a jointly authored volume falls, of necessity, on one 
of the authors alone. At the time of Campbell’s death, 
we had reasonably complete drafts of the first thir-
teen chapters of this book, and he had just provided 
his comments on the final chapter. Campbell was a 
pre-eminent Canadian petroleum economist, so his 
expertise, not to mention his energy and wit, were 
sorely missed during the lengthy updating, rewriting, 
and final editing. However, there can be no doubt that 
Petropolitics is truly a co-authored study.
Campbell first proposed this book many years ago. 
We were both trained as economists (Campbell going 
on to consult in energy economics, and I to join the 
Department of Economics, University of Calgary, as 
their first energy economist). So it is not surprising 
that we agreed that our discipline brought the most 
useful framework for understanding the functioning 
of the petroleum industry. While the subject matter 
might appear to be specific to the Alberta crude pet-
roleum industry, it was agreed from the beginning 
that the book would be directed at a much wider audi-
ence than Alberta petroleum economists. This broader 
perspective has both professional and geographical 
dimensions: the oil industry has ramifications for soci-
ety at large and for many professions beyond energy 
economics, and Alberta is far from alone in facing the 
opportunities and challenges of developing oil and 
natural gas resources.
Our intent in writing Petropolitics was to place the 
history of the development of Alberta’s crude petrol-
eum within the larger contexts of natural resource 
economics and public policy formation. Framed in 
this way, the example of the Alberta experience can 
be applied anywhere petroleum is being developed. 
Consequently, this is a lengthy volume, which read-
ers may wish to approach in a selective manner. For 
example, someone with training in economics may 
find little that is new in Chapter Four but require the 
description of industry activity found in Chapter One; 
conversely, someone employed by the oil industry may 
already be familiar with the material in the first chap-
ter but have no familiarity with the tools of analysis 
used by economists as set out in the fourth chapter. 
Conscious of the difficulties involved in providing 
reasonably refined economic analysis and detailed 
descriptions of government regulations while main-
taining narrative flow, we provide a brief “Readers’ 
Guide” at the start of each chapter to aid in deciding 
which parts might prove of most interest. In addition, 
there are numerous summary and conclusion sections, 
should the fine technical detail be of less interest to 
any specific reader. It was also decided that if material 
was of interest it should be included in the main 
text rather than in lengthy appended footnotes as is 
common in many academic studies.
I would like to thank the University of Calgary 
Press for accepting such a mammoth manuscript and 
to John King, in particular, for his invaluable and 
meticulous editing. The anonymous reviewers the 
Press called on made many valuable comments that 
led to useful modifications in the text. Campbell 
would, I am sure, join me in extending a special note 
of appreciation to our many colleagues and students 
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(Canada, U.S. and Mexico)
 NARG North American regional gas model
 NEB National Energy Board (federal)
 NEP National Energy Program
 NGGLT Natural Gas and Natural Gas Liquids Tax
 NGL Natural Gas Liquids
 NFFB Net federal fiscal balance
 NOC National oil company
 NOP National Oil Policy
 NORP New Oil Reference Price
 OEB Ontario Energy Board
 OGCB Oil and Gas Conservation Board 
(Alberta)
 OGSP Official Government Selling Price 
(OPEC)
 OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries
 P&NG Petroleum and Natural Gas
 PCC Petroleum Compensation Charge
 PGRT Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax
 PIP Petroleum Incentive Payment
 PNGCB Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Conservation Board (Alberta)
 PUB Public Utilities Board (Alberta)
 R/P Reserves/Production ratio
 RPP Refined petroleum products
 RSSC Resource stock supply curve
 RTPC Restrictive Trade Practices Commission 
(federal)
 SAGD Steam assisted gravity drainage 
(bitumen)
 SCC Special Compensation Charge
 SOOP Special Old Oil Price
 SPR Strategic Petroleum Reserve
 STRC Short term replacement cost
 TCPL TransCanada Pipeline Company
 TOP Take-or-Pay (natural gas)
 USOIQP United States Oil Import Quota Program
 VRIP Value Related Incentive Price 
(natural gas)
 WCSB Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin
 WGML Western Gas Marketing Ltd.
 WORV West of the Ottawa River valley
 WTI West Texas Intermediate
 WTO World Trade Organization
In January, darkness covers the Canadian prairies by 
five o’clock in the afternoon. The landscape appears as 
it has for the past century. Lights of vehicles or farm-
houses, and occasional small communities, dot the 
landscape. Otherwise, a wide expanse of snow-covered 
fields stretches out, marked only by the riverbeds 
and windbreaks of trees. Suddenly a blazing mass 
appears, myriad lights from a sprawling city: glow-
ing skyscrapers; never-ending streams of headlights 
spreading from the city core; hectic shopping centres; 
endless banks of apartments and houses in which the 
evening’s activities begin. A modern megalopolis in 
the once quiet prairie provides a tangible symbol for 
this book. Its light and warmth in the depth of winter’s 
cold illustrate the possibilities opened by the low-cost 
energy of the Fossil Fuel Age. The very existence of 
active, wealthy cities in the Canadian prairies, so far 
removed from the longer-lived centres of world power, 
reflects the potential offered to a region by nature’s 
bounty of energy resources.
We want to provide an ‘economic history’ of the 
petroleum industry in Alberta, from its beginning 
to the present. There are many ways in which the 
story could be told. A scientist might emphasize the 
physical history – how primitive life forms in shallow 
seas hundreds of millions of years ago can lead to an 
array of wells, pipelines, and refineries that provide 
the energy to fuel our industrialized world. The pol-
itical scientist might highlight the management role 
of governments and detail the complex web of petrol-
eum legislation and regulation that results from the 
political interplay of local farmers, regional entrepre-
neurs, multinational corporations, environmentalists, 
government departments, and just plain taxpayers. 
A lawyer would trace the course of cases in civil and 
common law, and the judicial judgments, that give 
precise meaning to laws and regulations and stimulate 
new legislation. For the psychologist or biographer, 
the story might lie in a succession of determined and 
eccentric personalities relentlessly pursuing new ideas 
and opportunities. We do not dismiss the vibrancy of 
these approaches. However, our view is one of petrol-
eum as an economic commodity, produced in com-
petition with other energy products throughout the 
world. The history of the development of oil and gas 
in Alberta is in large measure an economic story. We 
hope that this perspective will prove valuable to read-
ers of this book, even those who begin by thinking 
that energy is too important to be left to economists.
As economic commodities, oil and gas can be 
viewed from a purely ‘private’ perspective, as seen by 
companies and consumers. They can also be viewed 
from a ‘social’ perspective, as commodities to be 
utilized in the broad public interest. The import-
ance of energy to the functioning of any economy 
has meant that energy is amongst the most regu-
lated of commodities. What might appear to be 
purely private decisions are made within a complex 
and evolving web of government regulations. The 
title “Petropolitics” was chosen to acknowledge the 
importance of the legal and regulatory setting to the 
economics of the petroleum industry.
Our study deals with oil and natural gas in 
Alberta. It might, therefore, be viewed as a restricted 
study of narrow interest. However, the physical con-
ditions that generated petroleum, the assorted tasks 
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performed by the petroleum industry, the operation 
of economic markets, and the regulatory issues that 
arise are common to oil- and gas-producing regions 
throughout the world. It is our hope that the analysis 
in this book will serve as a valuable exemplar for ana-
lysts and policy-makers studying the petroleum indus-
try in other parts of the world.
Part One provides an overview, in four parts. 
Chapter One deals with oil and natural gas as physical 
products: what they are, what the petroleum industry 
does to/with them, and what these physical realities 
imply for an economic depiction of the industry. 
Chapter Two provides an initial perspective on 
the petroleum industry in Alberta, contrasting the 
operations of the industry in the late 1940s with the 
year 2010 and briefly reviewing some critical policy 
issues that arose over this period. Chapter Three sets 
the Alberta petroleum industry in a global context. 
Finally, Chapter Four reviews the formal concepts and 
constructs that economists utilize to help understand 
how economies and markets function.
Part Two looks at the Alberta crude oil industry 
from what we call a ‘private’ perspective’: it is largely 
concerned with the evolution of the industry from 
the viewpoint of oil producers and consumers. In this 
part we look at the crude oil resource base, the evolu-
tion of crude oil markets (prices and production), the 
development of Alberta’s non-conventional oil sands 
resources, and various ‘models’ that economists have 
built to help us understand this complicated industry.
Part Three examines the Alberta crude oil indus-
try from a ‘social’ perspective: it deals with the gov-
ernment regulatory environment. Three important 
policy areas are covered: pricing and trade regulations; 
production conservation regulations; and tax and 
royalty regulations.
Part Four includes three sections. First, it covers 
the history of Alberta natural gas, focusing on aspects 
that differ from crude oil. We discuss both natural gas 
markets and government regulations, with a particu-
lar emphasis on the restriction of gas exports to sales 
in excess of ‘domestic requirements.’ Next, the per-
spective is broadened from an emphasis on crude oil 
and natural gas markets to the role of the petroleum 
industry in the Alberta provincial economy. Finally, 
we conclude with lessons from the Alberta experience 
that may be of value to decision-makers elsewhere in 
the world.
While we have incorporated most of the economic 
issues of significance for the Alberta crude petroleum 
industry, we should alert readers to several excep-
tions. Our primary interest is with Alberta’s abundant 
natural petroleum wealth. Hence we focus on the 
production and marketing of crude oil and natural 
gas. However, we do not examine in any detail natural 
gas liquids such as ethane, butane, and propane, or the 
sulphur often produced in conjunction with natural 
gas; nor do we delve deeply into the many issues asso-
ciated with the subsequent shipment and processing 
of petroleum such as pipeline operation, oil refining, 
natural gas processing, or petrochemicals.
Finally, we do not engage in any detailed analysis 
of the environmental impacts of the industry. This is 
not because we think they are unimportant. However, 
this book is already very long, and the environmental 
questions involve scientific issues with which we have 
no expertise.
Readers’ Guide: Chapter One is aimed at readers 
who have little familiarity with the petroleum industry. 
It describes the activities of the industry in terms of 
a number of different stages required to transform 
petroleum from a resource in nature to a product that 
consumers willingly purchase. Readers familiar with 
the industry may wish to move on to Section 3 of this 
chapter.
1. What Is Petroleum?
A dictionary will note that the word ‘petroleum’ is 
derived from Latin, meaning ‘rock oil,’ and is almost 
always used to refer to those mineral oils provided 
from below the earth’s surface that consist mainly 
of mixtures of hydrogen and carbon molecules (i.e., 
hydrocarbons). Petroleum is, therefore, a natural 
resource. Sometimes the term has been broadened to 
include ‘manufactured’ hydrocarbons that are iden-
tical to the natural resource; this would include, for 
instance, liquid oil or natural gas derived from coal or 
biomass. However, such ‘synthetic’ products have not 
as yet been produced in large volumes. The term ‘pet-
roleum’ is also applied to refined petroleum products 
like motor gasoline and fuel oil, which are derived 
from processing the natural resource.
Naturally occurring hydrocarbon deposits vary 
greatly in physical composition but are generally 
grouped into two broad classes, depending upon 
whether the main output is liquid (crude oil) or gas-
eous (natural gas). The greater is the proportion of 
carbon to hydrogen in the deposit, the heavier and 
more viscous the petroleum. In extreme cases, such 
as the bitumen in oil sands deposits around Fort 
McMurray in Northern Alberta and kerogen in oil 
shale deposits in Colorado, the hydrocarbon is so vis-
cous that it will not flow of its own accord beneath the 
surface. To date relatively little petroleum of this very 
heavy type – frequently labelled ‘non-conventional 
oil’ – has been produced, with production concen-
trated in Alberta and Venezuela. ‘Conventional’ crude 
oil refers to liquid hydrocarbons derived from natural 
underground deposits (‘pools’ or ‘reservoirs’) in which 
the liquid is fluid enough beneath the surface that 
some of it can be lifted readily through wells.
Conventional crude oil is a liquid mixture of par-
affinic and other hydrocarbons spanning a wide range 
of molecular weights and containing varying amounts 
of sulphur, nitrogen, and other elements. It varies in 
specific gravity (relative to water) from about 0.8 to 1 
(API gravity from 50° to nearly 10°). API stands for the 
American Petroleum Institute, which instituted the 
API degree scale in the late 1800s. If (sg) is the specific 
gravity of the oil, the API degree is given by the fol-
lowing formula:
API = (141.5/sg) – 131.5.
The lower the specific gravity (the lighter the oil), 
the higher the API degree number. Since water has a 
specific gravity of 1, oil as heavy as water would have 
an API degree number of 10.The bitumen found in 
the Alberta oil sands is heavier than water, with API 
values around 5. Natural gas is a gaseous mixture of 
normal paraffinic hydrocarbons, mainly methane 
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(CH4), which is often contaminated with water vapour, 
nitrogen, carbon dioxide, and hydrogen sulphide. 
The general belief is that crude oil and natural gas 
were formed millions of years ago from the remains 
of aquatic plant and animal life. For this reason oil 
and gas (as well as coal) are called fossil fuels. In the 
prevailing view, petroleum originated in sedimentary 
basins – areas where thick layers of sediment were 
deposited at the bottoms of shallow seas. Over time 
dead plant and animal matter settled with the sedi-
ment; eventually these overlying layers of mud and silt 
created great pressure and high temperatures. Finally, 
when these beds had sunk thousands of metres deep, 
the plant and animal matter became chemically con-
verted to oil and natural gas.
As pressures on the original sedimentary rock 
intensified, and as the earth’s crust shifted over time, 
the oil and gas ‘migrated’ through pores, cracks, and 
fissures where it became trapped in porous rock in 
underground structures. These petroleum yielding 
structures are known as reservoirs and consist of sev-
eral types of ‘traps’ – the most typical being structural 
(or fault) traps, stratigraphic traps, and a combination 
of both types.
Structural traps are caused by local deformations 
that ‘fold’ or ‘fault’ the reservoir rock. Anticlines, 
resembling elongated arches, and domes, resembling 
inverted bowls, are the main types of folds that serve 
as traps for oil and gas. A fault is a fracture in the 
earth’s crust along which movement has taken place; 
these shifts can bring non-porous rocks in contact 
with porous ones, thus forming a trap.
A stratigraphic trap is one in which the chief 
trap-forming element is some variation in the nature 
of the reservoir rock. These traps represent the most 
difficult oil and gas accumulations to find since there 
are no structural features associated with them. A 
common stratigraphic trap consists of a wedge-shaped 
sandstone formation squeezed between impervi-
ous rocks and lying at an inclined angle. Oil or gas 
becomes trapped where the sandstone ‘pinches out’ 
against the impervious rock.
The trap holds the oil and gas in place so that they 
cannot escape until released by drilling a well. In an 
oil pool, the three elements that are usually present – 
water, oil, and gas – occur largely in layers. Water is 
at the base and gas, when present, tends to the top. 
Oil lies between since it is of intermediate density. In 
most cases oil deposits contain some natural gas in 
solution, mixed with the oil and held there by the high 
pressure in the reservoir; natural gas in gaseous form 
is also found as a gas cap above an oil trap. Such gas 
is called ‘associated’ since it is found in association 
with crude oil in the reservoir. Sometimes natural gas 
is discovered in a free state in a reservoir not in asso-
ciation with crude oil; this is called ‘non-associated’ 
gas. Frequently non-associated natural gas is relatively 
‘wet,’ including hydrocarbons heavier than methane; 
that is, the molecules have more than a single carbon 
atom. These may be removed as natural gas liquids 
(NGLs), such as ethane (C2), propane (C3), butane 
(C4), and pentanes plus (C5+). While water tends to 
lie beneath the oil in a reservoir, it is also common to 
have some water molecules adhering to the rock pore 
spaces in the portion of the reservoir holding oil.
Petroleum is of interest primarily for its energy 
content: the electromagnetic (chemical) bonds hold-
ing together the various atoms in the hydrocarbon 
compounds can be released quite easily (e.g., by appli-
cation of heat) with an attendant release of energy 
(again, in the form of heat), which can be harnessed 
to do work. More than 90 per cent of the world’s use 
of hydrocarbons is for their energy content. In the 
remaining instances petroleum is used for its matter; 
that is, the particular hydrocarbon compounds are 
desired, by petrochemical and plastics companies, fer-
tilizer manufacturers, road pavers or others, for their 
structural or other physical features.
Scientists note that petroleum, as a physical prod-
uct, is subject to various laws of nature including the 
first two laws of thermodynamics (Foley, 1976, chap. 
4). In simplistic terms, the first law of thermodyna-
mics is a conservation law that states that the energy 
content of petroleum can be neither created nor 
destroyed; instead it changes form on use. Expressed 
in quite different terms, the utilization of petroleum 
necessarily creates waste energy and matter. The 
second law of thermodynamics is the famous Entropy 
Law. It states, in essence, that the utilization of energy 
necessarily reduces it to a less usable or available form 
(i.e., increases entropy) so that, while it is possible to 
use energy more or less efficiently, it is not possible 
to recycle it. The entropy law, combined with the tre-
mendously long time span involved in the generation 
of petroleum deposits, make petroleum in nature 
a non-renewable or exhaustible natural resource. 
How efficiently the economic system recognizes this 
non-renewability is a matter of widespread debate. For 
example, Georgesceu-Roegan (1973) and Daly (1973) 
emphasize the critical importance of entropy; on the 
other hand, Adelman (1990) and Watkins (1992) ques-
tion whether the concept of finite physical resource 
limitations is meaningful to economic analysis of the 
petroleum industry.
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2. What Is the Petroleum Industry?
The petroleum industry consists of six main sectors: 
exploration for reservoirs of crude oil and natural 
gas; reservoir development; production or lifting of 
oil and gas; transportation or transmission; refining 
of crude oil into refined petroleum products; and the 
marketing (distribution) of these refined products 
and of natural gas. Exploration, development, and 
lifting (or extraction) are generally referred to as the 
‘upstream’ activities of the petroleum industry (or 
the ‘crude petroleum industry’) while the refining 
and marketing of petroleum constitute ‘downstream’ 
operations. Transportation provides the link between 
the ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ segments; this book 
treats it as part of the industry’s downstream activities.
In the material that follows, we shall refer to the 
production of oil; unless otherwise specified, similar 
factors hold for natural gas.
A. What Constitutes ‘Upstream’ Activity?
A formal definition of the ‘upstream’ segment of the 
petroleum industry is (Canada Petroleum Monitoring 
Agency, 1986): “activities and operations related to 
the search for, and development, production, extrac-
tion and recovery of crude oil, natural gas, natural 
gas liquids and sulphur, as well as the production of 
synthetic oil.”
1. Exploration and Development
a. Geological and Geophysical Work and Land Acquisition
The search for underground accumulations of oil and 
natural gas begins with looking for the type of rock 
formations in which petroleum deposits are likely 
to be found. (Gow, 2005, provides a useful overview 
of the geological and technical dimensions of pet-
roleum industry activity, with specific reference to 
Alberta.) This typically restricts the search to regions 
with deep overlays of sedimentary rock (i.e., a sedi-
mentary basin), in which it is believed that adequate 
source and reservoir rock (geological formations) 
were laid down in the distant past. The first stage in 
the exploration effort is to select the regions in which 
effort will be expended. This depends on a mix of 
factors including the physical prospects for finding 
petroleum, accessibility, the economic and political 
climate of the region, and proximity to markets. Once 
a region is selected, a preliminary geological survey is 
undertaken. Visible rocks are examined for any clues 
they may provide as to what type of formations lie 
beneath the area. Rock samples are taken to compare 
with samples from previously discovered hydrocarbon 
deposits. A detailed geological map is prepared, which 
provides information on the prospects for finding oil 
or gas in the area.
At this time the company will begin the process 
of acquiring ‘land’ in the region; more specifically, it 
must acquire ‘mineral rights,’ i.e., the property right 
that conveys the legal right to explore for and recover 
petroleum, if found, at particular locations. In Canada 
the majority of mineral rights are ‘Crown’; that is 
owned by governments, mainly provincial govern-
ments. Petroleum exploration rights have been issued 
primarily through competitive bidding sales. Some 
mineral rights are ‘freehold,’ that is owned by private 
parties with whom the oil companies must negoti-
ate. In addition to obtaining mineral rights for the 
subsurface petroleum resources, oil companies must 
negotiate with surface rights owners (e.g., farmers and 
ranchers) to obtain rights of use for the land needed 
for roads, drilling sites, etc. Before any oil can be pro-
duced, it is necessary to acquire production rights as 
well as exploration rights. Typically areas covered by 
exploration licences may be converted in whole or 
part into leases that allow petroleum extraction. In 
addition, primary landowners, like provincial govern-
ments on Crown land, often directly issue leases that 
permit exploration and production.
The next step is to investigate the underground 
rock structures. Geophysical surveying is the appli-
cation of the principles of physics to the study of 
subsurface geology. Geophysical surveys measure the 
thickness of sediments and map the shape of struc-
tures within the sediments. The most common type of 
geophysical study is seismic, in which explosive char-
ges are detonated at or near the ground’s surface. The 
ensuing shock waves are recorded by geophones after 
they strike and rebound off underlying layers of rock. 
With this information geophysicists are able to locate 
structures that might contain oil or gas. Gravimetric 
and magnetic surveys are other methods employed 
by geophysicists to obtain subsurface data. Recent 
technological developments, like 3-D seismic map-
ping, and now 4-D seismic (with time as the fourth 
dimension) have expanded the role of seismic activ-
ities and have led to much re-evaluation of previously 
studied geological strata.
b. Exploratory Drilling
Geological and geophysical surveys undoubtedly 
improve the chances of finding oil or gas, but they 
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can at best map the underlying geological structures, 
not pinpoint the presence of petroleum. Since many 
potential petroleum-holding traps are dry, the only 
way to prove the existence of an underground reser-
voir where large accumulations of oil or gas occur is to 
drill a hole. Thus the next stage in the search for pet-
roleum is exploratory ‘wildcat’ drilling. This is done 
on a site recommended by the geologist or geophysi-
cist, predicated on the survey work done earlier.
On occasion the first hole that is drilled in a new 
territory will ‘prove’ oil or gas in quantities large 
enough to be exploited commercially. The normal 
occurrence, though, is the drilling of a number of  
dry holes, or holes suggesting only small (non- 
commercial) amounts of petroleum. The additional 
information obtained from these holes will lead to 
a final decision on whether to proceed with more 
exploration of the area.
When a successful exploratory well occurs, a 
series of appraisal (‘stepout’ or ‘extension’ or ‘outpost’) 
wells are typically drilled to determine the extent of 
the reservoir. Cylindrical samples of the formations 
penetrated (known as ‘cores’) are analyzed over the 
oil-bearing section of the rock so that its permeability, 
porosity, and oil content can be determined. In addi-
tion, samples of the oil are taken from the bottom of 
the well at full reservoir pressure so that the properties 
of the oil, as it exists in the reservoir, can be measured, 
including the unrestrained flow rate. Oil pools are 
heterogeneous: they vary tremendously in areal extent, 
depth, rock porosity, permeability, fluid content (oil, 
gas and water), quality of the hydrocarbons (light or 
heavy, etc.), and other salient characteristics.
c. Development Drilling
The drilling of development wells begins as soon as 
the information derived from appraisal drilling is suf-
ficient to suggest that the oil or gas discovery is com-
mercial and what would be the most suitable way to 
develop and produce the reservoir. This stage is often 
reached before the limits of the field have been fully 
delineated, and it is therefore not unusual for more 
stepout or outpost wells to be drilled at the same time 
as development wells are being sunk. (While stepout 
wells are commonly classified as part of the explor-
ation process, they could just as well be considered 
development, since they occur after a reservoir has 
been found.)
The number of development wells, their spacing, 
and their depth will depend on the size and character 
of the field, as well as the land-tenure system under 
which the government establishes conditions about 
mineral rights. For example, development wells, like 
apple trees in an orchard, may be spaced in a regular 
pattern or grid system. This type of spacing pattern 
may ensure that the oil off-take is evenly distributed 
over the whole reservoir. However, such patterns are 
only appropriate in the development of flattish struc-
tures with relatively homogeneous subsurface rock 
and reservoir conditions. On steeply dipping struc-
tures, a single line or ring of wells is more likely to be 
drilled. And the distance between the wells depends 
on the size of the area that can be effectively drained 
by each one. In addition, governments typically set 
regulations about the allowable development patterns, 
often in the form of a minimum required spacing 
for wells. Such regulations often reflect a concern by 
the government to protect the (subsurface) property 
rights of adjacent land owners. (Since oil and gas 
are fugacious, i.e., fluid, it is possible for a producer 
to capture petroleum from beneath a neighbouring 
property.)
Until recently, development wells were almost 
always entirely vertical, or, in exceptional circum-
stances, slanted at a constant angle for the entire well 
depth. A slant well would be appropriate, for example, 
if the land is particularly sensitive for environmental 
reasons directly above the part of the reservoir being 
drained, or if a large area of the pool is to be drained 
from wells that start from the same location, as an off-
shore production platform. Technological advances in 
recent years have encouraged the drilling of ‘horizon-
tal wells’ in which the well bore turns markedly away 
from the vertical to the horizontal as the well enters 
the producing formation. A single horizontal well is 
in contact with a larger volume of reservoir rock than 
a single vertical well. In a reservoir that has relatively 
high permeability and is relatively homogeneous in 
character, horizontal wells allow faster recovery of oil. 
In a reservoir that has relatively poor permeability 
and/or is very heterogeneous in nature (with ‘pockets’ 
of better and worse producibility) horizontal wells 
may increase the ‘sweep’ area and allow greater total 
recovery of oil than would be possible with vertical 
wells only.
Development activities are multifaceted and 
highly specific to the particular characteristics of the 
pool to be drained. Wells may be all vertical or ver-
tical and horizontal. Development wells may include 
some or all of the following: appraisal (outpost) wells 
that prove up new volumes of recoverable oil (new 
‘reserves’); infill wells, spaced among previously 
drilled ones, that allow faster recovery of the oil; 
water disposal wells, to pump connate water back 
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into underground formations; water or gas or other 
injection wells and associated oil-lifting wells, as part 
of an enhanced oil recovery (EOR) project to augment 
the natural productivity of the pool. The variety of 
physical production procedures combined with the 
heterogeneity of oil pools translates into an array of 
economic costs of producing petroleum.
2. Production (Lifting or Operation)
The rate at which oil can be extracted once wells are 
drilled depends largely on the permeability of the 
rock – the degree to which a rock will allow oil and 
gas to pass through it. If this is too low, the production 
obtained from an individual well might be insuffi-
cient to offset its cost so that the development of the 
reservoir would be ruled out on economic grounds. 
Generally the porosity – the number of spaces and 
openings that separate the individual rock grains – 
and permeability vary from place to place within the 
same reservoir rock. Sometimes these variations are so 
diverse that wells located in different parts of the res-
ervoir may have markedly different production rates.
The reservoir crude can range from very heavy 
viscous (thick) oil under very low pressure containing 
little or no dissolved gas to extremely light straw- 
coloured crude under considerable pressure con-
taining a large amount of dissolved gas. The viscosity 
of the oil depends largely on its specific gravity as well 
as on the quantity of gas that it holds in solution. The 
less viscous an oil, and the more gas it contains, the 
more readily it will flow through the crevices of the 
rock to gain entry to the well.
An oil or gas reservoir also typically contains some 
water in its pore spaces. This ‘connate’ or ‘interstitial’ 
water is believed to be water that was not displaced 
by the petroleum at the time of its accumulation and 
entrapment in the originally water-saturated reservoir. 
The connate water content may range from 5 to 40 
per cent or more of the reservoir void space and plays 
an important role during the productive life of the 
reservoir.
a. Primary Production Methods
For oil to move through the pores of the reservoir rock 
and out into the bottom of a well, the pressure under 
which the oil exists in the reservoir must be greater 
than the pressure at the bottom of the well. As oil is 
removed from the rock, the pressure of the reservoir 
will decrease and the rate of production will decline. 
The rate at which the pressure decreases will affect 
the total amount of oil that can be removed from the 
reservoir over a given period of time, if only because 
declining production brings the well closer to being 
uneconomic to operate.
The connate water found in the reservoir, asso-
ciated gas, and the free gas in the gas cap are the 
main sources of energy that drive the crude oil to the 
bottom of the producing wells and thence up the pipe 
tubing to the surface or wellhead. The production 
mechanisms associated with these sources of energy 
are referred to as ‘water drive,’ ‘solution gas drive’ (or 
‘depletion drive’), and ‘gas cap drive,’ respectively. 
‘Water drive’ is normally the most efficient of the 
three displacement processes; ‘solution gas drive’ is 
the least efficient. Both gas cap and water drive reser-
voirs are often subject to more than one mechanism. 
Consequently, the terms ‘partial gas cap drive’ and 
‘partial water drive’ may apply. Also a reservoir’s pre-
dominant drive mechanism may change over time, 
as for instance when gas from solution collects by 
gravity segregation to form a gas cap as reservoir 
pressure declines.
The oil obtained as a result of these natural pro-
duction mechanisms, supplemented only by pumping 
and simple fracturing of reservoir rock, is referred 
to as ‘primary recovery.’ As will be discussed below, 
‘enhanced oil recovery’ (EOR) techniques may allow 
recovery of even greater volumes of oil.
b. Recovery Factor
As the preceding discussion suggests, there is no 
known economic process by which all of the oil in 
porous rock may be recovered. There are six groups of 
factors that jointly determine the ‘recovery factor’; that 
is the fraction of the oil-in-place within a reservoir 
that can be brought to the surface. These are:
•	 reservoir	rock	properties,	e.g.,	porosity,	







techniques (including EOR), spacing of wells, 
rate of withdrawal, utilization of EOR;
•	 economics,	e.g.,	drilling	and	completion	
costs, production costs, prices of oil, gas, and 
by-products;
•	 government	regulations	including	those	relating	to	
well-spacing and assorted ‘conservation’ practices, 
royalties, taxes.
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In combination these factors determine the amount of 
oil or natural gas that can be recovered economically, 
or the ‘reserves’ in the pool. Applying the recovery 
factor to the quantity of oil in place generates an esti-
mate of ‘initial recoverable reserves’ that is typically 
considerably less than the volume of petroleum in 
place. (‘Remaining recoverable reserves’ is an esti-
mate of the amount of petroleum still waiting to be 
produced, so equals initial recoverable reserves minus 
cumulative production to date.)
Recovery factors vary markedly among reser-
voirs, but on average about 25 to 35 per cent of the 
oil initially in place in a conventional oil reservoir is 
recoverable, as is about 80 per cent of the gas in place 
in a non-associated natural gas reservoir. The recovery 
factor for oil is often improved by the introduction 
of enhanced recovery techniques in the extraction 
process. In Alberta, for instance, on average about 17 
per cent of the oil in place is recovered by primary 
means and another 7 per cent by EOR (Alberta Energy 
Resources Conservation Board, 2013, Reserves Report, 
ST-98, p. 4-6). However, the recovery factor cannot be 
estimated reliably until the behaviour of the reservoir 
has been observed under actual producing conditions 
at commercial rates of off-take. Fields are generally 
put on production before delineation and develop-
ment drilling has been completed. As a result, data on 
recoverable reserves are continually being revised as 
additional productive areas are drilled up. Typically 
more reserves additions are credited to ‘extensions 
and revisions’ in discovered pools than to ‘new dis-
coveries.’ Expressed in other terms, the reserves in 
a petroleum pool typically ‘appreciate’ over time as 
development proceeds. An analysis by the Alberta 
Energy Resources Conservation Board in its 1969 
Reserves Report of all except the smallest pools found 
an average appreciation factor of about nine times 
for oil pools and four times for non-associated gas 
pools. That is, the average pool in the province will 
ultimately yield nine times the amount of oil that was 
credited to the pool as reserves in its year of discov-
ery. This average appreciation factor of nine for the 
Province masks a wide range of differences for indi-
vidual oil pools.
c. Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) Processes
Some EOR methods, like primary recovery, rely on 
direct displacement with another fluid to force the 
oil out of the reservoir rock and are often called ‘sec-
ondary’ recovery techniques. Water flooding is one of 
the most successful and extensively used secondary 
recovery methods. Water is injected under pressure 
into the reservoir rock via injection wells and drives 
the oil through the rock into adjacent producing 
wells. Where there is considerable variation in the 
permeability of the rock, the rate of injection must 
be carefully controlled to avoid trapping and leaving 
behind large quantities of oil. In the gas drive process, 
gas is injected into the reservoir via injection wells, 
which are usually located on or near the crest of the 
structure. The injected gas is driven downwards and 
sideways through the reservoir and displaces the oil 
into producing wells; over time the ratio of oil to gas 
recovered falls.
These techniques were originally developed to 
extract more oil out of reservoirs from which no 
more oil could be recovered by primary production. 
However, the current practice is to apply these pro-
cesses much earlier in the producing life of the reser-
voir to forestall the decline in reservoir pressure. The 
application of secondary recovery techniques during 
the early stages of the primary production phase is 
referred to as ‘pressure maintenance.’
In recent years, EOR processes have become more 
effective by the adoption of methods that improve the 
performance of the displacing fluids. These enhanced 
oil recovery methods can be broadly divided into sol-
vent techniques and thermal techniques and are often 
called ‘tertiary recovery techniques.’
In solvent techniques, the displacing fluid is 
treated with an additive to make it miscible with the 
reservoir oil and thus improve the efficiency with 
which it sweeps the oil out of the pores of the rock. 
For example, a ‘miscible gas drive’ is a process where 
the natural gas in a gas drive is rendered miscible with 
oil by the addition of a sufficient amount of liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG). This process is most effective 
in light oil reservoirs; however, large amounts of 
LPG are required, which makes the process relatively 
expensive. Carbon dioxide is another injection fuel, 
the popularity of which may increase as concerns over 
global warming lead to policies that reward the cap-
ture and storage of CO2.
The difficulty of recovering oil from reservoirs 
containing heavy viscous crude has led to the develop-
ment of thermal techniques that increase the flow rate 
of the oil primarily by the addition of heat, as in steam 
injection.
Since natural gas moves so readily through pore 
spaces in the reservoir, EOR techniques have not been 
common in non-associated gas pools.
d. ‘In Situ’ Bitumen Recovery
Some oil deposits contain crude that is so viscous 
that primary production is not generally feasible. The 
crude in these reservoirs is generally called ‘bitumen.’ 
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In some cases it can be produced through wells, some 
amounts by primary pressure or water and solvent 
injection, but most by thermal processes, in which 
heat is applied to the reservoir to reduce the viscosity 
of the oil and make it easier to displace. The heating 
effect might be achieved by injecting steam or hot 
water or by burning, underground, some of the oil in 
the reservoir. In this latter process, which is referred 
to as ‘in situ combustion,’ air is injected to support 
combustion and to act as the displacing agent. Such 
processes are used to recover the crude bitumen at 
various sites in east-central Alberta, including Cold 
Lake where steam is injected into the reservoir in 
cycles of injection and production. More recent pro-
jects have usually used steam-assisted gravity drainage 
(SAGD), a technique developed with the encourage-
ment of the Alberta Oil Sands Technology Research 
Authority (AOSTRA), a research facility created in 1974 
by the Alberta government. (In 1994 AOSTRA was 
melded into the Ministry and Energy. Then, in 2000, 
it was terminated, with its projects transferred to the 
Alberta Energy Research Agency. At the start of 2010, 
a new Agency, Alberta Innovates, took over.) With 
SAGD, steam (most often created by burning natural 
gas) is injected through horizontal wells above the 
bitumen-bearing rock; bitumen is then gathered by 
horizontal wells within the oil-bearing rock (Deutsch 
and McLennan, 2005; Engelhardt and Todirescu, 
2005). Such output is called ‘in situ’ bitumen produc-
tion, since the oil is treated in the reservoir to allow 
production.
e. Surface Mining of Oil Sands
The petroleum found in the oil sands in the vicinity 
of Fort McMurray, Alberta, is thick bitumen that is 
mixed with sand, clay, and water. Much of the bitu-
men-laden sands are sufficiently shallow that the 
sands can be strip-mined. Huge bucket-wheel excav-
ators and dragline shovels are used to remove the 
overburden and mine the exposed sands. However, 
this method can only be used to a depth of about fifty 
metres. Centrifugal water flotation techniques are 
used to separate the sand and the bitumen, and the 
bitumen is then upgraded to light crude, often called 
‘syncrude.’ As of 2012, there were only four commer-
cial mining operations. The Suncor and Syncrude 
plants had been in operation for decades. The Albian 
sands project co-ordinated by Shell began oper-
ation in 2005, and Consolidated Natural Resources 
Limited (CNRL) commenced the Horizon project in 
2008. At the end of 2012, the ERCB reported two new 
projects under construction, twelve others that had 
been approved and seven that had made application; 
these numbers include expansions by the four cur-
rent producers (ERCB, Reserves Report, ST-98, 2013, 
Table S3.2). The Imperial Oil and Exxon Mobil Kearn 
mining project began production in the spring of 2013, 
and is the first mining project to produce bitumen 
without upgrading it to synthetic crude oil.
Needless to say, these bitumen recovery methods 
are expensive and require prospective oil prices 
robust enough to warrant the high investment. Recent 
technological improvements have markedly reduced 
operating costs.
f. Lifting of Crude Oil
After wells have been completed, conventional oil 
has to be brought up from the bottom of the holes 
to the surface. This can be accomplished in several 
ways, depending on the nature of the oil, the poten-
tial energy available in the reservoir, and the specific 
form that prior development has taken. The reservoir 
may have sufficient energy to cause the well to flow 
naturally for many years – as is the case in almost 
all Middle East fields – or it may continue for only a 
short period of time without further investment such 
as ‘gas lift’ or pumping. And, of course, these methods 
are also applied to wells that have never had sufficient 
energy to push oil to the surface.
g. Surface Treatment of Crude Oil and Gathering
When the crude has been brought to surface, the 
next step is to reduce it to the form in which it will be 
delivered to the refinery for processing. Oil as pro-
duced at the wellhead varies considerably from field to 
field not only because of its physical characteristics but 
also as to the amount of gas and water that it contains. 
These have to be separated from the oil.
The oil from each producing well is conveyed 
from the wellhead to a gathering plant, occasionally 
by truck but usually through a flow line. The gather-
ing plant, which is located at some central point to 
handle the production from several wells, is equipped 
to separate any gas and water from the oil. The size 
and nature of the plant required for the separation 
of the gas from the crude will depend on the volume 
of gas dissolved in the oil as it exists in the reservoir 
and on the pressure at which it issues at the wellhead. 
Crude with very little gas in it, and possessing little or 
no pressure when it comes out of the wellhead, can be 
separated from the gas in a one-stage operation. High 
pressure crude with considerable gas content is subject 
to a multistage separation process.
The crude oil is then typically gathered up in pipe-
lines and moved from the field to meet with petrol-
eum from other fields (generating a ‘blended’ crude) 
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and is transported by pipeline to a main shipment 
and storage point in the region (e.g., in Alberta, for 
crude oil, the Edmonton terminals of the Enbridge 
and the Kinder Morgan pipelines. Enbridge began as 
the Interprovincial pipeline, moving oil eastward from 
Alberta; Kinder Morgan began as Trans Mountain, 
subsequently Terasen, moving oil westward).
As mentioned above, bitumen mined from the 
oil sands is separated from the sand, clay, and water; 
up to now it has then been substantially upgraded in 
Alberta to yield a synthetic crude oil (SCO), as has a 
portion (7% in 2012, ERCB, Reserves Report, ST-98, 
2013, p. 3–14) of the bitumen from in situ projects. 
Indeed the physical characteristics of the bitumen 
extracted from the tar sands have made further pro-
cessing mandatory. As one of the executives involved 
in Canada’s first oil sands project wrote (McClements, 
Jr., 1968):
Below 50 degrees Fahrenheit it [bitumen] is 
almost solid and at ambient temperatures 
above that it is a sticky asphaltic material. It 
cannot be burned in any but special equipment 
and it cannot be pumped through a pipeline, 
even during summer months. Additionally, 
the market for it is very limited. Consequently, 
it must be upgraded to pumpable, saleable 
material competitive with conventionally-
produced crude oils.
Recently, a number of refineries capable of handling 
bitumen have become accessible to Alberta produ-
cers. Before shipment, the bitumen is diluted with 
light hydrocarbons so it will flow readily through 
the pipeline. 
Natural gas with high hydrogen sulphide content 
is called ‘sour’ gas. When the hydrogen sulphide is 
removed from the gas, it is converted to elemental sul-
phur. Natural gas that is produced from a gas reservoir 
not associated with oil may require little treatment 
(other than sulphur removal) before it is delivered to 
market. However, some non-associated natural gas, 
and natural gas produced in association with oil, is 
generally ‘wet’ and thus is processed at plants near the 
field to extract useful by-products – propane, butane, 
and pentanes plus – and remove unwanted ingredients 
like hydrogen sulphide and carbon dioxide before it 
is shipped by pipeline to consumers. Typically, the 
natural gas is then combined with other natural gas 
from the region and shipped on a main large-diameter 
(‘trunk’) pipeline through a natural gas plant (‘straddle 
plant’), where the natural gas liquids are removed or 
gas that has already been processed is reprocessed. 
Some ‘deep cut’ gas processing facilities have been 
located near to the field to remove NGLs prior to treat-
ment at a straddle plant. This has generated dispute 
between local deep cut and straddle plant operators 
about who has primary claim to the NGLs.
B. What Constitutes ‘Downstream’ Activity?
As mentioned earlier, the term ‘downstream’ is used 
to refer to movements of petroleum beyond the main 
shipment point in the producing region. It includes 
transportation, refinery, and marketing activities for 
liquid oil and transportation and distribution for 
natural gas.
1. Transportation
For at least the past half century within North 
America, it has generally been most economic to move 
petroleum from the producing region to the consum-
ing region by large-diameter high pressure pipeline 
(Lawrey and Watkins, 1982). (Ocean-going tankers 
may be cheaper for crude oil on one or two specific 
routes, e.g., from Alaska to California or along the U.S. 
Gulf Coast.) These pipelines are subject to ‘economies 
of scale,’ meaning that the average cost (unit cost) 
of shipment is smaller the larger the volume moved. 
Essentially this is because the total volume that flows 
through the pipeline rises more than proportionately 
to the diameter of the pipe. It is cheaper to ship large 
volumes of crude long distances than it is to ship the 
refined petroleum products (RPPs) derived from the 
crude, since the RPPs must be kept separate from one 
another in the line. For this reason, and because they 
also exhibit economies of scale, the main refineries 
are large and usually located close to consuming 
centres. The crude oil moved is normally a mix of 
the variety of crudes produced within a region (e.g., 
a blend of Alberta light and medium crudes). Some 
specific crudes, or types of crudes such as very light or 
heavy crudes, may be ‘batched’ and moved separately, 
usually with a relatively non-permeable petroleum 
product separating this crude from the blends at 
either end. Such batching involves higher shipment 
costs. Heavier crudes and bitumen, such as those from 
the Cold Lake and Lloydminster areas, are typically 
blended with lighter hydrocarbons (‘diluents,’ conden-
sate, or pentanes plus) to increase their fluidity.
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For any given diameter pipeline, the flow rate can 
be changed by varying the number, location, and size 
of pumping stations that regulate the pressure in the 
line. In addition, parts of the pipeline may be ‘looped’ 
by adding new, parallel pipe. During operation, pipe-
lines must move a continuous flow of petroleum and 
will exhibit declining unit costs up to the level of 
capacity for existing equipment. Selecting the optimal 
capital configuration (e.g., pipeline diameter and asso-
ciated pumping stations) is a difficult task, particu-
larly when the product being shipped is a depletable 
natural resource, whose total availability in nature 
is necessarily uncertain. A system that is too small 
would leave new discoveries with no immediate access 
to market, while one that is too large will involve 
higher than necessary unit transmission costs.
The existence of significant scale economies in 
pipeline transport implies that the petroleum trans-
mission sector tends to ‘natural monopoly’ status, that 
is, a single pipeline (a monopoly) is the most efficient 
shipment means. However, a monopoly on shipment 
implies that the pipeline may be able to charge high 
monopoly prices to users, thereby generating higher 
profits for itself. There are a number of ways in which 
such exercise of monopoly power may be limited. 
First, shippers (crude oil producers and/or refiners) 
may build the pipelines themselves, thereby preclud-
ing the possibility of paying high prices to a third 
party. Second, pipelines have frequently been subject 
to legal restrictions giving common carrier and/or 
rate regulated status. Common carrier status means 
that all potential users have access to facilities, so 
that a group of oil companies who build a line cannot 
deny access to other users. If access to the pipeline is 
entirely open, markets may develop in which buyers 
who contract ‘space’ on the pipeline can trade their 
space allotments; such active trading can help to keep 
pipeline tariffs more competitive. Rate regulation has 
normally insisted that pipeline tariffs be based directly 
upon shipment costs, and be non-discriminatory 
(i.e., the same rate for the same service). There are 
many disagreements about exactly how this is best 
accomplished.
Both crude oil and natural gas produced in 
Alberta are shipped to markets outside the province 
by pipeline. The much lower density of natural gas, 
and an associated rapid fall in pressure as it moves 
through the line, mean that the cost of moving natural 
gas, per unit of energy content, is significantly higher 
than the cost of moving oil. Therefore, the transporta-
tion component of the delivered energy price becomes 
relatively more important for natural gas relative to 
crude oil the further the market is from the producing 
region. Expressed in other terms, the competitive 
advantage shifts toward oil the further the market is 
from the petroleum-producing region.
2. Refining
Crude oil is rarely consumed by final users. Instead, 
the crude is processed by a refinery into a myriad of 
refined petroleum products (RPPs) to generate an 
array of hydrocarbon products that best meet the 
needs of users.
The basic refining process is distillation in which 
the application of heat to the crude oil vaporizes 
different hydrocarbon constituents at different tem-
peratures, so they can be separated. Subsequently, the 
resulting condensed components, ranging from the 
very light (refinery gases) to the very heavy (asphalt), 
are subject to a variety of other chemical manufactur-
ing processes to generate a wide slate of separate RPPs. 
Any given grade of crude oil (e.g., Alberta light and 
medium blend) will have a particular set of distilla-
tion factors, but there are so many further ‘cracking,’ 
‘reforming’ and other processing techniques available 
that the final RPP mix from any specific grade of 
crude oil is potentially quite flexible. More processing, 
however, involves higher refinery costs. It is techno-
logically possible to build a refinery that could utilize 
almost any particular grade of crude oil to produce 
almost any mix of final RPPs. However, once a refin-
ery is built, without any further capital expenditures 
it can normally accept only a somewhat restricted 
set of grades of crude oil and produce a restricted set 
of RPPs. It will be clear that the refinery investment 
decision is a very complex one, including analysis of 
the availability and cost now and through the future 
of differing grades of crude oil as well as the antici-
pated current and future demands for a large number 
of RPPs.
It is also noteworthy that refineries are subject to 
economies of scale; that is the average cost of refin-
ing a cubic metre of crude oil declines the larger the 
refinery (up to a capacity of about 25,000 m3/d for a 
typical North American refinery with a relatively high 
yield of motor gasoline). Thus small regional markets 
may have few refineries, thereby possibly conveying 
some market power to the refineries in their sales of 
RPPs and their purchases of crude oil. The extent of 
such market power is limited by the possibility of new 
competitive refineries being built, and the possibility 
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of buyers importing RPPs from other regions (or sup-
pliers of crude oil selling their crude to refineries in 
other regions).
Within North America, demand and prices (even 
before retail taxes) have been particularly high for 
relatively lighter RPPs like motor gasoline and avi-
ation fuel. This reflects our affluence, large distances 
between urban centres in North America, and the 
absence of good substitutes for these products. On the 
other hand, heavy RPPs are commonly used for their 
heat content in simple combustion processes where 
natural gas, coal, and even wood will substitute very 
easily. Since the lighter crude gives refineries a higher 
yield of the more valuable RPPs, and/or saves the 
costs of extra equipment needed to obtain a high yield 
of these RPPs, higher API degree crude oils (lighter 
crudes) command a premium over heavier oils. A 
further implication is that the relative values of differ-
ent grades of crude oil (crude oil price differentials) 
will change over time in response to changes in the 
relative supplies of different crude oil grades, changes 
in demand conditions for different RPPs, and changes 
in refining operations and technology.
The price for any RPP depends on the price of 
crude oil in the producing region and the costs of 
crude transportation and refining, as well as the 
many factors affecting demand for the specific RPP. 
Prices vary greatly across RPPs. For example, since 
crude oil can be burned, it is a good substitute for a 
product such as heavy fuel oil (HFO). Thus, to sell 
HFO its price must be lower than that of crude oil. If 
you wonder how HFO (which has a refining cost) can 
have a lower price than the unrefined crude oil from 
which it comes, remember that a refinery is a ‘joint 
product process’ that necessarily produces more than 
just HFO. By analogy, think of the relative values of an 
ore containing gold and of the separated rock and the 
gold dust (Adelman, 1972). The economic requirement 
is that the value of all the refined products together 
must cover the cost of the crude oil and refining, not 
that each RPP must have a price higher than that of 
crude oil.
3. Marketing (Distribution)
RPPs are conveyed to final users in any number of 
ways. Large users like major manufacturing plants 
may be connected to the refinery by pipeline. In 
other instances, the product may be delivered to the 
final user by railcar or truck (e.g., home heating fuel 
deliveries), while in still others the consumer may 
collect the product at a local distribution centre (e.g., 
a service station). Natural gas is inevitably delivered 
to users by pipeline. Usually a local utility company 
performs this service, selling the natural gas to its 
customers, but some large users may purchase their 
gas directly from the trunk pipeline or even the pro-
ducer, bypassing the local utility or paying a transit fee 
to the utility.
It is the marketing segment that finally brings 
the supply side of the petroleum industry into con-
tact with society’s demand for petroleum products. 
Businesses and individuals demand services such as 
warmth or transport or process heat, which must be 
produced by the combination of energy, capital equip-
ment, labour time, and other materials. From this 
perspective, the demand for crude oil (or natural gas) 
is a ‘derived demand’ that depends upon three major 
types of factors:
(i) demand for the basic services that utilize 
energy;
(ii) production technologies and input supplies 
that produce those services within firms, 
governments, households, and other 
enterprises; and
(iii) supply conditions in the transportation, 
refining, and marketing sectors of the 
upstream part of the industry, which are 
necessary to make crude oil usable by 
businesses and households.
C. How Is the Industry Organized?
As just discussed, the petroleum industry involves six 
linked stages that effect the transfer of oil from nat-
urally occurring deposits to final users: exploration, 
development, lifting or extraction, transportation, 
refining, and distribution or marketing. Petroleum 
can be sold at any point along the continuous flow, 
even within any one of the six stages. For example, 
when Petro-Canada purchased the downstream assets 
of BP in Canada, it bought some oil that was partway 
through the refining process. Most petroleum com-
panies exhibit some degree of vertical integration, 
extending over more than one of the six stages. This 
is so customary over exploration, development, and 
production activities that such firms are normally 
labelled crude petroleum producers and are often 
called ‘independents.’ The term ‘integrated’ refers to 
companies that do more than one of crude petroleum 
production, transportation, refining, and marketing. 
Within the Alberta petroleum industry, large vertically 
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integrated companies have been active participants 
from the very beginning, but so have companies that 
have operated at only one level of industry activity.
There are, as a result, a number of different organ-
izational structures used by petroleum firms. Most 
large integrated oil companies, for example, have a 
‘production’ section or department whose responsib-
ility it is to search for and establish a supply of crude 
petroleum that is sufficient for other aspects of the 
company’s operations. There may even be exploration 
subsidiary companies. Whatever the organizational 
set-up, the purpose is to keep the company’s reserve 
situation under constant review, actively bringing 
forward new projects to add to existing reserves, or 
replace depleted reserves, as well as to ensure that 
these reserves are scientifically and economically 
exploited. Which activities are delegated to the pro-
duction arm of a company depends to a large extent 
on the individual circumstances under which a com-
pany operates. For example, the production depart-
ment of a large integrated company, in addition to 
being responsible for the more obvious activities relat-
ing to exploration, development, and extraction, may 
also be in charge of processing the petroleum lifted 
from the wellhead to meet pipeline specifications 
and for arranging transportation of this crude to the 
company’s refinery. A smaller independent production 
company may confine its operations to finding and 
bringing petroleum to the surface. And, since most of 
these smaller firms do not have processing facilities 
of their own, the petroleum is delivered to gathering 
systems (oil) and gas-processing plants for treatment. 
But these processing costs come out of the producer’s 
pocket, and so, even though the company has no 
direct involvement with the processing of the petrol-
eum, this activity can properly be included as part of 
the production process.
Government-owned oil companies, some ver-
tically integrated, have been popular in many parts of 
the world. In the industrialized western world, these 
have generally operated in competition with privately 
owned companies but have been established for a 
variety of reasons. For example, for strategic reasons, 
the government of the UK, in 1913, provided finan-
cing and took over ownership control of the Anglo 
Persian Oil Company (the forefather of BP). Statoil 
in Norway was founded in 1972, and Petro-Canada 
in Canada in 1975, to increase domestic ownership in 
the petroleum industry and to provide a ‘window’ on 
industry activities. (Both BP and Petro-Canada have 
since been privatized.) Some developing nations, for 
example Brazil, have also established state-owned oil 
companies to operate in competition with privately 
owned companies (often with special advantages). 
Many developing countries (for example, most OPEC 
members) have established a government oil company 
(or nationalized private companies) to leave a single 
state oil company in operation.
In conclusion, the consensus would be that all 
activities beginning with initial geological and geo-
physical studies to determine whether there is petrol-
eum underneath the surface up to the stage where the 
oil and gas is to be stored or transported to refiners 
or market should be classified as ‘crude petroleum 
production’ activity. We use this term in the broadest 
sense of the word, for, as we have seen, a more narrow 
interpretation of ‘production’ (also referred to as 
‘extraction’ or ‘lifting’ or ‘operation’) represents only 
the final stage of the crude oil or raw natural gas pro-
duction process, being preceded by exploration and 
development.
It is the crude petroleum production industry, 
so defined, which has been of such significance in 
Alberta. We will not emphasize the specific organiz-
ational structures and decision-making methods that 
various producing companies have utilized. Rather, 
we shall be concerned with the aggregate activities of 
the industry with particular emphasis on the produc-
tion of crude petroleum and the operation of crude 
oil markets. That is, our main interest is the upstream 
industry. However, we do not consider in any detail 
natural gas liquids, natural gas processing, or gather-
ing pipelines.
3. What Are the Economic Aspects of 
the Petroleum Industry?
A. What Is the Economic View?
Obviously analysis of the petroleum industry must be 
based on the physical realities of petroleum produc-
tion and use. However, purely physical factors are an 
insufficient basis for private or social decision-making. 
Deposits of crude oil and natural gas in Canada are 
a natural resource available for human use. Whether 
humankind is broadly defined (‘all people of all gen-
erations’), or more narrowly (‘today’s Albertans’), or 
more narrowly still (‘shareholders in oil companies’), 
the fact remains that the value of the resource is not 
inherent in its physical characteristics but must be 
mediated through people. Economic analysis stresses 
that the production of a resource such as petroleum 
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normally contributes both positive and negative effects 
to the parties concerned. There are costs involved in 
devoting effort to the production of oil and in deplet-
ing nature’s stock, but the consumption of oil gener-
ates beneficial work or products. It is a presumption 
of most economic analysis that decision-makers are 
interested in deriving the maximum ‘efficiency’ from 
energy resources, where economic efficiency, in its 
broadest sense, means maximizing the excess of the 
benefits of resource use over the costs. 
In this book we shall consider petroleum invest-
ment, production, and consumption from two points 
of view, the ‘private’ and the ‘social.’ The ‘private’ view 
is that of specific oil companies or consumers who 
make decisions about the utilization of Alberta’s pet-
roleum resources and whose activities are mediated 
through the operation of economic markets. The basic 
simplifying assumption is that these decision-makers 
evaluate benefits and costs from a ‘private’ perspec-
tive, seeking to gain the maximum net benefits for 
themselves. Companies producing crude petroleum, 
for instance, are generally understood to be trying 
to maximize the profits received from their activ-
ities. Economists would not claim this as an accurate 
description of the behaviour of every decision of every 
private decision-maker, but it is a useful working 
assumption that usually leads to relatively accurate 
depictions of individual transactions and aggregate 
behaviour in economic markets.
From a ‘social’ perspective, we will be largely 
concerned with assessing the desirability of certain 
public policies. We will assume that government 
decision-makers assess social efficiency with a view 
of benefits and costs that reflects the overall interests 
of the society they represent, not just private inter-
ests. Many differing definitions of social or economic 
efficiency are possible since different value systems or 
criteria exist and each would define social benefit and 
social cost within its own framework. Despite this, 
many economists have found one particular definition 
of social efficiency to be useful in policy analysis, in 
part because it leads to a concept of benefit and cost 
that is often readily measurable, but also because it 
derives from a particular value system that appears to 
enjoy wide acceptance. This view of efficiency assumes 
that social benefits and costs are equal to the net sum 
of the dollar values all individuals in society associate 
with the benefits (positive) and costs (negative) that 
they perceive. The approach is, therefore, individualis-
tic rather than paternalistic; the measuring rod for the 
intensity of feeling of the individual is his or her ‘will-
ingness to pay’ (that is, a particular dollar value). If, on 
balance, an energy policy measure generates a positive 
aggregate dollar sum of social benefits less social costs, 
it is judged by the social efficiency criterion to be a 
desirable policy.
It is important to realize that benefits and cost 
in the efficiency criterion are measured by reference 
to all members of society, irrespective of whether 
they are directly involved in the production and con-
sumption of the product. One implication is that the 
social costs of petroleum may exceed the private cost 
to the individual oil company, for example, if there 
are environmental costs associated with production. 
Similarly private benefits of oil use to consumers 
may understate social benefits, for example, if there 
are national security benefits. This view of economic 
efficiency is controversial, and those who advocate its 
usefulness are generally careful to assert that it is only 
one of the objectives that social decision-makers may 
view as relevant. Often, for instance, the distribution 
of benefits and costs, as well as their net sum, matters. 
Moreover, there are conceptual ambiguities in meas-
uring benefits and costs (Blackorby and Donaldson, 
1990) as well as major practical difficulties in meas-
urement and implementing policies based on eco-
nomic efficiency.
There are also purely physical (thermodynamic) 
definitions of the efficiency of energy use. In the eyes 
of the economist, such measures of efficiency are an 
insufficient basis for social decision-making since 
they abstract from the values that people place on 
energy and its production (Berndt, 1977), whereas the 




If we adopt the private firms’ perspective for the 
moment, the largely physical definition of economic 
activity in the earlier part of this chapter can be 
translated into the necessity of undertaking dollar 
expenditures (costs) in order to receive dollar rev-
enues (benefits). The various stages of industry activ-
ity, then, are perceived not so much in terms of the 
physical activities performed as by the expenditures 
(on capital, labour, energy, materials, land, and taxes) 
and the sales receipts that result. The critical role of 
economics to industry behaviour cannot be denied. 
A strong expectation that petroleum deposits exist 
in nature in a region will not generate exploratory 
activity unless companies anticipate a positive net 
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return after tax from their actions. The clear presence 
of crude oil in an exploratory well core will not guar-
antee development unless anticipated revenues will 
exceed the expenses needed to develop and lift the oil. 
A positive petroleum flow rate from an established 
well will not normally be allowed by a company unless 
the revenues from the oil are high enough to cover 
the operating costs of the well (including royalties 
and taxes). In this manner, all the important physical 
attributes of the industry generate economic effects 
that decision-makers will consider.
While the physical realities of petroleum pro-
duction will generate economic implications for 
those parties producing petroleum, it is difficult for 
the external economic analyst to examine the activ-
ity of individual decision-makers. In most cases, 
whether the purpose is descriptive or normative (i.e., 
policy generation), economic analysis provides a 
simplified view of petroleum industry activities, but 
one that captures the essence of what is occurring. 
Simplification is necessary in part because of data 
limitations, since accurate statistics on all specific 
transactions are not available. More fundamentally, 
however, there are so many complex individual 
actions that they could not possibly be considered in a 
single analysis. Instead, simplified ‘models’ of petrol-
eum industry activity are necessary.
The joint product nature of the industry generates 
particular problems for the analyst. As mentioned 
above, a joint production process is one in which a 
particular activity necessarily generates more than 
a single output, so that the markets for the products 
are linked (at least on the supply side). For example, a 
petroleum refinery produces an entire slate of separate 
RPPs. An exploratory well generates some general 
geologic knowledge applicable to other drilling sites, 
specific knowledge about this site, some estimated 
petroleum reserves (if it is successful), and some 
equipment that is utilizable in lifting oil to the surface. 
The fluids lifted through a petroleum well include 
a mix of products (hydrocarbons such as crude oil 
and natural gas, and non-hydrocarbons such as 
sulphur).
Some analysts try to handle the joint product 
problem by combining the different outputs into a 
single product. For example, natural gas discoveries 
can be converted to ‘volumes of oil equivalent’ by 
assuming some equivalency factor. Relative energy 
content (about 6Mcf of gas per barrel of oil) or rela-
tive market values are often used, but there is no 
obviously correct conversion factor because oil and 
natural gas have separate and non-interchangeable 
markets, reflecting the fact that the two products are 
far from perfect substitutes in use. Another approach 

















































Figure 1.1 Types of Petroleum
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is to divide the exploratory effort between the different 
products; for example, the proportion of total discov-
eries that are oil, or the percentage of total successful 
well metres drilled that was in oil discoveries, might 
be used. The important point is that there is no cor-
rect way to combine outputs or separate inputs in a 
joint product process. Any attempt to do so leads to 
economic fictions. However, analysis is made immeas-
urably more complicated if one must build economic 
models that always include all inputs and all outputs 
of the joint product activity. As is invariably the case, 
the economist must balance the costs of a theoretic-
ally more complex but realistic model against the 
benefits of unrealistic simplification. Increasingly, 
there is acceptance of the necessity of facing up to the 
joint product nature of petroleum industry activities 
and rejecting attempts to avoid it by combining two 
distinct products into one, or artificially separating a 
single activity into two.
4. Conclusion
Our introductory chapter concludes with three sum-
mary depictions of the petroleum industry.
Figure 1.1 sets out the main physical products the 
petroleum industry generates, divided into liquid and 
Table 1.1: Petroleum Industry Activities: Physical and Economic Aspects
 Physical Activities Economic Activities (oil)
 Stage Description Final Product Costs (Inputs)(b)	 Benefits	(Output)(c)
1. Exploration(a) Geological and Geophysical Knowledge of presence Costs of K, L, E, M; T Price of Undeveloped 
  (G&G) surveys; Exploratory or absence of petroleum-  reserves 
 drilling bearing geologic formations  Price of G&G data
2. Development(a) Installation of Production  Established reserves; Linkage: undeveloped Price of developed 
	 Facilities;	Extension	and	Infill	 productive	capacity	 reserves	 reserves 
 drilling; EOR; Pumps, Gathering  Costs of K, L, E, M; T 
 lines and separation  
 equipment; Gas plants
3. Production(a) Bringing petroleum to surface Crude oil (and natural Linkage: developed Price of crude oil, f.o.b., 
(Extraction or separation of products; gas gas, NGLs, sulphur) at input reserves  in producing region 
Lifting or  plant processing; shipment terminal of main pipeline Costs of K, L, E, M; T 
Operation) to regional gathering or transportation facility 
 location
4. Transportation Movement of petroleum  Crude oil at border or at Linkage: Crude oil, f.o.b. Price of crude oil, c.i.f., 
	 from	producing	region	to		 refinery	gate;	natural	gas	 Costs	of	K,	L,	E,	M;	T	 at	refinery	gate 
 export point or city gate  at border or delivered to 
	 (gas)	or	refinery	gate	(oil)	 distributor
5.	 Refining	 Distillation,	catalytic	processing	 RRPs	(gasoline,	kerosene,	 Linkage:	Crude	oil	at	 Prices	of	RPPs 
	 etc.	of	crude	oil	into	refined	 fuel	oil,	etc.)	at	refinery	 refinery	gate	 at	refinery	gate 
 petroleum products (RPPs) gate Costs of K, L, E, M; T
6. Marketing Conveyance of RPPs and RRPs and natural gas Linkage: RPPs at Prices of delivered RPPs 
(Distribution)	 natural	gas	to	final	users	 at	point	of	final	sale	 refinery	gate 
   Costs of K, L, E, M; T
Notes: (a) Exploration development and production together make up the crude petroleum industry, or petroleum upstream industry.
 (b) K, L, E, M, are the services of capital, labour, energy, and materials used in production processes. T represents royalties, taxes and land payments. f.o.b. 
means ‘free on board’, before shipment costs.
	 (c)	 Unit	benefits	(prices)	have	been	shown;	total	benefits	or	values	are	the	price	multiplied	by	the	quantity	of	output;	c.i.f.	means	‘cost,	insurance,	freight’,	
that is, after shipment costs.
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gaseous products including those drawn directly from 
nature and ‘synthetic’ petroleum and RPPs that are 
not immediate natural resources. Petroleum drawn 
directly from nature includes ‘conventional’ oil and 
natural gas, which are drawn from deposits where 
some of the petroleum flows to the surface through 
wells drilled into the deposit; this is the traditional 
(‘conventional’) way of producing petroleum. Non-
conventional crude oil comes from oil sands and oil 
shale deposits holding such heavy, viscous oil that 
none will naturally flow to the surface through a well, 
so ‘non-conventional’ production techniques must be 
used. Synthetic oils are liquid hydrocarbons generated 
from some other natural resource such as coal or bio-
mass. Historically, almost all of the world’s petroleum 
has come from conventional crude oil, natural gas, 
and natural gas liquids. This book will focus on con-
ventional crude and natural gas, which have been the 
mainstay of the Alberta petroleum industry. Alberta 
is one of the few areas in the world with significant 
non-conventional oil production from its oil sands, so 
we also incorporate this resource.
Table 1.1 provides an overview of physical and 
economic views of the six stages of petroleum produc-
tion, including physical descriptions of the activities 
and output of each stage and brief summaries of the 
economic costs and benefits to private decision-mak-
ers. Exactly how an oil company perceives the costs 
and benefits will differ depending on whether the 
company is vertically integrated or not. A vertically 
integrated company absorbs all the costs involved in 
the various physical stages of activity but generates 
benefits only at the downstream stage where sales 
occur. In the table, we have made some allowance for 
this by indicating at each stage a ‘linkage cost’ that ties 
this stage to the one just upstream. For a vertically 
integrated firm, the linkage cost is the costs of the 
previous upstream activities, while for a non-vertically 
integrated firm it is the sales price of the output of 










































Figure 1.2 Petroleum in the 
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integrated firms are never perfectly ‘in balance’ 
throughout all stages of petroleum industry activity; 
they will buy or sell some oil at most stages of activity.
Figure 1.2 is a flowchart that sets the activities of 
the petroleum industry within the larger economic 
system. The entire economic system is indicated by 
the large rectangular box, with the (unknown) natural 
endowment of petroleum deposits situated outside 
(1). The six stages of petroleum industry activity are 
shown (2 to 7), as is refined petroleum product (RPPs) 
demand by households (8) or business and other 
enterprises including government (9). The business 
demand for petroleum products derives from the 
production of goods and services, which is in turn 
derived from the household demand for goods and 
services other than petroleum products (10). Some 
indication of aggregate economic effects of the pet-
roleum industry (the “macroeconomic” effects) can 
be seen in the box showing the labour market (11). 
The six stages of petroleum production serve, along 
with other businesses, as a source of demand for the 
labour services of households. Similarly, although it 
is not shown in Figure 1.2, the petroleum industry 
demands the goods and services (capital, material, and 
other energy products) produced by businesses. The 
more active is the petroleum industry, the higher these 
demands. Finally, all those activities from exploration 
through to final consumption involve the ejection of 
waste heat and matter (12) back into the environment.
Chapter Two provides an overview of the Alberta 
petroleum industry, illustrating how the stages of 
industry activity developed there from 1950 to 2010, 
and introducing our theme of ‘petropolitics’ in the 
form of questions about the role of government in 
regulating the industry.
Readers’ Guide: Chapter Two provides a bridge from 
the discussion in Chapter One of what the petroleum 
industry does to the substantive description of the 
crude petroleum industry in Alberta, which occupies 
the remainder of this book. In this chapter we illus-
trate industry activity in Alberta for select years from 
1950 through 2010. We also introduce the concept of 
‘petropolitics,’ as we set out possible reasons for, and 
forms of, government regulation. Finally, we touch 
on some aspects of Alberta industry activities down-
stream from the crude petroleum phase, which will 
not be dealt with in this volume.
1. Introduction
Contrasts are often suggested between the neighbour-
ing prairie provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan; 
the Albertan may regard Saskatchewan with a certain 
old-fashioned nostalgia, and the Saskatchewan resi-
dent may be drawn to Alberta’s dynamic multifaceted 
society. These images probably speak more of stereo-
typical simplification than reality, but they do draw 
attention to differences in the economic history of the 
two provinces.
In 1946 Alberta’s population was 800,000, 
Saskatchewan’s 830,000. By 2013 Saskatchewan’s 
population had grown to just over 1,000,000, while 
Alberta’s was approaching 3,900,000. Before 1946, 
both provinces had been molded primarily by the 
wheat boom early in the century and their agricultural 
resources. Both economies have diversified since the 
end of World War II, but it is hard to avoid the conclu-
sion that development of Alberta’s oil and gas industry 
lies at the foundation of a coherent explanation of the 
very different provincial growth paths. Alberta’s pet-
roleum resources, especially crude oil, provided the 
base for a classic natural resource boom: strong export 
markets for oil and, later on, natural gas attracted 
new capital investment to the industry, and drew 
immigrants. The influx of people, plus backward and 
forward linkages from the crude petroleum industry 
into input supply and transmission and processing 
industries, generated further investment spending, 
especially in construction. The financial and service 
sectors expanded and government coffers swelled.
This chapter follows up on Chapter One’s gen-
eral review of the petroleum industry by providing 
a broad overview of the activities of the industry in 
Alberta. We illustrate how the industry’s activities 
evolved from 1945 to the present and set out the major 
policy decisions faced by corporations and govern-
ments. We will begin by looking at the position of the 
Alberta petroleum industry in 1946, just prior to the 
start of the ‘Oil Boom.’ We then provide preliminary 
information on the operation of the six stages of the 
petroleum industry in Alberta. Subsequent chapters 
in this book will explore in greater detail a number of 
the issues introduced here with regard to the Alberta 
crude petroleum industry.
CHAPTER TWO
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2. Before the Boom: 1946
The embryo of an active petroleum industry was 
well-established in Alberta by 1946. Geological poten-
tial had long been recognized. Rocks of the Canadian 
Shield lie exposed in the North East corner of the 
province, and the Rockies run along the southwest 
border, but 90 per cent of Alberta’s 662,000 square 
kilometres is overlain with sedimentary strata, part 
of the extensive central North American sedimentary 
basin that runs from the Mackenzie River delta south 
to the long-established petroleum producing fields 
of Texas and Louisiana. Tangible evidence of petrol-
eum was familiar to members of the First Nations 
and immigrant settlers, exemplified by natural gas 
seepages near Waterton and surface crude showings 
along the shores of the Athabasca River near Fort 
McMurray. Commercial natural gas production had 
begun late in the 1800s, after a water-directed well hit 
a shallow natural gas deposit near Medicine Hat, and 
at least three commercial petroleum booms had been 
stimulated by discoveries in the prolific Turner Valley 
field, southwest of Calgary. A small, shallow, Lower 
Cretaceous pool of wet gas, laced with light crude, was 
discovered just before World War I; in 1924, a deeper 
wet gas pool (in the Mississippian Rundle formation) 
came in; and a large, deeper oil pool in the Rundle 
formation was tapped in 1936. A provincial oil and gas 
conservation board was established in 1938 with regu-
latory powers over the industry. Oil output, mainly 
from Turner Valley, grew in the early years of the 
Second World War, peaking in 1942.
Other small exploratory successes occurred 
during the 1930s and 1940s, but Alberta’s potential as a 
major oil producer was in doubt. Many communities, 
including Edmonton and Calgary, were connected to 
local natural gas supplies, but Alberta, by 1946, was a 
net importer of crude oil and refined petroleum prod-
ucts. Most of the major North American oil explora-
tion companies were becoming disenchanted. Then, in 
February 1947, a crew drilling one of the last explora-
tory wells that Imperial Oil planned for Alberta struck 
Table 2.1: Selected Statistics for the Alberta Crude Oil Industry
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1 Petroleum and Natural Gas Leases outstanding (103 acres) 4,410 30,004 46,348 60,807 65,550 81,706 87,898*
2 Western Canada Survey Crew Months 1495 632 936 n/a n/a n/a n/a
3 Net G&G Expenditures 106 current $ 24.5 33.0 80.3 452.3 452.0 824.1 716.1
4 Net G&G Expenditures 106 1990$ 160.1 164.2 292.0 739.1 452.0 695.4 488.8
5 Number of Exploratory Wells 224 403 963 2,623 2,286 3,114 799
6 Exploratory Drilling Expenditures 106 current $ 11.0 44.0 83.8 1,621.6 950.2 2,364.8 2,145.2
7 Exploratory Drilling Expenditures 106 1990$ 71.9 218.9 304.7 2,469.7 950.2 1,995.6 1,464.3
8 Initial Oil Reserves Discovered 103 m3 81,809 11,910 9,439 29,357 12,990 11,842 735*
9 Initial Gas Reserves Discovered 106 m3 31,616 126,337 24,004 135,545 32,177 53,884 5,079*
10 Oil Discoveries per Exploratory Well 103 m3 366 30 4 11 6 4 1.8
11 Gas Discoveries per Exploratory Well 106 m3 141 313 25 52 14 17 11.4
12 Exploration Success Ratio .25 .33 .25 .61 .53 .79 .84
13 Oil as % of Exploration Successes 62 31 23 23 32 19 42
14 Initial Established Conventional Oil Reserves 106 m3 174.8 711.6 1,734.3 1,913.2 2,256.1 2,534.4 2,829.7
15 Remaining Established Conventional Oil Reserves 106 m3 152.6 525.0 1,207.9 719.9 510.4 291.4 236.9
16 Initial Established Gas Reserves 109 m3 146.8 935.9 1,593.2 2,647.1 3,286.8 4,063.5 5,213.5
17 Remaining Established Gas Reserves 109 m3 129.0 926.8 1,352.0 1,812.1 1,694.1 1,210.7 991.4
18 Number of Development Wells 788 1,363 884 4,425 1,969 8,953 7,103
19 Development Success Ratio .94 .83 .76 .88 .81 .94 .95
20 Oil as % of Development Successes 97 84 37 31 55 35 49
21 Development Expenditures 106 current $ 67.5 165.0 327.7 2,340.7 2,566.7 8,105.6 15,600.3
22 Development Expenditures 106 1990$ 441.2 820.9 1,191.5 3,824.7 2,566.7 6,840.2 10,648.5 
23 Conventional Oil Output 106 m3 4.3 20.8 52.4 63.2 53.0 43.5 26.6
24 Oil Sands and Bitumen Output 106 m3 0 0 1.9 8.0 19.9 35.3 84.7
/continued
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oil in upper Devonian rock (the D-2 formation). A 
neighbouring ‘stepout’ well proved disappointing in 
the D-2 formation but was extended deeper in May, 
with good production flow from the D-3 formation. 
The Leduc success, following over 130 Imperial dry 
holes, marked the start of the Alberta oil boom.
3. Alberta’s Upstream Petroleum 
Industry
A. Exploration
Exploratory activities, as discussed in Chapter One, 
include land (mineral rights) acquisition, geological 
and geophysical (G&G) prospecting, and exploratory 
drilling.
1. Land Acquisition
The legal right to explore for, develop, and produce 
petroleum must be acquired by petroleum companies 
from the owner of the mineral rights. The mineral 
rights on more than four-fifths (81%) of Alberta’s area 
are held by the provincial government (‘Crown land’); 
the federal government holds another 9 per cent, on 
Indian reserves and, primarily, in National Parks; the 
remaining 10 per cent is held by private individuals 
and companies as ‘freehold’ rights on land issued to 
the Hudson’s Bay Company, railroads, or homestead-
ers prior to 1887 (Alberta Department of Mines and 
Minerals, April 1972). Petroleum companies typically 
lease below-the-ground mineral rights from owners 
of mineral rights for a specified period of time, or as 
long as petroleum production might occur. In return, 
the original mineral rights owner is compensated, 
often with a lump sum bonus payment when the deal 
is signed, an annual rental, and a royalty out of any 
petroleum revenues. Companies must also obtain the 
right to the use of the surface of the land for purposes 
of exploration and production facilities.
Table 2.1 shows companies’ holdings of Alberta 
Crown leases in selected years since 1946. (To illus-
trate the development of the industry in Alberta, 
this chapter includes data on the industry at ten-year 
Table 2.1/continued
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
25 Marketed Gas Output 109 m3 1.4 9.1 42.9 62.1 84.6 142.2 112.8
26 Field Operating Expenditures 106 $ 10.5 55.5 119.4 950.7 3,604.6 4,832.4 10,055.1
27 Field Operating Expenditures 106 1990$ 68.6 276.1 434.2 1,553.4 3,604.6 4,078.0 6,863.5
28 Total Operating Expenditures 106 $ 16.5 92.0 219.5 1,679.2 4,445.4 5,751.2 12,097.6
29 Total Operating Expenditures 106 1990$ 107.8 457.7 798.2 2,743.8 4,445.4 4,853.2 8,257.7
30 Oil R/P Ratio 35.4 24.9 23.2 11.3 9.6 6.7 8.9
31 Gas R/P Ratio 88.0 96.2 31.9 29.2 20.0 8.5 8.8
32 Conventional Crude Revenue 106 $ 80.6 318.4 844.1 6,185.1 8,209.9 10,756.8 12,302.5
33 Gas revenue 106 $ 2.9 31.3 243.9 5,121.1 4,667.0 23,091.1 15,564.7
34 Oil Sands Revenue 106 $ 0 0 32.8 1,676.7 2,799.4 8,044.4 36,690.0
35 Oil Average Sales Revenue $/m3 18.74 15.09 16.07 97.69 154.61 244.72 450.07
36 Oil Average Sales Revenue 1990$/m3 122.48 75.07 58.44 159.62 154.61 208.68 307.48
37 Gas Average Sales Revenue $/m3 2.04 3.46 5.69 82.51 55.18 162.34 137.98
38 Gas Average Sales Revenue 1990$/m3 13.33 17.21 20.69 134.82 55.18 137.00 97.50
39 Gas Price Relative to Oil (energy content basis) 0.11 0.23 0.36 0.85 0.36 0.66 0.29
Sources and Notes: 
*2009 is the last year for which data is available.
Row	2:	Values	are	for	the	end	of	the	fiscal	year	(March	31)	except	for	2000	and	2009,	which	are	as	of	December	31.	From	Annual Reports of the relevant Alberta govern-
ment department (Mines and Minerals, Energy and Natural Resources and Energy); 2000 and 2009 from Dianne Johnston, Department of Energy.
Rows 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 22, 24, 25 26, 27, 29, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38: CAPP Statistical Handbook.
Rows 6, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21: ERCB Reserves Report ST-98.
Rows not mentioned are calculated by the authors.
The	Canadian	GDP	price	deflator	was	used	to	calculate	1990	real	dollar	values.
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intervals, commencing in 1950). Oil companies must 
hold leases on the land before producing oil. In addi-
tion, a variety of reservations permits and licences 
have been issued to allow exploration and were par-
tially or wholly convertible into production leases. By 
the 1980s most mineral rights were issued in the form 
of leases. The total amount of land held under some 
form of permit rose sharply after 1950 as unexplored 
parts of the province became of interest to compan-
ies and as leases above discoveries were retained to 
allow production. Companies allow rights to lapse on 
explored plots that do not appear to be economically 
productive, thereby saving rental payments. As the 
industry matures, the total area held in mineral rights 
can be expected to level out and eventually decline. 
This has not yet become apparent in Alberta, although 
land acquisition appears to have become more focused 
on natural gas and oil sands prospects than on con-
ventional crude oil.
2. Geophysical and Geological (G&G) Surveys
As was discussed in Chapter One, G&G surveys pre-
cede costly exploratory drilling, in order to locate the 
most promising drill sites. Table 2.1 includes measures 
of such exploratory effort for select years.
Unfortunately, consistent data on crew months 
is available only to the 1960s. For 1950 and 1960 we 
report the number of months of effort during the 
year by petroleum survey teams in Western Canada 
(mostly in Alberta). There has been significant 
knowledge growth and technological change in G&G 
activities, especially from the mid-1980s, with the 
development of new computer techniques including 
3-D and 4-D seismic surveys. As a result, a crew month 
in the year 2010 was more productive than in the year 
1950. Surveys occur early in the life-cycle of industry 
activity, as low-cost information gathering. However, 
G&G work will continue, and even grow in later per-
iods, as new areas or deeper formations become of 
interest, as new companies commence exploration 
and undertake their own surveys, and as growing 
scientific knowledge develops new G&G techniques or 
interpretations.
Table 2.1 also includes data on G&G expenditures 
in Alberta, both in current (nominal or ‘as-spent’) 
dollars and in dollars of 1990 general purchasing 
power (‘real 1990 dollars’); the latter shows the size 
of expenditures after allowance is made for general 
inflation, therefore showing changes in expenditure 
by this sector in terms of general purchasing power 
in the economy. From an economic perspective, 
the real expenditures are of most interest, since an 
increase in expenditures simply because price levels 
have been rising would be quite misleading. Nominal 
G&G spending tended to increase over the years. Real 
spending does not show a clear trend across time, 
presumably reflecting factors such as varying real 
oil and gas prices, changing views about exploratory 
prospects and different government policies.
Note that choice of the ‘correct’ adjustment for 
inflation is difficult. There is some ambiguity about 
the meaning of the concept of ‘real’ expenditures. We 
may intend it to refer to the activity undertaken by 
this sector of the economy, or what we might call the 
‘quantity of effort expended.’ In this case one would 
wish to adjust current dollar expenditures by a price 
index specific to the activities of this sector. However, 
such detailed price indices are not readily available, 
so it is generally necessary to rely on a broader price 
index. It would also be desirable to modify expendi-
tures to reflect technological (quality) improvements, 
but this is hard to do. Alternatively, real expenditures 
might refer to purchasing power in the economy 
at large, that is, what quantity of goods ‘in general’ 
could be bought by the expenditures of this sector. In 
this case, the adjustment index should be a general 
price index such as the Canadian GDP price deflator. 
However, there are different inflation rates across 
regions, and differently defined ‘reference bundles’ 
of goods, so that a number of general price indices 
are available. In a relatively open economy such as 
Canada’s, the longer-term trends in broadly defined 
price indices are much the same, but this is not neces-
sarily true for narrow indices, such as for one specific 
economic activity.
3. Exploratory Drilling
In Chapter One we said that exploratory wells gener-
ate two main products: geological knowledge (which 
is normally generalizable beyond the specific drill site) 
and petroleum discoveries. Most exploratory wells, 
particularly ‘wildcat’ wells located some distance from 
previously discovered pools, are ‘dry,’ not recording a 
commercial find.
Knowledge is particularly important for the initial 
wells drilled in a geographical area or through par-
ticular geological formations. The first exploratory 
well to discover a large pool in an entirely new forma-
tion is particularly productive for both knowledge and 
petroleum; significant examples in Alberta include 
Imperial Oil Leduc No. 1 in 1947; which, as noted 
above, signalled the beginnings of Alberta as a major 
crude oil producer, Socony Seaboard Pembina No. 1 
in 1953; and Banff-Acquitaine Rainbow West in 1965. 
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Each of these defined a new geological ‘play,’ and set 
off a major surge in exploratory activity and oil dis-
coveries in Alberta.
Table 2.1 shows petroleum industry explora-
tory drilling activity, including the total number of 
exploratory wells drilled, the oil and gas reserves 
discovered, the exploration drilling success rate, 
and current and real (constant) dollar exploration 
expenditures. Another measure of exploratory activity 
is the total exploratory drilling footage in a particular 
year; we have not included this variable. In models 
and descriptions of exploration, exploratory drilling 
effort is variously measured as the number of wells 
drilled, the total exploratory footage drilled, and the 
real expenditures on exploratory drilling. These meas-
ures are correlated with one another, but not perfectly. 
Thus, technological improvements might allow the 
same number of wells or footage to be drilled at a 
lower real expenditure; fewer wells might be drilled, 
but footage and expenditures increase if the average 
depth of wells rises. From a modeling perspective, dif-
ferent results might be attained in the same empirical 
model, depending upon which measure of exploration 
effort is used.
Reserves are volumes of petroleum known with 
a relatively high degree of certainty to be recoverable 
under current economic and technological condi-
tions. The reserves reported in Table 2.1 are estimates 
made in the year 2009 of the size of reserves discov-
ered in past years, that is, initial reserves (before any 
production) as reported in the discovery year and as 
‘appreciated’ or revised since then. In this appreciation 
process, reserve additions reported in any year for 
an oil pool or gas reservoir are credited back in time 
to the year in which the pool was discovered. As was 
reported in Chapter One, most reserves are credited 
due to development activities (‘extension’ or ‘outpost’ 
wells) in years after the pool is discovered. Pools dis-
covered in 2000 and 2009 have had fewer years for 
such appreciation to occur, so reserves discovered 
may be understated relative to earlier years. The suc-
cess rate is the proportion of exploratory wells that 
discovered oil or gas pools. As can be seen in Table 
2.1, there are much higher success ratios for the years 
shown after 1980. This could reflect a number of fac-
tors, such as a fall in the proportion of wildcat wells, 
improved technology allowing increased efficiency in 
selecting drilling sites, and more emphasis on outpost 
drilling in natural gas pools. Table 2.1 shows that dis-
coveries tended to shift towards natural gas over the 
fifty-year period, although relatively low gas prices 
near the end of the period led to renewed oil-directed 
exploration.
Year-to-year data show large fluctuations in the 
industry’s exploratory drilling activity in Alberta. The 
general trend was upwards, at least until the early 
1980s, as Table 2.1 suggests. Exploratory drilling fell 
off in the 1980s, but then picked up again by the year 
2000, although real expenditures were still smaller 
than in 1980. The cyclical variations reflect mainly the 
succession of new petroleum plays, the variability of 
oil and gas price expectations and changes in govern-
ment tax and other regulations. The incentive to drill 
and obtain general geologic information tends to be 
strongest in the early years of industry activity, as is 
true of G&G work. However, the number of specific 
drilling sites in Alberta is very large, so, for many 
years, new knowledge and any increases in price, or 
cost-reducing technological improvements, will tend 
to make a significant number of new potential drilling 
locations attractive. As Table 2.1 makes clear, these 
new drilling sites have become less and less product-
ive, as shown by the decline in the volume of reserves 
discovered per exploratory well drilled, although the 
decline would be smaller if more recent finds were 
adjusted to allow for future reserve appreciation. This 
falling finding rate typifies what many economists call 
a ‘stock’ or ‘degradation’ effect: as the stock of undis-
covered resources in a given geological play becomes 
smaller, new discoveries require more effort (i.e., tend 
to become more costly). In short, diminishing returns 
emerge. Table 2.1 suggests that the degradation effect 
has not operated in Alberta through deposits becom-
ing harder to find (the success rate has not shown a 
persistent tendency to fall); rather, discoveries have 
been becoming much smaller on average. Table 2.1 
also suggests that discoveries have tended to shift 
towards natural gas, as oil productivity has declined, 
and as natural gas markets have grown.
The reserves per well drilled in Table 2.1 are only 
roughly indicative because petroleum exploration is 
a joint-product process. The industry’s exploratory 
drilling produces: (1) knowledge, (2) oil discoveries, 
and (3) gas discoveries. It is impossible to specify what 
proportion of the total wells drilled was necessary to 
produce, separately, any one of these three products. 
One of the three may have been dominant in the mind 
of the company drilling, but we rarely have access to 
this information.
B. Development
Recall, from Chapter One, that development activ-
ities by the petroleum industry are concerned with 
‘proving up’ reserves (by demonstrating the existence 
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beneath the surface of commercially recoverable pet-
roleum volumes) and providing productive capacity 
that can be used to lift oil, that is by installing such 
capital equipment as completed wells, enhanced oil 
recovery (EOR) injection facilities, water disposal 
wells, and gathering and separation equipment.
While exploration is necessary to locate oil pools, 
most oil reserves (except in very small deposits) are 
added through development activities, particularly 
extension drilling and EOR investments. Historical 
experience in Alberta suggests that the amount even-
tually recovered from a typical oil pool (excluding the 
smallest ones) will be on the order of nine times the 
reserves estimated to be present on the basis of the 
discovery well (four times for gas). More accurately, 
ultimate oil recovery will be nine times the first year’s 
estimate of recovery.
Table 2.1 shows how total initial Alberta petroleum 
reserves have grown over time. Initial reserves are all 
those that have been discovered in the province up to 
the date shown and consist of the remaining reserves 
in that year plus past production. Since production 
continually depletes reserves, remaining established 
reserves are less than initial reserves. If total (‘gross’) 
reserves additions in a year exceed production in that 
year, remaining established reserves will rise, showing 
positive net reserves additions. Conversely, if pro-
duction exceeds gross additions, net additions will be 
negative and remaining established reserves will fall. It 
can be seen that gross additions exceeded production 
for natural gas through 1980. Remaining established 
reserves for oil went into decline earlier.
Table 2.1 also provides an historical review of 
development drilling and development expenditures 
in Alberta since the Leduc discovery. As would be 
expected, the success rate is much higher for develop-
ment than for exploration wells. The dominance of 
oil in the early decades of this industry’s growth is 
evident, as is the increased importance of natural gas 
since 1960. As with exploratory expenditures, there 
was a peak in real expenditures in the early 1980s, 
followed by a decline. However, in the 1990s nominal 
development expenditures rose markedly, and, unlike 
for exploration, real expenditures were higher in the 
years 2000 and 2010 than in 1980.
C. Lifting (Operation or Extraction)
Table 2.1 indicates how Alberta oil and gas production 
and operating expenditures have changed since 1950. 
As was discussed in Chapter One, output in any year 
reflects underlying natural conditions (e.g., volumes 
of oil in developed pools and reservoir characteris-
tics), physical capital constraints (developed capaci-
ties of wells, gathering, separation and transmission 
equipment), market conditions (demand and prices) 
and government regulations (taxes, output controls, 
export restrictions).
Production has tended to follow levels of remain-
ing established reserves, with natural gas output 
generally rising from 1950 to 2000, while conven-
tional crude production increased to the mid-1970s, 
then levelled out and fell. Production changes have 
reflected both changes in the level of reserves and 
also the intensity with which reserves are used, as 
indicated by the R/P ratio, which shows end of year 
remaining reserves divided by annual production. As 
can be seen in Table 2.1, the R/P ratios for conven-
tional oil and natural gas have both fallen. Oil sands 
production commenced in the late 1960s and has risen 
throughout the period, as plant expansion and new 
projects occurred. By 2010, oil sands and bitumen 
output significantly exceeded conventional oil produc-
tion. Nominal and real operating expenditures have 
risen throughout the period, reflecting in part, output 
increases. In addition, unit costs have risen as oil dis-
coveries have tended to become smaller, and output 
rates have fallen due to production decline in reser-
voirs. Also, in many pools the water to oil ratio rises 
over time, so water disposal costs increase.
The nominal sales value of Alberta petroleum 
output has risen dramatically over time, as illustrated 
in Table 2.1, partly due to output increases. In addi-
tion, beginning in the early 1970s petroleum prices 
increased very markedly. But, after the mid-1980s, 
prices declined again, especially for natural gas. 
During the 1990s, natural gas revenues surpassed 
conventional crude oil revenues for the first time, 
and by 2010 oil sands revenue exceeded that from 
natural gas. Alberta oil and gas prices (as shown by 
the average sales revenue figures in Table 2.1) have 
been affected most strongly by two factors: (1) inter-
national oil prices, which directly affect the value of 
oil everywhere in the world and influence the price 
of other energy products, such as natural gas, and 
(2) government regulations, particularly restrictions 
on international trade (which break the direct link 
with international prices) and direct price control 
regulations. Natural gas prices in Alberta have gener-
ally been well below oil prices on an energy-content 
basis, mainly reflecting the higher costs of shipping 
energy to markets in the form of natural gas. An 
exception to this was during the mid-1970s to mid-
1980s, when oil and natural gas prices were fixed by 
Canadian governments; these regulations will be 
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discussed in Chapters Nine and Twelve. In the mid-
1980s, crude oil and natural gas markets were deregu-
lated and became subject to the interplay of market 
forces, exhibiting significant instability, so there has 
been considerable year-to-year variation in industry 
revenue. The late 1990s saw the relative value of nat-
ural gas increasing again as Alberta became increas-
ingly integrated in the North American natural gas 
market and demand rises for gas in North America 
began to exceed supply increases, but by 2010 the gas 
price had fallen again relative to oil.
D. Government Activities in the Crude 
Petroleum Industry
1. Government Objectives
Governments are vitally concerned with the oper-
ations of the petroleum industry. As a result, the 
economics of the industry must be seen within the 
context of a regulatory environment: an economic 
history of petroleum is a story of petropolitics. Since 
1930, the Alberta provincial government has been 
owner of most of the province’s mineral rights, and so 
it has an obvious interest in ensuring that it receives 
a fair return on petroleum leases transferred to com-
panies. Moreover, as the representative of citizens, 
the government has responsibility for establishing a 
legal/regulatory environment that is consistent with 
the interests of Albertans. Returns to owners, taxation 
(royalties, rentals, and bonus bids), conservation, and 
macroeconomic impact are major concerns.
The crude petroleum industry can be a major 
revenue source for governments. High quality nat-
ural resources generate surpluses above the required 
expenditures to find, develop, and produce the 
resource. (In economic terms, ‘expenditures’ include 
the return required on capital investment.) This sur-
plus (a profit or ‘economic rent’) can, in theory at 
least, be taken from the industry without affecting 
industry activity, hence proving to be an ideally neu-
tral and efficient source of funding for government 
activities. The practical problem is to approach such 
ideal rent collection as closely as possible in a world in 
which the precise size of the rent surplus is uncertain 
and changing. Some use the term ‘taxes’ to refer to 
the payments the petroleum industry makes to gov-
ernments; other analysts call this ‘government take.’ 
It includes payments made to the government in its 
capacity as owner of Crown mineral rights (e.g., bonus 
bids, rentals, and royalties) plus those more conven-
tional taxes (e.g., corporate income taxes) which apply 
to the petroleum industry as to other industries. Some 
have argued that the two categories of payments to the 
government should be kept strictly separate. However, 
the government, unlike private mineral rights owners, 
can use its powers to unilaterally change the level 
of royalties it receives on previously issued mineral 
rights, just as it can change income and sales tax rates. 
Moreover, the levels of conventional taxes and pay-
ments of royalties and bonus bids are not independent 
of each other. Hence it is desirable to consider conven-
tional taxes and petroleum-specific payments together. 
For industry, the ‘bottom line,’ after deduction of all 
payments to governments, is crucial. Chapter Eleven 
examines government rent collection in Alberta.
‘Conservation’ is, surely, an unexceptionable 
objective. Exactly what is meant, however, is often 
left vague. We will use the term quite generally as 
meaning ‘good physical production practices’ and 
note that it has implications both for current indus-
try activities (‘intragenerational’) and for the future 
(‘intergenerational’). Intragenerational concerns relate 
partly to the physical impacts of production, such 
as minimizing unnecessary surface damage during 
exploration and production; careful disposal of water 
and other waste material; handling abandoned wells; 
reducing the risks of pipeline leaks and well blowouts. 
Also important is the desire to minimize the loss to 
society of the petroleum resource itself (e.g., reducing 
the flaring of natural gas, and increasing the recovery 
factor, the percent of the resource volume physically 
available that is commercially producible). The inter-
generational issue is that of balancing the legitimate 
needs and concerns of present and future citizens, 
given that the petroleum resource base is limited, at 
least in a geological sense. It is tempting to see only 
the costly side of this intergenerational problem – our 
production of petroleum must, by the very nature of 
physical depletion, reduce production possibilities 
in the future. Balanced against this, however, are any 
improvements in knowledge that reduce costs or 
increase recoverability in the future and the returns 
future citizens derive from investments undertaken 
today with petroleum revenues. An obvious question 
with respect to conservation is to ask why companies 
will not automatically incorporate good production 
practices, obviating the need for government regula-
tions. In Chapter Ten we consider one such conserva-
tion issue in detail.
Macroeconomic impacts relate to the effects that 
petroleum activities have on population, investment, 
employment, and per capita income, since the indus-
try is such a critical part of the province’s economy. 
The Alberta petroleum industry can be seen as an 
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example of an ‘export base’ industry, one where exter-
nal market conditions governing exports from the 
province play a key role in determining the value of 
the industry’s output. Fluctuations in the level of pet-
roleum industry activities will tend to generate similar 
fluctuations in the province’s economy, with obvious 
possibilities for ‘boom-bust’ cycles. Sub-regions of the 
province may be especially prone to such cycles. At 
the macroeconomic level, it is usually judged desirable 
to have a relatively high and stable rate of economic 
growth, with low rates of inflation. Chapter Thirteen 
delves into these macroeconomic issues.
The three government objectives – revenue, con-
servation, and stable macroeconomic growth – are 
not independent of one another but need not always 
be in conflict. Consider, for example, an ‘attenuated’ 
resource development scenario, where the govern-
ment imposes some limits on the speed of develop-
ment of the resource base (Scott, 1976); annual tax 
revenues collected will tend to be smaller, at least in 
the earlier years of industry activity, but intergenera-
tional conservation and macroeconomic stability may 
be enhanced, and total lifetime tax revenue from the 
industry may actually increase.
Government treatment of the petroleum indus-
try is particularly complicated in a confederation 
like Canada since both provincial (Alberta) and 
federal (‘Ottawa’) governments may wish to regulate 
the industry in the interests of their constituencies. 
Sometimes the concerns of the two levels of govern-
ment may coincide. For example, both may wish to 
minimize local pollution and obtain fair export prices. 
In other instances, the two may disagree; for example, 
Ottawa will have more concern than Alberta with 
the impact of higher petroleum prices on consum-
ers, and the two governments can easily disagree on 
how tax payments by the industry should be shared. 
Later chapters, especially Chapters Nine and Eleven, 
will detail a number of vociferous intergovernmental 
disagreements about Canadian petroleum policies, 
especially after the revolutionary increases in world oil 
prices in the 1970s.
2. Government Policies
After the Leduc discovery of 1947, oil companies dra-
matically increased exploratory activity in Alberta. 
Initially corporate interest centred on the Devonian 
reef formations in the centre of the province, but the 
new-found optimism about Alberta’s oil potential led 
to increased G&G surveys and drilling in all areas, and 
other productive plays soon followed. The government 
is concerned with the nature of exploration activities, 
their pace, and the financial effects.
The industry’s physical activities have been mon-
itored and regulated by the Alberta government. The 
aim has been to prescribe safe and clean methods of 
exploration, to require that companies obtain a permit 
or licence before undertaking activity, and to watch 
over what companies do to ensure regulations are 
followed. Economists have frequently been critical of 
regulation by direct control of activities undertaken by 
firms; this approach may involve high costs of admin-
istration and lack sufficient flexibility to respond to 
the variety of conditions faced by the industry, and 
the rapidity with which our world changes. It has 
been necessary in Alberta, for instance, to recognize 
changes in the geographical interests of companies 
(e.g., from the central plains to the forested foothills 
and north to permafrost land) as well as changes 
in technique (e.g., new drilling fluids and larger 
all-terrain vehicles). The government of Alberta has 
transferred prime responsibility for regulatory admin-
istration of the petroleum industry to an independent 
body, funded by the province and a levy on petroleum 
company revenues.
The Petroleum and Natural Gas Conservation 
Board (PNGCB) was set up in 1938, initially to regulate 
the Turner Valley oil discovery (Breen, 1993). Some 
small producers were having difficulty finding markets 
for their oil, gas flaring was common, and output rates 
were so large that future productivity was in danger. 
The high production rates were a legacy of the provi-
sion of British Common Law known as the ‘Rule of 
Capture,’ which had long plagued the U.S. petroleum 
industry. Daintith (2010) provides a detailed review of 
the rule of capture in the U.S. and elsewhere (though 
not in Canada). He notes that it stems from provi-
sions in Roman law and also operated under civil law 
in countries with no connection to British common 
law. Under the rule of capture, petroleum in a reser-
voir with divided interests is owned in common by 
all producers with access. It became the property of 
one company only when that company lifted it to the 
surface. In the circumstances, producers had strong 
incentives to drill many wells and produce at high 
output rates to capture the oil before their neighbours, 
even though this often damaged the recovery process 
in the reservoir. Turner Valley, prior to regulation, was 
a prime example.
In 1950, the PNGCB was given prime responsibil-
ity for administering the province’s new Oil and Gas 
Resources Conservation Act. In 1957, with the Oil and 
Gas Conservation Act, it was renamed the Oil and Gas 
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Conservation Board (OGCB). In 1971 its responsibil-
ities were extended over other energy products (coal 
and electricity), and it became the Energy Resources 
Conservation Board (ERCB). In 1994, the government 
announced that the activities of the ERCB would be 
combined with those of the Public Utilities Board in a 
new Energy and Utilities Board (EUB). Then, in 2008, 
the EUB was bifurcated and the ERCB resurrected.
The board has a large technical staff, which, among 
other things, monitors the industry to ensure that 
regulations are observed. It has been given quasi- 
judicial powers in certain areas to hold hearings and 
sanction or order changes in the actions of companies, 
and it frequently makes recommendations to the gov-
ernment about policy issues of concern, usually after 
hosting public hearings. Some economists and polit-
ical scientists feel that one problem with agencies such 
as the ERCB is that they are ‘captured’ by the industry 
they are designed to regulate (Stigler, 1972). Many 
individuals have moved easily between the board and 
industry, but most observers regard the ERCB as an 
efficient and independent body in much of its regu-
lation of the technical aspects of petroleum industry 
activities. In this book, we shall not investigate the 
administration by the board of regulations governing 
purely technical aspects of industry behaviour nor the 
more controversial issues related to public health and 
the environment. Later chapters will deal with several 
of the programs that have had a great impact on the 
economics of the industry, including market-demand 
prorationing schemes to regulate oil output rates from 
pools (Chapter Ten), and natural gas export sales 
restrictions (Chapter Thirteen).
In December 2012, the government of Alberta 
passed the Responsible Energy Development Act, 
which set up a new ‘Alberta Energy Regulator’. As of 
final editing in April 2013, the regulator was still in 
the process of being established; it would be respon-
sible for the regulatory functions previously han-
dled by the ERCB including matters which require 
public hearings.
The pace of petroleum exploration is another 
matter of concern to governments. It can be influ-
enced by licensing regulations for G&G surveys and 
exploratory drilling, and by government taxes and/
or subsidies, depending on whether the government 
wishes to discourage or encourage activity. In Alberta, 
however, the most immediate influence on the level of 
exploration activity comes through the rate at which 
the province issues mineral rights on Crown land 
(Crommelin, 1975; Crommelin et al., 1976). There is 
little, if any, evidence of a specific government policy 
on the rate of issuance of petroleum and natural gas 
exploration and production rights. The main influ-
ence on the number, and the surface area, of rights 
issued in any period appears to have been requests for 
rights by the industry. Alberta has, on occasion, issued 
regulations making it less attractive for companies to 
hold leased rights inactive and unexplored, thereby 
encouraging more exploratory activities. The require-
ment that exploration rights be partially relinquished 
back to the government, on a checkerboard basis, has 
ensured that the government retains an ongoing inter-
est in sub-areas of the province that become particu-
larly attractive for petroleum exploration. In addition, 
beginning in the 1970s, a series of royalty-rebate and/
or subsidy programs – both at the federal and prov-
incial level – were introduced to stimulate additional 
exploration. These programs came at a time of high oil 
prices but also of higher royalties/taxes and of reduced 
average discovery size, especially for oil, and con-
tinued as oil prices became lower in the 1980s.
Fiscal effects on exploration by the Alberta gov-
ernment are primarily tied to the financial terms of 
Crown mineral right issues. As was discussed earlier, 
the government would like to capture as much as 
possible of the economic rent (profit) from petroleum 
production. Three broad classes of financial payment 
have been common to virtually all mineral rights:
(1) Bonus bids: the mineral rights are issued to the 
company that offers to pay most in a competi-
tive, sealed-bid auction.
(2) Rentals: an annual rental per hectare is assessed 
on mineral rights held.
(3) Royalties: companies pay a portion of any petro-
leum sales revenue to the government.
Chapter Eleven will review these tax (rent collection) 
regulations in more detail. Provincial income tax 
also captures rent for the province, and the federal 
government has, of course, an interest in the petrol-
eum industry as a tax base. From the government’s 
perspective, it is very important to find the right mix 
and levels of payment. Table 2.2 gives some feel for 
the importance of the petroleum industry as a source 
of Alberta government revenue since 1950, excluding 
income tax. Considerable year-to-year variability in 
government revenues from the petroleum industry 
is apparent, particularly in bonus bids. Particularly 
high government revenue, in real terms, came in the 
early 1980s when world oil prices were at a peak, and 
total petroleum revenues amounted to over three 
quarters of total provincial government receipts. As 
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will be discussed in Chapter Thirteen, the govern-
ment questioned whether such high revenues from a 
depletable natural resource could be expected to con-
tinue indefinitely and whether some should be saved 
rather than spent immediately. Petroleum industry 
payments to the provincial government fell after 1980, 
and then rose again in the 1990s; however, after allow-
ance is made for inflation, and the growing size of the 
provincial economy, the relative importance of petrol-
eum revenues to the government is not as high as it 
was in the early 1980s.
As with exploration, the Alberta government has 
had responsibility for ensuring that development 
activities are carried out safely and in an environment-
ally sound manner. This book will not discuss details 
of these types of regulations, though we note that 
the possibility of well blowouts and other petroleum 
leakages has generated controversy, especially where 
population centres and sour (high sulphur) petroleum 
come together. There is also concern about clean-up 
costs of abandoned wells, particularly where wells 
were shut-in many years ago and where companies 
have gone out of business (Horner, 2011). There have 
been hearings before the EUB and its predecessor 
boards with respect to major EOR projects and natural 
gas processing plants. The EUB possesses some powers 
to force changes in development plans (e.g., compul-
sory EOR investment) if it is clearly in the interests of 
greater commercial oil recovery.
Government regulations with respect to well 
spacing (establishing minimum spacing require-
ments) have had a significant impact on the industry’s 
development activity. The government has also had 
to examine how its policies affect the rate of develop-
ment; high royalties, for instance, may discourage 
reserve development and lead to premature well aban-
donment unless they are mitigated. Output control 
schemes such as market-demand prorationing also 
affect industry development. These issues will be con-
sidered later in the book.
The board has also been given responsibility for 
assessing whether major oil sands ventures are ‘in the 
public interest.’ In Chapter Seven, we will look at how 
the board considered this with respect to the impact of 
oil sands production on the market for conventional 
Alberta crude oil. We will not, however, consider the 
board’s treatment of the environmental (including 
health) impacts of oil sands investments. These issues 
have been quite different from the board’s historic 
concern with oil and gas production techniques in the 
conventional industry; some critics have argued that 
the board has insufficient expertise in these broader 
environmental areas and is too sympathetic to the 
viewpoint of the industry.
As noted above, governments have an obvious 
interest in both the timing and value of petroleum 
output. Timing concerns relate to the depletable 
resource base, such that lifting today means foregoing 
future production. Governments may feel that output 
should be spread relatively evenly over time to help 
stabilize revenue and tax flows. Such timing concerns 
are clearly linked to prices. The provincial govern-
ment may, for instance, prefer to restrain production 
if output rises would drive down market prices or to 
delay production if prices are expected to rise in the 
future. Once again, the question arises of why private 
producers would not themselves react in this manner, 
therefore making government action superfluous.
The two decades following Leduc were dominated 
by the desire to find markets for the province’s rapidly 
expanding oil reserves; this search took place against 
a backdrop of falling real international oil prices. 
Two issues became the focal point of discussion, as 
discussed in detail in Chapter Nine. Should Alberta 
Table 2.2: Alberta Government Petroleum Revenues (106 $)* 
 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Fees and Rentals 6.3 32.7 58.3 69.3 72.4 141 158
Royalties 3.6 27.3 143.7 3,456.1 2,118.8 3,970 6,533
Bonus Bids 23.2 81.3 26.5 1,057.7 389.1 743 1,165
Total 30.1 141.3 228.5 4,583.1 2,580.3 4,854 7,756
(% of Provincial Government Revenue) (30.2) (42.2) (25.1) (80.9) (21.3) (24.1) (19.7)
*	For	the	fiscal	year	ending	March	31	of	the	year	indicated.
Source: Annual Reports of the Department of Mines and Minerals, Department of Energy and Natural Resources, and Department of Energy, depending on the year.
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oil be reserved primarily for use in Canadian mar-
kets, even if this meant bypassing closer markets in 
the Midwestern United States and shipping the oil to 
Montreal where it was less competitive with offshore 
international supplies? Should Alberta oil be offered 
protection from declining international crude oil 
values? As it happens, Canadian policy, implemented 
in Ottawa as the National Oil Policy, encouraged 
exports of oil to the United States and restricted 
Canadian access to offshore oil, thereby allowing 
Canadian prices above international levels. The United 
States was debating the same issues; the resultant oil 
import quota program maintained high prices in the 
United States and quickly incorporated special treat-
ment for oil produced in Canada but did not leave the 
U.S. market completely open to Alberta oil.
The 1970s brought rising international oil prices 
and international supply disruptions in connection 
with political events centred in the Middle East. The 
government of Alberta, and oil producers, viewed 
higher prices and buoyant U.S. markets with pleas-
ure. However, the Canadian federal government felt 
grave concern about the cost and security of oil sup-
plies – both immediately, for users in Quebec and the 
Atlantic provinces, and through the longer term for 
consumers in Ontario. Ottawa also worried about the 
impacts on consumers, and its own fiscal position, 
of sharply increased oil and natural gas prices. The 
resultant tension between Ottawa and the petroleum- 
producing provinces brought a decade of intergov-
ernmental rancour, with export limitations on oil, 
price controls to keep domestic oil prices below inter-
national levels, extension of oil transmission facili-
ties to Montreal, and new federal taxes on the crude 
petroleum industry. The provinces and a new federal 
government in Ottawa finally agreed, in 1985, on a 
policy of ‘deregulation’ of the petroleum industry; this 
coincided with a collapse of international oil prices.
Natural gas policies over this period exhibited 
similar tensions between domestic security of supply 
and export potential as well as between higher prices 
for producers and lower prices for consumers. Ottawa 
introduced price controls on natural gas and a new 
federal natural gas tax. These policies are reviewed in 
Chapter Twelve.
These instances of government involvement in 
the crude petroleum industry highlight an underlying 
uncertainty by some about the wisdom of relying on 
relatively open markets to allocate oil and natural gas 
supplies, given the importance of factors external to 
Canada in setting prices and the depletable nature of 
the resource base.
The provincial government has also been con-
cerned with variations in the level of petroleum 
industry activity and in the revenues received by the 
industry because such changes will impact on the 
level of economic activity in the province. In Chapter 
Thirteen, we look at the macroeconomic impact of the 
industry on Alberta.
4. Alberta’s Downstream Petroleum 
Industry
The focus of this book is on the Alberta crude pet-
roleum industry. In this section of Chapter Two, we 
briefly review aspects of the downstream industry in 
Alberta and provide some comments on economic 
issues, which may be useful to an understanding of the 
upstream industry.
A. Transportation: Industry Activities
Chapter One argued that two different categories of 
crude petroleum transportation have been important 
in Alberta. First, a network of ‘gathering’ pipelines is 
needed to collect the lifted petroleum from various 
reservoirs in the province and move it to major col-
lection points or local markets. Then large-diameter 
‘trunk’ pipelines move volumes to major market 
destinations outside the province. The physical 
heterogeneity of crude oil raises some technical prob-
lems. As noted in Chapter One, most crude oils are 
mixed together (blended) as they are shipped, but it 
is sometimes desirable to separate a particular grade 
from others in the line (to ship by ‘batch’), or to build 
a separate line to handle a particular product (for 
example, heavy oil, or bitumen or natural gas liquids, 
NGLs). While there are chemical differences between 
volumes of gas from different pools (e.g., in the pres-
ence of sulphur and NGLs), natural gas is more homo-
geneous than oil, especially after treatment in gas 
plants. Transmission of crude oil and natural gas has 
proceeded quite differently.
Crude oil pipelines in Alberta were usually built 
by oil companies themselves, often companies that 
both produce crude oil and refine it. Estimating the 
appropriate size of a line is difficult. Economies of 
scale imply that a pipeline should be as large as pos-
sible (up to limits that are significant relative to the 
volumes of oil shipped from Alberta). Therefore, 
oil companies normally try to anticipate the likely 
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volumes forthcoming from future discoveries in the 
area, as well as volumes immediately available. The 
various gathering lines have usually been constructed 
by the first company or companies to generate signifi-
cant crude oil discoveries in a particular region. The 
major gathering lines converge on Edmonton, which 
is the starting point for two trunk lines, both of which 
were initially built in the 1950s. The Interprovincial 
Pipe Line (now known as Enbridge) heads to major 
markets in the east, looping below the Great Lakes 
into the United States, as far as Toronto (with a link 
to Montreal built in the 1970s). The Trans Mountain 
Pipe Line (briefly known as Terrason and now as 
Kinder-Morgan) traverses the Rockies to Vancouver 
and the Pacific Northwest states. The gathering lines 
are wholly owned subsidiaries of various oil com-
panies, while the trunk lines are shareholder-owned, 
with shares traded on the public stock exchanges 
(generally, large blocks of shares have been held by oil 
companies).
The first natural gas pipelines were built by local 
Alberta distributors (utilities) to bring gas to their 
customers. In 1954, the government of Alberta intro-
duced legislation that set up a shareholder-owned, 
publicly traded company called Alberta Gas Trunk 
Line (AGTL), which would have sole responsibility 
for gathering natural gas in the province and moving 
it to the borders for ex-Alberta sales. (In 1980, AGTL 
became NOVA, an Alberta Corporation, then, in the 
late 1990s, it merged with TransCanada Pipe Line.) 
AGTL sold a transportation service to the owner of 
the gas. Until the 1980s, the gas was usually bought by 
and owned by the major trunk line transmission com-
pany, which took possession at the Alberta border. 
These gas-purchasing pipelines were not themselves 
natural gas producers but new investor-owned com-
panies with publicly traded shares set up explicitly 
as gas transmission companies. The largest early 
buyers of gas were TransCanada Pipe Line (for sales 
to the East), Westcoast Transmission (for sales to the 
West), and Alberta and Southern (owned by Pacific 
Gas Transmission, for sales mainly to California). 
Beginning in the 1970s, a number of new marketers 
and shippers began to enter the Alberta market, gen-
erally purchasing gas for shipment to export markets 
in the United States. Deregulation in the late 1980s 
further increased the number of natural gas buyers, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Twelve.
Table 2.3 shows the destination of sales of 
Canadian crude oil and natural gas for various years 
since Leduc, clearly demonstrating the significance of 
markets external to the province.
Table 2.3: Sales of Alberta Petroleum by Region
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
OIL SALES (106 m3)
Alberta 4.3 4.1 6.4 16.1 19.3 23.9 26.6
B.C. 0 3.7 3.2 7.5 3.6 2.3 1.9
Sask/Manitoba 0 3.3 4.4 3.6 1.9 7.7 10.8
Ontario 0 6.4 13.4 25.8 20.5 1.3 7.7
Quebec 0 0 0 15.4 3.6 0 0
Total Canada 4.3 17.5 27.4 68.4 48.8 35.2 46.9
U.S.A. 0 4.1 32.5 8.7 29.8 55.6 79.3
GAS SALES (109 m3)
Alberta 2.0 4.2 6.8 13.5 17.3 23.1 32.1
B.C. 0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.9 2.9 2.6
Sask/Manitoba 0 0.1 2.4 3.5 2.9 6.5 8.5
Ontario 0 0 11.5 18.0 17.3 29.7 17.1
Quebec 0 0 1.4 2.9 4.8 5.9 1.1
Total Canada 2.0 4.5 22.4 38.2 43.2 68.1 61.5
U.S.A. 0 1.1 17.4 19.4 35.7 66.1 49.6
Note:  Includes bitumen, synthetic crude oil, pentanes plus and condensate.
Sources:  2000 and 2010: ERCB, Alberta Energy Resource Industries Monthly Statistics (ST-3).
 1950–1990: ERCB and OGCB, Alberta Oil and Gas Annual Statistics (ST-17) and Cumulative Annual Statistics of the Alberta Oil and Gas Industry.
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B. Transportation: Government Activities
In addition to concerns about personal and environ-
mental safety, governments have been interested in 
the price charged for transmission, access to facilities, 
and the route and destination of pipelines. As was 
discussed in Chapter One, pipeline tariffs are of con-
cern largely because of the ‘natural monopoly’ nature 
of the service, since economies of scale usually mean 
that a single pipeline is the most efficient way to move 
the product. The government wishes to ensure that the 
transmission company does not take unfair advantage 
of its monopoly status by charging a tariff far above 
costs, or by buying petroleum itself at artificially low 
prices, or selling at artificially high ones. Access con-
cerns relate to the possibility of the pipeline denying 
service to some potential users (e.g., refusing to move 
a competitor’s oil or gas). A government may be con-
cerned about pipeline routes because it does (or does 
not) wish to see a specific geographic market pene-
trated, or because security of supply or environmental 
risks dictate certain routes.
In Canada, there has been far less government 
attention to crude oil pipelines than natural gas, per-
haps because the ownership of crude oil lines by the 
oil companies themselves was conducive to results 
that the industry found acceptable. In the early years 
of operation, the possibility of government regula-
tions may also have helped persuade the owners of 
crude oil pipelines to keep access open to all potential 
users and to base tariffs on pipeline costs, following 
the approaches used by regulated pipelines in the 
United States (Lawrey and Watkins, 1982). In addition 
other government regulations on oil output, in the 
form of market-demand prorationing, ensured that 
all oil reserves holders were given the opportunity 
to produce; thus, the large oil producers could not 
use their ownership of pipelines to squeeze out other 
producers while increasing their own oil production. 
The National Energy Board Act of 1959 declared inter-
provincial trunk lines (and intraprovincial lines used 
by more than the owner) to be common carriers, 
requiring that pipeline capacity be equally accessible 
to all potential shippers. In addition, the act gave 
the board the power to regulate oil pipeline tariffs, 
although the NEB did not begin to exercise this power 
until 1977 (Lawrey and Watkins, 1982).
Variations in Alberta oil output also raised ques-
tions related to government permits for pipeline con-
struction. In the early days, the question was that of 
determining pipeline sizes and destination markets 
when the potential for oil production in Alberta was 
unknown and just being established. As conventional 
oil reserves began to decline after 1970, there was 
concern about underutilization of facilities. Pipeline 
expansion became an issue again as the oil sands 
picked up in the new century, with discussion of 
whether pipelines would handle upgraded oil or bitu-
men and whether Alberta should continue to rely on 
traditional North American markets or look toward 
Asia.
Natural gas transmission has been more conten-
tious from the start. For example, in the 1950s the 
federal government insisted that the TransCanada 
Pipeline be built entirely on Canadian territory, even 
though it would have been cheaper to follow the 
Interprovincial oil line through the northern tier of 
the United States, south of the Canadian Shield. The 
natural gas trunk lines’ role as the main buyers of 
natural gas also raised potential problems. The pipe-
lines – if they crossed provincial boundaries – were 
subject to cost of service rate regulation under the 
authority of Ottawa’s National Energy Board, but 
petroleum companies frequently complained that the 
gas pipelines (especially TransCanada’s) monopsony 
position as a buyer of natural gas led to artificially low 
prices. Exacerbating this problem was the prevalence 
of long-term natural gas purchase contracts, often of 
more than twenty year’s duration, with relatively fixed 
prices. The issue came to a head in the 1970s when oil 
prices rose dramatically, increasing the value of com-
peting fuels such as natural gas. The Alberta govern-
ment began to use its export licensing requirements to 
force renegotiation upward of natural gas prices, and 
later began to cooperate with Ottawa in fixing natural 
gas prices in relation to oil prices.
Deregulation in the mid-1980s generated another 
series of public policy concerns. As a number of new 
pipeline proposals arose, drawing on Alberta natural 
gas, governments had to determine whether they 
were all compatible and in the public interest. Would 
there be costly duplication of facilities? Were markets 
strong enough to provide a fair return on Alberta gas 
(especially markets on the far east coast of the United 
States)? Could too many new facilities be constructed 
thereby providing so much additional Alberta gas 
to markets that prices would fall or increasing the 
risk of raising unit shipment costs? Readers will note 
that such questions all betray an anxiety about the 
operation of unregulated markets. The Alberta gov-
ernment was also under pressure to change its policies 
with respect to NOVA, and its method of handling 
gas movements within the province. NOVA was 
rate-regulated, but, for many years, applied a ‘postage 
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stamp’ tariff, in which all gas would be assessed the 
same charge regardless of pick-up or delivery point, 
even though some gas obviously had lower transpor-
tation costs. Only in the late 1990s did the government 
require that NOVA (now TransCanada) abandon the 
postage stamp tariff
C.	Refining	and	Marketing:	Industry	Activities
It was mentioned in Chapter One that it is cheaper to 
transport crude oil than refined petroleum products 
(RPPs); thus, regional refining capacity tends to be 
geared to the size of the local market. Table 2.4 shows 
the number and capacity of Alberta refineries in select 
years from 1950 to 2010. Refineries exhibit economies 
of scale; the reduction in the number of refineries 
since 1960, and the significant rise in total capacity 
and throughput, reflect a move to larger more efficient 
refineries. The main Alberta refineries are owned 
by large vertically integrated oil companies; some of 
the smaller refineries are former assets of the major 
oil companies that were purchased by employees or 
smaller companies (perhaps other gasoline marketers) 
when the majors were rationalizing facilities and dis-
posing of less profitable assets.
Table 2.5 shows the relative importance of utiliz-
ation of different energy products in Alberta in 1966 
and 1990. The importance of petroleum is evident. 
Natural gas plays a particularly high role in Alberta 
in comparison with other parts of Canada. Coal’s 
role has increased as a source for thermally generated 
electrical energy, and as the demand for electricity has 




Government attention to petroleum refining and mar-
keting has focused on competition policy, taxation, 
and conservation.
The importance of economies of scale in refining 
has meant that a relatively small market can support 
only a limited number of efficient refineries, raising 
the possibility of imperfectly competitive behaviour. 
In the oil industry, the oligopolistic nature of refining 
has combined with the vertically integrated nature 
of the industry to raise the possibility of restrictive 
competition from crude oil through to the marketing 
of oil products. For example, as will be discussed in 
Chapters Six and Ten, the process of refiners ‘posting’ 
prices that they would pay for crude oil, in conjunc-
tion with the government’s ‘market-demand pro-
rationing’ regulations, led to rigid prices for crude oil 
from 1950 through 1972. In another possible example, 
in Alberta (but not to the same extent in Ontario) 
motor gasoline prices have often exhibited a certain 
amount of rigidity, rather than the short-term variabil-
ity common to some other commodities. Concerns 
have also been expressed about restrictive tied mar-
keting arrangements imposed by refineries on retail 
distributors (for example, forcing them to handle a 
particular brand of motor oil or tires). These concerns 
have attracted a number of government studies.
There has not been much regulatory response, 
however, since clear evidence of anti-competitive 
behaviour is not strong (Watkins, 1981). This may, in 
part, reflect effective competition among the limited 
number of firms active in refining, and the greater 
number in marketing. Competition is also enhanced 
Table	2.4:	Alberta	Oil	Refining
	 Number	of	 Crude	Oil	 Refinery	Runs 
	 Refineries	 Refining	Capacity	 (m3 per day) 
  (m3 per calendar day)
1950 7 7,450
1960 11 15,650 12,248
1970 8 27,810 17,909
1980 6 45,311 45,301
1990  6 63,200 55,612
2000  5 68,055 70,167
2010 5 72,135 69,498
Sources: CAPP Statistical Handbook (excludes oil sands upgraders).
Table 2.5: Alberta’s Primary Energy Consumption by 
Fuel (Primary Energy Shares, %)
 Oil Natural Gas Coal Hydro Other
1966 41 52 5 0 2
1990 48 36 15 1 0
Source: For 1990, ERCB, Energy Alberta Reports (oil includes 24% bitumen); 
1966	figures	calculated	from	energy	use	tables	in	Appendix	C	of	NEB	(1969).	
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by the threat of new entry (Baumol et al., 1988), and 
the possibility of importing RPPs from more competi-
tive external markets (e.g., the United States).
With respect to natural gas, distribution to con-
sumers is efficiently done by a single company in 
any market area as a natural monopoly. Hence, gas 
utilities have been subject to cost of service rate regu-
lation by the Alberta Public Utilities Board (PUB); 
after 1994, regulation was by the Energy and Utilities 
Board (EUB), and, after 2007, the Alberta Utilities 
Commission (AUC).
Some RPPs have been very attractive to govern-
ments as targets for taxation. For revenue purposes, a 
commodity is especially appealing for a sales (excise) 
tax if its consumption is relatively unresponsive 
to price changes. (Economists would say that the 
demand is ‘inelastic’; this concept is set out in Chapter 
Four.) This is characteristic of a good that is viewed 
by many consumers as a necessity and for which few 
substitutes exist. Motor gasoline has been particularly 
appealing in this regard. In Alberta, the provincial 
tax on a litre of regular grade gasoline was 2.5 cents 
in 1962, 3 cents in 1970, zero cents in 1981, 5.0 cents in 
1989, and 9 cents by 2011 (Canadian Tax Foundation, 
Provincial and Municipal Finances, various years). 
(The 1990 tax was equivalent to over eight dollars per 
barrel of oil.) In 2011 the federal gasoline tax was about 
10 cents per litre (plus the 5% GST).
Conservation regulations include those designed 
explicitly to discourage current utilization of pet-
roleum, as has been advocated by many as part of 
the response to man-made global warming. (Such 
environmental problems are beyond the scope of this 
book.) Higher taxes on RPPs, such as a carbon tax, can 
be useful here, since higher taxes discourage current 
use. Regulations may also prohibit the utilization of 
certain petroleum products for particular purposes. 
For example, from the mid-1970s until 1992, Alberta 
did not allow new thermal electricity plants burning 
natural gas. (The United States had similar regulations 
for much of the 1970s and 1980s.) The removal of 
these restrictions stemmed from apparent surpluses of 
natural gas even at falling prices and from recognition 
of the special environmental risks posed by coal and 
nuclear-powered generation facilities.
5. Conclusions
This chapter has provided a preliminary overview 
of major developments in the history of the Alberta 
petroleum industry and of issues that have attracted 
the attention of governments. Underlying both his-
torical events and government policies is the oper-
ation of petroleum markets and the extent to which 
such markets adequately reflect society’s interests. 
The remainder of this book includes more formal 
analysis of petroleum markets and major government 
regulations and policies associated with the Alberta 
crude petroleum industry. Before concluding this 
chapter, however, brief comments are made on three 
important topics.
First, Alberta’s economic performance after 1947 
was tightly bound to developments in the conven-
tional petroleum industry. In purely physical terms, 
however, the conventional petroleum resource base is 
dwarfed by the volume of non-conventional petrol-
eum resources. For example, the year 2011 Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) Statistical 
Handbook estimates the total volume of conven-
tional liquid in place in the province (including 
past production) to be about 10.6 billion m3, while 
non-conventional heavy oil and bitumen deposits are 
estimated to hold over 400 billion m3. Since at least 
the 1920s, private companies and government bodies 
such as the Alberta Research Council have experi-
mented with ways to produce at low cost from these 
non-conventional deposits. In 2013 there were five 
operating oil sands mining companies, two having 
commenced more than thirty years previously – the 
Suncor plant (commenced in 1967) and Syncrude 
(commenced in 1978); in 2011, upgraded synthetic 
crude made up about 31 per cent of Alberta’s liquid 
hydrocarbons. Several large-scale and a number of 
smaller in situ heavy oil projects were also in oper-
ation; in 2011, bitumen from such ventures amounted 
to about 45 per cent of liquid hydrocarbon produc-
tion. While the physical potential for large volumes 
of oil from non-conventional sources is high, actual 
development hinges on perceptions of expected 
future economic conditions, the scope of techno-
logical innovations and the regulatory environment. 
Similarly, new techniques or improved economic con-
ditions have been necessary to stimulate exploitation 
of Alberta’s natural gas volumes held in very ‘tight’ 
(relatively non-permeable) formations or trapped as 
methane in the province’s coal seams. The problems 
and potential of these non-conventional resources 
differ considerably from those of the conventional 
crude petroleum industry. Chapter Seven deals with 
Alberta’s non-conventional oil, and we touch on 
non-conventional natural gas in Chapter Twelve.
Second, this chapter has not yet raised a contro-
versial public policy issue – foreign investment in the 
34 PETROPOLIT ICS
Canadian petroleum industry. Foreign ownership 
has been significant almost from the beginning, at 
least since Standard Oil acquired control of Imperial 
Oil back in 1898. By way of illustration, in 1989, the 
Federal Petroleum Monitoring Agency reported that 
44 per cent of the revenues in the Canadian crude 
petroleum industry were foreign owned; if all aspects 
of petroleum industry activity were considered, the 
foreign ownership percentage rose to 46 per cent of 
revenues, 49 per cent of assets, and 52 per cent of 
expenditures. Pervasive and persistent foreign owner-
ship in the petroleum industry touches the nerves 
of many Canadians. Opponents of foreign invest-
ment see foreign owners capturing jobs and profits 
that would otherwise go to Canadians. And large 
volumes of a scarce resource are seen as siphoned 
away from Canadian users to consumers south of 
the border. Foreign – read ‘American’ – values and 
mores are argued to be imported by the ex-Canada 
owners and imposed over traditional Canadian social 
values, transforming Alberta into a pseudo-Texas. 
Proponents of foreign investment see the financial 
capital and technical expertise of the multinational 
oil companies generating employment opportunities 
and income gains for Canadians that would not other-
wise occur. The higher per capita living standard that 
results makes it easier for Albertans and Canadians 
generally to provide those private and social goods 
that define our society. Such deep-seated and conflict-
ing views cannot be reconciled by economic analysis 
alone, but, in Chapter Six, we briefly consider some of 
these views.
Third, there is no discussion in this book of sig-
nificant issues in environmental economics, even 
though a number of controversial issues have attracted 
much public attention in Alberta, including the haz-
ards of well blowouts (which generated an extensive 
public hearing after the Lodgepole blow-out in the 
1980s); the health effects of petroleum production, 
especially sour natural gas; global warming; and the 
very significant environmental concerns associated 
with expanded oil sands production, especially from 
gigantic strip-mining ventures.
Readers’ Guide: Alberta is not an isolated economy. 
This chapter provides an overview of the world oil 
market, what it is, and how it has developed. Since 
the 1960s, this has been, to a considerable extent, 
the story of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC): the role of the OPEC governments 
gives obvious meaning to the term ‘petropolitics.’ 
We look at Canada’s position in the world oil market 
and argue that it has been such a small player that 
changes in production and consumption here have 
minimal effects on world oil prices. In economic terms, 
Alberta has been a ‘price-taker’ in the world market, 
and the international price of oil sets the value of 
Alberta oil.
1. Why World Markets Matter
It is commonplace to remark that global interdepend-
ence has been growing. Rapid, low-cost transporta-
tion systems easily move people and goods across 
the globe, and falling costs of communication have 
led to almost instantaneous exchange of information. 
Glimpses of other lifestyles have fuelled consumer 
tastes everywhere, including the material expectations 
of the world’s poor. Financial capital moves with ease, 
changing location and form at a moment’s notice, its 
price in all parts of the world responding to the latest 
news or rumour. Branches of large multinational cor-
porations reach into the world’s most distant corners, 
part cause and part symptom of the shrinking global 
village. For the world at large, international trade has 
been increasing faster than purely domestic trade, and 
governments throughout the world have been nego-
tiating regional and global agreements that impact on 
trade and investment.
International trade in crude oil provided one of 
the earliest of truly global markets. There are a var-
iety of reasons for this. First, energy is a necessary 
input to economic activity throughout the world, and 
oil provides a particularly convenient (and, in inter-
nal combustion engines, essential) form of energy. 
Second, oil is a relatively homogeneous commodity 
in the sense that crude oils from different deposits 
around the world can substitute for one another. 
Third, crude oil can be transported readily and at 
relatively low cost. Today, for instance, a charge of 
several dollars per barrel or less would normally be 
sufficient to cover the cost of moving oil up to 3,500 
kilometres through a large-diameter pipeline, or the 
7,000 kilometres between Saudi Arabia and Japan in 
an ocean-going tanker.
Crude oil is, and has been for decades, the most 
highly valued commodity moving in international 
trade, as measured by the total value of shipments. The 
ease of moving oil between markets means that, in 
the absence of any government regulation hindering 
the flows of oil between countries or imposing special 
import or export taxes, the price of crude oil within 
any one country is very closely tied to international oil 
prices. If the domestic price were significantly lower, 
those who own domestic oil (whether companies or 
consumers who have purchased it) have an economic 
incentive to move the oil into the higher-priced 
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international market, and the reduced domestic 
supply would drive home prices up. Conversely, if 
domestic prices were above world prices, there would 
be strong incentives to purchase in the international 
market, and the reduced demand for domestic oil 
would drive the price down.
If oil could be instantaneously transported, and if 
the world oil market had immediate and perfect infor-
mation flows to all actual and potential market partici-
pants, and if buyers and sellers were free to contract 
with one another and sellers could not discriminate 
amongst buyers, then oil prices in different parts of 
the world would differ, at most, by the marginal trans-
portation cost between locations. Economists often 
refer to this as the ‘Law of One Price,’ and argue that 
the exploitation of profitable trading opportunities 
(‘arbitrage’) will ensure this result. More accurately, 
there would be a structure of crude oil prices. Prices 
would vary across different qualities of crude oil, and, 
for any particular grade of crude oil, prices between 
any two locations would differ at most by transpor-
tation costs between the two. Crude oil from any 
large producing region would satisfy demands in that 
immediate location, with the delivered price of oil 
rising by the incremental shipment cost as sales occur 
in progressively more distant markets; at some loca-
tion, oil from this region would be higher priced in 
the more distant market than oil from another produ-
cing centre, and no sales would occur.
Figure 3.1 is a simple illustration of this effect for 
two producing regions (Alberta and Nigeria). The ver-
tical axis shows oil prices, initially PA in Alberta and 
PN in Nigeria, while the horizontal axis shows loca-
tions between the two producing centres (Winnipeg, 
Toronto, Montreal, Halifax, and Bermuda). The line 
PAA rising from left to right shows the delivered cost 
of Alberta oil in various markets, while PN N shows the 
delivered cost of Nigerian oil. The two lines meet at 
point X, in this case Montreal, with Alberta oil being 
chosen by consumers in Winnipeg and Toronto, and 
Nigerian oil chosen in Halifax and Bermuda. Prices 
in various markets are given by line PAXPN , and it 
can be seen that the price difference between any two 
regions may be equal to transportation costs between 
the markets (compare Montreal to either Alberta or 
Nigeria) or less than such transportation costs would 
be (if no oil moves between the markets; compare 
Alberta to Bermuda). The market where crudes from 
the two regions are priced equally (i.e., Montreal) is 











Figure 3.1 International Oil Flows and Prices
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interface.’ It can readily be seen that if the price of 
crude oil fell in one of the producing regions (e.g., PN 
declined) with nothing else changing (i.e., neither PA 
nor shipment costs) the watershed would move fur-
ther away from that market (e.g., to Toronto) and sales 
of the other region’s oil would decline. Such a reduc-
tion in the demand for Alberta’s oil might lead to a 
price fall in Alberta, with a new watershed somewhere 
between Toronto and Montreal and lower prices in 
all markets.
In an interconnected world market of this sort, the 
exact level of oil prices, and the specific geographic 
pattern of prices (and location of watershed markets), 
depends upon the entire global set of demand, supply, 
and transportation cost components. In general, any 
change in a major demand, supply, or shipment cost 
component will lead to changed prices, production, 
and consumption everywhere in the world. Consider, 
for example, the following stylized example of how a 
major oil conservation scheme in Tokyo might reduce 
the price of crude from the Alberta Pembina pool. 
Mandated improvements in transportation fuel econ-
omy in Japan reduce the Japanese demand for crude, 
which drives down the price of Indonesian crude oil 
sold in Japan; but a reduced Indonesian price cuts the 
price of Indonesian oil in India, and Indian consumers 
switch from Middle Eastern to Indonesian oil. The 
reduced Indian demand for Middle Eastern oil drives 
down its price in Western Europe so consumers there 
switch from Nigerian oil to Middle Eastern oil; in turn 
Nigerian oil prices fall, consumers in Ontario switch 
away from Alberta oil, and the reduced demand for 
Alberta crude oil drives down prices in Pembina.
Most economists have accepted this general 
depiction of interconnected world oil markets as 
accurate, or, as Adelman (1984b) noted, “the world 
oil market, like the world ocean, is one giant pool.” 
Casual observation of the world oil market suggests 
that the Law of One Price is true, at least to a first 
order of approximation: any large price change for 
oil internationally has carried into oil markets in all 
regions. On the other hand, Weiner (1991) argues that 
the immediate and perfect interconnectedness implied 
by our simple model does not appear to be empirically 
valid. Price differentials between regions of the world 
tend to change over time, as market conditions vary, 
rather than moving strictly together as the “one pool” 
analogy would suggest. Weiner’s results are somewhat 
difficult to interpret. They could reflect, as he suggests, 
varying degrees of market power in different regions, 
which allow sellers to exercise some degree of price 
discrimination as market conditions change. However, 
short-term inflexibilities in transportation systems 
and unique local demand and supply conditions for 
specific grades of crude may also affect the results, as 
may varying lags in shipment time, differences in the 
effectiveness of arbitrage responses in different mar-
kets, and differences in contractual terms governing 
price adjustments. More recent research (Gulen, 1999; 
Kleit, 2001; Fattouh, 2010) has questioned Weiner’s 
conclusion, finding that world oil markets exhibited a 
large degree of integration. Overall, we are willing to 
accept the simple model of an interconnected world 
oil market as a reasonable way to depict the general 
structure of world oil prices while accepting Weiner’s 
caution that it may not properly capture very short-
term market adjustments for specific crude oil grades 
or locations. By way of example, in 2010, the price 
of WTI oil at Cushing, Oklahoma (and also the price 
of Alberta crude oil which is linked to Cushing) fell 
significantly below that of North Sea Brent oil for the 
first extended period of time; this price differential 
still existed at the time of final editing of this volume 
(March 2013). The reason lies in a relative surplus of 
supply at Cushing and a shortage of pipeline capacity 
to connect Cushing with the rest of the oil market. 
The former reflects increasing oil production from the 
Alberta oil sands and the mid-west United States. The 
latter results from the lags in building new pipeline 
capacity to handle the increased output; this, in turn, 
may result from the difficulties in planning pipeline 
capital investments when oil production levels are 
uncertain, but it also comes from unexpectedly long 
lags in obtaining regulatory approval for pipeline 
construction.
Highly interconnected international gas markets 
have not developed, in large part because natural gas 
is so much more costly to ship, per unit of energy 
content, than oil. This is true for movement by pipe-
line but is particularly so for ocean-going tankers, 
which require facilities to liquefy and regasify the gas 
at either end of the shipment route. In addition, there 
are no essential energy needs that require natural 
gas specifically, and a high-cost pipeline distribution 
system is necessary to move natural gas to consumers, 
so that many regions of the world do not use much or 
any natural gas. The result has been that, up to now, 
natural gas markets have been regional rather than 
international. Therefore, it may make sense to speak of 
a North American natural gas market, and to expect 
the price of Alberta natural gas to be influenced by 
supply conditions in Texas and demand conditions 
in California, among other locations. However, the 
concept of a world natural gas market, with Alberta 
38 PETROPOLIT ICS
natural gas prices directly tied to Algerian gas supplies 
according to the Law of One Price, is not particularly 
useful. Of course, Algerian natural gas develop-
ments could affect the Alberta natural gas market. 
However, in the absence of low-cost transportation 
for gas bound from Algeria to North America, any 
interconnections are likely to be more indirect. For 
example, a higher supply of Algerian natural gas to 
Europe by pipeline under the Mediterranean means 
lower European gas prices, thereby reducing the 
European demand for oil; this in turn might lead to 
lower world oil prices, which would lower oil prices in 
North America and lead to a reduced demand for nat-
ural gas and lower Alberta natural gas prices. But the 
mechanism here is the world oil market and regional 
energy markets for products such as natural gas, 
which are tied to local conditions in the oil market, 
not a world natural gas market. Of course, natural 
gas prices in North America could rise to a level high 
enough that large-scale imports of LNG from Africa 
and the Middle East become economic, so that the 
natural gas market also becomes a world market. 
Significant cost reductions in the movement of natural 
gas across oceans would further this globalization. 
Recently there appear to be supply possibilities for 
large-scale ‘non-conventional’ natural gas production 
within North America (such as ‘tight’ gas, gas from 
shale formations, and coal bed methane) at prices 
lower than those required for large-scale LNG imports. 
It is not yet clear whether the additional supplies 
are sufficient to keep North American gas prices 
low enough to enable exports of LNG from North 
America; if such exports became feasible, the North 
American natural gas market would become global-
ized with prices tied to those in the export markets.
2. Alberta’s Role in the World Oil Market
Alberta is a relatively small player in world oil market. 
Table 3.1 shows that Canada’s oil output in 2011 was 
4.3 per cent of the world total. Canada’s share of 
proved reserves of oil was 10.6 per cent. (This percent-
age includes non-conventional bitumen and synthetic 
crude. This is the first year in which the BP source 
has included large oil sands volumes in Canada’s oil 
reserves.) Similarly, Alberta’s oil consumption, even 
all Canada’s, is a small part of total world oil demand. 
In 2011 Canada consumed about 2.5 per cent of the 
world’s oil (BP, 2012). For this reason, variations 
in Canada’s supply and demand for oil tend to be 
relatively insignificant for the world oil market. It is 
common, in fact, to assume that Canada is essentially 
a ‘price taker’ in international oil markets. Certainly, 
the actions of any single Canadian oil producer or 
consumer are so small that they will have no dis-
cernable effect on the world crude oil price; more 
generally, plausible variations in the Canadian oil 
supply (certainly Canadian conventional oil supply) 
or Canadian demand for refined petroleum products 
(RPPs) are small enough that they would generate 
barely noticeable effects upon world oil prices. The 
effect upon Alberta oil prices will tend to be small, but 
not necessarily negligible, depending upon the size 
of the regional markets in which Alberta oil sells, as 
well as the responsiveness of demand to price chan-
ges. Consider, for example, an increase in Alberta 
oil supply in the framework of the simple market 
depicted in Figure 3.1. If imports of oil into the water-
shed market (Montreal) are large enough, some incre-
mental Alberta oil supply may be absorbed there with 
no price change by backing out Nigerian oil. However, 
if imports of Nigerian oil are not large enough, then 
the price of Alberta oil will have to fall slightly, thereby 
encouraging more consumption of Alberta oil in all 
markets up to Montreal, and shifting the watershed 
slightly to the east. The ‘price taking’ assumption 
simply says that reduced Nigerian oil sales to Canada 
are such a small part of total world oil supply that no 
noticeable change is needed in the world (Nigerian) 
oil price. Hence, price changes for Alberta oil due to 
changes in the location of the competitive interface 
will be small; ripple effects in the ‘world oil pool’ will 
be minimal.
As was noted at the end of the previous chapter, 
Alberta’s non-conventional oil resources, in the form 
of tar sands and bitumen deposits, are very large in 
comparison to current world oil reserves, with esti-
mates of potential reserves of over 350 billion barrels 
(Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board 
[ERCB], Reserves Report, ST-98, 2010). This is over one 
third of current estimated world reserves, and 32 per 
cent higher than Saudi Arabia’s 2010 reserves. One can 
appreciate that any technological change, or crude oil 
price rise, which would be significant enough to make 
Alberta’s non-conventional oil resources economic, 
would be of tremendous importance, not only to 
Alberta, but to the world oil market generally. In fact, 
OPEC spokesmen have expressed awareness of the 
importance of pricing their oil below the cost of such 
large-volume alternatives as tar sands and oil shale 
hydrocarbons. An implicit assumption underlying 
these concerns is the belief that non-conventional 
oil output will prove to be very supply-elastic above 
some critical price; that is, large quantities could be 
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forthcoming with very little increase in cost. If this 
were true, then non-conventional oil might help play 
a role as a part of the eventual backstop technology for 
crude oil. A ‘backstop technology,’ strictly speaking, 
is an energy source available in essentially unlimited 
quantity, at constant cost, which is a perfect substitute 
for conventional crude oil (Nordhaus, 1973). Such a 
backstop would set a ceiling price for crude oil.
Table 3.1 makes clear the very uneven geographic 
distribution of conventional crude oil reserves, par-
ticularly their concentration in the phenomenally 
productive, low-cost oil fields of the Middle East and 
North Africa, which held over 50 per cent of world 
reserves at the end of 2011. The political instability 
of this region raises concerns about the security of 
supply of much of the oil moving in international 
trade, although it is easy to overstate security risks. 
Most of these Middle East reserves, plus those of a 
number of other countries, amounting in total to 
over 70 per cent of world reserves, are held by mem-
bers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC).
OPEC is an intergovernmental group of ‘third 
world’ nations that rely upon crude oil exports for 
the majority of their foreign exchange earnings. 
OPEC was formed in 1960 by Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, and, by the end of 2012, 
had grown to the thirteen members listed in Table 3.1. 
(OPEC membership has changed somewhat over the 
years. Ecuador suspended its membership in 1992 but 
indicated intent to rejoin when domestic economic 
conditions improved; it re-entered in October 2007. 
Gabon departed in the mid-1990s. In 2007 Angola 
joined. Indonesia suspended its membership in 2009.) 
OPEC’s share of world oil output in 2011 was just over 
42 per cent, much smaller than its 72 per cent share of 
oil reserves. Clearly OPEC nations in general are using 
their proved reserves much less intensively than other 
countries. The ratio of end-of-year reserves to annual 
output (R/P) shown in the last column of Table 3.1 
confirms this. In 2011 the United States, for example, 
had an R/P ratio of 10.8 in comparison to OPEC’s 
72.4. Most economists would attribute OPEC’s output 
restraint to a desire to maintain cartel-like high oil 
prices, rather than to a lack of ‘need’ for revenue or to 
a conservationist concern about the long-term avail-
ability of energy supplies for consumers. Some OPEC 
members exhibit much higher R/P ratios than others, 
but only Algeria and Indonesia had ratios smaller than 
20 in 2011.
It is interesting to note that, despite growing pro-
duction, remaining proved reserves of oil in the world 
have increased over the past four decades. Remaining 
Table 3.1: World Oil Reserves and Production, 2011
  Share of  Share of  R/P Ratio 
  World World  (Reserves/ 
  Reserves Production Annual  
  (%)  (%) Production)
 Canada 10.6 4.3 136.5
 United States 1.9 8.8 10.8
 Mexico 0.7 3.6 10.6
North America 13.2 16.8 41.7
 Ecuador* 0.4 0.7 33.2
 Venezuela* 17.9 3.5 298.6
South and Central America 19.7 9.5 120.8
 Norway 0.4 2.3 9.2
 Russia 5.3 12.8 23.5
 United Kingdom 0.2 1.3 7.0
Europe and Eurasia 8.5 21.0 22.3
 Algeria* 0.7 1.9 19.3
 Angola* 0.9 2.1 21.2
 Libya* 2.9 0.6 269.4
 Nigeria* 2.3 2.9 41.5
Africa 8.0 10.4 41.2
 Iran* 9.1 5.2 95.8
 Iraq* 8.7 3.4 140.1
 Kuwait* 6.1 3.5 97.0
 Qatar* 1.5 1.8 39.3
 Saudi Arabia* 16.1 13.2 65.2
 United Arab Emirates* 5.9 3.8 80.7
Middle East 48.1 32.6 78.7
 China 0.9 5.1 9.9
 Indonesia* 0.2 1.1 11.8
Asia	Pacific	 2.5	 9.7	 14.0
OPEC Total 72.4 42.4 91.5
World Total 100.0 100.0 54.2
Notes: Reserves estimates are for December 31, 2011, and are “proved 
reserves”	defined	as	“those	quantities	which	geologic	and	engineering	infor-
mation indicate with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from 
known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions.” Reserves 
estimates for non-conventional oil in Canada (“under active development”) and 
Venezuela (the Orinoco Belt) are included. Libya’s production is unusually low 
reflecting	the	2011	political	instability	associated	with	the	Arab	Spring.
* Member of OPEC (except for Indonesia which has had a suspended member-
ship since 2009).
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012.
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reserves of about 80 billion barrels in 1948 increased 
to about 350 billion barrels in 1965, doubled to just 
over 700 billion in 1985, and rose to over 1 trillion 
barrels by 1990, staying relatively constant at this 
level despite continuing production, then rising more 
recently to over 1600 billion barrels, partly as a result 
of the inclusion of non-conventional oil reserves in 
Canada and Venezuela (Dahl, 1991; BP, 2012). OPEC’s 
share of remaining reserves has also been increasing, 
particularly in the late 1980s when Venezuela, Iran, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) all added appreciably to their reserves. 
3. Determination of World Oil  
Prices: History
We have argued that world oil prices are of critical 
importance to Alberta and Canada but that Alberta 
is such a minor player in the world oil market that 
these prices are determined independently of any 
events in that province. What has been the pattern 
of international oil prices, and how have they been 
determined?
Figure 3.2 (from BP, 2011) provides an overview of 
the historical development of world crude oil prices, 
since the beginnings of the world oil industry in about 
1860. The higher of the two lines on the figure shows 
the price that a reasonably well-informed buyer might 
expect to pay for crude oil at a major world produc-
tion location, expressed in real U.S. dollars of 2010 
purchasing power. The lower line gives the current 
dollar price of oil as actually paid in any year before 
2010 (at the prices of that year); it is lower than the 
real 2010 dollar price due to inflation in the world 
economy over most of this period. The real price of 
oil provides a measure of the price of crude relative 
to commodities in general, and so is a more valid 
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Figure 3.2 World Crude Oil Prices, 1861–2010
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011
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showing actual price quotations in each year. The 
figure shows an average field price for U.S. crude up 
to 1944, the posted price for Saudi Arabian ‘light’ at 
the Persian Gulf from 1945 to 1985, and the Brent spot 
price since then. (Brent refers to a blend of North Sea 
light crudes. The changes in pricing location imply 
slight inconsistencies in the series in 1945, with Saudi 
prices slightly lower than U.S. prices, and in 1986 with 
Brent prices slightly higher than Saudi Light.) The 
pattern of movements shown would hold for other 
grades of crude oil at other locations, though there 
would be small differences in values reflecting quality 
differentials and transportation tariffs. Price trends 
would look similar for purchasers outside the United 
States, although, again, changes in real crude oil prices 
would differ somewhat to the extent that other coun-
tries experienced different inflation rates than the 
United States and/or currency fluctuations vis-à-vis 
the U.S. dollar. These two effects tend to offset one 
another to some extent, since inflation rates markedly 
higher (lower) than in the United States tend to be 
accompanied by depreciation (appreciation) of the 
local currency relative to the U.S. dollar. Most refined 
petroleum product prices would also show the same 
broad trends as crude oil prices; for some products, 
however, changes in government consumption taxes 
have played a major role in changing final retail prices 
over time.
There is no simple long-term trend in crude oil 
prices. This casts doubt on the hypothesis that over 
time increasing physical scarcity of a depletable, 
non-renewable natural resource such as crude oil will 
necessarily bring increasing economic scarcity (in 
the form of real price increases). While each year-
to-year price change will have its own unique set of 
underlying stimuli, it is useful to distinguish three 
broad periods of time: 1860–1930, 1930–70, and 1970–
present. (Many authors have reviewed the history of 
international oil prices; see, for example, Adelman, 
1972, 1995; Blair, 1976; Danielsen, 1982; Frank, 1966; 
Hamilton, 2011; Hartshorn, 1967, 1993; Jacoby, 1974; 
Odell, 1986; Penrose, 1968; Yergin, 1990.) Dvir and 
Rogoff (2009) provide a statistical analysis of world 
crude oil prices that finds three historical sub-periods 
similar to those noted here, though they date the 
end of the first period at 1878, while finding the years 
1878–1934 to be more unstable than their first period.
Period 1, 1860–1930. International crude oil prices 
were dominated by events in the United States, which 
was far and away the world’s largest oil producer. 
Apart from two years at the turn of the century when 
Russia ranked first, the United States produced more 
oil than any other country every year until the early 
1970s and was a net exporter until the late 1940s. By 
the turn of the century, a pricing pattern for oil had 
emerged, which was called ‘Gulf Plus’ pricing; the 
delivered price of oil anywhere in the world outside of 
North America was equal to the price of oil at the U.S. 
Gulf of Mexico (i.e., Texas) plus the cost of shipment 
from the Gulf of Mexico to that market. Gulf Plus 
pricing generally held up to World War II, apart from 
occasional local price wars and excepting markets 
that deliberately isolated themselves from the world 
market (e.g., Mexico after nationalization in 1938 and 
Russia after 1917).
Until the 1930s, U.S. crude prices showed instabil-
ity occasioned mainly by the operation of the ‘rule of 
capture’ in conjunction with erratic reserve additions 
(McDonald, 1971; Daintith, 2010). As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the rule of capture is a legal provision 
that ownership of a mobile or fugacious natural 
resource (such as wildlife and water, or petroleum in 
an underground reservoir) belongs to the party that 
captures (lifts) the resource. Typically, in the United 
States, the mineral rights that landowners issued to oil 
companies covered small areas so that more than one 
potential producer would have access to any oil pool. 
The oil beneath the surface was essentially unowned; 
that is, it was ‘common property’ to the producers 
with access to the pool. It is as if keys to your store-
room were owned by your competitors (Adelman, 
1964). As a result, there was a powerful incentive for 
each producer to attempt to lift the oil early, rather 
than risking its capture by a neighbouring competitor, 
and despite the damage this might cause to the reser-
voir’s natural drive and future producibility. 
Combined with the unpredictability of discoveries, 
the rule of capture induced pronounced cycles of 
production, with resultant price instability. Discovery 
of a major new oil play attracted eager explorers 
and there was a rush of discoveries and rapid output 
increases under the stimulus of the rule of capture; 
market prices would plummet. However, before long, 
rapid production decline in reservoirs, occasioned 
by the high initial output rates, would reduce output 
and force prices up again until the next major oil dis-
covery in a new geologic play. Refined product prices 
exhibited less price instability over this period, in part 
because unstable crude oil prices made up only a part 
of refined product prices. In addition, for much of this 
early period the refining sector of the oil industry was 
subject to strong anti-competitive corporate control, 
as exemplified by the Standard Oil Trust from the 
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1870s through to the 1911 U.S. Supreme Court decision 
that forced the break-up of Standard Oil.
Since the 1930s, the rule of capture has ceased 
to operate strongly as a factor influencing world oil 
prices, partly because the U.S. dominance of produc-
tion began to disappear. Also of importance were gov-
ernment regulations in North America that offset wild 
production swings (McDonald, 1971; Daintith, 2010). 
Of particular significance were: (1) market-demand 
prorationing regulations adopted by several U.S. 
states (and Alberta), which restricted output to the 
amount the market could absorb at current prices, 
and (2) various incentives to companies to ‘unitize’ oil 
pools and run them as a single producing operation 
so that production took place cooperatively rather 
than competitively. In addition, the rule of capture 
did not operate in many parts of the world that were 
of increasing importance after 1930 because British 
common law did not apply and/or because single 
production companies (like the Arabian Oil Company 
in Saudi Arabia) held vast tracts of land so reservoirs 
were not shared among producers.
Period 2, 1930–70. The period from the early 1930s to 
the late 1960s is characterized by an unusual degree 
of price stability, relative to the earlier and later per-
iods. Over these years, oil output in the United States 
grew, but at a slower rate than output elsewhere in 
the world, especially in less economically developed 
nations such as Venezuela, and some Middle Eastern 
and African countries. The majority of these new oil 
supplies were controlled by a small number of large, 
vertically integrated oil companies, the international 
‘majors,’ often referred to as the ‘Seven Sisters.’ 
Three of the companies derived from Standard Oil – 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, now known as Exxon; 
Standard Oil of California or Chevron; and Standard 
Oil of New York, or Mobil. There were two other U.S. 
companies – Gulf and Texaco – plus one British/
Dutch company long active in the United States – 
Shell – plus one company with significant British gov-
ernment ownership – the Anglo Persian Oil Company, 
now known as BP (privatized in the 1980s).
Despite occasional disagreements and price wars 
in some local markets, the majors maintained rela-
tively tight oligopoly control in the world oil market 
outside of North America and the USSR. (As will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, an oligop-
oly is a market in which some producers are large 
enough that they are able to affect the market price 
significantly. Thus they have an incentive to restrict 
production below what a price-taking producer might 
do, thereby increasing the market price and generat-
ing higher profits for themselves.) In earlier years, the 
companies entered into a number of formal agree-
ments. After World War II interactions between the 
major producers involved their joint operating agree-
ments in many countries along with more informal 
(tacit) understandings. Oligopoly markets, dominated 
by a few large sellers, exhibit an inherent tension 
between collusive (cooperative) and competitive ten-
dencies. The large producers are motivated to cooper-
ate, by restricting sales, to generate higher prices and 
profits. However, as a result of the high prices, any one 
of these collusive producers has potential additional 
production available with costs lower than price. It 
is tempting to produce this output, in violation of 
the formal or tacit group understanding, but such 
production will push the price down. These contra-
dictory behavioural impulses clearly serve as a source 
of potential price instability in oligopolized markets. 
In such an uncertain situation, producers in a reason-
ably well-functioning oligopoly may tend to adopt a 
pricing and marketing strategy of relative inaction, to 
avoid sending frightening signals to competitors and 
to maintain the status quo. Such oligopolistic rigidity 
seems to fit the international oil market quite well for 
the period from about 1930 through to the mid-1950s, 
with the prices for Middle Eastern crude tending to 
follow prices in the U.S. domestic market; U.S. prices, 
in turn, were quite inflexible under the domination of 
market-demand prorationing regulations.
As was described above, prior to the mid-1940s, 
international oil prices generally followed a system 
known as ‘Gulf Coast Plus,’ in which the delivered 
price of oil anywhere in the world was the price in the 
Gulf of Mexico plus transportation charges between 
the Gulf of Mexico and the delivery point. This was 
true whether or not oil was actually shipped from the 
Gulf of Mexico to that market. As a pricing system, 
this made eminent sense when the United States was 
by far the world’s largest producer of oil, the main 
source of incremental supply, and when most markets 
did in fact rely on shipments from the United States. 
However, Gulf Coast Plus pricing became increas-
ingly inappropriate as regions outside of the United 
States became major oil suppliers. By the late 1940s, 
the United States had become a net crude oil importer 
and was beginning to draw supplies from the Middle 
East so that pricing oil throughout the world as if it 
came from the United States no longer made sense. 
The first major break in Gulf Coast Plus pricing had 
come in 1942 when, at the insistence of the UK Navy, 
the price of Middle Eastern crude was set equal to the 
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U.S. price (rather than the U.S. price plus the trans-
portation charge from the U.S. to the Middle East). 
With the removal of price controls after World War II, 
U.S. oil prices rose more than Persian Gulf prices. Still, 
in the early 1950s, Persian Gulf Prices, while lower 
than those in Texas, followed any changes in U.S. 
crude prices.
The late 1950s saw the decoupling of North 
American and international oil prices. International 
prices fell under the pressure of increased competi-
tion, stimulated by the entry into the international oil 
market of new crude oil suppliers such as the USSR 
and a number of ‘independents.’ At the same time, 
the U.S. Oil Import Quota Program (1957) and the 
Canadian National Oil Policy (1961) allowed prices for 
North American-produced crude to remain signifi-
cantly above the international level (U.S. Cabinet Task 
Force on Oil Import Control, 1970; Watkins, 1989). 
From 1959 to 1970 the selling price of international 
crude fell gradually from $2.08/barrel (U.S. dollars 
for Saudi Arabia 34° crude f.o.b. Ras Tanura) to about 
$1.20/barrel. (The ‘posted’ price, in fact, remained 
constant at $1.80/barrel from 1960 through 1970 and 
served as a tax reference price, but this price was 
widely discounted in sales of oil.) The per barrel ‘tax-
paid cost’ of oil to companies in Saudi Arabia included 
about $0.10 of production costs and $0.85 to $0.95 in 
taxes throughout the 1960s, so that corporate profits 
per barrel fell drastically as the selling price of Middle 
East oil fell. Falling world oil prices meant that the 
consumption of oil rose very rapidly, with expanded 
Middle East and North African production providing 
much of the increased production.
Period 3, 1970–present. The third historical period, 
dating from 1970 to the present, is the OPEC-era (see 
Evans, 1986; Skeet, 1988; and Parra, 2004, amongst 
others). OPEC was founded in 1960 by Venezuela, 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, in response to 
the declines in oil prices in 1959 and 1960. (Lower 
sales prices meant lower tax revenues to the govern-
ment.) After 1960, nine other members were admitted: 
Ecuador, Algeria, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Indonesia, and (in 
2007) Angola; as noted above, Ecuador and Gabon left 
OPEC in the 1990s, with Ecuador rejoining in 2007.
OPEC had no dramatic effect on international 
oil markets during its first decade. It consolidated its 
existence and administrative structure, expanded to 
include new members, encouraged the standardiza-
tion of the oil tax regimes of the members, and was, 
through its continued existence and periodic protests, 
instrumental in persuading companies to accept 
royalty/tax assessments based upon the unchanging 
posted price of crude rather than the declining actual 
sales price. OPEC failed completely in its announced 
objective of forcing increases in international oil 
prices, in establishing an output control (prorationing) 
scheme, and in substantially increasing its overall 
‘take’ per barrel. But it did defend this take in the face 
of declining international oil prices.
However, since 1971, OPEC has been a dominant 
influence on world crude oil prices, although the 
degree of dominance has waxed and waned. The 
crumbling control of the large multinational oil com-
panies was replaced by OPEC as an even more effective 
price-determining oligopoly. Initially OPEC exercised 
its power in the oil market by actions designed to 
increase the taxes paid by the major oil companies; 
as the tax-paid cost of oil to the companies increased, 
they were forced to raise the selling price of the crude 
oil. However, by the end of the 1970s, the OPEC gov-
ernments had nationalized the oil reserves of the 
major oil companies, and the production and pricing 
of oil was the responsibility of the government-owned 
‘national’ oil companies (NOCs). (Jaffe and Soligo, 
2007, provide a recent survey of the relative signifi-
cance of NOCs and shareholder-owned private oil 
companies in the world market.) Figure 3.2 demon-
strates two ways in which this new (OPEC) oligopoly 
differed from the old (corporate) one: prices were 
increased to levels far above those of the 1930–70 
period, and international crude oil price instability 
became pronounced once again. Competing explan-
ations have been offered for the price changes over 
this period (Gately, 1984, 1986; Griffin and Teece, 1982; 
Mead, 1979). Our brief survey draws largely on the 
work of Morris Adelman, who has argued convin-
cingly that the most critical factor is OPEC’s role as 
an effective cartel (Adelman, 1980, 1984a, 1986, 1989, 
1990, 1993a, 1995, 2002, amongst many others).
The major price rises after 1970 suggest that OPEC 
has been a much more effective cartel than were the 
major oil companies. A partial explanation must 
lie in OPEC’s lack of inhibition in fully exploiting 
its powers in the market; OPEC is not, for instance, 
subject to corporate anti-combines (anti-monopoly) 
laws. However, in its search for higher profits, OPEC 
remains subject to the overall discipline of the market. 
Higher prices will induce conservation of energy and 
substitution away from oil to other energy products, 
as well as increased output by non-cartel suppliers. As 
a ‘residual supplier’ in the market, OPEC must beware 
lest declining sales more than offset rising prices. 
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Further, the quest for a price that maximizes OPEC’s 
profits necessarily has certain similarities to a game of 
blind man’s bluff. The OPEC cartel can see the current 
market situation but has only imperfect information 
about two key factors: what will happen to sales at 
prices significantly different from today’s, especially 
over the longer run, and what changes in behaviour, 
technology, and government regulation may occur in 
the future (induced, perhaps, by current OPEC deci-
sions). As a result, OPEC’s search for the optimal price 
takes place in an environment of uncertainty in which 
the optimal price is best seen as a moving target.
OPEC’s rise as a successful cartel was precipitated 
by actions taken independently by Libya and Algeria 
(both OPEC members) in 1970. Following the closure 
of the Suez Canal in 1967 and of the Trans Arabian 
pipeline from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean in 
Spring 1970, profits on North African oil increased. 
Shipment costs for oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe 
(now forced to travel around the Cape of Good Hope) 
increased, thereby raising the delivered price of oil in 
Western Europe and generating a higher value there 
for North African oil, which did not face a large rise 
in transport costs. Under the tax/royalty regime of the 
time, based on unchanging posted prices (that is, ‘tax 
reference prices,’ which were the price levels used in 
calculating royalty and income tax payments to the 
government), all the profit increase on North African 
oil went to the oil companies and none to the govern-
ment. Libya responded by demanding higher posted 
(tax reference) prices and a rise in the income tax rate.
The bargaining position of the governments of 
the oil-producing countries was generally thought 
to be weak in circumstances like this. For instance, 
when Iran had nationalized the assets of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC, now BP) in 1951, the 
majors boycotted Iranian oil and increased oil output 
elsewhere in the Middle East, particularly from AIOC 
holdings in Kuwait. Iran found that it was unable to 
sell any appreciable amounts of its oil and was forced 
to negotiate a new agreement with AIOC and other 
international oil companies in order to get back 
into the world oil market. Libya’s situation, however, 
differed in two important respects from that of the 
Persian Gulf OPEC members. First, rather than facing 
a single consortium producing virtually all the nation’s 
oil, Libya had issued oil permits (concessions) to a 
number of companies. Second, some of these com-
panies were ‘independents,’ like Occidental Petroleum, 
which had international oil output only in Libya, 
unlike the ‘majors,’ which had productive concessions 
elsewhere as well. Libya strengthened its bargaining 
position by negotiating with the companies separately, 
by focusing initially on the independents, and by 
ordering production cutbacks for those companies. 
After the first independent agreed to Libyan terms, the 
other oil companies soon followed. Algeria, whose oil 
was produced by French companies, attained similar 
agreements.
Libya’s success in generating more revenue per 
barrel for the government, through higher posted 
prices and tax rates, galvanized other OPEC members, 
whether or not they possessed Libya’s temporary loca-
tional advantage. OPEC focused its attention initially 
on oil shipped from the Persian Gulf (which came 
from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and 
Qatar), demanding changes similar to those agreed to 
in Libya. The oil companies had always refused to rec-
ognize OPEC as a legitimate bargaining agent, insisting 
on separate single company-single government 
negotiations. However, this had not worked to their 
advantage in Libya and Algeria. In late 1970, meetings 
began between representatives of countries with oil 
moving from the Persian Gulf and representatives of 
all the companies producing that oil. On February 
15, 1971, the Teheran Agreement was signed by the 
governments and companies, pretty well agreeing 
to the OPEC demands. Later in the spring, a similar 
agreement was signed at Tripoli covering oil that left 
OPEC from Mediterranean ports, and correspond-
ing agreements quickly followed covering the rest of 
OPEC oil (i.e., Venezuela, Nigeria, and Indonesia). 
The Teheran-Tripoli agreements were to apply for 
five years, bringing ‘stability’ to the world oil market 
by providing for an increase in OPEC tax rates and a 
schedule of moderate posted price rises. We can see 
now that their real significance was in demonstrating 
to OPEC that it possessed the ability to increase the 
price of oil and that neither the oil companies nor the 
world’s major oil importing countries would offer any 
effective resistance to this.
It is of some importance to note that the rises in 
posted price under the Teheran-Tripoli Agreements 
did not directly increase world crude oil prices 
because, as was noted earlier, oil was not in fact sold 
by the major oil companies at the posted price. 
However, the Agreements did raise oil prices in an 
indirect manner. Since the posted price served as a tax 
reference price, higher posted prices raised the ‘tax-
paid cost’ of oil to the oil companies, who in turn were 
pushed to increase the actual selling price of crude to 
recover these higher costs. OPEC members began to 
nationalize the crude oil producers beginning in 1972, 
and the posted pricing system became less important. 
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Increasing volumes of oil were sold directly by the 
government oil companies at a price set by the govern-
ment. Thus, in the early to mid-1970s, the major influ-
ence on international oil prices shifted from OPEC’s 
determination of the posted price and tax rates (which 
affected the per barrel payments the companies made 
to the governments) to OPEC’s direct establishment of 
a selling price for crude.
Opinions differ on why no effective opposition to 
OPEC appeared. It might be tied to the basic logistic 
and coordination difficulties involved in obtaining 
responses from the oil companies and consumer gov-
ernments; that is, this side of the bargaining table was 
effectively competitive. However, others (Adelman, 
1972) have argued that in 1971 a number of the other 
main players also desired higher oil prices. The major 
oil companies, for instance, had clearly lost much of 
their power over the oil market in the 1960s. If crude 
oil prices rose, they stood to benefit by higher profits, 
which would follow on non-OPEC oil, and even on 
OPEC oil, if they could increase the selling price of oil 
by more than increased taxes to OPEC. U.S. oil had 
become increasingly non-competitive throughout 
the 1960s, and higher oil prices would both make the 
relatively high U.S. oil prices more politically tolerable 
and bring oil costs in the rest of the world more in line 
with those faced by U.S. businesses. Moreover, most 
of the international oil companies were U.S.-based, 
so that higher international oil profits benefited U.S. 
citizens and the U.S. balance of payments. Other gov-
ernments with important domestic energy production 
sectors (Canada’s fossil fuels, coal in the UK, Belgium, 
and West Germany, etc.) may also have seen higher oil 
prices as desirable. In addition, the rapid growth in oil 
consumption in the 1960s, spurred by low and falling 
prices, had brought to an end most of the excess pro-
duction capacity in North America and had increased 
the world’s reliance on OPEC oil.
The promised stability of the Teheran-Tripoli 
agreements proved illusory, as some observers fore-
cast (Adelman, 1972). Once OPEC began to receive 
the fruits of higher prices, why would its members 
settle back quietly for five years? Later in 1971 and 
again in early 1973, OPEC insisted that negotiations be 
reopened, and, in agreements with the oil companies 
signed in Geneva, posted prices and tax payments per 
barrel were increased again. Signs of growing disarray 
in the international oil market led to attempts by par-
ticipants to stake out positions with a firm foundation. 
OPEC spoke of the priority of a “Principle of Changing 
Circumstances,” to which responsible governments 
must respond in the interest of the citizens they 
represent, while companies increasingly emphasized 
the “Principle of the Sanctity of the Contract.” OPEC’s 
Principle prevailed as the Organization moved to 
consolidate its power in world oil markets.
The result was an explosion in oil prices in the 
decade after 1972. This occurred with two separate 
price eruptions in 1973–74 and in 1979–81. Each fol-
lowed a four-stage process (Adelman, 1995):
(1) A disruption in international oil supplies (the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War, or 1978 Revolution in 
Iran) put strong upward pressure on oil prices 
in spot sales. OPEC members not involved in 
the disruption faced contradictory incentives. 
On the one hand was a willingness to see oil 
prices rise, with a corresponding reluctance to 
immediately make up for all the supplies lost as 
a result of the supply disruptions. On the other 
hand, there was an incentive to increase produc-
tion to generate more revenue at the high spot 
price.
(2) Other participants in the crude oil market – oil 
producers outside OPEC, refiners, marketers, oil 
consumers – had no certain knowledge about 
how long the crisis might last or how high oil 
prices might rise. They reacted by stockpil-
ing more oil for their own use or subsequent 
sale. But the resultant decreased supply and 
increased demand on the spot market drove 
the spot price even higher. Data on oil produc-
tion during the crises suggests that the reduced 
output during the crisis was quickly replaced 
by higher output, mainly from other OPEC 
members, so that the main stimulus to higher 
prices during the crisis came from the inventory 
(stockpiling) effects.
(3) Members of the cartel found that the high spot 
prices largely benefit companies that had pur-
chased oil at the cartel’s lower official selling 
prices. OPEC members individually or collec-
tively acted to raise official prices, ensuring that 
they captured the incremental oil profits.
(4) After the crisis passed, OPEC kept prices at the 
new higher level, adjusting its output so as to 
maintain the price.
Several dimensions of this four-stage process deserve 
further comment. First, from the mid-1970s to the 
early 1980s, OPEC operated as a ‘price-fixing cartel.’ 
At meetings of the OPEC conference, the group would 
decide upon a price for a ‘marker’ or reference crude 
oil (34° Saudi oil at the Persian Gulf). Individual 
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members were then responsible for fixing appropriate 
prices for their specific crude oils. Presumably, this 
was a price (relative to the reference grade) that would 
generate a demand for this country’s oil such that its 
share of OPEC production was at a level recognized 
as appropriate by other cartel members. Prior to 1982, 
OPEC did not publicly announce any agreed-on output 
levels or quotas for individual members, but if one 
country set its price too low, so that its sales rose ‘too 
high,’ other cartel members would accuse it of ‘cheat-
ing.’ In other circumstances, during supply crises, for 
instance, with fixed OPEC prices, increases in spot 
market prices conveyed a message of ‘foregone profits’ 
to OPEC members.
Second, OPEC operates under a consensual 
method of decision-making, rather than through a 
majority voting procedure; on matters of any import 
to the group, a policy change can occur only if all 
members agree to it. More accurately, none must dis-
agree, and it is possible that they may agree to allow 
different actions by different members. This method of 
decision-making brings rigidity to OPEC behaviour.
Third, uncertainties in the market meant that, 
while all OPEC members saw significant gains accru-
ing from high oil prices in the early 1970s, no one 
knew how high the price should go in order to 
maximize group profits. Reference was made to the 
possible costs of alternative energy supplies such as 
non-conventional oil, but agreement on exactly how 
far to raise the price was hard to attain, especially if all 
members had to agree on the new price. Under these 
conditions, it is easy to see why spot prices may have 
been taken as an indication of how much consumers 
would be willing to pay for oil.
Fourth, in the short term, neither consumption 
of oil nor production by non-OPEC suppliers is very 
responsive to a price rise. Therefore, OPEC sales 
declined relatively little immediately after a price rise, 
even a large one, and higher prices initially raised 
group profits. The lack of near-term response by non-
OPEC producers and consumers was accentuated by 
government policies in some non-OPEC countries, 
such as price controls, to limit oil price rises, and 
higher production taxes. Price controls keep oil con-
sumption higher, and along with higher production 
taxes keep oil production lower, thereby reducing the 
fall in OPEC sales as OPEC raises the price of oil.
These factors help explain the peculiar course of 
the international crude oil price in the 1970s. Instead 
of a steady price rise as OPEC gained strength, a 
‘ratchet’ process is apparent with periods of relative 
stability alternating with sharp increases. However, as 
time passed, longer-run market adjustments began to 
occur, and OPEC was forced to reassess its strategy.
The fall in prices as the 1980s progressed illustrates 
the problems inherent in cartel management when 
responses to its actions are gradual and cumulative 
rather than abrupt. The Saudi Arabia reference crude 
had risen in price from about $14.00/bbl in 1977 to 
as high as $34.00/bbl in 1981 and was still at $28.00/
bbl in 1985. By 1985 OPEC was producing at only 50 
per cent of the 1979 level. Thus, despite the doubling 
of nominal prices, members were in about the same 
earnings position as 1979 and worse off after allowance 
for inflation. Saudi Arabia was bearing a dispropor-
tionately large share of the burden of cutting output 
(falling from over 10 million barrels per day (b/d) in 
1979 to under 3 million by early 1985). This reflected 
the Saudi adoption of a ‘balance wheel’ (or ‘swing 
producer’) role in 1982, where it agreed to vary pro-
duction above or below its quota amount as necessary 
to maintain the OPEC price. Continuing declines in 
OPEC’s share of the market were in prospect at these 
prices; OPEC had overshot the mark with its price 
increases of 1978 to 1981. Saudi Arabia precipitated 
the required market adjustment by increasing its 
output sharply, driving spot prices below $10/barrel 
and forcing a new OPEC agreement. Revival of the 
OPEC cartel involved two components: agreement on 
the desirability of a significantly lower price, more 
compatible with the longer-term realities of the oil 
market; and a shift in group strategy from price-fixing 
to quantity-fixing, as OPEC instituted a system of 
production quotas.
The change in OPEC’s method of operation can 
be seen as part of what some authors have called 
‘commoditization’ of the world petroleum market 
(Verleger, 1982). The nationalization of the assets of 
the major oil companies by OPEC governments in 
the 1970s meant that the majors no longer controlled 
large volumes of petroleum within vertically inte-
grated channels. The majors were transformed into 
large buyers of crude oil, broadening the crude market 
dramatically. Further, the spot market for oil, and in 
the 1980s futures and options ‘derivative’ markets, has 
grown rapidly. In the late 1960s, about 5 per cent of 
international crude oil sales were in the spot market, 
the rest being either intercorporate transfers or sales 
under longer-term contracts. By the early 1980s, over 
50 per cent of sales were in the spot market. These new 
spot and derivatives markets have many active buyers 
and sellers, with flexible prices; entry is relatively easy, 
so that spot and future prices are very reactive to day-
to-day perceptions about variations in demand and 
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supply whether occasioned by real events or rumour. 
Of course, the play of spot and derivatives markets 
is against the all-critical backdrop of OPEC’s basic 
output decisions. By switching from a price-fixing to a 
quantity-fixing strategy, however, OPEC has moved to 
tie its exercise of oligopoly power directly to the vola-
tile spot market, with the prices paid to the country 
reflecting current market values.
The importance of these changes can be seen in 
the similarities and differences between the 1990 Gulf 
War in the Middle East and the two earlier political 
crises. With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990, spot prices of oil rose markedly, as in previous 
crises, from under $15/barrel in June 1990 for Saudi 
Light crude to near $40/barrel in late September. 
The market reacted sharply to the decreased supplies 
from Iraq and Kuwait (even though these were largely 
replaced by increases in output elsewhere, especially 
in Saudi Arabia), and the levels of stockpiles desired 
rose sharply. However, unlike the earlier crises, the 
price of oil fell sharply back to lower levels, reaching 
around $18/barrel by February 1991. The differences 
reflect five interrelated factors. First, OPEC had 
learned the longer-term dangers of pushing oil prices 
up too high. Second, even though Iraqi and Kuwaiti 
oil was completely lost to the market in 1991, other 
OPEC members – especially Saudi Arabia – were more 
than willing to make up the shortfall (as was neces-
sary if continuing high prices were to be avoided). 
Third, as a quantity-fixing cartel, with sales prices for 
these quantities tied to spot prices, OPEC producers 
automatically benefited from the rise in spot prices 
during the crisis, unlike the earlier two crises where 
OPEC-fixed prices lagged behind the spot market and 
OPEC had to raise the official government selling price 
to profit from the crisis. Fourth, strategic petroleum 
reserves (SPRs) were higher in OECD countries, with 
the United States actually releasing small amounts 
from its SPR in September. The use of SPRs helped to 
dampen prices, and knowledge of their potential for 
a moderating effect may have reduced the incentive 
to build up inventories. Fifth, the development of 
oil derivatives markets meant that companies could 
reduce their exposure to possible price increases 
during the crises by engaging in futures markets 
transactions instead of building up inventories. This 
reduced the pressure on spot prices during the crises.
Since OPEC adopted a quantity-fixing approach to 
the oil market in 1987, almost all crude oil sales take 
place at fluctuating spot prices. The spot prices are 
highly variable, reflecting current market conditions 
and expectations. On an annual basis, from 1987 to 
2002, the price of Saudi Arabia light oil was as low as 
$12.16/bbl (1998) and as high as $26.24/bbl (2000). On 
a daily basis, the price was as high as above $40/bbl 
(during the Gulf War and the uncertainties of early 
2003 leading up the U.S. invasion of Iraq); it fell below 
$10.00/bbl. when world oil consumption declined 
during the economic crisis in the Asia Pacific in 1998. 
Participants in the world oil market have had to learn 
to live with price variability. There was no obvious 
trend in price over this time period, although prices 
from 1987 to 1999 were largely in the teens, followed 
by about four years with prices more frequently in the 
twenties. This was reflected in OPEC’s ‘target’ price, 
which was $18.00/bbl. in the 1990s (and normally not 
attained!), but was increased to a range of $22–$28/
bbl in 2000. (The target price is the average price for a 
‘basket’ of seven specific crude oils.)
However, beginning in the year 2004, as shown 
in Figure 3.2, international crude oil prices rose 
dramatically, in a manner much welcomed by OPEC. 
(Smith, 2009, provides a good discussion of world 
oil prices with an emphasis on events from 2000 to 
2009; see also Hamilton, 2009.) For example, Saudi 
Light oil was priced at $27.08/b as of the start of 2004, 
$31.86/b in 2005, $50.86/b in 2006, and $55.94/b 
in 2007. Midway through 2007, prices increased 
markedly again, so that Saudi Light was priced 
at over $88/b by January of 2008, and still on an 
upward path, hitting a high of $136.02/b for the first 
week of July 2008, well above the previous real price 
maximum in 1980. (It should be noted that the real 
price refers to international prices expressed in terms 
of real dollars of U.S. purchasing power. For the many 
countries, like Canada, the UK, Australia, and those 
in the Euro in Western Europe, the real oil price was 
still significantly below the heights of 1980 because 
their currencies had been appreciating relative to the 
U.S. dollar.) These high prices generated tremendous 
revenue increases for the OPEC nations. OPEC’s March 
2006 Long-term Strategy document re-stated OPEC’s 
verbal commitment to helping maintain ‘stability’ in 
oil markets but included no mention of a long-term 
target price (OPEC, 2006).
However, the high prices of mid-2008 were 
short-lived, as prices fell steadily. Saudi Arabia Light 
averaged $38.35/b in the last week of December 2008! 
International crude oil prices then resumed a gener-
ally upward trend, reaching $71.58/b (for Saudi Light) 
in the first week of August 2009. From then until the 
time of final revision of this book (Spring 2013), prices 
have fluctuated but in a narrower range than that from 
2004 to mid-2009, with a low weekly average price for 
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Saudi Light of $66.33/b (mid-September 2009) and 
a high of over $100.00/b (by the end of February 2011).
We now turn from this brief historical review of 
world crude oil prices to a more general discussion of 
the major factors that determine the level of oil prices 
in the world market.
4. Major Determinants of  
World Oil Prices
It is tempting to explain the evolution of oil prices by 
the physical ‘realities’ of petroleum as a scarce natural 
resource. For example, the inevitable depletion of the 
resource base may be called upon as justification for 
forecasts of higher prices. However, as mentioned 
above, over a century of history does not show a con-
sistent tendency for higher real oil prices. Others have 
suggested that the geographic distribution of world 
oil necessitates increasing dependence on OPEC, espe-
cially Middle Eastern oil. Figure 3.3 shows that the 
world did become increasingly reliant on OPEC oil 
from 1965 to 1973, but that dependency fell after that. 
A missing element in these physical explanations is 
the operation of the market, specifically the slowdown 
in total oil consumption (and, hence, production) and 
the increase in non-OPEC production (especially out-
side the United States and the USSR) after OPEC forced 
oil prices up in the 1970s. Physical realities must 
underlie what occurs, but petroleum prices reflect 
economic factors.
It is sometimes argued that OPEC producers main-
tain high R/P (reserves to production) ratios because 
oil left in the ground has a higher value to them than 
oil produced today; in terms that will be set out more 
fully in Chapter Four, oil has a relatively high ‘scarcity 
value’ or ‘user cost.’ In strict economic terms, based on 
oil prices, the argument makes little sense. A simple 
numerical example illustrates this. If we abstract from 
production costs (which are very low for most OPEC 
producers) and consider the use to which current oil 
revenue might be put, $60/b, derived from the sale 
of one barrel of crude oil produced in the year 2010, 
would have a value of $638 in eighty years if invested 
at a real rate of return of only 3 per cent per annum. 
Eighty years is used to approximate the length of time 

























































Figure 3.3 OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Output, 1965–2010
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ratio would be required to draw on any oil left in the 
ground today. (If the long-term inflation rate were 2% 
per year, the nominal value of the investment, in dol-
lars of year 2090 purchasing power, would be $3112.) 
It would make sense to leave oil in the ground as an 
investment only if oil prices by 2090 were expected 
to be at these very high levels. This seems unlikely, 
given many analysts’ estimates for such potential 
backstop technologies as non-conventional oil and 
various solar/electric/hydrogen alternatives. A more 
plausible explanation for the high OPEC R/P ratio is a 
cartel (oligopoly) reason: the group’s desire to generate 
higher current prices and profits by restricting output. 
(However, Hamilton, 2009, argues that the higher oil 
prices after 2006 may incorporate a significant pure 
scarcity value, and, even if they do not now, rising 
world demand, especially in the developing world, is 
likely soon to generate such a scarcity value. While 
this would support competitive world oil prices higher 
than the production costs in the main OPEC nations, 
we do not believe it would justify prices of $60/b 
or more.)
However, the high R/P ratios also point out a 
major source of potential instability in the oil market, 
since most OPEC members would have little techno-
logical difficulty in expanding oil output significantly. 
(At an R/P ratio of 25, still far above the 2010 non-
OPEC ratio of 15.1, OPEC alone would have produced 
over 110 million barrels per day in 2010. Total world 
oil utilization in 2010 was about 82 million!)
Adelman (1990, 1993a) notes another sense in 
which the potential for rapid oil output increases is 
greater now, in the OPEC era, than it was when the 
multinational majors dominated the industry. When 
the Seven Sisters managed the market prior to 1970, 
their productive capacity was held quite close to 
planned output levels. The relative rigidity in pricing 
and market shares extended to restraint in the installa-
tion of new capacity, an accommodation that was, no 
doubt, fostered by the prevalence of joint production 
agreements amongst the companies. OPEC, however, 
has been operating in many years since early 1970s 
with significant excess producing capacity. In part, 
the excess capacity reflected the major fall in OPEC 
output after 1979, but, in addition, a number of mem-
bers were active in increasing capacity. There has 
been little formal economic analysis of why countries 
might undertake expenditures for development that 
is not utilized. Among the reasons that suggest them-
selves are: forecasting errors, in the sense that they 
had expected to need the capacity but subsequently 
discovered it was not needed; preservation of the 
ability to capitalize rapidly on increased sales if OPEC 
should collapse; holding spare capacity in reserve for 
use during any international supply disruption, like 
the 1990/91 crisis; using spare capacity as a poten-
tial threat to other OPEC members, thereby gaining 
greater influence over OPEC pricing policy and output 
quota allocations. Whatever the reasons, an overhang 
of spare capacity provides a clear threat of potential 
downward price instability to the market. The loss 
of Iraq’s and Kuwait’s 6.5 million b/d or so from the 
market in late 1990 dented the excess capacity con-
siderably for several years. In addition, production 
decline as oil pools are depleted will gradually eat up 
spare capacity, though there is disagreement amongst 
experts on how rapidly production decline is occur-
ring in the large oil reservoirs of the Middle East. 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 
2013) reports relatively low OPEC spare capacity in the 
mid-2000s (from 1.0 to 2.0 million b/d in the 5 years 
from 2004 to 2008) but an increase to 5 million b/d by 
2010, followed by reduced levels (2.8 million b/d by 
February 2013).
While the potential for a significant collapse of the 
world oil price is clear in a market with an overhang of 
spare capacity and high R/P values for key OPEC pro-
ducers, the likelihood of the scenario is more difficult 
to estimate. The major inhibiting factor is the wide-
spread recognition by OPEC members that they would 
all be worse off in this case, particularly if non-OPEC 
producing countries provide governmental support 
for their domestic oil production. On the other hand, 
prices of oil far above marginal production costs may 
tempt one or more OPEC members to exceed quotas; 
this behaviour could draw other members into similar 
action, trying to increase sales before prices plummet. 
Given the short-run unresponsiveness of world con-
sumption and non-OPEC production to lower prices, 
even relatively small output increases could generate 
a significant price reduction and induce responses 
from other OPEC members. If the short-run elasticity 
of demand for OPEC oil were –0.2, and total demand 
for OPEC oil were 22 million barrels/day, an output 
increase of only 400,000 barrels/day by any single 
cartel member would be sufficient to reduce price by 
almost 10 per cent. And no OPEC member would find 
a 10 per cent decline in revenue to be negligible. (An 
elasticity of demand of –0.2 means that if the oil price 
were to rise by 1%, the quantity of oil demanded would 
fall by 0.2%. Chapter Four provides discussion of the 
elasticity concept.)
While many OPEC members have often held sig-
nificant spare production capacity, it is only fair to 
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note that there are disincentives to investing in unused 
capacity, most importantly the foregone opportunity 
costs of the required expenditures. This is particularly 
so given the highly politicized atmosphere in which 
most OPEC government oil companies operate, where 
governments would prefer to see oil revenues utilized 
on programs that generate political capital amongst 
the population at large. In the early years of the new 
millennium, OPEC spare productive capacity fell to 
historically low levels. In such a market, the short-run 
unresponsiveness (inelasticity) of production and 
consumption behaviour means that the predominant 
instabilities in oil prices are in the upward direction 
in the face of unexpectedly large demand increases or 
supply disruptions.
From an economic perspective, the crucial ele-
ment in the determination of international crude oil 
prices is not the pressure of declining supplies of an 
exhaustible natural resource, but the oligopoly struc-
ture of the international oil market, and the opposing 
pressures on cartel members to collude for higher 
group profits or compete (cheat) for higher market 
shares. As a result, one can build plausible scenarios 
for international crude oil prices over the next sev-
eral decades that range from under $10/barrel to over 
$100/barrel, as well as mixed scenarios that move from 
lower to higher prices as OPEC exercises more or less 
production restraint in the face of changing market 
circumstances, and as periodic political crises occur in 
the Middle East. Pindyck (1999) argues that no single 
empirical model of OPEC is likely to prove adequate. 
This is a realistic message but not a comforting one for 
producers, consumers, and governments who cannot 
avoid making policy and investment decisions that 
hinge on long-term oil prices.
Some oil market analysts find it useful to dis-
tinguish between day-to-day or month-to-month 
shorter-term market fluctuations and the underlying 
longer-term phenomena. Given the commoditization 
of the crude oil market discussed above, the short-
term unresponsiveness of consumption and produc-
tion to price changes, and the feasibility of short-term 
storage, prices in spot and futures markets may change 
rapidly and significantly. As a result, commodity trad-
ing activities, including the extensive trading in deriv-
atives, have become critical for oil companies.
It is common to argue, however, that the price 
instability in the spot market is tied to, but relatively 
independent from, longer-term ‘market fundamentals.’ 
The hypothesis is that the average level of spot and 
futures prices is tied to longer-term factors, but that 
most changes in spot prices are largely independent 
of the longer-term underlying determinants of price. 
The trading departments of oil companies are vitally 
concerned with spot market prices that respond to 
seasonal factors, crises in the Middle East, break-
downs in facilities, changes in patterns of inventory 
behaviour, and all-and-sundry news reports about 
possible changes in government oil policies, OPEC 
solidarity, new technologies, etc. But the investment 
divisions of companies are vitally concerned with the 
longer-term fundamentals. It is important to note that 
the hypothesized independence of short- and long-
term influences on oil prices was not true during the 
supply crises of the 1970s, when OPEC used spot prices 
as a signal for their longer-term pricing strategies. As 
discussed earlier, the shift by OPEC to a quota-fixing 
strategy, and recognition of the unreliability of spot 
prices as an indicator of sustainable long-term prices, 
make a repetition of the crisis-driven price responses 
of the 1970s less likely. However, we should note that 
governments may become very quickly attached to 
the rapid rise in petroleum revenues from an oil price 
increase. (Revenue rises since, in the short term, sales 
fall very little as price increases.) However, such gov-
ernments run the risk of very substantial sales declines 
in the longer run as consumers and other producers 
adjust their behaviour to the higher prices.
The longer-term course of world oil prices hinges 
critically on the cohesion of the OPEC cartel in light 
of the usual (though difficult to predict) evolution of 
economic growth, technological change, discoveries of 
new oil plays, developments in mature areas, changes 
in consumer tastes, and government policies.
As noted, a ‘cartel’ is an endeavour by producers 
to generate profits by withholding output from the 
market to induce higher prices. A cartel is subject 
to high tension between this collusive tactic and an 
opposing temptation to expand output and cheat on 
the group agreement. OPEC members are all sovereign 
states, not subject to any binding international law, 
so that the ultimate oil output and pricing decisions 
are those of the individual members. In effect, each 
OPEC member has the following three decisions it 
must make:
(1) The individual member of OPEC has some pro-
posal for the actions of the group in its entirely; 
i.e., some target price and quantity (quota) for 
OPEC as a whole which is consistent with cur-
rent market conditions.
(2) The individual member has some implicit or 
explicit proposal of how the group’s total output 
will be allocated amongst the 13 members; e.g., 
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proposed output levels (quotas) for the thirteen 
which add up to the target output.
(3) The individual member must determine actual 
output or price levels for the various types of oil 
it produces; these may be consistent with the 
OPEC group decision or may involve ‘cheating’ 
by the individual member.
Numerous factors complicate these three deci-
sions. While any one member will tend to prefer a 
group decision that favours it, the consensual group 
decision-making procedure means that none of the 
other members must find the proposed group decision 
unacceptable. Since conditions in the oil market are 
uncertain, the group decisions cannot fix both the 
price of OPEC oil and the quantity produced. One of 
the two must be flexible to allow oil markets to find 
their economic equilibrium. Since 1986 OPEC has 
functioned as a quantity-fixing cartel, so price is flex-
ible, although the quotas have ostensibly been set with 
a target price in mind. (Starting around 2000, OPEC 
briefly flirted with a policy to automatically raise 
output if the price exceeds the target for a set period 
of time and to cut production if price falls below 
the target level. But this policy was not consistently 
applied.) While OPEC procedures require full agree-
ment, it seems reasonable to suppose that some OPEC 
members have more ability to achieve their object-
ives than others. For example, small producers (like 
Algeria) may be able to attain particularly high output 
rates (relative to reserves) and, perhaps, successfully 
cheat because they have such a limited effect on the 
market. Conversely, the largest producers, especially 
Saudi Arabia, must be accorded great weight in group 
decision-making, simply by virtue of their huge 
reserves and ability to vary output significantly to help 
attain any proposal favoured and to frustrate any plan 
not liked. But these are generalizations, and need not 
be true at any particular time, especially since the high 
responsiveness of oil prices to short-term output fluc-
tuations gives even middle-sized producers the ability 
to have a noticeable impact on the oil market.
It is difficult to know exactly when an OPEC 
member is cheating by overproducing. For one thing, 
output statistics are not available immediately, nor are 
they perfectly reliable, and OPEC’s auditing procedures 
have been singularly unsuccessful. Also, one must 
assume that the quota represents an average to be met 
over the period of agreement (e.g., half year); but the 
quota may well be exceeded for some weeks or even 
months, without any implication of cheating. Another 
possible ambiguity lies in the definition of what 
constitutes oil – does it include condensate, NGLs, or 
very heavy oil (bitumen)? Apparently OPEC interprets 
the quotas as applying to the production of crude oil 
in member countries, excluding liquid petroleum 
derived from natural gas production.
The inescapable conclusion is an awkward one: 
decision-makers in the oil industry must base their 
actions on expectations about the future course of 
international oil prices, but the outlook brackets a 
wide range of possibilities.
5. Conclusion
The impact of the OPEC governments on world oil 
prices illustrates ‘petropolitics’ writ large. To label 
OPEC a ‘cartel,’ as do most economists, conveys some 
economic information, but not a great deal. It implies 
that members of OPEC cooperate to restrict output 
and generate higher world oil prices. But cartels come 
in all shapes and sizes and change form over time. 
Adelman (1980, 1989) characterizes OPEC as a ‘loosely 
cooperating oligopoly’ which has tended to move back 
and forth between two different modes of operation: a 
‘full cartel’ mode in which all members operate to vary 
output together to control the market, and a ‘residual 
supplier’ mode in which only certain producers (espe-
cially Saudi Arabia) take responsibility for controlling 
the market by playing a balance wheel role. (Hansen 
and Lindholt, 2008, provide a statistical analysis of the 
world oil market that seems consistent with Adelman’s 
characterization.) It is easy to be misled by the size of 
Saudi Arabia’s output and reserves and to assume that 
it is the only OPEC member that really matters. In fact, 
empirical investigations of OPEC’s behaviour over the 
years since 1973 suggest that almost all OPEC members 
have been willing to cooperate to some extent to share 
fluctuations in the demand for the group’s oil (Griffin, 
1985; Jones, 1990; Smith, 2005). Nevertheless, a cartel 
always walks a knife edge between collusion and 
cheating. And the rest of the market must live with the 
resultant price uncertainty.
What is the relevance of this to the Alberta 
petroleum industry?
A country such as Canada can have little if any 
direct impact on world oil prices, at least until large 
non-conventional oil reserves come into play. Two 
concluding comments, therefore, are in order. First, 
if Alberta, or Canada, does wish to address concerns 
about OPEC’s control of international oil prices, or 
security of supply risks for international oil, the most 
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effective action will involve cooperation with other 
similarly concerned industrialized nations. Second, 
apart from such cooperative action, Canadians 
must accept international oil prices as determining 
the commercial value of domestically produced oil. 
These international oil prices are necessarily subject 
to uncertainty. The short-term instability of oil mar-
kets and the political instability of the Middle East 
mean that very high prices may occur, and a cartel 
may maintain such prices for some period of time. 
There is also potential instability on the downside. 
Cartel members maintain prices by holding output 
lower than one might expect under more competitive 
conditions, as demonstrated by the high reserves to 
production ratios of most OPEC members. However, 
weakening of cartel resolve may lead to widespread 
cheating and large price declines. Adelman (1989) 
notes that this possibility may be made more likely if 
attempts to gain intra-cartel bargaining power lead 
members to install excess capacity, since production 
increases can then occur very quickly.
The difficulties in forecasting international oil 
prices became all too apparent after the year 2000. 
For the previous fifteen years, oil prices, except during 
political crises in the Middle East, were rarely over 
$20/b. Then prices crept over $20/b and OPEC, its 
members pleased by the increased revenue, raised 
its ‘target price.’ By 2003, the prevailing expectation 
seems to have been that OPEC would likely be suc-
cessful in maintaining real crude oil prices at these 
levels (in the mid-20’s per barrel) through the rest of 
the decade. Instead prices rose dramatically (to over 
$130/b) by mid-2008. Oil analysts were left grasping 
for explanations. (For a discussion see Smith, 2009.)
Some saw the rise as largely temporary, reflecting a 
shortage of spare capacity in the market when faced by 
unusually large consumption increases and continu-
ing political uncertainty in the Middle East (the war 
in Iraq, continued Palestinian-Israeli violence, and 
fears over Iran’s nuclear intentions). From this point 
of view, the high prices include a significant, and pre-
sumably temporary, ‘security premium.’ At some time 
in the not-too-distant future, prices would come down 
again, although many expected that OPEC, happy with 
the revenue increase the higher prices brought, would 
now try to defend a price in the range of $40 to $60/b. 
Presumably OPEC would monitor world consumption 
and non-OPEC production to ensure that its market 
share did not plummet, as had happened with the 
price increases of the 1970s.
Other analysts suggested that the large price rise 
from 2004 to mid-2008 reflected a permanent change 
in the oil market, with increasing demand, driven by 
high growth in countries such as China and India, 
pressing against resource limits for conventional oil. 
Often those making this argument suggested that 
OPEC members have overstated their reserves and 
understated the production decline problems in exist-
ing producing fields. Even were this not true, OPEC 
may simply prefer very high prices, nearer $100/b, 
so long as there is no evidence of the rapid decline in 
sales which occurred in the 1980s.
Proponents of these opposing views have relevant 
criticisms of the other side. The lower-price advo-
cates remind us that, back in the 1973–80 period, it 
took many years for significant supply and demand 
responses to occur and that behavioural adjustments 
are further inhibited if governments (like China) are 
slow to pass through price increases. Those anticipat-
ing continued high prices note that oil inventories did 
not increase as dramatically as would be expected if 
the price was as high as it was largely due to a ‘security 
premium,’ so the high prices must reflect ‘real’ factors.
As was shown above, oil prices fell drastically after 
mid-2008, as forecast by the first of these two lines 
of argument. However, they quickly rose again and 
stayed in the $70/b to $80/b range for most of the 
next two years, then rose up over $100/b. As Figure 
3.2, shows, this is higher than prices have been for any 
time in the industry’s history, apart from brief periods 
in the 1860s and from 1980 to 1984. This might be 
taken to support the second line of argument but only 
if prices remain at this level over the longer term.
The history of international oil prices suggests 
that high, low, or medium prices are quite possible 
for either brief or more extended periods. Canadian 
decision-makers – producers, consumers, and gov-
ernments – have no choice but to live with this uncer-
tain situation.
Readers’ Guide: Chapter Four reviews the major 
microeconomic tools and concepts utilized by 
economists to analyze the operation of the market for 
a specific product and shows how they can be applied 
to the petroleum industry, focusing on the market 
for crude oil. The tools are applied to a number of 
specific policy issues in oil economics with specific 
reference to the objective of economic efficiency. 
Readers who are well acquainted with the vocabulary 
and tools of economics may wish to skim this chapter.
1. Introduction
Is petroleum too important to be left to the market-
place? Can it be rational to allow people to purchase 
scarce oil for use in a third snowmobile? If petroleum 
were an ‘irreplaceable asset’ how could we rely upon 
the decisions of profit-maximizing corporations? 
Questions such as these are frequently asked and 
betray a common concern: oil and natural gas – the 
main energy sources in our modern world – are finite 
in a physical sense. With these physical limits, how 
can we trust an allocation procedure based upon self-
ish economic valuations? To view petroleum as just 
another economic good is often seen as perverse.
It is not surprising to find that most economists 
disagree with this thesis!
Most people take for granted the ready avail-
ability of goods and services without thinking of 
the complicated coordination problems involved. 
In Chapter One, we summarized the many specific 
tasks that make up the modern petroleum industry. 
Obviously countless individuals are involved in the 
production and consumption of petroleum products, 
and each of these individuals is driven by complicated 
personal goals. How is it possible to bring together 
these many interests in an efficient manner? For most 
economists, the essence of the answer is clear: through 
the mechanism of the ‘market,’ which is potentially 
open to all.
Much economic analysis is concerned with the 
analysis of the operation of markets as a way of hand-
ling society’s complex production and consumption 
decisions. Amongst the goals of economic analysis are 
the following:
(a) to help us understand the physical and social 
world in which we live;
(b) to provide useful input into the decision- 
making processes of individuals, companies, 
and governments.
Economists have developed a number of tools of 
analysis to aid attainment of these goals. This chapter 
includes an introduction to the most important of 
them, and illustrates how they can be applied to sev-
eral policy issues in the petroleum industry. Attention 
will focus upon the concepts of ‘supply’ and ‘demand,’ 
and the precise meaning economists attach to such 
words as ‘competition’ and ‘monopoly.’
CHAPTER FOUR
Economic Analysis and Petroleum Production
54 PETROPOLIT ICS
2. Supply and Demand
A. Introduction
Supply and demand are the most ubiquitous of the 
modern economist’s analytical tools. Transferring 
goods or services from one party to another involves 
some explicit or implicit exchange ratio. The exchange 
ratio is approximated by the price of the product, 
and this price is a major variable in reconciling the 
interests of buyers and sellers. Attendant conditions 
of exchange, beyond the market price, may also be 
a part of the ‘true’ exchange ratio; for example, ser-
vice guarantees, credit terms, delivery arrangements, 
pleasantness and promptness of service, etc. The fol-
lowing discussion abstracts from these considerations. 
Economic exchange in a market is a voluntary activity, 
so for exchanges to occur the price of the good or 
service must settle at a level that is acceptable to both 
buyers and sellers. Hence economists’ tools of supply 
and demand focus upon market price as the key ele-
ment in exchange.
The basic concepts of ‘supply,’ ‘demand,’ and 
‘market equilibrium’ will be reviewed with specific 
reference to the wellhead price for crude oil. The term 
‘supply’ (or ‘demand’) is most frequently utilized by 
economists to refer to a curve (or schedule) that shows 
a hypothetical relationship between (1) the quantities 
of a product that would be supplied (or demanded) in 
the market place over a particular period of time and 
(2) various possible market prices of the product. The 
relationship is hypothetical in that it is not a descrip-
tion of what actually does happen but of what would 
happen if a certain price were to prevail. For example, 
a supply schedule for oil might indicate that, at a price 
of $70.00 per cubic metre ($70/m3), Canadian produ-
cers would be willing to bring 300,000 cubic metres 
of oil a day (300,000 m3/d) to the market, whereas 
at $30/m3 they would supply only 100,000 m3/d. It is 
not the intention of economists to argue that only the 
price of the product affects the quantity supplied (or 
demanded). Rather, a particular supply (or demand) 
curve is defined for a specific and fixed set of under-
lying variables other than price, and the curve shows 
the quantities supplied (or demanded) at various 
alternative prices, given the values of those other vari-
ables. A well-functioning market will tend to an equi-
librium price at which it clears; that is, the quantity 
willingly demanded by buyers is exactly matched by 
the quantity willingly supplied by sellers, and neither 
buyers nor sellers wish to change their behaviour (at 
that price).
Prices and costs for these demand and supply 
functions should be thought of as real (constant 
dollar) values that show prices relative to other goods 
in the economy. General inflation in the economy will 
not ordinarily shift supply and demand curves, since 
real dollar values are unchanged. What is relevant is a 
greater or lesser change in input costs and other values 
for this industry than for the economy in general.
B. Supply
1. The Supply Curve
One could postulate a ‘supply function’ that shows the 
relationship between the quantities of oil (in m3/d) 
that producers would be willing and able to supply at 
the wellhead and all the major variables that deter-
mine that quantity. We have not said whether buyers 
are there to take the quantities concerned: this is the 
meaning of the independence of demand and supply. 
The reader can probably make a long list of factors 
that might influence the quantity of oil the produ-
cer would be willing to supply. Economists typically 
handle a complex problem such as this by building 
a simplified analytical model that is assumed to be a 
reasonable depiction of the behaviour under study. 
In the case of crude oil supply, for instance, it is com-
monly assumed that producers wish to maximize 
profits, so that the following factors would influence 
supply.
(a) the price of oil (the higher the price, the greater 
the quantity supplied, everything else affecting 
supply held fixed);
(b) the technological conditions of production, 
including the nature of the equipment used and 
the physical characteristics of the reservoir (the 
better the technology, or more amenable the 
reservoir, the greater the quantity supplied);
(c) the costs of inputs such as labour, materials and 
supplies, land and capital, including the mini-
mum profit the operator must receive in order 
to continue his activity, i.e., the ‘normal profit’ 
(the lower the costs of inputs the greater the 
quantity supplied);
(d) the price of natural gas, natural gas liquids,  
and other products produced in conjunction 
with oil;
(e) other financial charges incurred with produc-
tion, e.g., royalties and income taxes (the lower 
the taxes the greater the quantity supplied); and
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(f) expectations about the future values of all these 
variables (generally, the less favourable to profits 
the operator expects these to be, the greater the 
quantity supplied now out of available reserves, 
but the less attractive are additions to reserves). 
In addition, in light of uncertainty, production 
closes off the option of waiting until more infor-
mation is available; an opportunity cost of fore-
gone anticipated profits may be associated with 
this (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). (Kellogg, 2010, 
finds evidence of such an effect on oil invest-
ments in Texas.)
If all factors except the first (the price of oil) were 
assumed to be fixed at some level, then we arrive at 
a hypothetical supply schedule of the type described 
earlier. The supply curve is the locus of points of max-
imum quantities that would be supplied to the market 
at various prices. At any given price, suppliers will 
be willing to supply less, but they can’t be induced to 
supply more. That is, the curve tracks the minimum 
prices that will induce suppliers to place the various 
quantities on the market. Suppliers will be happy to 
accept a higher price for a given quantity but will 
not supply that quantity for a lower price. The min-
imum price necessary to entice the supply is called 
the ‘supply price.’ To be profitable, this minimum 
price must cover the cost of producing the unit of 
oil in question, so the general condition for supply is 
that price equals marginal cost (P = MC) for the last 
unit of oil the producer is willing to bring to market. 
(‘Marginal’ is the term economists use to refer to the 
individual unit.)
We expect the supply curve to slope upward to 
the right, showing a greater quantity of oil willingly 
supplied at a higher price (curve S in Figure 4.1), since 
a higher price will cover the higher-cost units of pet-
roleum that were not profitable to producers at the 
lower price. Such a curve could be imagined for any 
unit of production in the industry (well, pool, field, 
or company). Horizontal summation of the quantities 
across all units of one type (e.g., oil pools) at each 
price would generate a market supply curve for the 
region. This supply curve would have a positive slope 
both because a higher price may induce more produc-
tion from any one unit (e.g., pool of oil) and because a 
higher price makes higher cost units (e.g., low produc-
tivity pools) attractive to produce.
We have been speaking of the wellhead supply 
of oil. Oil is non-homogeneous in two important 
respects, in a regional producing market. Firstly, pools 
differ in location, with pools closer to the market in a 
preferred position. Secondly, crudes differ in quality, 
yielding differing arrays of product when refined and 
possessing undesirable impurities (e.g., sulphur) to 
varying degrees. Because refined products differ in 
price, this affects valuation of the crude; also different 
quality crudes incur different costs of transportation 
and processing. Hence it is best to think of the market 
supply of crude oil in a producing region as defined 
for one specific grade of crude oil at a central gather-
ing point in the region. In Alberta, for instance, the 
reference oil might be light (42°), low sulphur crude 
oil at the Edmonton terminal of the Enbridge pipeline. 
The actual wellhead price for any specific barrel of 
crude oil will be higher (or lower) than this reference 
price as: (1) the transportation cost to the central 
gathering point is lower (or higher) than that for the 
reference crude, (2) the market value of the array of 
refined products obtained from the crude is higher (or 
lower) than for the reference crude, and (3) the cost of 
moving or refining the crude is lower (or higher) than 
for the reference crude.
There are, obviously, an infinite number of hypo-
thetical market supply curves derived from the infinite 
number of possible assumptions about variables other 
than price that underlie the supply curve. However, 
at any particular time, one set of underlying variables 
will be extant and one of the hypothetical supply 
curves will exist. (This is subject to qualification 
about ‘short-run’ versus ‘long-run’ curves, as will be 
discussed below.) If the specific value of one of the 
underlying variables should change, then a new supply 






Figure 4.1 The Supply Curve for Crude Oil
56 PETROPOLIT ICS
the curve S’ shows an increase in supply relative to 
curve S; that is, at every hypothetical price the quan-
tity supplied is greater on curve S’ than on curve S. 
This increase in supply might result from successful 
new exploration, improved technology, or reduced 
royalties or input costs, among other possible causes. 
Similarly a shift to the left in the supply curve, for 
instance as a result of higher input costs, represents a 
decrease in supply. As time passes, decreases in the oil 
supply curve for a particular well are expected, at least 
in the later years of operation, reflecting the phenom-
enon of production decline in oil reservoirs: with the 
depletion of oil reserves, there is less oil available and 
the internal production drive of the reservoir falls.
2. Supply and Costs
The supply curve is usually taken to show the mar-
ginal cost (incremental cost) of the additional unit 
of output indicated on the horizontal (quantity) 
axis. This recognizes that the operator will be willing 
to produce an additional unit of output when, but 
only when, the price of the product is as high as the 
incremental cost involved in providing that unit. It 
is common (e.g., Davidson, 1963; McDonald, 1971; 
Watkins, 1970) to divide crude oil marginal costs into 
three components: (1) variable input costs including 
labour costs, equipment and material costs, rent, and 
normal profits; (2) production taxes (e.g., royalties); 
and (3) the present value (discounted value in today’s 
dollars) of any future profit foregone by producing 
the cubic metre of oil now instead of leaving it in the 
ground for later production. A present value is an 
expected future dollar value multiplied by a discount 
factor that allows for the return foregone on those 
funds by having to wait for them rather than having 
them available now. If r is the relevant annual rate of 
interest, and the future value would occur in T years, 
the discount factor is 1/(1+r)T.
This third cost element is called the ‘marginal user 
cost’ of production, and derives from the consider-
ation a profit-maximizing operator gives to possible 
conservation of a depletable natural resource like 
petroleum. The user cost of an oil pool reflects two 
ways in which current lifting of oil reduces future 
profit possibilities. The first is a pure ‘timing’ effect, 
which reflects the depletable nature of oil deposits 
so that one cubic metre produced today is simply 
not available for future lifting. The second is a ‘stock’ 
or ‘degradation’ effect, which captures the internal 
reservoir dynamics of an oil pool and measures the 
increase in future production costs caused by the 
reduction in reservoir pressure as a result of produ-
cing the cubic metre today (Bohi and Toman, 1984). 
Obviously expectations of future prices, costs, and 
taxes influence the marginal user cost. The higher 
expected future prices, the higher will be the marginal 
user cost, and the lower current supply. Producers 
would be induced to wait for the better market in the 
future. Such conservation will operate only to the 
extent that producers are able to make reasonable 
predictions about the future and expect to control the 
oil pool then. It is also affected by government regula-
tions that influence output rates, and by any contrac-
tual obligations the producer may have undertaken.
The user cost concept is particularly helpful in 
understanding the development of pools. Why, for 
example, would a company refrain from drilling a 
low-cost infill well that produces significant amounts 
of oil? Typically it is because the infill well has a high 
cost of foregone future profits because it reduces the 
later production from adjacent established wells; in 
essence, the infill well simply accelerates production, 
but the producer might find the future profits if he 
does not drill the well more attractive.
In analyzing oil supply it is necessary to distin-
guish between the supply of produced (lifted) crude 
oil and the supply of discovered oil in the ground (i.e., 
reserves) (Uhler, 1981). Exploration, and development 
activities, such as outpost (or extension) drilling and 
enhanced oil recovery (EOR), are concerned with the 
supply of oil reserves. Higher oil prices will cover 
higher cost reserve additions. Figure 4.2 shows, for a 
given set of underlying factors (input costs, geological 
and technical knowledge, future expectations, taxes, 
etc.) an upward sloping supply curve (SRA) for reserves 
additions as the price of reserves additions rises. The 
‘price of reserves additions’ is a sales value for oil 
reserves in the ground (an in situ price); it will be 
greater the higher the price of produced or lifted crude 
oil but will tend to be lower than the price of produced 
crude since the operator must still pay lifting costs for 
the oil and must wait into the future before he is able 
to recover all of the oil reserves.
Uhler (1976, 1977) argues that the supply curve of 
reserves additions in a given basin is subject to two 
contrary dynamic influences: technological improve-
ments and new geological knowledge tend to increase 
the supply of reserves additions (shift it rightward 
to S’), while the depletion over time of the stock of 
undiscovered reserves tends to make new additions 
more costly and shifts the supply curve to the left, to 
S’’. Uhler has hypothesized that the first effect tends 
to dominate early in the history of reserves additions 
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from a particular geological play (or formation), while 
the second effect dominates later on, thereby giving a 
tendency to first rising then falling reserves additions 
per unit of exploratory effort. Over the long run, it is 
reserves additions that support continued crude oil 
production.
In this book, we will emphasize the supply of oil 
production (lifted crude) rather than the supply of 
reserves in the ground.
3. The Analytical Time Dimension
Economists commonly distinguish between short-run 
and long-run supply curves. The short-run supply 
curve describes the relationship between the price of 
the product and the quantity that operators are willing 
to supply when some of the factors of production (e.g., 
major pieces of capital equipment, like the number 
of wells in a pool) are fixed and cannot be changed. 
The long-run supply curve describes the relationship 
between price and quantity when the operator has 
enough time to vary all inputs. Some writers further 
differentiate the short-run (when all capital facili-
ties, including the number of wells, are fixed), the 
medium-run (when already discovered pools can 
be drilled more intensively and EOR schemes put in 
place, but no new pools can be brought on stream) 
and the long-run (when operating, development, and 
exploration activities are all variable) (McDonald, 
1971). These analytical distinctions provide a conven-
ient bridge from physical to economic descriptions of 
petroleum industry activity. Figure 4.3 shows short-
run (SSR), medium-run (SMR) and long-run (SLR) supply 
curves of lifted crude oil from a region for some par-
ticular year. Recall that these are ‘hypothetical’ curves 
illustrating what would happen under certain assumed 
conditions. Figure 4.3 illustrates the variations in 
supply if capital investment decisions possess a speci-
fied flexibility: complete inflexibility in the short-run 
so only existing equipment is used; flexible develop-
ment capital but no new exploration in the medium-
run; and both development and exploration possible 
in the long-run. Other factors influencing the supply 
of oil are assumed to remain at fixed levels.
Consider an initial price such as P, which is 
assumed to apply to identical short-, medium-, and 
long-run outputs (Q1). The short-run supply curve 
is very steep (inelastic) since higher prices can draw 
forth very little additional output given that no new 
capital is installed; a higher price does serve to cover 
the marginal costs of some higher-cost (and, usually, 
low-output) wells, which would otherwise be aban-
doned or shut-in. The greater quantity responsiveness 
of the medium- and long-run supply curves is due 
to a higher price covering increased marginal costs 
of lifting and development in previously discovered 
pools (medium-run) and of lifting, development, and 
exploration in newly discovered pools (long-run). The 
shape of the short-run supply curve (SSR) indicates 
that the price of oil would have to fall very low before 
it failed to cover the operating and user costs of those 
wells currently in operation (see for Canada, Edwards, 
1972; for the United States, Griffin and Jones, 1986, and 
Adelman, 1992). The vertical distance between the SSR 
and SMR curves, for output levels below Q1, represents 




















Figure 4.3 Short-, Medium-, and Long-run Supply 
Curves for Crude Oil
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the past to support output up to level Q1, while the 
vertical distance between SMR and SLR represents sunk 
exploration costs.
An increasing cost industry (i.e., one with rising 
supply curves), such as the crude petroleum industry, 
will earn unit revenues (prices) higher than marginal 
costs. For price P, and output Q1, this excess dollar 
profit (usually called ‘economic rent,’ or ‘producers’ 
surplus’), can be represented by shaded area APB in 
Figure 4.3; this rent is also known as a ‘differential 
rent’ or ‘Ricardian rent’ and measures the difference 
in cost between the highest cost unit produced (at 
Q1) and lower cost units. Economic rent is usually 
defined to include the user cost component of the 
supply (marginal cost) curves since this represents an 
expected future profit, not an expenditure on produc-
tion or required return on capital; this component of 
economic rent is sometimes labelled a ‘scarcity rent,’ 
deriving from the exhaustible nature of an individual 
oil deposit.
It is important to note that the differences between 
the three supply curves relate to an analytical time 
distinction (the time required to invest capital) rather 
than a calendar time distinction. A price rise for oil 
that was expected to be sustained would immedi-
ately induce short-, medium-, and long-run supply 
responses. Some of these might take place very rapidly 
(a new shallow exploratory or development well), 
while others might take many years (a large EOR 
scheme or frontier exploration program). Therefore, 
observed real world supply behaviour would include 
a mixture of (i) oil supply decisions as indicated by 
supply curves and (ii) the process of adjustment 
between different supply curves due to shifts in those 
curves and the process of capital investment.
Between any two calendar time periods the three 
supply curves of produced oil can be expected to 
change position. These dynamic adjustments can be 
credited to two somewhat different forces. First, a 
number of the factors that are assumed constant in 
an initial time period may change; examples would 
include changes in technology and knowledge, in 
input costs, in taxes, in expectations about the future. 
Second, the potential supply of lifted oil is affected by 
the supply of reserve additions. If at current prices (of 
both oil as produced and oil in the ground) additions 
to reserves just equal production, then the supply 
curves for output would tend to remain unchanged. 
However, if production exceeds reserves additions, 
then the process of production decline in existing 
pools would reduce supply (shift the supply curves 
to the left). On the other hand, if reserves additions 
exceed current production, then the supply of lifted oil 
would tend to rise, with the supply curves shifting to 
the right.
The underlying physical dimensions of the crude 
oil production decision, and the related economic 
supply concepts, may be made somewhat clearer by 
the slightly more extended graphical treatment of 
Figure 4.4, which examines a single oil pool in more 
detail. Panel A illustrates the capacity output path over 
time from an oil pool with a fixed amount of capital 
equipment in place; this is a short-run situation and 
the output path, qt, shows falling production due 
to the depletion of reservoir energy as cumulative 
output rises. The dashed line, qa, shows, for each 
year, the minimum output level acceptable to the 
producer. It is the output level that would generate 
just enough revenue to cover operating costs, and 
it is equal to the operating costs (OC) of the wells 
divided by the price (P) of oil. (If Pt · qa = OCt, then 
qa = OCt/Pt.) Production decline means that actual 
output is steadily pushed down towards the minimum 
acceptable output rate; typically this defines a time 
of abandonment, TA, at which the oil pool will be 
shut down. The variable tax component of the short-
run production decision is treated sometimes as a 
component of operating costs (OC) and sometimes 
as a deduction from price (P) to yield a net (after-
tax) price.
Panel B translates this pool’s output path into 
economic short-run supply curves (abstracting from 
complications of the user cost component). Given 
that capital costs are sunk, the variable operating costs 
of a pool would typically yield a marginal cost curve 
like MC0. The decision to operate (produce even one 
cubic metre of oil) requires an expenditure to main-
tain the equipment for the year. But once that is done, 
the incremental lifting cost is very low (e.g., pumping 
costs only) until capacity of the equipment is reached 
under the pool’s current reservoir conditions (capacity 
output q0, where the marginal cost curve becomes 
extremely steep). Curve AVC0 shows the average 
variable cost of various possible output levels; the 
first cubic metre has the same average and marginal 
cost and, thereafter, the low cost incremental units 
reduce the average cost, up to output level qO. Under 
these conditions the producer will decide either: (1) to 
produce at capacity, where price, PO = MCO, so long 
as average revenue covers average operating costs 
i.e., PO ≥ AVCO) or (2) to shut down (if PO < AVCo). 
Therefore the short-run supply curve (SO) for the oil 
pool is the marginal cost curve above the minimum 
point of the average variable cost curve. Production 
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decline means that the capacity output level from the 
fixed capital becomes smaller and smaller, so that the 
short-run supply curve shifts back to the left-over 
time (to S1, S2, …, St) until the year of abandonment 
(STA, if the real price of oil is fixed at level Po).
Panel C of Figure 4.4 shows changes in the time-
path of output from the pool as more wells are drilled. 
Apart from occasional dry holes, additional wells will 
increase the initial output rate from the pool (q0). 
Panel C shows five possible developmental options 
with progressively higher initial output rates from q10 
to q50, illustrating different types of medium-run pool 
development. From an initial development plan (q1t), 
output path q2t shows extension (or outpost drilling) 
which brings more oil reserves into production and 
allows higher output levels in all years. Output path 
q3t is an example of infill drilling that produces the 
same reserves more quickly, so that q3 > q2 in early 
periods, but q3 < q2 later. Curves q2t and q3t illustrate 
‘pure’ cases of extension and infill drilling; in most oil 
pools, incremental development will involve a gradual 
transition from extension to infill activities. Output 
path q4t shows a somewhat perverse case of infill drill-
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Figure 4.4 Crude Oil Supply: One Pool
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damage reservoir flow rates so that the production 
decline becomes very high. Most petroleum reservoirs 
have a ‘maximum efficient rate’ (MER) for oil wells or 
for the reservoir as a whole, which, if exceeded, results 
in high output decline rate and a loss in total recover-
able reserves. Profit-maximizing producers ordinarily 
have no incentive to exceed the MER since it means a 
large loss of future profits (i.e., user costs are very high 
above MER). A significant exception is when several 
companies jointly produce from an oil reservoir, have 
no agreement on sharing output and profits, and oper-
ate under the legal convention known as the ‘rule of 
capture’ in which ownership of the oil belongs to the 
party that brings it to the surface. Here companies 
may exceed the MER since they believe that any oil 
left unproduced today will be captured by the other 
companies in the pool. Government agencies like 
the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board 
(ERCB) often impose regulations that restrict output 
to levels less than the MER. (See Chapter Ten.)
Finally, output path q5t, in Figure 4.4, Panel C, 
shows the impact of a successful EOR project that 
raises the recovery factor, thereby bringing new 
reserves into production, allowing more output in all 
periods. Panel D of Figure 4.4 shows the medium-run 
supply curve for crude oil produced this year from the 
pool shown in Panel C. Pure extension drilling adds 
output at a cost very close to the initial wells (q10 to 
q20); infill drilling generates higher per unit costs due 
to well interference and rising user costs as current 
production reduces future output and profits (q20 to 
q30); EOR schemes are typically more costly than pri-
mary recovery schemes (q30to q50); output in excess of 
the MER has very higher user costs of forgone future 
profits so is very high in cost (q50 to q40).
The way in which various development options 
might be sequenced is very reservoir-specific.
4. Elasticity of Supply
Economists frequently use the term ‘elasticity of 
supply’ to describe the shape and position of the 
supply curve. The concept of ‘elasticity’ is important: 
it is the relative (percentage) change in one variable 
divided by the associated percentage change in a 
related variable, and shows the responsiveness of one 
variable to change in another. ‘Own-price elasticity of 
supply’ (usually called, simply, ‘elasticity of supply’) 
is the percentage change in the quantity of a product 
supplied divided by the percentage change in the price 
of the product, all else being equal; that is, it describes 
movement along the supply curve. Where the symbol 
‘∆’ is used to represent a change:
Es = (∆Qs/Qs)/(∆P/P) = (∆Qs/∆P)(P/Qs).
The own-price elasticity of supply (Es) is equal to the 
reciprocal of the slope of the supply curve (∆Qs/∆P) 
multiplied by the ratio of price to quantity. The slope 
of the supply curve by itself is not a satisfactory 
measure of supply responsiveness. Exactly the same 
supply information can be conveyed using a number 
of different quantity measures; i.e., b/d; b/year; tons/
year, m3/month, etc. The same supply curve would 
yield quite different numerical values for its slope in 
each of the cases, even though the relative changes 
in price and quantity were the same. It is desirable to 
measure elasticity as a pure number, independent of 
the particular units of measurement chosen, and using 
percentage changes does this.
A higher price elasticity of supply means that any 
given percentage rise in price yields a higher percent-
age rise in quantity supplied. Thus, for instance, the 
long-run price elasticity of supply for crude oil will 
tend to be higher than the short-run elasticity as was 
seen in Figure 4.2.
It is customary to refer to a value of Es greater than 
unity as showing ‘elastic’ supply and a value of Es less 
than unity as showing ‘inelastic’ supply. Empirical 
work by economists has clearly demonstrated that 
the elasticity of a supply for crude oil is significantly 
greater than zero (e.g., Uhler, 1977; Bradley, 1989). This 
gives lie to one of the common beliefs in energy analy-
sis – that fossil fuel availability is determined solely by 
nature, and that economics is essentially irrelevant to 
energy policy: price does affect availability.
C. Demand
Our treatment of demand is analogous to our discus-
sion of supply. One can postulate a ‘demand function’ 
that shows the relationship between the quantities (in 
m3/d) that purchasers are willing and able to buy and 
the major factors that influence that desire. Amongst 
the important factors affecting demand for crude oil at 
the wellhead would be:
(1) the price of oil (the lower the price, the greater 
the quantity demanded);
(2) conditions in the markets for refined oil prod-
ucts, for example,
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(i) tastes of consumers (Do they prefer com-
pacts or larger cars? Do they like really 
warm houses or cooler ones? Is it an aus-
tere, puritanical society, or a conspicuous- 
consumption-oriented one?);
(ii) incomes of consumers;
(iii) population in the market;
(iv) prices of substitute products (e.g., natural 
gas, insulation) and of complementary 
products (e.g., automobiles);
(v) technological and cost conditions in 
industries that use petroleum products in 
their production processes;
(3) conditions in the supply industries between 
the oil field and the final consumer, e.g., pipe 
line and tanker systems and oil refineries (the 
higher the costs of moving or refining the oil, 
the lower the quantity demanded at the well-
head); and
(4) current expectations of the future values for 
these variables and the price of oil (higher 
expected prices in the very near-term tend to 
induce higher current demand to capitalize 
on today’s lower prices, while higher expected 
prices in the far-term tend to induce lower cur-
rent demand as consumers purchase non-oil-us-
ing capital equipment today).
A demand curve shows the hypothetical relationship 
between the quantity demanded and various prices 
of the product, with all the other factors that might 
affect demand assumed to be constant. The demand 
curve is the locus of points representing the maximum 
rate of purchase at the given price; equivalently, it is 
the maximum price that would be paid for the given 
quantities. It should exhibit a downward slope since a 
reduced price for crude oil will both free income for 
more consumption (including more crude oil) and 
induce the consumer to substitute crude oil products 
for products whose price has not fallen (e.g., other 
fuels). If any of the other factors underlying demand 
should change, then a new demand curve would 
appear. In Figure 4.5, for instance, an increase in 
demand from curve DSR to curve D’ can be seen (at 
every price the quantity demanded is higher on curve 
D’). This might result from a rise in the price of nat-
ural gas, an increase in consumers’ income, a rise in 
population, a fall in refining costs, or the like. In addi-
tion, it is useful to distinguish between the short-run 
demand for crude oil, when the ability of purchasers 
to adjust their capital equipment is assumed to be 
non-existent, and the long-run demand, shown by 
DLR, when the stock of energy-using capital equip-
ment can be adjusted in a way that is optimal for that 
oil price. For example, in Figure 4.5, a fall in price 
from OB to OC would lead to an increase in quantity 
demanded of only AD in the short-run, but of AE in 
the long-run.
The (own-) price elasticity of demand (Ed, usually 
called the elasticity of demand) measures the per-
centage change in the quantity demanded divided by 
the percentage change in price of the product, other 
things affecting demand held unchanged; i.e.
Ed = (∆Qd/Qd)/(∆P/P) = (∆Qd/∆P)(P/Qd).
The elasticity of demand will normally be nega-
tive since a price rise means a fall in the quantity 
demanded. (It is wise to be aware that some econo-
mists drop the negative sign, utilizing the absolute 
value of the elasticity.) A “large” elasticity of demand 
(e.g., an elastic demand, where |Ed| > 1) implies that 
a given percentage change in price gives a relatively 
large change in quantity demanded. The long-run 
elasticity will exceed the short-run elasticity. Empirical 
evidence clearly demonstrates that price changes do 
affect petroleum consumption (e.g., Berndt, 1977; 
Berndt and Greenberg, 1989; Berndt et al., 1981; 
Watkins, 1991c). Hughes et al. (2008), however, find 
that the short-run elasticity of demand for motor gas-
oline appears significantly lower after 2000 than it was 
in the 1970s and 1980s.
An interesting relationship exists between the 
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expenditures as a result of price changes. With an elas-
tic demand (|ED| > 1), a rise in price will generate a 
fall in the amount consumers spend for oil; conversely, 
a price fall will give increased expenditures. If the 
demand curve is inelastic (|ED| < 1), a price rise (fall) 
gives increased (decreased) expenditures. With uni-
tary elasticity of demand (|ED| = 1), expenditures are 
constant as prices change. By way of example, consider 
a price rise along a downward sloping demand curve. 
If all else were equal, an x% rise in price would imply 
that expenditures on oil rise by x%. However, the 
price rise generates a reduction in the quantity pur-
chased; if quantity fell by y%, all else being equal, then 
expenditures would fall by y%. The change in total 
expenditures clearly depends on which of these two 
effects is larger. (That is, which is larger, x or y?) Recall 
the definition of the price elasticity of demand: per-
centage changes in quantity along the demand curve 
(i.e., y) divided by percentage change in price (i.e., x). 
If the curve is elastic (|ED| > 1), then the numerator 
(y) must exceed the denominator (x), so that a price 
rise implies reduced expenditures after the consumer 
adjusts his purchases to the higher price.
This price elasticity/expenditure relationship helps 
explain some economic phenomena. Consider, for 
example, the effect on oil-importing regions of the 
OPEC-generated oil price rises of the 1970s. Recall 
that in the short-run the demand curve for oil is quite 
inelastic, as low as –0.1 or –0.2 according to some 
studies. Sharp increases in the price of oil, then, gen-
erate large increases in expenditures on oil, at least 
in the short term. This helps us understand OPEC’s 
desire for higher crude oil prices. Or, to put the issue 
somewhat more generally, large price rises are not 
simply a result of the establishment of effective oli-
gopoly power by sellers but also depend on conditions 
on the demand side of the market (i.e., the elasticity 
of demand).
We might also point out some macroeconomic 
implications of the elasticity/expenditure connec-
tion. For oil-importing regions, the oil price rises of 
the 1970s generated larger expenditures on imported 
oil because of the short-run demand inelasticity. 
Therefore consumers had less money to spend on 
other goods and services, generating a deflationary 
effect. In the absence of some countervailing change to 
increase the economy’s aggregate demand (e.g., expan-
sionary monetary or fiscal policy, or large increases 
in investment by domestic energy industries or sub-
stantially increased exports of goods and services to 
OPEC), the oil price rise was recessionary, giving lower 
growth and higher unemployment.
3. Market Equilibrium in Perfect 
Competition
Supply and demand provide a ready framework to 
explain market price when the selling and buying 
sides of the market are completely independent of one 
another. This condition is met under ‘perfect compe-
tition,’ in which a great many fully informed buyers 
and a great many fully informed sellers buy and 
sell exactly identical units of some product with no 
collusion whatsoever; it is assumed that new buyers 
and sellers can enter the market, and old buyers and 
sellers leave, with no impediment. Perfect competi-
tion is an idealized market form. In the real world 
the hypothetical perfectly competitive results may be 
approximated under conditions of ‘effective’ or ‘work-
able’ competition.
Under such competitive market conditions, the 
price will tend toward an equilibrium point at which 
demand is equal to supply, i.e., the market clears at 
price PE and quantity QE in Figure 4.6, Panel A. A 
price higher than this (for instance, a price of OA) will 
mean that the quantity sellers are willing to supply 
(OC) exceeds the quantity purchasers are wishing to 
buy (OB); this excess supply (BC) can be expected 
to put downward pressure on market price until the 
equilibrium point is reached. For purposes of illustra-
tion, it is convenient to assume that the market always 
adjusts instantaneously to the equilibrium point. 
This avoids the difficulty of illustrating the nature of 
the adjustment process, including any lags and the 
accumulation and disposal of unwanted inventories. 
Of course, in the real world, this adjustment process 
might proceed in a variety of ways and is a matter 
of major concern to participants in the oil market. 
Trading departments in oil companies and assorted 
middlemen (including speculators) operate in large 
part in response to current disequilibria. And in a 
well-informed trading environment, their actions help 
to move the oil market to equilibrium.
The analytical advantages of the demand and 
supply tools become evident when attention is turned 
to the impact on market equilibrium of changing 
circumstances. The major factors underlying both 
demand and supply were noted earlier; changes in any 
of those factors will lead to changes in the equilibrium 
price and quantity. Figure 4.6, Panel B, for instance, 
shows the short- and long-run effects of an increase in 
the demand (from D to D’) for oil at the wellhead (for 
example, as a result of increases in natural gas prices, 
rising population, etc.). In the short run, when supply 
responsiveness (elasticity) is low, there is a large rise 
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in price from OB to OD and a relatively small rise in 
quantity from OA to OC. In the long run when produ-
cers are fully able to adjust to the price rise, the equi-
librium will be established at a lower price (i.e., OF) 
and higher quantity (i.e., OE) than in the short-run.
It is easy to examine the impact of other shifts in 
demand and/or supply and the associated changes in 
equilibrium price and quantity: a number of cases will 
be considered later in this chapter. Remember that the 
more inelastic the demand curve (and/or the supply 
curve) is the greater the extent to which adjustments 
occur in the price of the product rather than the quan-
tity. It is generally conceded that the short-run supply 
and demand elasticities for petroleum are low; less 
certainty exists about the long-run elasticities, except 
that they exceed short-run elasticities. It is also true 
that the more narrowly a market is defined, the more 
elastic at least one of the curves tends to become. For 
example, the demand for 36° oil from the Redwater 
pool would be very elastic because a wide variety of 
other crudes substitute very easily for this grade of oil.
We make two final comments. First, at any par-
ticular time only one market price and quantity will 
be observed. Under the simplifying assumptions made 
here, this is the equilibrium result, a point on both the 
demand curve and the supply curve. All other points 
on the two curves are hypothetical (i.e., unobserv-
able in the market): they tell what buyers (or sellers) 
would do if the price were at some level other than 
the equilibrium one. The fact that most points on the 
demand and supply curves are hypothetical makes 
empirical derivation of the curves extremely difficult. 
Economists speak of the ‘identification problem,’ 
meaning that the plotting of price/quantity combin-
ations as observed over time will not generally trace 
out either a supply curve or a demand curve. If all 
observations come from various intersections of the 
two curves, this information alone cannot be used 
to derive the parameters of one of the curves. More 
sophisticated techniques are needed that take account 
of the many other changing factors that affect supply 
and demand, and different modellers will generally 
estimate somewhat different supply and demand 
functions. Second, the terms ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ 
are frequently used in a much looser way than as 
defined here. Sometimes ‘demand’ is used to mean 
consumption and ‘supply’ is used to mean production 
(or availability), but the words then refer to observed 
market results, not hypothetical price-quantity sched-
ules. For the economist bound by the conventions 
of current economic terminology, the equivalence of 
‘consumption’ and the ‘demand schedule’ (or ‘pro-
duction’ and the ‘supply schedule’) only make sense 
if the quantities of oil demanded (or supplied) are 
completely unresponsive to (perfectly inelastic with 
respect to) price and other variables discussed above. 
To say that the ‘demand’ for oil is higher because 
consumption has increased need not mean that there 
has been a rise in the demand schedule: it may simply 
be that the price of oil has decreased, generating a 
movement along the demand curve. The distinction 
























Thus far, we have dealt with several analytical tools of 
value in describing why a particular result occurs in 
the market for oil. Society is interested not only in why 
changes occur but in whether they should occur. This 
involves a change in focus from ‘positive’ (or descrip-
tive) analysis to ‘normative’ analysis and means that 
the analysis of the economics of the petroleum indus-
try is an exercise in ‘petropolitics’ rather than pure 
economics. Is the price of natural gas too low? Should 
Canada allow the price of crude oil to rise? Is a gas-
oline rationing system desirable? Should we impose 
a depletion tax on non-renewable energy resources? 
These are issues of social policy. What can economics 
contribute to their solution? Some economists feel 
that the tools of demand and supply are useful not 
only because they help us describe the operation of 
the economy but because they tell us something about 
the desirability or ‘efficiency,’ of alternative economic 
positions. As a general criterion for policy, economic 
efficiency is concerned with maximizing the benefits 
attainable from society’s scarce resources.
That argument has been popular since an early 
version was propounded by Adam Smith in 1776. It 
relies strongly on the acceptance of what might be 
called ‘individualistic liberalism’ as a preferred social 
ethic: it assumes that the individual is the best judge 
of his or her own well-being, and that, if one individ-
ual is moved to a preferred position without harming 
anyone else, society is better off. Since most changes, 
however much they may benefit some people in soci-
ety, involve moving others to a less-preferred position, 
it is necessary to further supplement the assumptions 
of individualistic liberalism. Specifically, it is often 
assumed that a common additive measuring stick 
can be applied equally to all people, that measuring 
stick being the monetary value individuals associate 
with changes, and that there is a social gain (rise in 
efficiency) if the sum of (dollar) benefits exceeds the 
sum of costs. This involves abstraction from all ‘equity’ 
considerations: how costs and benefits are distributed 
across different individuals. More accurately, it is 
usually suggested that equity considerations must be 
considered as well but can be considered independ-
ently of the efficiency criteria outlined so far. We shall 
return to this point shortly.
It might be noted that ‘efficiency’ can be treated as 
a purely descriptive concept: that is, efficiency rises if 
aggregate dollar benefits from a policy exceed aggre-
gate dollar costs. However, to say that an increase in 
efficiency is desirable does necessitate the acceptance 
(explicitly or implicitly) of the value system outlined 
above. This is an extreme version of what Sen calls 
‘welfarism.’ (For a discussion of this and other ethical 
premises for social policy see MacRae, 1979, and Sen, 
1987.) That this is an extreme version is suggested by 
the observation that even where acceptance of this 
general system of beliefs has been most common, it 
is not usually applied to all segments of society (e.g., 
to children, lunatics, and criminals). It has also been 
suggested that the emphasis upon the individual fails 
to give adequate weight to humans as social animals. 
And some critics have questioned whether the indi-
vidual’s choices can be taken as representing the indi-
vidual’s best interests.
There are other ethical premises for valuing social 
policy. Some alternate value systems are ‘paternalistic’ 
in the sense that individual preferences are over- 
ridden by some other criterion of the social good. Still 
other value systems may give equity considerations 
over-riding importance: for example, a change is 
never acceptable if it moves poorer people in society 
to a less-preferred position. Other value systems may 
be strictly libertarian, arguing that a person should 
never be forced by government policies to move to 
a less-preferred position. Despite these alternatives, 
many economists feel that the concept of economic 
efficiency provides a workable and plausible basis for 
evaluating policy alternatives and feel comfortable 
enough with its underlying individualistic premises.
If the efficiency criterion is accepted as socially 
desirable, one can quite easily see why a well-func-
tioning perfectly competitive free market economy 
is frequently characterized as preferable to alternate 
forms of economic organization. It is, after all, based 
upon the expression of individual desires through 
demand and supply and does not involve individ-
ual producers or consumers exercising control over 
market prices to their advantage.
The argument may be advanced in slightly more 
formal terms. Effectively competitive markets are 
assumed. Moreover, it is necessary to assume that all 
the real gains and losses from economic transactions 
are felt only by individuals actually participating in the 
market transactions. In formal economic terms, this 
means that there are no ‘externalities’ of either a posi-
tive sort (e.g., one firm benefiting by adopting, with-
out appropriate charge, another firm’s innovation) or 
a negative sort (e.g., harmful pollution, which a firm 
does not take into account as a cost of its production). 
Under these circumstances, the supply curve can be 
interpreted as representing costs for the whole society 
(i.e., social costs) as well as showing marginal costs 
to the individual private operator. In other words, it 
measures the amount society must pay inputs in order 
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to achieve that particular unit of production. Both 
input costs and user costs would be accepted as valid 
marginal social costs. Royalties and taxes normally 
would not, since they are a transfer of profits from the 
private decision-maker to the landowner or govern-
ment, rather than a cost to society. An exception is 
where the government devises a ‘perfect’ tax scheme 
to capture the marginal user costs and institutes a 
royalty equal to what these costs would be without the 
royalty. (With the royalty the user costs are zero, since 
the operator cannot capture any future profits, but 
the royalty is equivalent to the user costs. The games 
economists play!)
In the absence of externalities, the demand curve 
can be interpreted as a marginal social benefit curve, 
in that it approximates the amount that the individ-
ual is willing to pay to obtain that particular unit of 
output and is thus a measure of the value of that unit
Market equilibrium occurs where the marginal 
social benefit curve (D curve) intersects the marginal 
social cost curve (S curve). (See Figure 4.6A, again.) 
This quantity of output, with the associated market 
clearing price, is preferred to any other. Why? Any 
additional unit of output has a social cost greater than 
the social benefit (i.e., S > D, for that unit, as meas-
ured on the value or price axis), so it should not be 
produced. But all the previous units of output have 
a (marginal) social benefit greater than (marginal) 
social cost (i.e., D > S, for each unit), therefore each 
contributed a net benefit to society and should be 
produced. The conclusion? Competitive free markets 
yield the most desirable economic results for society: 
less production reduces net social benefit, as does 
more production. It is important to remember that 
this result depends on all benefits and costs being 
‘internalized’ into the oil market.
It is useful to elaborate slightly on this idea of 
economic efficiency in effectively competitive mar-
kets, and on the concepts of ‘producers’ surplus’ and 
‘consumers’ surplus.’ Recall that producers’ surplus 
(economic rent) is the excess of market revenue above 
aggregate costs. In an efficiently competitive market 
(Figure 4.6A), it is the area between the price line and 
the supply curve. Consumers’ surplus is the difference 
between the (maximum) amount a consumer would 
be willing to pay for a unit of output and the amount 
actually paid. In the market equilibrium in Figure 
4.6A, it is the area between the demand curve and the 
price line. The producers’ and consumers’ surpluses 
represent net gains to market participants – profits 
(the excess of price above marginal cost) for produ-
cers, and net consumption gains (the excess of the 
value of consumption above price) for consumers. It is 
easy to see in Figure 4.6A that the price and quantity 
where supply intersects demand maximizes the sum of 
producers’ and consumers’ surpluses.
We would suggest that there are several normative 
interpretations of the result. Suppose, for instance, one 
were to look at the possible output levels in the market 
for a product, as illustrated in Figure 4.6A, and to ask 
what is the most desirable output level for society. 
Even without a clearly expressed general normative 
criterion, a plausible choice is the output level that 
maximizes the sum of producers’ and consumers’ 
surpluses. The fact that this is exactly the response that 
economic efficiency suggests can be taken as offering 
support to efficiency as a useful normative objective. A 
second normative interpretation is that which initially 
generated this discussion. If efficiency is the normative 
goal, then free and effectively competitive markets are 
socially desirable precisely because they do tend to 
generate maximum efficiency.
There are, of course, complications, including the 
concepts of ‘second-best’ and externalities. The failure 
of the economy as a whole to function in a perfectly 
competitive manner poses special problems in deter-
mining the value of inputs drawn from other sectors 
and the value of output in this sector. Costs and 
prices may no longer measure marginal social values. 
This is what economists label as the ‘Problem of the 
Second-Best.’ This book abstracts from these prob-
lems, although it has been argued that they dominate 
economic activity (Blackorby, 1990; Blackorby and 
Donaldson, 1990).
Externalities in the petroleum industry can, in 
theory, be incorporated within the normative theory: 
quantities can be evaluated at hypothetical costs and 
prices (‘shadow prices’) that include the dollar value 
of the externality. For example, we could find the 
maximum payment an individual would be willing to 
make in order to avoid industry-generated pollution 
and include this as an additional cost to society of the 
industry’s activities. In this case the private industry 
would not be expected to produce at the efficient level 
unless forced to recognize (‘internalize’) the pollu-
tion cost.
Most market adjustments for a single product 
have relatively minor effects upon the overall distri-
bution of income in the society. If the effects are not 
minor, they can usually be overcome by some general 
tax or subsidy arrangement. Hence, for many policy 
changes, an acceptance of the ethic of individualistic 
liberalism suggests the desirability of improvements in 
efficiency, regardless of the equity effects. Critics note 
that several major problems arise from the decision 
to separate efficiency and equity. The efficiency rule 
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is based upon current prices of goods and services. 
To separate efficiency and equity suggests that these 
prices are independent of the distribution of income. 
If our equity judgment tells us that income differ-
ences between the average North American and the 
average resident of South East Asia or Ethiopia are 
morally indefensible, can we accept the price structure 
the current world income distribution gives us? The 
second problem relates to the weight given to future 
generations. They have no direct vote (can have no 
direct vote) in the efficiency rule: is the role given to 
them through our expectations about their demand 
for goods and services an adequate one? On this issue, 
see Page (1977).
Acceptance of the normative aspects of the effi-
ciency criterion is obviously not universal. Some feel 
the concentration upon dollars as measured in the 
market is too restrictive, ignoring as it does histor-
ical processes, the non-market aspects of individual 
and social life, and pervasive second-best prob-
lems. Others simply do not accept an individualistic 
approach. Such criticisms argue that individual pref-
erences do not equate with social welfare. However, 
a majority of North Americans seem inclined to an 
individualistic ethic; hence, in the remainder of this 
study, the normative model will be used on occasion. 
Readers who are sceptical of the appropriateness of 
the normative efficiency criterion might give careful 
consideration to the two following arguments:
(1) One of the major advantages of the efficiency 
objective is its broad applicability, with the 
associated virtue of consistency in policy rec-
ommendations. There is a tendency – especially 
strong if the economic system is viewed from 
the perspective of a specific interest group – to 
reject the policy conclusions of the efficiency 
rule, but to replace it with a series of ad hoc 
judgments. The resulting policy recommenda-
tions often turn out to contain contradictions. 
Two examples might be cited:
a. The efficiency argument suggests that North 
American domestic oil prices should equal 
international (OPEC) levels, since we import 
OPEC oil. Therefore, OPEC is a marginal supply 
source for Canada and the United States, and 
one extra barrel of oil consumption costs the 
OPEC price. But, it is often argued, higher prices 
reduce the standard of living of oil consum-
ers. Therefore, oil prices within the country 
should be kept low. However, as the economic 
reasoning outlined earlier makes clear, lower 
oil prices both induce greater consumption and 
inhibit new supply additions, therefore increas-
ing the dependence on high cost imported oil 
and generating even larger transfers of funds to 
oil producers in the OPEC world. Thus the view-
point of current oil consumers is far too narrow 
a basis for consistent long-run policy analysis. 
The point is not that the effects upon oil con-
sumers are unimportant. Rather, the point is 
that oil producers and taxpayers who subsidize 
imports from OPEC are also members of society 
and it is desirable to have a policy guide that 
incorporates the effects on them as well. The 
efficiency rule provides such a guide.
b. A second example relates to exports of 
energy products. It is frequently suggested that, 
since oil is a depletable natural resource, we 
must save all we can for future generations of 
Canadians. Therefore, all current exports should 
cease. What is less frequently suggested, but 
should surely follow as strongly, is that current 
generations of Canadians are also consuming 
too much of this scarce resource, at the expense 
of future Canadians. Limiting exports, without 
additional regulation, will increase availabil-
ity for the domestic market and lower prices 
thereby tending to generate more energy con-
sumption by current consumers in Canada. 
How does this meet the obligation to future 
generations?
It is not our intent to argue that Canada must 
export oil or that the efficiency argument is the 
only correct basis for public policy. However, 
what happens far too frequently is that policy 
recommendations are made on the basis of 
very limited or expeditious judgments. What is 
required is some broad overview of public wel-
fare: the normative efficiency rule is one such 
view and therefore ranks among useful criteria 
for economic policy evaluation.
(2) Many critics of the efficiency criterion would 
suggest that the clearest proof of its failure lies 
in the area of energy policy, for reasons sug-
gested in the first paragraph of this chapter: 
how can policy based upon the satisfaction of 
selfish desires of today’s oil producers correctly 
allocate the fixed stock of petroleum that time 
and chance have bequeathed? Supporters of the 
Economic Analysis and Petroleum Production 67
efficiency rule have two lines of argument in 
support of their position:
a. The first is to point to the historical record. 
For the past century or more, in the industrial-
ized world, economic production and consump-
tion have been based in large part on individual 
market decisions. This does not guarantee 
economic efficiency, but, as we noted above, 
the concept of economic efficiency does give 
strong support to the institution of free markets. 
Over this period we have witnessed sustained 
improvements in our physical well-being 
(measured both by consumption and health 
statistics). Moreover, most depletable natural 
resources seem, if anything, to have been more 
available (i.e., cheaper) in the post-World War II 
period than before. Thus, while admitting that 
there have been instances of monopoly power 
and agreeing that some externalities require 
correction, the historical record can be inter-
preted to suggest that free markets have not led 
to overly rapid exploitation of the resource base. 
Several simulations of the long-term future 
conditions in energy markets have reached the 
conclusion that energy needs can likely be met 
through the indefinite future, if the efficiency 
rule is followed. (For example, see Nordhaus, 
1973, and Manne, 1976.) Of course, the argu-
ment that supplies of energy are likely sufficient 
for the indefinite future does not preclude the 
possibility that we are over consuming energy 
today because markets fail to recognize negative 
externalities such as environmental costs.
b. The second line of argument stresses the 
theoretical model of resource markets. In par-
ticular, it notes that efficient natural resource 
producers do take account of the expected 
future values of resources and will be quite 
willing to save resources for consumers in the 
future, if it appears profitable. The argument 
that the efficiency rule should be abandoned 
because it includes consideration only of imme-
diate profitability is incorrect.
Once again, it has not been our intent to argue 
that the efficiency rule is the only feasible 
one for social decision-making. One can, for 
instance argue, that it gives insufficient weight 
to future generations because discount rates 
used by private decision-makers are too high 
(Lind, 1982). However, the rule is not as limited 
as many critics suggest, and it is reasonable to 
suggest that efficiency is one criterion that is 
useful for evaluating economic policies.
5. Market Equilibrium in Imperfectly 
Competitive Markets
Many markets do not have independent buyers and 
sellers: individuals (or small coalitions) are able to 
affect the market price. Supply and demand cannot, 
then, operate independently to establish price since 
one side or other of the market (or both, in some 
cases) is able to determine, in part, what the other side 
will do – in short some participants possess ‘market 
power,’ and competition is ‘imperfect.’
It is important to note that market power is not 
conveyed to a firm simply because it is large. What 
is relevant is the size of the firm compared with the 
market and ease of entry. A large firm (measured by 
assets or sales) in a large industry may have no market 
power, whereas a small firm in a small market may 
have significant power. Moreover, it is not only current 
but potential participation that determines the extent 
to which markets may be effectively competitive. One 
approach emphasizes potential entry into (the ‘con-
testability’ of) markets (Baumol, 1986). This raises the 
contentious issue of the formal definition of a market. 
Obviously, it must be rather arbitrary, an extreme view 
suggesting that there are no markets, only buyers and 
sellers. Should we speak of the market for non-leaded 
premium motor gasoline in Don Mills, Ontario? Or 
the market for gasoline in Ontario? Or the market for 
oil in Western Canada? Or the market for energy in 
Canada? The most critical requirement of a ‘market’ 
would seem to be that it includes all individual buyers 
who show high willingness to move from one seller 
to another; similarly, all sellers must be very willing 
to move between buyers. A market typically covers a 
relatively homogeneous product and has good infor-
mation flows among market participants.
Five cases of market power will be examined:
A.	Monopoly
There is only one seller, so the monopolist faces 
the entire market demand for the product and can 
select where on that curve to operate. (The case of a 
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‘price-discriminating monopolist,’ which charges dif-
ferent prices for different units sold, will be discussed 
below.) In this case a company may profit by restrict-
ing sales in order to charge a higher price. Economists 
have formalized this in a simple but useful model. The 
firm will maximize profits if it produces output up to 
that unit which has a marginal cost (MC) equal to the 
marginal (incremental) revenue (MR) (Figure 4.7) 
and charges the price shown by the demand curve for 
that unit of output. The marginal cost of production 
for a monopoly is equivalent to what was called the 
‘supply curve’ for a competitive firm. But the monop-
olist’s marginal revenue curve lies below the market 
demand curve. The monopolist can sell an additional 
unit of the product only by cutting price and accepting 
a lower price on all sales. Thus to calculate marginal 
revenue it is necessary to deduct, from the revenue 
on the new unit sold, the reduction in revenue on all 
units that were previously sold at the higher price. For 
example, if 150,000 m3/d were sold at $35/m3, total 
revenue would be $5.25 million/d. Demand conditions 
might be such that 160,000 M3/d could be sold if 
the price were reduced to $34/m3; revenue would be 
$5.44 million. Marginal revenue (per additional cubic 
metre) would be $190,000/10,000m3 = $19/m3, which 
is less than the market price of $34. The $190,000 con-
sists of $340,000 on the new sales (10,000 m3 at $34 
each) less $150,000 ($1 less on each of the 150,000 m3, 
which used to be sold at $35).
Contrast this with an effectively competitive 
market. Price is determined where market supply 
intersects market demand. Individual firms have no 
ability to influence the price of the product. If a firm 
attempts to charge more than the market price, no 
one will buy its product. It has no need to charge less 
than the market price because its small size means it 
can sell as much as it wishes at the market price. As 
far as the individual firm is concerned, the demand 
curve is perfectly elastic (i.e., flat) at the market price 
and this price will be the marginal revenue from each 
extra unit sold. In order to maximize profits, each 
firm in a perfectly competitive market produces where 
MR = MC, but this means it produces where price 
equals marginal cost.
In Figure 4.7 the monopolist would charge OB 
and sell OA units. An effectively competitive market 
with the same costs, including user costs, would yield 
price OD and quantity OC. If the normative efficiency 
criterion is applied, it is evident that there is a welfare 
loss (efficiency loss) under monopolistic conditions. 
The monopolist values additional units of sale (as 
indicated by the MR curve) less highly than does 
society as a whole (as indicated by the demand curve, 
D). The welfare loss of the monopoly is given by the 
shaded area: it is a dollar sum equal to the amount 
consumers would be willing to pay for the units of 
output the monopolist does not produce, less the cost 
the firm would incur in producing them, up to the 
unit of output at which the marginal benefit (demand) 
equals the marginal cost. Expressed slightly differently, 
by restricting output in order to maximize its own 
profits, the monopolist generates a market result that 
no longer maximizes the sum of producers’ and con-
sumers’ surpluses.
For most changes in underlying market condi-
tions – that is, if the demand and/or marginal cost 
curves shift – a monopoly market will react in the 
same directional manner as an effectively competitive 
one. Thus, the tools of competitive demand and supply 
are often useful for analyzing the direction of changes 
in equilibrium price and quantity, even though the 
market may not be perfectly competitive.
The discussion thus far has assumed that a monop-
olist charges a single price to all purchasers. Another 
possibility is a price-discriminating monopoly that 
charges different prices to different customers, or 
even to the same customer on different units. In this 
manner, the monopolist can capture more of the con-
sumers’ surplus. For such price discrimination to be 
possible, the purchasers in different price classes must 
be effectively segregated. For example, Buyer ‘A’ who 
is charged a lower price must not be able to increase 
purchases and resell them to Buyer ‘B’ to whom the 








Figure 4.7 Monopoly in the Crude Oil Market
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distance may provide a segregating factor, as when 
Buyer ‘A’ has to pay a shipment cost to move the prod-
uct to Buyer ‘B.’ The presence of price discrimination 
is sometimes difficult to determine (Phlips, 1983). It 
includes, for instance, the obvious case of different 
prices for identical units of output. However, it also 
includes price differences not justified by differences 
in the characteristics of the output. For instance, to 
charge the same price for delivered output to custom-
ers in different regions would involve price discrimin-
ation because the prices do not reflect differences in 
the cost of delivery to the regions. It is interesting to 
note that a perfectly effective price discriminating 
monopolist would produce at the efficient output and 
price (just as under perfect competition, where the 
demand curve cuts the marginal cost curve). Each 
unit of output would be sold at the price indicated on 
the demand curve; all potential consumers’ surplus, as 
well as producers’ surplus, would be captured by the 
monopolist. Monopolies, let alone price-discriminat-
ing monopolies, are relatively rare. Their existence in 
the long-run depends upon an ability to exclude new 
firms from the industry, even in the face of substantial 
monopoly profit. 
Four significant types of barriers to entry, and their 
possible application to the petroleum industry, will be 
discussed:
1. Economies of Scale (Natural Monopoly). 
Technical conditions of production may mean 
that the average cost of production for a firm 
decreases with increased output, up to the full 
extent of market demand. In this case, efficiency 
requires only one facility in the market so that 
production costs are at a minimum. On the 
other hand, efficiency requires a pricing policy 
other than the monopoly one. Small firms find 
entry difficult since costs are so high, and large 
firms will not wish to enter because the market 
is not large enough for them as well as the 
established monopoly. Significant economies of 
scale exist in the petroleum industry in pipeline 
transportation and natural gas distribution, 
though there is a size of pipeline above which 
no further economies can be realized. If the 
market were small enough, economies of scale 
in refining could also prove significant, although 
they would be circumscribed by disecono-
mies of distribution, depending on location in 
relation to markets – one giant refinery might 
serve all the market with the lowest unit cost of 
refining but would incur less than optimal dis-
tribution costs. Economies of scale may also be 
significant in ‘frontier’ areas in exploration and 
development. It should be noted that economies 
of scale serve as a barrier to entry only if they 
hold up to a level of output that is large relative 
to the size of the market demand.
2. Government Monopoly. Legislation or govern-
ment decree may bring about monopoly condi-
tions. The favoured company may or may not be 
government-owned. Often it is coupled with an 
enforced pricing policy that is designed to avoid 
the welfare costs of the monopoly.
3. Absolute Cost Advantage. The monopolist 
may have such a significant cost advantage over 
competitors that, even at the monopoly price, 
and with monopoly profits, new firms are not 
attracted to enter. This refers to the case in 
which the monopolist has lower levels of cost at 
all possible output levels, in contrast to the nat-
ural monopoly case where all firms have a lower 
average cost at higher output levels. Such cost 
advantages may arise, for example, from spe-
cial knowledge, natural resource scarcity (one 
firm controls the lowest cost resource), vertical 
integration with a monopoly in upstream activ-
ities (the monopolist can charge high prices for 
essential inputs that it produces itself), monop-
oly in essential processes (generally supported 
by patent rights), access to unusually low cost 
capital, etc. In the petroleum industry, the major 
companies have been vertically integrated, 
often with a high degree of concentration in 
one or more levels of industry activity (e.g., the 
Standard Oil Trust in refining in the late 1800s, 
Middle Eastern crude oil reserves, refining in 
countries with small markets, pipelines). This 
opens up the possibility of input or output 
pricing practices that discourage entry at other 
levels of industry activity.
4. Brand Loyalty. On the demand side of the 
market, a particular firm may command such 
loyalty from consumers that new entrants are 
unable to break into the market place, even 
though the monopolist earns great profits. 
Usually this requires some legal protection 
(e.g., a patent or copyright) so that a compet-
itor cannot produce an identical product. It 
may involve an absolute cost advantage, if a 
new entrant must undertake a major ‘educa-
tional’ expenditure to make buyers aware of its 
product.
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These cases illustrate that the advantages of effective 
competition are not as clear as was suggested above. 
If there were significant economies of scale, or abso-
lute cost advantages not due to monopoly restrictions 
of input supply or process technology, then real cost 
advantages accrue to society as a result of the mon-
opoly. However, the monopolist’s profit-maximizing 
position is not optimal for society since he will under-
produce and overcharge. Usually government regula-
tion or ownership is advocated by economists, such as 
the rate regulation that has been pervasive in the pipe-
line industry. Further, on the basis of dynamic con-
siderations, some economists, like Joseph Schumpeter, 
have emphasized the importance of monopolistic 
markets in a technologically innovative society: the 
inventor of a new technology that benefits society also 
generates market power for itself, at least temporarily, 
so some degree of monopolization may be a price we 
pay for progress.
In general, unless entry barriers are extremely low 
or government regulations very effective, monopol-
ies charge higher prices than effectively competitive 
industries and can generate efficiency losses.
B.	Monopsony
There is one firm buying the product. The buyer may 
be able to price discriminate by paying less for some 
units purchased than for others, in effect picking up 
different units along the supply curve. In the absence 
of price discrimination, the result is analogous to the 
monopoly case (with a similar welfare cost), except 
that the reduced quantity produced is purchased at 
a price lower than with effective competition. The 
monopsonist buyer benefits by buying at the low 
price, but, as an upward-sloping supply curve tells us, 
at the lower price producers will make less available. 
If the monopsonist consumes the product directly, 
it has benefited by obtaining units at a price lower 
than the competitive one. If the monopsonist uses the 
product to produce something else, it benefits through 
the extra profits it gains from purchasing inputs at a 
low price. For the non-price-discriminating monop-
sonist, additional units of the product cost more than 
the price. This is because an offer to increase price in 
order to cover the increased marginal cost of the next 
unit of output also involves a higher payment for all 
units it was willing to purchase at the lower price.
A more complicated case arises if the monop-
sony buyer is a rate-regulated natural monopoly. 
For example, a natural gas pipeline company may be 
the sole gas buyer in a region, and the sole seller in 
a market area, but subject to rate regulation. In this 
instance, the monopsonist has a direct profit motive 
to restrict purchases (and sales) by paying less for the 
product only to the extent that he is able to disguise 
extra profits as allowable costs in the rate base or is 
allowed a rate of return in excess of the normal profit 
rate. A more indirect motive comes from the increase 
in the size of the monopsonist’s system if costs are 
lower so demand for the monopsonist’s product is 
higher, but this raises obvious problems in obtaining 
the input supplies necessary to service customers since 
the low price paid to the input suppliers inhibits their 
willingness to produce. Some analysts have suggested 
that a monopsony of this sort existed in the 1950s and 
1960s in the export market for Alberta natural gas. 
Large volumes of gas had been found as a result of the 
search for crude oil. While the market for this gas was 
being built up, a monopsonistic natural gas purchaser 
(TransCanada Pipeline, TCPL) was able to purchase 
gas at exceptionally low prices and rapidly expand its 
market east of Alberta. However, one would expect 
that, eventually, a market imbalance would become 
apparent, where more gas was being demanded at 
these low prices than TCPL could contract from nat-
ural gas producers. 
C. Oligopoly
As noted in Chapter Three on OPEC, an oligopoly is a 
market situation with more than one selling firm but 
few enough firms (or with one or more of the firms 
large enough) that companies are able to affect the 
market price and must consider competitors’ reac-
tions to their decisions. Oligopoly market structures 
are prevalent in our society: the Canadian refining 
industry is an example, as is OPEC. Economists have 
no single model of oligopoly, since what occurs 
depends upon how companies perceive one another, 
and exactly how they interact. Preservation of a prof-
itable oligopoly with a small number of firms requires 
barriers to entry of the type noted above. ‘Profitable’ 
here means continuing profits above and beyond the 
minimum return needed to keep firms in the industry. 
Sometimes the word ‘cartel’ is used interchangeably 
with ‘oligopoly,’ but we prefer to apply the term ‘cartel’ 
to an oligopoly market structure in which the oligop-
olists are in direct communication with one another.
An oligopoly market might generate a result 
identical to the monopoly one. This would be true of 
a ‘strict’ cartel, in which the companies act as if they 
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were a single firm – that is they rank output from the 
lowest cost unit to the highest cost unit, regardless 
of which firm produces it, and restrict output to the 
point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. 
Investment in new facilities must also occur in the 
lowest cost manner. One can easily appreciate the 
difficulty in forming a strict cartel, particularly with 
regard to such matters as scheduling output shares, 
setting ‘fair’ profit shares, and determining the role 
of potential new entrants. Furthermore, there is a 
temptation for each individual producer to attempt 
to increase its share of industry output, especially if it 
feels that its share of industry profits is unfair.
In most countries, it is illegal for firms to enter 
into formal agreements to limit competition. However, 
a result close to monopoly may occur in oligopoly 
markets as a result of tacit (informal) collusion among 
firms. This is more likely if there are relatively few 
firms, producing virtually the same product, in an 
industry with high barriers to entry, and under rela-
tively stable market conditions (e.g., steady growth in 
market demand). When companies all have the same 
information, they may collude by acting in a parallel 
fashion without direct communication. Frequently a 
pattern of price leadership evolves, in which one firm 
(often the largest) takes the initiative in changing price 
and other firms follow.
At the other extreme, an oligopoly situation may 
generate strong price competition among firms, with a 
result approaching the perfectly competitive one. This 
is the effective or workable competition model. If the 
good or service produced can be transported easily 
at low cost, effective competition may be attained 
with only a few domestic producers, given foreign 
competition.
Between the two extremes lie an infinite number 
of possible cases, some closer to the strict cartel end, 
some to the competition end. In comparison with the 
perfectly competitive case, all partake to some extent 
of the welfare criticism made of monopoly: the market 
result involves restricted production and higher 
prices. One type of intermediate position is thought to 
be very common in our society. Firms may compete 
in a non-price manner by means such as advertising, 
packaging, and changes in product quality, in order to 
differentiate their product. This raises costs, leading 
to a monopoly-type result (a higher price and lower 
quantity than with effective competition), but with the 
monopoly profits largely competed away. The absence 
of excess profits serves as a barrier to entry.
Generally speaking, the greater the number of 
firms in an industry and the smaller the largest firm 
relative to total industry activity, the more effectively 
competitive the industry is likely to be. With a very 
large number of firms, or a moderate number of firms 
of roughly equal size, it will be very difficult for one 
firm to lead the industry or for all firms to reach a 
collusive agreement.
D. Oligopsony
Oligopsony is when there are few enough, or large 
enough, buyers that they must take into account their 
interactions with one another. As with oligopoly, the 
market equilibrium may lie between two extremes, 
in this case the monopsony and perfectly competitive 
cases. Aspects of non-price competition occur in oli-
gopsonies as in oligopolies; examples include prepay-
ment agreements (where an initial payment is made 
prior to delivery), inclusion of take-or-pay provisions 
in the contract (where the buyer must pay whether or 
not it takes delivery), absorption by the buyer of cer-
tain gathering or distribution costs, etc.
E.	Bilateral	Monopoly
This is the case where a monopolist sells to a monop-
sonist. The actual market result depends on the 
relative bargaining strengths of the two parties. The 
equilibrium quantity may lie anywhere between the 
competitive quantity and the extreme, restricted, 
non-perfectly competitive quantity. The price may be 
anywhere between the low monopsony one and the 
high monopolist one. The efficiently competitive result 
may occur in a bilateral monopoly case (e.g., if the 
monopolist and monopsonist are ‘perfectly’ matched, 
and will not compromise), but it is unlikely.
In general, imperfect competition involves restricted 
market quantities relative to perfect competition and 
(if the normative model is accepted) some welfare loss.
Little has been made in the preceding discussion 
of the existence of vertical integration, which is cor-
porate activity at successive stages of processing in 
an industry. Vertical integration has been prevalent 
in the petroleum industry. Economic policy views 
horizontal concentration, at a single stage of the pet-
roleum industry, as the more critical problem. Vertical 
integration is compatible with degrees of market 
concentration all the way from monopoly to effective 
competition. However, as was suggested above, there 
may be interactions between vertical integration and 
72 PETROPOLIT ICS
horizontal concentration (often called ‘economies of 
scope’). Vertical integration may generate significant 
economies (reduced costs). These are seen largely in 
economies in the information process, greater flex-
ibility in scheduling operations, and absolute cost 
economies or economies of scale due to large size. 
However, the existence of vertical integration does not 
necessarily imply that such economies are important. 
For example, in the international petroleum industry, 
a major inducement to vertical integration historically 
was to avoid the market power exercised by existing 
firms at the refining or crude oil production level.
6. Applications to the Petroleum 
Industry
The purpose of this section is to apply the tools of 
economic analysis to several public policy issues in the 
petroleum industry. For ease of presentation, we shall 
assume that the petroleum market is effectively com-
petitive. Empirical analysis of several of these issues is 
included in later chapters.
A.	Interrelations	among	Markets
The petroleum industry is international; no part of 
the world oil market is immune from the impact of 
changes elsewhere. However, any relatively small 
producing region or consuming area may, by itself, 
have very little impact upon the basic price level of 
oil. As discussed in Chapter Three, to a great extent 
this has been true for Canada. Field prices of oil and 
natural gas have always been very heavily influenced 
by prices in the United States, which both produ-
ces and consumes much more oil than Alberta or 
Western Canada. And both Eastern Canada and the 
United States have been closely connected to overseas 
oil producers.
From the viewpoint of a small producing region, 
the price in the larger market (‘the international price’) 
might be seen as a price ceiling. Analytically, this can 
be handled in one of two ways: either (1) the demand 
curve may be viewed as perfectly elastic (flat) at the 
left since if producers in this region tried to charge a 
price higher than the international price, sales would 
fall to zero, or (2) the supply curve might be viewed 
as perfectly elastic (flat) to the right, since at the inter-
national price large quantities become available from 
other sources. There is no real reason to prefer one of 
these approaches to the other, so both are shown, but 
for somewhat different market positions, in Figure 4.8. 
In this figure, the price in the larger market is at level 
PI, SS is the supply curve for the producing region, 
and DD is the demand curve in the domestic con-
suming market to which this region’s oil moves. The 
approach is simplified by the exclusion of transporta-
tion costs within the domestic market.
In Panel A, the effective domestic demand curve, 
as viewed by the producers, is the kinked curve PID: 
even though consumers would (hypothetically) be 
willing to pay more than OP1 for some oil, the pro-
ducing region cannot charge more than the inter-

























Figure 4.8 The Small Region in International Trade
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and Western Canadian markets since about 1950. It is 
assumed that regional supply is large enough relative 
to demand that there is no need for purchases from 
the larger world market. If producers are restricted 
from selling in the larger market they would produce 
quantity OB and obtain a price of OA. However, if 
producers are free to move into the larger market, 
they will view the total demand curve for their oil as 
curve PIDT and produce OC units for sale at the inter-
national market price PI. Of this quantity, OD will be 
sold in the domestic market and DC will be exported. 
Given the international price, increases in supply, 
domestic demand unchanged, would mean increases 
in exports. Increases in domestic demand, supply 
unchanged, would mean reduced exports.
In Panel B of Figure 4.8, domestic demand is large 
enough that it cannot be satisfied by regional supply 
at a price below the international level, as has some-
times been true of Canada as a whole. In this case 
a total supply curve can be drawn as viewed by the 
consuming portion of the market; this would be iden-
tical to the domestic supply (SS) at prices lower than 
PI but show unlimited quantities available (i.e., from 
the world market) at that price (curve SST). Given the 
local demand (DD), price would be PI and the quantity 
demanded would be OG, of which OH comes from 
domestic producers and HG is imported. An increase 
in demand (regional supply unchanged) would mean 
more imports but unchanged domestic production. A 
rise in domestic supply (demand unchanged) would 
mean reduced imports, but no reduction in price until 
domestic supply is greater than that shown by curve 
S’OS’O. (A supply greater than S’OS’O yields the situation 
in Panel A.)
The history of Canadian oil pricing and produc-
tion is discussed in detail in Chapter Six. Chapter 
Nine looks at government regulations that interfered 
with the free movement of production, consumption, 
or price.
B. Royalties
The term ‘royalty’ is generally applied to a payment 
made by the producer of petroleum to the resource 
owner on the basis of the amount of petroleum lifted. 
In Canada, it happens that most petroleum rights 
are owned by governments, so the royalty has been 
viewed as a tax by some observers. Its purpose is to 
allow the landowner (government) to share in the 
profits (economic rent) from petroleum production. It 
may also represent compensation for any reduction in 
the value of land transferred from an alternate use into 
oil production, though the resource owner may assess 
a rental payment for this purpose.
Royalties are viewed as a cost of production by 
the petroleum operator and therefore enter into the 
supply (private marginal cost) curve. It is evident 
that an increase in royalties will generate a reduced 
supply (leftward shift in the supply curve). Some 
aspects of royalties are shown in Figure 4.9. Panel A 
shows a ‘specific’ royalty, set at a fixed dollar value 
per cubic metre regardless of the market value of the 
oil (e.g., $3/m3). SS is the supply curve without roy-
alty and DD the demand curve, with price OA and 
quantity OC. With the royalty, the new supply curve 
is S’S’, the royalty being the fixed vertical distance 
SS’ per cubic metre. The new equilibrium price is at 
price OD and quantity OG: price is higher (but not 
by the full amount of the royalty, since AD < EF), 
and quantity supplied is lower. The reduced quantity 
reflects reduced capital investment in exploration and 
development and earlier abandonment of existing 
equipment due to higher operating costs for the com-
pany. The government collects revenue equal to SS’ 
× OG = Area SS’EF. In the normative model, unless 
the royalty is set to internalize an external cost, there 
is a net welfare loss to society equal to area EFB (the 
shaded area), for the GC units now not produced. This 
equals the excess of their marginal value (shown by 
the demand curve) over their marginal costs (shown 
by the supply curve, SS). Formally, the royalty involves 
a loss of consumers’ surplus and of producers’ surplus 
(economic rent). The consumers’ surplus loss is EHB 
for the unproduced units; it is the excess of the value 
of the marginal units to consumers (as given by the 
demand curve) over the price the consumer formerly 
paid (i.e., OA). The lost producers’ surplus is FHB: it is 
the excess of the price formerly paid for the marginal 
units (i.e., OA) over the cost of production (as given 
by the supply curve). Taxes almost invariably involve 
some efficiency loss. One objective of taxation is to 
raise revenue with a minimum of such losses.
Owners of subsurface rights usually assess an ‘ad 
valorem’ royalty instead of a specific royalty. An ad 
valorem royalty is some percentage of the market price 
of the product. Panel B of Figure 4.9 compares specific 
and ad valorem royalties. The initial demand is DD. 
If SS is the supply curve including a specific royalty, 
the market would clear with output OB at price OA. 
Consider now an ad valorem royalty that would gen-
erate exactly the same per unit revenue as the specific 
royalty when the price is OA. The supply curve with 
an ad valorem royalty would be S’S’, with greater 
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supply than the specific royalty at lower prices and 
less supply at higher prices. If market demand were 
to increase, the new equilibrium would be at point E 
with an ad valorem royalty as compared to point G 
(a lower price) for a specific royalty. In the normative 
model, area EFG is the extra welfare cost of an ad 
valorem royalty as compared to a specific royalty, but 
the ad valorem royalty generates more revenue for the 
government or landowner than the specific royalty 
on the incremental units produced. (If the demand 
decreased, however, and price fell, there would be an 
increase in supply under an ad valorem royalty relative 
to a specific royalty, and a welfare gain.) Why are ad 
valorem royalties common? They have the advantage 
of allowing both the operator and the mineral rights 
owner to share in changing market conditions, since 
royalty payments vary directly with market prices.
Some attempts have been made to generate more 
revenue from the royalty, while lessening the wel-
fare costs, by the use of ‘sliding-scale’ royalties that 
attempt to assess a higher rate on the least costly (i.e., 
most profitable) production. Look at curve S”BS in 
Figure 4.9, Panel A. This involves a high royalty on 
the lowest cost units of output with royalties finally 
falling to zero on the OCth, and all more costly, units. 
So long as the price is OA, curve S”BS is in effect a 
net royalty, as opposed to a gross royalty; that is, the 
royalty is based, not on the price alone, but the price 
less marginal cost. Unless the royalty is actually set 
up as a net profit tax, however, such an ideal scheme 
can only be approximated since (i) it would be too 
costly administratively to set a separate rate for each 
cubic metre of output, and (ii) the rates would have to 
change each time market price or costs changed, and 
it would be impossible to have an automatic formula 
that did so perfectly.
Frequently a sliding-scale royalty is based upon 
the well production rate, with lower royalties for wells 
with lower output rates, on the assumption that there 
is a significant negative correlation between costs per 
cubic metre and output per well. The assumption has 
some justification, since many costs are specific to 
the existence of a well, and invariant with respect to 
the production rate of the well, so that higher output 
means lower average costs. However, the correla-
tion is not perfect, and some high output wells have 
high costs. This may hold for some, but not all, EOR 
schemes, and for very deep wells and those in hostile 
environments. As a result, a sliding-scale royalty will, 
like the royalties discussed above, generate reduced 
rates of oil production in a region, due to reduced 
investment and earlier abandonment dates for wells.
Sliding-scale royalties have also been tied to the 
price of petroleum, with higher rates the higher the 
price. Royalties have also been related to ‘vintage,’ 
generally the date of discovery of reserves, with higher 
royalties assessed on ‘older’ oil. This has been particu-
larly popular if companies were willing to establish 
reserves in the past at lower prices, and subsequently 
prices rise substantially.
Panel C of Figure 4.9 illustrates some aspects of 

















Figure 4.9 Crude Oil Royalties
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curve before royalties are assessed. An output-based 
sliding-scale royalty (assuming a negative correlation 
between cost and output levels) would shift the supply 
curve to S’S’, with price OA and quantity OB. A vin-
tage dimension, which reduced royalties on ‘new’ oil, 
would give a supply curve such as S’DS”, since some 
of the incremental long-run production would now 
be assessed a lower royalty. (The precise definition of 
‘new oil’ is of vital concern to companies: newly dis-
covered reserves normally qualify and frequently so 
do reserves from new EOR schemes; reserves added 
through extension drilling are often more problem-
atic, and higher output from existing reserves due to 
accelerated depletion [infill drilling] is usually labelled 
‘old oil.’)
The impact of a royalty scale that slides with price 
is harder to depict since the royalty payment (and 
hence the supply curve) will depend upon the equi-
librium price. Thus, for instance, the supply curve 
might be S’S’ if the price were OA, but S’’’S’’’ if demand 
rose to D’D’ with the equilibrium price rising to OC. 
(The ad valorem supply curve of Panel B [curve S’S’] 
showed marginal costs including the royalty on the 
assumption that the last unit produced was the equi-
librium unit at which supply equalled demand. In 
effect, it traced out equilibrium points, like D and 
E, along varying supply curves like S’S’ and S’’’S’’’ 
of Panel C.)
In general, royalties can be used to raise revenues 
for the mineral rights owner and/or government, but 
they also change the market equilibrium (price and/
or output) and generate welfare losses. More elabor-
ate royalty schemes may minimize these changes and 
losses but cannot do so entirely and run the risk of 
becoming very complex to administer. For this reason, 
economists have not tended to favour royalties as the 
sole method of collecting economic rent from the 
petroleum industry.
Alberta’s royalty and tax regime is discussed in 
Chapter Eleven of this book.
C. Production Controls
It has been common for government to impose lim-
itations upon levels and methods of production from 
petroleum pools. Some of these regulations reflect 
safety and general conservation principles (like 
requiring that gas be reinjected rather than flared). 
In North America, the most important controls were 
largely dictated by the rule of capture. Consequently 
a number of governments (including Alberta) intro-
duced prorationing (production control) restrictions, 
along with well-spacing regulations, with the avowed 
goals of (i) reducing the ‘waste’ in production associ-
ated with the rule of capture and (ii) protecting cor-
relative property rights (i.e., the rights of access to the 
pool by adjacent property owners).
In Figure 4.10, Panel A, DD is the market demand 
curve in the region, and SS represents what the market 
supply curve would be if the rule of capture did not 
operate. This would be the case if the oil pools were 
‘unitized’ – each pool produced by one operator only, 
although that operator might represent several com-
panies. Equilibrium price would be OA and quantity 
OB. If the rule of capture (with shared oil pools) were 
suddenly to come into effect, the supply curve would 
shift to the right, to S’S’, with a corresponding fall 
in market price to OC and rise in quantity to OD. 
If supply and demand were inelastic, price could be 
much lower under the rule of capture. The increased 
supply (reduced marginal costs) reflects the ten-
dency to ignore user costs under the rule of capture. 
Davidson (1963) argues that the rule of capture gener-
ates a negative user cost, which offsets the usual posi-
tive user costs. See also Watkins (1970) and McDonald 
(1971). Why would a company pay attention to the 
possible future profits that a cubic metre of reserves 
might generate if its competitor were likely to capture 
those reserves?
In theory, a well administered production con-
trol scheme could be imposed to limit production to 





















like curve S’FS” (perfectly inelastic at quantity OB) 
and market equilibrium would correspond to that 
expected if the rule of capture did not operate. In 
practice, such a scheme is administratively infeasible 
since: (1) it would require restricting production to 
the lowest cost units of oil, even though at the price 
OA operators would be willing to supply substantially 
more (i.e., desired supply, without production control, 
is OE at price (OA)); and (2) with every change in 
demand (DD) or supply (SS), the regulations would 
have to change so that the only barrels produced 
would be those now corresponding to the hypothetical 
equilibrium without the rule of capture. It is unlikely 
that the administrators of the program would know 
exactly where the ‘true’ supply curve (SS) lies and 
which units of potential output have the lowest cost. 
Hence production controls are likely to give a market 
price higher or lower than the ‘desired’ price, OA.
Some critics of North American market-demand 
prorationing schemes accused the government regu-
lators of administering the schemes in such a way that 
their prime effect was to fix petroleum prices at arti-
ficially high levels, thereby generating high consumer 
costs and higher petroleum profits than would other-
wise have existed.
Figure 4.10, Panel B, illustrates this contention. 
Initially, assume the existence of a well-functioning 
prorationing scheme, such that production, OB, and 
price, OA, under the scheme (at the intersection of the 
demand, DD, and prorationed supply, S’FS”) corres-
pond to the competitive equilibrium levels without the 
rule of capture (where DD and SS intersect). Suppose 
several major new discoveries are made, so that the 
basic market supply (excluding rule of capture con-
siderations) shifts to S’’’S’’’ (and the supply curve with 
the impact of the rule of capture moves to S’’’’S’’’’). The 
equilibrium price without the rule of capture would 
fall to OC and the quantity rise to OD. But regulatory 
authorities may continue to hold production at level 
OB (and price at OA); the prorationing equilibrium is 
where DD intersects S’’’’GS”. The new supply addition 
is not allowed to affect the market, and there is a rise 
in ‘excess capacity’ (i.e., the amount producers would 
like to bring to the market at the existing price, but 
are not allowed to). In the normative model, there is 
a welfare loss equal to the excess of social benefit over 
social cost on the barrels that the regulatory author-
ities do not allow to be produced.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which pro-
rationing schemes in North America generated wel-
fare losses of this sort. The price of oil was relatively 
stable under these schemes from 1950 through 1970, 
 












































Figure 4.10 The Rule of Capture and Prorationing
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even in the face of changing supply and demand con-
ditions, while the amounts of excess capacity held 
off the market fluctuated more than price. It will be 
appreciated that under a prorationing scheme an 
individual producer has little incentive to cut price 
since it will gain little of any increase in quantity 
demanded. The increased production to meet a rise in 
quantity demanded will be divided amongst among all 
producers.
Prorationing schemes have also been criticized for 
inefficiencies due to their particular administrative 
structure. Typically (although not invariably) (i) some 
production from high-cost wells has displaced 
output from low-cost wells; and (ii) the schemes have 
induced the drilling of more development wells than 
is necessary to support allowable production. This 
situation can also be depicted by demand and supply 
curves, as in Figure 4.10, Panel C. In this figure, the 
curves DD, SS, and S’S’ are the same as in the earlier 
diagrams: i.e., they represent, respectively, market 
demand, market supply with no rule of capture effects, 
and market supply with the rule of capture but with-
out regulations. We assume a prorationing scheme is 
introduced that attains the ‘desired’ equilibrium price 
and quantity (i.e., OA and OB). The two administra-
tive inefficiencies would lead to a supply curve under 
prorationing like curve S’DS”, instead of the S’CS” 
associated with perfect regulation. The area S’CD is the 
welfare cost associated with this imperfect production 
control scheme; it represents the dollar cost of oil pro-
duction in excess of the lowest cost production pattern 
available. Empirical research has suggested that such 
extra costs have been substantial (Adelman, 1964; 
Watkins, 1971, 1977c).
Chapter Ten looks in detail at Alberta’s conserva-
tion regulations.
D. Export Controls
The movement of oil between two separate jurisdic-
tions increases possibilities for government interven-
tion in the functioning of the market. For instance, 
at various times, both the Canadian and the U.S. 
governments have introduced measures to control 
the volume of crude oil, refined products, and natural 
gas flowing from Canada to the United States. Some 
useful conclusions about the economic impact of such 
measures can (of course!) be gained from the supply- 
demand apparatus.
Figure 4.11, Panel A shows a domestic producing 
region in which demand (DD) is entirely satisfied by 
domestic sources (domestic supply is SS). A much 
larger export market is available so that external 
demand is virtually unlimited as far as domestic 
producers are concerned, at a market price of OA. 
In the absence of trade controls, the equilibrium 
price would be OA and the equilibrium quantity of 






















Figure 4.11 Oil Export Controls
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production OB; of this, OC is consumed domestic-
ally and exports are CB (equal to OD in Figure 4.11, 
Panel B, showing the export market). Suppose that 
the domestic government limits the volume of exports 
to OE (< OD = CB). (Or we could suppose that the 
foreign government limits the volume of imports.) 
The reduction in the demand for domestic oil will 
mean a fall in the domestic price to level OF, at which 
the quantity supplied (OH) is equal to the quantity 
demanded (OH, of which OG is domestic demand and 
GH = OE is a foreign demand). Domestic consumers 
benefit by such a policy on the part of the government 
since the oil price is reduced, but domestic producers 
suffer. There is also a benefit to those in the foreign 
market who are fortunate enough to obtain oil from 
the domestic region: the market price in the foreign 
market is OA, but foreigners can purchase these bar-
rels at price OF, thereby gaining to the extent of the 
shaded area. In the domestic market, efficiency (wel-
fare) losses equal to NMIJ occur: losses in revenue on 
exports (LMIK = AFQR), losses of producers’ surplus 
on the reduced output (IJK) and the payments for-
eigners used to make in excess of the value of the extra 
domestic consumption (NLM). The program, there-
fore, involves income transfers from domestic produ-
cers to both domestic and foreign consumers.
If only select domestic producers are allowed 
access to export markets, those producers may be 
able to gain extra revenue by selling oil in the foreign 
market at price OA. This is an example of price dis-
crimination, where foreign and domestic customers 
are charged different prices. The difference can exist 
only because the foreign customers are not allowed 
open access to competing Canadian suppliers.
Another possibility, an export tax, will be dis-
cussed below.
It must be noted that analysis is further compli-
cated if the producing region operates a prorationing 
scheme. In this case, the imposition of export controls 
may simply mean reduced production without corres-
ponding price changes.
E. Price Ceilings
In some instances, the imposition of a price ceiling at 
a level lower than the market clearing price is identical 
in impact to export control, as analyzed above. One 
might interpret Figure 4.11, for instance, as showing 
the impact of a ceiling price in the domestic market at 
level OF. The ceiling price implies an excess demand 
in the market. Domestic consumers are assumed 
to buy all they wish, but foreign consumers cannot 
obtain all they would like. In Figure 4.11, the excess 
demand does not pose severe adjustment problems 
since foreigners can obtain what they want from other 
sources at a price of OA.
Once domestic demand is high enough to prevent 
exports, however, the price ceiling implies an excess 
of quantity demanded over quantity supplied within 
the domestic market. Some type of rationing scheme, 
deliberate or ad hoc, is necessary to allocate the short-
age amongst users. Furthermore, a price ceiling, by 
definition, prevents the types of responses that are 
most natural in a market economy. For example, in 
response to impending shortages, there would be no 
price-induced restrictions in use and increases in 
investment and production.
Figure 4.12 illustrates the economic features of a 
price-control scheme that holds the quantity supplied 
domestically below the quantity demanded. In the 
absence of price controls, the equilibrium price would 
be OA and the equilibrium quantity would be OB. The 
imposition of a price ceiling at level OC (< OA) means 
a reduction in the quantity supplied (by BD) and an 
increase in the quantity demanded (by BE): a shortage 
(equal to DE) appears in the market. This shortage 
might be met by rationing the oil amongst buyers. If 
the scheme is perfectly efficient, in the sense that the 
petroleum goes to those areas that are willing to pay 
most for it, the net welfare loss to society is given by 













Figure 4.12 Oil Price Control
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social cost for those units of output that are now not 
produced. In addition, the program involves a transfer 
of purchasing power, equal to area CFGA, from pro-
ducers to consumers. Producers receive less revenue 
on each of the OD units sold than they would without 
the price ceiling, while consumers receive the same 
benefit as before from consuming even though the 
units cost them less. In other words, an amount equal 
to CFGA is transferred from producers’ surplus to 
consumers’ surplus.
Alternatively, the domestic shortage might be met 
by imports at the international price (say OA in Figure 
4.12), with the government subsidizing the imports 
to the amount of CA per unit consumed. In this case, 
in the normative model, there is a net social loss of 
FGI + IJK relative to an absence of price controls. 
This loss consists of: (1) the excess (on the extra oil 
consumption) of the cost of imports over the value 
to consumers of that oil (i.e., area IJK) and (2) the 
excess of the cost of imports over the production cost 
of domestic oil on the extra units domestic producers 
would willingly bring to market at the higher price 
(i.e., area FGI).
F. Export Tax
The previous two sections showed that the imposition 
of export controls and the imposition of a price ceil-
ing could lead to equivalent results, when crude oil 
is sold both at home and in a foreign market. A third 
alternative could also bring this result: the impos-
ition of an export tax. In Figure 4.11, suppose that the 
government has imposed a tax per barrel on exports 
equal to AF. Given the foreign price (OA), the netback 
to domestic producers will be OF (i.e., OA – AF), at 
which price they see virtually unlimited demand in 
the foreign market. So long as the quantity supplied at 
this price exceeds the quantity demanded domestic-
ally, this will be the price for the product. In contrast 
to the other two programs, however, the shaded area 
in Figure 4.11 represents the export tax payment to the 
domestic government, not a subsidy to foreign users.
In a sense, then, for a country that exports oil, 
any one of the three programs outlined (export con-
trols, a price ceiling, or an export tax) could be used 
to achieve the same effect upon domestic prices and 
quantities. In a dynamic sense, they differ, however: 
that is, changes in demand and supply lead to different 
results under the schemes. For instance, if the foreign 
price rises, so does the domestic price under any given 
export tax, whereas with a price ceiling or an export 
quota there is no change in the domestic market. The 
dynamic differences, and the differing distributional 
effects, help explain why the Canadian federal govern-
ment imposed all three types of schemes in 1973. At 
the same time, it must not be forgotten that Canada is 
a federal state, and that the government in Ottawa had 
to consider the ability of unhappy provincial govern-
ments to frustrate its policy goals. For instance, had 
the federal government imposed export controls alone 
and had Alberta prorationing authorities reduced 
the market allowable by an equivalent amount, there 
would have been no reduced price effect in Canada.
Chapter Nine will provide more detail on 
Canadian oil policies, and Chapter Twelve on natural 
gas, in the tempestuous 1970s and 1980s.
7. Conclusion
This chapter has been designed to demonstrate the 
usefulness of economists’ analytical tools in describ-
ing the operation of petroleum markets. The tools 
are abstractions that aid in the understanding of 
real-world movements of market prices and quanti-
ties. They are also useful in describing the impact of 
changing market conditions or alternative regulatory 
policies upon different market participants: oil pro-
ducers, domestic consumers, foreign consumers, and 
governments.
It has also been argued that the tools are useful in 
assessing the desirability of various alternative poli-
cies. Policy analysis should involve four stages:
(1) a clear statement of policy objectives;
(2) determination of alternative ways in which the 
policy objective might be achieved;
(3) assessment of the likely effectiveness of these 
alternative policy tools, and selection of that 
thought best; and
(4) assessment of the actual effectiveness of the 
policy chosen, after it has been applied.
This is a complicated process. For example, some of 
the policy objectives may conflict with others, and 
trade-offs must be considered.
The concepts set out in this chapter are of use 
in policy analysis in part for their descriptive value. 
However, beyond this, they have particular applic-
ability to the assessment of one possible social policy 
goal – economic efficiency. This refers to the maxi-
mization of the difference between the dollar value of 
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benefits received by members of the society and the 
dollar value of the costs of obtaining those benefits. 
Under certain conditions, the attainment of this max-
imum net benefit can be equated with effectively com-
petitive market-clearing prices and quantities. Unless 
there is a strong reason for supposing otherwise, many 
economists judge this outcome to be a desirable one 
for society. What reasons might be raised for not pre-
ferring such a position?
(1) There are cases in which demand and supply 
forces do not accurately reflect benefits and 
costs to society. For example, there may be pol-
lution costs not reflected in the supply curve. 
Or, profits on production may accrue to persons 
from outside the region. Or, monopoly power 
may exist. In this case, governmental action may 
be required in order that efficiency is achieved.
(2) The maximum efficiency outcome may conflict 
with the attainment of some other social goal. 
For instance, it may involve extreme hardship 
on the poorest members of society, may be felt 
to transfer undue political influence to the capi-
talist sector, may be felt to treat vested property 
rights unfairly, etc. In this case, it may be judged 
desirable to accept some inefficiency in order 
that another goal be more nearly satisfied.
Normative policy analysis is a critical issue in any 
society. At the same time, the establishment of goals is 
a difficult task: no universal agreement on policy goals 
is to be expected, or, many would argue, desired. This 
book will concentrate upon the goal of economic effi-
ciency but will note the implications of various poli-
cies for the attainment of other possible social goals.
Ultimately the story of an exhaustible natural resource 
industry in a region is one of rise and fall. But within 
this skeletal history, many particular lifetimes are 
possible. Moreover, as Part Five of this book will 
argue, a regional economy need not mirror exactly the 
emergence and decline of a key natural resource: other 
natural resources may rise to take its place, and the 
benefits of natural resource production may be par-
layed into a viable, ongoing, dynamic economy based 
on the wealth and skills of the local population.
Part Two of this book examines the Alberta crude 
oil industry from the beginning of its rapid growth in 
the late 1940s through to the early twenty-first century. 
Nature and humanity jointly determine this history. 
Nature conveys opportunities and imposes limits; 
humanity must determine which opportunities to 
exploit and how hard to push the limits. It is import-
ant to note that the activities of the oil industry reflect 
two quite different types of human influences: the 
directly productive decisions of individuals and com-
panies in the petroleum industry and the government 
regulatory framework, which constantly changes the 
set of legal options open to these decision-makers. It is 
the inescapable presence of government that has lead 
to our use of the term ‘petropolitics’ in the title to this 
book. Our focus, articulated in the Overview to Part 
One, is on the interplay of nature, individuals, com-
panies, and governments to generate the economic 
history of the crude petroleum industry.
This section of the book details the history of 
Alberta crude oil largely from the industry’s point of 
view, while Part Three is primarily concerned with the 
rationale for, and course of, government regulation. 
The distinction is one of convenience rather than 
reality, since industry decisions reflect the actual and 
anticipated regulatory environment, and the regula-
tions introduced by government derive from actual 
and anticipated industry activities.
Part Two includes four chapters: Chapter Five 
examines the evolution of Alberta’s oil reserves; 
Chapter Six considers production and pricing; Chap-
ter Seven looks at the province’s non-conventional 
oil resources; and Chapter Eight discusses vari-




Readers’ Guide: The crude oil industry in a region 
derives from nature’s bounty. But no one can know 
for certain how much oil lies beneath the surface in 
an area such as Alberta and how much of that might 
eventually be produced. Chapter Five is concerned 
with attempts to understand how much conven-
tional oil Alberta has and how these estimates have 
changed over time.
1. The Concept of Reserves
No one knows exactly how much conventional crude 
oil lies beneath Alberta or how much will eventually 
prove to be commercial. Exploratory activities of the 
petroleum industry are designed, in part, to reduce 
such uncertainties. Ongoing geophysical activities 
and exploratory drilling allow the interpretation and 
re-interpretation of accumulating records to gener-
ate theories and hypotheses about the pre-historic 
sources and migration of petroleum into trapped 
pools. However, our ability to see hundreds of metres 
beneath the surface will always be limited, so know-
ledge of the province’s underlying resource base will 
remain imperfect. Moreover, knowledge and expect-
ations in this regard are products of the human mind 
and are necessarily subjective. Skills, training, and 
experience differ among experts providing infor-
mation to decision-makers in the oil industry. The 
resultant diversity of opinion is one of the engines 
driving industry activity, as different companies 
seek out niches that reflect their particular expect-
ations. Differences in behaviour among companies 
are observable to some degree, but the subjective 
evaluations that influenced that behaviour are rarely 
made public. Thus, while it is the expectations and 
decisions of individuals that determine what happens, 
most economic analysis of the oil industry is based on 
aggregate results, as reported in published statistics 
from government agencies, like Statistics Canada, the 
Energy and Resources Conservation Board (ERCB), 
the National Energy Board (NEB), the Geological 
Survey of Canada (GSC), and private industry 
groups, like the Canadian Petroleum Association 
(CPA), the Independent Petroleum Association of 
Canada (IPAC), or their 1992 amalgam, the Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). This 
chapter examines information about the amount of 
crude oil in the ground in Alberta, both the under-
lying physical resource base and the rate at which this 
oil has been discovered and rendered producible.
Some terminological and conceptual issues must 
be dealt with. (Tanner, 1986, and Thompson et al., 
2009, provide useful reviews.) The term ‘resources,’ or 
‘resource base,’ is commonly used to refer to the total 
physical volume of a resource as it exists in nature. 
However, as one early resource economist put it, 
resources “are not, they become” (Zimmermann, 1951, 
p. 15), and the becoming involves more than physical 
existence; usefulness and accessibility to humans are 
also required. In a similar vein, Firey (1960) noted that 
natural resources have characteristics of possibility 
(physical existence), adoptability (cultural accept-
ance), and gainfulness (economic feasibility). More 
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is at issue than the fact that a natural phenomenon 
must be recognized as of value before it is seen as a 
resource. Of what is available only some portion will 
ultimately prove to be utilizable by us. Some deposits 
may never be located, some that have been located 
may never be exploited, and some of the resource in 
a produced deposit will be left behind forever. In this 
light, it is wise to be skeptical of the simplistic view 
that we face a fixed stock of petroleum that must 
somehow be spread out over time until the resource is 
completely gone. Adelman (1990, pp. 1–2), in his dis-
cussion of the concept of a fixed stock, argues that:
… there is no such thing. The total mineral 
in the earth is an irrelevant non-binding 
constraint. If expected finding-development 
costs exceed net revenues, investment dries up 
and the industry disappears. Whatever is left in 
the ground is unknown, probably unknowable, 
but surely unimportant; a geological fact of no 
economic interest. … What actually exist are 
flows from unknown resources into a reserve 
inventory. … The fixed-stock assumption is 
both wrong and superfluous.
Profitable volumes of crude, as defined by physical, 
technological, economic, and political factors, are 
known as ‘reserves.’ Reserves consist of the entire 
resource in the ground multiplied by a recovery 
factor that equals the percentage of the resource that 
is actually produced. Only when an oil reservoir is 
abandoned, never to be reopened, is it known with 
certainty what the ‘ultimate reserves’ of the pool 
have been (abstracting from any errors in measuring 
production over the life of the deposit). Prior to that, 
any estimates of reserves are very much conditional, 
depending on assumptions made about a variety of 
key factors, and they always reflect the judgment of 
the individual or group making the estimate, includ-
ing that party’s subjective evaluation of underlying 
uncertainties. Aguilera et al. (2009) provide a recent 
example of the argument that the world’s recoverable 
conventional petroleum resources will prove to be 
larger than has generally been expected, due both to 
exploration in new geological arenas and develop-
ment extensions.
The basic meaning of the word ‘reserves’ is well 
accepted. The ERCB defines established reserves as 
“those reserves recoverable under current technology 
and present and anticipated economic conditions, 
specifically proved by drilling, testing or production; 
plus the portion of contiguous recoverable reserves 
that are interpreted to exist from geological geo-
physical or similar information, with reasonable cer-
tainty” (ERCB, Reserves Report 2010, ST-98, p. A-2). 
As Tanner (1986, p. 23) notes, however, this basic 
definition leaves abundant room for disagreement. For 
example, the World Petroleum Congress has suggested 
a concept of ‘proven reserves’ that is based on current 
economic and technical conditions, while the ‘estab-
lished reserves’ concept commonly used in Canada 
assumes current technology but anticipated, not 
just current, economic conditions. Beyond this, the 
necessity of ‘reasonable’ assurance for recovery, leaves 
room for differences of opinion. The conclusion is that 
reserves data must be treated with a certain amount 
of caution: estimates for a region, or a pool, may not 
be completely compatible if they come from differ-
ent sources. Aggregate reserve estimates (e.g., all of 
Alberta) inevitably involve estimates from a number 
of different sources, though bodies like the ERCB and 
the CAPP (formerly CPA) have tried to ensure that 
all those making estimates use the same criteria; as 
a result, the aggregate reserves each of these bodies 
reports is widely regarded as reliable and consistent 
over time. Tanner notes (1986, p. 28) that the actual 
estimation practices did not change much for either 
the CPA or ERCB when they switched to ‘established’ 
reserves in the 1960s from ‘proved’ (ERCB) or ‘proven 
and probable’ (CPA) reserves.
Given the basic definition of reserves, there 
are three commonly used bases for measure-
ment: ‘remaining,’ ‘initial,’ and ‘ultimate’ reserves. 
‘Remaining reserves’ are those currently in the ground 
and recoverable, whereas ‘initial reserves’ are those 
that were initially in pools (at the time of discovery) 
and therefore consist of remaining reserves plus any 
past production. ‘Ultimate reserves’ are the total oil 
that will ever be produced in the region, and they 
are often not true ‘reserves’; in effect, they drop the 
requirement for ‘reasonable certainty’ in estimation 
in order to allow for the effects of more speculative 
future activities such as the discovery of new oil 
pools, extension drilling, and EOR schemes. Everyone 
knows with absolute certainty that many of these 
ventures will occur in Alberta, but no one can say 
with sufficient (‘reasonable’) certainty exactly where 
or when they will occur, so future activities of this sort 
are excluded from initial and remaining established 
reserves estimates.
Estimates of remaining established reserves will 
change over time. Production clearly reduces remain-
ing reserves (while leaving initial reserves unchanged). 
There are three additional reasons for changes:
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(1) The industry undertakes activity to add 
reserves: exploration for new discoveries, and 
development to extend pool boundaries or add 
EOR schemes.
(2) Apart from adding reserves, industry activ-
ity adds new information that may lead to a 
re-evaluation of the previous period’s estimates: 
production, for example, provides additional 
information on reservoir characteristics includ-
ing production decline, lifting costs, water to oil 
ratios, etc., which may or may not correspond 
exactly with what was anticipated last year.
(3) Economic, political, and technological changes 
occur: e.g., oil prices fall unexpectedly, taxes 
are increased, a new and cheaper miscible flood 
agent is developed.
Whereas the first of these always leads to an addi-
tion to estimated reserves, the second and third may 
involve either increases or reductions. In practice, 
published estimates of reserves are not fine-tuned 
with the regularity that the discussion so far implies. 
Reserves additions for reason (1) are typically esti-
mated each year, and any relatively significant re- 
evaluations for reason (2) are allowed for; but more 
minor adjustments of type (2) in any one pool often go 
unmarked, and only significant changes in economic 
or political conditions (reason (3)) will usually gener-
ate an adjustment in published reserves data.
The ERCB (and, for some years, the CAPP) have 
reported reserve additions due to new discoveries; 
this is the estimate, as of December 31, of the reserves 
in pools discovered that year. Recall that this typ-
ically underestimates the eventual reserves that will 
be booked in these pools since it makes no allowance 
for revisions and extensions or EOR investment (i.e., 
appreciations). The economic analyst faces severe data 
problems here. Suppose, for example, we are trying 
to model the exploration process. What volume of 
oil does this year’s exploration actually discover? A 
company drilling on a large structure certainly expects 
that a success will hold much more oil than will be 
reported in that year as the size of the new discovery; 
this argues for some attempt to increase, or ‘appre-
ciate,’ the new discovery reserves estimates. This can 
be done relatively easily for pools discovered many 
years ago. As we noted in Chapter Two, the ERCB 
estimated that a representative Alberta oil pool, unless 
very small, appreciated about nine times over the first 
year’s estimate of initial reserves. But for recent finds 
future reserves additions due to extension drilling 
or EOR are unknown. Moreover, reserves additions 
that do occur for these reasons may not have been 
anticipated but reflect new technologies or changes in 
economic conditions years after the initial discovery. 
As a further complication, this year’s exploration may 
generate knowledge that makes future discoveries 
easier. The conclusion, in more formal economic ter-
minology, must be that it is almost impossible to set 
out an ‘oil reserves production function’ that is com-
pletely satisfactory from an analytical point of view. 
An oil reserves production function is a quantitative 
(mathematical) relationship that relates the inputs in 
the oil exploration process (G&G, exploratory wells) 
to the resultant outputs – reserves additions of various 
types. In describing exploration, one must be satisfied 
with workable empirical models that seem ‘reason-
able enough.’
This chapter continues with two main sections: 
a review of the history of Alberta crude oil reserves 
additions and a survey of some studies of Alberta’s 
ultimate reserves potential. Chapter Eight will review 
attempts to build supply models that ‘explain’ the pro-
cess of oil discovery and reserves additions in Alberta.
By way of introduction, we present informa-
tion from the ERCB’s 2013 assessments of the size of 
Alberta’s oil reserves (from chap. 4 in the 2013 Reserves 
Report and Supply/Demand Outlook, ST-98). By the 
end of 2012, the ERCB reported that 13,374 separate oil 
pools had been discovered in the province, 10,570 with 
light and medium oil and 2,804 with heavy crude. 
A majority of these pools (about 60%) were being 
drained by a single well. However, the smallest 75 per 
cent of pools held only 6 per cent of the estimated 
recoverable oil, while the largest 3 per cent contained 
82 per cent of estimated initial recoverable reserves 
(and 70% of remaining reserves). The ERCB reported 
initial discovered oil-in-place at the end of 2012 as 
12,026 million m3 (about 76 billion barrels), of which 
17 per cent was expected to be lifted by primary means 
and a further 7 per cent by EOR, for a total recovery 
factor of 24 per cent. The average recovery factor was 
higher for light and medium crude (18.6% primary 
and 26.5% in total) than for heavy crude (11.7% pri-
mary and 15.8% in total). These recovery factors have 
changed little over the years.
2. Historical Reserves Additions
The CAPP (formerly CPA) and ERCB (the EUB from 
1993 to 2008, and Oil and Gas Conservation Board in 
the 1950s and early 1960s) are the two main sources 
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of aggregate reserves data for Alberta. Tanner (1986) 
provides a review of the methodologies of these 
two bodies as well as detailed summaries of their 
estimates.
The CAPP Reserves Committee consisted of 
experts from member companies who were respon-
sible for assembling reserves estimates for individ-
ual oil pools, concentrating on the largest ones in a 
region, and drawing on the practical expertise of the 
large companies in operating most of these pools. 
It has been more problematic to estimate reserves 
for the many small oil pools of the province, so after 
1984 the CPA relied upon ERCB estimates for them 
(Tanner, 1986, p. 43). Commencing in the year 2010, 
CAPP began to derive its conventional crude oil 
reserves from provincial sources and the NEB. Table 
5.1 shows the type of reserves information available 
from the CAPP Statistical Handbook, as of 2011. Table 
5.1A shows estimated (remaining) reserves at year 
end for all Canada for years from 1951 to 2009 and 
the major sources of changes in reserves each year. 
The change from a proven to an established reserves 
basis in 1963 increased estimated reserves by 64 per 
cent, largely as a result of the inclusion of 50 per cent 
of ‘possible’ reserves as established reserves after 1963. 
In some years, the CAPP reported only total gross 
Table 5.1A: CAPP Canadian Conventional Established Oil Reserves, 1951–2009 (103 m3)
Year Remaining at Beginning of Year Gross Additions Net Production Remaining at End of Year Net Changes
1951  191,106 35,169 7,519 218,756 27,650
1952  218,756 57,749 9,614 266,891 48,135
1953  266,891 39,222 12,857 293,256 26,365
1954  293,256 72,750 15,194 350,812 57,556
1955  350,812 68,240 20,262 398,790 47,978
1956  398,790 80,910 26,907 452,793 54,003
1957  452,793 32,868 28,882 456,779 3,986
1958  456,779 72,701 26,386 503,094 46,315
1959  503,094 81,832 29,198 555,728 52,634
1960  555,728 59,197 30,368 584,557 28,829
1961  584,557 113,788 35,123 663,222 78,665
1962  663,222 87,720 38,914 712,028 48,806
1963  1,062,733 13,944 40,758 1,035,919 –26,814
1964  1,035,919 255,384 43,033 1,248,270 212,351
1965  1,248,270 196,556 46,337 1,398,489 150,219
1966  1,398,489 208,887 50,224 1,557,152 158,663
1967  1,557,152 124,587 54,690 1,627,049 69,897
1968  1,627,049 93,668 59,030 1,661,687 34,638
1969  1,661,687 66,636 62,516 1,665,807 4,120
1970  1,665,807 26,894 69,606 1,623,095 –42,712
1971  1,623,095 37,636 76,297 1,584,434 –38,661
1972  1,584,434 22,229 82,319 1,524,344 –60,090
1973  1,524,344 6,537 99,423 1,431,458 –92,886
1974  1,431,458 –5,065 95,530 1,330,863 –100,595
1975  1,330,863 –6,280 79,897 1,244,686 –86,177
1976  1,244,686 5,921 69,683 1,180,924 –63,762
1977  1,180,924 10,227 70,872 1,120,279 –60,645
1978  1,120,279 37,426 67,647 1,090,058 –30,221
1979  1,090,058 71,415 79,469 1,082,004 –8,054
1980  1,082,004 –56,247 74,529 951,228 –130,776
1981  951,228 178,220 65,873 1,063,575 112,347
1982  1,063,575 19,314 61,756 1,021,133 –42,442
1983  1,021,133 66,074 64,488 1,022,719 1,586
/continued
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Table 5.1A/continued
Year Remaining at Beginning of Year Gross Additions Net Production Remaining at End of Year Net Changes
1984  1,022,719 –588 73,108 949,023 –73,696
1985  949,023 39,837 73,030 915,830 –33,193
1986  915,830 98,719 70,138 944,411 28,581
1987  944,411 67,943 72,192 940,162 –4,249
1988  940,162 108,468 73,482 975,148 34,986
1989  975,148 31,677 68,832 937,993 –37,155
1990  937,993 18,350 68,386 887,957 –50,036
1991  887,957 22,359 69,014 841,302 –46,655
1992  841,302 39,697 71,265 809,734 –31,568
1993  809,734 65,439 74,587 800,586 –9,148
1994  800,586 56,607 78,400 778,793 –21,793
1995  778,793 78,078 78,844 778,027 –766
1996  778,027 71,518 80,176 769,369 –8,658
1997  769,369 97,177 82,607 783,939 14,570
1998  783,939 72,883 81,473 775,349 –8,590
1999  775,349 48,966 76,468 747,847 –27,502
2000  747,847 103,550 79,368 772,029 24,182
2001  772,029 48,559 80,492 740,096 –31,933
2002  740,096 58,867 84,986 713,977 –26,119
2003  713,977 47,049 84,739 676,287 –37,690
2004  676,287 97,629 81,975 691,941 15,654
2005  691,941 215,224 79,227 827,938 135,997
2006  827,938 36,292 78,540 785,690 –42,248
2007 785,690 92,816 81,169 797,337 11,647
2008 797,337 46,565 78,767 765,135 –32,202
2009 765,135 –7,786 69,693 687,656 –77,479
Note: Proved reserves, 1951–62.
Source: CAPP, Statistical Handbook, Tables 2.6a and 2.6b.
Table 5.1B: Canadian Liquid Established Conventional Oil Reserves, December 31, 2009 (103 m3)
 Initial Volume in Place Initial Established Reserves Remaining Established Reserves
 British Columbia 461,062 130,153 18,005
 Alberta 10,644,160 2,803,966 237,716
 Saskatchewan 6,752,312 951,610 152,398
 Manitoba 222,442 51,610 8,400
 Ontario 92,973 15,656 1,634
 Other Eastern Canada 2,860 128 0
 Mainland Territories (S.68°N) 92,911 43,003 1,906
 East Coast Offshore 1,272,240 394,013 213,647
Total Conventional Areas 19,540,910 4,389,700 633,706
 Mackenzie Delta/Beaufort Sea 173,000 54,000 53,950
 Arctic Islands 1,440 463 0
Total Frontier Areas 174,440 54,463 53,950
TOTAL CRUDE OIL 19, 715,350 4,444,163 687,656
Source: CAPP, Statistical Handbook, 2011, Table 2.15a.
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reserve additions (1963–77, 1984–present) as shown 
in this table, while other years provided more detail 
including estimated new discoveries and (with vary-
ing degrees of breakdown) revisions and extensions. 
Gross reserves additions may be negative, reflecting 
large downward revisions of earlier discoveries, as 
occurred in 1980. Remaining reserves will decline (net 
reserves additions will be negative) when production 
exceeds gross additions, as has been the case in most 
years since 1969. Table 5.1B shows the December 
2009 reserves reported for various regions in Canada, 
including Alberta. The CAPP Statistical Handbook 
includes a number of other tables of oil reserves, by 
region, detailing them, for example, by year of discov-
ery and major geological formations.
The ERCB oversees most provincial regulation of 
the petroleum industry. It has a large technical staff 
that analyzes company data, including reserves and 
well reports, which it uses to estimate pool by pool 
oil reserves. The reserves estimates were important in 
determining allowable output rates under Alberta’s 
prorationing regulations, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Ten. If an oil producer disagrees with the 
ERCB estimates for its pool, the producer may request 
reassessment. The ERCB provides reserves data for 
most individual pools in the province, including esti-
mates of major pool characteristics, oil-in-place and 
initial and remaining reserves. Table 5.2 is a summary 
table of Alberta conventional crude oil reserves and 
reserves additions from 1951 to 2012. Additions have, 
over varying time periods, been divided into new dis-
coveries, ‘development and re-evaluation,’ and (since 
1958) EOR additions; gross additions are generally, but 
not always, positive. As with CAPP data, remaining 
crude oil reserves peaked in 1969. It is noteworthy 
that the ERCB’s estimate of remaining conventional 
oil reserves rose significantly after 2009, attributable 
at least in part to newer horizontal drilling techniques 
and hydraulic fracturinging which expanded oil 
recovery (ERCB 2013 Reserves Report, ST-98, p. 4-9).
The CAPP and ERCB each provide relatively con-
sistent historical time series of reserves and reserves 
additions, but the two series are not directly compar-
able. The CAPP, for instance, estimated remaining 
Alberta conventional oil reserves at December 31, 
2009, as 237.7 million m3, while the EUB reported 
236.9 million m3. Tanner (1986, pp. 47–53) contrasts 
the two series, noting that the CPA’s estimates of estab-
lished reserves (from 1962 to the early 1980s) con-
sistently exceeded the ERCB’s, particularly prior to the 
1980s, in part because of CPA’s earlier willingness to 
credit reserves to EOR proposals. In earlier years, the 
CPA may also have tended to overestimate reserves in 
the small pools for which detailed reservoir analyses 
were not undertaken. The general trends in remaining 
reserves estimates over time have been similar for 
both data series. Year-to-year correlations between 
reserves additions estimates are somewhat lower; for 
example, in the decade from 1964 through 1973, the 
ERCB estimate of new discoveries (gross reserve addi-
tions) varied from 34 per cent less (70% less) to 500 
per cent more (300% more) than CPA estimates (Foat 
and MacFadyen, 1983).
Such differences highlight the dangers inherent 
in mixing data sources but raise more fundamental 
questions for economic analysis; if two such reputable 
data sources offer different time-patterns for what is, 
presumably, the same process – discoveries of conven-
tional oil – then the same economic model is likely to 
generate different empirical results depending upon 
which series is used. Differences may relate in part 
to different criteria by the ERCB and CAPP on what 
determines the size of reserves, but it seems more 
likely that a significant part of the problem relates to 
differences in the timing of receipt of information 
and some differences in opinion on what constitutes 
‘reasonable certainty’ about the existence of reserves. 
If three-year moving averages of reserve additions (or 
new discoveries) are used, the CPA and ERCB series 
are more similar, suggesting that time factors in esti-
mation are critical.
Tables 5.1A and 5.2 showed CAPP and ERCB esti-
mates of gross crude oil reserves additions from the 
early 1950s to the early 2000s. Immediately appar-
ent are the great year-to-year variability of reserves 
additions and a tendency to long-term decline. The 
latter reflects a complex mix of factors, including: 
(1) depletion of the stock of undiscovered resources as 
exploration continues, (2) changing levels of explor-
ation activity (where more drilling will add more 
reserves), and (3) growing knowledge and techno-
logical changes. Figure 5.1 shows reserves additions 
per well drilled, thereby reducing the influence of 
the second of the three factors; the values plotted are 
three-year moving averages, reducing the impact of 
wide year-to-year variability in drilling results. These 
simple adjustments make no allowance for the joint 
product nature of the exploratory process. The meas-
ure considers neither the full range of inputs like G&G, 
land and development investment, nor the complex 
mix of hydrocarbon and by-product outputs. Also, the 
economic principle known as the law of diminishing 
marginal returns suggests that incremental discoveries 
in any year due to drilling more wells will tend to be 
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Table 5.2: ERCB Conventional Crude Oil Reserves and Changes, 1947–2012 (106 m3)
Year New EOR Development Net Net Total Cumulative Remaining Annual 
 Discoveries Additions  Revisions Additions Production  Established  Production
1948 0.5 0.0 7.9  8.4 14.8 14.0
1949 4.8 0.0 41.2  45.9 18.0 56.7 3.2
1950 3.2 0.0 96.9  100.1 22.2 152.6 4.3
1951 15.3 0.0 29.2  44.5 29.4 189.9 7.2
1952 14.0 0.0 48.5  62.5 38.8 243.0 9.4
1953 24.2 0.0 42.4  66.6 51.0 297.3 12.2
1954 1.9 0.0 53.7  55.6 65.0 338.9 14.0
1955 9.4 0.0 58.8  68.2 82.8 389.3 17.8
1956 3.5 0.0 78.5  82.0 105.7 448.4 22.9
1957 10.8 0.0 29.1  39.9 127.4 466.6 21.8
1958 1.3 4.9 –4.8  1.4 145.2 450.2 17.8
1959 14.3 16.0 37.2  67.5 165.7 497.2 20.5
1960 0.5 18.1 29.9  48.5 186.6 525.0 20.8
1961 1.7 24.5 31.5  57.7 211.5 557.6 24.9
1962 2.9 19.9 21.8  44.5 237.9 575.6 26.4
1963 14.6 29.2 12.6  56.4 264.6 605.4 26.7
1964 9.5 250.8 88.2  348.5 292.4 926.1 27.8
1965 28.6 –2.4 42.6  68.8 321.6 965.7 29.2
1966 89.1 38.3 13.5  141.0 353.9 1074.2 32.3
1967 57.2 22.2 15.7  95.2 390.4 1132.8 36.5
1968 62 42.9 14.8  119.8 430.3 1212.8 39.9
1969 40.5 58.5 –44.5  54.5 474.7 1222.8 44.4
1970 8.4 36.1 –7.6  36.7 526.5 1207.9 51.8
1971 14 –0.8 8.7  22.1 582.9 1173.6 56.4
1972 10.8 14.8 –5.6  20 650.5 1126 67.6
1973 5.1 10.2 –6.0  9.2 733.7 1052 83.2
1974 4.3 30.8 3.3  38.5 812.7 1011.5 79.0
1975 1.6 3.3 2.1  7 880.2 950.9 67.5
1976 2.5 –27.0 5.9  –18.6 941.2 871.3 61.0
1977 4.8 9.2  5.1  19.1 1001.6 830 60.4
1978 24.9 1.4  –1.9  24.4 1061.6 794.5 60.0
1979 19.2 4.8 10.3  34.3 1130.1 760.2 68.5
1980 9 8.6 5.1  22.8 1193.3 719.9 63.2
1981 15 7.2 10.4  32.6 1249.8 696 56.5
1982 16.8 6.6 –16.5  6.9 1303.4 649.4 53.6
1983 21.4 17.9 24.8  64.1 1359 657.8 55.6
1984 29.1 24.1 –11.2  42 1418.2 640.7 59.2
1985 32.7 21.6 9.7  64 1474.5 648.5 56.3
1986 28.6 24.6 16.6 –30.7 39.1 1527.7 634.7 53.2
1987 20.9 10.5 12.8 –11.2 33 1581.6 613.8 53.9
1988 18 16.5 18 –15.8 36.7 1638.8 592.9 57.2
1989 17 7.8 12.9 –16.2 21.4 1692.6 560.5 53.8
1990 13 8.4 7.2 –25.6 3 1745.7 510.4 53.1
1991 10.2 9.1 10.6 –20.5 9.4 1797.1 468.5 51.4
1992 9 2.8 12.3 3 27.1 1850.7 442 53.6
1993 7.3 7.9 14.2 9.8 39.2 1905.1 426.8 54.4
1994 10.5 5.7 11.1 –22.6 4.7 1961.7 374.8 56.6




Year New EOR Development Net Net Total Cumulative Remaining Annual 
 Discoveries Additions  Revisions Additions Production  Established  Production
1996 9.7 6.1 16.3 –9.5 22.6 2072.3 341.8 54.8
1997 8.5 4.2 16.1 8.7 37.5 2124.8 326.8 52.5
1998 8.9 2.9 17.5 9.2 38.5 2174.9 315.2 50.1
1999 5.6 2.1 7.2 16.6 31.5 2219.9 301.6 45.0
2000 7.8 1.5 13.4 10 32.8 2262.9 291.4 43.0
2001 9.1 0.8 13.6 5.2 28.6 2304.7 278.3 41.8
2002 7 0.6 8.1 4.6 20.2 2343 260.3 38.3
2003 6.9 1 5.9 17.1 30.8 2380.1 253.9 37.1
2004 6.1 3.2 8 13.6 30.9 2415.7 249.2 35.6
2005 5.5 1.2 13.2 18.9 38.8 2448.9 254.8 33.2
2006 8.2 1.9 14.8 2.2 27.1 2480.7 250.1 31.8
2007 6.8 2.2 11.8 –0.2 20.6 2510.9 240.7 30.2
2008 6.9 6.2 9.3 –0.7 21.7 2540.1 233.0 29.2
2009 4.0 4.8 7.4 5.8 21.8 2566.5 228.4 26.4
2010 3.8 5.8 23.5 1.7 34.8 2592.8 236.9 26.6
2011 4.0 6.4 14.0 9.0 33.5 2617.3 245.9 24.5
2012 5.8 2.2 52.9 -2.4 58.5 2652.5 269.2 35.2
Sources: 
ERCB ST98-2013 (Alberta’s Energy Reserves 2012 and Supply Demand Outlook), p. B8, Table B.3 for New Discoveries, Net Total Additions, Cumulative Production and 
Remaining Established 1968–2012, for EOR 1981–2012 and for Development and Net Revisions 1986–2011.
ERCB 77-18 and 86-18 (Alberta’s Reserves of Crude Natural Gas, Natural Gas Liquids and Sulphur) Tables 9a and A-4 for years 1948–67, plus 1968 to 1986 for EOR and 
Development.	Values	in	the	‘Development’	column	are	for	‘Development	and	Re-evaluation’	plus	‘Enhanced	Recovery’	1948–57;	enhanced	recovery	additions	were	first	
reported for 1958; for 1948–1985, ‘Development’ includes ‘Development and Revisions.
smaller the greater the number of exploratory wells 
drilled, regardless of whether or not there is a ten-
dency to declining discoveries over time.
Three series are shown in Figure 5.1: (1) ERCB 
‘new discoveries’ per exploratory well drilled, for 
Alberta; (2) ERCB ‘gross reserves additions’ per well 
drilled (development and exploratory), for Alberta; 
and (3) CAPP ‘initial established reserves by year of 
discovery’ (that is, ‘appreciated’ reserves as assessed 
at the end of 2008) per exploratory well, for western 
Canada. Each series has problematic features, as dis-
cussed in Section 1 of this chapter. ‘New discoveries’ 
measure only the first year’s estimate of the volume 
of recoverable reserves, not the ultimate size of the 
find as proved up through subsequent development 
activities. ‘Gross reserves additions’ do include all 
estimated reserves established in that year, but most of 
these are from fields actually discovered much earlier. 
‘Appreciated reserves’ include additions from develop-
ment activities, including EOR, which may have 
become viable only years after the initial discovery.
The yearly fluctuations in Figure 5.1 reflect, in 
part, the vagaries of the reserves reporting proced-
ures. More fundamentally, however, the inherently 
stochastic nature of reserves additions is responsible. 
Reserves additions inevitably include significant 
random variability as companies are unable to predict 
results, especially of exploration, with certainty. From 
the perspective of risk analysis, reserves additions 
instability is significant. It would hardly be surprising 
that different companies experience markedly differ-
ent ‘efficiencies’ in reserves additions in any single year 
(even apart from variations in technical and manage-
ment skills). For small firms in particular, there is a 
real risk of bankruptcy in the crude oil industry, even 
for well-run companies. The risk is smaller for larger 
firms, which are more able to spread exploratory risk 
around and to withstand runs of bad luck. Of course, 
even large firms may overextend themselves through 
a combination of unfortunate happenstance, such as 
large mega-projects that fail and poor management, 
for example insufficient spreading of risk. In any 
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particular year, even averaging across the many firms 
in the industry, the good and bad, lucky and unlucky, 
volatility in reserves additions per well still remains.
The three-year moving averages of Figure 5.1 
smooth out some of this underlying variability and 
make clearer the long-term tendency to declining 
crude oil reserves additions in Alberta. This sug-
gests that the first of the three factors noted above (a 
depleting resource base) outweighs the third (grow-
ing knowledge). An anticipated corollary might be 
that real crude oil costs will rise over time. This need 
not be true, however, as declining costs of explora-
tion could offset the reduced physical productivity, 
as might productivity gains or falling real costs of 
development and/or lifting. As can be seen, the data 
is affected by the nature of the Keg River play in the 
mid-1960s in northwest Alberta; many small oil pools 
were discovered with a large proportion of the pool 
reserves credited in the year of discovery rather than 
waiting for subsequent development as is the case with 
larger pools. This factor has a particular effect on the 
annual ‘new discovery’ reserve additions; its impact 
is muted when all reserves additions are considered, 
or when our current knowledge of reserves is used to 
credit reserves back to the year in which the pool was 
discovered.
Aggregate reserves addition data fail to provide 
much evidence on one of the more remarkable char-
acteristics of the Alberta crude oil industry: major 
oil discoveries have occurred through a sequence of 
geologically distinct oil plays. As discussed in Chapter 
One, before nature can bequeath us a commercial 
crude oil reservoir, a complex set of underlying 
physical conditions regarding the generation, migra-
tion, and entrapment of hydrocarbons must occur in 
just the right way. This does not happen very often, 
but when it does significant numbers of deposits are 
typically created, all exhibiting much the same his-
tory; such a group of pools is known as an oil ‘play,’ 
defined by the specific geological formation in which 
these pools are found. Some geological judgment is 
required to define plays, so different authorities may 
use somewhat different groupings of pools. Table 5.3 
shows a recent ERCB tabulation of discovered Alberta 
oil reserves, illustrating that a large portion of reserves 
lie in a small number of formations. (See also the 
CAPP Statistical Handbook. Hardy, 1967, chap. 2, pro-
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ERCB New Discoveries per exploratory well 3-year moving average
ERCB Total Reserves Added per well drilled (exploration and development) 3-year moving average
CAPP Discoveries in W Canada by year of discovery 3-year moving average per exploratory well
Figure 5.1 Alberta Conventional Oil Reserve Additions per Well Drilled, 1950–2009
Formation Initial Initial Remaining 
 Volume  Established Established 
 in Place Reserves Reserves
UPPER CRETACEOUS
 Belly River  302 47 9
 Chinook* 6 1 0
 Cardium 1,704 294 31
 Second White Specks 42 5 1
 Doe Creek 79 7 2
 Dunvegan 24 2 0
LOWER CRETACEOUS
 Viking 355 68 5
 Upper Manville 2,054 318 56
 Lower Manville 997 226 30
JURASSIC 217 57 7
TRIASSIC 450 86 15
PERMIAN-BELLOy* 14 8 0
MISSISSIPPIAN
 Rundle 350 62 7
 Pekisko 97 16 2
 Banff 106 14 2
Formation Initial Initial Remaining 
 Volume  Established Established 
 in Place Reserves Reserves
UPPER DEVONIAN
 Wabamun 70 8 2
 Nisku 474 213 12
 Leduc 824 511 9
 Beaverhill Lake 1,142 408 23
 Slave Point 181 36 8
MIDDLE DEVONIAN   
 Gilwood 309 134 5
 Sulphur Point 9 2 0
 Muskeg 61 10 1
 Keg River 494 179 10
 Keg River SS 43 18 1
 Granite Wash 56 14 2
* from 2007 ERCB Reserves Report ST-98-2007.
Source: ERCB, Alberta’s Energy Reserves 2007 and Supply/Demand Outlook, 
2008 (ST98-2008), Table B.5. Later Reserves Reports did not include this 
information.
Table 5.3: Alberta Conventional Oil Reserves by Geological Formation, End of 2007 (106 m3)
Figure 5.2 Main Alberta Oil Plays
Source: Foat and MacFadyen, 1981, p.25.
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long been aware of the importance of oil plays, but 
the emphasis on separate plays in models utilized by 
economists is more recent; in the Alberta context, see, 
for example, Ryan (1973a,b), Uhler (1976, 1977), and 
Foat and MacFadyen (1983).
Figure 5.2 is a stylized geological cross-section 
showing seven of the most important Alberta crude 
oil plays; Map 5.1 shows the approximate geographic 
location of each (Foat and MacFadyen, 1983). There 
are many other small plays, and more are likely to 
be found.
The Geological Survey of Canada (1987) under-
took play-specific modelling of the Canadian crude 
oil industry. It reported 78 ‘established plays’ (with 
reported discoveries) and 49 ‘conceptual plays’ (with 
no discoveries yet, but oil potential) in Western 
Canada, for light and medium crude oil. Table 5.4 
looks at 50 (mainly established) plays that lie largely 
in Alberta. Column (1) tells the first year a pool was 
discovered in that play; column (2) shows the number 
of pools discovered up to 1987; and column (4) gives 
initial established reserves as estimated in 1987. (The 
‘potential’ columns will be discussed later in this chap-
ter.) It can be seen that these 50 oil plays are a hetero-
geneous mix. In total over 3,000 pools have been 
discovered, ranging from 439 in the Keg River play 
to 2 in the Turner Valley (the only ‘conceptual play,’ 
included in Table 5.4). Column 4 shows that reserves 
thus far established also vary considerably. The rank-
ing of plays in terms of reserves is also shown. The 
five largest plays hold 43 per cent of the reserves 
from all fifty plays; the largest ten hold 52 per cent of 
reserves. The preponderance of Devonian formations 
for Alberta oil is evident. These are the oldest of the 
geological horizons indicated, and their importance 
reflects both the timing of major prehistoric oceans 
over Alberta, and the relative tectonic stability of the 
region (without frequent disturbances that would 
allow oil to migrate to newer formations).
Each oil play tends to mimic the pattern of aggre-
gate oil reserves additions shown in Figure 5.1. There 
is considerable year-to-year variation in the size of the 
pools discovered, but the average discovery size tends 
to fall over time. Figure 5.3, for example, from data 
in Foat and MacFadyen (1983), plots annual discov-
eries by year from 1947 to 1976 in the Leduc ‘D-3’ play 
(using early 1980s estimates of reserves).
One artefact of discovery data arranged by year of 
discovery, as noted earlier, is the tendency to under-
state the size of more recent discoveries, since these 
pools may not be fully developed. Since average pool 
size has been falling for new discoveries, and smaller 
pools will tend to exhibit less appreciation, this under-
estimation may not be too severe. A large, or other-
wise promising, initial discovery generates a rush of 
exploratory drilling directed at that play. However, a 
small initial find may be viewed as an isolated inci-
dent; in effect, the play is not widely recognized and 
concerted exploratory activity may not occur until 
after one or more additional discoveries many years 
later. The same result may occur if the initial discovery 
was largely accidental (e.g., by a well targeted at some 
other formation) and locating prospects in this play 
requires an undeveloped technology (e.g., there is no 
obvious structural feature locatable by seismic). A 























Map 5.1 Six Major Alberta Conventional Crude Oil 
Plays and Three Oil Sands Areas
Sources: The areas for geological plays are from Foat and MacFadyen (1981), 
Figures C.3 to C. 9. Areas for oil sands deposits from ERCB, Reserves Report 
2010, ST-98, p. 2-1.
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Table 5.4: Alberta Light and Medium Oil Reserves and Potential by Play: GSC 1987
 Number of Pools Initial Recoverable  Median Recoverable Ultimate Potential 
  Reserves, 1986, 106 m3 Potential, 1106 m3 106 m3
Formation/Play Year of Discovered Expected   (Rank)  (Rank) Oil in Recoverable (Rank) 
 Discovery       Place
DEVONIAN
Beaverhill Lake 1956 21 60 406.1 (1) 25.1 (6) 1027 431.2 (1)
Leduc-Rimbey 1947 23 40 351.4 (2) 29.7 (4) 625 381.1 (2)
Keg River 1965 439 846 137.4 (4) 61.9 (1) 491 199.3 (4)
Nisku-Shelf 1947 65 150 119.4 (5) 37.3 (2) 278 156.7 (5)
Gilwood-Mitsue 1956 3 3 97.6 (6) – (50) 238 97.6 (6)
Leduc-Bashaw 1950 51 80 54.3 (7) 14.5 (8) 121 68.8 (8)
Leduc-Deep 1953 10 40 54.2 (8) 25.8 (5) 132 80.0 (7)
Nisku-W. Pembina 1977 45 50 32.8 (10) 3.6 (26) 91 36.4 (12)
M.Devon. Clastics 1954 106 280 32.8 (10) 33.3 (3) 161 66.0 (9)
Slave Point-Sawn 1958 37 80 6.7 (25) 4.6 (23) 72 11.3 (27)
Leduc-Nisku-S. 1951 11 60 6.2 (26) 7.7 (13) 45 13.9 (25)
Slave Point-Golden 1970 12 40 5.8 (28) 2.7 (30) 22 8.5 (32)
Nisku-Meekwap 1965 7 30 5.1 (29) 9.9 (12) 37 15.0 (22)
Zama 1965 71 160 3.6 (31) 5.7 (21) 56 9.3 (29)
Wabamun-Peace R. 1956 29 80 3.1 (33) 2.5 (32) 31 5.6 (34)
Keg River-Senex 1969 14 50 2.9 (34) 6.6 (17) 43 9.5 (28)
Bistcho 1965 15 70 0.8 (40) 1.6 (35) 17 2.4 (40)
Wabamun-Eroded 1952 9 40 0.8 (40) 0.9 (42) 11 1.7 (43)
Muskeg 1965 4 42 0.6 (44) 6.4 (18) 37 7.0 (33)
Leduc-Peace R. 1949 4 10 0.3 (48) 0.4 (47) 4 0.7 (48
CARBONIFEROUS
Elkton Edge 1955 36 60 30.8 (12) 4.1 (25) 125 34.9 (14)
Pekisko Edge 1946 78 110 27.3 (15) 1.3 (37) 220 28.6 (17)
Turner Valley 1936 2 n/a 22.3 (16) 4.2 (24) 189 26.6 (18)
Banff Edge-Central 1954 32 80 6.1 (27) 2.6 (31) 50 8.7 (31)
Desan 1983 17 80 0.8 (40) 2.8 (29) 44 3.6 (37)
Carbon. Sweetgrass 1936 11 40 0.5 (45) 1.2 (38) 17 1.7 (43)
Banff Edge-S. 1970 6 25 0.1 (50) 0.1 (48) 2 0.2 (50)
PERMIAN
Belloy-Peace R. 1951 14 40 11.1 (22) 3.1 (28) 51 14.2 (24)
TRIASSIC
Boundary Lake 1955 25 70 28.3 (14) 6.8 (16) 133 35.1 (13)
Peejay-Milligan 1957 35 50 14.1 (19) 1.6 (35) 49 15.7 (21)
Montney 1952 5 20 7.5 (23) 5.8 (20) 78 14.3 (23)
Halfway Strat. 1978 23 90 6.8 (24) 6.2 (19) 46 13.0 (26)
Inga Structure 1962 12 35 3.2 (32) 1.2 (38) 29 4.4 (35)
Halfway Drape 1960 12 35 1.3 (37) 0.8 (44) 11 2.1 (42)
Charlie L. Sond. 1952 32 100 1.2 (38) 1.0 (41) 13 2.2 (41)
Charlie L. Algal 1976 9 45 0.4 (46) 0.5 (46) 7 0.9 (47)
Doug Structure 1976 11 30 0.2 (49) 0.1 (48) 4 0.3 (49)
JURASSIC
Gilby-Medicine R. 1956 23 45 12.3 (20) 7.5 (14) 79 19.8 (19)
Sawtooth 1944 12 40 1.1 (39) 1.7 (34) 13 2.8 (39)
Rock Creek 1956 14 35 0.4 (46) 0.7 (45) 7 1.1 (46)
/continued
Table 5.4/continued
 Number of Pools Initial Recoverable  Median Recoverable Ultimate Potential 
  Reserves, 1986, 106 m3 Potential, 1106 m3 106 m3
Formation/Play Year of Discovered Expected   (Rank)  (Rank) Oil in Recoverable (Rank) 
 Discovery       Place
CRETACEOUS
Cardium Sheet 1953 128 200 288.5 (3) 3.6 (26) 1506 292.1 (3)
Viking-Alta 1949 137 270 43.5 (9) 16.5 (7) 312 60.0 (10)
Lower Mannville 1920 329 600 29.1 (13) 11.3 (9) 268 40.4 (11)
Belly R. Shoreline 1954 37 90 19.9 (17) 11.3 (9) 151 31.2 (15)
Upper Mannville 1957 177 450 18.4 (18) 11.3 (9) 197 29.7 (16)
Cardium Scour 1962 48 90 12.0 (21) 7.0 (15) 99 19.0 (20)
Belly R. Fluvial 1956 34 100 4.5 (30) 5.5 (22) 48 9.0 (30)
Dunvegan-Doe Cr. 1957 13 50 2.3 (35) 1.9 (33) 47 4.2 (36)
Ostracod 1959 32 80 1.8 (36) 1.2 (38) 20 3.0 (38)
1 and 2 White Specks 1961 16 50 0.7 (43) 0.9 (42) 16 1.6 (45)
TOTAL  3036 5141 1918.4  404.0  7370 2322.4













1947 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974
Initial Recoverable Reserves by year of discovery
Figure 5.3 Leduc Play: Reserves by Year of Discovery
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relatively small pools of questionable commercial feas-
ibility, whence continued exploration may be delayed 
until the economics improves (e.g., oil prices rise).
The importance of the oil play as a significant 
factor in the underlying natural resource base pro-
vides a convenient opportunity to return to consider-
ation of the inevitable and ubiquitous uncertainty of 
crude oil industry activities. There are at least four 
different ‘levels’ of uncertainty:
U1: Existence of Oil Plays. Of the large number of 
different geologic formations in Alberta, which 
ones will prove to be significant oil plays? In 
each case the resolution of the uncertainty 
tends to come abruptly, coincident with the 
first significant discovery in the play. As the 
industry matures, with a larger cumulative 
number of wells drilled throughout the region 
and a greater number of the plays discovered, 
the likelihood of finding a major new play 
becomes smaller; in this sense, uncertainty 
of type U1 will tend to become less significant 
over time.
U2: Extent of the Oil Play. The geographical and 
geological extent of the potential oil-bearing 
rock in the play will be subject to uncertainty. 
After the initial discovery, reinterpretation of 
records from already drilled wells will allow 
preliminary estimation of the extent of the 
play. Further refinement, and, presumably 
reduced uncertainty, will occur as more new 
wells are drilled looking explicitly for new dis-
coveries in the play.
U3: Existence of an Oil Pool. Knowledge of the 
extent of the oil play begins to allow the selec-
tion of ‘prospects’ or specific drilling sites, but, 
prior to drilling, it is not possible to know for 
certain whether or not the prospect will con-
tain oil. As with U1, uncertainty of this type 
is usually resolved in a sudden discontinuous 
manner as the exploratory well is either dry 
or successful. There may be more ambiguous 
cases in which very low porosity or permeabil-
ity in the reservoir, or this part of the reservoir, 
make it difficult to tell whether a commercial 
deposit has been found.
U4: Size of an Oil Pool. Finally, it is the commer-
cial volumes of oil (the reserves) which are of 
ultimate interest to the oil company. Reserves 
estimates are subject to geologic uncertainties 
(how large is the pool?), reservoir engineering 
uncertainties (what is the permeability in the 
pool, and is it homogeneous across the entire 
pool?), technological uncertainties (will hori-
zontal well-drilling techniques be effective 
here?), economic uncertainties (what will the 
price of oil be?), and political uncertainties 
(will the government change tax and royalty 
rates?). The geological and engineering uncer-
tainties tend to be reduced by development 
activities and some production history, but the 
economic and political uncertainties are always 
present.
All oil companies are aware of these uncertainties and 
will take them into account in their decision-making. 
Part of the dynamism of the crude oil industry comes 
from companies’ varying assessments. Moreover, risk 
preferences of decision-makers differ, reflecting differ-
ent underlying psychological propensities and varying 
financial situations. Most of the aggregated economic 
analysis of the petroleum industry assumes that these 
individual differences between companies average out, 
in some sense, and so do not have to be considered 
explicitly. We would note that this assumption may 
be very useful in assessing total Alberta oil supply 
but is not at all helpful in deciding which company’s 
stock you should buy. Nor would picking a Hawaiian 
holiday resort with very low average annual rainfall 
keep you from scanning the sky each day as you leave 
your room.
3. Ultimate Reserves Potential
Planners and decision-makers, both public and pri-
vate, have an obvious interest in the potential for 
future oil discoveries in a region. The ERCB defines 
ultimate potential as “an estimate of the initial estab-
lished reserves that will have been developed in an 
area by the time all exploration and development 
activity has ceased, having regard for the geological 
prospects of that area and anticipated technology and 
economic conditions” (ERCB, 2010, Reserves Report, 
ST 98, p. A-8). Reflection will demonstrate that ultim-
ate reserves consist of the current remaining estab-
lished reserves plus past production plus any future 
reserves additions. Estimates of ultimate potential, 
particularly its future reserves addition component, 
involve the exercise of subjective judgment to resolve 
the manifold uncertainties – geological, reservoir 
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engineering, technological, economic, and political – 
attendant on forecasting possible future petroleum 
production.
Many methods have been used to estimate ultim-
ate natural resource potential in a region. (Harris, 
1984; Kaufman, 1987; Power and Fuller, 1992; Walls, 
1992; and Sorrell and Speirs, 2009, provide useful 
reviews.) Virtually all approaches are extrapolative, 
trying to extrapolate some historical evidence through 
the future. Many differences exist amongst studies, 
and some utilize a combination of approaches, but 
four main types of analysis emerge:
(1) Volumetric. The (cubic) volume of potential 
oil-holding sediment in the region or play is 
estimated, and an anticipated quantity of oil 
(m3 or barrels) per unit volume is multiplied 
by the total volume. The quantity number may 
come from ‘similar’ geological formations some-
where else, especially if this region is relatively 
unexplored; or it may simply reflect considered 
expert judgment on potential for the region.
(2) Subjective Probability. This method simu-
lates ultimate oil volumes as the outcome of a 
multiplicative relationship among key under-





UR is ultimate recovery in barrels of oil;
NP is the number of prospective drilling 
sites (prospects);
SR is the success ratio, or chance that a 
prospect holds crude oil;
A is the surface acreage of a prospect;
D is the depth in feet of the oil-bearing 
sediment in the prospect;
P is the porosity of the project (percentage 
pore space in the rock);
WOR is one minus the water saturation 
(percentage of pore space with fluid 
other that water);
GOR is one minus the gas to oil ratio 
(percentage of non-water fluid that is 
crude oil rather than gas);
RF is the recovery factor (percentage of oil 
that will be recovered); and
7,758 is the number of barrels of fluid in an 
acre foot of pore space.
Equation 5.1 is an identity, showing ultimate 
reserves as the product of a number of variables. 
Each of the underlying variables is defined 
by a subjective probability distribution across 
possible values, as assessed by experts in the 
field. Sampling techniques like Monte Carlo 
analysis can be used to generate a probability 
distribution of possible values for UR, ultimate 
reserves. Generally the median value of the 
distribution is reported; this is the value for 
which higher values are just as likely as lower.
Briefly, a Monte Carlo simulation work as 
follows: Assume that the variables in equation 
5.1 are all independent of one another. 
Values are then selected ‘at random’ from the 
underlying probability distributions assumed 
for the variables in equation 5.1, so that the 
likelihood of selecting any value is equal to the 
specified probability of its occurrence. It may 
be useful to describe the process in detail. First 
select a value for NP, the number of prospects 
(e.g., 122), from the probability distribution 
for the number of drilling prospects in this 
region. Then this number (122) of drawings are 
made from the other probability distributions; 
each of the 122 drawings involves one value for 
each of the variables in equation 5.1, which, 
when multiplied together, give an estimate of 
likely reserves for that prospect. Then these 122 
values are added together to give an estimate 
of the ultimate potential of oil reserves from 
the region. If this entire process is repeated a 
great many times (e.g., 10,000) then a frequency 
distribution of ultimate reserves can be 
constructed. Enough information on a region is 
necessary to allow construction of the subjective 
probability distributions.
(3) Econometric Estimation. Statistical (econo-
metric) techniques may be used to estimate 
the ‘most likely’ quantitative relationship in 
the past between variables that are assumed to 
be associated with one another. If one of the 
variables were, for example, reserve additions, 
then it would be possible, by assuming that the 
same relationship holds through the future, to 
estimate future reserves additions, and there-
fore ultimate reserves. The simplest case, for 
instance, would look at the impact of the pas-
sage of time on reserves added. If the relation-
ship was a declining one, and therefore relatively 
bounded, ‘forecast’ future reserve additions 
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could be generated by extrapolating the declin-
ing reserves through the future until the new 
additions became small enough to ignore. 
Ultimate reserves would be total reserves added 
over the life of the industry including past 
history and the extrapolated future. Sufficient 
historical data is needed to allow econometric 
estimation of the hypothetical relationships 
between variables.
(4) Discovery Process. Oil discoveries are viewed 
as occurring in separate oil plays, each of which 
exhibits its own discovery history. Discoveries 
in each of these plays are seen as involving a 
process of sampling without replacement from 
the finite number of pools that lie in that play in 
nature. Moreover, the larger pools are assumed 
to be easier to find than the smaller, so are gen-
erally discovered earlier in the life of the play. 
If very specific assumptions are made about the 
distribution of pools in nature (e.g., ‘the size 
distribution is log normal’), and the likelihood 
of discovery for each pool (e.g., ‘the likelihood 
of discovery is proportionate to the size of the 
pool’) then sophisticated statistical analysis 
may be applied to the discovery history of pools 
in the play to develop estimates of the total 
number of pools in the play and the size of each. 
Finally, a sum of all pools in the play (often 
subject to a minimum economic size constraint) 
provides an estimate of ultimate recovery. This 
method is obviously complex and requires a sig-
nificant discovery history before it can be used.
Numerous attempts have been made over the years to 
estimate Alberta’s ultimate crude oil reserves. Many of 
the estimates were made by individuals for planning 
purposes for their companies; such estimates are not 
usually publicly reported. We will summarize the 
results of the main analyses undertaken by govern-
mental bodies, federal and provincial, with two early 
estimates by private groups, the CPA (in 1969) and the 
Canadian Society of Petroleum Geologists (CSPG) in 
1973. (See Canada. Energy Mines and Resources, 1973.) 
Unfortunately, not all studies separate Alberta from 
other parts of the Western Canadian Sedimentary 
basin (N.W.T., Northeast B.C., Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
and Southern Manitoba). As of December 31, 2008, 
according to the CPA, 70 per cent of initial established 
reserves of crude oil in this area was in Alberta (CAPP, 
Statistical Handbook).
CPA. In 1969, the CPA released results of a volu-
metric analysis of Canadian conventional crude oil 
potential that set ultimate reserves for the Western 
Canadian Sedimentary Basin at 7.5 billion m3 (47.4 
billion barrels) (Energy, Mines and Resources, 1973, 
vol. II).
CSPG. In 1973 members of the CSPG gave a pet-
roleum potential of about 3.5 billion m3 (22.3 billion 
barrels) for the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin 
(McCrossan and Porter, 1973, p. 74). The estimates 
were derived from “a very thorough analysis by volu-
metric techniques using geological analogy and by 
setting upper and lower limits of the yields through 
comparisons with a number of known areas to 
achieve what is probably a very reasonable figure for 
Alberta.” It was explicitly noted that no formal eco-
nomic criteria were applied, so the numbers should 
not be interpreted as ultimate established reserves 
(McCrossan and Porter, 1973, pp. 595–97). The CSPG 
was substantially less optimistic than the CPA.
Federal Government. The Department of Energy, 
Mines and Resources (EMR – which in 1993 became 
part of the Department of Natural Resources) and 
the National Energy Board (NEB) have been actively 
involved in modelling Canadian oil supply. As far as 
ultimate potential is concerned, federal government 
bodies have generally relied in part on the work of the 
Geological Survey of Canada (GSC), a research body 
housed within EMR.
Geological Survey of Canada (GSC) models 
have progressed from volumetric through subjective 
probability to discovery process techniques. Table 5.5 
summarizes the estimates of the GSC for the Western 
Canadian Sedimentary Basin. As can be seen, the GSC 
estimates were initially (1972) over 25 per cent more 
optimistic than the CSPG but have fallen considerably 
since 1973, with the 1987 estimate of ultimate poten-
tial for the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin at 
2.8 billion cubic metres (17.6 billion barrels), though 
this is only for light and medium, not heavy, oil pools. 
Of the 2.8 billion, about 500 million m3 (3.2 billion 
barrels) were yet to be established as reserves.
Table 5.4 provides more detail for 49 established 
oil plays, and one conceptual oil play (Turner Valley), 
largely in Alberta. The GSC uses a subjective probabil-
ity approach for the conceptual plays. The established 
oil plays are subject to a discovery process model that 
provides an estimate of the total number of pools 
expected to be discovered in the play (column (3)) and 
the potential recoverable oil volumes still to be discov-
ered (column (6), for the median, 50% probability esti-
mates). Columns (7) and (8) show ultimate potential 
oil in place and recoverable volumes (i.e., initial estab-
lished reserves, column (4) plus the potential, column 
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(6)). Potential of 404 million cubic metres amounts 
to 21 per cent of already discovered reserves, though 
the percentage varies greatly across plays, from 0 per 
cent for the Gilwood-Mitsue play (in a very restricted 
geological formation) to over 1,000 per cent for the 
Muskeg play. The rankings of potential in column (6) 
are quite different from those for established reserves 
in column (4), though the largest volumes of antici-
pated additions do tend to occur in relatively large 
plays. Anticipated additions, like past discoveries, are 
concentrated mainly in a limited number of forma-
tions – 46.5 per cent in the most promising five and 66 
per cent in the top ten. Of course, such potential num-
bers are subject to a wide range of uncertainty, and 
some of the ‘conceptual’ plays not included in Table 
5.4 may turn out to be large. The 3,000 plus pools 
discovered in these 50 plays so far generated almost 
two billion cubic metres of oil reserves; the pools vary 
greatly in size but averaged about 630 thousand cubic 
metres (almost 4 million barrels). The remaining 2,105 
pools anticipated (in the median case) would hold 404 
million m3 of potential reserves, averaging about 190 
thousand m3 in size. This declining average discovery 
size, at levels of both the play and the aggregate prov-
ince, are a strong force pushing towards higher oil 
production costs.
In 1998 the GSC updated the 1987 study of light 
and medium oil in Western Canada, using similar 
methods and data up to the end of 1994. (This report, 
Oil Resources of Western Canada, by P. J. Lee, is sum-
marized in NEB, 2001.) The number of established oil 
plays was reduced from 78 to 69, and the conceptual 
(“immature”) from 49 to 25; the GSC applied a modi-
fied discovery process modelling to the conceptual 
plays. This report considered only oil in place, with no 
consideration of economic factors or estimated ultim-
ate recovery of oil. Perhaps the most striking feature 
of the 1998 estimate was an increase in the estimated 
number of undiscovered pools, from 4,000 to 18,000, 
with newly discovered pools expected to be much 
smaller than the historical average. Discovered oil in 
place had been estimated at 7,377 106 m3 in the 1988 
Report, and undiscovered at 1,874 106 m3; in the 1998 
Report the equivalent numbers were much higher at 
12,547 and 6,958. These estimates suggest that con-
siderable amounts of conventional light and medium 
oil still lie undiscovered in the WCSB. However, for 
major additions to reserves to materialize, oil prices 
must be sufficiently high to offset the smaller pool 
sizes, and/or significant technological advances in 
discovery and recovery of oil must occur.
In 2001, the NEB published a study of conventional 
heavy oil in the WCSB (NEB, 2001), using the GSC 
methodology. This report drew on the oil plays from 
the 1998 GSC report; discovery process modelling was 
used, and prospective oil pools were subject to an 
economic analysis as well. The heavy oil plays lie in 
all four western Canadian provinces, not just Alberta. 
The NEB estimated that total heavy oil in place 
amounts to 7,926.6 106 m3, of which 2,894.8 106 m3 is 
as yet undiscovered. The recovery factor for previously 
discovered heavy oil is estimated at almost 25 per 
cent, with 372.8 106 m3 of additional reserves additions 
expected from already discovered pools. Undiscovered 
pools are expected to be much smaller on average 
than already discovered pools; the NEB reports an esti-
mated recovery factor of less than 12 per cent, yielding 
337.8 106 m3. It is interesting to note that the possible 
Table 5.5: GSC Estimates of Ultimate Crude Oil Potential
 Estimated Ultimate Potential 109 m3 (109 bbl)  Method Source 
 (Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin)
1972 4.5 (28.6) Volumetric EMR, 1973, Vol. II, p. 32–3
Feb. 1973 3.6 (22.4) Volumetric EMR, 1973, Vol. II, p.32–3
March 1973 3.4 (21.6) Subjective Probability EMR, 1973, Vol. II, p. 32–3
1977 3.3 (20.7) Subjective Probability EMR, 1977
1983 2.9* (18.2) Subjective Probability Procter, Taylor and Wade, 1984
1987 2.8+ (17.6) Discovery process  and Canada, GSC, 1987 
   Subjective Probability
* The Alberta Basin and disturbed belt which cover Alberta and northeast British Columbia have ultimate potential of 2.4 billion m3 (15.2 billion barrels). These are the 
50% probability estimates.
+ The 1987 study is for light and medium oil pools only.
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future reserves additions for heavy oil amount to 710.6 
106 m3, which is about 3.75 times larger than remain-
ing conventional heavy oil established reserves at the 
end of 2000. Supply costs (including royalties and 
taxes, and based on a 10% discount rate) varied signifi-
cantly, from $35/m3 to $270/m3. As with conventional 
light and medium oil, this suggests that considerable 
potential for reserves additions of heavy oil exists, but 
at much higher costs than were seen in the earlier days 
of the industry.
NEB. In 1974 the NEB began to issue a series of 
reports dealing initially with Canadian oil supply and 
demand, then, starting in 1981, with all energy forms. 
The September 1984, October 1986, September 1988, 
and June 1991 studies all reported NEB estimates of 
ultimate conventional crude oil potential in Western 
Canada. The NEB relied heavily on GSC research, 
especially for light and medium crude. Potential, in 
addition to initial established reserves, included both 
enhanced oil recovery and new discoveries for light 
and medium oil and for heavy oil. Table 5.6 summar-
izes the estimates in the four NEB reports. It can be 
seen that the NEB estimates rose from 1984 to 1986, 
particularly insofar as possible new discoveries were 
concerned. The 1984 Report alludes to rising prices, 
though no formal model illustrating the effect of 
rising prices is included. The 1989 estimate for light 
and medium crude from established reserves plus new 
discoveries is close to the GSC 1987 estimate (2.8 bil-
lion m3), but the NEB adds a further 295 million m3 of 
possible reserve additions through increased recovery 
in established pools. (The 1987 GSC model focused on 
oil in place, then applied recovery factors based upon 
averages in various oil plays.)
The 1991 NEB study provided a breakdown by 
geographical area, indicating that 87 per cent of the 
potential for light and medium oil lies in Alberta, 
as opposed to 36 per cent for heavy oil (where 
Saskatchewan is more important). It is also note-
worthy that, for Alberta, possible additions to reserves 
were estimated at 36 per cent of already established 
reserves for light and medium oil, but 71 per cent for 
heavy oil. This suggests that the future mix of Alberta 
conventional oil output may tend to shift towards 
heavy oil.
ERCB. The ERCB has provided reserve estimates 
for Alberta, generally in conjunction with its Reserves 
Report (as noted above, since the late 1960s, this has 
Table 5.6: NEB Estimates of Ultimate Conventional Crude Oil Potential in Western Canada (106 m3)
 1982 1984 1986 1989*
LIGHT AND MEDIUM CRUDE
Initial Established Reserves 2,055 2,165 2,264 2,370 (1,982)
EOR in Discovered Pools 404 367 295 295 (260)
New Discoveries 280 308 563 521 (454)
Ultimate Potential 2,739 2,840 3,122 3,086 (2,696)
HEAVy OIL
Initial Established Reserves 366 404 434 488 (172)
EOR in Discovered Pools 381 378 370 320 (115)
New Discoveries 140 125 250 270 (107)
Ultimate Potential 887 907 1,054 1,078 (395)
ALL CONVENTIONAL CRUDE
Initial Established Reserves 2,421 2,569 2,699 2,757 (2,154)
EOR in Discovered Pools 785 745 665 615 (375)
New Discoveries 420 432 813 791 (561)
Ultimate Potential 3,626 3,746 4,177 4,163 (3,091)
* Values for Alberta in 1989 are in parenthesis.
Sources:
1982: NEB, Canadian Energy Supply and Demand, 1983–2005 (September 1984).
1984: NEB, Canadian Energy Supply and Demand, 1985–2005 (October 1986).
1986: NEB, Canadian Energy Supply and Demand, 1987–2005 (September 1989).
1989: NEB, Canadian Energy Supply and Demand, 1990–2010 (June 1991).
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been issued annually as Report number ST-18 or 
ST-98). The ERCB has not provided much detail on 
its estimation procedures. Prior to 1977, “volume of 
sediments and exploration well statistics methods” 
were used. Since then, however, estimates have been 
based on “geological judgment with respect to trends 
reflected in exploration success, extent of exploration 
and development and likelihood of hydrocarbon 
accumulations in unexplored geologic horizons” 
(ERCB Reserves Report ST-18, 1977, p. 9-2). Table 5.7 
reviews the ERCB estimates since the mid-1960s, 
with values reported for years in which the estimate 
of ultimate potential was changed. As can be seen, 
the estimate of 1.9 billion m3 in the early 1960s was 
increased to 3.2 billion m3 by 1973, perhaps due to 
the Keg River and assorted plays that developed in 
Northwestern Alberta in the late 1960s. In 1975 esti-
mates were reduced and have been in the 2.4 to 3.1 bil-
lion m3 range since then. The ERCB has indicated that 
the 1993 estimate is still felt to be reasonable, although 
the board states that “[g]iven recent reserve growth 
in low permeability oil plays, the ERCB believes that 
this estimate may be low” (2012 Reserves Report, 
ST-98, p. 6). Comparison with the NEB estimates for 
1989 of Table 5.6 suggest that the ERCB is slightly less 
optimistic than the NEB. Comparison with the GSC 
is difficult, since the GSC estimates include only light 
and medium crude.
4. Summary and Conclusions
As of December 31, 2012, the ERCB estimated that 
Alberta held the ultimate potential to produce 3.13 
billion cubic metres of conventional crude oil; of this, 
2.65 billion (85%) has already been produced, 269.2 
million (8.6%) lay in remaining established reserves, 
and 209 million (6.6%) had yet to be established as 
reserves through new discoveries or other means 
(e.g., EOR schemes). The degree of certainty attached 
to these numbers varies greatly, the past production 
data being very accurate, and the remaining reserves 
estimates reasonably good, though subject to revision 
in light of future production levels and other infor-
mation. Considerable caution must, however, attend 
the 209 million m3 of possible future reserves addi-
tions, since they will hinge upon the major uncer-
tainties associated with exploration at untested sites, 
the course of future technological changes, and the 
vagaries of oil prices and government regulations. 
If the ERCB is right, we have, as of 2013, less than 
ten percent of Alberta’s recoverable conventional oil 
reserve base left to find and develop. Moreover, these 
reserves are likely to lie in deposits that are relatively 
small in comparison to those that generated the large 
reserve additions of the first two decades after 1947. 
The GSC estimated in 1987 that discovered Western 
Canadian Sedimentary Basin conventional oil pools 
numbered about 3,300, while more than 4,000 pools 
remained undiscovered; the latter would hold only 25 
per cent of the oil that might be recovered from the 
Basin (GSC, 1987, p. 124). On the basis of such expecta-
tions, prevailing wisdom has the Alberta conventional 
crude oil industry turning to increasingly more costly 
reserves additions, while undergoing a tendency to 
declining output as established reserves are run down. 
On a more optimistic note, the GSC 1987 estimate of 
about 7,300 light and medium crude oil pools in the 
entire Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin, had, by 
the year 2002, been surpassed in Alberta alone. And 
Table 5.7: ERCB Estimates of Alberta Ultimate 
Conventional Crude Oil Potential
Date Ultimate Potential  Source 
 106 m3 (109 bbl)  (ERCB Report)
1963 1.9 (1.2) Report 64-8
1968 2.9 (18) Report 69-18
1973 3.2 (20) Report 74-18
1975 2.9 (18) Report 76-18
1976 2.5 (15.9) Report 77-18
1978 2.4–2.7 (15.1–17.0) Report 79-18
1980 2.6 (16.4) Report 81-B
1982 2.67 (16.8) Report 83-E
1984 2.65 (16.7) Report 85-A
1987 2.91 (18.3) Report 88-E
1990 2.84 (17.9) Report 91-18
1993 3.13 (19.7) Report 93-18
Notes: The ERCB did not increased its estimate of ultimate potential through 
to the 2013 Reserves and Supply/Demand report (Report 2013-98), although 
it suggested in 2012 that “this estimate does not include potential oil from 
very low permeability reservoirs, referred to by industry as “tight oil,” which is 
now starting to be exploited using horizontal multistage fracturing technology” 
(p. 4-9). 
Sources: 
Report 64-8 and Reports xx-18 are Reserves Reports.
Report 81-B is Estimates of Ultimate Potential and Forecasts of Allowable 
Production Capacity of Alberta Crude Oil and Equivalent.
Report 83-E is Alberta Oil Supply, 1983–2007.
Report 85-A is Alberta Oil Supply, 1985–2010.
Report 88-E is Alberta Oil Supply, 1988–2003.
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exploratory drilling in Alberta is not yet as intensive 
as in the lower-48 United States.
Physical resource estimates are not infallible 
guides to economic outcomes and so must be treated 
with care. Adelman (1990, p. 1) said “The total mineral 
in the earth is an irrelevant non-binding constraint” 
and also that whatever is left after abandonment is “a 
geological fact of no economic interest.” Most useful 
analysis looks to only some portion of the total petrol-
eum available in the ground. Consider, for example, 
the least controversial, and most widely accepted, 
of the various resource measures – the established 
reserves of crude oil. One might think that those 
reserves are a prime determinant of output rates, now 
and in the future. Often established reserves are com-
pared to annual production in the form of the R/P 
(reserves-to-production) ratio, sometimes called the 
‘life index.’ For example, in 1991, Alberta produced 51.4 
million m3 of crude oil (per year), out of reserves as of 
December 31, 1990, of 510.4 million m3, yielding a R/P 
ratio of (510.4 million m3 / 51.4 million m3/year) or 9.9 
years. The R/P ratio is not, however, an estimate of the 
future lifetime of the industry in Alberta; consider, 
for example, that in 2010 Alberta was still producing 
significant volumes of conventional crude oil, and 
the conventional oil R/P ratio was still close to ten 
years! As industry observers quite properly emphasize, 
remaining reserves are a dynamic concept, dimin-
ished by production but augmented by new reserves 
additions. Adelman (1990) is helpful in suggesting 
that established reserves are best seen as the industry’s 
on-the-shelf working inventory. As in any ongoing 
business, one of the industry’s tasks is to develop opti-
mal withdrawals from and additions to this inventory. 
The R/P ratio itself is a measure of the intensity with 
which the current inventory is worked. While oil 
pools vary significantly in their physical characteris-
tics, the dynamics of oil reservoirs probably mean that 
sustained operation of oil pools at R/P ratios much 
less than 10 is difficult, without significantly damaging 
pool recovery mechanisms. In this case, established 
reserves serve as a severe constraint on the ability to 
increase production. On the other hand, high reserves 
to production ratios, like values in excess of 100 for 
some Middle Eastern countries, imply that output 
could be increased relatively easily from existing 
reserves. The Alberta conventional oil R/P ratio has, 
since 1947, been at both higher and lower levels. The 
point is that any given volume of reserves allows many 
different possible output rates.
As the Adelman quotes of the previous para-
graph makes clear, the concept of ultimate potential 
must also be used cautiously. (See also Adelman and 
Watkins, 1992 and 2008, and Watkins, 1992.) In the 
first place, its precise value is subject to a wide range 
of uncertainty, since ultimate oil recovery depends on 
so many future technological, economic, and political 
factors, which simply cannot be forecast with accur-
acy. This is on top of inevitable uncertainties in basic 
geological knowledge. Moreover, what is critical from 
the economic point of view is the course of annual 
reserves additions and how they are brought into 
production, rather than the ultimate stock of such 
additions. Of course, the ability to add reserves in any 
period is limited by the amount potentially available, 
but this is only one of the factors affecting actual 
reserves additions. 
From this discussion of Alberta’s conventional 
oil reserves, we turn to the question of the levels of 
Alberta oil production, and the prices received for that 
output.
Readers’ Guide: Chapter Six looks at the history of 
the prices for Alberta crude oil and the levels of con-
ventional crude oil production. In economic terms, 
price and output are determined in the market for 
crude oil, in which Alberta oil meets other crude oils 
in competition. However, the prices and output have a 
petropolitical dimension, since the operation of crude 
oil markets is affected by a variety of government 
regulations. As this chapter illustrates, Canadian gov-
ernment regulation of the crude oil market since the 
end of World War II has covered the spectrum from a 
relatively hands-off policy to an approach that directly 
fixes oil prices by government fiat. This chapter looks 
at the prices and output of Alberta conventional crude 
oil, while Chapter Nine presents detailed analysis of 
the government policies.
1. Introduction
As was discussed in Chapter Four, Alberta crude oil 
output and prices have been determined in crude 
oil markets whose operations reflect four factors: 
(1) supply-side decisions; (2) demand-side decisions 
(including refining and transportation components); 
(3) governmental regulations; and (4) adjustment 
processes as the market reacts to changing circum-
stances. The common assertion that demand and 
supply determine market outcomes is widely accepted, 
but, unfortunately, ambiguous. We must distinguish at 
least three senses in which supply equals demand in 
the market for lifted crude oil:
Sense (1): As an accounting identity and reflecting 
material balance requirements in the 
physical world, every unit produced 
(‘supplied’) in a period must end up 
somewhere (i.e., ‘demanded’).
Sense (2): As a condition for economic equi-
librium, the total quantity willingly 
produced (‘supplied’) will equal the 
total amount willingly consumed 
(‘demanded’); in other words, there are 
no undesired build-ups or downturns in 
inventories of crude oil held by produc-
ers or users. It should be remembered 
that the inventories of crude oil held by 
producers are generally in the form of 
reserves in the ground.
Sense (3): As a condition for a perfectly (‘effec-
tively’) competitive equilibrium, price 
and quantity will be where the willingly 
undertaken supplies of ‘price-taking’ 
producers just equal the willingly 
undertaken demands of ‘price-taking’ 
purchasers. (Price-takers are producers 
or consumers who form such a small 
part of the market that their variations 
in output or purchases have no effect on 
the market price.)
Supply and demand are always equal in sense (1). In 
the real world, participants in a market are often in 
the process of adjusting their behaviour in response 
to changing conditions with some undesired change 
in inventories, so that the market is not in equilib-
rium in senses (2) and (3). However, it is common for 
CHAPTER SIX
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economists to assume that markets adjust to equilib-
rium quite quickly, as would be anticipated if buyers 
and sellers are well-informed and communication 
flows accurate and rapid. Thus, observed values in the 
market are taken to be equilibrium values subject only 
to some small random error reflecting adjustment 
difficulties (disequilibrium). At any point in time, the 
crude oil market can be in short-run equilibrium, 
when, for example, at current prices, producers are 
lifting and selling just as much as they wish from 
installed productive capacity, but in medium-run dis-
equilibrium, if producers wish to install more capacity 
in existing reservoirs to add more reserves. In long-
run equilibrium, producers would have the desired 
levels of lifted crude oil, productive capability and 
reserves, including anticipated reserves from newly 
discovered reservoirs.
It is the effectiveness of competition in the market 
that determines whether prices and output are deter-
mined by demand and supply in sense (2) or sense (3). 
Sense (2) encompasses sense (3), effective competition, 
but also includes those instances in which market 
participants exercise their ability to manipulate quan-
tities in order to influence price. As was discussed in 
Chapter Four, this may include producers restricting 
output to generate higher prices (oligopoly), buyers 
restricting sales to generate lower prices (oligopsony), 
or some combination of the two (bilateral oligopoly). 
Such exercise of market power will generate prices 
that differ from the effectively competitive level. It 
may also involve price discrimination, typified by the 
case in which different consumers pay different prices 
for identical products, and more accurately “defined 
as implying that two varieties of a commodity are 
sold (by the same seller) to two buyers at different 
net prices, the net price being the price (paid by the 
buyer) corrected for the cost associated with the prod-
uct differentiation” (Phlips, 1983, p. 6). Economists are 
generally concerned with persistent price discrimina-
tion, rather than isolated cases that may occur as mar-
kets feel their way towards equilibrium.
Vertical integration in the petroleum industry 
complicates the issue. Many ‘crude oil’ companies 
are both producers of crude oil and purchasers (as 
oil refiners) and most of the large oil refineries have 
crude oil production facilities of their own. In such 
circumstances, the major buyers of crude oil (even if 
an oligopsony) might prefer higher prices for crude 
oil, particularly if high crude oil prices help to serve 
as a barrier to entry to ‘independent’ refiners (those 
without their own crude oil). Lower effective income 
tax rates on profits from crude oil than on profits from 
refining, as has generally been true in North America, 
might reinforce this preference by major vertically 
integrated refiners for higher crude oil prices. The 
main point is that a highly concentrated market on 
either the seller or the buyer side tends to translate 
into pressure for higher or lower prices for crude oil 
than under effective competition.
This chapter is concerned with how the four fac-
tors underlying the oil market have operated to deter-
mine the price of Alberta crude oil. Section 2 sets out 
the underlying data with minimal discussion – the 
annual course of crude oil prices, conventional crude 
oil output, and domestic and export sales from 1947 
through 2012. Section 3 then discusses the major influ-
ences on Alberta oil prices and output, with five time 
periods considered:
(i) Prior to 1947, when Alberta was an oil-
importing region;
(ii) 1947 to 1960, when new market areas were 
being established;
(iii) 1961 to 1972, when the Canadian National Oil 
Policy and U.S. Import Oil Quota Programs 
were dominating influences;
(iv) 1973 to 1984, when stringent federal (Ottawa) 
controls operated, including the National 
Energy Program; and
(v) 1985 to the present, when deregulation 
exposed Alberta to direct contact with an 
increasingly volatile international market.
Section 4 looks briefly at the corporate structure of 
the industry, including the degree of concentration of 
production and the extent of foreign ownership.
2. Alberta Oil Production and Prices:  
The Data
Table 6.1 details Alberta annual oil production, includ-
ing conventional crude oil and, since 1967, synthetic 
crude oil. The synthetic crude oil industry is dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter Seven of this book. 
Synthetic crude oil rose from 3 per cent of Alberta’s 
liquid hydrocarbons production in 1970 to over 35 per 
cent by 2012. Petroleum from the oil sands (synthetic 
crude oil plus bitumen) accounted for over 72 per 
cent of Alberta production by 2012. Since crude oil is 
not a perfectly homogeneous product, output in any 
year includes a mix of hydrocarbons, ranging from 
lighter crude oils and condensate from natural gas 
pools through to heavy crudes and bitumen. Table 6.1 
divides the oil into that sold in domestic markets and 
Crude Oil Output and Pricing 105
Table 6.1: Alberta Oil Production and Sales, 1914–2012 (103 m3/d)
 Sales












1952 26.0 25.5 0.5
1953 33.7 32.7 1.0
1954 38.5 37.4 0.7 0.4
1955 49.6 43.2 1.5 4.9
1956 63.1 47.1 4.9 11.1
1957 60.3 42.7 2.7 14.9
1958 49.8 43.9 2.0 3.9
1959 57.3 49.4 2.1 5.8
1960 58.7 47.5 3.3 7.9
1961 72.0 49.1 8.5 14.4
1962 79.1 48.1 11.2 19.8
1963 82.3 50.2 12.6 19.5
1964 87.0 51.6 13.3 22.1
1965 91.7 56.2 13.6 21.6
1966 100.4 58.4 17.9 24.1
1967 113.4 61.1 23.9 28.4  0.2
1968 125.6 66.9 34.1 24.6  2.5
1969 142.1 68.9 42.4 30.8  4.4
1970 165.6 76.4 56.2 33.0  5.3
1971 181.2 80.3 68.4 32.5  6.8
1972 213.5 81.3 90.7 41.5  8.2
1973 261.8 102.6 120.1 39.1  8.0
1974 249.2 123.2 95.4 30.6  7.3
1975 215.7 115.6 73.3 26.8  6.8
1976 196.3 132.5 49.2 14.6  7.6
1977 194.7 156.7 34.5 3.5  7.2
1978 192.9 161.8 28.9 2.2  8.9
1979 222.0 184.9 33.1 4.0  14.6
1980 211.4 187.6 20.6 3.2  20.3
1981 191.8 172.0 16.7 3.1  17.7
1982 186.4 162.0 21.4 3.0  19.1
1983 195.3 164.1 28.1 1.5 1.6 25.4
1984 205.6 162.1 40.5 2.8 0.2 21.2
1985 207.2 150.1 53.6 2.9 0.6 26.7
1986 205.5 135.9 64.7 3.4 1.5 29.4
1987 214.9 140.3 71.1 1.4 2.1 28.7
1988 227.8 140.3 83.5 1.1 2.9 31.9
/continued
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that exported to the United States, where the ‘west’ of 
the United States is PAD V (Petroleum Administration 
District V, which includes states on the west coast plus 
Nevada and Arizona). Occasional barrels of Alberta 
crude oil made their way to other markets; markets 
other than those in Canada and the adjacent north-
ern part of the United States have had ready access 
to easily transported international crude oil supplies 
at prices with which Alberta has been unable to 
compete.
Table 6.2 shows the course of Alberta light crude 
oil prices from 1948 through to 2012, for 35° crude oil 
at the field gate of the Redwater pool just northeast of 
Edmonton to 1985 and for Alberta ‘Par’ at Edmonton 
Table 6.1/continued)
 Sales
 Crude Oil Production Domestic Export U.S.A. (East) Export U.S.A. (West) Export (Offshore) Synthetic Crude Production
1989 221.6 139.9 78.3 1.6 1.8 32.6
1990 217.1 133.4 81.2 0.6 1.9 33.1
1991 216.7 121.6 90.9 0.8 3.4 35.9
1992 224.0 122.1 98.9 — 3.0 37.7
1993 228.8 124.4 102.6 — 1.8 38.7
1994 235.8 127.8 102.3 7.1 0.6 41.6
1995 242.4 122.1 117.4 6.3 0.8 44.7
1996 245.2 117.8 120.8 10.3 2.0 44.7
1997 253.0 103.8 136.7 10.8 1.9 43.7
1998 254.6 101.3 139.3 11.3 3.2 49.0
1999 239.4 101.2 136.4 7.1 0.5 51.4
2000 257.3 96.6 139.1 7.5 — 51.0
2001 259.0 88.2 156.8 7.5 — 55.4
2002 243.7 94.2 155.6 6.2 — 70.1
2003 257.9 128.2 161.7 8.5 3.3 80.9
2004 274.7 132.4 176.2 14.3 1.4 96.3
2005 268.9 123.6 175.2 11.3 4.4 86.9
2006 287.2 127.4 199.6 14.3 4.0 104.4
2007 295.0 131.4 197.0 16.2 6.1 109.2
2008 293.7 127.3 200.5 17.7 6.7 104.1
2009 305.8 134.3 203.8 15.9 22.0 121.7
2010 326.4 128.6 198.7 18.9 21.7 125.8
2011 355.1 135.5 192.1 22.0 7.0 137.1
2012 389.8 143.2 201.8 21.1 9.7 140.0
Notes: All production prior to 1952 is assumed to be for domestic use. Production includes condensate and pentanes plus and synthetic (tar sands) oil. Domestic sales 
include inventory changes and miscellaneous losses and adjustments plus resale of minor volumes of crude imported into Alberta in some years. Western U.S.A. is PAD 
(Petroleum Administration District) V (Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada and Arizona). There are data problems for the year 2001 which the ERCB has indicated it 
is addressing.
Sources:  
1914–51: Annual Report of the Department of Mines and Minerals for the Fiscal year Ended March 31, 1952; 
1952–2012: Energy Resources Conservation Board (or Energy Utilities Board or Oil and Gas Conservation Board) as follows:
 1952–61: Oil and Gas Industry Annual Report, 1961; 
 1962–63: Oil and Gas Industry Annual Report, 1963; 
 1964–71: Cumulative Annual Statistics of Western Oil and Gas Industry, 1973 (ST74-17); 
 1972–80: Cumulative Annual Statistics of Western Oil and Gas Industry, 1981 (ST82-17); 
 1981–97: Alberta Oil and Gas Industry Annual Statistics, assorted years (ST-17); 
 1998–2012: Alberta Energy Resource Industries Monthly Statistics, various issues (ST-3).
Crude Oil Output and Pricing 107
i) Market Penetration $/m3 $/b
1948 (January 1) 20.14 3.20
1949 (January 1) 16.87 2.68
 (September 1) 18.12 2.88
1950 (October 16) 17.18 2.73
1951 (April 24) 15.35 2.44
 (June 1) 15.48 2.46
1952 (April 23) 14.57 2.315
 (June 1) 15.48 2.46
1953 (March 19) 15.01 2.385
 (July 21) 16.64 2.645
1954 (October 15) 16.08 2.555
1955 (January 7) 15.64 2.485
 (February 1) 15.67 2.49
1957 (January 16) 16.80 2.67
 (August 30) 16.55 2.63
1958 (April 12) 16.11 2.56
1959 (March 24) 15.23 2.42
ii) National Oil Policy (Covert Controls) $/m3 $/b
1961 (September 11) 15.86 2.52
 (May 10) 16.49 2.62
1970 (December 15) 18.38 2.92
1973 (May 1) 21.9 3.48
 (August 1) 24.42 3.88
iii) Covert Controls $/m3 $/b
1974 (April) 41.41 6.58
1975 (July) 50.82 8.075
1976 (April) 51.00 8.105
 (June) 51.13 8.125
 (July) 57.74 9.175
 (November) 57.99 9.215
1977 (January 62.40 9.915
 (June) 62.58 9.945
 (July) 68.88 10.945
1978 (January) 75.17 11.945
 (February) 74.98 11.915
 (July) 81.24 12.91
1979 (July) 87.54 13.91
 (October) 87.67 13.93
1980 (January) 93.95 14.93
 (August) 106.35 16.9
1981* (January) 112.71 17.91
 (June) 113.21 17.99
 (July) 119.57 19.00
 (October) 132.97 21.13
iii) Covert Controls/continued $/m3 $/b
1982* (January) 146.31 23.25
 (July) 185.64 29.5
iv) Deregulation $/m3 $/b
1985 (June 1) 231.27 36.75
 (4th quarter) 232.83 37.00
1986 (March) 111.2 17.67
 (October) 124.2 19.11
1987 (March) 142.4 19.74
 (October) 155.52 22.62
1988 (March) 119.65 19.01
 (October) 100.13 15.91
1989 (March) 135.61 21.55
 (October) 143.41 22.79
1990 (March) 149.9 23.82
 (October) 255.83 40.65
1991 (March) 137.07 21.78
 (October) 156.67 24.90
1992 (March) 132.33 21.03
 (October) 163.31 25.95
1993 (March) 146.31 23.25
 (October) 139.69 22.20
1994 (March) 114.54 18.20
 (October) 141.29 22.45
1995 (March) 155.95 24.78
 (October) 140.73 22.36
1996 (March) 176.17 27.99
 (October) 207.57 32.98
1997 (March) 176.53 28.05
 (October) 179.48 28.52
1998 (March) 127.45 20.25
 (October) 131.97 20.97
1999 (March) 131.43 20.88
 (October) 204.77 32.54
2000 (March) 273.30 43.42
 (October) 311.77 49.54
2001 (March) 258.21 41.03
 (October) 213.15 33.87
2002 (March) 239.30 38.01
 (October) 276.52 43.94
2003 (March) 309.86 49.24
 (October) 242.29 38.50
2004 (March) 305.84 48.60
 (October) 405.87 64.50
2005 (March) 425.38 67.60
 (October) 472.13 75.02
2006 (March) 429.13 68.19
  (October) 397.52 63.17
/continued
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after that. Oil of different quality or at a different 
location would exhibit a price differential from this 
oil but would otherwise tend to follow the same his-
torical price path. Only when a crude oil differs quite 
significantly from the Redwater “reference” crude oil, 
for example very heavy oils from some eastern Alberta 
pools, might changes in the size of the price differen-
tial itself be a significant factor in the general trend.
Little concerted economic analysis of crude oil 
price differentials is available. Conceptually, in a 
well-functioning relatively competitive market, one 
would expect that there is, in any time period, an 
equilibrium set of price differentials that reflects:
(i) transportation cost differences, with crude 
oil further from market than the reference 
oil having a lower price (a higher negative 
differential relative to the reference crude oil), 
as would heavier crude oils which are more 
costly to ship;
(ii) refining cost differences, with heavier crude 
oil having higher refining costs (especially if 
subject to special processes such as cracking 
designed to increase the yield of lighter 
products), and therefore less value to the 
refiner, generating a larger negative differential; 
and
(iii) refined petroleum product refinery gate 
values, with heavier crude oil having a lower 
yield of the more highly valued light products, 
therefore commanding a larger negative 
differential.
Changes in transmission costs, in the configuration 
of purchasing refineries, in refinery technology and 
in the values of refined petroleum products would all 
change price differentials across different grades of 
crude oil. In practice, the industry and governments 
have generally handled the hydrocarbon quality part 
of the price differential by means of relatively fixed 
conventions, accepted by all and holding for lengthy 
periods of time. The locational differences have 
reflected the costs of transmission.
Historically, Alberta oil price differentials from 
1947 on (as set out by Imperial Oil) were 3 cents per 
barrel for every degree API difference, and 2 cents per 
barrel for every 0.1 per cent sulphur difference (above 
.49% sulphur). (See Bertrand, 1981, vol. iv, pp. 4–8.) 
Bradley and Watkins (1982, pp. 66–68) argue that the 
inability of individual refineries to select output from 
particular oil pools as a result of the Alberta govern-
ment market-demand prorationing scheme meant that 
market flexible differentials were not viable and some 
more arbitrary way of determining relative crude oil 
values was required. Acceptable fixed differentials 
provide a low-cost solution to this problem. Much of 
the analysis of the crude oil industry in the Bertrand 
Report on the State of Competition in the Canadian 
Petroleum Industry (Bertrand, 1981, vol. iv) was con-
cerned with whether these set differentials up to 1980 
were, in fact, appropriate. 
Figure 6.1 shows two price differentials for the 
years from 1986 to March 2013. One largely represents 
a locational differential: it shows amount by which 
the Alberta light oil price at Edmonton is less than 
the price of North Sea Brent oil delivered to Montreal. 
If Alberta oil were to be competitive in Montreal, 
the Alberta price had to be lower than the Brent 
price by at least the shipment cost from Edmonton 
to Montreal. Up until 2005, the price differential was 
relatively small, usually less than $10/m3. However, 
after 2005 it increased, rising sharply in 2011 until 
reaching over $160/m3 by the time of final editing in 
March 2013.
The second differential shown is for Alberta heavy 
oil as compared to Alberta light oil. Except for a brief 
Table 6.2/continued
iv) Deregulation/continued $/m3 $/b
2007 (March) 435.86 69.26
  (October) 511.31 81.25
2008 (March) 664.51 105.60
  (October) 538.68 85.59
2009 (March) 379.83 60.39
  (October) 483.18 76.78
2010 (March) 511.89 81.34
  (October) 470.38 74.75
2011 (March) 614.41 97.63
 (October) 589.14 93.62
2012 (March) 541.36 86.03
 (October) 581.37 92.39
2013 (March) 560.54 89.07
Note:	Quarterly	figures	are	end-quarter	prices.	*	Price	refers	to	“old”	oil.	1948–
85, price is for Redwater 35º oil. After 1985, price is ‘Canadian Par Price.’
Sources: 1948 to 1974, Alberta, Energy Resources Conservation Board, unpub-
lished data, and Esso Canada, Esso Price Bulletins (various years); 1975 to 1985, 
Alberta Petroleum Marketing Commission, Selling Price Bulletin for Crown 
Petroleum (various years); 1985, Esso and Shell, Crude Oil Pricing Bulletin (var-
ious months); 1986 to 2013, Natural Resources Canada, Petroleum Resources 
Branch, Crude Oil Data, Selected Oil Prices – Monthly Data.
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period in 1990, the price difference was less than 
$40/m3 until the year 2000. After that it tended to rise, 
to as much as $60/m3 (in December 2007), until fall-
ing back below $10/b through much of the next two 
years. The differential has fluctuated since then but 
was up to $94/m3 at the time of writing in April 2013. 
A larger price differential indicates a relative surplus 
of heavy crude oils relative to lighter grades and offers 
an incentive to refiners to buy and upgrade the heavier 
oil. Some observers of the international oil market 
have been on record for many years arguing that 
larger differentials are to be expected as world crude 
oil production shifts to heavier grades and transpor-
tation demands (for light refined petroleum products) 
become more dominant; however, this forecast has not 
yet been realized.
The discussion of price and output that follows 
draws heavily upon Watkins (1977a), Watkins (1981), 
Bradley and Watkins (1982), Watkins and Bradley 
(1982), Watkins (1989), and Helliwell et al. (1989).
3. Determination of Alberta Crude Oil 
Output and Prices
A. Tentative Beginnings: Pre-1947
Native Indians and early explorers and settlers found 
scattered evidence of Alberta’s petroleum potential in 
oil and natural gas seepages, frequently in ravines or 
springs by rivers or creeks. (For more detailed discus-
sion of the earliest industry activities in Alberta, see 
Beach and Irvin, 1940, Toombs and Simpson, 1957, 
Hanson, 1958, Simpson et al., 1963, de Mille, 1969, 
Gray, 1970, Gould, 1976, Dow, 2005, and Finch, 2007. 
Also useful are the Annual Reports of the Alberta 
Department of Lands and Mines after the transfer of 
resources from Ottawa to the province on October 1, 
1930.) Henry Kelsey, of the Hudson’s Bay Company, 
was brought a rock sample from the Athabasca tar 
sands in 1719 by a Native named Wa-pa-su, and Peter 
Pond (1778) and Alexander Mackenzie (1781) both 
$/m3
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Canadian Light (Edmonton) less Brent (Montreal) Canadian Heavy less Canadian Light
Figure 6.1 Oil Price Differentials
Note: Annual averages, except for 2013, which is the month of March.
Source: Natural Resources Canada, Selected Crude Oil Prices Monthly, 1986–2013.
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saw the Athabasca deposits during their expeditions. 
Other early reports of oil seepages were by John G. 
(Kootenay) Brown at Cameron Creek near Waterton 
(in 1874), John Ware on the Sheep River (in 1888), and 
G. M. Dawson and R. G. McConnell of the Canadian 
Geological Service at Tar Island near Peace River 
(1893). (Dormaar and Watt, 2008, provide a history of 
the Waterton finds.) However, the earliest commercial 
petroleum activities in Alberta centred on natural gas 
for local use, though this was more a result of acci-
dents of discovery than intent.
The first commercial petroleum well came in 
at Langevin near Medicine Hat when a CPR water-
directed well hit gas. Despite oil traces in several wells 
at Cameron Creek at the turn of the century, the sig-
nificant early discoveries were of natural gas, particu-
larly in two major finds at Turner Valley in 1914 and 
1922. The Turner Valley natural gas reservoirs signal 
the start of the Alberta crude oil industry, since both 
held ‘wet’ gas (with high liquid – i.e., condensate – 
content). In fact, the production of gas from Turner 
Valley was largely driven by the demand for liquid oil, 
with much flaring of gas and public concern about 
waste of the gas resource.
As Table 6.1 shows, Alberta oil production was 
negligible until the late 1930s and did not increase 
significantly until the late 1940s. Most date the Alberta 
oil industry from the Leduc finds of February and 
May 1947. The only significant oil discovery prior to 
that was the Turner Valley discovery of 1936, on a 
deeper southwest incline below the gas cap that had 
been discovered in 1922. Seventeen other smaller oil 
pools were discovered before Leduc, including Del 
Bonita (1931), Princess (1939), and heavy oil deposits at 
Wainwright (1925), Taber (1937), Lloydminster (1939), 
and Vermilion (1939) (Hanson, 1958, pp. 52–57). None 
of these early oil finds were part of a major oil play, 
so the initial discovery was not followed by a flurry of 
drilling activity and new discoveries in the same geo-
logical formations. Turner Valley is anomalous, appar-
ently a large oil pool that is not part of a larger play; 
this may reflect some chance element in its generation, 
or the peculiarities of the complex highly fractured 
geology of the Foothills. Small discoveries, and those 
involving less attractive heavy oil, are not likely to 
stimulate an active oil play.
Turner Valley proved to be both a large oil pool 
and a learning experience. Production there raised 
several problems that would continue through the 
years after Leduc. Problems related to the rule of 
capture, to protection of correlative property rights 
of oil producers on adjacent properties, and to the 
orderly marketing of crude oil. The problems were 
interrelated. The rule of capture pushed companies to 
attempt rapid recovery of the fugacious (flowing) oil 
before their neighbours could capture it, but this pres-
sure occurred in a market that was underdeveloped 
both in terms of infrastructure for shipment and insti-
tutional forms for market exchange.
Companies that built their own pipeline facilities 
and/or had well-established connections with refin-
ers would have a competitive advantage and might 
be able to produce significant volumes of oil from 
beneath neighbouring companies’ property. The 
large, so-called ‘major,’ oil companies were especially 
favoured, with good access to financial capital and 
their own refineries. Smaller producers, concerned 
about the situation for obvious reasons, cried out for 
some control over development of the Turner Valley 
field, and the government responded by establishing 
the Petroleum and Natural Gas Conservation Board 
(PNGCB) in 1938. A Turner Valley Gas Conservation 
Board had been set up in the early 1930s. The 
PNGCB was the precursor of the Alberta Oil and Gas 
Conservation Board (OGCB, 1948), its successor in 
1968, the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation 
Board (ERCB), the 1994 Alberta Energy and Utilities 
Board (EUB), and, once again in 2008, the Energy 
Resources Conservation Board. Regulatory duties 
are due to be taken over by the new Alberta Energy 
Regulator in June 2013. For a detailed history of these 
bodies prior to 1990 see Breen (1993).
 The low recovery rates under the rule of cap-
ture were accentuated for the Turner Valley field by 
production from the natural gas cap discovered in 
1922; total primary recovery for the main oil pool is 
currently estimated at only 13 per cent. Imperial Oil 
in 1931 limited its purchases of oil from Turner Valley 
to one half of well potentials in what seems to be the 
first recorded example of ‘proration’ in Alberta, albeit 
at the instigation of private industry rather than gov-
ernment. Later in the 1930s the PNGCB initiated a 
prorationing scheme in the Turner Valley field to help 
control depletion of reservoir energy. (See Chapter 
Ten for a discussion of prorationing.) The McGillivray 
Royal Commission on Petroleum and Petroleum 
Products (McGillivray, 1940) agreed that prorationing 
was necessary for Turner Valley oil, but argued that, 
for other oil pools, it would be preferable to apply unit 
operations, where each pool would be operated as a 
single entity. However, Alberta continued to utilize 
prorationing in preference to unitization right through 
to the end of the 1980s.
Turner Valley pushed Alberta’s liquid hydro-
carbon production up from about 3,600 b/d (570 
m3/d) in 1936 to a war-time peak of 27,800 b/d in 1942, 
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transforming Alberta from a net oil importer to a net 
oil exporter, with ex-Alberta sales going primarily 
to Regina. However, by 1947 Alberta’s oil output had 
fallen to 24,000 b/d, as Turner Valley moved into a 
phase of production decline.
The price of Alberta crude oil in this period 
was tied to the price of oil from adjacent areas of 
the United States, particularly the Cutbank pool in 
Montana. The McGillivray Commission of 1940 sum-
marized the explanation of Alberta oil pricing that has 
gained most credence (McGillivray, 1940, pp. 56–57). 
North America was viewed as an integrated crude oil 
market, with prices everywhere, including Montana, 
tied to prices at the U.S. Gulf (of Mexico). This reflects 
the Gulf Coast pricing system for oil throughout the 
world (‘Gulf Plus’) as discussed in Chapter Three. 
Montana oil served as the competition to Alberta oil 
in Regina and hence was the prime determinant of 
the price of Turner Valley oil. For example, in 1939, a 
field price of US$1.10/b for Cutbank 37° oil in Montana 
generated a delivered price (in Regina) that could 
then be netted back to Turner Valley by deducting the 
Turner Valley to Regina shipment cost, with further 
allowance for quality differences and the exchange 
rate. This implied a price in Turner Valley for 43° oil 
of CDN$1.28/b, which was just about the prevailing 
price. The Commission noted that if Turner Valley 
oil were shipped further east to Portage la Prairie, its 
price would have to fall to compete with oil and prod-
ucts supplied from Sarnia and that the revenue earned 
would fall since the extra volume shipped would not 
make up for the price decline. The report did not, 
however, discuss what forces prevented sales from 
occurring in the Portage market, though it noted that 
production decline would soon necessitate a falling off 
of sales in Saskatchewan.
Thus, Alberta crude oil prices, from the begin-
nings of production in 1914, followed U.S. crude oil 
prices. In the period from 1925 through 1946, average 
per barrel receipts on Alberta crude oil fluctuated with 
North American prices with a low of CDN$1.22/b in 
1939 and a high of $4.60 in 1927. The average value of 
Alberta oil sales in 1947 was $2.66/b.
The McGillivray Commission noted that the vast 
sedimentary basin covering most of Alberta offered 
high crude oil potential but that new discoveries were 
essential even to maintain the output levels of the 
early 1940s. The full extent of Alberta’s oil potential 
was uncertain.
In the early 1900s, the chief geologist of Standard 
Oil had been negative about Alberta’s potential. How-
ever, the company’s subsidiary in Canada (Imperial 
Oil) had persuaded Standard that an exploration 
program in the Western Canadian sedimentary basin 
was warranted (de Mille, 1969, p. 154). Imperial had 
a share in the Turner Valley pool, but of 134 Imperial 
exploratory wells drilled up to 1946, only one had 
found a significant oil pool (and that was too far 
north, at Norman Wells, in the Northwest Territor-
ies, to be of commercial value) (Gray, 1970, p. 98). 
Despite contrary pressures, Imperial decided not to 
abandon exploration in Alberta. A group of senior 
geological experts recommended drilling on land 
Imperial held near what was then understood to be 
the Alberta ‘hinge belt’ where the shallower sediment-
ary rock layers to the northeast suddenly deepened 
very sharply to the southwest. The well was targeted 
primarily to rocks of Mesozoic age. The ironies of the 
Leduc well have often been noted. Oil was discovered, 
unleashing the first of the major oil plays that trans-
formed the Alberta economy. The irony lies, not in 
the discovery of oil itself, but in the location, which 
was not in the geologic target but in a deeper Devon-
ian formation; moreover, an Alberta hinge belt, as 
envisioned in 1947, does not exist. Decision-making 
in an uncertain world guarantees surprises, some of 
them pleasant!
B.	Market	Penetration:	1947–60
After Leduc, Alberta’s reserves swelled with new dis-
coveries. New markets for western Canadian crude oil 
needed to be found. This would entail displacement 
of other oil supplies in areas increasingly far from 
Alberta. Expansion in an eastward direction would 
require acceptance of lower netbacks to compete with 
the delivered price of oil from the alternative source 
of supply – the United States. Markets progressively 
further east from Alberta were closer to U.S. mid- 
continent pipeline terminals, so had lower shipment 
costs for U.S. crude oil. Figure 6.2 (a modification 
of Figure 3.1) illustrates the general relationships. 
Distance is shown along the bottom of the figure, 
while the vertical distance shows the price of oil. PT 
represents the delivered price of U.S. crude oil, up the 
Niagara peninsula, to Toronto. The line PT X shows 
the delivered price of such crude oil moved westward 
from Toronto to various Canadian markets. In 1947 
Alberta crude oil was competitive as far east as Regina; 
this is indicated by an Alberta price at level PA and a 
delivered price for Alberta oil in markets to the east 
as indicated by line PAY. As can be seen, the water-
shed market (where U.S. and Alberta crude oils are 
equally attractive) is just east of Regina. In Winnipeg, 
Manitoba, in 1947, U.S. oil was cheaper than Alberta 
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oil (PW < P1W). Only if the Alberta oil price fell to level 
P1A would customers in Winnipeg be induced to pur-
chase Alberta crude oil.
The precise way in which the market would 
respond to increased Alberta oil reserves would 
depend upon the degree of competition in the market. 
We begin by considering two possible geographic 
pricing patterns.
1. Competitive Pricing Patterns
What sort of pricing structure would arise if output 
grew under competitive market conditions? As just 
discussed, acquisition of new eastern markets would 
involve absorption of shipping charges. To meet 
the United States delivered price in, say, eastern 
Saskatchewan, Alberta producers would have to lower 
their wellhead price.
As still more reserves were discovered, Alberta 
output would continue to expand, absorbing all 
Saskatchewan demand, then moving into Manitoba. 
A lower Alberta price would be necessitated with 
each eastward extension of the market area in order 
to keep the oil competitive with imported oil into the 
new market. Under competition, this would become 
the price at which all Alberta crude oil would be sold, 
regardless of destination. At each step, sellers would, 
of course, like to maintain the previous higher price 
level. However, if individual companies tried to hold 
the price up, producers without contracts would bid 
down the price of all oil to the new, lower level. Under 
competition, this process would continue until the 
Alberta wellhead price fell to the long-run incremen-
tal cost of supply.
2. Monopolistic Pricing Patterns
What price structure would have evolved had Alberta 
producers been able to exert monopolistic power? 
Such power would likely involve price discrimination. 
Producers would have continued supplying Alberta at 
the original Alberta wellhead price, while supplying 
Saskatchewan at a lower wellhead price, and Manitoba 
at a still lower price, reflecting higher transportation 
costs. The incremental benefit of each market expan-
sion step would be greater for producers than in the 
competitive case: even though the netback on new, 
more distant sales would be lower, prices would be 
maintained at previous levels in nearer markets.
Price on at least some of the sales would be in 
excess of the long-run incremental supply cost of the 
crude oil. Although producers would clearly prefer to 
keep price higher in markets adjacent to the supply 
region and only cut it for the new markets, a monopo-
listic result might occur without price discrimination, 
but with price in excess of incremental costs. That is, 
a uniform wellhead price could emerge but be held 
above long-run marginal cost by restricting output.
3. What Pattern Evolved?
What happened to Alberta oil prices as output 
expanded in the late 1940s and 1950s? Table 6.2 shows 
that, by and large, crude oil prices were reduced in 
a series of steps corresponding to the penetration of 
successively more distant markets.
In 1947, Alberta oil supplied Alberta requirements 
and a portion of Saskatchewan’s. By 1948, Alberta oil 
had begun to penetrate the Manitoba market, and in 
1951 deliveries to the Ontario market commenced, as 
did exports to the United States.
In 1947, the price of Alberta oil was $3.20 per 
barrel. By December 1948, this price had been reduced 
to $2.68 to make Alberta oil competitive with the 
delivered price in Manitoba of United States sup-
plies from Illinois, Oklahoma, and Texas. Alberta 
oil prices fluctuated in 1949 and 1950, according 
to changes in the exchange rate of the Canadian 
dollar. The reduction in price in 1951 was intended 
to make Alberta crude oil competitive with Illinois 
crude oil at Sarnia. The price rise in 1953 reflected 
an increase in equivalent delivered prices of U.S. 
and world oil at Sarnia. The price fell in 1955 with a 








Edmonton Regina Winnipeg Toronto
PToronto
PT
Figure 6.2 Alberta Crude Oil Market Penetration
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rate adjustments but rose in 1957 as world oil prices 
increased. Subsequently, the 1958 decline in world oil 
prices induced a fall in Alberta oil prices. In 1962, the 
devaluation of the Canadian dollar to a pegged rate 
(CDN$1 = US$0.925) resulted in an Alberta (Redwater) 
wellhead price of $2.62. This price held until 1970.
Up to 1960, the behaviour of Canadian oil prices 
is compatible with the competitive model outlined 
above. The build-up in supplies induced market 
expansion. Prices for all markets were reduced as the 
competitive interface for Alberta oil shifted eastwards 
to displace United States supplies. Also, up until 
1960, changes in world crude oil prices were directly 
reflected in Alberta prices.
However, further consideration suggests that nei-
ther the price adjustments nor the level of prices were 
fully consistent with the competitive market outcome. 
Rather, a mix of oligopoly (with some large powerful 
sellers) and oligopsony (with some large powerful 
buyers) was operating (Bradley and Watkins, 1982).
4. The Oligopoly-Oligopsony Case
In a situation of few sellers (and that of few buyers 
can be treated similarly), it would be irrational in the 
view of an economist, and folly in the view of a busi-
ness manager, for a given seller to adjust the terms 
of sale – in particular, the price – without taking 
account of how rival sellers would respond. As the 
most familiar example, consider the possibility of a 
unilateral price cut. Word of bargains usually travels 
fast, so, long before the path to the price-cutter’s door 
could become well worn, rivals might be expected to 
match the price cut in order to preserve their sales. If 
this were the case, why make the initial cut, creating 
only the prospect of lower prices for everyone? This 
recognition of mutual dependence must form part 
of the explanation of price formation in oligopolistic 
industries, as was seen in the discussion of OPEC in 
Chapter Three.
The degree of group organization in oligopoly 
can vary greatly, yielding results that bear resem-
blance to monopoly at one extreme or to competi-
tion at the other. Resemblance to monopoly is most 
likely to occur where the group is small in size, its 
members share similar situations and interests, and 
entry to the industry by outsiders is impeded. Such a 
group can enjoy greater aggregate profits by exerting 
some degree of control over price without the aid of 
any formal organization because individual produ-
cers condition pricing decisions upon recognition 
of the circumstances facing the group as a whole. 
Discretionary behaviour by the group is curtailed if 
these conditions are altered – for example, if there 
is a larger group, members with diverse situations 
and conflicting interests, or if entry to the industry is 
unimpeded. In this case, the industry is subject to the 
discipline that would be imposed by an impersonal, 
competitive market. Because market behaviour in an 
oligopolistic industry can vary so widely, industry 
analysis must identify and take account of factors that 
enhance or diminish group action.
Drawing on commonly observed patterns, it is 
possible to formulate a model of price formation in 
an oligopoly. The key presumption of recognition 
of mutual dependence has already been noted. The 
success with which individual pricing decision can 
be aligned will depend on what may be classed as 
internal considerations (Osborne, 1978), the two 
main ones being: (1) the degree to which a given price 
level suits all sellers; and (2) the degree of confidence 
possessed by each seller that others are adhering to 
the given price. The first, or ‘compatibility’ factor, is 
determined by such circumstances as the similarity 
of cost structures and growth objectives among the 
sellers. The second, or ‘discipline’ factor, rests upon the 
availability of information about transactions and the 
means for deterring individual departures from the 
industry price. The effectiveness of a pricing strategy 
for increasing group profits (hence, those of individ-
ual sellers) will depend on external considerations, of 
which the key factor is the ease with which new sellers 
can join the industry.
Much of our discussion will focus on how external 
and internal circumstances condition price formation 
in crude petroleum markets, but any explanation is 
incomplete without an indication of the mechan-
ism by which price itself is established. If there is no 
outside auctioneer or broker, some member of the 
group must name a price. The development of active 
international spot markets and the growth of futures 
trade for crude oil on various Mercantile Exchanges 
in the 1980s has provided an outside source of oil 
prices in recent years; but earlier this was not the case. 
There must be some means for efficiently adjusting 
price because a group of sellers is not well served by 
a rigid price when demand and cost conditions in 
an industry are continually changing. This means is 
most frequently provided through the convention of 
price leadership.
The price-leader is likely to be the largest or the 
longest-established member of the group, although 
this is not necessarily the case. It is more important 
that the prices set by the price-leader be regarded by 
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the members of the group as appropriate, or at least 
tolerable, in light of market conditions. Where such a 
leader exists and is followed, not only can price wars 
be avoided, but prices can be adjusted appropriately 
to ‘soft’ or ‘firm’ market conditions. Where leadership 
is not well-established, a price announcement by 
a prospective leader might be followed by some 
jockeying – other members testing slightly higher or 
lower prices – before the group price is established. 
This interval of uncertainty can be avoided when 
the leader has been identified through practice and 
the firm’s prices continue to seem reasonable to 
other sellers.
Whether or not oligopoly pricing can be sustained 
depends on elements we characterize as internal fac-
tors. For instance, a company desperate to increase 
its market share in order to spread overhead or meet 
cash needs might provoke a price war if it incorrectly 
believed it could successfully conceal price conces-
sions. At the same time, external factors determine the 
degree of market power that can be achieved through 
successful oligopoly pricing. We have noted that if 
new firms can join the industry readily when price–
cost margins rise, then this threat will limit price 
increases. (Such markets are sometimes said to be 
‘contestable,’ as argued by Baumol, 1986, and Baumol 
et al., 1988). There can be other constraints, for 
example, loss of markets to imports or fear that gov-
ernment will remove industry privileges or actually 
intervene to set prices.
The oligopoly-oligopsony model of price forma-
tion proves useful in understanding the evolution 
of Canadian crude oil prices as the market area was 
expanded in the 1950s. Deliveries through two pipe-
lines, the major Interprovincial Pipe Line (IPL) to 
the east (now known as Enbridge), and the smaller 
Trans Mountain, to the west (now known as Kinder-
Morgan), disposed of the bulk of the increased output. 
As noted above, during this period, prices paid by a 
small number of refiners in the most easterly mar-
kets – refiners who had access to alternative crude oil 
sources – were decisive in establishing the price of 
all Western output. Alberta crude oil prices evolved 
to meet competition in the most distant market as a 
competitive model would imply.
What were the actual circumstances of crude oil 
markets in the 1950s? There was a moderate degree of 
concentration in the production sector. (See Table 6.6 
and Section 4 of this chapter.) In 1957, the largest four 
producers accounted for about three-eighths of total 
output; the largest eight, for just over half. There were 
many smaller producers, some affiliated with refiners 
and marketing organizations, but most independent. 
The extent of concentration in the industry was less 
than is generally assumed to be necessary in order to 
achieve significant market power through coordinated 
oligopoly pricing. However, the possibility of price 
competition in the sale of crude oil within Canada 
was constrained by government regulation. Market-
demand prorationing in Alberta, the principal supply-
ing province, suppressed competitive selling strategies. 
(See Chapter Ten.) A seller had little reason to propose 
a lower price when there was no possibility of increas-
ing the quantity of oil sold, since any increased sales at 
lower prices would be spread across all the producers 
in the province.
Not only had discoveries materialized, but 
throughout the 1950s development drilling, over-
stimulated by the land tenure system and by incentives 
in the Alberta prorationing system, had proceeded 
at a rate that maintained and even widened the gap 
between productive capacity and actual output. 
In fact, there was more to the predicament than is 
revealed by the low overall utilization of capacity since 
the method of quota allocation under prorationing 
was such that low-cost fields bore the brunt of unused 
capacity. As an example, Imperial Oil noted that its 
Golden Spike field in 1958 had a “maximum permis-
sible rate” (MPR) of 45,000 barrels per day but was 
only assigned production of 3,400 barrels per day.
How then was the price of crude oil established? 
The task could have been assigned to the Alberta Oil 
and Gas Conservation Board, which was then super-
vising the prorationing system. In fact, while it was 
authorized under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act 
to regulate quantities produced, the board had no 
authority to establish prices directly. It remains to look 
to the buyers’ side of the market, where the price of oil 
was given by matching posted prices of major refiners.
There are only a few refiners in any region of 
Canada. Even on a national basis, the number of 
different companies represented in refining is not 
large since each of the four major oil companies has 
refineries in most regions. This level of concentra-
tion suggests potential market power on the buyers’ 
side. Because the refiners were in varying degrees 
integrated back into crude oil production, different 
objectives might have been served by the exercise 
of market power. However, it will be shown that the 
range within which prices could be set was severely 
limited. The price that could be charged in the market 
most distant from Alberta was limited by the price 
of that region’s alternative crude oil supply, while the 
way in which prorationing suppressed pressures from 
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excess capacity tended to preclude market-clearing 
price reductions. Furthermore, price discrimination 
by destination was never instituted.
Organizing a market so that pricing may serve 
group interest proceeds in our model through the 
mechanism of price leadership. Individual refiners 
are likely to see it to be in their long-term interest to 
match the crude oil price postings of a leader. There is 
evidence that Imperial Oil consistently led in posting 
crude oil prices from the 1950s onward (Bertrand, 
1981, vol. iv, pp. 6–7). Imperial Oil was a pioneer in 
exploring the Western Canadian sedimentary basin, 
and by the 1950s it had succeeded in establishing itself 
as the largest producer. In 1957, Imperial’s share of 
Western Canadian production exceeded that of the 
next three largest producers combined (see Table 6.6). 
In fact, output shares understate Imperial’s position. 
Much of its crude oil came from the more productive 
and hence lower cost reservoirs, and Alberta prora-
tioning imposed the most severe output restrictions 
on such reservoirs. Consequently, Imperial’s share of 
marketable reserves would have been higher than its 
share of production. Thus, it had strong motivation to 
promote market expansion.
Before Interprovincial Pipe Line was organized, 
Imperial had already taken the initiative toward 
market expansion to the east by making arrangements 
for construction of a pipeline from Edmonton to 
Regina. In July 1948, after a survey of possible routes, 
negotiations were begun for 16-inch diameter pipe. 
When mounting discoveries provided justification 
for a pipeline that would reach the east via the Great 
Lakes, Interprovincial Pipe Line Company (IPL) was 
incorporated by a special act of Parliament in April 
1949 to carry forward construction of a line. In August 
1949, Imperial subscribed to the first 10,000 shares 
of IPL. For several months, until October 1949, IPL 
was a wholly owned subsidiary of Imperial, but at 
that time a further 10,000 shares of stock were sold, 
of which 3,000 were subscribed by oil companies – 
2,000 by Canadian Gulf Oil and 1,000 by Canadian 
Oil Companies Limited. Imperial assumed significant 
parental responsibilities with respect to IPL. It under-
took to provide guarantees that a minimum amount 
of crude oil would be shipped (the Throughput 
Agreement) and that if throughput fell below a stipu-
lated figure it would make up the tariff shortfall to IPL 
in cash. Inability of IPL to meet its financial obliga-
tions would be remedied by Imperial under a Three 
Party Agreement among Imperial, IPL, and the Royal 
Trust Company, stipulating that if IPL failed to meet 
interest or principal payments to Royal Trust, the 
deficiencies would be made up by Imperial. (These 
agreements are reproduced as Appendices C and D in 
Interprovincial Pipe Line Company, Submission to 
The Royal Commission on Energy, February 1958.)
To foster the development of IPL, Imperial not 
only utilized the line for transport of crude oil to its 
Regina, Winnipeg, and Sarnia refineries, but it also 
signed contracts with British American Oil Company 
(BA) and Canadian Oil Companies Limited to supply 
crude oil to their refineries in Ontario. Contracts 
were also made to supply U.S. refiners who could be 
served by IPL. Shipments of crude oil under all these 
contracts reduced the risk that IPL would fail to meet 
projected shipment volumes, thereby necessitating 
payments by Imperial under its throughput and finan-
cial deficiency agreements.
In describing the model of oligopoly-oligopsony  
price formation, reference was made to internal 
factors related to compatibility and discipline. 
Willingness to match a price posted by the leader is 
enhanced if that price is seen to serve well-understood 
industry objectives. In the 1950s, there was consensus 
among producers on the desirability and even need 
to supply the Ontario market and parts of the U.S. 
market that could be reached by the Interprovincial 
pipeline. This established a clear limit for price: it had 
to match the price of alternative suppliers at the com-
petitive interface, which came to be Sarnia, Ontario.
The explanation thus far for Canadian crude oil 
price changes in the 1950s may be summarized briefly: 
sellers had little influence on prices that were set by 
buyers acting as a group in pursuit of the industry 
objective of orderly market expansion. Accordingly, 
crude oil prices were reduced in a series of steps, cor-
responding to the penetration of successively more 
distant markets.
The policy of expanding the marketing area 
placed a ceiling on crude oil prices. We must now 
consider how the price floor was supported. The guid-
ing spirit of the system set up under the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act was equality of treatment for all pro-
ducers. The act is strongly worded in its insistence that 
no discrimination be practised, although there does 
not appear to have been any subsequent litigation that 
developed the law on this point. Had the price-setters 
not been operating in this atmosphere, they might 
have been more aggressive in lowering the price of 
crude oil in order to increase the level of utilization 
of low-cost fields (where their ownership interest was 
strongest) at the expense of high-cost fields.
It will be recalled that the evolution of Alberta 
crude oil prices began from a starting point at which 
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price matched the delivered cost of U.S. imports. Thus, 
it was economically feasible to develop a particular 
pool of oil so long as costs were no higher than this 
price. Pools developed under this price umbrella 
were entitled to produce according to the formulae 
of the prorationing system. Aggressive price-cutting 
by refiner-buyers, as might have occurred in other 
circumstances, would have rendered the high-cost 
pools unprofitable. Re-allocation of output in favour 
of low-cost pools would not have constituted dis-
crimination as the economist defines it, but it seems 
certain that it would have been at variance with 
the non-discriminatory thrust of the statute, which 
allowed for a “reasonable opportunity to produce.” The 
regulatory regime not only eliminated competition 
among sellers but precluded buyers from selectively 
securing lower-cost crude oil by posting lower prices.
Crude oil price formation in the 1950s does 
appear to have evolved in a manner consistent with 
our oligopoly model, but the degree of buyer power 
was circumscribed within narrow bounds. The struc-
ture of prices at the end of the decade was similar to 
what would have been observed under a competitive 
pricing model: one price was quoted at Edmonton for 
a particular grade of crude oil regardless of its destina-
tion or place of origin. Had complete monopoly power 
been available and exploited, buyers in each market 
(not just the most distant one) would have been 
charged a price for Alberta crude oil that approached 
or matched the price from alternative sources. Had 
monopsony (or buyer) power been exploited, different 
prices would have been offered for different crude oils, 
depending on their cost of production. Both forms of 
discrimination were precluded by several factors – the 
fairness principle inherent in the prorationing system 
and associated regulation, the administrative com-
plexity that would have been entailed, and probably 
also a sense of what was customary elsewhere in the 
petroleum industry.
While the structure of prices that evolved was 
consistent with what would have occurred under 
competitive markets, the level was not necessarily 
so. A downward trend in prices had taken place as 
a prerequisite to continued extension of the market 
area. However, the downward pressure on prices 
was never severe enough to force demand to be met 
from lowest-cost sources. Instead, excess productive 
capacity was always present. Price changes supported 
the objective of increasing industry output through 
orderly market expansion and were sustained by 
the way proration automatically adjusted supply. 
But the dynamics of price formation were both 
conditioned and restrained by the Alberta Oil and Gas 
Conservation Board.
Alberta’s oil production and sales, as shown in 
Table 6.1, reflect the expansion of the market west-
ward to Puget Sound and eastward to Sarnia in 1953 
and Port Credit (near Toronto) in 1957. The capacity 
of the initial Interprovincial Pipe Line facilities was 
increased by the installation of various extra loops, 
pumping stations, and compressors. By the early 
1970s, there were three large-diameter lines between 
Edmonton and Superior, Wisconsin, and two from 
there to Sarnia. The temporary surge in sales in 
1956 and 1957 reflected, in part, increases in North 
American oil output to offset the international oil 
supply decrease associated with the Suez Crisis of 
1956. Alberta oil output was largely supply driven from 
the start of construction of the major trunk pipelines 
in 1950 through to 1957, and demand driven subse-
quently, as sales were tied to demand growth in the 
markets adjacent to the pipeline.
As was discussed above, the tie to refinery demand 
was supported by the Alberta market-demand pror-
ationing regulations. The significance of demand 
constraints can be illustrated in several ways. For 
example, the ratio of remaining oil reserves to annual 
production rose from about 18 in 1956 to 22 in 1960, 
suggesting relatively low, and declining, utilization of 
available reserves. Furthermore, after 1953, the growth 
of output was exceeded by the growth of production 
capability. After being restored to over 70 percent 
from its 1950 low of under 45 percent, capacity util-
ization fell steadily so that by 1957 only about half of 
Alberta’s potential was being utilized (Bradley and 
Watkins, 1982, p. 70).
The situation for the Canadian industry by the late 
1950s was graver than the low and sagging capacity 
utilization indicated. The U.S. oil industry was lob-
bying vigorously for more effective protection from 
imports. With voluntary limitation proving inad-
equate, the United States was moving toward manda-
tory controls. Canadian producers were concerned 
that they might be prevented from expanding exports 
into the mid-continent of the United States. Exports 
to the West Coast appeared to be restricted to the 
Puget Sound area already connected by pipeline. If the 
oil had to be transhipped by tanker to the California 
market, it could no longer compete with overseas 
crude oil.
The decline in international oil prices that began 
in 1957 served to heighten the oil industry’s concerns. 
The Canadian industry was in trouble, and it turned to 
the federal government for help.
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C. The National Oil Policy and Covert Controls: 
1961–73
1. The Borden Commission
In October 1957 a Royal Commission, chaired by 
Henry Borden, was appointed by the federal govern-
ment to look into such questions as energy export 
controls, the regulation of pipelines, and the func-
tions that might be assigned to an administrative 
agency to be known as the National Energy Board. 
The Commission did indeed investigate these various 
issues, but the specific question that dominated its 
deliberations was how best to nurse the ailing crude 
oil industry back to health. Chapter Nine elaborates 
on these issues, but an outline will be given here.
Submissions to the Royal Commission addressing 
the problems of the crude oil industry all endorsed 
the need to find markets for more Canadian crude 
oil. The most widely discussed means was to supply 
Canadian crude oil by pipeline to Montreal refineries. 
The Montreal pipeline proposal was championed by 
the independent oil producers, but it was strongly 
opposed by the Montreal refiners, who were at that 
time being supplied by cheaper offshore crude oil, 
principally from Venezuela. The refineries included 
major oil companies that were important produ-
cers in Alberta (Imperial, Shell, McColl-Frontenac 
[Texaco], and British American [Gulf], as well as 
Petrofina [which had a little western Canadian output] 
and British Petroleum [BP, which shortly afterward 
acquired Triad Oil with Alberta crude production]). 
The majors and BP were also affiliated with the inter-
national majors which held Middle Eastern and 
Venezuelan oil concessions.
Companies which refined in Montreal made sub-
missions to the Borden Commission setting out the 
difficulties with an oil pipeline extension to Montreal. 
For Canadian crude oil coming east as far as Toronto, 
to remain competitive with United States crude oil 
involved meeting price in a market where the price 
level was relatively high. But bringing Canadian crude 
oil into Montreal meant meeting world competition, 
implying western producers faced an immediate price 
cut, with the risk of more to follow. Furthermore, past 
pipeline expansion had involved guarantees by users 
to maintain agreed-upon levels of throughput. As long 
as they had access to alternative supplies from over-
seas, the Montreal refiners were certainly not prepared 
to offer guarantees of this sort. Based on market con-
ditions in April 1958, W.J. Levy estimated Canadian 
crude oil would have been delivered in Montreal at a 
price disadvantage of about 12 cents per barrel com-
pared with oil from Venezuela. Canadian producers 
would have had to reduce the price on all the crude oil 
they sold by 12 cents in order to meet the overseas price 
(Levy, 1958, pp. II-18, 18A). This would have greatly 
diminished the marginal value of the extra sales to 
them. The continuing decline in international oil 
prices in the late 1950s only exacerbated this difficulty.
It was evident to Levy and to others that, before 
Montreal refiners would accept Canadian crude oil, 
either a method would have to be devised to offer 
special prices in that market or the government would 
have to erect some kind of barrier to offshore imports. 
Levy recognized “the possible commercial preference 
of refiners in the area (Montreal) for foreign crude oil, 
even should Canadian crude oil be available at com-
petitive prices.” He explained:
Access to the foreign production of inter-
national companies with which Montreal 
refineries are affiliated offers opportunities of 
profit that Canadian crude cannot match. So 
long as this is the case for the area as a whole, 
no individual company could reasonably afford 
to switch to Canadian crudes no matter what 
other considerations it may wish to defer to. 
(Levy, 1958, p. III-19)
To meet this problem, proposals were advanced to 
establish pricing procedures that cross-subsidized 
Canadian crude oil going to Montreal at the expense 
of crude oil delivered elsewhere. One approach was 
to have refiners post delivered prices (including costs, 
insurance, and freight) at all refinery centres, prices 
that would reflect the delivered cost of competitive 
crude oil. This discrimination by destination would 
have been at variance with the Alberta regulatory 
system and would have created a complex administra-
tive problem of dividing the proceeds from different 
markets of varying profitability. Another suggested 
form of cross-subsidization was through the pipeline 
tariff structure, which would have been amended in 
order to load charges onto short-haul crude oil so as 
to reduce the Edmonton-Montreal tariff.
When these types of special treatment found little 
support, attention turned to protection – in particular 
the imposition of tariffs or import quotas. Imperial 
Oil suggested an alternative to penetration of the 
Montreal market, as an intermediate strategy. It con-
tained two lines of action, the first of which was to 
secure the entire Ontario market for Canadian crude 
oil. Although the volume of foreign crude oil refined 
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in Ontario at this time was small, a substantial volume 
of oil products was imported, either from abroad 
or from Montreal refineries. It was suggested that 
these imports should be supplanted with oil products 
refined from Canadian crude oil. The second part of 
Imperial’s proposal was to expand crude oil exports 
to the United States. In the longer term, Imperial 
expected that the United States would rely much 
more heavily on imports and that Canada would be 
a natural supplier to northern and western regional 
markets. It was important, therefore, to negotiate 
favourable treatment of Canadian exports by the 
United States. To alleviate the immediate problems of 
the Canadian producing industry, an effort to saturate 
the United States Puget Sound market was suggested – 
an effort parallel to that proposed for Ontario.
In July 1959, the Borden Commission published 
its Second Report, which dealt entirely with the prob-
lems of the Canadian oil industry. In essence, the 
Commission followed the suggestions of the major oil 
companies, at least as a near-term strategy. It recom-
mended the oil industry take “vigorous and imagin-
ative action … to enlarge its markets in the United 
States” and “displace, with products refined from 
Canadian crude, … products now moving into the 
Ontario market from the Montreal refinery area.” A 
Montreal pipeline was to be held in abeyance, pending 
the opportunity given “to the oil industry to demon-
strate it can find markets elsewhere in Canada and the 
United States.” But the Commission recommended 
that import licensing be imposed if markets for 
Canadian oil did not expand (Borden, 1959, pp. 6–32, 
33). In effect, then, the Commission told the integrated 
majors with refineries in Montreal to expand markets 
for Canadian oil in Ontario and to increase exports of 
Canadian oil to the United States or face displacement 
of foreign oil in the Montreal market by Canadian 
crude oil.
2. The National Oil Policy (NOP)
In 1961 the government adopted the recommendations 
of the Second Report of the Borden Commission with 
little alteration. The measures selected to secure desig-
nated markets for Canadian oil became known col-
lectively as the National Oil Policy (NOP). Target levels 
of production were set at 640,000 barrels per day in 
1961 rising to 800,000 barrels per day by 1963. The 
latter figure was expected to approximate levels that 
would have been achieved with a Montreal pipeline. 
A production goal of 850,000 barrels per day was set 
for 1964, but no targets were specified thereafter. The 
targets were to be reached by substituting Canadian 
crude oil for both foreign crude oil refined in Ontario 
and imports of oil products from Quebec or offshore 
to Ontario, and by additional exports to markets 
served by established pipelines. The National Energy 
Board (NEB) was to exercise surveillance over progress 
of the program. Subsequently, the United States indi-
cated the acceptability of the general levels of exports 
contemplated under the NOP. In this way the policy 
was ‘continental’ rather than nationalistic. It relied 
on a voluntary (covert) mechanism, but regulation 
loomed if the voluntary program was not effective.
U.S. acceptance of the export provisions of the 
NOP were important because that country was also 
adopting measures to protect output of the domestic 
oil industry in the face of increasing international 
competition (falling world oil prices). In March 
1959, the United States had adopted an oil import 
quota program that limited the volumes of foreign 
oil allowed into the country. (See, for example, U.S. 
Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, 1970; 
Adelman, 1964; Shaffer, 1968; Watkins, 1987a; Bradley 
and Watkins, 1982.) Initially, Canadian oil was treated 
like any other oil import, but on April 30, 1959, 
Canadian and Mexican oil, shipped overland to the 
United States, were exempt from mandatory quotas, 
though their utilization did involve a slight penalty on 
the U.S. refinery purchasing Canadian crude oil. From 
1959 through 1972, increased volumes of Canadian 
exports to the United States were accepted by the U.S. 
government, but the U.S. market was never completely 
and unrestrictedly open to Canadian oil; a number of 
formal and informal controls were imposed.
The NOP essentially divided the Canadian market 
into two parts, along the Ottawa River Valley (ORV). 
Markets to the west were to utilize Canadian oil only. 
Markets east of the ORV (the Maritimes, Quebec, and 
several eastern Ontario counties) would continue to 
utilize imported oil, attainable at prices below those 
prevailing in the United States and in Canada west 
of the ORV.
3. Alberta Crude Oil Prices under the NOP
As Table 6.2 shows, Alberta oil prices rose by 10 cents 
per barrel in 1961, and again in 1962 and were then 
fixed (at $2.62/b for Redwater crude oil) until late 
1970. Why were crude oil prices so rigid?
Given the United States Oil Import Quota 
Program and the way in which it dealt with Canadian 
oil, the price of Alberta oil would, of necessity, be 
located between an upper limit set by the United 
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States domestic price and a lower limit set by the 
landed price of Middle East or African crude oil 
in the United States. During this period, crude oil 
import prices were falling, while United States prices 
rose markedly in the latter half of the decade. It is 
somewhat difficult to determine U.S. oil import prices 
precisely, since international sales generally took place 
at a discount to posted prices and transport rates 
are variable over time and between different buyers. 
However, by way of illustration, Newton (1969) esti-
mated the price of Saudi Arabia 34° API crude oil, 
delivered to the north east coast of the United States, 
at US$3.07/b in 1956, $2.48 in 1959, $2.08 in 1963, and 
$1.78 in 1968. (At the fixed exchange rate of the 1960s 
of US$0.925 per Canadian dollar, the latter two prices 
would be CDN$2.25 in 1963 and CDN$1.92 in 1968.)
The posted price of U.S. mid-continent 36° API 
crude oil was US$2.97/b from 1959 through 1963, fell 
slightly (US$2.92/b in 1965), then rose up to US$3.23/b 
by 1969 (Bradley and Watkins, 1982, p. 117). It will be 
noted that the gap between U.S. and import crude oil 
prices widened considerably over the decade, so that 
the effective protection to the U.S. domestic crude 
oil industry due to the oil import quota program 
was around $1.50/b (Adelman, 1964, 1972) by the end 
of the 1960s. (At an exchange rate of US$0.925 per 
Canadian dollar, the per barrel mid-continent crude 
oil price would be CDN$3.21 in 1963 and CDN$3.49 
in 1969.)
It can be seen that a Canadian price of $2.62/barrel 
lies between the upper limit of U.S. domestic prices 
and the lower limit of U.S. offshore oil import costs. 
Precise comparisons would involve the inclusion of 
actual or hypothetical transportation costs to a water-
shed market such as Chicago for all three types of 
crude oil, as well as the requisite quality adjustments. 
In any event, in the 1960s there was, it would appear, 
scope for either upward or downward movements in 
Canadian crude oil prices. Neither occurred. Why?
Consider first possible upward movements. One 
consideration was the exchange rate. As previously 
noted, the Canadian dollar was pegged at 92.5 cents 
United States during the 1960s, so adjustments to 
Canadian prices were not required for this reason. 
With United States prices creeping up, and with 
Canadian pipeline tariffs falling, there would seem 
to have been room for a modest upward movement 
in Canadian crude oil prices in the United States 
without a marked impact on market penetration. 
(The Interprovincial Pipe Line tariff from Edmonton 
to Superior, Wisconsin, fell from $0.465 per barrel 
in 1954 to $0.363 in 1964 (Lawrey and Watkins, 1982, 
p. C-6).) A comprehensive time series on delivered 
costs of oil in U.S. markets is not available, but data for 
the Detroit area, for example, show a trend of wid-
ening differentials in delivered prices of Alberta and 
United States crude oils in U.S. markets in the 1960s, 
from 20 cents per barrel in 1961 to 62 cents per barrel 
in 1969 (Bradley and Watkins, 1982, p. 128). At the 
same time, the attraction of Canadian oil to U.S. refin-
eries under the Oil Import Quota Program decreased 
somewhat, implying a rising penalty to the use of 
Canadian oil instead of domestic U.S. oil. (For reasons 
discussed in Chapter Nine, the use of oil imported 
from Canada reduced U.S. refiners’ claims on cheap 
foreign oil; the lower the foreign oil price, the greater 
the penalty for buying Canadian instead of domestic 
U.S. oil.)
The rising penalty may help explain the reluc-
tance of the price-leader (Imperial Oil) to offer higher 
posted prices for Canadian oil. But a more compelling 
explanation may lie in the increased political tensions 
that higher prices would probably have created. In 
particular, higher Alberta oil prices would have made 
even larger the growing disparity in prices in Canada 
east and west of the Ottawa River Valley, as eastern 
consumers used ever cheaper international oil. By 
holding the Alberta crude oil price fixed, instead of 
increasing it, Canadian consumers west of the ORV 
would be more accepting of the market division 
imposed by the NOP.
What about lower prices for Canadian crude oil? 
Certainly this would have reduced pricing tension 
between the unprotected and protected parts of the 
Canadian market. But it would have increased the 
attractiveness of Canadian oil in the U.S. market. The 
excess demand for Canadian oil which already existed 
was only held in check by intergovernmental agree-
ments. Increasing the attraction of Canadian oil would 
have been provocative, leading in all likelihood to 
controls of a more formal nature, which in turn would 
have made the special treatment given to Canadian 
oil under the U.S. Oil Import Quota Program more 
obvious. In other words, a lower price for Canadian oil 
would have entailed the risk of further U.S. regulation 
of export volumes.
These conflicting factors within the framework 
of government policy appear sufficient to explain 
why inertia in Canadian oil prices made sense during 
the 1960s: Imperial Oil’s adherence, as price-leader, 
to $2.62 per barrel at Edmonton may have seemed 
unrealistic, but it was also astute. Keeping Canadian 
crude oil prices where they were caused fewer prob-
lems than varying them up or down.
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However, when international oil prices began to 
increase in 1971 under the stimulus of the Tehran-
Tripoli agreements between OPEC members and 
the international oil companies, these restraints on 
Canadian oil prices were loosened. The Alberta price 
began to rise. But, by this time, the revolution in the 
world oil market was ringing the death knell for both 
the NOP and the U.S. Oil Import Quota Program.
4. Alberta Oil Output under the NOP
In the 1960s, Alberta’s output was conditioned in large 
measure by government regulatory programs – the 
NOP, the U.S. Import Quota Program, various agree-
ments between the U.S. and Canadian governments 
and Alberta market-demand prorationing. The NOP 
reserved markets west of the ORV exclusively for 
Canadian produced crude oil. So long as the price of 
oil remained fixed, demand would respond primarily 
to economic growth in this region. Canadian oil was 
priced attractively for U.S. refiners, but expanded 
sales into the United States were limited by U.S. 
unwillingness to increase imports from Canada too 
far (thereby offending domestic U.S. producers and 
other oil exporters such as Venezuela). A 1967 secret 
agreement between the two countries limited imports 
into the Chicago area when the Interprovincial Pipe 
Line facilities reached that market, and in March 1970 
the United States imposed a ceiling on imports from 
Canada. Thus there were sharply increased exports of 
Canadian oil to the United States in the 1960s, stimu-
lated by the output targets of the NOP, and the attract-
ive pricing of Canadian oil, but the exports never 
became as large as they might have.
In small part, the demand for Canadian-produced 
oil was met from provinces other than Alberta 
(mainly Saskatchewan, especially for heavier crude 
oil). However, the large residual came from Alberta, as 
determined by the market-demand prorationing regu-
lations. Prorationing kept over 50 per cent of Alberta’s 
crude oil productive capacity inactive in every year 
from 1960 through 1969 and prevented the downward 
pressure on prices that the excess capacity might have 
been expected to generate. Of course, a large price 
fall would have been necessary to stimulate much of 
an increase in sales since: (i) the elasticity of demand 
for crude oil in established Canadian markets west 
of the ORV, especially in the short term, is relatively 
low; (ii) the Quebec market could only have been 
attracted with a major price decline, both to cover 
the incremental transportation cost beyond Toronto, 
and to meet the lower delivered price of Venezuelan 
and Middle Eastern crude oil; and (iii) the U.S. 
government, under pressure from U.S. producers, and 
competitive oil-producing areas such as Venezuela, 
simply would not have tolerated large incremental 
sales of Alberta oil.
In summary: after the 1950s, the pricing and pro-
duction of Alberta oil came under increasing regula-
tory control, though largely of an indirect or voluntary 
nature (hence the use of the term “covert controls”). 
The 1950s had been influenced by the extension of 
Alberta’s market into central Canadian markets, with 
prices adjusted so as to make the oil competitive. 
The period of the NOP from 1960 through the early 
1970s saw regulations by Ottawa to define a protected 
Canadian market, and a restricted market extension 
into the United States under the watchful eye of the 
Washington regulators of the U.S. oil import quota 
program. The levels of prices possible were limited by 
these regulatory programs, and even more so by the 
political realities of the situation. Alberta’s market- 
demand prorationing regulations were the mechanism 
that ensured that expanded output from Alberta did 
not upset the equilibrium that resulted.
D.	Overt	Controls:	1973–85
North American oil policy in the 1960s was protec-
tionist: both Canada and the United States created a 
sheltered market for domestic crude oil producers, 
at prices higher than international levels. In the early 
1970s, changing internal and external circumstances 
overtook these regulations.
In the United States, it became increasingly clear 
that reserve additions were insufficient to support the 
output levels that the U.S. Oil Import Quota Program 
was designed to allow. Initially ad hoc modifications 
were made to the program, and then, in April 1973, the 
United States abandoned it entirely. External changes 
had improved the political acceptability of this to 
domestic oil-producing interests, since the price 
of international oil had increased markedly in the 
wake of the Tehran-Tripoli Agreements of early 1971. 
In fact, as reviewed in Chapter Three, by mid-1973, 
international oil prices were beginning to lead U.S. 
prices upwards. Then, in the fourth quarter of 1973, 
international oil prices quadrupled, and U.S. author-
ities began to ponder the effects of domestic oil prices 
following international prices.
Canada’s National Oil Policy cracked under these 
pressures. Initially, the changes were favourable to 
the domestic crude oil industry. Increasing demand 
for imported oil in the United States meant rising 
Canadian shipments. Table 6.1 shows sales of Alberta 
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oil in Canada rising from about 47,000 m3/d in 1960 
to 81,300 in 1972 (a gain of 73%), while exports to the 
United States rose from 11,200 to 132,200 m3/d (up 
1,078%); by 1972 exports accounted for 62 per cent of 
Alberta’s crude oil output. From 1967 to 1973, sales in 
U.S. markets east of Alberta climbed by over 400 per 
cent. As the United States opened to more Canadian 
oil, and as international prices began to rise, the 
U.S. market began to look like the ‘watershed’ that 
would determine Canadian prices. The link would be 
those marginal oil supplies to the United States with 
which Canadian oil was competing. The Canadian 
price-leader (Imperial Oil) increased the posted price 
for Redwater oil by 30 cents per barrel, to $2.92, in 
December 1970. Several other increases followed, up 
to $3.48/b by May 1973, when Canadian oil was priced 
competitively with U.S. domestic oil supplies delivered 
to Chicago.
The sharp rise in Alberta oil production in the late 
1960s and early 1970s came just as the Alberta crude 
oil finding rate fell off as the last major oil play (the 
Keg River play in northwestern Alberta) began to die 
down. The ratio of conventional crude oil reserves 
to annual production (R/P ratio) fell from about 30 
in 1966 to about 14 by 1973. Meanwhile the capacity 
utilization rate rose from about 50 per cent in the late 
1960s to 85 per cent by 1973.
Changes this rapid are often perceived as revolu-
tionary, and it is often felt that revolutionary change 
calls for revolutionary action. Ottawa may not have 
verbalized the situation in exactly this way, but in 1973 
the NOP was completely overturned: the month of 
May saw export limits placed on crude oil shipments; 
September saw the imposition of a price freeze on 
crude oil, an export tax on oil, and announcement that 
Montreal would be connected to the Interprovincial 
Pipe Line; and in December Prime Minister Trudeau 
formally acknowledged the death of the NOP and 
the advent of an oil policy based on direct control of 
pricing and exports.
1. Price Controls
Table 6.2 outlines the changes in regulated oil prices 
over the period from the initial price freeze of 
September 1973 ($3.88/b) through to deregulation in 
1985 ($29.50/b in July 1983 as the last regulated price, 
in this case for what is called “old oil”). These prices 
are for Alberta-produced crude oil. It is noteworthy 
that oil imports were also price regulated, in the sense 
that consumers of imported oil in eastern Canada paid 
a price equivalent to the price for Canadian-produced 
oil (delivered to Central Canadian markets), with the 
Canadian government paying the differential up to the 
import price on foreign-oil deliveries. Price controls 
on Canadian-produced crude oil led the government 
into an export tax so that U.S. consumers would not 
be subsidized by the Canadian program. The export 
tax would raise the price of Canadian oil to the level 
of the U.S. marginal supply source, i.e., imports from 
OPEC.
Chapter Nine provides detailed discussion of these 
oil control programs. At this point, it might simply 
be said that the policies tread a fine political line (for 
an energy abundant, developed nation) between the 
interests of energy consumers in lower prices and 
the interests of energy producers (and the provincial 
governments which owned oil and gas Crown land) 
in higher prices. International crude oil prices (for 
Saudi Arabia 34° crude oil in the Persian Gulf) rose 
from under $3.00/b in 1972 to $10.50 in 1974 to $36.00 
by 1981; the market value of crude oil throughout 
the world followed right along. Federal government 
authorities in Ottawa argued that such rapid rises 
in oil prices might significantly disrupt Canadian 
macroeconomic performance, that they had startling 
implications for the federal-provincial Equalization 
Program, and that they were not based directly on 
either international or Canadian costs of supplying 
crude oil. Furthermore, there was no guarantee that 
OPEC control would be successful in maintaining 
price increases. Thus, for a variety of reasons, it was 
argued that it was reasonable for Canada to allow only 
moderate increases in the price of oil, so that consum-
ers and the economy could adjust gradually. Needless 
to say, most oil-producing interests and many others 
(including a large number of economists) were not 
fully persuaded.
The precise regulatory mechanism controlling oil 
prices varied over the 1973–85 period. The initial price 
freeze was a unilateral act by Ottawa, tied both to the 
price explosion in oil markets and to the government’s 
fall 1973 anti-inflation package. By 1975 Ottawa had 
passed legislation giving it the legal authority to set 
the price of any oil (or natural gas) moving interprov-
incially or leaving the country. However, in practice, 
beginning in 1974, oil prices were set by joint agree-
ment among the federal and provincial governments, 
sometimes at ministerial conferences involving all the 
provinces and, on occasion, by negotiation between 
Ottawa and Alberta (sometimes with other oil- 
producing provinces represented).
The federal government’s 1976 energy study, 
called An Energy Strategy for Canada, announced 
that Canadian oil prices would gradually be increased 
to international levels, but the doubling of world oil 
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prices that began in 1978 left the regulated Canadian 
oil price further and further behind. In this environ-
ment, Ottawa and Alberta had great difficulty in 
reaching a new agreement on prices. This difficulty 
was complicated by the defeat of the Progressive 
Conservative minority government in the House 
of Commons in December 1979 and election of a 
majority Liberal government (which was bound by a 
campaign promise to maintain a “made-in-Canada” 
oil price). In August 1980, Alberta unilaterally raised 
the crude oil price by $2.00/b. The newly elected fed-
eral government responded with a budget in October 
1980 that consisted in large part of a National Energy 
Program (NEP). Among its many provisions were 
schedules of anticipated crude oil prices, including 
proposed regulated prices for Canadian oil over the 
coming years. Alberta vigorously objected to such 
unilateral federal price controls and introduced output 
cutbacks in protest. Accommodation ensued, with a 
September 1, 1981 Memorandum of Agreement between 
Ottawa and Alberta (and similar agreements between 
Ottawa and each of B.C. and Saskatchewan). From 
this date, until deregulation in 1985, Canadian oil 
prices were once again set by joint intergovernmental 
agreement. The NEP itself is defined by a total of eight 
sets of documents over the five years from the initial 
October 1980 announcement.
The complexity of the institutional mechanisms 
for establishing controlled Canadian oil prices pales 
beside the intricacies of the prices themselves. For 
Alberta crude oil, the key regulations applied to well-
head prices, but not all oil was treated in the same way. 
Once oil was produced, export prices were subject 
to further regulation via the export tax, and various 
government levies entered into Canadian consumer 
prices. Moreover, since the price controls applied to 
reference crude oil (“Alberta light” – of average grade 
delivered to the Edmonton terminals of the main 
trunk pipelines), the issue of the quality differentials 
for different grades of crude oil was also relevant. 
Table 6.2 provides details of the changes in wellhead 
prices for Alberta crude oil. (We discuss the major 
price changes; the minor changes in the table repre-
sent adjustments due to changes in location/quality 
differentials or the exchange rate.)
a. Alberta Producer (Wellhead) Prices
Throughout the controlled-price period, there was 
continual tension between the wish to hold prices 
below world levels in order to benefit oil-consuming 
interests and the obvious disincentive effects on pro-
duction of lower prices. At first glance, it may seem 
reasonable to suggest that domestic prices for an 
abundant (and critically important) natural resource 
should reflect domestic production costs. In practice, 
for a heterogeneous natural resource such as crude oil, 
where different natural deposits have quite different 
costs, the notion of the domestic production cost is 
hopelessly ambiguous. It can be noted that certain 
reserves were voluntarily brought into production at 
historic (e.g., pre-1973) prices, but production decline 
means that the volumes of oil forthcoming from 
these reserves will eventually begin to fall. Output 
therefore becomes increasingly dependent upon new 
reserve additions, and the incentive to undertake such 
additions is positively tied to the level of the oil price. 
Initial recognition of this came with respect to tar 
sands oil, which was obviously high cost, and was, in 
the late 1970s, allowed international prices.
Incentive pricing for conventional crude oil was 
introduced in October 1980 with the NEP and became 
increasingly complex. The October 1980 regulations 
defined a new category of conventional oil output 
labelled “tertiary” oil, which consisted of oil from 
new (and officially recognized) reserves additions and 
enhanced recovery techniques other than waterflood-
ing. Tertiary oil would command a price of $30/b (as 
compared to the $16.75 price for other conventional 
oil, and the world price of about $38.00/b, netted back 
to Edmonton). At Alberta’s insistence, the principle 
of higher prices for incremental supplies was broad-
ened in the September 1981 Memorandum, to create a 
price category called NORP (“new oil reference price”) 
which would apply to “new” oil from pools discovered 
after 1980, as well as oil from all new enhanced recov-
ery projects other than waterfloods, and from the 
Cold Lake heavy oil deposits. (It went also to oil from 
the frontier “Canada Lands” and synthetic crude oil, 
including that from “experimental” projects.) Effective 
July 1, 1982, after the June 1982 NEP Update, the NORP 
was applied to all tertiary and experimental oil, and 
to output from wells that had been shut down for at 
least three years (so long as the provincial government 
also levied lower “new” oil royalties on these wells). In 
addition, a SOOP (supplemental old oil price) category 
was created, above the “old” oil price but below NORP 
for oil discovered between April 1974 and December 
1980. Subsequently, a June 1983 amendment to the 
NEP moved SOOP up to NORP and added oil from 
infill wells in all pools. Watkins (1989) notes that 
by the last year of the NEP there were 10 classes of 
Alberta oil. Overall, about 60 per cent of Alberta’s oil 
production was “old” oil and 40 per cent NORP oil of 
one class or another.
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The categorization process was obviously fluid 
and increasingly complex. The associated controlled 
prices were also complicated. This arose in part from 
the inherent contradictions of a “made-in-Canada” 
oil price. The phrase suggests a price reflective of 
Canadian demand and supply conditions, but, from 
the very beginning of the control period, the level of 
price was always established with reference to prevail-
ing world prices. Thus, as noted above, the 1976 fed-
eral government plan, An Energy Strategy for Canada, 
envisioned a gradual adjustment of Canadian prices to 
world prices. The NEP exhibited an even more marked 
interdependence. The October 1980 budget included 
a projection of world oil prices through the future 
and set out a schedule of regulated Canadian prices 
that were lower than, but reflective of, the anticipated 
trend in international prices. Moreover, the authors of 
the NEP were well aware that no one could accurately 
forecast future world oil prices; in fact, the October 
1980 projections were soon revealed as far too high. 
As a result, throughout the NEP period, controlled 
prices were often set as the lower of: (i) some specified 
price (presumably tied to forecast world oil prices) or 
(ii) some percentage of the actual world oil price.
Table 6.3 provides further detail on the various 
regulated prices. (It shows the price provisions at year 
end, so not all price changes are noted.) The prices are 
for the reference crude oil of the various agreements, 
which was 38° crude oil (instead of the 36° Redwater 
oil used in Table 6.2). The symbol n/a (not applicable) 
Table 6.3: Crude Oil Prices under Overt Controls, 1973–85 (Canadian $/b, at year end)
 World Oil (Wp) Old Oil New Oil (NORP)
 Actual Oct. 1980 Sept. 1981 Conventional Oct. 1980 Sept. 1981 Oct. 1980 Sept. 1981 June 1982 
  Forecast Forecast Oil 1973–80 NEP Schedule 75%Wp Tertiary Schedule
1973 5.28 n/a n/a 3.00* n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a
1974 12.40 n/a n/a 6.58* n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a
1975 13.78 n/a n/a 8.08* n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a
1976 13.68 n/a n/a 9.18* n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a
1977 16.14 n/a n/a 10.95* n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a
1978 18.25 n/a n/a 12.91* n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a
1979 30.42 n/a n/a 13.93* n/a  n/a  n/a n/a n/a
1980 40.68 38.00 n/a n/a  16.75* n/a n/a n/a n/a
1981 40.38 41.85 41.67 n/a (18.75)  21.25* 30.29  30.00*  n/a
1982 40.63 45.80 47.69 n/a (20.75) 25.75* 30.47 (33.05) (49.22)
1983 37.39 49.85 56.25 n/a (22.75 ) (33.75) 28.04 (36.15) (57.06)
1984 39.71 54.10 62.31 n/a (27.25) (41.75) 29.78  (39.35) (63.48)
1985 n/a  58.55 69.10 n/a (31.75 ) (49.75)  (42.70)  (70.23)
Notes: n/a = not applicable.
Old oil shows 35º Redwater oil from 1973–79, and the 38º reference crude in the various agreements after 1979.
The October 1980 world oil price forecast is the projected synthetic crude price in the NEP, which was to be the lesser of the international price or the 1980 value of 
$38.00, increased by the Canadian Consumer Price Index. It therefore is a lower limit on the international oil price projections of the October 1980 NEP. (By 1989, the 
value had risen to $79.65/bbl.)
Tertiary oil entered the NORP category in the September 1981 Memorandum of Agreement. SOOP oil is not shown; it originated in the June 1982 Update and was to be 
priced at 75% of the world level, but in June 1983 was incorporated in oil subject to NORP.
Values with * are the actual prices received on Alberta oil, except that old oil exceeded the limit of 75% of the world price by July 1983 so received $29.75/bbl from that 
date	up	to	June	1985.	Values	in	parenthesis	were	prices	specified	in	an	agreement	but	which	were	superceded	by	another	provision	or	agreement.
Only end-of-year values are shown, although scheduled prices under the various NEP agreements generally rose each six months.
The	actual	world	oil	price	is	based	largely	on	the	Official	Government	Selling	Price	for	34º	Saudi	Arabian	Crude,	f.o.b.	Ras	Tanura,	shown	in	Chapter	3,	and	as	reported	in	
the Petroleum Economist. The SA price in U.S. dollars has been increased by $2.05/bbl to derive a Canadian oil price (for par crude) in U.S. dollars in Alberta; this takes 
the average excess of the WTI price over the SA price from 1987 to 1991 ($3.13/bbl as reported in the OPEC, 1991 Annual Statistical Bulletin), less the average excess of 
the WTI price over the Alberta par price in 1991 and 1992 ($1.08/bbl as reported in the Energy, Mines and Resources, The Canadian Oil Market). The resultant price for 
Alberta oil in U.S. dollars per barrel was then translated into Canadian dollars using the end-of-year exchange rate reported in IMF, International Financial Statistics.
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indicates that the particular category did not apply at 
that date (e.g., NEP price forecasts before 1981; NORP 
oil before 1981). A price in parenthesis is a controlled 
price under one regulation, which was superseded 
by another regulation. Where several prices might 
apply in different years, the actual regulated price 
is indicated by an asterisk (*). As can be seen, the 
failure of world oil prices to match the increases in 
the early NEP forecasts meant that by 1983 wellhead 
prices were established by world oil prices, rather than 
specified levels of controlled prices. For example, a 
decline in world prices in 1983 meant that the price 
level fixed under NORP now exceeded the world 
price, so the new oil price was the world price. Rather 
than reducing the old oil price in line with the fall in 
world prices, old oil was simply held at $29.75/b from 
July 1982 on.
The shift to actual world oil prices as the basis for 
calculating Canadian oil prices raised a practical prob-
lem of administration – what was the relevant world 
oil price? Under the NEP, world prices were calcu-
lated on the basis of the average price of imported 
oil landed in Montreal in the latest three months for 
which data were available. This meant that Canadian 
prices lagged about one quarter (three months) 
behind world prices (Helliwell et al., 1989, p. 46). From 
the start of 1984, world price estimates were based on 
current official government selling price (OGSP) for 
international crude oil, therefore eliminating the prob-
lem of the lag, but failing to allow for the increasing 
prevalence of spot sales at discounts from OGSP. As 
a result, the NORP was sometimes in excess of inter-
national values.
b. Alberta Producer Prices: Price Differentials
The issue of quality differentials became increasingly 
problematic as North America became more fully 
integrated with the international oil market. Until 
1981 differentials for light and medium crude oil con-
tinued to be established on the same basis as had been 
introduced by Imperial Oil in 1947. The September 
1981 Memorandum set up wider differentials for NORP 
oil and allowed the established differentials on old oil 
to increase as the old oil price rose (Helliwell et al., 
1989, pp. 46–47). Schedule A of the Memorandum 
of Agreement established the NORP differentials at 
$0.22/b per API degree and $0.165/b per 0.1 per cent 
sulphur; old oil differentials were eventually to reach 
$0.15 per API degree and $0.101 per 0.1 per cent 
sulphur. The differentials were also supposed to be 
in line with those in the international market. This 
would prove to be a difficult task in tracking. OPEC 
members would be acutely aware of the appropriate 
differential so as to ensure they met output quotas 
(after 1982), and might, further, utilize price differen-
tials to test out possible gains from cheating on the 
group agreement.
Effective at the start of 1984, each quality of 
crude oil in the NORP category was to be priced on 
the basis of the cost of equivalent quality crude oil 
delivered to Montreal (with the field to Montreal 
transportation costs then netted out). However, so 
long as OGSP rather than spot prices were used, and 
for grades of crude oil that were not actually shipped 
to Montreal, it was very difficult to ensure that the 
NORP was accurate. Thus the differential problem also 
contributed to NORP values in excess of international 
price levels as were observed in 1983 and 1984. As 
Watkins (1989, p. 117) notes, these pricing problems, 
plus difference in import compensation for crude oil 
and product imports, led some Montreal refiners to 
begin importing oil instead of purchasing Western 
Canadian oil.
c. Purchase Price for Alberta Oil: Domestic Sales
One might assume that refiners would buy oil from 
Alberta producers at the regulated prices. However, 
field price regulation covered only a part of the federal 
government’s policy, and other aspects of the policy 
impacted on the refiners’ purchase price. In essence, 
the government argued that refiners should pay an 
average or “blended” price for oil that covered the 
costs of all the various types of oil utilized in Canada, 
though the interpretation given to this requirement 
varied somewhat over the 1973–85 period. The initial 
move in this direction came in 1976, when a charge 
was imposed on all oil refined in Canada to provide 
the extra payment to Syncrude’s synthetic tar sands 
oil, which received the world price. After 1980, there 
was an additional charge assessed on the refiners’ 
cost of oil, the Canadian Ownership Special Charge 
designed to help cover the government’s costs of 
establishing and expanding Petro-Canada. Prior to 
the NEP, the cost of subsidizing imported crude oil 
had been viewed as being offset to a significant extent 
by the export tax on oil sold to the United States. As 
crude oil exports fell sharply in the later 1970s, even 
with reduced imports due to the Montreal pipeline 
extension, the net cost to Ottawa grew, and pres-
sures to include imports in a blended price became 
very strong.
The blended concept idea was embedded in the 
October 1980 NEP, which had refiners paying an 
amount equal to the average cost of oil to Canadian 
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refineries, essentially the costs of old oil, imported oil 
at world prices, synthetic crude oil, tertiary crude oil, 
and after 1981 NORP oil, and after 1982 SOOP oil.
d. Purchase Price for Alberta Oil: Export Sales
After September 1973, foreign refiners purchasing 
Alberta oil were assessed an export tax designed to 
raise the cost of Canadian oil to that of other foreign 
suppliers to the U.S. market. Initially, the Chicago 
market was used as a basis for comparison, and all 
Canadian exports were assessed the same tax, one 
presumably based on the values of blended light oil in 
the Chicago market. The export tax in the 1970s rose 
or fell in line with changes in world oil prices and the 
regulated Canadian price, based largely on the analysis 
and recommendations of the National Energy Board 
(NEB). The tax began at $0.40/b in September 1973, 
and rose to $6.40/b by February 1974. By late 1980, as 
the NEP was introduced, the export tax hit $26.00/b, 
for light crude oil. The initial export tax, in 1973, had 
applied at the same level to all crude oil, but produ-
cers of heavy oil were soon complaining that the tax 
discriminated against their less-valued product and 
was harming sales to U.S. refiners. In November 1974, 
the NEB allowed a special, lower tax on heavy oil and 
continued as time progressed to set differential taxes 
for different grades of crude oil (Helliwell et al., 1989, 
p. 37). Here, as elsewhere in the regulated oil environ-
ment, it was apparent that more and more detailed 
fine-tuning of regulations was necessary if undesirable 
distortions of production and consumption were to 
be avoided. Table 6.4 includes more detail on the NEP 
crude oil export taxes.
Table 6.4 shows the level of the crude oil export 
tax at year’s end over this period. (The 1985 value is 
for June, the last month in which an export tax was 
assessed.) Taxes are shown for two grades of oil: 
(i) light and medium blend (and condensate); and 
(ii) Lloydminster blend heavy crude oil. By June 1985, 
the NEB distinguished 13 different grades of oil, each 
with a different level of export tax subject to review 
each month. It can be seen that while the general 
trends in the tax for heavy and light oil are similar, 
there is no consistent relationship between the two. 
The taxes reflect the NEB’s efforts to follow changing 
world crude oil quality differentials, as well as demand 
Table 6.4: Canadian Crude Oil Exports and Export Taxes, 1973–85
 (Net) Exports (103 m3/d) Year-end Export Tax ($/m3)
 Light and Mediuma Heavy Total Crude Oil Exchanges Light and Medium Blend Heavyb
1973c n/a n/a 149.4 n/a   2.52 2.52
1974 n/a n/a 144.8 n/a 32.72 25.80
1975 n/a n/a 112.4 n/a 28.32 23.28
1976 n/a n/a 73.9 2.7 23.60 18.25
1977 34.6 8.6 43.2 8.7 32.41 21.71
1978 16.1 10.6 27.7 14.8 33.98 23.60
1979 6.9 18.1 25.0 19.7 119.65 107.00
1980 0 14.8 14.8 14.2 180.80 102.90
1981 0.8 15.0 15.8 10.8 165.05 108.70
1982 0.3 24.5 24.8 10.0 97.20 44.40
1983 11.0 31.8 42.8 4.9 43.75 16.25
1984 14.3 36.0 50.3 7.7 32.55 34.50
1985 33.4 41.9 75.3 4.0 36.30d 31.35d
Notes:
n/a:	 figures	not	available.
a Includes condensate and synthetic crude.
b Lloydminster blend; other grades of heavy oil faced other export taxes.
c 1973 exports are for March to December.
d May and June 1985.
Source: National Energy Board, Annual Reports; National Energy Program; NEP Update.
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conditions for Canadian heavy oil in the special-
ized mid-continent U.S. refineries that bought such 
crude oil.
2. Production Under Overt Controls
The 1973 changes to Canadian oil policy essentially 
reversed the National Oil Policy of 1961. Instead 
of reserving the Montreal market for oil imports, 
the Interprovincial Pipe Line would be extended 
from Toronto to Montreal; rather than encouraging 
increased exports, the volume of exports would be 
limited through a licensing scheme to ensure they 
were not ‘excessive.’
Table 6.1 shows the impact of these changes as 
exports fell off drastically (from about 160,000 m3/d 
in 1973 to 31,000 m3/d by 1978, down to the 1962 
level). As the Montreal extension came on stream in 
1976, Canadian use of Alberta oil rose, from 115,600 
m3/d in 1975 to 187,600 m3/d by 1980. Other factors 
influenced oil sales as well. For example, exports 
to the U.S. west coast fell sharply in the mid-1970s, 
reflecting the contribution of North Slope Alaskan oil 
to the U.S. market – in the early 1980s U.S. authorities 
specified that Alaskan oil could not be sold outside 
the United States. Sales in domestic markets, and oil 
output, declined in response to declining oil con-
sumption as a result of the sharply increased price of 
oil. (See Helliwell et al., 1989; Berndt and Greenberg, 
1989.) In 1980 Ottawa imposed formal procedures for 
light and medium crude oil to ensure that available 
supplies were allocated ‘fairly’ to refiners in Montreal 
and Ontario; allocations were based largely on his-
toric refinery runs (Ontario) and available capacity 
(Montreal).
Export controls, as introduced in March 1973, con-
sisted of a licensing system administered by the NEB. 
Such licensing had been permissible under law ever 
since the act creating the NEB and had been applied 
to natural gas since the early 1960s (as Chapter Twelve 
details). Concern about oil exports was initially stimu-
lated by complaints about crude oil availability by 
some Canadian refiners and deepened with the Arab 
oil embargo and output cutbacks of late 1973, during 
the Arab-Israeli war (Helliwell et al., 1989, pp. 39–40). 
The NEB was willing to issue export licences for 
‘surplus’ crude oil; it argued that, especially with the 
Montreal pipeline extension, no obvious surplus 
existed so that exports should be eliminated. For light 
and medium oil, this is basically what happened in the 
later 1970s. However, heavy crude oil was not accept-
able to most refineries unless it is passed through a 
special upgrader to be transformed into lighter oil. 
The mid-1970s saw significant excess production cap-
acity for heavy crude oil, so the NEB was quite willing 
to allow its export.
Table 6.4 shows Canadian exports of crude oil 
from 1973 through 1985, with separate details for heavy 
and light crude oils after 1977. Net light oil exports 
virtually disappeared by 1980, while heavy oil exports 
were allowed to increase from 1977. Saskatchewan was 
a particularly important source for heavy oil. Light 
crude oil exports were allowed again in 1983. The table 
also includes a column for crude oil ‘exchanges’; those 
included agreements in which crude oil (usually of 
light or medium gravity) was exported to the United 
States (generally the mid-continent region), and in 
turn equivalent volumes of U.S. oil were provided to 
eastern or central Canadian areas. Net exports exclude 
such exchanges.
3. Conclusion
Whatever the advantages of a “made-in-Canada” 
price for oil, the administrative complexities in such 
regulation were huge and failed to capture fully all 
the heterogeneities of crude oil markets. Moreover, 
as is discussed in Chapter Nine, the whole idea of 
fixing Canadian prices below world levels was coming 
under concentrated attack as the 1980s progressed. 
Certainly, even for proponents of such regulation, the 
process began to look increasingly trivial as world oil 
prices, instead of rising, become progressively weaker. 
A change in the federal government consolidated the 
forces for change.
E.	Deregulated	Markets:	1985–
On March 29, 1985, the recently elected federal 
Conservative government negotiated the Western 
Accord with the provincial governments of Alberta, 
B.C., and Saskatchewan. The Accord deregulated 
crude oil prices and eliminated a variety of fed-
eral taxes and grants, thereby eliminating the NEP. 
Starting June 1, 1985, Canadian oil prices would be 
free from both overt and covert controls for the first 
time since the 1961 NOP. Procedures to allocate light 
and medium oil supplies to central Canadian refiners 
were also dropped, as were quantity and price restric-
tions on exports of light and medium crude oil with 
shorter than a one-year contract (less than two years 
for heavy oil). The 1989 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
essentially codified much deregulation through formal 
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Canada-U.S. commitments to allow free movement 
of oil between the two countries, without discrimina-
tory trade practices. (Chapter Nine discusses the FTA, 
and its successor, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), in more detail.)
After the long period of government-administered 
pricing, oil companies found the need to market their 
oil a novel and, for some, chastening experience. The 
basic price-setting procedure that was established 
was familiar from the post-Leduc days, with the 
major refiners ‘posting’ the price they would pay at 
Edmonton for any oil offered to them. As the 1990s 
progressed, new market initiatives began to develop, 
such as specialized electronic clearing houses that 
enabled prospective buyers and sellers to establish 
quick contact.
If deregulation were effective and a ‘workably’ 
competitive market established, what kind of pricing 
behaviour might be observed?
First, the price of Alberta crude oil posted at 
Edmonton by refiners would be set within a narrow 
band at any one point in time. A significant spread in 
posted prices for oils of the same quality would sug-
gest price discrimination, behaviour not sustainable in 
a competitive market.
Second, the level of posted prices would be closely 
related to ‘netbacks’ from the main market interfaces 
where Alberta crude oil competes with other supplies, 
namely (in 1985) Montreal and Chicago. Or to put it 
another way, the delivered price (laid-down cost) of 
Alberta oils in market regions where Alberta faces 
competition would correspond closely to the delivered 
prices from other sources. Since international prices 
are denominated in U.S. dollars, the price in Canada 
would also reflect changes in the exchange rate, rising 
as the Canadian dollar depreciates relative to the U.S. 
dollar and falling as the Canadian dollar appreciates.
Third, refiner postings would be sensitive to 
changes in world prices. If world prices were quite 
volatile, correspondingly frequent changes would be 
seen in posted prices.
To what extent do refinery postings in Alberta 
satisfy these tests? We look at the market in the late 
1980s to assess this issue.
August 1989 postings at Edmonton by three major 
refineries – Esso, Shell, and Petro-Canada – were 
$21.61/b, $21.29/b, and $21.29/b, respectively, for 40° 
API gravity crude oil (0.5% sulphur). The spread in 
prices is minimal.
Estimated netbacks in July 1989, for international 
crude oil at Montreal and Chicago are shown in Table 
6.5 (Watkins, 1989, p. 25). The upper panel develops 
the Edmonton netback for North Sea Brent oil deliv-
ered to Montreal; the lower panel develops Edmonton 
netbacks for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil deliv-
ered to Chicago (WTI is the most popular ‘benchmark’ 
crude oil in the United States). The spread in netbacks 
is about $1 per barrel, suggesting that Chicago (the 
nearer market) is a more attractive one for Alberta 
crude oil. More importantly, the actual light crude oil 
price prevailing was CDN$22.98/b, straddling the two 
netbacks. This confirms that Alberta oil was competi-
tively priced with international crude oil.
Finally, over the period July 1988 to June 1989, one 
refiner – Shell – registered eleven changes in postings, 
precisely the kind of volatility expected in light of 
the frequent changes in world oil market conditions. 
Parallel changes were registered by other refiners.
Table 6.5: Alberta Netbacks from Foreign Crudes
Netback for Brent Crude from Montreal,  $/b 
July 20, 1989
Representative Price (spot) Brent 38.0° API 18.25 (US$)
Plus Tanker Charge 0.81 (US$)
Plus Portland-Montreal Pipeline Tariff 0.96 (US$)
(includes terminaling charge)
Laid Down Cost at Montreal 20.02 (US$)
Laid Down Cost at Montreal 23.80 (CDN$)
Less IPL Tariff to Edmonton 1.53 (CDN$)
Netback at Edmonton 22.27 (CDN$)
Quality Adjustment for 40° API 0.30 (CDN$)
Netback for 40° API, equivalent type crude 22.57 (CDN$)
Netback for WTI Crude from Chicago,  $/b 
July 20, 1989
Representative Price (spot) West Texas 20.35 (US$
Intermediate at Cushing, 40° API)
Plus Pipeline Tariff, Cushing to Chicago  0.39 (US$)
Laid Down Cost at Chicago 20.74 (US$)
Less IPL U.S. Tariff  0.46 (US$)
Border Price 20.28 (US$)
Border Price 24.11 (CDN$)
Less IPL Tariff to Edmonton 0.51 (CDN$)
Netback at Edmonton 23.60 (CDN$)
Quality Adjustment for 40° API 0.00
Netback for 40° API, equivalent type crude 23.60 (CDN$)
(Based on Exchange Rate of $0.84 US/$1 Cdn.)
Source: Watkins (1989), p. 25.
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Thus, all three competitive pricing criteria have 
been met: deregulation has been effective. A com-
petitive market exists for the sale and purchase 
of Canadian crude oil, interfacing with the world 
oil market.
Formerly, the supply of Alberta crude oil was 
governed by prorationing. Prorationing reduces 
incentives for direct price competition. It remains 
on Alberta’s legislative books. But, in large measure, 
deregulation induced changes in administration of the 
prorationing scheme that allowed producers to sell 
any shut-in oil on the spot market, although control 
for technical reasons is retained on maximum produc-
tion rates. Before, strict quota control kept the prices 
of oil from a reservoir uniform. And by 1989, mar-
ket-demand prorationing was consigned to history.
Of course, pipeline transportation remains fed-
erally regulated, but common carrier legislation 
provides for open access. However, the pricing mech-
anism has yet fully to intrude on the ‘menu’ of pipe-
line services offered.
Deregulation has also affected the disposition of 
Canadian production. With the removal of federal 
transportation subsidies, Atlantic refineries no longer 
used Canadian oil, and the share of refinery runs held 
by imports in Quebec began to rise, until the Sarnia– 
Montreal link of the Interprovincial Pipe Line was 
closed in 1991, and then reversed in October 1999 to 
allow imports into Ontario. At the same time, the 
share of Canadian output absorbed by more prox-
imate (U.S. Midwest) export markets has tended to 
increase. This more efficient distribution of Canadian 
production is what would be expected if deregulation 
were effective.
The 1986 price collapse, when the spot price of 
Persian Gulf oil fell into single-digit figures, provoked 
proposals for re-regulation of prices (not the least 
from some in private industry), with calls for import 
tariffs, floor prices, income stabilization plans, and 
the like. Admittedly, most proposals stressed that 
assistance would be temporary. However, the federal 
government resisted the temptation to introduce 
price supports and confined itself to some tax relief 
and incentives.
In sum: deregulation has resulted in a more com-
petitive market structure for the oil industry than at 
any time since the Leduc discovery of 1947.
Table 6.1 shows that Alberta conventional oil 
production rose from 1984 to 1988, but then fell, 
largely reflecting production decline in established 
reservoirs along with relatively small reserve addi-
tions. However, oil sands production continued to 
rise, offsetting declining conventional production 
and generating modest total production increases for 
Alberta oil production through the 1990s. Sales in 
Canadian markets east of Ontario fell off through to 
the early 2000s with deregulation and closure of the 
pipeline link to Montreal but have since risen again. 
Exports to the U.S. mid-continent region have risen 
sharply. The increased exports are based largely on 
expanding non-conventional oil production (synthetic 
crude oil and bitumen from the oil sands), as will be 
discussed in Chapter Seven. Closure of the Montreal 
pipeline link makes it clear that the competitive price 
watersheds for Alberta oil now lie in the Chicago and 
Toronto markets. Sales prices internationally, and for 
Canadian crude oil, have become increasingly volatile 
in the short term as a preponderance of sales have 
become tied directly or indirectly to spot markets 
for crude oil. Oil brokerage services have grown in 
importance, providing intermediaries between crude 
oil producers and refiners, and more oil companies 
are developing their own trading division to monitor 
and participate in spot markets and the futures and 
options markets for oil, which expanded rapidly in 
the 1990s.
Expectations of further increases in Alberta 
crude oil production have raised the issue of major 
market expansion for the first time since the 1960s. 
Expansion of existing facilities, into existing mar-
kets, had begun in the 1990s as crude oil output in 
Alberta rose somewhat. However, with larger output 
increases, driven by the oil sands, the most obvious 
routes would be to press further into the U.S. market, 
effectively driving out more offshore imports. As of 
March 2013, TransCanada was still awaiting approval 
of its Keystone XL line which would carry additional 
Alberta bitumen through Cushing, Oklahoma to the 
Texas Gulf. The northern portion of this line was 
denied U.S. regulatory approval in 2012; a modified 
route is now under consideration. TransCanada has 
announced plans to proceed independently with 
the Oklahoma to Texas portion. The possibility of 
increased sales of Alberta oil in central Canada has 
attracted attention, as Enbridge is applying to re- 
reverse the Sarnia–Montreal pipeline so Alberta oil 
can once again access the Quebec market.  Attention 
has also turned to the possibility of significant sales 
in east Asian markets, especially China and Japan. At 
the time of writing in the Spring of 2013, Enbridge 
is pushing forward with plans for a new oil pipeline 
(called the Northern Gateway) from near Edmonton 
to Kitimat on the B.C. coast; a parallel line would 
carry condensate eastward from Kitimat, which could 
be blended with bitumen to allow its movement back 
to Kitimat. In addition, Kinder Morgan has expressed 
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interest in expanding its pipeline from Edmonton to 
Vancouver, which would enable additional exports 
to the U.S. west coast and to Asia. Given the longer 
distance to Asian markets, it is not clear Canadian oil 
could be as competitive with Middle Eastern oil there 
as it is in North America. However, the project spon-
sors seem to feel either that buyers in Asia (most likely 
Chinese) will be willing to pay a premium for Alberta 
oil (especially if it is produced from the oil sands by 
the Chinese companies establishing a presence there) 
or that the international price differentials between 
light and heavy oils will be such as to establish a 
demand for Canadian bitumen in Asia. (The markets 
for Canadian oil and the transmission alternatives 
are discussed in NEB, 2006, chaps. 4 and 5.)  Another 
possibility is that North American crude oil produc-
tion will increase sufficiently to allow exports of oil 
from the Texas Gulf Coast, but that the U.S. govern-
ment will prohibit such exports, restraining prices in 
the United States. In this case, Alberta oil producers 
would find the Asian export market more attractive 
than the United States.
Table 6.2 shows that Canadian oil prices increased 
dramatically after 1999, following international oil 
prices; the rise was somewhat less pronounced than in 
the United States, since the Canadian dollar appreci-
ated significantly beginning in 2003. Canadian prices 
followed world oil prices, up to a peak in mid-2008 
(the maximum monthly price was $138/b in July 
2008 for the Canadian par price at Edmonton), then 
collapsing (to $32/b in December 2008). The Alberta 
crude oil price rose after that, and has fluctuated in 
line with world crude oil prices. 
However, as Figure 6.1 showed, the usual small 
price differential between Alberta and North Sea light 
crudes oil rose dramatically, particularly after 2010, 
and persisted through final editing of this book, in 
spring 2013. This reflected a combination of increased 
oil production in central North America (including in 
Alberta, but also in regions such as Texas and North 
Dakota) and pipeline constraints in moving this oil 
to the most profitable markets. As a result, the crude 
oil market centred on Cushing, Oklahoma exhibited 
a supply excess with downward pressure on the price 
of WTI (West Texas Intermediate) and such linked 
oils as that from Alberta. (Chapter 1 of the ERCB 2012 
Reserves Report, ST-98, offers a discussion of this 
issue.) Presumably this unusual price discount for 
Alberta oil reflects a temporary (short-run) disequi-
librium in the crude oil market while modifications 
in the transmission system are made to allow the 
increased crude oil supplies access to the broader 
world market. The modifications are of two types, 
both under consideration in 2013. The first is new 
pipeline capacity, such as the Keystone XL, Northern 
Gateway, and Kinder Morgan projects mentioned 
above. The second is the reversal of pipelines which 
allow imports of oil into central North America, 
turning them into export lines; we mentioned the 
proposed reversal of Enbridge’s Sarnia–Montreal line, 
and several companies are planning reversals of pipe-
lines currently carrying oil from the U.S. Gulf Coast to 
Cushing, Oklahoma.
It is interesting to note that no significant price dif-
ferentials between Alberta and world oil were appar-
ent in the first period of rapid expansion of Alberta 
oil production following the Leduc find of 1947, when 
producibility of Alberta oil exceeded the pipeline cap-
acity to carry it to market. At that time, prorationing 
regulations restricted production to levels the available 
market would absorb, so the potential excess supply 
could not push prices lower. Since the late 1980s this 
government output control mechanism has no longer 
been in operation, so, after 2010, WTI and Alberta 
prices were free to fall (relative to the world price) as 
local supplies increased.  
Alberta oil prices will continue to be determined 
primarily by international crude oil prices, which 
reflect the output decisions of OPEC, but with sig-
nificant day-to-day variability as stockpiles, weather 
conditions, political events, and changing expectations 
impact on the spot market. 
4. Crude Oil Market Structure
For much of the historical period, as we have seen, 
the price and output of Alberta crude oil have been 
strongly influenced by government regulations, 
both provincial (e.g., market-demand prorationing) 
and federal (e.g., the NOP and the NEP). However, 
industry behaviour also reflects the structure of the 
petroleum industry, in particular the degree to which 
the industry is or is not free of large, concentrated, 
monopoly-like firms, an issue that has been touched 
on already. Government regulations have had the 
most pronounced impact, so much so that we have 
argued that understanding the economics of the 
industry is an exercise in ‘petropolitics.’ During those 
periods that allowed market price flexibility, oil did 
not exhibit such clearly oligopolistic behaviour as 
geographic price discrimination. This concluding 
section of Chapter Six will discuss, briefly, two struc-
tural issues that have attracted much critical attention. 
The first is whether the private market structure is 
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so concentrated as to make monopolistic behaviour 
likely. The second is whether the presence of for-
eign capital in the industry has significantly affected 
behaviour.
A. Competition in the Alberta Oil Industry
It is widely recognized that real-world markets rarely 
meet all the conditions of the economists’ model 
of perfect competition (i.e., many small buyers and 
sellers trading units of a perfectly homogeneous 
commodity in a market with free entry and exit and 
with instantaneous, perfect, and costless informa-
tion flows). The question, rather, is how ‘effective’ or 
‘workable’ the competition is. Does the real-world 
market come close to approximating the perfectly 
competitive outcome? This is not easily determined, 
if only because a number of key determinants of per-
fectly competitive prices are typically not observable 
(for example, individual buyer’s utility or preference 
functions, and individual seller’s expectations about 
the future). The Canadian petroleum industry has 
frequently been accused of harmful ‘monopolistic’ 
(more properly, oligopolistic) actions. For examples, 
see Laxer (1970, 1974, 1983). Our discussion earlier in 
this chapter relied on an oligopoly-oligopsony view 
of the market in the 1950s but noted that there were 
external upper and lower bounds on the price that the 
industry might set.
The most detailed examination is undoubtedly the 
1981 study of the Canadian petroleum industry by the 
Director of Investigation and Research of the (federal) 
Combines Investigation Act (Bertrand, 1981). Vol. iv of 
the Bertrand Report considered the Canadian crude 
petroleum industry in detail, finding that (pp. 211–14):
[W]hile production was not highly concen-
trated, the disposition of crude production was 
controlled by a small number of firms.
… The high level of concentration in 
‘controlled’ crude discouraged the entry of 
other companies who wished to purchase 
crude oil. … 
The monopoly situation which was pro-
duced by the control possessed by the leading 
firms was exploited in several different ways. 
First, it was used to establish a crude pricing 
formula which resulted in prices that were 
higher than they would otherwise have been. 
In addition complementary devices were used 
to maintain the prices of other hydrocarbons 
such as condensate and heavy crude and to 
prevent the price structure for light crude from 
deteriorating. … 
… The major firms which possessed con-
trol were able to wielded [sic] their power in 
such a way as to entrench their market position 
downstream from production. …
This practice lessened competition from 
small and large competitors who lacked crude 
control.
We will not report in detail on the Bertrand analysis, 
in part because the follow-up federal government 
study by the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission 
(RTPC) concluded that in its view “the Director failed 
to establish his allegations against the producing 
companies” (Canada, RTPC, 1986, p. 140). The RTPC 
(p. 132) did note:
[T]here is little doubt that, as the Director has 
argued, the Alberta Government’s prorationing 
scheme and the Federal Government’s National 
Oil Policy had the effect of raising the price 
of domestic crude oils and hence petroleum 
products, for many Canadian consumers. On 
the other hand, there is no doubt that both 
programs produced many benefits as well.
This ascribes the higher prices to the government poli-
cies, not monopolistic behaviour. At a more pragmatic 
level, the RTPC pointed out (in 1986) that Canadian 
crude oil prices had been set by governments since 
1973, so detailed investigation of crude oil pricing was 
not warranted.
However, despite the lack of evidence in support 
of the hypothesis that the oil industry has exercised 
market power over crude oil prices, there has been 
significant interest in the structure of the Canadian 
petroleum industry. Attention has focused largely on 
two issues – the degree of concentration of production 
and the level of foreign ownership in the industry.
B. Structure of the Canadian Crude  
Oil Industry
1. Concentration
Crude Oil. The lower the concentration of output, the 
less likely the exercise of monopolistic behaviour by 
producers. Further, if entry and exit into the industry 
were relatively easy, it would be difficult to maintain 
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high monopolistic prices for any great length of time. 
Significant entry and exit would imply that the relative 
size of firms changes over time, rather than remaining 
stagnant. Specific corporate information on Alberta 
oil production is not readily available, but data for 
Canada is (and, recall, Alberta provides a large major-
ity of Canadian crude oil). Table 6.6 provides data on 
corporate production of Canadian crude oil, for select 
years: it shows the eight largest crude oil producers for 
the year 1957 and similar values for 1970, 1980, 1990, 
2000, and 2009 as drawn from Oilweek magazine’s 
annual tabulation.
The level of concentration is measured in two 
ways. Four (eight) firm concentration ratios give the 
percentage of total oil output from the largest four 
(eight) producers. It is, of course, hard to interpret 
such numbers. One prominent expert in industrial 
organization suggested (Bain, 1968, p. 464) that 
“[T]entative indications are that if seller concentration 
exceeds that in which the largest eight sellers supply 
from two-thirds to three-fourths of the output of an 
industry … there is a strong disposition toward sig-
nificant monopolistic price-raising and excess profits.” 
By this criterion, Canadian crude oil production is 
Table 6.6: Concentration in Canadian Crude Oil Output (8 Largest Producers)
 Percentage Shares of Output
 1957 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009
Imperial (Esso) 19.2 13.4 12.9 17.5 13.0 6.4
British American (Gulf) 7.1 7.3 8.0 3.9  3.8
Texaco 6.9 8.9 8.6
Mobil 4.6 7.6 5.8 4.1
California Standard (Chevron) 4.5 5.0 5.6 4.1  3.7
Hudson’s Bay Oil and Gas 4.5 4.8
Shell Canada 2.3 5.4    4.5
Pan American (Amoco) 1.9 4.5 5.1 6.5
PetroCanada   4.1 7.0  3.8
Dome   4.1
Pan Canadianc    4.8  5.5
Suncor Energy    3.2  5.9 9.9
Canadian Natural Resources     7.7 10.9
Husky Energy     5.8 6.4
Alberta Energy Co.c       3.7
Encanac      9.7
ConocoPhillips      6.3
Devon       4.5
 Concentration Ratios
4-Firm 37.8% 37.2% 35.3% 35.8% 32.4% 36.9%
8-Firm 51.0% 56.9% 54.2% 51.1% 49.2% 58.6%
HHI 566a 528b 507b 516b 432b 524b
a	 It	was	assumed	that	the	next	13	largest	firms	all	produced	1.5%	of	industry	output	and	that	all	the	other	firms	in	the	industry	were	too	small	to	add	anything	to	the	
HHI.	Once	the	production	share	is	less	than	one,	each	extra	firm	adds	a	minimal	amount	to	the	HHI.
b Based on the top 20 producers. (The 20th largest in 1970 and 1980 produced 1.3% of output; in 1990, the 20th largest produced 0.8% of output, in 2000, it pro-
duced 0.9% of output, and, in 2009, 1.1%.)
c PanCanadian and AEC merged in 2002 to form Encana. In 2009, Encana separated into Conovus (oil operations) and Encana (focusing on natural gas).
Sources: Oilweek, May 15, 1972, p. 24; June 15, 1981, p. 42; June 17, 1991, pp. 22–25; July 2, 2001, p. 32. The 2009 data was provided by Dale Lunan of Oilweek and 
appears in a July 2010 issue.
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relatively unconcentrated. The rising concentration 
ratios for 2009 reflect the growing importance of the 
large oil sands mining operations.
The second measure of concentration is the HHI 
(the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index), which is the sum 
of the squared output shares (percentages) of all firms 
in the industry. A monopoly would show a value 
of 10,000 (i.e., 1002), while a very unconcentrated 
industry would have small value (e.g., if 100 equal-
sized firms made up the industry, the value would 
be 100 – i.e., 100 × 12, while 1,000 equal-sized firms 
would have an HHI of 10). The HHI is harder to calcu-
late than the concentration ratio, since the output of 
all firms in the industry must be known; in practice, 
firms that produce less than 1 per cent of the indus-
try’s output add very little to the HHI. Once again, no 
precise interpretation can be attached to particular 
values of the HHI. The most prominent use of the HHI 
has been since 1982 in the Merger Guidelines of the 
U.S. Department of Justice. The precise criteria of the 
Department are quite complex, but mergers would 
clearly be challenged if the industry HHI were above 
1,800, and would not be if it were less than 1,000. 
Once again, by this standard, the Canadian crude oil 
production industry appears quite unconcentrated.
However, as many observers have noted, the 
degree of output concentration may not be the only, 
or the most, relevant measure in a vertically integrated 
industry. Bertrand’s report, for instance, emphasized 
the role of the major oil producers, especially Imperial 
Oil, as builders and equity shareholders in the major 
pipelines (especially Interprovincial Pipe Line).
Pipelines. By the late 1940s, as discussed above, 
Imperial Oil had begun initial plans to construct an 
oil pipeline east of Edmonton. In April 1949, a spe-
cial act of Parliament incorporated Interprovincial 
Pipe Line (IPL), and Imperial was the first subscriber 
for shares, with a 50 per cent equity holding by 1950 
(Bradley and Watkins, 1982, pp. 105–6). Imperial also 
guaranteed minimum shipment volumes and agreed 
to make up debt repayments if IPL were in default. 
Trans Mountain Pipeline was incorporated in 1951, 
also with major oil companies as majority sharehold-
ers and guarantors of debt. These two main (trunk) 
lines were connected to Alberta oil pools by a system 
of local gathering pipelines linked to a number of 
main feeder lines running to Edmonton; these local 
pipelines were usually owned and built by the first oil 
companies to generate significant discoveries in that 
part of the province.
The key question of concern is whether the rela-
tively concentrated control of essential pipeline links 
by the major oil companies was utilized to their com-
petitive advantage. This might have happened in a 
number of ways including:
(i) excessively high pipeline tariffs;
(ii) denying access to facilities to crude oil from 
competing oil producers;
(iii) restricting total facility throughout to keep oil 
prices artificially high.
Bertrand (1981, vol. iv) discusses these and other 
possible practices, but most observers have not found 
the evidence convincing (e.g., Lawrey and Watkins, 
1982; Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, 1985). 
Why not?
(i) The effective controls on Alberta crude oil 
production were the government prorationing 
regulations, and these were designed to 
ensure a ‘fair’ allocation to all companies. (The 
situation was somewhat different for heavy 
crude oil, which came from Saskatchewan to 
a large degree and was not subject to market-
demand prorationing in Alberta.)
(ii) The pipelines, certainly the two trunk lines, 
seem to have operated essentially as ‘common 
carriers’ and there are few recorded complaints 
from non-owner producers. (A common 
carrier pipeline is one which is open to all 
potential users on an equal basis; it does not 
discriminate in favour of its owners by offering 
them preferred access or lower tariffs.)
(iii) The 1959 National Energy Board Act gave 
the NEB the authority to regulate tariffs of 
the trunk lines. While this power was not 
exercised until 1977, it was potentially available, 
and rates did have to be filed with the NEB. 
The sections of IPL and Trans Mountain which 
were in the United States were rate regulated 
by the U.S. government. Regulations, and the 
threat of regulations, will inhibit excessive 
tariffs.
(iv) Lawrey and Watkins (1982) find the IPL and 
Trans Mountain tariffs before NEB regulation 
in 1977 to be somewhat higher (12–16% 
greater) than they would have been under the 
NEB rules. However, they note that the tariffs 
seem to be consistent with the rate procedures 
established by the U.S. Interstate Commerce 
Commission and suggest that a higher risk 
premium may have been called for in the 
earlier years of operation of the pipelines.
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On balance, then, there is little evidence that the 
major oil companies’ control of pipeline facilities was 
used to generate significant excess profits.
Refiners. One might suppose that oil refiners are 
interested in the highest possible price for refined 
petroleum products (RPPs) and the lowest possible 
price for the crude oil they purchase. As discussed in 
Chapter One, there are economies of scale in refin-
ing – by the 1960s an efficient refinery producing the 
light-end slate of products typical in North America 
would need a capacity of 100,000 barrels per day or 
more. However, this is a relatively small share of the 
RPP market in highly populated parts of the continent. 
Moreover, a refiner charging high prices would have 
to worry not only about new competitive refineries in 
its market area but also about imported products from 
other areas. Therefore, some observers have suggested 
that an oligopolistic refining industry, consisting 
mainly of vertically integrated companies, might 
prefer to pay high prices for crude oil. This would 
generate high profits for their crude oil affiliates, 
necessitate high prices for refined products, but not 
offer an incentive to new refining companies to enter 
the market. The strategy makes particular sense for 
a company that produces a large amount of crude oil 
relative to its total refining operations and is especially 
attractive if income tax laws favour crude oil profits 
over refining and marketing profits. (The latter was 
generally true, at least up to 1980, as Chapter Eleven 
discusses.)
There is no doubt that the purchases of Alberta 
crude oil exhibit higher concentration than do sales. 
Table 6.7 shows the nominations for Alberta crude oil 
for the month of August (a seasonally high demand 
month) for a number of years from 1955 through 1986. 
Nominations are the volume that buyers (usually 
refiners) indicate to the ERCB that they plan to pur-
chase and serve as the basis for market-demand 
prorationing allocations. All buyers who asked for 
one percent or more of total Alberta nominations 
(in any of the indicated months) are shown in Table 
6.8, as well as the number of smaller buyers. In total, 
buyers ranged in number from 6 (in 1955) to 31 (in 
1976). It will be recalled that producers of crude oil in 
Alberta number in the hundreds. The concentration 
ratios and the HHI are higher than on the seller side, 
and particularly high for 1956. It can be seen that the 
lowest concentration occurred in those years (1971 and 
1986) when access was open to U.S. markets and in 
1976 before the U.S. market was severely restricted and 
when the Montreal link of Interprovincial Pipe Line 
was open. Note that the year 1986, with deregulation 
of North American energy markets, saw the emer-
gence of several crude oil purchasers who were not 
refiners (e.g., the Alberta Petroleum Marketing 
Commission [APMC] and Northridge Petroleum) but 
operated as crude oil-marketing middlemen.
However, claims that refiner-buyers were able to 
generate artificially high prices for Alberta crude oil 
must remain suspect. Output control came, not from 
the refiners themselves, but from the Alberta govern-
ment market-demand prorationing scheme. For the 
years 1973 through 1985, governments also set the oil 
price. Up to the National Oil Policy of 1961, and since 
1985, the Alberta oil price seems to have been set by 
competitive interface with other North American 
crude oil. The NOP years, 1962 through 1972, are the 
most difficult to assess, with Canadian prices rela-
tively fixed, lying between falling international and 
higher relatively stable U.S. prices. We suggested 
above that this reflected oligopolistic price rigidity, 
where the Alberta Oil and Gas Conservation Board 
administered quantities, and refiners, aware of the 
political uncertainties associated with the NOP, simply 
refrained from altering oil prices. Thus, the level of 
Alberta crude oil prices has reflected government 
policies at least as much as the market power of crude 
oil buyers.
Other structural features of the Alberta crude oil 
industry, such as the changing relative importance of 
the major integrated companies, the other large crude 
oil producers and the small (‘junior’) companies, 
are not discussed in this book. Nor do we examine 
the reasons for and extent of merger activity in the 
industry, or why mergers occurred so much more 
frequently in some time periods rather than others.
Performance. Industry profitability is a key indi-
cator of market ‘performance.’ (Differences between 
individual companies or types of companies will not 
be discussed here.) High levels of profit are often 
taken as evidence of market power, although careful 
interpretation is necessary. Profits, for instance, tend 
to be sensitive to cyclical fluctuations in the economy 
so that a single year’s high profit is not necessarily 
meaningful. Moreover, the preponderance of fixed 
costs means short-run profits are highly levered by 
price variations, up or down. Beyond this, there are 
difficulties in measuring profit rates, especially in 
terms that the economist finds meaningful. Reported 
measures of profit typically are annual rates (for an 
entire corporation) derived using a variety of account-
ing conventions regarding things such as historic costs 
and capital depreciation rates. Economists are inclined 
to view profits as the present value lifetime return 
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Table 6.7: August Nominations for Alberta Crude Oil (103 m3/d)
 1986 1981 1976 1971 1966 1961 1955
PetroCanada 45.6 0.6 — — — — —
Imperial Oila 41.5 45.6 39.4 31.4 21.2 22.0 5.6
Shell 27.1 30.4 30.7 27.0 20.6 7.3 —
Texacob 18.5 20.6 16.0 20.9 19.4 12.3 1.4
Koch 13.1 3.0 2.9 — — — —
Sun Oil 11.2 12.2 9.9 5.3 1.7 2.0 —
APMC 8.4 — — — — — —
Petrosar 7.7 14.5 1.2 — — — —
Husky 7.5 3.2 1.9 0.9 0.7 0.2 —
Dome 6.3 — 4.3 0.7 — — —
Northridge 5.7 — — — — — —
Turbo 5.4 1.0 — — — — —
Chevron 4.5 4.8 4.6 2.5 2.5 1.8 —
Consumers’ Co-op 4.3 3.8 2.7 3.3 2.5 1.7 —
Amoco 3.7 — 1.0 2.7 — — —
Union Oil 3.5 — 0.8 0.3 — — —
Gulfc 2.9 32.6 31.2 21.2 16.9 10.9 1.9
Mobil 2.9 0.2 5.4 14.3 4.9 3.2 —
Murphy 2.5 1.9 5.9 4.9 1.4 0.3 —
BP 0.3 13.9 11.8 2.5 2.5 — —
Ultramar 1.6 6.1 — — — — —
Petrofina	 —	 4.6	 2.5	 —	 —	 —	 —
Hudsons Bay — — 9.7 13.5 2.5 — —
Ashland — — 7.3 10.4 2.1 1.6 —
Consumer Power — — 2.2 — — — —
Atlantic	Richfield	 —	 —	 2.1	 1.9	 —	 —	 —
Sohio — — 1.8 6.0 3.2 2.1 —
United	Refinery	 —	 —	 0.7	 2.7	 —	 —	 —
Clark — — — 4.2 — — —
Bay — — 0.2 2.2 1.5 0.7 —
Cities Service — — — 1.5 — 2.1 —
International — — — — 0.9 2.3 —
Northwestern — — — — 0.5 — —
Canadian — — — — — 3.6 —
Anglo American — — — — — 0.4 0.5
Wainwright Prod. — — — — — — 0.2
# of Other Cos.d (5) (1) (7) (6) (4) (2) (1)
Total 229.3 198.4 148.4 184.5 104.9 75.2 9.8
 Concentration Ratios (%)
4-Firm 57.9 65.1 59.2 54.4 74.5 69.9 96.8
8-Firm 75.6 87.6 80.3 78.2 87.0 84.7 100.0
HHI 1060 1312 1111 953 1463 1525 3951
Notes:
a	 Includes	nominations	from	one	Royalite	refinery	(in	1961)	and	a	U.S.	Humble	Oil	Refinery	from	1971	on.
b Includes McColl-Frontenac and Regent in 1956.
c Includes BA Oil before 1971.
d All nominators who took 1% or more of Alberta oil in any of the years are listed separately.
Sources: Various issues of Oil in Canada and Oilweek.
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associated with particular projects, using replace-
ment cost criteria to value assets. Moreover, there are 
ambiguities involved in assessing the profits expected 
under effective competition in natural resource indus-
tries since economic rent over and above normal 
profits is to be expected. Unusually high profits might, 
in this case, say more about the ineffectiveness of 
government rent collection schemes than the degree 
of competition in the industry! Effective competi-
tion requires only that the marginal project does 
not generate excessive profits (that is profits above 
normal profits and marginal user costs, as discussed 
in Chapter Four). We will not provide information on 
the industry’s profitability over the historical period 
but will briefly refer to several studies of the petrol-
eum industry’s profits.
Jenkins (1977) examined rates of return to 
Canadian industries; accounting data was adjusted 
to reflect economic valuation of assets. He reports 
rates of return for the “mineral fuels and petrol-
eum” industry for private companies for years 1965 
through 1974. For the first eight years of this decade, 
annual returns on capital varied from 3.6 per cent 
to 5.9 per cent, averaging 5.0 per cent; for the final 
two years, the return rose to 7.0 per cent and 7.3 per 
cent, in line with rising energy prices. Over the entire 
decade, the rate averaged 5.4 per cent as compared to 
5.9 per cent for all Canadian manufacturing and all 
non-manufacturing industries. DataMetrics Limited 
estimated annual real rates of return on capital for 
oil and gas production from 1972 to 1980, a period of 
rapidly rising prices. Two series were reported, the 
second incorporating an allowance for rising costs in 
the petroleum sector relative to the economy at large 
(DataMetrics, 1984, Tables 2.1 and 2.2). The latter 
series showed an average rate of return of 5.5 per cent 
for the nine years; the rate was at its lowest, at 1.9 per 
cent, in 1972, and then rose sharply to 4.3 per cent in 
1973. It fell the next year, and then rose again to a peak 
of 9.4 per cent in 1979, before falling back to 6.6 per 
cent in 1980. The average real return was higher than 
in the utility or manufacturing sectors (at 3.7% and 
4.6%, respectively); however, these sectors exhibited 
much more stable rates of return, indicating some-
what less risk. Mining (exclusive of petroleum), like 
oil and gas, showed more variability in returns over 
this period and also a somewhat lower average rate of 
return (at 4.7%).
The Annual Reports of the Petroleum Monitoring 
Agency (set up on August 1, 1980, by the federal 
government) give more conventional accounting 
measures of profitability. The rate of return on total 
capital for upstream (crude petroleum) industry 
activities can be compared to that of all non-financial 
Canadian industries, for the years 1980 through 1990. 
Annual differences are great; for example, in 1980, the 
petroleum industry earned 14.1 per cent while other 
industries averaged 10.3 per cent, while in 1986 the 
respective values were –1.0 per cent and 9.1 per cent. 
From 1981 to 1985, oil averaged 8.3 per cent, and other 
industries 7.7 per cent; from 1986 to 1990, oil was at 
3.4 per cent, others at 8.8 per cent. Crude oil may have 
been slightly more profitable than average during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s when international oil prices 
were high but became much less profitable once oil 
prices tumbled. These averages cover a wide range of 
values for individual companies.
Overall, this brief review of profitability does not 
support the claim that the Canadian crude oil industry 
has generated large oligopoly profits.
2. Foreign Ownership
A second structural feature of the Canadian petrol-
eum industry that should be addressed, if only briefly, 
is the relatively high level of foreign investment. The 
presence of foreign-owned capital in Canada’s oil 
industry can be placed in context from two somewhat 
broader perspectives:
(i) Many sectors of the Canadian economy have 
high foreign investment, and some people have 
seen this as a major problem.
(ii) In most parts of the world, except where oil is 
nationalized, development of the oil industry 
has depended heavily on foreign (largely U.S., 
British, or French) capital from major oil 
companies, and many people have seen this as 
a major problem.
Most people would likely accept that there is nothing 
inherently wrong with the international mobility of 
capital. Economists, in particular, have suggested that 
it is an important part of the process of economic 
development. Inflows of capital allow regions to 
finance imports in excess of exports, thereby provid-
ing a net inflow of goods and services that can, poten-
tially, spur greater economic development. Of course, 
the owners of the capital expect that they will recover 
their investment plus a return (profit) at least as high 
as they could obtain in the next best alternative invest-
ment of equal risk. Foreign capital flows in the form of 
official government assistance or charitable donations 
will not usually have the same expectations about 
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repayment and return. Some economists and business 
leaders have also stressed that international capital 
flow, especially in the form of ‘direct investment’ that 
carries ownership of (equity participation in) projects, 
may also bring valuable technical and management 
skills that are not indigenous to the region. But the 
benefits of foreign investment are not necessarily 
without cost.
There is a large academic and popular literature 
in Canada on the benefits and costs of foreign invest-
ment; no clear resolution of the debate has occurred, 
or is likely. Some flavour of the main issues can be 
obtained from Levitt (1970) and Safarian (1973); 
Baldwin and Gellatly (2005) and Baldwin et al. (2006) 
provide an historical overview. Six separate issues 
might be highlighted. Our discussion is cursory.
(i) Necessity of Foreign Investment. Critics have 
argued that, at least in part, foreign investment 
simply displaced Canadian capital, entrepre-
neurial talent, and technological skills. In 
other words, foreign capital simply was not 
needed. Others respond that foreign invest-
ment responded to opportunities available in 
Canada which Canadians were not undertak-
ing, often when there was little unemployment 
or spare capacity, and Canadians were unwill-
ing to reduce consumption in order to invest 
more. Further, they argue, it is unfair to blame 
foreign investment for failures in Canadian 
macroeconomic policy.
(ii) Profitability. Critics of foreign investment 
argue that foreign investors received higher 
rates of return than were required or fair, 
thereby reducing the standard of living of Can-
adians. Excess payments may have occurred 
partly through transfer pricing practices, 
in which artificially low prices are paid on 
exports from Canada to affiliates and/or artifi-
cially high prices are paid on imports from the 
foreign affiliate. They also note that if excessive 
profits are reinvested in Canada they become 
almost impossible for Canadian governments 
to claim for Canadians, since this would 
involve expropriating the newly acquired assets 
(or their depreciation payments). Those more 
supportive of foreign investment often say that 
these arguments are less against foreign capital 
than they are in support of Canadian govern-
ment policies to encourage workable competi-
tion and corporate income taxes which capture 
a significant share of profits for Canadians. 
Both policies are desirable in their own right.
(iii) Decision-Making. Critics suggest that 
sectors with high foreign investment may 
make decisions differently than they would 
if Canadian-owned corporations dominated. 
Common examples include a reluctance to 
invest in R&D in Canada, failure to train 
Canadian staff for high-level technical or 
management positions, and failure to process 
raw materials in Canada. Furthermore, in 
sectors with some, but not complete, foreign 
ownership, Canadian-owned companies 
may be forced to behave in the same manner 
or be at a competitive disadvantage. In 
response, others have expressed scepticism 
that companies would deliberately forego 
potentially profitable investments, and argue 
that importing R&D from abroad may be the 
lowest cost way to obtain new knowledge.
(iv) Extraterritoriality. This occurs when a firm 
in Canada acts in a particular way because it 
is foreign-controlled and the home govern-
ment of the foreign investor requires certain 
action. For example, the U.S. government 
has, on occasion, ordered U.S. corporations, 
including their affiliates, to restrict trade with 
certain communist and Middle Eastern coun-
tries. Another possibility is that state-owned 
oil companies from other countries might 
devise policies for political rather than com-
mercial reasons; for example, might Chinese 
state-owned oil companies who have recently 
invested in the oil sands attempt to ship bitu-
men or synthetic oil to China at lower than 
market prices to ensure it is competitive with 
Middle Eastern crude oil? Others argue that 
such an exercise of extraterritoriality has been 
rare, and that, if it occurred, the Canadian or 
Alberta government may wish to pass counter-
vailing regulations applicable to companies 
operating here.
A related argument is that Canada’s openness 
to foreign companies may not be matched 
by the same degree of openness to Canadian 
investors in the home country of the foreign 
interests.
(v) Resource Depletion. Critics of foreign 
investment have sometimes argued that foreign 
investors have been particularly prone to come 
into a country and produce large volumes of a 
depletable natural resource for export markets 
(often in the company’s home country), 
thereby accelerating depletion of the country’s 
valuable and limited natural resources. Those 
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more favourable to foreign investment usually 
note that, if valuable export markets exist, 
domestic corporations usually behave in 
exactly the same way and that the government 
always has the right to control levels of output 
and exports.
(vi) Cultural Sovereignty. High levels of foreign 
investment, critics argue, tend to lead to 
changing social and cultural norms, often with 
greater homogenization and adoption of for-
eign values. The process may be direct, with 
the influx of foreign management and workers, 
or more indirect through the influence of a for-
eign corporate ethos, or very indirect through 
the loss of political resolve on the part of local 
governments who come to feel dependent on 
the goodwill of foreign firms and their govern-
ments. (Urquhart, 2010, in this vein, discusses 
whether Alberta might be considered a ‘Petro-
state.’) Others, in response, argue that social 
values are not all that fragile, that governments 
can do many things to encourage national cul-
tural institutions, and that the higher standards 
of living derived from foreign investment 
should increase the governments’ options in 
this regard.
Before returning to the Alberta petroleum industry, 
we should discuss the distinction between foreign 
‘ownership’ and ‘control.’ Ownership relates to the 
distribution of equity shares in a corporation; it is the 
prime determinant of the distribution of dividends 
from current income and claims on the net assets of 
the firm. An emphasis on equity capital, rather than 
debt capital, is consistent with the tenor of the six 
arguments above. Foreign debt capital does entail an 
obligation to transfer the capital borrowed plus inter-
est to the foreigner making the loan, but it is nor-
mally at a fixed rate of interest and does not transfer 
decision-making power to the foreign lender.
Foreign control refers to the ability of foreign 
equity interests to control decision-making in the 
corporation. Since outsiders do not have a window on 
decision-making procedures in corporations, control 
is difficult to assess. The most common criterion was 
that developed for CALURA, the Corporations and 
Labour Unions Return Act (now CRA, the Corporate 
Returns Act). From 1962, CALURA required most 
corporations and unions to file data annually with 
Ottawa, including details on the degree of foreign 
involvement. (The Petroleum Corporations Marketing 
Act gave the Department of Energy, Mines and 
Resources the responsibility to gather information on 
petroleum companies’ activities and resulted in the 
annual report of the Petroleum Monitoring Agency 
[PMA]). CALURA defined ‘foreign control’ as occur-
ring when more than 50 per cent of the voting shares 
in a corporation were owned by non-Canadians (or 
by some other corporation that in turn is foreign con-
trolled). Weaknesses in this convenient definition are 
easy to find. If the 50 per cent or more foreign share-
holding is dispersed, effective control could lie with 
Canadian shareholders or management. Conversely, a 
large, but minority, foreign shareholder could effect-
ively control decision-making.
There is also the question of what is controlled. A 
crude oil company builds up a stock of assets (land, 
oil and gas reserves, employees, capital) in order to 
produce physical output to generate sales revenue that 
gives the company profits. Foreign ownership and 
control shares of an industry will vary depending what 
dimension of the industry is measured.
High levels of foreign ownership and control in 
the Canadian petroleum industry have long been 
indisputable. By 1890, Standard Oil had acquired a 
majority interest in the first large Canadian crude oil 
producer and refiner (Imperial Oil). Royalite Oil was 
an Imperial subsidiary; Royalite acquired the assets 
of one of the first discoverers in the Turner Valley 
gas field in 1914 (the Calgary Petroleum Products 
Company), was responsible for the deeper 1924 gas 
discovery, and helped finance the 1936 Turner Valley 
oil find (Hanson, 1958, chap. 5; Gray, 1970). Foat 
and MacFadyen (1983) looked at seven of the largest 
Alberta crude oil plays; in all of them, the discovery 
well was by a foreign-controlled corporation (e.g., 
Imperial Oil for Leduc in 1947, Socony-Mobil for 
Pembina in 1953; Banff-Acquitaine for Rainbow West 
in 1965). The major vertically integrated companies, in 
particular, were foreign-owned and controlled, until 
the creation of Petro-Canada in the 1970s.
The federal government’s comprehensive 1973 
study, An Energy Policy for Canada (EMR, 1973) 
included a detailed discussion of foreign ownership 
in Canadian energy industries. In 1970, the Canadian 
petroleum industry (including crude petroleum, 
refining, and marketing operations) had assets that 
were 77 per cent foreign-owned and 91 per cent 
foreign-controlled (EMR, 1973, vol. v, pp. 219–29). 
Foreign control was also 91 per cent for industry 
equity, 93 per cent for reported (accounting) profits, 
and 96 per cent for the value of sales. These percent-
ages had held during most of the 1960s, with slightly 
rising foreign control shares of profits and sales. 
Foreign control was somewhat lower as far as crude 
petroleum activities were concerned, and somewhat 
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higher for refining and marketing. EMR reported 
foreign ownership and control at around 20 per cent 
for the oil and gas transportation industry. In 1974, 
the government established the Foreign Investment 
Review Agency (FIRA) to monitor foreign acquisitions 
to ensure that they provided ‘significant benefits’ to 
Canada. (Eden, 1994, pp. 14–16, provides a summary 
history.)
After the 1973 EMR Report, continued statistics on 
foreign ownership in the Canadian petroleum indus-
try were available through CALURA and PMA surveys. 
Table 6.8 shows the evolution of Canadian ownership 
and control percentages as reported by PMA for select 
years from 1971 through 1991, and from CALURA 
(CRA) reports for 2000 and 2007, based on the total 
revenue earned by the industry; the early years are 
for both upstream and downstream activities, while 
2000 and 2007 include petroleum extraction only. 
The very high levels of foreign involvement in the 
1970s had fallen by the 1980s, particularly with the 
rapid growth of Petro-Canada and Dome. Mergers 
and acquisitions have been common in the Canadian 
petroleum industry (PMA, 1990, provides a list of the 
main takeovers from 1976 through 1990). With this 
activity, the foreign share of the industry fluctuated, 
but generally it has stayed around 55 per cent for 
ownership and 60–65 per cent for control through 
to 1990, after which foreign control fell to near 50 
per cent. The apparent decline to 2000 reflects the 
exclusion of downstream activities in these numbers. 
Foreign control of assets has continued to be lower 
than of revenues.
As was discussed earlier, the share of the industry 
held by foreign firms varies depending upon the type 
of firm and industry activity considered. For example, 
in 1985, the year that FIRA was disbanded and mon-
itoring of foreign investment shifted to Investment 
Canada, petroleum industry exploration expenditures 
were only 31 per cent by foreign-controlled firms, 
and upstream petroleum revenues by non-integrated 
firms were 49 per cent under foreign control, while 
upstream revenues earned by integrated firms were 
61 per cent foreign-controlled (Canada, PMA, 1986). 
These contrast with the 57 per cent foreign control 
for all petroleum industry revenues as reported in 
Table 6.8. By 1990 the foreign control percentages 
corresponding to those of the previous two sentences 
were 47 per cent, 49 per cent, 80 per cent, and 52 per 
cent (Canada, PMA, 1991). Rising levels of Canadian 
ownership and the closer integration of the U.S. and 
Canadian economies under the Free Trade Agreement 
led to a relaxation of regulations regarding foreign 
acquisition of Canadian oil and gas assets in 1992. 
Petroleum would henceforth be treated like most 
other industrial sectors (Globerman, 1999, p. 19). 
Investment Canada was eliminated in 1994 and the 
Department of Industry took over responsibilities 
for overseeing foreign investment; acquisitions of 
Canadian-owned assets above certain values would 
be monitored to ensure they offered ‘net benefits’ 
to Canada.
The high level of foreign investment in the 
Canadian petroleum industry is likely to continue 
to be of concern to some Canadians, who view the 
petroleum industry as a particularly critical one and 
who suspect that a foreign-dominated industry will 
behave differently than a Canadian-owned industry 
would. Those more accepting of foreign investment 
in the Canadian petroleum industry emphasize the 
benefits of the greater access to financial capital and 
technology and note that foreign-owned corporations 
are subject to regulation by Canadian governments if 
their actions are perceived to be harmful. Moreover, 
physical assets, in the form of oil-production equip-
ment and developed reserves, cannot be removed 
from the country, so remain subject to Canadian laws 
and regulations.
Both views are likely to persist, so that the foreign- 
ownership issue will likely be a recurring one on the 
Canadian political agenda. We would suggest that the 
persistent disagreement stems in part from differing 
views on the two sides of the debate about the role 
Table 6.8: Foreign Ownership and Control in the 
Canadian Petroleum Industry, 1971–2007  









Note: 2000 and 2007 are for oil and gas extraction and related activities.
Sources:  
Canadian Petroleum Monitoring Agency Monitoring Reports for 1971–91. 
Statistics Canada catalogue #61-220 (Report	of	findings	under	CRA) for 2000 
and 2007; available from CANSIM as table 179-0004.
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in society of economic markets and the corporate 
sector in particular. Most economists adopt an ‘eco-
nomic’ focus in which corporations, for example, 
are generally viewed as working to maximize profits 
within whatever regulatory environment they operate. 
Governments are free to initiate policies that they 
believe to be in the public interest, and individuals are 
similarly free to pursue whatever objectives they feel 
are important. In this view, foreign investment is not 
in itself undesirable, but governments have a respons-
ibility to introduce regulations ensuring that after-tax 
corporate profits are not much in excess of ‘normal’ 
levels, with the additional profits captured for the 
public benefit. In addition, governments always have 
the ability, and responsibility, to introduce laws and 
regulations to control any corporate behaviour that is 
not in the public interest. However, other analysts, and 
some economists, have taken a different perspective 
on foreign ownership, from a ‘political economy’ point 
of view, generally with a leftist slant. In this view, the 
corporate sector is important, not primarily for the 
allocative economic functions it performs, but as a 
social power structure that imposes its values on the 
broader society and subverts the government’s will-
ingness to act in the broader public good. From this 
perspective, foreign investment is seen as problematic 
for the economy because it is not only tied to the cor-
porate sector but because it imports foreign values and 
culture. Barrie (2006) does not deal with the foreign- 
investment question but does provide interesting com-
ments on Alberta’s political culture.
Our view is the ‘economic’ one that, subject to 
appropriate government regulations, the international 
flow of capital – and the inevitable foreign ownership 
that results – is a desirable component of a dynamic 
and growing world economy. We do not view for-
eign investment in the petroleum industry as being, 
or having been, detrimental to Canadian interests. 
We will return to the issue of foreign investment in 
Chapter Nine when we discuss the impact of govern-
ment regulations to control the price of oil. It is also 
one of the issues lying beneath the analysis in Chapter 
Eleven of the efficiency of the regulations devised by 
the government to capture a ‘fair’ share of the eco-
nomic rent from producing oil for the government.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have reviewed the history of prices 
and output for Alberta conventional crude oil. (The 
market outcomes reflect as well the production of 
bitumen and synthetic crude oil from the oil sands. 
The unique features of the oil sands are discussed in 
Chapter Seven.) We argued that our focus has been 
largely from a ‘private’ perspective, as seen through 
the activities of crude oil producers and refiner pur-
chasers in the crude oil market. However, throughout 
the period, the activities of private market participants 
played out against a backdrop of government regula-
tions: petropolitics was ever-present. 
Private market behaviour was sometimes more 
constrained, and sometimes less, by government 
regulations. Of the four main periods into which we 
divided the history of the Alberta oil industry, the first 
and the last were relatively more loosely regulated. 
From the early days of production, and especially 
after the 1947 Leduc discovery, up to the end of the 
1950s, the key issue was the expansion of the market 
for Alberta oil, in competition with imported crude 
oil. Market growth fell behind increases in reserves 
additions, but major price declines were contained by 
the market power of the large integrated oil compan-
ies and, most critically, the government of Alberta’s 
market-demand prorationing regulations. With 
deregulation of the crude oil market in 1985, and high 
U.S. demand for imported crude oil, Alberta produc-
tion was once again facing a relatively unregulated 
market in which it had to meet competition from 
other sources in the world. The welcome reception 
of non-OPEC oil in the U.S. market (so long as com-
petitively priced) meant that the market for Alberta 
crude oil was large; after 1989, market-demand pro-
rationing no longer constrained production. The main 
new government regulations in this later period were 
the two free trade agreements. Their impact was not 
to constrain Alberta oil production or prices but to 
offer some certainty to the private industry that the 
Canadian government was committed to the relatively 
unimpeded operation of a free market for crude oil.
The years bracketed by these two periods of rela-
tively free markets saw government regulations aimed 
at affecting the price of Canadian-produced crude 
oil. Initially, from 1960 through to the early 1970s, the 
main concern was low world oil prices, and the federal 
government’s National Oil Policy operated indirectly 
(‘covertly’) to keep Alberta oil prices above world 
levels. From the early 1970s through to 1985, Ottawa 
was concerned by the high level of international oil 
prices, and explicit (‘overt’) price controls kept Alberta 
crude oil prices below world levels; at times, the prices 
were set unilaterally by the federal government, but 
most often federal-provincial agreements applied.
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As with the degree of government regulation, 
the range of crude oil prices since the end of World 
War II has been large. Nominal prices have been as 
low as $2.00/b and as high as over $130/b, and have, 
especially since 1970, varied considerably within a 
relatively short period of time. This price instability 
has posed considerable problems for decision-makers 
in energy industries, especially since many of the 
factors causing the instability – Middle East crises, the 
degree of stability within OPEC – cannot be forecast 
with any precision. Thus decision-makers have been 
forced to find ways to live with oil price instability and 
uncertainty. One can interpret the price regulation 
periods of 1960 through 1985, in part, as governmental 
responses to this problem. And, in Chapter Thirteen, 
we will see that the price instability for crude oil also 
raised macroeconomic policy issues for the province.
Before turning to governmental regulation of the 
oil industry, we will review the history of the Alberta 
oil sands (Chapter Seven), and briefly summarize 
some of the literature that has attempted to build 
economic models of Alberta conventional crude oil 
supply (Chapter Eight).
Readers’ Guide: Alberta’s gigantic non-conventional 
oil sands resources have been known to exist for over 
a century. In this chapter, we review the long history of 
the evaluation of this resource and the development 
of production techniques thought to be commercially 
viable. The initial projects of the 1960s and 1970s are 
discussed in detail, including the important public 
policy issues raised by the prospect of large oil sands 
output. We then discuss the absence of large new 
projects in the 1980s and 1990s, with smaller bitumen 
projects appearing, and the two existing mining ven-
tures engaging in moderate expansion. Finally, the 
resurgence of interest in the oil sands at the turn of 
the millennium is discussed.
1. Introduction
The difference between the conventional and the 
non-conventional is hazy and changeable. Some  
lifestyles progress from unacceptable to tolerated to 
conventional within the space of a generation. A  
similar transition is occurring for the so-called ‘non- 
conventional’ oil from the Alberta oil sands and very 
heavy oil deposits. The non-conventionality of these 
resources lies in the fact that they cannot be produced 
by the techniques that have conventionally been used 
in the oil industry. The hydrocarbons (bitumen) in 
the ground are so heavy and viscous, and so firmly 
attached to the rock pores, that the oil will not easily 
flow to and up the well bore, even with the ‘primary’ 
inducements that the industry commonly uses 
(fracturing the reservoir rock around the well and 
pumping). Loosely put, commercial primary recovery 
rates are very low, and the EOR techniques required 
are not those that the industry has developed for 
conventional oil pools. The ERCB has defined crude 
bitumen as “a naturally occurring viscous mixture, 
mainly of hydrocarbons heavier than pentanes, that 
may contain sulphur compounds and that in its nat-
urally occurring viscous state will not flow to a well” 
(ERCB, 2010 Reserves Report ST-98, p. A1). The resour-
ces discussed in this chapter include more than those 
shallow oil sands deposits around Fort McMurray 
that are amenable to strip-mining. There are also 
extensive oil sands deposits that are too deep to be 
effectively strip-mined, and from which oil must be 
recovered by in situ processes that typically inject heat 
into the reservoir to make the viscous heavy oil more 
fluid and allow it to flow beneath the surface to a well 
bore. Early prospectors attempted this in the shallow 
Athabasca sands, but much of the experimentation has 
been more recent, relying on new technologies such as 
horizontal drilling.
There are four very large areas in Northern 
Alberta on which bitumen deposits are recognized 
to exist: Athabasca, Wabasca, Peace River, and Cold 
Lake. (See Figure 5.1, in Chapter Five.) Recently the 
Athabasca and Wabasca sands, which border one 
another, have often been combined. There are also 
other smaller deposits of a similar bitumen nature in 
Northern Alberta, for example in the Buffalo Hills 
area. Typically, there are a number of heavy oil or 
bitumen formations in each of these deposits. Overall, 
as of 2012, the ERCB recognizes fifteen separate bitu-
men sand deposits in these four areas. On balance, 
CHAPTER SEVEN
Non-Conventional Oil: Oil Sands and Heavy Oil
142 PETROPOLIT ICS
the distinction between conventional and non-con-
ventional heavy oil resources is somewhat arbitrary, 
perhaps best viewed as involving a division along a 
continuum of heavy oil pools. The non-conventional 
resources are usually considered to be those very large 
accumulations of heavy oil in Northern Alberta that 
were not historically producible by conventional tech-
niques. However, the ERCB shows a number of heavy 
oil projects that are ascribed primary production. 
Moreover, there are undoubtedly smaller ‘conven-
tional’ heavy oil deposits that hold oil in formation 
in a manner very similar to a deposit such as Cold 
Lake. Such conventional heavy oil pools often exhibit 
increased recovery rates with EOR schemes that are 
similar to the in situ production techniques used in 
the non-conventional heavy oil pools. We suspect that 
the crucial difference, which will soon be commonly 
accepted, is between mining and in situ production 
techniques, though it will still be of interest whether 
an in situ scheme is located in one of the huge bitu-
men sand ‘fields.’
By 2012 crude bitumen made up 78 per cent 
of Alberta’s oil production (ERCB, Reserves Report 
ST-98, 2013, p. 2), as conventional output continued 
to exhibit production decline and non-conventional 
output expanded. Most analysts see the share rising. 
The non-conventional is becoming commonplace! The 
reasons for this lie in a mix of natural, technological, 
economic, and political factors. Alberta’s bitumen 
resource base is huge. Higher oil prices beginning in 
the 1970s served to attract more attention to high-
er-cost energy sources such as the oil sands. Com-
panies and government research agencies have long 
investigated new production techniques explicitly for 
Alberta’s oil sands and heavy oil resources, and there 
was significant ‘learning by doing’ along with produc-
tion. Governments offered encouragement to oil sands 
projects and came to believe that the special features 
of this petroleum resource warranted different royalty 
and tax treatment than conventional oil.
2. Early History
Alberta’s oil sands were probably the first of its hydro-
carbon resources to be discovered. (Carrigy, 1974; 
Chastko, 2004; Ferguson, 1985; Fitzgerald, 1978; Gray, 
1970, chap. 14; Pratt, 1976, chap. 3; NEB, 2000, Sec-
tion 3 and Nikiforuk, 2008, provide historical detail 
on the oil sands.) In 1778, Peter Pond, an early white 
trader, remarked on the shows of oil in the banks 
of the Athabasca River north of the present town of 
Fort McMurray. Pond noted that the local aboriginal 
population used the bitumen in a number of ways. 
However, the difficult nature of the bitumen – heavy, 
viscous and high in sulphur – discouraged its develop-
ment, even after the start of the modern petroleum 
industry about 1860. The federal government’s geo-
logical service turned its attentions to the oil sands in 
1882. Robert Bell ascertained the Lower Cretaceous 
age of the Athabasca sands, suggested that the bitu-
men might be separable from the rock by a hot water 
process, and argued that the bitumen in the sands had 
originated in Devonian era rocks. Three years later, 
Robert McConnell provided further geological analy-
sis and estimated that the oil sands area was at least 
1,000 square miles with at least 30 million barrels in 
place. In the Ottawa labs of the Geologic Service, G. 
Hoffman had discovered the asphaltic nature of the 
bitumen. He demonstrated that, by heating the bitu-
men-laden rock, the concentration of bitumen could 
be increased from under 15 per cent to about 70 per 
cent.
Attention focused initially on the presumed pres-
ence of deeper large conventional oil deposits from 
which seepages to the surface must have occurred. 
In the late 1890s, a series of wells was drilled by the 
Geologic Service in the oil sands region; several gas 
strikes occurred, but no underlying oil reservoirs were 
located, a result confirmed by private sector drilling 
early in the century. However, the non-conventional 
bitumen sands themselves were so obvious, and large, 
that numerous prospectors and scientists were drawn 
to speculate on, and experiment with, ways of pro-
ducing the bitumen. After World War I, both private 
and public enterprises were involved, most notably 
Sidney Ells with the Mines Branch of the federal 
government, Karl A. Clark with the provincial gov-
ernment-funded Alberta Research Council, Robert C. 
Fitzsimmons, who founded the International Bitumen 
Company, and Max Ball, who founded the Abasand 
Oil Company.
Ells first became convinced of the potential of the 
oil sands when commissioned to undertake a survey 
in 1913. For the next three decades, he became a firm 
proponent of the oil sands, suggesting production 
methods and actively pursuing uses for the bitumen. 
Ells was especially active in demonstrating the utiliz-
ation of concentrated bitumen for paving projects (in 
Edmonton in 1915 and Jasper in the 1920s). Ferguson 
(1985) suggests that Ells’s difficult personality slowed 
federal involvement in the oil sands and encouraged 
the government of Alberta to take a more active role.
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Clark began work in the early 1920s, based on hot 
water extraction methods, which had been applied 
since before the turn of the century to petroleum 
from heavy oil deposits in California and elsewhere. 
Laboratory work and pilot plants at the University of 
Alberta (1923), Dunvegan (in Edmonton, 1924), and 
on the Clearwater River near Fort McMurray (1930) 
confirmed the technological feasibility of Clark’s hot 
water process. Clark also demonstrated the possibil-
ity of using bitumen for paving purposes, but, unlike 
Ells, emphasized that it was more costly than the 
usual materials. While researchers like Ells and Clark 
established a firmer understanding of the resource and 
technological potential of the mineable Athabasca oil 
sands, commercial viability had not been proved. With 
falling oil prices and the Great Depression in the early 
1930s, government interest in the oil sands waned.
Private entrepreneurs continued to pursue com-
mercial development. Fitzsimmons headed the Inter-
national Bitumen Company (1927, successor to the 
Alcan Oil Company, a drilling company funded by a 
group of New York policemen in 1922). Fitzsimmons 
initially drilled for conventional oil in the Athabasca 
area, where his self-promoting claims of success seem 
to have been derived from bitumen that flowed into 
the well bore as a result of the heat of the revolving 
drill bit. He turned his attention to a mining and sep-
aration facility and in 1930 constructed a hot water 
separation plant at Bitumount, near Fort McMurray. 
International Bitumen struggled along with a mix 
of high promises, technical problems, and manage-
ment and financial crises until bankruptcy occurred 
in 1938. In 1942 a Quebec investor, Lloyd Champion, 
bought International Bitumen, re-organized it as Oil 
Sands Limited, and approached the Alberta govern-
ment about the possibility of government funding to 
complete and re-open the Bitumount plant. Alberta 
refused to provide loans or loan guarantees to the 
company, but in late 1944 it entered into a joint ven-
ture. This decision reflected advice from experts such 
as Karl Clark, who argued that the private sector could 
not be expected to invest heavily in the oil sands in 
light of their uncertain commercial viability, especially 
when technical issues about separation and upgrading 
had still to be resolved. The provincial government 
took over sole operation of Bitumount in 1948 when 
Oil Sands Limited proved unable to continue its finan-
cial share. There were numerous technical problems 
and accidents, but Bitumount did operate for part 
of 1948 and 1949. In September 1949, the plant was 
closed, issues of technical feasibility having been sub-
stantially addressed. The government hosted the First 
Athabasca Oil Sands Conference in 1951 and used this 
as a forum to make available to the public the tech-
nical information that had been gained at Bitumount.
Max Ball was an American engineer who became 
interested in bitumen sands in the 1920s while work-
ing at a lab in Denver. In 1930 he founded Abasand 
Oils Limited (originally the Canadian Northern Oil 
Company) to operate a separation plant in the Atha-
basca oil sands. (See Comfort, 1980, for a history of 
Abasands.) Ball consulted with Karl Clark, and by 
1936 Abasand was in production using a hot water 
separation process. There were numerous technical 
problems, many of them involving mining difficulties, 
since the sands quality was poorer at the Abasand site 
than at International Bitumen’s. Abasand was, how-
ever, much more effective than International Bitumen 
in its financing, management, and operation. In 1941, 
Abasand finally began to operate consistently, only 
to burn down in November. In April 1943, the federal 
government, concerned about war-time oil supplies, 
decided to finance the rebuilding of the Abasand 
plant. A restructured Abasand Oil would run the 
facility and have the right to purchase it from the gov-
ernment at a later date, at market value. Numerous 
construction delays and unexpected cost increases 
plagued the re-building, with the separation plant 
beginning sporadic production in the fall of 1944. 
Experiments were undertaken in 1945 with a second 
separation plant using a cold water process. But in 
June 1945, a fire destroyed part of the project includ-
ing both separation plants. The federal government 
delayed in committing more funds to the project, in 
part because the war pressures had ended and also 
because much of the desired technical information 
had been gained. In June 1946, Ottawa formally 
announced what most people had come to expect; 
it was out of the Abasand project. Abasand Oil took 
over the remaining assets but was essentially inactive 
until the mid-1950s when it sold its oil sands leases to 
Sun Oil.
What conclusions can be drawn from this brief 
early history of the Athabasca oil sands? The period 
from 1880 to 1950 was primarily one of knowledge 
generation. It was soon clear that the natural resource 
base was huge, but time had been needed to dem-
onstrate that the resource was the Lower Cretaceous 
bituminous sands themselves, not an underlying con-
ventional oil play. The bitumen content of the sands 
varies, averaging around 12 per cent (by weight) in the 
Fort McMurray area, but rising to almost 20 per cent 
at some locations. While some investors attempted in 
situ recovery methods, it was commonly accepted by 
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the 1930s that strip-mining of shallow sand deposits 
was the most promising production approach. By 
1950, it was also pretty clear that the initial commer-
cial production of oil sands oil would involve the three 
stages that Clark, Fitzsimmons, and others had been 
advocating for at least twenty years. A mining process 
would strip-mine the bitumen-laden rock that lay 
near the surface; a hot water flotation process would 
free the bitumen from the rock; and a refining process 
would upgrade the bitumen from very heavy and high 
sulphur crude to sweet, light crude or into specific 
light refined petroleum products.
In their 1927 Report for the Scientific and Research 
Council of Alberta, Karl Clark and Sidney Blair sum-
marized the view prevalent amongst many early oil 
sands researchers (vol. II, p. 35).
It will require but a small diminution in the 
supply of crude oil or increase in the demand 
for gasoline to render possible the develop-
ment of the Alberta bituminous sands for the 
production of motor fuel. If, as appears to be 
the case, separated bitumen can be produced 
for a dollar a barrel, and can be turned into a 
forty-five per cent yield of cracked gasoline, 
conditions in the near future should cause a 
profitable basis for an industry. On the other 
hand, prospecting may reveal extensive pet-
roleum pools in Western Canada which would 
cause a delay in bituminous sand develop-
ment. The results of the search for oil fields to 
date does not give strong hopes that this will 
happen. It is not improbable that the great 
bituminous sand deposit represents Nature’s 
major gift of crude oil to Western Canada, 
and that it must be turned to as the source of 
supply of mineral oil products for the Prairie 
Provinces.
Clark and Blair were quite correct to remark on the 
connection between the conventional oil industry and 
the likely appeal of the oil sands and were not alone in 
suggesting that the oil sands were not quite commer-
cially attractive.
From an economic point of view, there are a 
number of issues of interest, though data is somewhat 
sketchy. Commercial viability is one issue, and some 
information is available from the pilot projects and 
from reports by such careful analysts as Karl Clark. 
(Most of the data we use are drawn from Ferguson, 
1985.) The desirability of an upgrading stage, for 
example, is evident in the finding that separated 
bitumen was not competitive as a paving material. 
(Clark noted that one seller charged Camrose 
$1/square yard for paving with bitumen, and prob-
ably lost money; the City of Edmonton costed paving 
by more conventional means at $0.66/square yard.) 
However, the likely cost of synthetic (upgraded) 
crude is harder to estimate. For one thing, the cost is a 
function of project-specific factors such as the grade, 
depth, and location of the bituminous sands being 
mined and the separation and upgrading techniques. 
Further, both learning-by-doing and economies of 
scale are likely to be significant. The former implies 
that costs fall as more is produced and that new plants 
may be cheaper than older ones. The latter implies that 
per unit costs may be significantly less for larger plants 
than for small pilot projects. The ‘hardest’ data on 
synthetic crude costs comes from the two large pilot 
projects, Bitumount and Abasand. The experience of 
both projects suggested that unanticipated technical 
difficulties, including equipment failures and long 
shut-down times, would be likely to affect commer-
cial ventures, at least in the early years, and these, of 
course, increase the cost of the synthetic crude. (Costs 
that are incurred even when there is no output must 
be spread over the output when it does occur; also, 
delayed output has a lower present value than earlier 
output, and so increases the effective capital cost of 
a unit of output.) On both these projects, the capital 
costs turned out to be higher than initially projected. 
This was especially true for the war-time Abasand 
project, which was projected to cost $500,000 to 
rebuild and which by 1945 had absorbed more than 
$1,900,000. (Bitumount was initially budgeted at 
$250,000 in 1942 and had spent $750,000 by 1949.) 
However, since both projects were pilot projects, and 
neither produced for long, no reliable unit costs can 
be derived from them.
Another source of synthetic crude oil costs came 
from estimates made by those involved in the bitu-
minous oil business. Such estimates have the advan-
tage of allowing for factors such as economies of scale 
and utilization of the (presumed) best production 
technique. But they have the disadvantage of being 
hypothetical, a major problem when virtually all the 
actual projects undertaken exhibited unexpected 
technical problems and cost overruns. Further, the 
cost estimates of promoters are particularly suspect, 
since they were often attempting to raise capital 
from investors. They may also have been drawn to 
reduce the cognitive dissonance they felt as their cash 
dissolved in unprofitable investments; if they could 
convince themselves, however inaccurately, that 
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profitability was just around the corner, they would 
feel less unhappy about the money they had already 
lost. For example, Fitzsimmons estimated a synthetic 
crude cost in the mid-thirties of $0.72/b, even as his 
company was slowly going bankrupt. Contrast this 
with Karl Clark who, in his detailed Report on the 
oil sands for the Research Council of Alberta, had 
estimated mining and separation costs at $1.00/b for 
bitumen alone (Clark and Blair, vol. II, 1927, chap. III). 
However, Clark and Blair had noted (p. 31) that this 
‘is evidence that the separation process besides being 
efficient is also economically possible.’ Finally, it is 
often difficult to compare cost estimates since they do 
not always include the same elements. For example, 
it is not always clear how the cost of capital is treated, 
some estimates are for only one of the three processes 
(e.g., separation) and some estimates included the cost 
of shipping the synthetic crude out of the Athabasca 
region while others did not.
Ferguson (1985) notes a number of independ-
ent studies, especially in the 1940s as governments 
considered investing in oil sands operations, which 
suggested that if a few of the technological uncertain-
ties could be resolved, synthetic crude production 
costs would be in the vicinity of light crude oil prices. 
However, these cost estimates varied considerably. 
For example, two federal government studies in the 
early 1940s estimated bitumen costs (mining and 
separation but not upgrading) at $1.31 (G. Hume of the 
Geologic Survey) and $2.00 (Federal Oil Controller 
G. Cottrelle) per barrel, when bitumen was selling for 
about $1.60/b. G. Webster of Abasand estimated that 
a 1,000 b/d separation plant could produce bitumen 
at a cost of about $2.50/b, when crude at that time 
(September 1945) was selling for about $1.00/b.
In 1949, the government of Alberta commissioned 
Sidney Blair, a former Research Council colleague of 
Clark’s, to write a report on the oil sands. Blair under-
took a detailed examination of all the technical tasks 
involved in producing synthetic crude and came up 
with a cost estimate (Blair, 1950, p. 75). He estimated 
the cost of light oil from a 20,000 b/d oil sands pro-
ject at $3.10/b; Blair also estimated that the oil would 
sell for at least $3.50/b (delivered to Lake Superior) to 
yield a return on capital of 5.5%/year. The $3.50 value 
was considerably higher than the price of conventional 
Alberta light (Redwater) crude, reflecting the very 
light, high quality of the upgraded bitumen. In 1950 
Blair noted that Alberta Redwater crude delivered 
to the Lakehead sold for $3.00/b, which is just under 
his estimated $3.10/b cost. Since his cost estimates do 
not appear to include a cost of capital nor any taxes 
or royalties, and given the constant technical prob-
lems the pilot plants had consistently experienced, 
it is hardly surprising that no commercial ventures 
followed immediately on the Abasand and Bitumount 
closures. Falling Alberta oil prices after 1949 offered 
further discouragement, as did the rapid acceleration 
in both production and excess production capacity of 
conventional Alberta oil. Some observers (e.g., Pratt, 
1976) suggest that the major oil companies acted to 
tie up leases in the oil sands and deliberately refrained 
from production in order to maintain output from 
their conventional oil reserves in Alberta and else-
where. Commercial production of oil sands oil did not 
commence until 1967.
The question of whether synthetic crude should 
obtain a value appreciably higher than Alberta 
light conventional oil has been controversial. The 
upgrading process is, in very simplified terms, a 
coking and distillation procedure. Bitumen, as a very 
heavy hydrocarbon, has a relatively high proportion 
of carbon relative to hydrogen. In upgrading, some of 
the carbon is removed as coke (a by-product, along 
with sulphur) and the remaining hydrocarbons are 
separated by distillation. For example, Fitzgerald 
(1978, p. 3) notes that four main products result from 
the Suncor plant: gases (used internally by the plant), 
naphtha (which is readily processed into motor gaso-
line), kerosene and light fuel oil (gas-oil). These light 
products (other than the gases) typically have prices 
higher than crude oil. However, to obtain such prices 
it would be necessary to ensure that the products meet 
consumer specifications and that they are transported 
to market in a pure form, which is not inexpensive 
given the distance from Fort McMurray to major 
petroleum product markets. In fact, the practice for 
existing oil sands mining plants (e.g., Suncor and 
Syncrude) has usually been to blend the three liquid 
products together and ship the mix, which is then 
valued as a light sweet crude.
Early government policy with respect to the oil 
sands was much more active than that with respect to 
conventional oil, where exploration, development, and 
production decisions were left to the private sector, 
subject of course to a regulatory framework (e.g., min-
eral rights and taxation/royalty policies). However, 
both the federal and provincial governments saw the 
oil sands deposits as unique in at least two important 
respects. The first was geological, their non-conven-
tionality, their apparent size, and unusual nature. In 
part this piqued the curiosity of government scientists 
such as Bell, McConnell, and Ells. The second was 
an engineering problem, how to treat the bitumen in 
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such a way as to produce valuable products, and this 
too attracted the attention of university and govern-
ment scientists such as Clark. There is an economic 
argument for a government role in generating basic 
engineering and geologic knowledge. Since the infor-
mation, once gathered, has very low marginal costs 
of transmission, it should be provided to prospective 
buyers at a very low price. However, if this were the 
case, private companies would have very little incen-
tive to invest in the production of such knowledge. 
If private companies do undertake such research but 
charge high prices for their information, then society 
at large may not benefit as much as would be desired; 
high prices can be a particular problem since the firm 
producing the new, valuable information may be in 
a monopoly position. Of course, this problem of the 
‘public good’ nature of information is a ubiquitous 
one in society and is handled in a variety of ways. 
(Information is a public good in terms of its non-ex-
clusivity – my consumption of a bit of knowledge does 
not prevent you from also consuming it, quite unlike 
my consumption of Skor bars.) If the knowledge is of 
a narrow and specific nature, it is most frequently left 
in the hands of the private sector with the innovator 
offered patent protection to encourage investment in 
generating new knowledge. However, for more ‘basic’ 
research, which may have no immediate apparent 
commercial use, or for which the possible uses are so 
broad as to be hard to define, it is common for govern-
ments to play an active role in generating or funding 
the production of knowledge. Of course, there is no 
clear demarcation between these two classes.
The federal government was particularly active in 
oil sands research prior to 1920 and with the Abasand 
plant during World War II. The provincial government 
was heavily involved in the 1920s with Clark’s hot 
water process and then in the Bitumount plant from 
1945 to 1949. By 1950 the Alberta government had 
decided that further oil sands development would be 
left to the private sector, using the 1951 Athabasca Oil 
Sands Conference as a venue for conveying to private 
entrepreneurs the information it had gathered. (The 
government continued to offer some support for basic 
oil sands research through its universities and bodies 
such as the Alberta Research Council. In 1974 it cre-
ated AOSTRA, the Alberta Oil Sands Technology and 
Research Authority, which undertook joint research 
with industry on oil sands, heavy oil, and EOR tech-
nologies. AOSTRA was later incorporated into the 
Alberta Energy Research Institute, which in 2010 
became part of Alberta Innovates.)
Another significant policy responsibility of gov-
ernments was in managing the leasing of mineral 
rights on oil sands lands, which are largely Crown 
owned. As with conventional oil and gas, such lands 
were under the jurisdiction of the federal government 
until 1930, in which year most were transferred to the 
province. (Ottawa continued to hold control of some 
mineral rights in Alberta, for example on Indian res-
ervations and in National Parks; in the oil sands area, 
small acreages were still federally held, including the 
plot on which the Abasand plant was built.) However, 
there were relatively few bituminous sand leases 
issued. By March 31, 1946, the province had only four 
outstanding leases covering 3,952 acres, and by March 
1949 there was only one outstanding. (Data in this 
chapter on mineral rights and oil sands royalties and 
taxation come largely from the Annual Reports of the 
provincial government departments responsible, i.e., 
Mines and Minerals, Energy and Natural Resources or 
Energy, depending on the year.)
3. Resources, Reserves, Production  
and Costs
In this section, we discuss oil sands projects from a 
‘private’ point of view, largely that of the oil producer. 
In the next section, we review government policies.
A. Resources and Reserves
The word ‘reserves’ is often used rather loosely, as 
has been the case in oil sands analysis. (Chapter Five 
included discussion of this terminology). The ERCB 
Reserves Reports (ST-18 and ST-98) set out criteria 
used in determining estimates of producible volumes. 
Dunbar et al. (2004, chaps. 2 and 3) provide a good 
review of the resource characteristics of Alberta heavy 
oil deposits and the production technologies currently 
under consideration. See also NEB (2000); Engelhardt 
and Todirescu (2005); and the ERCB Reserves Report 
ST-98. Some have used the word ‘reserves’ to mean 
‘resources;’ that is, the amount of bitumen or syn-
thetic crude in place. (The produced natural resource 
is bitumen, which may then be upgraded to light 
synthetic crude, or ‘syncrude.’ The first two commer-
cial oil sands mining plants, for instance, produce 
a little over 0.8 of a barrel of syncrude per barrel 
of bitumen.) More careful analysts restrict the use 
of the word ‘reserves’ to an estimate of recoverable 
volumes, but this is often an amount assumed to be 
eventually recoverable under hypothetical (and often 
undefined) technical and economic conditions. We 
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prefer to label such estimates ‘ultimate potential.’ 
Reserves (initial or remaining) are volumes known 
with a reasonable degree of certainty to be producible 
under current technologies and anticipated economic 
conditions. Until recently, this meant that bitumen 
volumes recognized as oil reserves were restricted 
to projects currently in production. Almost all such 
reserves come from large commercial projects, though 
small amounts may be credited to experimental pilot 
projects. However, since the early 2000s, Alberta and 
Canadian statistics have accepted large volumes of 
oil sands resources not currently in production as 
qualifying as reserves, and in 2003 the U.S. Energy 
Administration Information (EIA) accepted these 
estimates. Thus, for example, BP estimated end of 
2004 Canadian crude oil reserves as about 16 billion 
barrels, in contrast to the EIA’s 174 billion; by 2010, 
BP had raised its estimate of Canadian oil reserves 
to 33.2 billion barrels by including 27.1 billion bar-
rels of oil sands ‘under active development’ and, in 
2011, it reported 175.2 billion barrels. However, even 
those sources that now place Canada a not-so-distant 
second to Saudi Arabia in oil reserves acknowledge 
that the quality of the two countries’ reserves differ by 
many orders of magnitude, with the Saudi production 
costs a fraction of those for Alberta heavy oil.
It is also important to realize that Alberta’s oil 
sands and heavy oil deposits are not homogeneous. 
The natural product is a mix of hydrocarbons (bitu-
men), water, sand, and other earth materials like clay. 
Amongst the important ways in which deposits differ 
are: specific gravity (some crudes are heavier than 
others), bitumen concentration (the proportion by 
weight or volume that is bitumen), and depth (where 
shallow deposits, usually up to 75 m deep are regarded 
as amenable to mining operations). The concentration 
of bitumen, by weight, may range from 1 to 18 per 
cent. The physical chemistry of the Alberta oil sands 
is such that bitumen encases sand particles with a film 
of water between the sand and the oil; this separation 
between sand and bitumen seems to make commercial 
production somewhat easier than for other non-con-
ventional oil resources such as U.S. oil shale. Deposits 
of intermediate depth may be the most difficult to pro-
duce since they are too deep to be mined, but so shal-
low that injection fluids leak quickly to the surface.
As discussed above, it was soon recognized that 
Alberta’s heavy oil and bitumen resource base was 
huge, though it was not until after the turn of the 
nineteenth century that the idea of large underlying 
lighter oil pools was abandoned. The mapping and 
drilling programs of the federal Geologic Service prior 
to 1900 had made clear that the deposits occurred 
over a very large area, and examinations of specific 
sites in the Fort McMurray region had allowed assess-
ment of the characteristics of shallow deposits at those 
locations. Allen, in his 1920 report to the Alberta 
Legislature, said that there were 10,000 to 15,000 
square miles in the Athabasca region underlain by 
bitumen, and repeated an estimate by T. Davidson of 
Imperial Oil that they might hold 30 billion barrels 
(Allen, 1920). In their extensive Report on the bitu-
minous sands for the Alberta Research Council, Clark 
and Blair simply noted that outcrops of oil sands in 
the Athabasca area covered at least 750 square miles, 
but that actual bitumen deposits covered a much 
larger area; they provided no estimate of total oil 
accumulations (Clark and Blair, vol. I, 1927). Sidney 
Blair’s 1950 Report to the Alberta government noted 
that “outcrops and drillings proves a vast deposit” but 
that “the evidence is inadequate to appraise the total 
bitumen” (Blair, 1950, p. 13). The federal government 
undertook a drilling program of 291 wells on federal 
leases during World War II, and a consortium of 11 
companies completed 91 wells on provincially issued 
leases from 1952 to 1954, clearly demonstrating the 
richness of the sands on those leases.
Estimating petroleum reserves was one of the tasks 
undertaken by the OGCB (later ERCB and EUB), and 
one can follow the evolution of its estimates through 
various board publications, including its annual 
Reserves Report (Reports ST-18 and later ST-98). By 
1962 the board was basing its estimates on 600 wells 
and a further 1,200 observational drillings in the bitu-
minous sands areas and, excluding Cold Lake, esti-
mated in-place volumes at 710.8 billion barrels (625.9 
billion in the Athabasca deposit) and potentially 
recoverable volumes at 300.9 billion barrels (266.9 
Athabasca). In 1967 the board estimated Cold Lake in 
place bitumen ‘reserves’ at 75 billion barrels. By 1981 
the ERCB estimated in place bitumen in Alberta at 
1,163 billion barrels (including 862 in the Athabasca 
and 187 in the Cold Lake deposits). However, the esti-
mated ultimate potential had been cut to about 150 
billion barrels. Initial established syncrude reserves of 
24.5 billion barrels were associated with deposits sim-
ilar to those underlying the two producing oil sands 
mining projects.
In 2003, the board began to update resource and 
reserve estimates for 15 separate oil sands deposits. 
By the time of the 2013 Reserves Report (ST-98), 11 
deposits, including the largest, had been reviewed. As 
of the end of 2012, the ERCB puts in-place bitumen at 
1,844 billion barrels (293.1 billion cubic metres), with 
over 1,500 billion barrels in the Athabasca-Wabasca 
deposits, over 180 billion barrels in the Cold Lake 
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deposits, and 135 billion barrels in the Peace River 
deposits. Initial established reserves of bitumen are 
estimated at 176.8 billion barrels (28.1 billion cubic 
metres), of which 39 billion barrels is mineable and 
138 billion barrels recoverable by in situ means. 
However, only 33.7 billion barrels of this was under 
active development in 2011, 82 per cent of it in mining 
projects, including several projects that had not 
begun yet, but were, in the board’s judgment, likely 
to proceed. The mining projects exhibit an expected 
recovery factor (recovered syncrude as a proportion 
of bitumen in-place) of 29.6 per cent, while the in situ 
projects average 10.4 per cent, usually including 5 per 
cent credited to primary recovery techniques.
These numbers might be compared to the ERCB’s 
estimate for year-end 2012 of Alberta’s initial reserves 
of conventional crude of 18.0 billion barrels (2,863.2 
million cubic metres) and remaining conventional 
crude oil reserves of 1.5 billion barrels (245.9 million 
cubic metres). The current and potential significance 
of the oil sands and heavy oil deposits is evident.
B. Production
In the 1930s and 1940s, various small pilot projects 
produced small amounts of bitumen and syncrude, 
but in a very sporadic manner as projects began and 
folded, going through numerous financial and tech-
nical problems. With the closing of the Bitumount 
plant in 1949, production of non-conventional oil 
ceased. Interest in the oil sands picked up again in the 
mid-1950s, and once again small pilot projects began 
to operate, including a mining venture run by Cities 
Service Athabasca and in situ experiments by Shell 
and Pan Canadian. In 1960, Great Canadian Oil Sands 
Ltd. (GCOS) applied to the OGCB to build a 31,500 
b/d mining plant; permission was given in 1962 and 
the plant (now known as Suncor) began production 
in 1967. (George, 2012, provides a recent history of 
Suncor and the oil sands by one of Suncor’s CEOs.)  
There were a number of other proposed mining pro-
jects in the 1970s, but by 2000 only one other plant 
had been built. In 1967, Syncrude (owned, at the time, 
30% each by Imperial Oil, Atlantic Richfield Canada, 
and Canada-Cities Service and 10% by Gulf Canada) 
applied to the OGCB for an 80,000 b/d mining plant; 
in 1972, permission was given, and, in 1977, produc-
tion began. Both Suncor and Syncrude amended their 
applications to a larger size. By 2013, both Syncrude 
and Suncor had expanded considerably, Syncrude to 
a capacity of 350,000 b/d and Suncor to over 300,000 
b/d. Both companies experienced start-up difficulties 
in the early years of operation and have had occa-
sional shut-down periods for maintenance or due 
to accidents. Reliability since about 1990 has been 
better than earlier, although unexpected closures still 
occur. A third mining venture, Shell’s Albian Sands 
began production in late 2002. The Albian-mined 
bitumen is shipped to a Shell Canada upgrading plant 
near Edmonton, rather than being upgraded on site. 
In September 2008, the Horizon project, owned by 
Consolidated Natural Resources Limited, commenced 
production. As of the end of 2012, these were the only 
mining operations in production, although the ERCB 
regards three other projects as under active develop-
ment, including Fort Hills (owned by Suncor, Teck, 
and UTS Energy), Jackpine (Shell) and Kearl (Imperial 
and ExxonMobil). The Kearl project was slated to 
begin production in spring 2013, at the time of the 
final editing of this volume, with initial output of 
110,000 b/d and an eventual capacity of 345,00 b/d. A 
number of other mining projects have been proposed, 
including planned expansions by existing operators.
Experimental in situ projects have continued to 
produce small volumes of oil, but there have been an 
increasing number of commercial in situ ventures, 
the largest of which is Esso Resources’ Cold Lake 
cyclic steam project, which began in the mid-1980s 
(with a rated capacity of 140,000 b/d of bitumen). 
The EUB (in its Alberta Crude Bitumen Production 
Report) listed 9 ‘commercial schemes’ operating in 
1997, with an average daily bitumen output of 149,350 
b/d (23,706 cubic m/d); 72 per cent of this came from 
Esso Resources’ Cold Lake project. In addition, in 
December 1997, there was 101,400 b/d (16,099 cubic 
m/d) from 55 ‘primary recovery schemes,’ 5,610 b/d 
(891 cubic m/d) from ‘conventional bitumen recovery 
not associated with an approved oil sands project,’ and 
1,600 b/d (255 cubic m/d) from experimental schemes. 
The relative importance of the smaller primary recov-
ery schemes increased during the 1990s. For instance, 
in December of 1993, the ERCB had reported only 13 
such ventures with a total output of 5,580 b/d (887 
cubic m/d). The impetus in oil sands development had 
shifted from the mining and in situ megaprojects to 
smaller ones, many relying on primary recovery. Many 
of these small projects draw on new horizontal drilling 
techniques and may have been encouraged by Alberta 
royalty regulations, which offered some relief to hori-
zontal drilling projects (and to new EOR schemes, in 
some cases).
The Alberta Department of Energy reported that, 
by August 2009, the number of in situ projects in 
operation had risen to 87. The ERCB’s 2013 Reserves 
Report (ST-98) noted that the number of producing 
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wells had increased from 2,300 in 1991 to 11,500 in 
2012 (p. 3-13). In 2012, 25 per cent of bitumen produc-
tion was credited to ‘primary’ recovery techniques 
(which include ‘water and polymer injection’); cyclical 
steam stimulation (used by Esso in its 1980s Cold 
Lake development) contributed 26 per cent, while the 
steam-assisted gravity drainage (SAGD) techniques, 
which became popular in the early 2000s, generated 
49 per cent (p. 3-14). According to the ERCB (2009 
Reserves Report, p. 2-23), the average SAGD well pro-
duces about ten times as much bitumen as wells using 
either of the other techniques.
Table 6.1 in the previous chapter included syn-
thetic crude production in Alberta, showing it rising 
from less than 1 per cent of the total in 1967, when 
the Suncor plant opened, to 3.7 per cent in 1977, to 
13.4 per cent in 1987, 17 per cent in 1997, and 36 per 
cent in 2012. In 2012, almost all the mined bitumen 
output, and 7 per cent of in situ produced bitumen, 
was upgraded to synthetic crude oil at the five Alberta 
upgrading facilities. (The mining projects, Suncor, 
Syncrude, Shell, and Consolidated Natural Resources, 
have all built their own upgrading facilities; in 2009, 
Nexen opened an upgrader at Long Lake, just out-
side Fort McMurray.) Table 7.1 shows yearly synthetic 
crude and bitumen output since the Suncor plant 
began operation in 1967. The lengthy start-up periods, 
and unpredictability of shut-down times, are evident 
for the two mining projects (especially Suncor). Bitu-
men output was about one quarter the size of syn-
thetic crude output in 1984 but had risen to almost 60 
per cent by 1996, and 108 per cent by 2012, indicating 
the growing importance of in situ heavy oil projects 
without associated upgraders.
Year Suncor  Syncrude Total Synthetic Bitumen 
   Crude
1967 72 0 72 42
1968 835 0 835 64
1969 1,601 0 1,610 69
1970 1,904 0 1,904 38
1971 2,451 0 2,451 15
1972 2,963 0 2,963 71
1973 2,906 0 2,906 71
1974 2,654 0 2,654 73
1975 2,506 0 2,474 199
1976 2,810 0 2,779 440
1977 2,641 0 2,611 486
1978 2,629 624 3,239 453
1979 2,425 2,827 5,329 581
1980 2,760 4,691 7,410 556
1981 1,548 4,732 6,446 753
1982 1,011 4,989 6,958 1,281
1983 2,320 6,319 9,258 1,455
1984 2,822 4,961 7,738 1,943
1985 2,175 7,394 9,746 3,030
1986 3,271 7,487 10,728 5,410
1987 2,503 7,918 10,472 6,750
1988 2,972 8,719 11,643 7,540
1989 3,343 8,631 11,901 7,482
1990 3,044 9,086 12,091 7,856
1991 3,552 9,675 13,121 7,113
1992 3,369 10,445 13,778 7,362
1993 3,326 10,736 14,123 7,685
1994 3,579 11,173 15,191 7,810
1995 3,967 11,885 16,328 8,630
Year Suncor  Syncrude Total Synthetic Bitumen 
   Crude
1996 3,895 11,752 16,318 9,505
1997 3,808 12,152 15,960 13,806
1998 4,062 12,322 16,384 16,364
1999 3,712 13,059 16,771 14,171
2000 4,416 11,946 16,362 16,781
2001 4,537 13,142 17,679 17,954
2002 8,050 13,537 21,587 17,560
2003 12,563 12,296 29,522 20,248
2004 12,807 14,085 34,841 22,455
2005 9,936 12,412 31,709 25,553
2006 15,080 14,964 38,093 27,161
2007 13,665 17,689 39,860 29,230
2008 13,230 16,820 38,008 33,047
2009 16,863* 16,248 44,406 33,047
2010 14,999* 17,316 45,918 39,453
2011 17,690* 16,722 50,042 44,209
2012 18,792* 16,617 51,105 52,086
Note: * Excludes the Suncor share of Syncrude output following the August 1, 
2009 merger of Suncor and Petro-Canada.
Sources: Mining project output from ERCB Alberta Oil Sands Annual Statistics 
(series 43, various years) for 1975–96; mining output from Alberta Oil Plant 
Statistics (ST-39) for 1997–2004, 2010.  Other data from ERCB Alberta Oil and 
Gas Annual Statistics (ST-17, various years), and ERCB, Alberta Energy Resource 
Industry Monthly Statistics (ST-3, various years).  For years 1967–69 data in 
barrels was converted to cubic metres by assuming 6.3 b per cubic metre.  For 
1967–74 it was assumed that all synthetic crude came from the Suncor plant. 
The 2003 and 2005–12 data for Suncor and Syncrude come from the compa-
nies’ web sites.
Table 7.1: Alberta Oil Sands Production, 1967–2012 (103 m3 per year)
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Prospects for future oil sands production are good. 
Of course, such forecasts are subject to a wide range 
of uncertainty, but they illustrate the prevailing opti-
mistic expectations regarding oil sands production. 
Chapter Six, commented briefly on the necessity for 
market expansion as oil sands output rises. In 2013, the 
ERCB (Reserves Report, ST-98) projected mined crude 
bitumen output of 1,602,000 b/d by the year 2022 (up 
from 930,000 b/d in 2012). Since 2006, the board had 
reduced its medium-term mined bitumen output fore-
casts somewhat. On the other hand, in recent years, 
the board has increased its estimates of future in situ 
bitumen production; the 2013 Reserves Report saw 
output rising from 992,000 b/d in 2012 to 2,207,000 
b/d in 2022. As noted, mined bitumen is currently 
upgraded. The precise nature of the upgrading varies 
somewhat (pp. 2–24 in the 2010 Reserves Report):
Suncor produces light sweet and medium 
sour crudes plus diesel, while Syncrude, CNRL 
Horizon, and Nexen Long Lake produce light 
sweet synthetic crude, and the Shell upgrader 
produces intermediate refinery feedstock for 
the Shell Scotford Refinery, as well as sweet 
and heavy SCO.
In early 2013 it was announced by Suncor and Total 
that their projected Voyager upgrader had been can-
celled. Even before this announcement, the ERCB had 
expected the proportion of bitumen sold, relative to 
syncrude, to rise.
The sharp rise in world oil prices after 2004 was 
undoubtedly a factor encouraging expansion of oil 
sands output. At the same time, a number of news-
paper reports indicated that companies were also 
revising their expected costs in an upward direction. 
Such cost inflation had been seen in the earlier con-
struction boom, with Suncor and Syncrude, and 
seems to reflect a combination of design modifica-
tions, errors in cost estimation and rising input costs 
(spurred in part by the increased industry activity 
due to higher oil prices). In the following section, we 
examine the costs of oil sands production.
C. Costs
In our discussion of costs, we will focus mainly on 
costs for the mining projects, for which individual 
project costs are more readily available and may 
exhibit somewhat greater consistency across projects 
than do costs for the greater number, and generally 
smaller scale, of in situ ventures.
As discussed above, the 1960s saw the beginning 
of large-scale private production of bitumen deposits 
in Alberta. Profit expectations have not always been 
realized as the investor hoped, in part because pro-
ject costs have often escalated and in part because it 
has been harder to attain and maintain output levels 
than was expected. This is especially apparent with oil 
sands mining projects. The unexpected rapid increases 
in world oil prices after 1972 were a great help to high 
cost oil projects and played a role in the increased 
interest in in situ recovery starting in the late 1970s.
Per barrel cost estimates for oil sands oil are dif-
ficult to derive, in part because much of the actual 
cost information is confidential to the companies 
concerned. However, some information has been pro-
vided in company annual reports and applications to 
governments and in public statements from company 
officials. It is useful to divide syncrude costs into at 
least three components – capital costs, operating costs, 
and ‘government take’ (taxes and royalties). The last 
of these will be discussed below and has frequently 
been subject to negotiation between companies and 
governments. The operating cost can be calculated 
on an annual basis as operating expenditures divided 
by annual output. It is often considered to include a 
‘fixed’ and a variable component. The fixed compon-
ent consists of expenditures that must be undertaken 
as soon as the decision is made to run the plant this 
year instead of shutting it down, whereas the variable 
operating expenses are those extra costs incurred 
each time an extra barrel is produced. The unit oper-
ating cost will be particularly high in those years in 
which there are technical operating difficulties; this 
is because the fixed operating costs must be spread 
over a smaller annual output and because operating 
expenditures on maintenance and repair will likely be 
higher. Economists usually calculate the unit capital 
cost as a ‘supply cost’ that spreads the total capital 
cost over the lifetime output of the plant and which 
includes a normal profit allowance as a cost. (Formally 
the supply cost is the present value of capital expendi-
tures divided by the present value of output, where 
the present values are calculated on the basis of the 
‘marginal opportunity cost of investment’ (the normal 
profit rate of return). The supply cost is, therefore, 
a unit charge on output that will generate a present 
value total just equal to the present value of the capital 
costs.) An unexpected breakdown that shifts output 
into the future has the effect of raising the capital cost 
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of production since the present value of output will 
be reduced. Expressed in other terms, per unit capital 
cost estimates are dependent, not only on the accuracy 
of the capital cost numbers, but also on the accuracy 
of the output estimates for the project.
As discussed above, in 1950 Sidney Blair had 
estimated that a 20,000 b/d mining, separation, and 
upgrading project would be able to produce synthetic 
crude delivered to Edmonton for $2.08/b excluding a 
normal profit allowance. Allowing for general infla-
tion (the GDP price deflator) and assuming a 1950 cost 
with normal profit of $2.20, this would imply a cost in 
1965 of $3.18/b. The actual price of Redwater crude at 
Edmonton in 1965 was $2.62/b. This simple calculation 
would suggest that oil sands oil was not economic in 
the 1950s or early 1960s. However, two commercial 
ventures were initiated in the 1960s, Suncor and Syn-
crude. Can we say anything about their costs?
When Suncor was announced, it was expected 
to have a capital cost of $110 millions and a capacity 
of 31,500 b/d. A conservative estimate of the implied 
per unit capital cost can be calculated by asking what 
the supply cost would be for an infinite life project, 
costing $110 million this year and commencing 
production this year at 11,500,000 b/year. The cost 
depends on the normal profit rate chosen. At a 10 per 
cent rate, the implied capital cost is $0.96/b. (This 
combines a variety of errors. Since the $110 million 
is spread over time, its present value will be reduced 
slightly lowering the capital cost. However, the supply 
cost would be higher if it took account of the fact that 
present value output is overstated by this calculation. 
It would be lower than this cost since output too is 
delayed, since the project will likely have a 25- or 
30-year life rather than an infinite one and since the 
project will not run at capacity all days in the year. 
On balance, the $0.96 understates costs.) The OGCB 
Feb.1964 Report on the Suncor (GCOS) application 
noted that cost escalation had increased the estimated 
capital cost to $137 millions (an implied per barrel cost 
of $1.20 on our rough estimate). Estimated operating 
costs had also increased. Both GCOS and the board 
now viewed the 31,500 b/d project as uneconomic. 
Hence GCOS was applying for a capacity increase to 
45,000 b/d of bitumen, at a capital cost of $171 million 
($1.04/b on our basis). Camp (1976, p. 63) reports that 
Suncor ended up spending $230 millions for a capacity 
of 45,000 b/d. Calculating as before, this implies a 
capital supply cost of $1.40/b. (In 1974, Suncor applied 
to increase capacity to 65,000 b/d, without any further 
capital expenditures. This would give a lower implied 
per barrel capital cost.) Suncor began producing in 
1967 with a rated capacity of 45,000 b/d but did not 
attain that output level until 1972, as a result of signifi-
cant start-up difficulties.
Reports by company spokesmen in the mid-1990s 
suggest that operating costs for both Suncor and 
Syncrude had been over $20/b in the late 1980s. How-
ever, they were falling, presumably as a result both of 
increased plant reliability and also due to efficiency 
improvements (due in part to what many call ‘learn-
ing-by-doing’). Syncrude reported that operating costs 
in 1997 were $13.78/b and could fall as low as $10/b by 
the early years of the twenty-first century (Syncrude 
Canada, Annual Report, 1997; note that, with inflation 
in the economy, real operating costs per barrel are 
falling even more than these numbers indicate). If we 
assume a $13/b operating cost for Suncor and increase 
the $1.40/b capital cost for GDP price inflation from 
1967 to 1997 (the investor would need payments to 
compensate him for rising costs over time due to 
inflation), we would find a total cost of production of 
$19.65/b ($13 + $6.65), as compared to an average price 
for synthetic oil in 1997 of $27.84/b. (However, from 
the viewpoint of 1967, if that year’s price of $2.80/b 
had increased by the GDP deflator, the 1967 real price 
would have been only $13.30/b. That is, it was the 
rising real price of oil that would have allowed prof-
itable operations by the late 1990s.) Hence, it would 
seem that crude oil prices since the early 1980s would 
have been high enough to cover the costs of a ‘Suncor,’ 
given the operating-cost savings that have been real-
ized, but it is not at all clear that the prices anticipated 
in 1967 would have done so.
Syncrude’s capital costs were much higher, for 
reasons that are not entirely clear. Among factors 
leading to higher costs are: (1) high inflation in the 
mid-1970s, (2) higher cost increases for the petroleum 
industry than other sectors of the economy as oil and 
gas activities increased with the OPEC-induced price 
rises beginning in the early 1970s, and (3) unexpected 
design adjustments as the Syncrude project came 
closer to completion. In its first guise, a consortium 
including Cities Service, Atlantic, Imperial Oil, and 
Royalite filed an application with the OGCB for a 
100,000 b/d mining project to produce syncrude with 
an expected capital cost of $356 million ($0.98/b on 
our rough calculations). For reasons to be discussed 
below, OGCB permission was not granted. In 1964, the 
group re-constituted itself as Syncrude and filed in 
1968 for an 80,000 b/d plant, which the OGCB author-
ized in 1969. In 1971, Syncrude filed an amended 
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application to increase capacity to 125,000 b/d, with an 
estimated capital cost of $500 million, implying a cost 
per barrel (using our approximation) of $1.10. By the 
time production began in 1977, actual capital expendi-
tures had escalated to $2.2 billion ($4.82/b).
Syncrude was the last oil sands mining venture in 
Alberta in the twentieth century. A number of other 
proposals were advanced, most notably the Alsands 
project in the 1980s (25% owned by Esso Resources, 
20% by Canadian Occidental, 20% by Gulf Canada, 
15% by Petro-Canada, 10% by Pan Canadian, and 10% 
by the Government of Alberta). The 1991/92 Annual 
Report of the Alberta Department of Energy esti-
mated that it would produce 80,000 b/d of syncrude 
at a capital cost of $5.4 billion or $18.50/b! In 1982, 
Brandie et al. (1982, p. 158) reported likely costs for a 
140,000 b/d syncrude plant. Operating costs were esti-
mated at $16/b (excluding taxes and royalties). Capital 
expenditures included a low estimate of $5.1 billion 
($9.98/b) and a high estimate of $8.5 billion ($16.63/b). 
Eglington and Uffelman (1984) estimated the cost of 
upgraded crude from the proposed Alsands project 
at $33/b to $48/b and suggested it would not be eco-
nomic at anticipated world oil prices.
However, the expansion of Suncor and Syncrude 
apparently allows the realization of economies that 
lower unit capital costs for the incremental output. 
Presumably, it is possible to fit in new facilities that 
utilize spare capacity in existing facilities and to inte-
grate new capital with old in ways that realize efficien-
cies. For example, the ‘Syncrude 21’ expansion was 
estimated to involve capital expenditures of $6 billion 
from 1999 to 2010, while increasing output from 
220,000 b/d to 425,000 b/d. Our rough method of 
cost estimation shows a capital cost of $8.01/b for the 
incremental output. Combined with operating costs of 
about $12/b, this expansion would be profitable at oil 
prices over $20/b, apart from royalties and taxes.
Given the cost estimates of the 1980s, and the fall 
in world oil prices after 1985, it is hardly surprising 
that Syncrude was the last mining project opened 
before the millennium. In the early 1980s, however, 
many were optimistic about the possibilities for 
additional oil sands mining projects, partly because 
of the persistent, and long-standing, tendency to 
underestimate costs, and partly because of overesti-
mates of oil prices. For example, Volume III of Foster 
Research’s 1980 report for the Alberta government 
on A Re-assessment of the Elements of an Economic 
Strategy for the Province of Alberta offered a ‘refer-
ence case scenario’ in which mining plant capacity 
in the year 2000 was over 1,100,000 b/d, including 
expanded Suncor and Syncrude plants, the Alsands 
plant, and three large new mining projects. On the 
other hand, the National Energy Board in its June 1981 
Supply-Demand Report showed a ‘base case’ in which 
only Alsands came on stream prior to 2000. The 1992 
NEB Supply-Demand Report showed no new oil sands 
mining projects by the year 2010, estimating supply 
costs in the $22 to $30 per barrel range. (Chapter 
Eight, Table 8.3, includes more information on the 
NEB’s cost estimates for syncrude and bitumen.)
In the late 1990s, a number of companies began to 
express renewed interest in large-scale oil sands pro-
jects, although the fall in oil prices in 1998 injected a 
note of hesitancy into some of these announcements. 
(In mid-February 1999, Alberta light crude was sell-
ing at under $17/b.) In February 1998, the EUB gave 
approval to a 140,000 b/d Shell project, the Albian 
Sands project, which would mine bitumen north of 
Fort McMurray, then ship it by a slurry pipeline to an 
upgrader just outside of Edmonton. The expected cap-
ital cost of $3.2 billion translates into approximately 
$6.26/b. As was noted above, beginning in the early 
2000s, a number of companies revised their cost esti-
mates in an upward direction, indicating sharp cost 
inflation, a process that continued over the next five 
years. By 2007, many were suggesting that integrated 
oil sands projects would be just economic at oil prices 
as high as $50/barrel. To illustrate the higher cost 
estimates, the December 18, 2010, Globe and Mail (p. 
B10) reported on an agreement between Suncor and 
Total in which the two would cooperate on invest-
ment in two bitumen mining projects, with capital 
costs of $6 billion and $9.5 billion and output levels 
of 100,000 b/d and 160,000 b/d, respectively. Also 
proposed was a 200,000 b/d upgrader at capital cost 
of $6 billion. Using our approximation of per unit 
capital costs, this translates into $16.44/b for mined 
bitumen and $8.22/b to upgrade it to syncrude, for a 
total capital cost of about $25/b; with the recent levels 
of operating costs discussed below, total per barrel 
costs for syncrude would come close to $45/b, and 
higher once royalties and income taxes are included. 
(Since the royalty/tax component is price dependent, 
it is difficult to include them in a cost estimate.) Costs 
may have been rising since then. The ERCB, in its 
2013 Reserves Report (ST–98, p. 3-25), estimated that 
bitumen from in situ SAGD would require a WTI price 
of U.S.$50–80/b; mined bitumen would need WTI at 
U.S.$70-85/b.
As can be seen, cost estimates for mining projects 
have varied dramatically over the years. We suspect 
that costs for smaller-scale in situ ventures show at 
least as much variation, both in initial estimates and 
in actual outcome. The industry expenditure data 
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reported by CAPP allow estimates over time of the unit 
operating costs and royalties for oil sands production 
(from both mining and in situ production). Figure 7.1 
shows per barrel operating costs and royalties for the 
years 1968 through 2011. Operating costs started at 
under $5/b in 1968, and then rose dramatically to over 
$20/b in the years 1978 and 1982. They fell after that, 
hovering around $12/b after the mid-1980s until rising 
sharply again after 2005. Syncrude’s Annual Reports 
show its operating costs falling to around $12/b in the 
late 1990s, but then rising above $16/b in the early 
2000s, apparently reflecting a number of operating 
problems and shut-down periods. (Royalties will be 
discussed below.)
Two components of operating cost are particularly 
critical, since oil sands projection techniques (particu-
larly mining projects) are energy- and water-intensive. 
Hence costs are sensitive to the prices of these 
resources, and the policy issues and uncertainties 
related to each.
Thus far, natural gas has been the major energy 
source utilized. A CERI oil sands study (Dunbar et al., 
2004, pp. 60 and 67) suggests that one barrel of bitu-
men from a mining project requires between 250 and 
300 feet of natural gas, while an integrated mining, 
separation, and upgrading project uses between 400 
and 750 Mcf per barrel of synthetic crude. Using 
the average values, this implies that a two dollar per 
Mcf rise in the price of natural gas would increase 
the annual operating costs of a 100,000 b/d bitumen 
mining venture by some $20 million (about 0.55 cents 
per barrel); the operating cost for a synthetic crude 
operation of the same size would rise by over $40 mil-
lion per year (or a little under $1.20 per barrel). The 
CERI study notes a rule of thumb for in situ bitumen 
ventures of 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas per barrel 
of bitumen, but reports a range of 510 to 1610 cubic 
feet, depending on the required steam to oil ratio. The 
rule of thumb value implies that a $2/Mcf increase in 
the natural gas price would raise the bitumen cost by 
$2/barrel.
Rapidly rising gas prices in the early 2000s 
increased operating costs for the oil sands and 
spurred interest in alternative energy sources. There 
were occasional presentations of the argument that 
costs might be reduced if the oil sands operators 
were able to self-generate the required energy, for 

























































Figure 7.1 Unit Oil Sands Operating Costs and Royalties, 1968–2011
Source: CAPP, Statistical Handbook, 2012, Tables 3.2a and 4.16a.
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hydrocarbons from the heavy oil. The argument is 
curious because the appropriate cost of an input is 
its ‘opportunity cost.’ Hence gas produced from the 
heavy oil resource is not costless but has an economic 
cost equal to the price one might sell it at; if natural 
gas prices rise, the value of the self-produced gas also 
increases. The decline in North American natural gas 
prices after 2009 would, of course, reduce oil sands 
operating costs.
A further complication relates to the controver-
sial question of whether energy and water inputs are 
bearing their full social costs (Nikiforuk, 2008). If not 
(for example, because energy prices fail to include 
environmental costs such as those associated with 
global warming, or water is underpriced), then oil 
sands operating costs could increase appreciably in 
the future as government programs are introduced 
to address such inefficiencies. Of course, such input 
price rises encourage input substitution, which can 
be particularly effective for new ventures. Thus, use 
of alternative energy sources such as nuclear power 
or coal (which could produce hydrogen as an injec-
tion fluid), increased use of carbon dioxide as an 
injection substance, and greater water recycling could 
well result.
There can be no doubt that output from the oil 
sands is costly, frequently more costly than has been 
anticipated, often due to unexpected technical prob-
lems. Operating costs fell somewhat from the mid-
1980s, especially in real terms, but development and 
operating costs are still high, and there are continuing 
uncertainties attendant to the cost estimates. Escal-
ating costs may reflect ever-present design problems 
and may be providing some incentive to companies to 
phase in projects more gradually, and in smaller incre-
ments. The high costs have meant that anticipated oil 
prices play a major role in project planning. Moreover, 
costs must be considered from both a project and an 
industry perspective, since oil sands production is 
concentrated in a relatively small regional economy. 
Greater construction activity puts pressure on local 
input supplies and requires greater in-migration of 
workers and materials. The labour and goods mar-
kets react through price increases that attract more 
workers and supplies from outside the region. Price 
increases also raise costs to local producers, thereby 
discouraging some projects and freeing inputs for 
other projects (such as the oil sands plants). This can 
raise major problems for the local community; for 
instance, the projects squeezed out by rising input 
costs might be local government services and com-
munity and recreational facilities (Nikiforuk, 2008). 
These broad-based regional economic effects raise the 
possibility that a more active government role is desir-
able to address inefficiencies in market reactions and/
or to help smooth adjustment costs. Examples of the 
former might be government investment in vocational 
training for specific skills in short supply and provi-
sion of information in other regions of job opportun-
ities in northern Alberta. Examples of the latter might 
include financial aid from Edmonton to local govern-
ments for infrastructure such as roads and schools.
More controversial, as government policy, would 
be a requirement that the licensing of projects take 
into explicit account the ‘optimal timing’ of construc-
tion in light of socio-economic adjustment costs. 
Thus far, the ERCB has noted some of these problems 
but has not explicitly taken them into account when 
issuing approvals for expansions or new facilities; this 
has lead some to suggest that it is failing to uphold its 
responsibilities to assess the extent to which projects 
are in the public interest (Fluker, 2005; Nikiforuk, 
2008). The government, as much as market forces, 
would then be playing an active role in selecting 
which project would proceed and when. Growth 
pressures on the local economy, including input 
price inflation, could be moderated. However, the 
government, or its regulatory representative, would 
have to develop criteria to distinguish amongst com-
peting projects to see which would be approved first, 
and it must be recognized that some local workers, 
homeowners, and businesses might prefer to see their 
services rise in value.
4. Government Policy in the Oil Sands
A.	Mineral	Rights
As noted, Alberta decided in 1950 that oil sands 
development would be undertaken by the private 
sector. Bitumen leases were generally issued following 
application to the government, rather than through 
the competitive bidding process used for most con-
ventional petroleum mineral leases. This reflected the 
uncertain economics of the oil sands, and the desire 
to encourage companies to develop and test new 
technologies. More recently (since 1992), bonus bids 
have been solicited on leases on oil sands lands, but 
bids per hectare have been low compared to much 
land more promising for conventional oil or natural 
gas; this is not surprising given the relatively high 
expected costs, and low prices, of bitumen. Bitumen 
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and oil sands leases have also incurred annual rent-
als. (For example, the 1978 regulations for oil sands 
leases specified an annual rental of $2.50 to $3.50 
per hectare.)
Oil sands leases have generally applied only to the 
geologic formations that hold the oil sands, thereby 
allowing the government to issue conventional pet-
roleum mineral rights for other formations on the 
same land area. In the late 1990s, some potential oil 
sands operators were questioning the wisdom of this 
policy since they felt that the production of natural 
gas from formations adjacent to oil sands formations 
might serve to reduce recovery of in situ bitumen. The 
EUB held hearings on this issue, and in 2004 the EUB 
issued an interim order that a significant number of 
natural gas wells in the oil sands area be shut in. A 
final decision, EUB Decision 2005-122 of November 
2005, reaffirmed the shut-in of 917 natural gas wells.
By the mid-1950s companies were beginning to 
take up bitumen leases (starting in 1961 the leases were 
issued as ‘oil sands leases’). These were 21-year leases, 
renewable for another 21-year term, and then for a 
third 21-year term, so long as the lease had attained a 
minimum output level specified in the lease. (In the 
mid-1990s, the government amended these regula-
tions so that third-term renewals were possible so 
long as the operator and the EUB had agreed upon 
a plan to commence production.) From 1 lease at 
March 31, 1946, covering 3,834 acres, the number of 
outstanding leases rose to 9 (17,788 hectares) in 1956, 
86 (1,254,409 ha) in 1962, 138 (1,686,815 ha) in 1970, 
197 (2,023,000 ha) in 1979, and 345 (2,032,000 ha) in 
1994. By March 31, 1996, a total of 526 leases covered 
about half of Alberta’s estimated bitumen in place; 
118 of these leases were in their second term, some 
nearing the end. By fall 2003, a total of 1,807 leases 
were in operation covering 32,000 square kilometres 
(3,200,000 ha), and from then until March 31, 2010, 
another 5 million hectares were issued. (Data are from 
the Annual Reports of the provincial government 
department handling mineral rights; outstanding lease 
areas were not reported for 1996 or subsequently; 
new leases after 2003 are from the Annual Summary 
of Oil Sands Public Offerings on the Department of 
Energy’s website.)
B. Approvals
Before commercial syncrude production can com-
mence, provincial government approval is required 
for the project. An initial report (usually following a 
public hearing) by the ERCB (previously OGCB, and 
EUB) makes a recommendation to the Lieutenant 
Governor-in-Council. After the provincial gov-
ernment gives approval, the ERCB issues an order 
allowing production. Approval depends on the project 
being in the ‘social interest,’ but the critical question 
is what this means. The ERCB has, at various times, 
considered a number of factors including the tech-
nical efficiency of the project (does it use a viable 
technology? does it recover a sufficient proportion 
of the bitumen in place? is the upgrading procedure 
efficient?, etc.), the economic and financial viability of 
the project, the social and regional impact, environ-
mental effects, the impact on government revenue, 
and others. (See Atkins and MacFadyen, 2008. Fluker, 
2005, McCullum, 2006, and Nikiforuk, 2008, argue 
that the ERCB has been negligent in failing to take a 
broad enough view of the Alberta public interest.)
In the 1960s, however, the key issue was the 
impact that a large oil sands project would have on 
the conventional petroleum industry. Two factors 
made this an important matter. The first was the high 
cost and large scale of oil sands mining projects. It 
was assumed that economic viability depended on 
their operation at full capacity (so that the high cap-
ital costs and significant ‘fixed’ operating costs could 
be recovered as quickly as possible), and large plants 
were needed to realize economies of scale. The second 
factor was the provincial market-demand prorationing 
scheme, which, in the early 1960s, fixed the output of 
the conventional Alberta oil industry at only about 50 
per cent of productive capacity. (Chapter Ten looks in 
detail at prorationing. Simply put, prorationing regu-
lations restricted oil production to estimated market 
demand at current prices.) If a new oil sands project 
were to provide oil to customers who would otherwise 
buy conventional Alberta crude, prorationing regu-
lations would have to cut back conventional produc-
tion even further. The government faced an obvious 
dilemma. On the one hand, it wished to encourage 
development of technologies that would unlock the 
large bitumen resource base. On the other hand, this 
would mean displacing relatively low-cost conven-
tional crude with high-cost syncrude.
The issue was recognized as early as 1955, when the 
Bituminous Sands Act was passed with a key provision 
ensuring that the Oil and Gas Resources Conservation 
Act of 1950 did not apply to surface mining oil sands 
projects or the sale of the resultant products. We shall 
trace the evolution of the Alberta policy with respect 
to oil sands development through the historical appli-
cations for approval.
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GCOS 1960 Application. As discussed above, 
Suncor (then known as Great Canadian Oil Sands, 
GCOS) applied for a 31,500 b/d integrated mining pro-
ject in 1960. GCOS indicated that almost all the output 
would be sold to two Sarnia refineries, owned by Sun 
and Canadian Oil Companies, largely using conven-
tional Alberta crude. The OGCB estimated that 80 per 
cent of the oil displaced would come from Alberta 
and that ‘proratable market demand’ for conventional 
oil would fall by 20–30 per cent (OGCB, 1960, pp. 5, 
73–74). (Proratable market demand was total market 
demand less the well based economic allowances and 
was the basis for the variable output allowable pro-
duction levels under the province’s market-demand 
prorationing regulations.) The size of this impact on 
the conventional industry, along with its doubts about 
project economics, led the OGCB to defer its decision 
and invite GCOS to submit further evidence by June 
1962.
GCOS 1962 Application. The board cited three fac-
tors to aid in assessing the impact of oil sands produc-
tion on Alberta’s conventional oil industry: (1) trends 
in the life index (R/P ratio); (2) capacity utilization; 
and (3) the market-demand prorationing allocation 
factor (OGCB, 1962, p. 39). (The prorationing factor 
was essentially the proportion of productive capacity 
a well was allowed to use under market-demand pro-
rationing.) On October 2, 1962, the OGCB approved 
the GCOS (Suncor) project for a 31,500 b/d capacity 
plant. It argued that the impact of the project on the 
market for conventional oil, the allocation factor, and 
the ratio of output to capacity was not sufficient “to 
have any serious detrimental effect on the conven-
tional oil industry” (OGCB, 1962, p. 42).
Oil Sands Development Policy of 1962. The provin-
cial government accepted the OGCB recommendation, 
but Premier Manning took the occasion in October 
1962 to announce a provincial policy on oil sands 
developments. The policy statement is reprinted as 
Appendix B in the February 1964 Report of the OGCB 
on the GCOS application for expansion (OGCB, 1964a). 
The statement noted that
the Government has an obvious responsibility 
to regulate the timing and the extent of oil 
sands production to protect the interests of the 
public as the owners of the resource....
Obviously it would be detrimental to 
the public interest to permit unregulated 
development of an alternative source of supply 
to impair the economic soundness of the 
conventional oil industry by further reducing 
its already limited market. … Having regard 
to these circumstances, the policy of the 
Government will be to so regulate oil sand 
production that it will supplement but not 
displace conventional oil. At the same time, an 
opportunity will be provided for the orderly 
development of the oil sands within the limits 
dictated by the Government’s responsibility to 
the public interest in preserving the stability of 
conventional oil development. …
The Policy Statement suggested that there were two 
categories of oil sands oil. “For such production from 
the oil sands as may be able to reach markets clearly 
beyond present or foreseeable reach of Alberta’s con-
ventional industry, there is no need to restrict the rate 
of production.” However, three criteria were imposed 
for oil sands oil that did compete with conventional oil 
in “present or foreseeable markets”:
(a) in the initial stages of oil sands development, 
by restricting production to some 5 per cent of 
the total demand for Alberta oil – i.e., at a level 
of the order of that recently approved for Great 
Canadian;
(b) as market growth enables the conventional 
industry to produce at a greater proportion 
of its productive capacity, by permitting 
increments in oil sands production 
as recommended by the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Board, and on a scale, and so 
timed, as to retain incentive for the continued 
growth of the conventional industry; and
(c) by relating the scale and timing of increments 
of oil sands production also to the life index of 
proven reserves of conventional oil allowing 
the index to decline gradually from present 
levels but ensuring that it does not drop below 
12 to 13 years.
1963 Applications by Cities Service et al. and Shell. 
In early 1963, the OGCB held hearings on two new 
mining project applications, one by a group led by 
Cities Service Athabasca (including also Imperial 
Oil, Richfield Oil, and Royalite Oil) for a 100,000 
b/d mining plant, and a second by Shell Canada for 
a 97,000 b/d project. The board interpreted the 1962 
government policy as favouring the sharing of any 
market growth in excess of that which would main-
tain the conventional industry’s level of capacity 
utilization. So long as this capacity utilization grew 
by at least one percentage point per year, the ‘excess’ 
market growth could be shared between conven-
tional and oil sands production. However, the board 
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argued (OGCB, 1963, pp. 231–32) that these projects 
would violate the provincial policy: synthetic crude 
output would exceed 5 per cent of the market; the R/P 
ratio wasn’t likely to fall below 12–13 years within the 
forecast period the board was using; and even syn-
thetic crude of 100,000 b/d commencing in 1971 (let 
alone what these two projects planned) would deny 
growth opportunities for conventional oil until 1973. 
Both projects were denied, but the board would allow 
reconsideration of the projects up to the end of 1968.
Additional GCOS Application, 1963. In Septem-
ber 1963, GCOS filed an application to increase the 
capacity of their project to 45,000 b/d, arguing that 
a larger capacity was economically essential. Clearly 
the 1962 government Policy Statement provided a 
rough guideline that the OGCB had to interpret in a 
specific manner. From an economic point of view, the 
two-fold market distinction was strange. Why should 
there be markets for high-cost oil sands oil that were 
not accessible to lower-cost conventional oil? If there 
were significant buyer power in the crude oil market, 
a refiner might refuse to buy oil from conventional 
producers in Alberta but be willing to switch from 
non-Alberta producers to its own oil sands oil. How-
ever, in a reasonably competitive market, conventional 
light Alberta oil and syncrude should be equally 
appealing to a prospective buyer. The OGCB seems to 
have accepted the competitive market view as it took 
“the position that the boundaries to such markets are 
geographical, and would not be defined according 
to individual company policies” (OGCB, 1964a, pp. 
60–61). Hence, the three criteria (a), (b), and (c) were 
the critical ones. In essence, the OGCB undertook 
forecasts of consumption of Alberta oil and conven-
tional reserves additions and then saw what conven-
tional oil output would be at different hypothetical 
syncrude production levels; this allowed assessment 
of syncrude’s share of demand (was it close to 5% as 
(a) required?), of spare capacity in the conventional 
industry (was the percentage of spare capacity falling 
as (b) required?), and of the R/P ratio (was it around 
13% as (c) required?). In 1964, the board approved the 
GCOS amended application, even though at startup 
the project was expected to absorb 7.5 per cent of the 
market for Alberta oil. While this was seen as beyond 
“a narrow interpretation” of the five per cent limit, 
the project was seen as falling “within the intent of 
the policy for the initial development of the oil sands” 
(OGCB, 1964, p. 80).
Oil Sands Development Policy of 1968. A new oil 
sands policy was issued by the government in Febru-
ary 1968 (reprinted as Appendix A, Part 2 in OGCB, 
1968) in response to several developments since 1962. 
These included the 1964 modifications to the prora-
tioning plan that had reduced incentives to develop 
extra conventional crude oil production capacity. In 
addition, the market for Alberta oil had grown more 
slowly than the OGCB had expected, and several new 
oil plays had added to conventional reserves, so that 
the R/P ratio in 1968 was at 31 years, much higher 
than the 21 years the board had forecast. A number of 
modifications were made to the oil sands policy:
•	 The	oil	sands	provisions	were	extended	to	heavy	
oil deposits like Cold Lake.
•	 ‘Beyond	reach’	markets	(definitely	accessible	to	
oil sands output) were not to be interpreted in a 
purely geographic sense. Rather, they were to be 
interpreted as any markets, including ‘specialty 
markets,’ not served, nor expected to be served 
in the foreseeable future because of price, quality 
specifications, or other reasons.
•	 For	‘within	reach’	markets,	the	capacity	utilization	
requirements were dropped, leaving the trend in 
the R/P ratio as the prime criterion. In addition, 
if an applicant could demonstrate provision of 
additional growth in demand by developing a 
‘new’ within reach market, then 50 per cent of the 
new market could be granted to the applicant. A 
‘new’ market was “one not being served today; 
one over and above growth in existing markets; 
and one representing a net increase in the total 
market.” However, up to 1973, oil sands production 
in such ‘new’ markets was limited to 150,000 b/d 
including the 45,000 b/d from GCOS.
Syncrude (Cities Service) Application, 1968. In 1968, an 
amended application was made by the Cities Services 
group for an 80,000 b/d oil sands project. The oper-
ating company would be Syncrude Canada. Each 
Syncrude member proposed to market its share of the 
project’s oil in ‘new within reach’ and ‘beyond reach’ 
markets. The board, in its decision, fleshed out the 
1968 government policy distinction between ‘within 
reach’ and ‘beyond reach’ markets (OGCB, 1968, 
pp. 73–74):
•	 ‘Within	reach’	markets	were	defined	geograph-
ically by the current and prospective pipeline 
network available to Alberta producers; ‘beyond 
reach’ markets lay outside this geographic area. 
However, the board did allow for specialty markets 
in the ‘within reach’ geographic area which were 
not serviceable, now or in the foreseeable future, 
by the conventional industry; such specialty mar-
kets would be classified as ‘beyond reach.’
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•	 The	board	set	out	its	interpretation	of	the	three	
criteria for ‘new within reach’ markets. This 
would include ‘within reach’ requirements not 
served by Canadian sources of supply. ‘Markets 
over and above normal growth’ had to allow for 
increased penetration by conventional oil over 
the medium term, so would involve accelerated 
market acquisition and could involve serving a 
market which otherwise would be unlikely to use 
oil from Alberta. The board felt that corporate 
proprietary interests could be important for such 
‘new’ markets. ‘Normal growth’ included growth 
in feedstock requirements for refineries heavily 
dependent on Canadian supplies, increased 
penetration of refineries which were showing 
a trend of rising reliance on Canadian oil, and 
requirements of any refineries with no alternative 
supply sources. A ‘net increase in the total market’ 
would not be satisfied if absorption of Canadian 
supplies in a ‘new within reach’ market displaced 
Canadian supplies to other portions of ‘within 
reach’ markets, or precluded normal growth of 
sales in such markets.
With respect to the Syncrude application, the board 
found that the marketing plans aimed largely at ‘new 
within reach’ export markets were valid and that pro-
posed specialty market sales of syncrude and naphtha 
would satisfy the ‘beyond reach’ criterion. However, 
the board felt that for the export sales to qualify as 
representing a ‘net increase in the total market,’ the 
U.S. restrictions on imports of Canadian oil would 
have to be removed. (The U.S. Oil Import Quota 
Program is discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine.) 
Since it was uncertain whether this would happen, 
especially given the developing oil supplies from the 
North Slope of Alaska, the board refused approval 
of the Syncrude application. It did invite a recon-
sideration of the application in late 1969 if the appli-
cants could provide information to allay the board’s 
concerns about the impact of Alaskan supplies in 
reducing the markets for Canadian oil.
Syncrude’s March 1969 Appeal. In February 1969, 
Syncrude applied to the Alberta government, appeal-
ing the OGCB decision and requesting a new hearing. 
Syncrude argued that uncertainties about Alaskan oil 
supplies could not be resolved at this time. Syncrude 
alluded to new evidence that U.S. oil consumption was 
growing faster than earlier studies had estimated and 
proposed deferring the start-up date of the project 
three years to 1976. Syncrude argued that these factors 
should assuage the board’s concerns about the impact 
on oil imports of a rapid build-up of Alaskan oil pro-
duction. The government referred these matters to the 
OGCB, which invited an amended application from 
Syncrude.
Syncrude’s Amended Application, 1969. After a May 
1969 hearing, the board issued a September Decision 
Report approving the amended Syncrude application. 
The decision was not unanimous, but the majority 
agreed that Syncrude’s plans now met the ‘net increase’ 
criterion. The dissenting board member disagreed 
with this conclusion but saw the proposal as “appro-
priate” in light of the declining trend in the R/P ratio 
and the expected need for oil sands oil to supplement 
conventional oil around the year 1980.
This dissenting opinion was prescient: following 
approval of the Syncrude application, neither the 
government nor the board expressed much concern 
with the question of whether oil sands production 
would reduce the market for conventional Canadian 
oil. The U.S. import quota program was eliminated in 
the early 1970s, and the unsettled world oil market led 
the Canadian and U.S. governments to favour North 
American oil supplies, including oil sands production.
Alberta’s Conservation and Utilization Committee. 
In 1970, the Social Credit government, which had 
been in power since 1935, was defeated by the 
Progressive Conservatives under Peter Lougheed. The 
new government established an internal Conservation 
and Utilization Committee to prepare an oil sands 
development strategy. In a statement of its ‘primary 
objective,’ the Committee noted (p. 5):
Alberta is not under any pressure to develop 
synthetic crude oil from the bituminous 
tar sands for the purpose of meeting either 
Albertan or Canadian petroleum require-
ments. The pressure to develop synthetic crude 
from the tar sands emanates from markets 
external to Canada. … 
… [I]t becomes axiomatic that Alberta’s 
primary objective should be to regulate, 
guide and control the bituminous tar sands 
development in order to meet the growing 
socio-economic needs of Albertans as well as 
Canadians. 
The authors noted that this left a variety of relevant 
concerns (provincial economic development, conserv-
ation, stimulus to Canadian businesses, government 
revenue, regional economic development, manpower 
training, environmental protection) which were not 
all mutually consistent but did provide the guiding 
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principle that “foreign energy demands should not be 
the only force influencing development” (p. 6). The 
“pro-Canadian and pro-Albertan flavour” (p. 27) of 
this approach made itself manifest in suggestions that 
the Canadian engineering and design input should 
be maximized, that the local Fort McMurray region 
should be heavily involved in the planning and imple-
mentation process, and that “[t]he oil sands offer a 
unique opportunity to change the historical trend 
of ever-increasing foreign control of non-renewable 
resource development in Canada” (p. 16). Research 
was suggested to study the feasibility of channelling 
private and public Canadian investment into the oil 
sands. Under the heading “Suggested Dimensions 
of Development Model” (p. 24), it was noted that, 
while “the actual rate would depend on Alberta’s and 
Canada’s capability to generate sufficient capital as 
well as our requirements for socio-economic develop-
ment,” their “projection is based on approximately 
1,000,000 barrels capacity per day by the year 2000.”
Underlying this policy document is a common, 
but debatable, view of the oil sands as an almost lim-
itless constant cost resource. Once the price rises high 
enough that they are economic, they would become 
a perfect substitute for other crude oil supplies. Con-
sumers anxious to reduce dependence on OPEC, and 
unstable Middle Eastern suppliers in particular, will 
turn en mass to the oil sands. From such a perspective, 
it is natural that the government should be concerned 
with the orderly development of the resource. A more 
realistic view casts some doubt on this vision. In the 
first place, the oil sands are not a constant quality 
resource; the depth of the overburden, the bitumen 
content, the serviceability of the deposit, the closeness 
of process water, and other factors vary for mineable 
deposits. There is probably even more variability for 
in situ sources (Ruitenbeek, 1985). However, it does 
seem likely that the long-run supply curve is relatively 
elastic once the oil price is high enough. Moreover, the 
resource base is so large, and the quality of deposits is 
consistent enough over the area necessary to support 
a single project, that the user cost of bitumen produc-
tion is undoubtedly very low. A second problem with 
this view of the oil sands is that it ignores the strategic 
and dynamic nature of world crude oil markets. OPEC 
is acutely aware of the necessity of pricing oil in such 
a way as to maintain markets and would not tolerate a 
large loss of market share to a competitor such as the 
oil sands. In a reasonably well-functioning crude oil 
market, one would expect that potential investors in 
oil sands projects would be aware of this and regulate 
investment accordingly. (Such commercial caution 
could be overridden by some government policies, 
such as, for example, a minimum price guarantee high 
enough to cover capital and operating costs.)
The Conservation and Utilization Committee’s 
report was quite properly concerned with the develop-
ment of Alberta’s oil sands resources in a manner con-
sistent with the public interest. It is likely that the oil 
sands and heavy oil deposits raise potential problems 
beyond those associated with the conventional crude 
oil industry. The huge resource base is regionally con-
centrated, mining mega-projects have relatively high 
manpower requirements during both construction 
and operation, and the separation and upgrading 
processes pose special environmental problems. These 
were, in fact, not entirely new concerns in the early 
1970s, many of them having been considered by the 
OGCB in the 1960s under the guidelines established 
by Manning’s Social Credit government. The 1971 
Progressive Conservative government under Peter 
Lougheed may be seen as offering an oil sands policy 
that differed in two main respects. One was the high 
emphasis placed on the regional economic impact of 
syncrude production. The other was the suggestion 
that direct government investment in oil sands ven-
tures might be desirable. The latter did become an 
important factor, although not for the reasons that the 
Conservation and Utilization Committee suggested.
Syncrude’s Construction. The story of the building 
of the Syncrude project is complicated and overlaps 
in part with negotiations about government take. 
(Pratt, 1976, provides a detailed review of the history 
of Syncrude, although one that is coloured by distrust 
of the major oil companies.) As discussed above, in 
September 1969, the OGCB approved an 80,000 b/d 
Syncrude plant. In December 1971, it approved an 
expansion to 125,000 b/d capacity. The market for 
Alberta oil was growing rapidly, and additions to con-
ventional reserves were slowing with the result that 
the board foresaw continuing declines in the Alberta 
conventional oil R/P ratio (or ‘Life Index,’ as the board 
preferred to call it). Hence the output from Syncrude 
could be absorbed in the market without a significant 
negative effect on the conventional Alberta industry.
By 1973, conflicting pressures were evident. On the 
one hand, escalating costs were inhibiting the private 
Syncrude investors. On the other hand, the 1973 inter-
national oil crisis, and the OPEC price rises in 1973 
and 1974, increased the value of Alberta oil and its 
attractiveness as a North American supply source. The 
Conservation and Utilization Committee had implied 
that there might be such high demand to invest in 
the oil sands that the government would have to limit 
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investment and that both the provincial and federal 
governments might desire to invest themselves in 
order to maintain Canadian control over the resource. 
Rising cost estimates for the Syncrude project changed 
this picture dramatically. It became unclear whether 
any mining projects would be economic, and gov-
ernment involvement became a possible means of 
ensuring that Syncrude went ahead. By 1973, the 
capital cost estimate for Syncrude had escalated from 
$500 million to $2.4 billion. Planned capacity had also 
been raised to 125,000 b/d, but the 56 per cent increase 
paled beside the almost 400 per cent cost rise. Intense 
negotiations between the Syncrude consortium and 
Canadian governments ensued, covering tax/royalty, 
pricing and investment issues, the resultant agree-
ments proving to be very controversial. (Pratt, 1976, 
chaps, 8, 9, 10, and 11, provides a very interesting 
review of the process, while arguing that the govern-
ments caved in to demands of the multinational oil 
companies. Fitzgerald, 1978, chap. 11, reports much 
more favourably on the governments’ roles, suggesting 
that the project would not have proceeded without 
their involvement.) Alberta and Syncrude had reached 
an initial agreement in September 1973, which estab-
lished a new royalty regime unique to Syncrude, 
a provincial-government-established oil company 
(Alberta Energy Company) providing utility and 
transportation infrastructure and taking a minority 
equity share in Syncrude and government guarantees 
of some stability in environmental and trade union 
regulations.
However, the taxation and pricing provisions 
required the agreement of the federal government as 
well. (As will be discussed in Chapter Nine, Ottawa 
had imposed a freeze on the price of crude oil in 
Canada in September 1973, holding it below the inter-
national price, whereas Syncrude and Alberta had 
agreed that Syncrude should obtain the international 
price. Also, the unusual royalty arrangement had to be 
recognized in the corporate income tax regulations.) 
Negotiations were proceeding with Ottawa when, in 
December 1974, Atlantic Richfield announced its with-
drawal from the Syncrude consortium, necessitating a 
reassessment of the project.
A new agreement was reached in Winnipeg on 
February 3, 1975. This affirmed the international 
pricing and royalty provisions of the earlier agree-
ment with Alberta, the provincial infrastructure 
provision and investment in utilities by the Alberta 
Energy Company, and the exemption of Syncrude 
output from prorationing restrictions. The govern-
ments would step in to replace Atlantic Richfield. 
The Winnipeg agreement left equity ownership in 
Syncrude as follows: Imperial Oil, 31.25 per cent; 
Cities Service, 22 per cent; Gulf, 16.75 per cent; Ottawa 
(Petro-Canada), 15 per cent; Alberta, 10 per cent; and 
Ontario, 5 per cent. In addition, Alberta agreed to loan 
$100 million each to Gulf and Cities Service (with 
an option to convert to equity, which was exercised 
1982), and the Alberta Energy Company was given 
an option to buy from 5 per cent to 20 per cent of 
the project, an option that could be exercised before 
cumulative Syncrude output hit 5 million barrels and 
was taken up in 1979. Hence Syncrude, the last oil 
sands mining venture before the turn of the century, 
proceeded with significant direct government invest-
ment. After 1975, the ownership of Syncrude changed 
somewhat. As of 2013, it is as follows: Imperial Oil 
Resources, 25 per cent; Suncor (which acquired the 
Petro-Canada share when the two companies merged 
in August of 2009), 12 per cent; Sinopec Oil Sands 
Partnership (a Chinese state oil company, effective 
April 2010, acquired the ConocoPhillips share, which 
it had gained when it took over Gulf Canada in 2002), 
9.03 per cent; Nexen Oil Sands Partnership (formerly 
Canadian Occidental), 7.23 per cent; Murphy Oil, 5 per 
cent; Mocal Energy (a subsidiary of Nippon Oil from 
Japan), 5 per cent; and Canada Oil Sands Limited, 
36.74 per cent. (The latter is a royalty trust that makes 
payments to its investors on the basis of Syncrude 
operations.)
It is difficult to undertake detailed economic 
analysis of the Syncrude project from either the 
private or social points of view. Private analysis is 
hard, given the changing corporate ownership and 
the lack of detailed cost data. In part, this difficulty 
extends to the government sector as well since the 
governments were equity participants. But analysis 
for the governments is further complicated by uncer-
tainty about exactly what governments were trying to 
achieve with their oil sands investments. Was it sec-
urity of supply (higher Canadian oil production and 
reduced imports)? Was it improved knowledge about 
oil sands production techniques? Broader spread-
ing of commercial risks? Economic diversification? 
Regional economic development in north eastern 
Alberta? Canadian participation in the development 
of oil sands technologies? All of these may have 
been obtained to some extent by the governments’ 
investments in Syncrude, but there is no clear indi-
cation of the value that ought to be placed on such 
benefits.
The sale by the Alberta Government of its equity 
interests in Syncrude in the early 1990s provides some 
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basis for assessing economic returns associated with 
the plant. In December 1993, Alberta sold a 5 per cent 
share in Syncrude to Murphy Oil for $150 million (or 
$30 million for a 1% equity share). In November 1995, 
Alberta sold 11.74 per cent to Torch Energy for $352.2 
million (again $30 million for 1%, a slightly lower 
value, allowing for inflation over the two years since 
1993). If we take $30 million as the value of expected 
discounted profits to an investor in Syncrude for each 
1 per cent ownership share, we can derive a rough 
estimate of the expected profitability of a barrel of 
Syncrude production as seen by market participants 
in the mid-1990s. If we assume that output would 
continue for twenty more years, that Syncrude had a 
capacity of 220,000 b/d, and that the requisite rate of 
return on capital is 10 per cent, then the anticipated 
per barrel profit (after taxes and royalties) would be 
$4.32/b. (The life of the plant is hard to determine. 
Syncrude is now over thirty years old but may be 
able to maintain its separation and upgrading equip-
ment for many years and simply mine new parts of 
the sands; moreover, more efficient use of existing 
equipment has apparently allowed both Syncrude 
and Suncor to expand output somewhat beyond rated 
capacity with minimal new investment. Further, both 
Syncrude and Suncor have undertaken large expan-
sions.) This estimated return is an implicit function 
of the tax/royalty regulations, expected oil prices, 
expected operating costs, and the past depreciation 
and capital cost provisions that dictate how much of 
past capital has been ‘recovered.’
It might be tempting to compare Alberta’s share 
of Syncrude investment to the return from its sale of 
ownership, but it is hard to know how to interpret the 
resultant figure. If Syncrude had a capital cost of $2.4 
billion, a 16.4 per cent cost share would be $394 mil-
lion spent in the mid-1970s, making a return of $502 
million after almost twenty years seem relatively small. 
($394 million invested at 5%/yr would give over $1 bil-
lion after twenty years.) However this calculation fails 
to account for the payments made to the government 
over the years as a partner in Syncrude. These would 
have been relatively small in early years when operat-
ing costs were very high but became more significant 
as operating costs fell. (The 1997 Syncrude Annual 
Report shows operating cash flow, i.e., revenue less 
operating costs and royalties, rising from $6.39/b in 
1993 to $11.34/b in 1997.) Annual Reports of the prov-
incial government’s Energy Department show total 
equity payments to the province from 1980 to 1992 of 
$496.2 million, making the total return to the province 
over the twenty years on its equity investment almost 
$1 billion. (This calculation allows for neither the 
province’s share of Syncrude’s incremental investment 
costs after the first stage nor the time value of money 
in the time flow of these receipts.)
In retrospect, it appears that high risks prob-
ably necessitated active government involvement in 
Syncrude, while recognizing that some of the risks 
were government generated (e.g., risks of changes in 
regulations). An integrated oil sands mining project 
involves a very large capital commitment, and the 
high per unit capital and operating costs mean that 
the project is very vulnerable to falling oil prices.
The other large proposed mining venture in the 
1980s was the Alsands project (or OSLO, Other Six 
Lease Owners project), which was reportedly expected 
to produce 70,000 b/d of syncrude at a capital cost of 
$4.1 billion ($16/b by our rough estimates, based on 
numbers in the 1988/89 Annual Report of the Alberta 
Department of Energy). Another estimate put pro-
duction at 80,000 b/d of syncrude at a capital cost of 
$5.4 billion ($18.50/b). In September 1988, the private 
participants reached an agreement similar to that 
with Syncrude, including federal (10%) and provin-
cial (10%) government equity participation. But in 
February 1990, Ottawa withdrew, and work officially 
stopped two years later. Costs were simply too high, 
given world oil prices in the 1990s.
On the other hand the commercial in situ projects 
of the 1980s (e.g., Esso’s Cold Lake and BP’s Wolf 
Lake, since sold to Amoco, but re-acquired when 
BP and Amoco merged internationally) were under-
taken without government financial contributions, 
even though one of them (Cold Lake) was also very 
large and costly. The large oil sands projects proposed 
in the late 1990s, some proceeding after the turn of 
the century, came from private participants with no 
indication that they required government equity 
participation or loan guarantees, nor any hints that 
governments were considering this possibility. While 
the involvement in Syncrude might be justified on 
grounds of learning or higher private than social risk, 
the judgment now appears to be that oil sands pro-
jects must stand on their own in commercial terms. 
Alberta still requires that such projects be approved 
by the ERCB after demonstrating that they are in the 
public interest by making efficient use of available 
technologies, meeting environmental standards, and 
not placing undue burdens on regional economies 
and infrastructure. Subject to these conditions, the 
Province expects that commercial exploitation of the 




As has been noted, Alberta syncrude is a light, low 
sulphur crude and hence is priced a little higher per 
barrel, delivered to Edmonton, than a typical refer-
ence crude such as Redwater. In general, syncrude 
prices have tracked the light crude oil prices shown in 
Chapter Six. It should be noted that there are unique 
characteristics of synthetic crude oil from the oil sands 
that prevent a typical refinery from running entirely 
on this oil; currently synthetic crude can provide up to 
about 30 per cent of the oil input for such a refinery.
As will be discussed in Chapter Nine, from 1973 
until 1985, there were government price controls on 
Canadian crude oil. These arose after the international 
price rises engineered by OPEC beginning in the early 
1970s and served to keep oil prices in Canada lower 
than international prices. A key issue for potential 
investors in the oil sands was how their oil was to be 
priced under the government price control regula-
tions. As it happened, it was agreed that Syncrude’s 
output would be allowed the international price, even 
while much conventional Alberta crude received 
lower domestic prices. This reflected the presumption 
that syncrude was high cost so would be produced 
only if it were allowed a high price and the realization 
that it would be preferable for Canada to produce 
syncrude rather than importing oil so long as the 
production cost of the syncrude was less than the cost 
of the imported oil. This decision did raise an issue of 
fairness with respect to Suncor. Starting in 1978, it too 
was allowed the world price. Thus from 1978 to 1985, 
synthetic crude was at the world price, rather than the 
domestic controlled price.
If the oil from the oil sands is not upgraded, the 
value of the oil is much less. While bitumen prices 
have tracked the broad trends in lighter crude oil 
prices, the correlation is not perfect; in other words, 
the light oil-bitumen price differential changes over 
time. Part of this reflects the changing relative values 
of light and heavy oil prices. From 1987 through 
2001, the posted price for Lloydminster Heavy oil at 
Hardisty averaged $6/barrel below the Alberta light 
par price; but the differential varied considerably as 
well, from as little as $2/barrel to over $20/barrel. In 
addition, the differential between heavy oil and bitu-
men also changes. Precht and Rokosh (1998) present 
a figure (their Figure 8) plotting Lloydminster Heavy 
and Cold Lake bitumen prices from 1994 to 1998 in 
which bitumen prices are consistently lower than the 
Lloydminster price by amounts varying from $2 to $7 
per barrel. Bitumen prices are not regularly posted, 
but the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board does obtain 
some bitumen price data from producers. Figure 7.2 
shows crude oil price differentials in Alberta from 
2002 to 2011, where the differential between bitumen 
and light oil can be seen as comprising two compon-
ents: (1) the differential between light and heavy oil (as 
represented by the Alberta ‘par’ price less the price of 
heavy oil at Hardisty), and (2) the differential between 
the Hardisty price and that for bitumen. As can be 
seen, the light/bitumen differential over this period 
has varied from as little as $9/b (in summer 2009) to 
$60/b (in spring 2008). In general, the differential rose 
from 2002 to 2005/6, then declined, before hitting the 
spring 2008 peak; after this, it fell back to the levels 
of 2002–4. In 2011, the heavy/bitumen differential 
widened again; in addition, as was discussed in Chap-
ter Six, a significant  differential opened up between 
Alberta and International oil prices. As can be seen in 
Figure 7.2, until 2008 changes were more due to the 
fluctuating light/heavy differential than the heavy/
bitumen differential.
The light oil-bitumen price differential is a prime 
determining factor in the level of bitumen upgrading 
in Alberta. So long as the expected differential is 
higher than the unit cost of upgrading the bitumen 
into a light crude oil, there is an economic incentive 
to build upgraders. Reflection shows that the future 
development of Alberta’s heavy oil industry could 
involve one of a number of rather different paths, 
or some mix thereof. The result will reflect all of 
the following:
•	 the	level	of	future	world	light	crude	oil	prices	and	
the price differentials between lighter crudes and 
both bitumen and the very light hydrocarbons that 
are used as diluents when shipping heavy crude;
•	 current	and	future	techniques	and	costs	for	
shipping light oil and bitumen, and the decline in 
price needed to sell Alberta bitumen or synthetic 
crude in more distant markets;
•	 current	and	future	techniques	and	costs	for	
refining heavy oil and the prices of heavy refined 
petroleum products;
•	 current	and	future	techniques	and	costs	of	
upgrading bitumen into light synthetic crude;
•	 current	and	future	techniques	and	costs	of	refining	
synthetic crude oil; and
•	 current	and	future	techniques	and	costs	of	
shipping refined products.
Given the cost disadvantages of shipping refined pet-
roleum products (RPPs), as compared to crude oil, it 
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is unlikely that large volumes of bitumen would be 
upgraded and refined in Alberta for export as refined 
products. However, increased growth in the Alberta 
economy may translate into higher local demand for 
RPPs. Combined with the expected falling conven-
tional oil production, this would mean a retooling of 
existing refineries and some expansion in capacity to 
handle a growing volume of upgraded synthetic crude.
A more critical question is whether it will be more 
attractive to upgrade the bitumen in Alberta and ship 
the lighter synthetic crude to export markets, or to 
export bitumen for refining (or upgrading and refin-
ing) elsewhere. One might suppose that the former 
is favoured by the relative difficulty in shipping the 
exceptionally heavy bitumen. However, if the bitu-
men is mixed (diluted) with a lighter hydrocarbons, 
which are slated to be exported anyway, this shipping 
cost disadvantage may disappear; currently pentanes 
plus, in a proportion of about 30 per cent, are nor-
mally used as the diluent. The diluent might even be 
upgraded synthetic crude (in a proportion of about 
50%, according to the ERCB 2010 Reserves Report, 
ST-98, p. 2-18), which would imply a need for some 
upgrading within the province. It would also require 
long-run planning to ensure that the purchasing 
refineries in the export market are constructed so as 
to handle the heavier oil. Extension of the Alberta 
oil market as far as the Texas Gulf Coast, as has been 
planned since 2011, would open potential markets for 
bitumen from refineries that have been importing 
heavy oils from Venezuela and Mexico. While export 
of bitumen might be economically feasible, Alberta 
interests have generally favoured the ‘value-added’ 
approach of upgrading bitumen in the province, with 
the associated expansion in economic activity and, 
from some points of view, economic ‘diversifica-
tion.’ (We return in Chapter Thirteen to this issue of 
diversification.) It is obvious, however, from a short-
er-term perspective, that exporting bitumen, without 
upgrading, would be one way to reduce the regional 
economic inflationary pressures of rapidly expanded 
oil sands production. Whether Alberta should reply 
on relatively unfettered markets to handle these 
investment options or look to a more activist gov-
ernment policy in scheduling the timing and type of 
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Figure 7.2 Bitumen Price Differentials Jan 2002–Dec 2011
Source: From data in CAPP Statistical Handbook, Table 5.5 and ERCB, Alberta Energy Resource Industries Monthly Statistics, ST-3
164 PETROPOLIT ICS
D.	Government	Take
We use the term ‘government take’ to refer to the pay-
ments made by the oil company to the government; 
governments derive these payments in part through 
their role as the owner of mineral rights and in part 
through their powers of taxation. On both grounds, 
the government of Alberta has been concerned that 
a ‘fair’ share of the value of petroleum goes to it, as 
representative of the public. Chapter Eleven contains 
an extensive discussion of objectives of government 
with respect to payments it assesses on the petroleum 
industry and the instruments that might be used 
to collect revenue. In brief, the government simul-
taneously pursues objectives of revenue generation, 
risk sharing, equitable treatment of all parties, and 
administrative simplicity. The industry might make 
payments to the government in the form of bonus bids 
to obtain mineral production rights, land rental pay-
ments, taxes based on the value of production (usually 
called ‘royalties’ or severance taxes), corporate income 
taxes, and/or the government share of profits if it is a 
part-owner of the company. In the oil sands, compan-
ies have obtained mineral rights through competitive 
bonus bidding and face annual rental payments on 
the area under which they own the rights. However, 
the most controversial parts of government take have 
been the provisions applied to projects once they have 
begun to produce bitumen or upgraded synthetic 
crude oil. (Plourde, 2009, provides a useful review of 
government take in the oil sands up to 2008).
Experimental oil sands projects have typically 
been assessed a gross royalty of 5 per cent. When 
Suncor began production in 1967, it was governed by 
the prevailing royalty and income tax regulations on 
conventional oil, as discussed in Chapter Eleven. In 
1978, the royalty was set at 8 per cent on production 
below 143,019 cubic metres/month (30,000 b/d), at 
20 per cent on output above that up to 217,389 cubic 
m/month (45,000 b/d), at 8 per cent again on output 
to 258,704 cubic m/month, and at 20 per cent again 
above that. (The second tier at 8% applied to the 
Suncor expansion of the late 1970s.)
With Syncrude, the Esso Cold Lake project and 
the BP Wolf Lake projects, the royalty and tax regimes 
became subject to negotiation on a project-by-project 
basis with the provincial and federal governments. 
This recognized that oil sands projects were not ‘like’ 
conventional crude oil projects. They were very high 
cost and involved unusual technological risks since 
they used untested processes. At the same time, gov-
ernments want to ensure that they derive a fair share 
of the profits from the oil sands. The picture was 
complicated with the new taxes on petroleum intro-
duced by Ottawa with its National Energy Program 
of October 1980. (These taxes were removed with the 
federal-provincial ‘De-regulation’ Agreement of 1985, 
so were of concern only to Suncor and Syncrude.)
The approach agreed to by Syncrude and the 
Alberta government was a new royalty arrange-
ment based largely on the profitability of the project. 
This was attained through a 50 per cent net royalty 
arrangement, where Syncrude would pay 50 per cent 
of net operating profits (that is, after operating costs 
were deducted from revenues) once the project had 
recovered its investment costs and an agreed-upon 
(8%) annual return on unrecovered capital costs. To 
ensure that the province would receive some revenue 
in all periods, there was a minimum 5 per cent gross 
ad valorem royalty. In the mid-1980s the net royalty 
was modified to require amortization of remaining 
unclaimed capital expenditures (although expansion 
investment undertaken in the mid-1980s could be 
written off immediately). Alberta had a non-reversible 
one-time option to replace the 50 per cent net roy-
alty with a 7.5 per cent gross royalty, but this option 
was never exercised. In the Winnipeg Agreement, 
Syncrude and the governments agreed that this net 
royalty would be deductible as an expense in calcu-
lating the federal/provincial income tax owing. They 
also agreed that companies would be allowed to ‘flow 
through’ capital expenses to the parent companies, 
so that they could be deducted from the parent’s rev-
enues for income tax purposes without having to wait 
until Syncrude itself generated sufficient revenue to 
allow deduction of these costs. (The sooner a company 
can deduct expenses in calculating taxable income, the 
earlier the tax savings are earned, and the more valu-
able they are to the company.) In addition, under the 
corporate income tax regulations, mining expenses 
could be deducted immediately, rather than expensed 
over time. As a result, Syncrude’s royalty payments per 
barrel of oil were relatively small as compared to pay-
ments by most conventional oil production, and the 
owners gained a significant corporate tax advantage.
In situ oil sands projects were assessed royalties 
based on the Esso Cold Lake project, which paid a 1 
per cent gross royalty initially, rising to 5 per cent over 
six years. After recovery of capital expenses, payment 
was to be the maximum of a 5 per cent gross royalty 
or a 30 per cent net royalty. (However, unlike bitumen 
mining, in situ investments had to be expensed over 
time for corporate income tax purposes.) A fairness 
issue arose with respect to Suncor after these special 
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deals were negotiated for large mining and in situ pro-
jects. Effective in 1987 the Suncor royalty was changed 
to the greater of a 2 per cent gross royalty or a 15 per 
cent net royalty, with these percentages increasing to 5 
per cent and 30 per cent respectively in 1992.
Table 7.2 shows Provincial receipts from syncrude 
and bitumen royalties for fiscal years ending March 
31 from 1968 to 2012. The jump in the early 1980s 
reflects a combination of the start of Syncrude pro-
duction and the very high international oil prices that 
determined the value of Syncrude’s output. The sharp 
decline in royalties after 1985, as international crude 
oil prices plummeted, illustrates the sensitivity of a net 
royalty to oil prices. The move to ‘profitability’ of the 
mining ventures is the main factor leading to the rapid 
increase in payments after 1990, with the large decline 
in 1998 and 1999 once again demonstrating the sensi-
tivity to oil price declines. Payments rose markedly 
after 2004, as output and oil prices both increased. In 
the 2006/7 fiscal year, oil sands royalties for the first 
time surpassed conventional oil royalties; in 2009/10, 
they also exceeded natural gas royalties, due largely to 
falling natural gas prices.
In the 1990s, potential investors and the govern-
ment both found the absence of an agreed-upon roy-
alty for oil sands projects to be less than satisfactory, 
since it meant that project-by-project negotiations 
were needed, and companies could not assess the 
commercial viability of their project until the negoti-
ations were concluded. In 1995, a ‘Task Force,’ includ-
ing both government and corporate representatives, 
recommended that Alberta implement a ‘generic’ 
oil sands royalty regime that would apply to all new 
projects (National Task Force on the Oil Sands, 1995). 
The task force had been set up in 1993 under the chair-
manship of Dr. Erdal Yildirim to examine the lack of 
interest at the time in expanded oil sands production. 
Alberta accepted the recommendations with respect 
to royalties, announcing on November 30, 1995, that 
oil sands projects would be subject to a minimum 1 
















































Note: Values from 1968 to 1972 include oil sands rentals and fees.
Source: Annual Reports of the Alberta Department of Energy and of Energy and 
Natural Resources. 
Table 7.2: Oil Sands Royalties, 1968–2012
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per cent gross royalty and would be assessed a 25 per 
cent net royalty after capital costs, including an inter-
est allowance, had been recovered; the interest charges 
would be determined by the long-term Government 
of Canada bond rate. Oil sands investments, whether 
for mining or in situ projects, could be written off 
immediately against income from the project. (Alberta 
Energy, 2006, Plourde, 2009, and Mitchell et al., 1998 
summarize the new regulations, which became effect-
ive in September 1997.) For the net revenue royalty, 
most ‘project’ costs would be deducted, including any 
gross royalties paid, but not bonus bids or pre-in-
vestment start-up costs. This royalty is quite different 
from that assessed on conventional oil (a sliding-scale 
gross royalty). It recognizes that oil from the oil sands 
is now, and is likely to continue to be, high cost, and 
hence very dependent on the level of oil prices and 
the size of the tax burden. By assessing payments to 
the government (both royalties and corporate income 
taxes) largely on the basis of the project’s profits, the 
commercial risk is shared by the company and the 
government, and any disincentive to invest due to 
the necessity to make payments to the government 
is minimized.
Recognition of the significance of this new royalty 
regime, and the efforts of the National Task Force, 
was made manifest in a ceremony at Fort McMurray 
in June 1996; the governments of Canada and Alberta 
and executives of almost twenty oil companies 
signed a document expressing their commitment to 
expanded oil sands development. It is important to 
note that the generic royalty could be applied to either 
the bitumen or the synthetic oil produced; since bitu-
men prices were lower than synthetic crude prices, 
companies had a clear incentive to reduce the size of 
the royalty by electing to pay on the basis of bitumen 
prices, as has been the case. (The issue is more com-
plicated than this suggests. If bitumen were chosen as 
the product to which the royalty applies, upgrading 
costs could not be deducted as a cost for royalty pur-
poses. Therefore, until payout, companies would likely 
prefer to base the royalty on the upgraded product. 
After that, as long as upgrading is expected to be prof-
itable, companies would prefer not to pay a royalty on 
upgrading as well as bitumen operations. Suncor and 
Syncrude, covered by royalty arrangements agreed to 
before the generic regime, had the option to switch 
from a royalty on syncrude to a royalty on bitumen 
anytime prior to 2009. Both companies exercized 
this option, Syncrude in late 2008.) (Alberta Energy, 
2003, 2007a, 2007b reviews Alberta petroleum royalty 
provisions. The department now maintains a web-
page with ready links to relevant royalty documents: 
www.energy.alberta.ca/About_Us/Royalty.asp.)
The generic royalty regime removed some of the 
political uncertainty faced by prospective oil sands 
producers, as well as the additional project costs 
involved in negotiating specific tax/royalty regulations 
for each project. As was noted above, reliance on a 
net royalty provided an explicit sharing of economic 
risk. For instance, if prices were insufficient to cover 
costs (including an allowance for return on capital 
invested), payments to the government would be 
relatively small (mainly the 1% gross royalty, much 
less than the average rate of nearly 20% assessed on 
conventional oil and gas production); however, once 
prices were high enough to generate profits, the gov-
ernment and company would split them on a 25/75 
basis. That is, in order to encourage investment in the 
oil sands, the province was willing to allow the com-
panies a significant proportion of price-related upside 
profit potential. (Plourde’s simulations [Plourde, 2009] 
suggest that the companies’ share of anticipated eco-
nomic rent did increase on mining projects as the oil 
price rose up to about $70/b. It is not clear whether in 
situ projects showed similar price sensitivity.) From 
a public policy perspective, this might be justified in 
several ways, for example, to offset high corporate 
risks (e.g., risks with still developing technologies, 
risks of high cost inflation or risks of world oil prices 
collapsing). If the government foresaw little chance 
of very high oil prices, the chance of foregoing large 
amounts of royalty revenue would be seen as low.
In comparison to the conventional royalty for-
mula, the generic oil sands royalty involved two main 
elements of increased administrative complexity. First, 
it involves accounting for the specific costs of the 
project. Since companies would pay lower royalties 
if they absorb higher costs, there would be an incen-
tive to inflate reported costs or pass on benefits to 
the company and its managers in the form of higher 
costs; hence, the government would be expected to 
incur incremental monitoring costs. A second com-
plexity relates to the relative lack of ‘transparency’ 
in bitumen markets, which are less well-developed 
than North American markets for conventional light 
and heavy crude oil. The tax base for the net royalty 
depends on the price paid for bitumen, so companies 
would have some incentive to report relatively low 
prices, especially if the sales are made to an affiliate 
company (which would then receive relatively high 
profits on the subsequent processing and sale of the 
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oil products). Hence, in assuring it is receiving its fair 
share of profits, the government would incur addi-
tional costs of monitoring the North American bitu-
men market.
The generic regime was explicitly designed to 
encourage oil sands development. In part, this was 
attained by the introduction of a net royalty based on 
project profits, rather than a gross royalty. But it also 
stemmed from the relatively low rate of the net royalty. 
This became an issue of concern to many as inter-
national oil prices rose in the early years of the new 
millennium; the net royalty would capture only 25 per 
cent of the increased profits due to price increases, 
although it should be remembered that the 75 per 
cent accruing to the companies would be subject to 
the corporate income tax. It is difficult to separate the 
effect of higher price expectations from the impact of 
a royalty regime designed to encourage investment, 
but, as was discussed above, by the year 2013, three 
major new oil sands projects were already in pro-
duction, both Suncor and Syncrude had undertaken 
expansions, and numerous other projects had been 
announced, a number of which had received approval 
from the EUB/ERCB.
Smaller heavy oil projects in the oil sands area 
(known as Township 53), which are capable of produ-
cing heavy crude by primary techniques, were initially 
subject to conventional oil royalties. These projects 
were particularly encouraged by some of the oil roy-
alty relief measures introduced in Alberta beginning 
in the mid-1980s. Of special importance were the 
EOR-tertiary project and the horizontal production 
well royalty relief programs of the early 1990s. As 
part of the 1995 generic royalty regulations for the oil 
sands, projects that produce heavy oil in the oil sands 
part of the province were given the option of selecting 
the generic oil sands royalty instead of the conven-
tional crude oil royalty, an option most companies 
have taken.
Suncor and Syncrude, who were still producing 
the majority of the mined oil in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, were not covered by the generic 
royalty regulations but by the deals they had negoti-
ated earlier, which lasted up to the year 2015.
Figure 7.2, above, included per barrel royalties for 
syncrude and bitumen from 1968 to 2011. These varied 
considerably, from a high of $8/b to almost nil. The 
high per barrel values came with high crude oil prices 
such as during the early 1980s and after 2006, the low 
royalties with low prices. Since the introduction of the 
generic royalty scheme, based mainly on a measure of 
profitability, the royalty per barrel has fluctuated con-
siderably as world oil prices rise and fall.
Petroleum corporations are also subject to federal 
and provincial corporate income taxes. From 1972, the 
mining portion of oil sands plants were allowed rapid 
write-off of capital costs. As part of the 1995 revisions 
to the oil sands royalty regulations, the mining por-
tion of oil sands projects and in situ ventures were 
granted an accelerated capital cost allowance that 
allowed immediate deduction of the costs up to the 
full amount of income from the sale of the oil from 
the project. In effect, corporate taxes could be delayed 
until all investment costs were recovered. This also 
generated some support for projects to include an 
upgrader since the upgraded synthetic crude has a 
higher value than bitumen and therefore allows ear-
lier write-off of the capital costs of the mine. Taylor 
et al. (2005) argued that such measures provided an 
unfair advantage to oil sands investors compared to 
those in other Canadian industries. The March 2007 
federal budget announced that the accelerated allow-
ance would be phased out entirely by 2015, at least as 
far as the federal share of the corporate income tax 
was concerned.
In September 2007, the Alberta Royalty Review 
Panel released its Report (Alberta Royalty Review 
Panel, 2007). (Plourde, 2009, who was a member 
of the Royalty Review Panel, presents a detailed 
summary and some simulation results.) The panel 
reported that, as of the end of December 2006, a total 
of sixty-six projects were covered by the generic oil 
sands royalty regulations, of which thirty-four were 
past the payout stage (p. 76). The panel reported on 
simulations of project profitability undertaken for and 
by the Department of Energy, which suggested that 
the share of economic rent (profits) captured for the 
government on oil sands projects was significantly less 
than what other jurisdictions in the world were gath-
ering on oil investments. Across a number of differ-
ent cost and price levels, they estimated that Alberta 
would receive about 47 per cent of the economic rent 
under the present regulations, a significantly lower 
share than the 60 per cent or so that had been antici-
pated when the generic royalty was introduced in 
late 1995 (pp. 7 and 11). Plourde’s simulations suggest 
that the share of expected profits accruing to govern-
ment (provincial and federal) over the entire life of 
an oil sands project would be relatively stable under 
the generic royalty regime, for oil prices of $70/b or 
more ($50/b or more for an in situ project) (Plourde, 
2009). He argues that the lower than expected share 
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under the generic regime reflects changes to corporate 
tax provisions, including reductions in the rates after 
1995. (In 1995, the combined federal–Alberta corpor-
ate income tax rate was 43.62%; by 2007, it had been 
reduced to 30%.)
Accordingly, the panel recommended a number of 
changes to the oil sands royalty regulations, including 
an increase of the net royalty rate from 25 per cent to 
33 per cent, the introduction of a new price-dependent 
‘severance tax,’ and making the 1 per cent gross roy-
alty payable in all years and an expense in calculating 
the net revenue tax. The new severance tax would be 
based on bitumen revenues less base and net royalties 
and rentals and would be set at 0 per cent for oil prices 
(WTI) at $40/b or less and rise linearly to a rate of 9 
per cent on oil prices of $120/b or more; the severance 
tax would not be an allowable deduction for either 
net royalties or the corporate income tax. The panel 
also urged the government to take steps to ensure 
that bitumen prices are fair market values and recom-
mended a tradable credit against oil sands royalties for 
companies undertaking oil sands upgrading invest-
ments (pp. 85–89). From an economic perspective, the 
severance tax seems likely to be more distortionary 
than a larger increase in the net revenue royalty but 
may have been appealing since a new tax could be 
more easily applied to Suncor and Syncrude as well as 
those producers covered by the generic royalty system. 
The panel’s report also expresses obvious concern 
about the efficiency of synthetic crude and markets, 
as evidenced by both the desire for an assessment of 
bitumen prices and the apparent unwillingness to 
allow investment in bitumen upgrading to be handled 
solely by market forces.
Late in 2007, the government announced its 
response to the recommendations of the Royalty 
Review Panel (Alberta Department of Energy, 2007c). 
The government said that new royalties on bitumen 
values would become effective at the start of 2009. 
It did not introduce the new severance tax recom-
mended by the panel. Instead, the 1 per cent gross roy-
alty would be revised to a price-sensitive sliding-scale 
fee, at 1 per cent for oil prices less than $55/b, rising 
to 9 per cent when the oil price reached $120/b; the 
net revenue royalty rate would continue to be 25 per 
cent at oil prices of $55/b or less but would increase 
with higher prices to a maximum rate of 40 per cent 
at prices of $120/b or more. The gross royalty would 
be paid up to the time costs (including a normal 
return) were recovered and then the higher of the base 
or net royalty would be paid. Negotiations would be 
undertaken with Suncor and Syncrude to revise their 
agreements with the government prior to the expiry 
date of 2016. (In 2008, Suncor and Syncrude both 
agreed to increase royalty payments starting in 2010 
until they became subject to the new regulations in 
the year 2016.) The government also announced that 
it would follow Ottawa’s plans in making oil sands 
capital expenditures deductible over time for the 
corporate income tax rather than being immediately 
expensible. Plourde’s simulations (Plourde, 2009) sug-
gest that the new regulations would generate a share 
of profits for the provincial and federal governments 
(combined) in the range of 60 per cent, about what 
had been projected under the generic royalty regime 
in 1995 and about 12 to 17 percentage points higher 
than actually occurred. However, the share is signifi-
cantly lower than that which would have resulted from 
the Royalty Review Panel recommendations (though 
there is a shift in share under the government’s 
announced regulations from the federal government 
to the Alberta government).
The government did not adopt the Royalty Review 
Panel’s recommendation for a royalty credit against 
new upgrading investments. In late June 2008, it 
announced a proposal for the determination of 
bitumen values in the absence of a clear fair market 
(arms-length) value (e.g., for bitumen retained by the 
producer for upgrading or for intercorporate trans-
fers). Subject to a floor value based on heavy Mayan 
crude from Mexico, the value would be determined 
by the price for heavy crude at Hardisty, Alberta, with 
quality adjustments (Alberta Department of Energy, 
2008). It also announced plans to take delivery of 
bitumen in place of royalty payments (a ‘bitumen in 
kind’ royalty).
5. Conclusion
Alberta’s non-conventional oil resources are huge, 
even by global standards, and dwarf the province’s 
conventional oil reserves. They are often seen as a part 
of the world’s ‘backstop’ to conventional crude oil: that 
is, a large-volume but high-cost perfect substitute for 
conventional crude. Producers have been holding out 
high hopes for significant oil sands production since 
the start of the twentieth century. Many of the main 
technical innovations needed to allow production of 
shallow deposits through strip-mining and upgrading 
were made in the first half of that century, and the 
evolution of EOR technologies for conventional oil 
offered knowledge for use in in situ production from 
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the deeper oil sands. However, commercial produc-
tion proved elusive.
The first mining/upgrading venture, now known 
as Suncor, started in the 1960s. It was seen by many 
as a precursor to rapid development of the oil sands, 
but only the 1970s Syncrude mining/upgrading and 
Cold Lake in situ projects materialized. Costs of these 
projects exceeding initial estimates and falling world 
oil prices after 1985 inhibited further investment. Syn-
crude and Suncor began some cautious expansions in 
the 1980s, suggesting that there might be economies 
that they could capture as existing operations. In addi-
tion, the continuing development of horizontal drill-
ing technologies encouraged a number of small-scale 
in situ projects. But it was rising oil prices around the 
turn of the millennium that appears to have been the 
main factor leading to a surge in oil sands investments 
at that time. by 2005, most forecasters were projecting 
rapid output growth from the oil sands of both bitu-
men and light upgraded synthetic crude; output has 
been expanding and, as of March 2013, several new 
projects are underway, have received approval, or have 
been announced.
The significance of the oil sands to the province 
can hardly be overestimated. By the year 2012, syn-
crude and bitumen provided over 75 per cent of 
Alberta’s crude oil and had more than offset the 
decline in conventional oil production. Forecasts 
of rising oil output depended entirely on expanded 
oil sands production. However, this involves major 
changes since oil sands output differs in a number of 
important respects from conventional crude oil. Some 
of the changes are largely ‘physical’ and technical. 
Thus, for example, the oil resource in the oil sands is 
bitumen, a very heavy viscous hydrocarbon which is 
difficult to move and handle and which has had a lim-
ited market. Thus, the expansion of oil sands produc-
tion saw the growth of a large upgrading industry to 
transform bitumen into light syncrude; it has also seen 
a rising demand for very light oil products in pipeline 
transmission to mix with and dilute the bitumen, and 
development of plans to extend the pipeline network 
from Alberta to the U.S. Gulf Coast where refin-
eries are equipped to handle very heavy oil. Mining, 
upgrading, and in situ production technologies are 
very energy intensive, leading some to expect that 
large amounts of natural gas will have to be diverted 
from export markets to oil sands production. Further, 
growing environmental concerns are raised by the 
large water requirements of the mining operations, 
the strip-mining itself, and the sulphur content of the 
bitumen.
There are also economic differences between the 
oils sands and conventional crude oil production. 
Conventional production has been spread broadly 
across Alberta, but expenditures on the oil sands have 
been concentrated in a small geographical area in east 
central Alberta, with further potential to the west in 
the Peace River region. The costs in the oil sands are 
high, and the prospective economic rents seem to be 
smaller, though this will obviously hinge on the price 
of oil. Thus, the impacts on the province seem likely 
to come through the economic activity directly asso-
ciated with oil production and somewhat less from 
the ‘surplus’ revenues collected by the government. 
Finally, the operating phase of oil sands production 
is much more labour-intensive than the operations 
phase of the conventional industry, especially for 
mining and upgrading activities. This also implies 
a more direct and regionally concentrated impact 
from oil sands than was seen with the conventional 
petroleum industry in Alberta. That the government 
has come to recognize the problems this might raise 
is suggested by its appointment of a committee to 
investigate the impacts of increased oil sands produc-
tion; the committee’s final report focused on regional 
planning and infrastructure investment needs in the 
oil sands area (Oil Sands Ministerial Strategy Com-
mittee, 2006). The Alberta Land Stewardship Act, pro-
claimed on October 1, 2009, may provide a framework 
within which many regional planning issues can be 
addressed, but the hard work of financing and build-
ing new facilities remained to be addressed.

Readers’ Guide: Supplying crude petroleum is a 
complex process. In this chapter, we review a number 
of attempts to build models of this process, or, as is 
more frequently the case, some part of the process, 
for the province of Alberta. Rather than a history of 
the Alberta petroleum industry, this chapter might 
be seen as a history of Alberta oil-supply model-
ling. Readers with a limited interest in the details of 
oil-supply modelling will likely find Section 3 of most 
interest; it summarizes the conditional forecasts of oil 
production made by the National Energy Board from 
about 1970.
1. Introduction
This chapter summarizes various studies of the 
supply of conventional crude oil in Alberta. Rather 
than building our own model of crude oil supply, we 
provide an overview of the broad range of published 
models. Also relevant are the studies of Alberta crude 
oil potential set out in Chapter Five, especially the ‘dis-
covery process’ models.
We will first briefly review what economists typi-
cally mean by the ‘supply’ of a product.
As was discussed in Chapter Four, the ‘supply 
of crude oil’ is ambiguous. For example, it could be 
used to refer to the size of the total resource base in a 
region, or to the quantity of reserves additions added 
in a particular period, or to the volume of oil lifted 
to the surface in a particular period. However, for 
the economist, ‘supply’ typically has a much broader 
meaning, referring to the constellation of factors that 
might influence production. Formally, this broader 
use of the term ‘supply’ is called a ‘supply function’; 
it is best seen as a formulation that documents all 
factors potentially affecting oil production, as well as 
the strength of impact of each. In a more restricted 
manner, economists often speak of the ‘supply curve’ 
for crude oil (or more simply ‘the supply of oil’), 
which shows how the production of crude oil will 
change as the price of crude oil changes. This aspect 
of supply is of particular interest to economists, who 
focus on the way in which the oil market determines 
prices. It is important to realize that only one level of 
price and production will actually occur at any point 
in time; in other words, only one specific point on the 
supply curve is actually observed in any time period, 
and the other possible price/output combinations are 
hypothetical. It is also important to recall that the con-
cept of a supply curve does not say that only the price 
of oil is important in determining production. Rather, 
it says that out of all the factors that have influence, 
price is the one upon which analysis will focus. One 
can define a meaningful price/output relationship 
only for fixed values of the other variables that influ-
ence output. If other things change, then a new price/
output relationship will occur. A change in supply can 
be associated with a change in price (which leads to 
a ‘change in quantity supplied,’ or a movement along 
a supply curve) or a change in other factors affecting 
supply (which leads to a ‘change in supply’ or a new 
supply curve).
Chapter Four provided a list of the main fac-
tors that might be expected to enter into the supply 
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function for conventional crude oil in Alberta. 
Included are: the price of crude oil; the underlying 
natural resource base; knowledge about the resource 
base; the technologies currently governing produc-
tion; the costs of various inputs into production (wage 
rates, interest rates, the prices of types of capital equip-
ment, the cost of hiring a drilling rig, the price of elec-
tricity, etc.); the extent to which the quantity of capital 
equipment can be varied; government regulations 
(such as tax and royalty rates, rules for the issuance 
of mineral rights, drilling requirements on mineral 
rights, price controls, export limits, production con-
trols, well-spacing regulations, gas-flaring regulations, 
etc.); the determinants of oil companies’ behaviour 
(i.e., company objectives including risk preferences); 
and expectations about the future. A complete supply 
function would specify exactly how all these variables 
impact upon the level of production of crude oil.
Estimation of such a comprehensive supply func-
tion must remain an unattainable ideal. The number 
of variables influencing supply is large, especially 
when it is realized that each individual oil company 
will have its own objectives, current knowledge, and 
expectations about the future. Beyond this, some 
variables are difficult to know. We cannot know for 
certain what the underlying resource base looks like 
(the number, size, and location of all the oil pools 
that nature has given us). We may not even be able to 
define all the possibilities. If we can’t do this, we can’t 
include all of the possible expectations companies 
might have, nor how these expectations will vary in 
response to changing circumstances. Thus, the estima-
tion crude-oil-supply functions is another example of 
the ‘art of the possible,’ and, as with all the arts, what is 
beautiful lies very much in the eye of the observer.
The essential first step in crude-oil-supply model-
ling is simplification. Simplifications may or may not 
be explicitly acknowledged by the analyst. A common 
assumption is that certain variables, which might the-
oretically be expected to affect oil production, simply 
are not relevant and therefore will not be included 
in the analysis. This clearly reduces complexity. The 
assumption may reflect the analyst’s judgment that the 
variable is not significant enough that it is worthwhile 
expending time and effort to gather the data. Or it 
may reflect the belief that the variable did not change 
very much over the period and therefore changes in 
output cannot be due to this variable. Analysts often 
report only the variables that they include in their 
analysis and not the ones that they exclude. Simplifi-
cation frequently involves explicit assumptions that 
the analyst realizes are not necessarily true, but which 
it is believed (or hoped) will allow the major factors 
affecting supply to be assessed. The analyst is aware 
that the model will not capture all aspects of real-
ity but hopes that it will come close and that errors 
will be random (so, for example, a forecast will be 
equally likely to over- or underestimate oil produc-
tion). An example of such a simplifying assumption 
relates to the determinants of companies’ behaviour. 
Economists often assume that all oil companies are 
profit-maximizers; therefore, companies will always 
pursue the lowest cost methods of production and 
will exploit all profitable investment opportunities. 
In this case, as argued in Chapter Four, the supply 
curve is a marginal cost curve, which ranks possible 
units of crude oil production from the lowest cost unit 
to the highest cost unit. Thinking of a supply curve 
as a marginal cost curve is a useful way to see how 
various crude oil ‘products’ differ from one another; 
thus, undeveloped oil reserves require development 
investment to become developed reserves, and these 
require operating expenses to become oil in the field, 
which require pipeline expenses to become oil at a 
main gathering point. It also follows that the price 
that elicits oil supply differs in each case as well; that 
is, the price of oil in the ground (reserves) differs 
from the price of oil as lifted. If we further assume 
that all companies have the same knowledge and 
expectations, it is not necessary to treat the industry as 
consisting of many different firms, each influenced by 
different factors. Instead, we can treat the industry as 
if it were a single large profit-maximizing firm. Other 
simplifying assumptions commonly adopted are to 
assume: that current conditions (for example, prices) 
reflect expected future conditions; that all pools, once 
discovered, tend to be depleted in the same manner; 
that future reactions to prices and other variables will 
mimic past reactions; and that the supply function 
takes a particular mathematical form.
This chapter includes five main sections. Section 2 
offers a more detailed discussion of the framework for 
oil-supply modelling. Section 3 summarizes the results 
from the most well-known and accessible estimates of 
Western Canadian crude oil supply, those undertaken 
on a regular basis by the National Energy Board (NEB) 
since the 1970s. We refer briefly to similar analyses 
from the Canadian Energy Research Institute. Section 
4 discusses studies that assess Alberta oil supply by 
attempting to directly measure the cost of oil produc-
tion. Section 5 turns to research that provides ‘indi-
rect’ estimates of oil supply by attempting to estimate 
various forms of an oil-supply function. We conclude 
with some general comments in Section 6.
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2. Concepts of Crude Oil Supply
As mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, 
the term ‘crude oil supply’ has a number of different 
meanings. (Bohi and Toman,1984, provide a useful 
review.)
The ‘product’ crude oil resources is of a qualita-
tively different order than the others. Here economists 
often speak of a ‘Resource Stock Supply Curve’ (RSSC), 
which, on the basis of an assumed set of underlying 
conditions (regulations, input prices, technology) 
ranks, by marginal cost, the total quantity of crude 
that it is thought lies in the ground. This is quite 
unlike the economists’ usual supply notion, which is 
a flow concept; that is, it refers to the quantity of oil 
supplied in a particular period – discoveries in 1967, 
total gross reserves additions in 1987, or oil lifted in 
1992. However, the idea of an RSSC is often the start-
ing point for detailed oil-supply analysis in a region 
such as Alberta. Exploration and development activ-
ities translate the resource stock into reserves in the 
ground, and production facilities translate reserves in 
the ground to production at the surface.
We would also remind readers that oil is found 
in separate ‘pools’ (‘deposits’ or ‘reservoirs’) and 
that these pools tend to accumulate within a rela-
tively small number of geological plays. A grouping 
of nearby pools in the same geological formation is 
called a ‘field.’
A number of authors review different approaches 
that have been used in crude petroleum supply mod-
elling (for example, Adelman et al., 1983; MacFadyen 
and Foat, 1985; Kaufman, 1987; Power and Fuller, 
1992; Walls, 1992; Adelman, 1993b; Brandt, 2009). We 
will provide a brief summary of some of the main 
approaches. As we shall see, many of them have been 
applied to the Alberta crude oil industry.
Following Kaufman (1987), Figure 8.1 provides a 
simple classification of these modelling approaches 
along two key dimensions: the extent to which the 
models are primarily ‘economic’ or ‘technological’ 
and the extent to which the model utilizes relatively 
‘simple’ as opposed to ‘complex’ quantitative or sta-
tistical procedures. It is important to realize that 
the approaches are not mutually exclusive. They can 
overlap and researchers may utilize more than one 
approach.
Cost Estimation. Estimates or reports of expendi-
tures are tied to the resultant output to derive a meas-
ure of the unit cost of oil.
Engineering Process. A relatively simple rela-
tionship affecting oil supply is assumed, based on the 
physical activities involved in oil production. Some-
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might be assumed that all oil reserves are developed 
and depleted in identical fashion; for example, devel-
opment occurs in equal stages over three years, output 
commences at a reserves to production ratio of 10, and 
the pool exhibits constant exponential decline at a 7 
per cent annual rate. Another engineering approach 
posits a consistent relationship between the discov-
ery rate of oil (or average discovery size, or reserves 
added per foot drilled) and the passage of time (or 
cumulative footage drilled); this relationship is often 
based on historical experience, and, in mature regions, 
normally shows ‘depletion effects’ where oil becomes 
increasingly hard to find.
Life Cycle. This approach assumes a regular rela-
tionship between the passage of time and the rate of 
oil discoveries and production; it is a specific example 
of an engineering process model.
Econometric: Ad Hoc. Econometric approaches 
argue that economic variables are a prime deter-
minant of crude oil supply and that one can utilize 
regression techniques applied to historical data to 
estimate the precise relationship between oil supply 
and the underlying variables that affect it. The model 
may also include non-economic variables, for instance 
representing different geological plays. The ‘Ad Hoc’ 
approach begins with a ‘conceptual’ model that sug-
gests the variables most likely to affect crude oil supply 
and then utilizes statistical estimation procedures to 
see how strongly these variables are connected. The 
investigator may assume a specific functional form for 
the relationship amongst the variables (e.g., a linear 
relation) or try a number of possible functional forms 
and select the one that appears to ‘fit’ best.
Econometric: Optimization. Optimization models 
begin with a formal analytical model of industry 
behaviour, which is utilized to generate the list of var-
iables that are expected to affect oil supply, as well as 
constraints on the precise mathematical relationship 
amongst the variables. Normally a number of sim-
plifying assumptions are necessary in order to make 
the theoretical model and its operationalized version 
tractable. Thus, for example, all firms may be assumed 
to be effective profit-maximizers, with identical expec-
tations based on the current values for key variables, 
and the underlying production functions may be 
assumed to have specific ‘regularity’ properties.
Discovery Process. These models assume that the 
discovery of oil pools involves a non-random sam-
pling process without replacement from an underlying 
distribution of crude oil pools. Given assumptions 
about the nature of the underlying pool distribution 
in nature (e.g., that the size distribution of pools 
is log-normal) and the sampling process (e.g., the 
probability of discovery for a pool of size ‘s’ is propor-
tional to the volume of oil still in the ground in pools 
of that size), it is possible to calculate the probabil-
ity that the next discovery will be of size ‘s,’ and the 
expected size of the next discovery. In Chapter Five, 
results of the Geologic Survey of Canada’s discovery 
process model were summarized.
Hybrid. Hybrid models typically combine aspects 
of the engineering, economic, and discovery process 
approaches. Thus, for example, the level of exploratory 
drilling and anticipated success rates might be esti-
mated econometrically while the volumes of discover-
ies are drawn from a discovery-process model.
Many of these modelling approaches have been 
applied to the Alberta crude oil industry, often in 
combination. In Chapter Five, we reviewed some of 
the estimates of the total availability of crude oil in 
Alberta. In this chapter, we will emphasize studies 
that assess the flows of oil supply, specifically reserves 
additions and production (or productive capacity). 
Recall that the two are connected, since production 
comes out of reserves.
The next section will review the crude-oil- 
supply scenarios of the National Energy Board (NEB). 
Beginning in 1969, and periodically since then, the 
NEB has issued conditional forecasts of Canadian oil 
supply. These studies have drawn on many modelling 
approaches, including cost estimates, engineering pro-
cess analysis, discovery process analysis, and econo-
metrics. They provide a very useful review of how 
expectations about Canadian crude oil supply have 
changed over the past three decades.
3. NEB Supply Studies
In providing information about its regulatory respon-
sibilities, the NEB has produced a number of reports 
that forecast the future production of Canadian crude 
oil. These reports are of interest for a number of rea-
sons. They are the most visible forecasts of Canadian 
energy production and consumption (or ‘Supply’ 
and ‘Demand,’ as they are usually labelled). They also 
depict how prevailing expectations about Canadian 
energy industries have changed over time. It is tempt-
ing, in this regard, to emphasize the ways in which the 
forecasts have been ‘wrong,’ but this is not the most 
profitable way to view them. The NEB forecasting 
procedures have evolved over time, learning from 
new information and modelling techniques. And the 
NEB studies have usually been at pains to point out 
how and why the forecasts have changed from one 
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report to the next. Failure to revise forecasts in light 
of changing circumstances would be a much more 
serious concern than the continual revision of the 
forecasts. The more interesting question is why the 
forecasts have changed.
The Appendix to this chapter (Appendix 8.1) 
provides a number of tables showing oil-production 
(or productive capacity) forecasts from NEB reports, 
which we will refer to simply by the year in which they 
were issued. We consider reports issued from 1974 
through to 1999, and look at oil output projected up 
to the year 2010. (The NEB ‘Supply/Demand’ Reports 
after 1999 include numerical values for total oil output, 
rather than the disaggregated categories we utilize; 
some graphs for disaggregated output are included in 
the reports, but the precise output values are difficult 
to determine from the graphs.) In what follows, we 
briefly review the various types of crude-oil-supply 
models utilized by the NEB, the forecasts of conven-
tional crude oil reserves additions in the Western 
Canadian Sedimentary Basin (WCSB), and the fore-
casts of light and heavy crude oil output (or potential 
production) in the WCSB. (The NEB does provide 
detail by province, but the main reports are for the 
entire WCSB. Alberta is the source of most of this oil, 
although less so for heavy crude oil.) The NEB has not 
usually labelled its projections as ‘forecasts,’ instead 
using terms such as ‘cases’ or ‘scenarios.’ Our prefer-
ence is to label them as conditional forecasts, that is, 
forecasts of future output conditional on a number of 
underlying assumptions.
A.	The	NEB	Modelling	Procedure
The first NEB report in 1969 utilized a simple aggre-
gate engineering approach based on the estimated 
availability of oil reserves; these in turn were drawn  
largely from relatively simple geological-volumetric 
estimates provided by the Canadian Petroleum Asso-
ciation. As discussed in Chapter Five, the geological- 
volumetric approach estimates the total volume of 
potential oil-bearing rock in a sedimentary basin and 
applies an assumed average amount of oil found per 
unit volume of rock. Often, this average oil volume 
is based on experience from other petroleum basins 
elsewhere in the world.
Since the 1969 report, the NEB has built up a con-
siderable bank of data that allows much more detailed 
forecasting. Some of these data consist of detailed 
reserves and output information on all significant oil 
pools in production in Canada. Cost and planned 
output data is obtained from many of the main oil 
producers. The NEB also draws extensively on the 
play-based models of the Geological Survey of Canada 
(GSC). Beginning as early as the 1974 report, this 
allowed the NEB to make disaggregated forecasts of 
crude oil producibility.
The 1994 report provides extensive detail on the 
modelling procedures. A number of the approaches 
discussed in Section 2 are utilized. Some of the fore-
casts are largely engineering or technical in approach. 
For instance, already discovered pools normally are 
assumed to produce following specified depletion 
paths; oil sands output is based to a significant extent 
on announced projects; reserves additions follow 
assumed time paths of development and depletion. 
Production of pentanes plus and condensate falls out 
of the NEB’s natural gas forecast through assumed liq-
uids to gas ratios. Cost estimation is often used. Thus 
‘supply costs’ are estimated or assumed for large oil 
sands mines, for bitumen and frontier projects, and 
for the potential reserves additions. Reserves additions 
are normally separated into those added through new 
discoveries, those added through extensions and revi-
sions of extant discoveries, and those added through 
enhanced oil recovery (EOR) projects. The resource 
potential for conventional oil is derived from the GSC 
discovery process and subjective probability models 
(discussed in Chapter Five). The NEB recognizes that 
future production is conditional on many factors that 
cannot themselves be forecast with certainty. Hence, a 
number of different forecasts are usually provided to 
indicate how oil production might change as under-
lying conditions change; such ‘sensitivities’ may relate 
to variations in the price of oil, in technologies, in the 
size of the resource base, or in government regula-
tory policies.
The NEB has undertaken a very difficult task. The 
crude oil industry is complex, and to provide detailed 
and frequent forecasts of the total Canadian output 
of crude is a major undertaking. The openness of the 
NEB to a variety of modelling approaches – the eclec-
ticism of its approach – is probably one of its main 
strengths. Yet it is quite different to the modelling pro-
cedure most common in academic studies, which is to 
select a more restrictive problem and apply a relatively 
sophisticated technique to this smaller issue.
B. Potential Reserves Additions
A key determinant of the future producibility of Cana-
dian crude oil is the volume of conventional crude oil 
that remains to be added to reserves. The production 
from reserves additions depends not only on their 
176 PETROPOLIT ICS
volume but also on the rate the reserves are added 
and developed, which in turn reflects the willingness 
of producers to undertake the necessary investments. 
Readers may recall our argument that resource limits 
are not absolutely binding since the real issue is what 
volumes from the indeterminate underlying physi-
cal resources will ultimately prove to be economic. 
The NEB, like many oil-supply modellers, has felt it 
necessary to recognize the exhaustible nature of con-
ventional oil by incorporating in their model some 
estimate of the volume of oil that may ultimately 
prove to be economic. If all else were equal, one would 
expect to find that the volume of potential reserve 
additions would fall over time since reserves additions 
over time would reduce the total amount remaining in 
the ground still to be added to reserves, making addi-
tions more difficult. However, while such ‘depletion 
effects’ will reduce reserves addition potential, chang-
ing knowledge and technology could increase it by 
making larger volumes commercially accessible.
Table A8.1 in Appendix 8.1 shows that declines in 
reserves additions potential have not been the norm 
in the NEB reports. In fact, for both light and heavy 
crude, and for both new discovery and EOR reserves, 
the NEB has become much more optimistic since the 
mid-1970s. For light oil discoveries, the latest report 
considered here (1999) shows the highest potential 
(666 million m3). For heavy oil, estimated potential 
was increased sharply to 1991 but has since been low-
ered for both new discoveries and EOR reserves addi-
tions. The potential for light crude EOR reserves was 
also cut in 1999, although this may partially reflect the 
application of economic criteria to the 1999 figures. In 
general, the data in Table A8.1 suggest that there is a 
tendency for the passage of time to generate improved 
expectations about possibilities for reserves additions. 
This may well be a common occurrence in disaggre-
gated models since the ability to foresee entirely new 
techniques or geologic plays is necessarily limited and 
the willingness to extrapolate trends in these supply 
components may be constrained by the presumption 
of depletion effects in discovery.
Rising estimates of potential reserves additions 
cannot be tied to rising oil prices. Table A8.1 shows 
the approximate level of the crude oil price at the time 
the report was issued. (These prices are in nominal 
dollars, so the earlier prices are actually understated 
in real terms compared to more recent prices.) As can 
be seen, the highest reserves potential does not occur 
in the year with highest prices; for example, the Janu-
ary 1981 report had the highest price ($38/b), but the 
light crude potential is significantly higher for all years 
since then, even at prices 50 per cent lower. Changing 
knowledge must be the most significant factor in the 
revisions of the NEB forecasts, and the knowledge 
changes must tend to be ‘positive’ (that is, leading to 
more optimistic forecasts over time).
C. WCSB Crude Oil Producibility
Appendix 8.1 includes four tables showing the NEB 
forecasts of crude oil producibility in the WCSB: con-
ventional light oil (Table A8.2), conventional heavy 
oil (Table A8.3), syncrude (Table A8.4), and bitu-
men (Table A8.5). In each table, actual output is also 
shown for years from the mid-1970s to 2010. Where a 
number of scenarios were reported, we normally show 
the ‘Base’ or ‘Reference’ case, selecting the case that 
seems most accurately to reflect actual world prices in 
the years immediately following the forecast. We shall 
discuss, briefly, each of the four crude oil categories. 
The first NEB supply/demand report of 1969 did not 
report estimates for these separate grades of crude oil. 
It did forecast rapid increases in Canadian crude oil 
output. (The report did not distinguish between pro-
duction and producibility.) Thus, for example, Table 
17A(1) of the 1969 report showed Canadian petro-
leum production rising from 161,000 m3/d in 1966 
to 361,000 in 1975, to 522,000 in 1980 and to 654,000 
by 1990. Actual production of conventional and 
non-conventional crude oil in 1991 was 243,500 m3! 
These extremely high production forecasts presumably 
reflected the high resource potential stemming from 
the volumetric estimation procedures.
1. Conventional Light Crude in the WCSB
Each of the eleven forecasts exhibits pronounced 
decline over time. This reflects decline rates in indi-
vidual oil pools, which apply to the sizable number of 
pools already in production at the time the forecast 
was made. Since the forecasts are usually for produc-
tive capacity, they may tend to overstate the amount 
of production anticipated in those years from 1974 
to 1985 when there were government limits on the 
volume of exports from Canada. (See Chapter Nine.) 
Note, also, that the 1974 and 1975 reports include all 
WCSB crudes, not just light oils. It is therefore not 
surprising that these two reports forecast higher oil 
output than actually occurred for light and medium 
crude in the 1970s. But, by 1984, actual produc-
tion exceeded the forecasts of both the 1974 and 
1975 reports.
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The year 1993 is instructive, since this year 
included forecasts for all the preceding reports. Fore-
cast production tended to be higher the later the 
report was issued. (The 1991 report is an exception; the 
1977 report also appears to be, but remember that the 
1974 and 1975 reports included all crude, not just light 
and heavy.) Actual production in 1993 exceeded the 
forecast from all reports for 1974 through 1991. In line 
with these revisions, the 1994 report was more opti-
mistic about future production than the 1991 report. A 
comparison of 1999 to 1994 is more ambiguous, with 
the more recent forecast lower for the first decade but 
higher from 2005 on.
These results are quite consistent with the changes 
we mentioned for estimates of reserves additions, 
where the additional information garnered over time 
led to more optimistic projections. It also highlights 
the dangers in emphasizing the exhaustible nature 
of conventional oil since there seem to be persistent 
tendencies to underestimate future availability. These 
probably stem from the difficulties imposed by (or the 
conservative reluctance to go beyond) the constraints 
of current technology and knowledge. This raises a 
classic induction problem, however: the fact that vir-
tually all the historical forecasts have been overly pes-
simistic does not mean this pattern exists of necessity.
2. Conventional Heavy Crude in the WCSB
Table A8.3 shows NEB forecasts of conventional heavy 
crude production in its reports from 1977 through 
1999. We see the same pattern as for light and medium 
crude oil. Forecasts have underestimated the actual 
growth in heavy oil production, and later forecasts 
have tended to be more optimistic. Thus, for example, 
the 1977 report foresaw heavy crude oil production 
in 1995 of 19,000 m3/d, whereas output was actually 
73,000. The 1991 report put the level in 1998 at 48,700 
m3/d; that year output hit 85,000.
3. Synthetic Crude
NEB reports from 1974 through 1999 provided future 
output paths for syncrude, as did the NEB’s three later 
reports on the oil sands. (See Table A8-4.) The 1974 
report provided the most optimistic forecast, and all 
three reports from the 1970s substantially overesti-
mated the future syncrude output. These reports all 
reflected the siren call of the huge synthetic crude 
resource base and optimistic estimates of the associ-
ated production costs. However, as was discussed in 
Chapter Seven, it soon became apparent that the oil 
sands were much more difficult and costly to bring 
into production than had initially been thought. The 
NEB reports after 1978 reflected this information and 
also a change in estimation methodology in which the 
projected paths of syncrude output mainly reflected 
announced projects or expansions. Given the long 
lead times in constructing integrated mining projects, 
this meant that the forecasts were relatively accurate 
for a period of five or maybe ten years, but the reliabil-
ity had to be suspect beyond that. As it happens, up to 
2000, no new mining projects had been commenced, 
but addition to capacity in the Suncor and Syncrude 
plants has been greater that was anticipated in the NEB 
reports from 1981 through 1991. The 1999 report antic-
ipated that one large new project would begin produc-
tion by 2005, which was accurate as the Albion Sands 
project began production in late 2002.
4. Bitumen
Table A8.5 shows that the NEB estimates of future bitu-
men production exhibited the same pattern as for con-
ventional crude. The forecasts underestimated future 
production. Later forecasts were more optimistic, but 
still tended to be too conservative. 
D. Implied NEB Supply Elasticities
As we mentioned, the NEB often provides a number 
of ‘conditional’ forecasts in its reports; that is, the 
specific forecast is conditional on particular assump-
tions. The previous section looked at the NEB forecasts 
that assumed prices closest to those that actually 
occurred and found that, except for synthetic crude, 
the NEB tended to underestimate future production. 
In this section, we consider a different dimension of 
the NEB forecasts. In those cases, where the NEB pro-
vided forecasts at different prices, and price was the 
only variable that changes, it is possible to look at the 
responsiveness of the forecast to the price difference; 
that is, there is an implied elasticity of supply given 
by the two estimates. (Remember from Chapter Four 
that the elasticity of supply is the percentage change 
in output divided by the percentage change in price 
that brings it about, all other factors affecting supply 
held constant.) These are ‘arc’ estimates of the elastic-
ity of supply, since the two output values are typically 
estimated at prices that are quite distant. (As such, 
they contrast with ‘point’ elasticity estimates, which 
indicate the responsiveness of output to very small 
price changes. A number of varying ‘paths’ of point 
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supply elasticities are all compatible with any particu-
lar arc elasticity.) The values that we calculate below 
are not always true supply elasticities because in some 
cases the difference between the two NEB forecasts 
involves more than simply two prices of crude oil; we 
have noted the most important differences. It is also 
important to note that there is usually no single supply 
elasticity involved in comparing two cases since the 
relative difference between outputs typically varies 
depending how long into the future one is looking. 
Since the NEB production forecasts tend to exhibit 
short-run price inelasticity (as is entirely appropriate), 
we have normally picked a year for comparison at 
least ten years into the forecast. And, finally, not all 
price assumptions involve constant prices over time, 
so that the percentage change in price is not necessar-
ily constant between two forecasts; once again, we try 
to take note of exceptions in this regard.
The 1969, 1974, and 1975 reports included no 
explicit price assumptions. Appendix A8.6 has tables 
showing the ranges of forecasts for the subsequent 
NEB reports. We shall briefly review the price assump-
tions of each report and make comments on the 
implied elasticities where appropriate. Table 8.1 sum-
marizes the estimated price elasticities from the 1984 
to 1999 reports.
1977 Report. A constant real price (at the 1980 
international level) was assumed in the ‘expected’ case; 
in the ‘maximum price’ case, the real price rises by 5%/
yr, while in the ‘minimum price’ case, the real price 
falls by about 5%/year (the nominal price is constant). 
The NEB estimates show significant price response for 
both conventional and synthetic crude, especially if 
prices fall.
1978 Report. The base, high, and low price 
assumptions are the same as for the three cases in the 
1977 report, but with greater supply desegregation. 
Production from current established reserves was 
completely unresponsive to price differences. Pre-
sumably this oil has only to recover operating costs, 
so the effect of different prices is on the abandonment 
date, when output rates are small. Bitumen production 
is low and is shown as responding asymmetrically 
to price changes; a higher price does not call forth 
any more production, but output falls dramatically if 
the price declines. Synthetic crude is also shown as 
particularly affected by lower prices. Conventional 
light reserves additions are particularly responsive to 
higher prices.
1981 Report. The 1981 report showed sharply rising 
nominal (and real) prices, as international prices were 
assumed to continue to rise, and Canadian prices 
increased under the various schedules of the National 
Energy Program. The sensitivity cases shown in this 
report do not reflect price differences but, rather, 
differences in geologic and technological potentials 
and in fiscal regimes. Of course, reduced govern-
ment take is like a price increase as far as producers 
Table 8.1: Implied Oil Supply Elasticities in NEB Reports, 1984–99
 1984 1986 1988 1991 1994 1999
Established Reserves, Light and Heavy 0.8/0.15
New Discoveries, Light and Heavy 1.48/0.67
EOR, Light and Heavy 2.68/1.12
Established Reserves, Light  0.04 0.04
EOR, Light  0.28 0.50  0.9/1.94
New Discoveries, Light  0.96 0.02  0.33/0.17
Light and Medium    0.83/1.5  1.03/0.32*
Established Reserves, Heavy  0.08 –0.84
EOR, Heavy  0.98 0.90  1.03/2.46
New Discoveries, Heavy  0.96 –0.5  0.4/0.26
Heavy Crudes and Bitumen    1.07/1.73
Conventional Heavy      0.52/0.59*
Bitumen  5.62 2.68  5.27/2.43 2.21/2.77*
Syncrude  1.00 1.60  1.17/0.34 1.31/2.23*
Notes:	Most	elasticities	reflect	the	supply	response	to	higher	prices;	numbers	in	bold	are	elasticities	with	respect	to	price	declines.	In	1999,	the	values	marked	with	an	
asterisk (*) are from the “Low-Cost Supply Case,” which assumes that greater volumes of low-cost resources are available.
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are concerned. The modified base case allowed for 
reduced taxes or royalties. The low case assumed 
somewhat higher government take and poorer geolog-
ical potential. The high case assumed higher geologi-
cal potential and more rapid approach to international 
oil prices. Specific price effects cannot be estimated 
since price is not the main variable changing between 
cases and the netback changes assumed are not explic-
itly described. This report shows bitumen as com-
pletely unresponsive to changes between cases, while 
synthetic crude production is highly responsive to 
improved conditions. Conventional crudes are clearly 
regarded as also sensitive to changing conditions; of 
course, this is true pretty well by definition as far as 
changes in geological potential are concerned.
1984 Report. The report showed high and low 
prices relative to the reference case. In 1983, U.S. 
dollars/b, the reference price in 2005 was $37.60, the 
high price was $50.10 (or 33% higher) and the low 
price was $28.10 (or 25% lower). These price differ-
ences were not constant across time, so the implied 
elasticities of supply are only approximate. We have 
estimated elasticities of supply by taking the percent-
age change in quantity between cases and dividing 
it by the percentage change in price. For example, as 
Appendix A8.6 shows, at higher prices, output from 
currently established reserves is 5 per cent higher 
(20/19); since the price was 33 per cent higher the 
elasticity of supply implied is 0.15 (5/33). As Table 8.1 
shows, higher elasticities are implied for output from 
new discoveries than for established reserves, with 
EOR output even more responsive to price changes.
It will be noted that these estimates show supply 
as being more responsive to lower prices than higher. 
This is true even for already established reserves; by 
2010, the output from these reserves has fallen dra-
matically due to production decline, so small changes 
in production appear more significant. It is not clear 
why supply should be less responsive to price rises, 
although this could reflect a higher government take 
as prices increase. Another possibility is related to the 
tendencies we noted above to underestimate reserves 
additions. Forecasts tend to be conditioned by the 
existing knowledge gained at prevailing prices, so ten-
dencies to underestimate resource potential may be 
particularly pronounced for cases that assume prices 
higher than we have seen. Alternatively, it may reflect 
a judgment that additions to volumes of recoverable 
oil become smaller as prices rise.
1986 Report. By 2005, the high price of US$27/b 
(real 1986 dollars) is 50 per cent higher than the low 
price. The implied elasticities in Table 8.1 show that 
output from current established reserves is minimally 
sensitive to price changes, which is not surprising. 
Light oil output from EOR projects is estimated to be 
relatively inelastic. Unlike the 1978 and 1981 reports, 
bitumen is highly responsive to price increases. 
The other output categories all exhibit about unitary 
elasticity.
1988 Report. As in the 1986 report, the high price 
(at US$30/b in 1987 dollars) is 50 per cent higher than 
the low price. Using the same procedure as before, the 
elasticities shown in Table 8.1 are derived. The nega-
tive supply price elasticities for two of the heavy oil 
categories stand out. Why would higher prices reduce 
output? The reason seems to lie in the exhaustibility 
implications of the NEB’s models, where higher prices 
induce increases in reserves but may also speed up 
production so that, by the year 2005, heavy established 
reserves and reserves additions actually show less 
production at higher prices. (This highlights the diffi-
culty of deriving precise supply elasticities when what 
is really being compared is production paths over 
time.) As in the 1986 report, non-conventional supply 
sources are shown as particularly price responsive; 
large volumes are waiting, if only the price gets high 
enough. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, how-
ever, it seemed that the ‘magic’ price was always above 
prevailing market prices! The production possibilities 
for light oil in 2005, due to higher prices, have flipped 
in the 1988 report as compared to the 1986 report, with 
EOR now offering most of the incremental output.
1991 Report. The control case had a price of 
US$27.00 in 2010 (1990 real dollars). The other cases 
are described in slightly vague terms but seem to 
involve a price 26 per cent lower and 30 per cent 
higher. Supply elasticities (Table 8.1) are generally 
elastic and are higher for heavy crudes than light.
1994 Report. The reference price in 2010 is 
US$23.00/b (in real 1991 dollars). The low price is 
35 per cent lower, and the high price is 30 per cent 
higher. Table 8.1 includes implied supply elasticities 
based on the production amounts for 2010. EOR is 
quite price sensitive, especially to price declines. On 
the other hand, this report shows conventional crude 
as being particularly sensitive to price rises, though 
the supply response is still inelastic. The high supply 
elasticity of bitumen is evident.
1999 Report. This report gave two price sensitivi-
ties, a 29 per cent higher price in a case involving ‘cur-
rent supply trends,’ and a 22 per cent higher price in 
a case with a greater volume of low-cost oil available. 
Once again, the NEB analysis implies particularly high 
supply elasticities for non-conventional crude, as Table 
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8.1 shows. Conventional heavy oil is seen as supply 
inelastic. The sharp fall in the supply elasticity for light 
oil between the two cases suggests that a significant 
portion of the expected reserves additions for light oil 
are booked at the lower price, leaving relatively small 
incremental volumes to draw under the stimulus of 
higher prices: the supply curve gets steeper.
E. Conclusion
We have reviewed the NEB supply forecasts from the 
early 1970s through to 1999 in some detail because 
they are the most widely reported and accepted supply 
estimates in Canada. They incorporate all types of 
crude, have been revised and published on a regular 
basis, and have seen the gradual development of a 
large data base and increasingly sophisticated mod-
elling. The modelling approach is eclectic, involving 
a variety of techniques ranging from ‘rules of thumb’ 
through to elaborate statistical estimation. Because the 
techniques are so varied, and the underlying data so 
extensive, it is not always obvious what factors are of 
most significance in giving changes in forecast oil pro-
duction from report to report. The NEB reports have 
tended to become increasingly optimistic about the oil 
production capabilities of the Western Canadian sed-
imentary basin. The disaggregated supply estimation 
methods imply that crude oil supply is price respon-
sive to some degree. Supply from already established 
reserves normally appears as very price inelastic, 
and the various categories of reserves additions, EOR 
potential, and non-conventional crude show widely 
varying implicit supply elasticities in different NEB 
studies, but the clear, emerging message is that ‘price 
matters.’ The NEB has generally found that price is 
particularly important for non-conventional crude 
oils. Underestimates of supply for the conventional oil 
may reflect a tendency to underestimate the impact of 
changes in technology and knowledge (for example, 
with respect to new geological plays or new recovery 
techniques). But this could also stem from underesti-
mation of the price elasticities of conventional crude 
oil supply since much technological change is, in 
fact, induced by expectations of profit that is, clearly, 
enhanced by higher prices. That is, higher prices will 
induce increased crude oil production because higher 
cost oil (under current technologies) becomes profit-
able; they also induce more production as a result of 
the new technologies and knowledge that the price 
rises stimulate. Our sense is that the NEB forecasts 
of the 1970s and 1980s tended to be insufficiently 
optimistic about these new technological possibilities. 
This in turn may reflect a natural conservatism in 
making forecasts that manifests itself in the difficulty 
in allowing for truly novel possibilities. However, that 
this has been the case in past forecasts is not a guar-
antee that it will prove to be so for the most recent 
forecasts, which may be more accurate as forecasting 
procedures have improved. In addition, it may well 
happen that the tendency to resource ‘pessimism’ 
turns out, at some point in time, to be correct!
The NEB is not the only research organization to 
build a disaggregated model of Alberta oil supply, 
although it is the only body to provide continually 
updated forecasts over an extended period of years. 
Both the ERCB and the Canadian Energy Research 
Institute (CERI) have also provided forecasts of 
Alberta conventional crude oil production, using 
relatively detailed supply models. The ERCB forecasts 
have appeared in the series of publications to which 
we have made frequent allusion entitled Reserves and 
Supply/Demand Outlook (ERCB, ST-18 and, since 2001, 
ST-98) and will not be reviewed here. We will summa-
rize some of the CERI work.
Heath (1992) and Heath, Chan, and Stariha (1995) 
set out the CERI conventional-oil-supply model. It is 
difficult to disentangle all the details, which involve 
numerous assumptions to go from separate oil pools 
to total Alberta supply. We will provide a brief outline 
of the model as we understand it. To some extent, they 
rely on data and assumptions from the NEB models. 
For geological information, they draw on analysis 
from the Institute of Sedimentary and Petroleum 
Geology (ISPG), which set out a total of 45 crude oil 
plays in Alberta (39 of them light and medium crude, 
and 9 heavy crude). CERI researchers added a 46th 
play to represent small and unclassified pools and oil 
from natural gas pools with high condensate content. 
The ISPG data was largely drawn from discovery pro-
cess modelling, which provided estimates of the size 
distribution of pools in the 45 plays and, by deducting 
historic discoveries, gave a distribution of the number 
and expected sizes of as-yet-undiscovered pools. The 
ISPG model also estimates a parameter that indicates 
the extent to which pools have been discovered in a 
strict largest-to-smallest sequence; this variable can 
be used to indicate the likelihood that the next dis-
covery in the play will be of any specific size. Drawing 
on a number of sources, CERI assumes exploration 
success ratios for each play. In addition, play-specific 
depletion paths are assumed, as are two abandonment 
quantities, one for larger pools and one for smaller. 
Heath, Chan, and Stariha also discuss economic 
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criteria for determining the abandonment date for 
oil pools and the willingness to invest in pools, but it 
is not clear how these criteria interact with the more 
deterministic rules they also discuss. The economic 
criteria appear to be used largely for a separate cash 
flow and profitability analysis of the oil pools available 
in each play; in effect, these involve the estimation 
of ‘resource stock supply curves,’ which indicate the 
volumes of oil available at various possible costs. The 
estimates of Alberta production to 2014 are apparently 
assumed to be drawn from the economic pools. The 
CERI study also assumes that results from Saskatch-
ewan for increased recovery factors due to new EOR 
and horizontal drilling (Chan et al., 1994) can be gen-
eralized to Alberta.
The CERI production model incorporates short-, 
medium-, and long-run perspectives. In the short-
run, existing established reserves are run down using 
established production decline relationships and 1995 
economic and fiscal conditions. The analysis assumed 
a WTI price of US$19.50/b at Cushing, netted back 
to Alberta, with quality and local transmission cost 
adjustments appropriate to each oil play.
In the medium-run, oil pools are developed up 
to some level for primary production and are also 
assessed for EOR potential. The EOR is assessed as 
waterflood potential but draws on EUB data for all 
types of EOR. Considerable judgment was used in 
defining the number of development wells required in 
an oil pool, based on four factors: an assumed 80 per 
cent success rate; the provincial average, for each pool 
size, of reserves divided by the estimated lifetime pro-
duction of an average well; an assumed average well 
spacing (e.g., 64 hectares for a well in a light oil pool); 
and the historic average number of wells in each pool 
size. Planned development is usually the smaller of 
that suggested by the latter two of these criteria and 
is assumed to take five years, following an ‘S’-shaped 
curve, with assumed maximum numbers of wells 
possible each year in a pool. Within any play, devel-
opment is assumed each year to start with the largest 
pools and progress through to smaller pools, in so far 
as development expenditures allow. (See below for the 
determination of these expenditures.)
In the long-run, new pools can be discovered 
from the 46 plays, based on the estimate of the size 
distribution of undiscovered pools and the likelihood 
of finding each pool. At any time, the relative appeal 
of different oil plays is based on each play’s share of 
as-yet-undiscovered reserves in the province.
The level of investment activity, and hence the 
actual amount of development and exploration that 
takes place, is said to be based on econometric esti-
mates that CERI derived from the Alberta Department 
of Energy. Heath, Chan, and Stariha (1995) provide 
insufficient data to understand this model clearly. 
Their Appendix A.6 suggests that the model estimates 
constant dollar expenditures on exploratory drilling, 
G&G expenses, land rental costs, and development 
drilling as a function of variables such as interest rates 
and oil netback values (price net of operating costs 
including taxes and royalties). However, Appendix A.4 
describes the independent variable as “the producers’ 
probability of reinvesting” (p. 259) and says that the 
reference cases assume a constant reinvestment rate 
of 88 per cent (p. 260) with 62.5 per cent of this going 
to development and the rest to exploration. Thus, the 
key factor is the reinvestment of the net operating 
income of the industry (which we assume is revenue 
less operating costs, royalties, land rentals, and taxes). 
Exploration and development expenditures are then 
allocated across the plays on the basis of each play’s 
share of undiscovered oil volumes. In this model, 
reserves additions fall off rapidly. For example, in 1995, 
in millions of barrels, there are new discovery reserves 
additions of 220.5, but in 2014 there are only 2.8. Less 
drastically, EOR reserves additions fall from 32.0 to 7.1.
Table 8.2 (with data from Heath, Chan, and 
Stariha, 1995, p. 29) shows forecast Alberta conven-
tional crude production for several years from 1995 
to 2014 in cubic metres per day. The extremely rapid 
forecast decline in Alberta conventional oil produc-
tion is apparent, much more rapid than the declines 
forecast by the NEB in 1994 and 1999 for WCSB con-
ventional light and heavy crude (Appendix Tables A8.2 
and A8.3). CAPP shows conventional Alberta oil pro-
duction in 2000 as 119,188 m3/d, almost 40 per cent 
higher than the CERI forecast for that year; in 2005, 
CAPP reported 90,804 m3/d as compared to 44,923 for 
Table 8.2: CERI Alberta Oil Model: Forecast Oil 
Production (m3/d)
 Existing, fully  Existing pools, New pool Total 
 developed not completely discoveries  
 pools developed by 1992
1995 87,758 4,088 58,187 150,032
2000 33,051 1,087 51,359 85,497
2005 17,221 391 27,310 44,923
2010 11,002 174 14,960 26,093
2014 8,306 130 9,045 17,439
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CERI; for 2010 the numbers were 72,957 m3/d (CAPP) 
and 26,093 m3/d (CERI) (CAPP Statistical Handbook).
Thus, the CERI forecast seems to share the under-
estimation characteristics of the NEB forecasts.
4. Direct Cost Estimation
A. Introduction
 Recall that, if we are willing to assume that the indus-
try is dominated by profit-maximizing companies, 
then the supply curve for crude oil can be interpreted 
as the marginal cost curve of crude oil. From this per-
spective, one way to assess the supply of Alberta crude 
oil would be to directly estimate the actual and poten-
tial costs of production. This procedure is often used, 
both in cost assessments for specific projects and in 
industry-wide studies of ‘Finding’ and ‘Replacement’ 
costs. And the profitability analysis internal to most 
companies either explicitly or implicitly incorporates 
the unit costs of the oil associated with specific invest-
ment proposals; of course, these analyses are usually 
kept confidential as propriety information to the 
company.
In this part of the chapter, we will review some 
studies that directly estimate the cost of Alberta crude 
oil. In estimating the costs of oil production, only 
variable costs are relevant. This leads to the distinc-
tion between ‘full-cycle’ costs (when new exploration, 
development, and lifting costs must be incurred) and 
‘half-cycle’ costs (in already discovered pools, when 
only new development and lifting costs are needed).
Direct cost estimation normally relates quantities 
of crude oil production (Q) to the expenditures 
(E) undertaken to produce those quantities. In the 
simplest format, we could define an average cost of 
oil production as E/Q. But this is not the marginal or 
incremental cost that economists think of as defining a 
supply curve of oil. Complications abound, including 
the following seven:
(i) Care must be made to distinguish between 
oil-in-the-ground (for example, additions to 
oil reserves) and oil as it is lifted (crude oil 
production).
(ii) The time value of money must be considered. 
In practice, a base year must be defined 
(usually the current year or a recent one), and 
expenditures after this year assigned a smaller 
value than the actual expense since their 
present value is reduced by the advantage of 
being able to wait before incurring them and 
investing the capital funds in the intervening 
period. Mathematically, if r is the annual rate 
of ‘discount’ or time value of money, expressed 
as an annual interest rate, then the present 
value of $I spent a t years from the base year is:
Z =  I  ; (1+r)t
that is, $Z invested today at r% per year would 
give $I in t years time. Let us suppose that $I* is 
the present value of the investment expenditures 
needed to add R barrels of oil to reserves. Then 
I*/R would be a measure of the average cost of 
the additional oil-in-the-ground.
Timing is also important for the process 
of oil production since reserves are depleted 
over many years and much of the revenue will 
not be received until far into the future. If the 
analyst is estimating the cost of oil as lifted, 
it is therefore necessary to adjust production 
for timing as well. This involves the concept of 
the ‘supply cost’ or ‘supply price’ or ‘levelized 
cost’ of oil, which is the present value of costs 
divided by the present value of production, or, 
in symbols, where q(t) is output in year t, and 
year T is the last year of production:
   I *   
  T
 ∑ q(t)(1 + r)-t
 t=0        .
If output follows an exponential decline 
relationship, falling at annual rate of a% per 
year, and q(0) is the initial annual output rate, 
and continuous rather than discrete time is 
used, then the supply cost is:
   I *    = (  I *  ) (  a + r  )  T ∫ q(0)e–ate–rtdt   q(0)  1 –  1 
 t=0                
e(a+r)T
   .
These timing factors must be kept in mind 
when estimating the costs of oil.
(iii) Determination of the appropriate rate of dis-
count (r) is not easy. From the start, care must 
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be taken to ensure that both expenditures and 
r are in the same ‘units,’ that is either nominal 
(current or ‘as spent’) dollars or real (constant 
or ‘inflation free’) dollars. A number of differ-
ent inflation rates are potentially available to 
translate nominal into real discount rates.
(iv) The supply curve is a ranking of potential units 
of oil production from low cost to high cost, 
where the cost is the incremental, or marginal, 
cost of that unit of oil. However, reported cost 
data is normally an average cost for an aggre-
gated volume of oil. This may be all the costs 
in a region for a particular time period, or it 
may be the total costs for an entire project. 
Relating these costs to the associated reserves 
or output will, therefore, yield an average cost. 
For a specific project, the data may reflect 
indivisibilities (‘lumpiness’), in the sense that 
one cannot typically vary capital expenditures 
in such a way as to change production on a 
unit-by-unit basis. Hence, the calculated cost 
might be interpreted as a marginal cost since 
it does represent the incremental cost per unit 
of the next ‘lump’ of output. However, even 
for individual projects, the data are often not 
in an appropriate form to calculate a marginal 
cost, since it represents the total investment 
plan of the producer and does not include the 
sequence of smaller investment options that 
preceded the one selected. It is the sequence of 
these incremental projects that really defines 
the marginal costs. In certain circumstances, 
this may not pose much of a problem. Thus, 
for example, in a reservoir that has homo-
geneous physical characteristics – porosity, 
permeability, thickness, water-to-oil ratio, 
etc. – extra units of production from extension 
drilling will exhibit relatively constant returns, 
where average and marginal costs are equal as 
production expands. However, activities like 
infill drilling and EOR projects are more likely 
to involve diminishing returns as the scale 
of the project is increased. Thus, the average 
cost of the entire development investment will 
understate the marginal cost of the last units 
produced.
It may be possible to approximate marginal 
costs from average cost data. Suppose that 
we know the equation for the average cost 
curve. We also know that total cost (TC) is the 
average cost (AC) multiplied by quantity (Q); 
marginal cost (MC) is the first derivative of the 
total cost curve with respect to quantity. For 
example, suppose that we assemble average 
cost data that suggest that the average cost 
curve is a straight line that starts at zero. That 
is, costs begin at a minimal level for the very 
first unit of production, then increase so that 
AC = bQ, where b is the slope of the average 
cost curve. Then total cost is (bQ)(Q), and 
MC = 2bQ; the marginal cost curve is twice as 
steep as the average cost curve.
(v) Direct estimation of the cost of oil production 
is plagued by joint-product problems since 
much expenditure is not clearly tied to specific 
units of output. Remember that in a joint-
product process a single activity necessarily 
generates more than one output. Petroleum 
exploration is an outstanding example since 
exploration expenditures almost invariably 
yield knowledge that is useful in the location 
of both oil and natural gas deposits and also 
for both current and future discoveries. How, 
then, can a particular exploratory investment 
be tied to specific units of output? One point 
of view is that it cannot and that attempts to 
directly estimate ‘finding’ (or exploration or 
discovery) costs are futile and meaningless 
(Adelman, 1992). Other analysts disagree, 
suggesting that simplifying assumptions allow 
us to derive meaningful cost measures in joint-
product cases. Often the argument is not so 
much that the specific value is a ‘true’ measure 
of cost, but that, so long as we always make 
the same assumptions, these costs may serve 
a useful comparative purpose. For example, 
trends across time in costs for a region may be 
calculated, or cost comparisons may be made 
between different companies in order to assess 
their relative performance. The assumptions 
required are of two main types, one related 
to timing and one to the types of products 
produced.
For the first, it is normally necessary to 
make some assumption about the timing of 
the output tied to a particular expenditure. 
Thus, for example, it might be assumed that 
geological and geophysical (G&G) expenses 
are tied to oil discoveries one year later 
(and therefore include one year’s interest 
cost), while exploratory drilling costs relate 
to discoveries in the same year. It is also 
184 PETROPOLIT ICS
necessary to decide whether discoveries are the 
reported ‘new discoveries’ in the year of the 
exploratory expenses, or whether an attempt 
should be made to estimate ‘appreciated 
discoveries,’ including the reserves that will 
be added through subsequent development 
activities. Presumably, exploration discovers 
the whole oil pool, but some of the reserves 
subsequently added may reflect later economic 
or technological conditions, especially where 
EOR schemes are concerned. However, if only 
year-of-discovery ‘new discovery’ reserve 
estimates are used, then these reserves will be 
allocated a relatively high cost of exploration, 
and the subsequent reserves added in the pool 
will not show any exploration cost at all.
Exploration normally generates both oil 
and natural gas discoveries. In any region 
where both products are valuable, it is neces-
sary to: (a) model oil and gas discoveries 
together, (b) divide the expenditures between 
the two products, a cost allocation process, 
or (c) combine the two products into a single 
one (e.g., barrels of oil equivalent), an output 
aggregation process. In the cost allocation or 
output aggregation cases, a ‘reasonable’ cri-
terion will be selected, but there are a number 
of such criteria and no firm basis for thinking 
that any one is the valid method. For example, 
total exploratory drilling costs may be allo-
cated on the basis of the relative number of 
successful oil and gas wells, or some measure 
of the ‘intent’ of companies when drilling the 
exploratory wells, or the relative footages of 
successful oil and gas wells. Oil and natural gas 
could be combined into a single product on 
the basis of their respective energy contents or 
their relative market values. The absence of any 
obviously valid solution to the joint-product 
problem leads some to deny the validity of 
any direct cost measures where joint-product 
problems are significant. Adelman and Wat-
kins (2002) note the range of different results 
depending on the method used and argue that 
no one approach is more meaningful than 
any other. The contrary view is that, once a 
specific assumption is made about how to treat 
joint-product cases, trends in the value calcu-
lated are meaningful.
Readers may recall that, if the proportions 
of the joint products can be varied by varying 
the types of expenses undertaken, then it is 
possible to calculate marginal costs for the sep-
arate products, even though the average costs 
are still arbitrary. The marginal cost is the ‘full’ 
opportunity cost per unit of the incremental 
output, where the opportunity cost includes 
the incremental investment expenditures to 
produce the extra product plus the net operat-
ing profits given up on any units of the other 
product which are sacrificed. For example, a 
company might redirect its exploration away 
from wells that have a higher probability of 
locating natural gas and toward wells with a 
higher probability of finding oil. One would 
expect to see a net increase in oil discoveries 
from the new wells drilled, but there would 
be an additional opportunity cost in terms of 
reduced discoveries of gas. In practical terms, 
however, cost data are rarely available in suf-
ficient detail to allow the estimation of such 
marginal costs.
(vi) It is also important to realize that expenditures 
(even including allowance for the time value 
of money) do not account for all costs that go 
into the supply curve. Both user costs and any 
costs associated with the foregone value of 
future options will also enter marginal costs. 
That is, direct estimation of a marginal cost 
curve on the basis of industry expenditures 
will normally underestimate the marginal 
costs of production and therefore over-
estimate supply.
(vii) Finally, when time series data are used to 
directly estimate unit oil costs, there are 
‘identification problems’ in interpreting the 
resultant values (one per year) as a supply 
curve. This is because, as time passes, the 
factors underlying the supply curve change 
so that it is not clear whether the cost has 
changed across time because there has been a 
movement along a supply curve or because the 
supply curve has shifted.
 Despite these problems, direct cost estimates of 
oil are frequently made. They can be very useful when 
data are available for specific projects, as they can 
provide a check on whether that project is potentially 
profitable at the current level of oil prices. The project 
will not necessarily be undertaken even if this condi-
tion is met, since the willingness to invest depends not 
only on the current price of oil but also on expected 
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prices. And even were it profitable based on expected 
oil prices, the company might find it profitable to 
delay production for ‘user cost’ or ‘option value’ rea-
sons. Also, a company might be willing to undertake 
a project even if it did not generate expected profits 
itself, if, for example, it was expected to generate 
geological information that would help the company 
make better exploration decisions in subsequent 
periods.
We will not attempt to summarize all the 
published direct cost estimates for Alberta oil, but we 
will provide several examples falling into two broad 
classes. The first involves cost estimation for specific 
projects, while the second involves time trends in 
costs for the entire industry.
B.	Costs	of	Specific	Projects
Companies undertake project evaluations all the time, 
which could be readily translated into unit cost esti-
mates. These could be either for oil in the ground (i.e., 
the present value of exploration expenditures divided 
by the volume of oil reserves expected to be discov-
ered) or for crude oil as produced (i.e., the present 
value of expenditures divided by the present value of 
the output that is expected to result). However, com-
panies rarely make this information public.
There are several examples of studies that have 
used this approach to analyze the supply of crude oil 
in Alberta. We will see a detailed example in Chapter 
Ten, where Watkins estimated the costs in the 1950s of 
developing a number of particular oil pools in Alberta 
under three possible sets of regulatory conditions. 
Cost estimation has also formed a part of the NEB’s 
analysis in their ‘Supply/Demand’ reports. Starting 
with the June 1981 report, the forecasts of bitumen and 
oil sands production summarized above, for instance, 
derived in large part from direct estimation of supply 
costs and their size in relation to anticipated oil prices. 
There seems to be a common presumption that the 
resource base of the oil sands is so large that per unit 
development and operating costs are constant and the 
user cost component of marginal cost is minimal. This 
may well be reasonable for mining type operations, 
where it seems to be relatively easy to move on to 
a new piece of land to strip mine more ore without 
appreciably impacting production opportunities in 
the near future. For in situ ventures, the assumption of 
zero user costs may not be as appropriate since current 
production may deplete reservoir energy and there-
fore increase future production costs, much as hap-
pens in a conventional oil pool. Table 8.3 summarizes 
the varying supply costs reported by the NEB for syn-
crude from combined oil sands mining and upgrading 
projects and for bitumen from heavy oil projects. The 
costs are in dollars per cubic metre and have not been 
adjusted for inflation. As can be seen, current dollar 
cost estimates for upgraded synthetic crude oil tended 
to fall from 1981 to 2000 (and real costs would have 
fallen even more dramatically), but then rose again 
after that. In 2011, the NEB was estimating that new 
mining and upgrading projects would require a price 
for WTI of US$535-600/m3 (NEB, 2011). Estimated 
bitumen costs showed less variability, but also rose 
after the year 2000.
The NEB has also used the supply cost approach 
to assess the likely future production from enhanced 
oil recovery (EOR) projects. An extensive data base 
was built up and used to screen major oil reservoirs 
Table 8.3: NEB Supply Costs for Non-Conventional Oil ($/m3)
NEB Report Integrated Mining (mining and upgrading) Bitumen Bitumen and Upgrading
June 1981 $260 N/A N/A
October 1986 $185–$275 $70 and up $140–$230
September 1988 $170 $65–$100 $150–$185
June 1991 $200 $65–$90 N/A
December 1994 $157–$189 $57–$100 N/A
1999 $94–$151 $50–$107 N/A
2000 $94–$114 $44–$88 N/A
2003 $138–$176 $63–$120 N/A
2006 $226–$251 $88–$138 N/A
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to see which had technical characteristics that might 
be amenable to particular types of EOR; from this, the 
NEB estimated the supply costs of the various possi-
bilities to see if they would be economic at various oil 
prices. The NEB reports do not give detailed estimates 
of these supply costs. Supply cost analysis of EOR pro-
jects in Alberta was also undertaken by the Canadian 
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources (1977), 
Watkins (1977b), Prince (1980), and Eglington and 
Nugent (1984).
Watkins (1977b), for example, examined thirteen 
EOR projects in Alberta. At the time there were 370 
such schemes in place in the province, but these thir-
teen accounted for about 40 per cent of the reserves 
credited to EOR. Most of the projects were water-
floods, with one solvent flood, and one combined 
water and solvent flood. The data were supplied by the 
firms involved in the EOR projects and included actual 
development and operating expenditures (excluding 
taxes and royalties) and output to 1974; costs incurred 
after 1974 were projections. All values were in real 1973 
dollars; the deflator used was a U.S. oilfield equipment 
price index. The supply costs of crude ranged from 
$0.25 to $2.35/b, with an average reserves-weighted 
cost of $0.83/b, supply costs evaluated at a 12 per cent 
rate of discount. Ten of the projects had unit develop-
ment and operating costs below $1/b, and the highest 
cost project was the solvent flood in the Swan Hills 
South pool. Field prices in these pools in 1973 were 
in the $3–$4/b range. Supply prices less than market 
prices would be anticipated since the investors in the 
EOR projects presumably anticipated that they would 
earn profits over and above a normal rate of return – 
that is, they would enjoy some economic rent. Of 
course, this expectation is not necessarily met since an 
EOR project may function less well than anticipated 
and/or the actual market price could turn out to be 
lower than was anticipated.
Prince (1980) undertook an extensive study of 
Canadian EOR potential based upon economic anal-
ysis of Alberta oil pools. He considered ‘tertiary’ 
EOR, after waterflood recovery. Prince looked at the 
potential for eight different EOR processes in 1,372 
individual Alberta oil reservoirs. An initial screening 
of reservoir characteristics eliminated a number of 
these reservoirs as suitable for any of the EOR tech-
niques but left a total of 1,536 possible EOR projects. 
(Some reservoirs could potentially support more than 
one type of EOR project.) Economic analysis (based 
on the implementation of projects over a ten-year 
period, an 8% required real rate of return and an oil 
price of $20/b) reduced the number of reservoirs with 
positive expected profit to 460. (This also involved 
selecting the most attractive project in reservoirs 
where more than one EOR scheme was feasible.) His 
analysis allowed construction of a reserves additions 
supply curve, showing the supply cost associated with 
the various projects. The lowest cost project began at 
about $14/b ($88/m3) and showed approximately 2.4 
billion barrels accessible through the 460 projects, at 
a cost of $20/b ($126/m3) or less. Prince’s results show 
much higher EOR costs than in the previously estab-
lished projects analyzed by Watkins but also show a 
flat supply curve for a large supply addition.
Supply costs studies also formed a part of the 
research funded by the Economic Council of Canada 
in its extensive review of Canadian energy policies 
in the early 1980s. Eglington and Nugent (1984) 
undertook extensive analysis of hydrocarbon miscible 
flood projects in three Alberta oil reservoirs. They 
estimated both ‘social’ supply costs (which excluded 
the effects of taxes and royalties) and ‘private’ supply 
costs (which included the payments to governments, 
on the basis of 1983 tax and royalty regulations). These 
costs were estimated using a 10 per cent real discount 
rate and are in 1983 dollars; they include no formal 
allowance for risk. Table 8.4 summarizes some of 
their results.
The three EOR projects are of quite different size 
and are in three different reservoirs. Costs do not 
vary strictly with the size of the project, though the 
smallest project is the most costly. At the prices in 
effect in 1983 (for oil from new EOR projects), the 
Violet grove project was marginal, but the other two 
appeared profitable. However, all three would have 
been unprofitable, if the costs including royalty/tax 
payments had stayed the same, at average prices from 
1986 through 2000. It should be noted, however, that 
the costs of the hydrocarbon flooding agent would 
likely fall along with oil prices. The size of the tax/
royalty burden is apparent, even though there were 
a number of special incentives for EOR investments. 
The Eglington and Nugent study suggests that oil from 
hydrocarbon miscible flood projects is quite expensive 
and appreciably more costly than Prince found. 
(Prince shows an average cost of about $96/m3 for 
hydrocarbon miscible flood projects.) Eglington and 
Nugent’s study considered only three projects and was 
designed largely to allow an assessment of Canadian 
oil policies in the mid-1980s.
Taken together, these studies demonstrate the 
reservoir-specific nature of EOR, both with respect 
to the technical viability of different schemes and the 
costs of the oil produced.
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C. Province-Wide Supply Costs
Some studies have estimated the average cost of oil 
produced in Alberta by relating reported industry 
expenditures to the resultant oil volumes. Oilweek 
magazine, for instance, has frequently reported annual 
average oil costs but using a suspect methodology that 
combines values for oil in the ground (investments 
divided by reserves additions) with values for oil as 
produced (operating costs divided by production).
One of the earliest estimates of the cost of Alber-
ta’s conventional crude oil was Watkins and Sharp 
(1970), which used expenditure and production data 
for all pools discovered in the province from 1947 
through 1968. A variety of allocation factors divided 
total expenditures between oil and gas. They also 
forecast future operating costs, development costs 
for pool extensions and production to the year 1990. 
(Remember that a supply price estimate shows the 
present value of expenditures divided by the present 
value of output.) A number of different sensitivities 
were undertaken, but their ‘normal case,’ assuming a 
10 per cent rate of discount, generated a ‘social’ cost 
for Alberta crude oil of $1.20/b; adding payments to 
landowners (including the provincial government) 
increased the cost to $1.91/b, and adding projected 
income taxes generated a ‘private’ cost of $2.24/b. (The 
three costs just given, if transformed to a cost per 
cubic metre, would be $7.55, $12.02, and $14.10.) This 
compared to a 1969 market price of $2.55/b. Watkins 
and Sharp suggested that on average oil companies 
were earning approximately a 15 per cent rate of 
return over this period. The two governments’ policies 
seemed quite effective in capturing a large share of the 
profits on this oil. Using a 10 per cent rate of discount 
as representative of the marginal opportunity cost of 
investment, the governments were estimated to cap-
ture 77 per cent (that is, $1.04/$1.35) of the economic 
rent on an average barrel. Of course, such an average 
cost covers an unknown range of marginal and aver-
age costs for different pools.
While the Watkins and Sharp study examined the 
cost of all conventional Alberta crude found from 
1947 through 1968, others have looked at the year-
to-year variation in the average cost of oil. One early 
study was Blackman and MacFadyen (1974), but we 
will focus on work done for the Economic Council of 
Canada in the mid-1980s (Eglington and Uffelman, 
1983) and after that by the Canadian Energy Research 
Institute (Slagorsky and Pasay, 1985; McLachlan, 1990, 
1991; Kolody, 1992; Chan, 1993; Heath, Chan, and Star-
iha, 1995; and Quinn and Luthin, 1997).
The Eglington and Uffelman (1983) analysis 
considered the capital cost of oil reserve additions 
in Alberta for the years 1957 through 1979; the cost 
was a cost of oil-in-the-ground in 1981 dollars, for 
the most part using the Canadian Industrial Selling 
Price Index as the price deflator. Expenditure data 
came from the Canadian Petroleum Association 
(CPA, now CAPP), and a number of factors were used 
for different expenditure categories to allocate costs 
between oil and natural gas. Reserves data were the 
Energy Resources Conservation Board’s reported 
annual ‘booked’ reserves. It was assumed that bonus 
payments were those that occurred three years before 
the reserves were booked; geological expenses were 
those incurred two years previously, and exploratory 
drilling expenses those incurred the previous year. 
In each case, an interest factor was added to costs to 
allow for the required return on capital during the 
delay between the expenditure and the reserves addi-
tions. Development expenses were assumed to be tied 
Table 8.4: Eglington and Nugent Supply Costs for EOR Projects
EOR scheme, Reservoir, acres Recoverable Reserves Recoverable Reserves Private Supply Social Supply 
 before Scheme (106 m3) in Scheme (106 m3) Cost ($/m3) Cost ($/m3)
Violet Grove AB Lease, Pembina Cardium,  0.81 0.27 261.24 161.30 
640 acres
Nipisi Gilwood Unit 1, Nipisi Gilwood 6.07 2.73 206.71 99.26 
Middle Devonian A, 3,840 acres
West	Waterflood	Area,		S.	Swan	Hills	 18.15	 7.25	 160.29	 124.85 
Beaverhill Lake A&B, 11,000 acres
Note: Costs are in 1983 dollars.
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to the booked reserves in that year. The per barrel 
‘social’ cost excluded bonus bids, which were consid-
ered to be part of the economic rent transferred to 
the government. The ‘private’ cost included the bonus 
bids. Eglington and Uffelman noted that the cost of 
oil-in-the-ground could be transformed into a supply 
price per barrel of oil produced by multiplying it by 
an appropriate factor that reflected the time value of 
money and the expected timing of lifting the oil; for 
example, with an annual percentage decline rate of 8 
per cent per year in production over a production life 
of thirty years, and an annual discount rate of 10 per 
cent, this factor would be about 2. (The equation to 
make this adjustment is shown in Section 4.A.) Due 
to the tremendous year-to-year variability in booked 
reserves, Eglington and Uffelman preferred to use 
five-year moving averages of expenditures and booked 
reserves. Several sensitivity cases were run, but the 
main results are seen in Table 8.5.
The table shows private and social costs for oil-
in-the-ground and a social supply cost for lifted 
oil (assuming a factor of two to go from oil-in-the-
ground to produced oil) with all costs in dollars per 
cubic metre. The table also shows the five-year moving 
average of booked reserves in millions of cubic 
metres. It should be noted that the social supply costs 
are much higher than Watkins and Sharp’s $7.55/m3, 
which includes an operating cost of $2.25. This is true 
even if only the earlier years (1957 to 1968) covered 
by the Watkins and Sharp study are considered. The 
oil found prior to 1955 may have been particularly 
cheap. But there may also be major differences in the 
ways in which the data were treated. Thus Eglington 
and Uffelman include implied interest costs on top of 
the exploratory spending to account for lags between 
expenses and reserve additions, and they have put all 
values in terms of 1981 dollars. The latter adjustment is 
significant, due to the high inflation felt in the 1970s. 
(If the Watkins and Sharp capital cost of $5.30/m3 
[ = $7.55–$2.25] is inflated by the Industrial Selling 
Price Index from 1969 to 1981, the average exploration 
and development cost of Alberta oil becomes $15.14/
m3, which is more in line with the costs reported by 
Eglington and Uffelman for the period before 1970.)
An obvious question of interest is what meaning 
one might give to the annual costs derived by Egling-
ton and Uffelman. It is important to note that neither 
the social nor the private costs trace out an average 
cost curve for reserve additions. This is because an 
average cost curve is a ranking of reserve additions 
from low cost to high cost; thus, in any year, if there 
are more reserves additions, more higher-cost projects 
will have been undertaken, and the average cost of 
reserves additions in that year will be higher. But the 
average costs reported in Table 8.5 tend to be lowest 
in the period of highest reserves additions and highest 
in times of the smallest reserves additions. One might 
argue that this simply reflects the great uncertainty 
in the process of reserves additions, so that when oil 
companies are unusually lucky their costs tend to 
be low, and vice versa. While this is true, one might 
expect that over a number of years things would tend 
to average out, and, if the yearly values were tracing 
out an average cost or marginal cost (supply) curve, 
the expected positive relation between costs and the 
volume of reserves additions would be apparent. 
However, this is not seen. Rather, as economic logic 
would suggest, the reported average costs reflect a 
mix of movements along the curve and shifts in the 
curve. Presumably movements along the curve are 
driven largely by increases in the expected level of 
Table 8.5: Eglington and Uffelman Supply Costs of 
Reserves Additions
 Social Private Social Supply Booked 
 Cost  Cost Cost ($/m3 of Reserves 
 ($/m3) ($/m3) lifted oil) (106 m3)
1957 11.82 13.94 23.64 51.8
1958 12.25 15.56 24.50 47.9
1959 13.96 17.27 27.92 43.0
1960 13.24 16.66 26.48 43.8
1961 10.76 13.33 21.52 100.0
1962 5.14 6.32 10.18 104.0
1963 4.97 6.00 9.94 106.3
1964 4.40 5.33 8.80 131.7
1965 4.17 5.09 8.34 142.0
1966 4.09 5.20 8.18 154.5
1967 7.03 9.07 14.06 95.8
1968 7.57 9.98 15.14 89.4
1969 10.11 13.62 20.22 65.7
1970 12.50 17.14 25.00 50.6
1971 20.49 27.00 40.98 28.5
1972 20.30 26.35 40.60 25.3
1973 22.98 29.01 45.96 19.4
1974 33.34 41.13 66.68 11.2
1975 31.66 37.78 63.32 11.0
1976 29.45 34.71 58.90 10.3
1977 42.20 48.58 84.40 13.2
1978 53.92 63.79 107.84 16.4
1979 44.43 53.68 88.86 21.7
Note: Costs are in 1981 dollars.
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oil prices, while shifts in the curve reflect a variety 
of factors, including the following three: (1) techno-
logical changes and knowledge generation, including 
the discovery of new oil plays, which increase supply 
and allow more reserves to be added at any given 
cost; (2) depletion effects, which reduce supply as oil 
becomes harder and harder to find; and (3) shifts in 
the curves due to uncertainty, that is, good or bad 
luck. Since real oil prices were relatively low and fall-
ing in the 1960s, when reserves additions were at their 
highest, and real prices increased markedly in the 
1970s when reserves additions were low and tending 
to decline, movements along an average cost curve 
offer little explanatory value. Rather, shifts in the 
curves seem to be particularly significant, with new 
knowledge (and good luck?) operating strongly in the 
1960s, and the 1970s showing strong depletion effects 
(and bad luck?). Table 8.5 does indicate that the cost 
of reserves additions is higher in periods with higher 
prices, as economics would lead us to expect: that is, 
higher prices induce companies to search for high-
er-cost oil.
The Canadian Energy Research Institute (CERI) 
has also undertaken average cost studies, both of 
annual costs for the Province, and a comparison of 
costs for a sample of companies in the early 1990s. 
McLachlan (1990) estimates both ‘short-term replace-
ment costs’ (STRC) and ‘long-term replacement costs’ 
(LTRC) for Alberta oil and natural gas, from 1970 to 
1988. Several cases are presented. The results we will 
summarize calculate STRC’s as the sum of appropri-
ately lagged expenditures divided by total reported 
reserves additions and so are a cost of oil-in-the-
ground. It can be interpreted as “the weighted average 
of the finding cost and development cost components 
for the reserves additions from a particular year” 
(McLachlan, 1990, p. 45). Reserves added in year 
t are associated with land expenditures two years 
previously, geological expenses one year prior, and 
exploratory and development drilling costs in the 
same year as the reserves additions. The inclusion of 
land expenditures, which are largely bonuses paid 
to the provincial government, implies that the costs 
are from a ‘private’ rather than ‘social’ perspective. 
Early work by CERI included implied interest costs 
for the expenses from an earlier year, but McLach-
lan’s study did not. LTRC’s use appreciated estimates 
of reserves added, where reserves are credited to the 
discovery year. McLachlan (1990, p. 45) argues that 
the LTRC is “the sum of the finding and development 
cost components for the fully appreciated reserves 
from a particular discovery year.” It is assumed that 
reserves in a pool are completely proved up in five 
years, with the allocation of development expenditures 
to the five years mimicking the reserves appreciation 
pattern. The same lags as in the STRC calculations are 
applied to exploration expenditures, while develop-
ment expenditures in any year are allocated to pools 
discovered in the previous five years. This required 
estimated development expenses for the years 1989 to 
1993, so total development costs could be included for 
reserves found up to 1988. All expenditures are in 1988 
dollars, with deflators drawn mainly from the inflation 
cost indices of the Canadian Petroleum Association. 
Expenditures are allocated between oil and natural gas 
on the basis of the relative total drilling footage.
Table 8.6 summarizes the results. The costs are in 
dollars per cubic metre of oil-in-the-ground. Average 
oil prices are shown as well, in dollars per cubic metre. 
Also shown are the appreciated reserves credited to 
each year (in millions of cubic metres); these are the 
reserves used for the LTRC estimates. In order to allow 
some comparability with the Eglington and Uffelman 
estimates, costs and prices are shown in 1981 dollars; 
McLachlan’s 1988 costs and average Alberta oil prices 
were adjusted using the Canadian GDP price deflator.
Table 8.6: McLachlan’s CERI Reserves Addition Costs
 STRC  LTRC Appreciated Reserves Price 
 ($/m3)  ($/m3) (106 m3) ($/m3)
1970 na 142.54 4.3 39.27
1971 na 67.66 10.9 42.33
1972 na 117.63 4.8 40.42
1973 na 18.53 30.5 45.39
1974 na 71.99 8.2 65.84
1975 na 148.55 4.2 75.37
1976 na 112.32 6.5 81.22
1977 na 38.88 26.4 91.75
1978 na 25.89 51.1 103.56
1979 37.11 53.46 32.7 101.67
1980 72.04 102.92 17.5 108.20
1981 52.48 173.14 10.1 118.25
1982 248.86 124.71 14.9 148.62
1983 29.11 103.33 21.8 175.48
1984 54.07 119.49 19.9 178.41
1985 43.17 76.09 30.3 177.49
1986 65.06 84.75 20.0 95.37
1987 75.30 64.59 22.9 110.01
1988 32.95 70.50 11.0 78.42
Note: Prices and costs are in 1981 dollars.
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Interpretation of McLachlan’s results is difficult, 
and costs show an erratic pattern over time. The only 
comment McLachlan offers is that costs seem to have 
fallen after the early 1980s. Clearly, the combination 
of reserve volumes discovered and the LTRC does not 
trace out a single average cost curve. Larger volumes 
tend to exhibit smaller costs, as might be expected if 
larger pools imply an unusually lucky year in explor-
ation. (The LTRC and the quantity of reserves move 
in opposite directions in all years.) But this seems 
to suggest that shifts in the curve (for example, the 
new knowledge that a particular pool is large) tend 
to overwhelm the basic shape of the curve. The chan-
ciness of discoveries may also help explain the rather 
strange result that in seven years the LTRC (which is a 
cost of oil-in-the-ground) is actually higher than the 
average market price of oil as lifted. Alternatively, this 
might reflect bad decision-making, expectations of 
price rises, or flaws in the whole concept of replace-
ment costs. (Eglington and Uffelman suggested that 
in the late 1970s the cost of oil reserves additions were 
higher than the expected value of oil-in-the-ground, 
although their costs were lower than the market prices 
for lifted oil.)
Perusal of the assorted oil-in-the-ground costs 
generated so far make clear why it is difficult to place 
much reliance on any single estimate. The STRC and 
LTRC costs from McLachlan not only differ greatly in 
value but do not even change in the same direction 
in four of the ten years. The McLachlan LTRC and the 
Eglington and Uffelman private cost estimates also 
differ greatly and move in opposite directions in seven 
of the nine yearly changes that they share. In six of ten 
years, the LTRC is greater than the private cost esti-
mate, usually by large amounts. (The average private 
cost from 1970 to 1979 is $36.32/cubic metre, while the 
average LTRC is $79.75/cubic metre.) One implication 
of this is that the particular assumptions made in esti-
mating oil costs are critical. (It should be noted that 
the two studies utilize mainly the same data sources.) 
And it is also clear that the changes from one year to 
the next have relatively little meaning. Broader trends 
may be more meaningful, but even here it is hard to 
see similarities in the 1970s between the Eglington 
and Uffelman and the McLachlan studies. This could 
mean that direct cost estimate studies are of little value 
at all. Or it may mean that the form of the reserves 
data (i.e., whether appreciated discoveries or reported 
gross reserves additions) is critical to the results. 
McLachlan, in fact, places relatively little weight on 
her numerical results, suggesting that she is primarily 
concerned with issues of methodology.
Heath, Chan, and Stariha (1995) and Quinn and 
Luthin (1997) continued the CERI cost analysis in a 
somewhat more disaggregated manner. Quinn and 
Luthin, for example, calculated unit costs for oil 
reserves additions for a sample of forty-three West-
ern Canadian oil companies, divided into three size 
groups. The sample accounted for around 40 per cent 
of industry activity. Their estimates allocate expendi-
tures between oil and gas on the basis of the relative 
proportions of successful wells, and they relate explo-
ration and development expenditures in a particular 
year to proven reserves additions in that year, without 
any assumed lags. (They argue that the lags between 
land acquisition and geological expenditures and 
resultant reserves additions are so variable that one 
might as well assume no lag.) They generally excluded 
‘Revisions’ from their reserves additions figures since 
these primarily reflect reassessment of oil flow rates 
and are not associated with current investments. Table 
8.7 summarizes some of their findings; values have 
been transformed from 1996 dollars per barrel into 
1981 dollars per cubic metre to facilitate comparison 
with the previous tables. The deflator for inflation is 
the Canadian GDP Price Deflator. The ‘social’ cost is 
the ‘private’ cost less land expenditures.
Oil reserves additions increased over this period, 
suggesting that there were some improvements in 
technology and knowledge. (That is, more reserves 
additions resulted each year, while the average 
cost showed a tendency to decline.) Quinn and 
Luthin’s private costs are higher than those esti-
mated by Eglington and Nugent for years prior to 
1974, but lower than the 1974–79 costs, and lower 
than McLachlan’s SRTC’s. (Averages are: Quinn and 
Luthin, 1992–96, $27.67/m3; Eglington and Nugent, 
1957–73, $13.93/m3; Eglington and Nugent, 1974–79, 
$39.76/m3; McLachlan, 1979–88, $71.01/m3.) Clearly 
the average cost of reserves additions tends to follow 
oil prices, with higher prices (as in 1980–85) drawing 
forth higher-cost oil. There are, it must be noted, two 
main reasons for oil costs to rise as prices rise: (1) 
with constant input prices, producers are encouraged 
to look for deeper, harder to find and smaller pools 
and to undertake more expensive development pro-
jects; and (2) the extra exploratory and development 
effort attracted by higher prices will tend to push up 
the prices of drilling rigs and other inputs, making 
oil industry activities more expensive relative to 
other activities in the economy. Thus, for example, 
McLachlan (1990, p. 56) shows drilling costs rising by 
289 per cent from 1972 to 1981, when the GDP price 
deflator rose by 126 per cent. (McLachlan’s study 
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attempted to isolate the first of these effects by deflat-
ing exploratory costs by the drilling cost index.) Such 
cost rises could reflect ‘rent seeking’ behaviour by 
input suppliers, as they attempt to gain some of the 
increased value of oil and gas.
Quinn and Luthin offer no real explanation of why 
oil companies of intermediate size apparently exhibit 
such high costs of oil reserves additions. If the forty- 
three companies are considered separately, there is 
wide variation in the five-year average costs, the high-
est cost company having a per unit cost almost 300 
per cent higher than the lowest cost company. They 
suggest that companies may find this sort of infor-
mation useful for ‘benchmarking’ purposes, in which 
a company can see how well it is doing compared to 
others in the industry. The wide company differentials, 
like the large range of historical variation in reserves 
additions costs, point out the great heterogeneity in 
industry experience with respect to the cost of incre-
mental oil supplies.
Even apart from the conceptual difficulties 
involved in directly measuring the unit cost of adding 
oil reserves, it is difficult to weave any but the simplest 
stories (‘Higher prices draw out higher cost oil’) out 
of the costs calculated. Therefore, while ‘replacement 
cost’ studies are common in the industry, most econ-
omists have tended not to rely on this approach as the 
main avenue of petroleum supply modelling. Instead, 
they have generally tried to deduce the position of, 
and shift in, the marginal cost (supply) curve for crude 
oil by more elaborate and indirect means.
 Lasserre (1985) provides an example of a 
researcher drawing directly on discovery cost esti-
mates to try to understand the oil-supply process. He 
looked at the discovery cost of Alberta oil in order to 
examine the suitability of using discovery cost as a 
proxy for the user cost of crude oil production. Recall, 
from Chapter Four, that the user cost is the present 
value of the future profits given up by lifting a unit of 
crude oil today, rather than leaving it in the ground. 
Consider a simple resource extraction model, which 
treats exploration as an activity to increase reserves, 
and which assumes that crude oil lifting costs are a 
function of the volume of reserves and that there are 
no ‘depletion’ effects in the process of adding reserves 
through exploration. In this model, the marginal ben-
efit of adding reserves is the anticipated profit from a 
unit of added reserves; this profit is measured by the 
marginal user cost. (That is, the present value profit 
of adding one unit to reserves would be the same as 
the present value profit foregone by producing a unit 
out of reserves.) The profit-maximizing competitive 
producer would, then, add reserves through explo-
ration until the marginal cost of new discoveries just 
equalled this marginal benefit. Hence, marginal dis-
covery cost provides a measure of the marginal user 
cost. This is a potentially useful result since the mar-
ginal user costs depends on such unobservable factors 
as producer’s expectations about future oil prices so is 
not easily estimated by an outside observer. However, 
if, contrary to Lasserre’s assumption, current discover-
ies deplete the stock of available reserves and thereby 
raise future discovery costs (a depletion effect), there 
is a user cost of discoveries, and the estimated capital 
cost of discoveries will understate the total cost. In this 
case, the estimated discovery cost would understate 
the user cost of production.
Lasserre, drawing on cost information from Uhler 
and Eglington (1983), calculates the cost of reserves 
additions per barrel of oil in-the-ground from 1957 to 
1981 for various components of cost, and for ‘full mar-
ginal development cost’ (FMDC). There is considerable 
year-to-year variation in FMDC and its components, as 
seen in the tables above. Roughly, FMDC rises slightly 
to the year 1960 from a little over $2.00/b in 1957, falls 
to not much over $1.00/b in the early and mid-1960s, 
then rises sharply, peaking at almost $10.00/b in 1978, 
and ending the study period at about $8.30/b in 1980. 
From the late 1960s, exploratory drilling and develop-
ment costs increased particularly markedly. Lasserre 
Table 8.7: Quinn and Luthin CERI Reserves Addition Costs by Company Size (1981$/m3)
 Private Cost Social Cost Private Cost Seniors Private Cost Intermediate Private Cost Juniors Market Price
1992 28.90 26.49 26.39 57.66 27.96 96.68
1993 28.05 24.59 25.35 45.59 31.40 91.53
1994 32.20 27.26 31.31 47.46 25.96 88.96
1995 24.62 22.09 22.87 46.82 22.90 84.85
1996 24.56 21.49 23.42 33.70 32.17 88.06
 
192 PETROPOLIT ICS
draws a number of conclusions, including the follow-
ing (Lasserre, 1985, pp. 480–82): (1) there is consid-
erable stochastic variability in unit reserves addition 
costs; (2) rising costs in part reflect depletion effects, 
as the stock of undeveloped reserves declines and 
reserves additions become harder to make; (3) rising 
costs may also reflect diminishing returns to effort 
in any one year as the level of exploration and devel-
opment increases (independent of depletion effects), 
reflecting, for example, the problems in spreading 
fixed knowledge and inputs over more effort, and 
(4) user costs in the reserves addition process are sig-
nificant, as indicated by significant bonus bids, imply-
ing that discovery costs are not a valid proxy for the 
user costs of lifting oil.
Lasserre provides an interesting application of 
direct-cost data. Most economists, however, have been 
skeptical about the possibility of drawing meaningful 
conclusions from trends in unit costs alone and have 
turned to more complicated econometric estimation 
of oil-supply relationships and functions. We now turn 
to some of this literature as applied to Alberta crude 
oil supply.
5. Indirect Supply Estimation
A. Introduction
Since the oil-supply process is so complicated, differ-
ent studies make quite different simplifying assump-
tions and focus on different parts of the process. We 
will begin by reviewing some of the major dimensions 
of difference.
One is the specific variable that the model is 
designed to explain. Most models look at oil as the 
product, but some studies focus primarily on oil in the 
ground (e.g., reserves additions), while others look at 
the volume of crude oil lifted. As has been discussed 
previously, these are related products. Crude oil 
cannot be lifted unless there are reserves available, and 
the value of a unit of reserves added is based in part 
on the expected prices of lifted crude. Other studies, 
however, set the level of industry activity (‘effort’) as 
the variable to be explained. They might, for instance 
look at total real exploratory spending or at the 
number of exploratory wells or the exploratory well 
footage drilled. It is also necessary to decide whether 
a single variable measures the ‘effort,’ or whether there 
are a number of separate activities involved (e.g., land 
acquired, G&G activities, drilling).
The two types of variables (‘oil’ and ‘effort’) are 
related. The volume of oil added to reserves obvi-
ously depends on the amount of exploration under-
taken, and the quantity of effort must be a function 
of expected discoveries. Figure 8.2 provides a simple 
reconciliation of the ‘discovery’ and ‘effort’ approaches 
for an effectively competitive, profit-maximizing crude 
oil industry. Figure 8.2(A) is drawn on the assumption 
that companies will undertake exploratory effort (EE) 
up to the level at which the marginal benefits of explo-
ration (MBE) equal the marginal costs of exploration 
(MCE). The MCE curve is drawn as upward-sloping 
on the assumption that more exploration causes price 
rises in the costs of the inputs used for exploration. (If 
we were looking at a region that is a small part of the 
total North American oil industry, these input costs 
might not change, and the MCE curve would be a 
horizontal line.) The marginal benefit of exploration is 



















Figure 8.2 Reserves Additions: Discoveries and 
Effort Approaches
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discovered reserves (PRES) and the marginal product 
of exploration (MPE, that is, the number of reserves 
that would be found by one unit of exploratory effort.) 
The optimal amount of exploratory effort is shown 
where these two curves intersect. That is,
MCE = MBE = (PRES)(MPE) = (PRES)( ∂RA )                 ∂EE ,
where RA stands for reserves additions, and the 
last expression is the change in (the derivative of) 
reserves with respect to the change in (the derivative 
of) exploratory effort. In order to understand how 
exploratory effort changes, it is necessary to look at 
how the two curves might shift. More exploration 
could result from anything that causes a fall in the cost 
of exploration, anything that might increase the price 
of reserves and/or anything that would increase the 
marginal productivity of exploration. Remember that 
the price of reserves is the value of a unit of oil in the 
ground; it would increase the higher is the expected 
market price of (lifted) crude, the faster reserves will 
be depleted, the lower are variable development and 
operating costs and the lower the rate of discount. The 
marginal productivity of investment tends to fall as a 
result of depletion effects, which specify the extent to 
which new discoveries become more difficult as more 
and more of the available resource base is discovered. 
However, the marginal productivity of investment will 
also increase as a result of technological innovations 
(like 3-D seismic) that make exploration more effi-
cient, or knowledge changes, like the discovery of a 
new oil play in a geologic formation that was not pre-
viously known to hold oil.
Figure 8.2(B) takes the quantity of reserves 
additions as the ‘dependent’ variable instead of the 
amount of exploration. Rational companies will add 
reserves up to the level where the marginal benefits 
of reserves additions (MBRA) equals the marginal 
costs of reserves additions (MCRA). The former (for a 
price-taking industry, which is a small part of the total 
oil market) is equal to the price (value) of reserves 
(PRES). The marginal cost of reserves additions will be 
equal to the marginal cost of an extra unit of explor-
ation (MCE) multiplied by the marginal exploratory 
effort required to add one more unit of reserves. 
Equilibrium will occur where the marginal benefits 
of reserves additions equals the marginal costs of 
reserves additions.
That is,
MBRA = PRES = MCRA = MCE( ∂EE ) = ( MCE )             ∂RA   MPE .
Since this is describing exactly the same process as 
the exploratory effort model, it is not surprising that 
this equation shows exactly the same relationships 
amongst PRES, MCE, and the two derivative terms. 
Variations in the volume of reserves added will reflect 
any factors that shift either the marginal costs or mar-
ginal benefits of reserves additions. These, of course, 
are the same factors that might cause a change in the 
level of exploratory effort!
A second major difference amongst the ‘indi-
rect’ supply studies relates to what might simply be 
called the degree of sophistication of the analysis, 
as illustrated in Figure 8.1. The simplest approach is 
relatively atheoretical trend extrapolation, where a 
simple historical correlation is assumed to continue 
in the future as it has held in the past. This could 
involve time extrapolation (e.g., production per year 
or the reserves added per year) or might involve the 
continuation of the trend in the change of one variable 
(e.g., the quantity of oil found per successful well) rel-
ative to another (e.g., the number of exploratory wells 
drilled). More complicated statistical modelling can 
take place through ‘reasoned’ but informal or ad hoc 
methods. Thus, on the basis of one’s understanding 
of the industry, a list of variables could be set out that 
might be expected to affect the variable of interest, and 
then an equation estimated to show the relationships 
amongst the variables. For example, the volumes of 
reserves added in a year are specified as a function of 
the price of oil, the cost of hiring a drilling rig, the cost 
of money (that is, an interest rate), time (to allow for 
technological improvements) and the cumulative dis-
coveries up to this time (to allow for depletion effects). 
At a higher level of complexity, one might build a 
formal model of industry behaviour and derive a set of 
equations from it that reflect the anticipated behaviour 
of the industry, and then estimate this set of equations. 
We call this ‘econometric (statistical) optimization 
modelling.’
The degree of complexity that may arise in the 
formal economic modelling approach warrants dis-
cussion. Most such models begin at the level of the 
individual oil company. It is normally assumed that 
companies make decisions in an optimal way. Thus, 
for example, a company might be imagined to be 
looking at the possibility of adding to its crude oil 
reserves through a joint-product production function, 
which describes the current state of knowledge and 
technology. The production function would describe 
the volumes of oil and natural gas reserves additions 
(output) that would result from the efficient utilization 
of various inputs such as land, geological surveys, 
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exploratory wells, undeveloped reserves, and labour. 
Given the prices of oil and natural gas reserves and the 
costs of the various inputs, the company would pur-
chase the optimal quantities of the productive inputs 
to produce the optimal quantity of oil and natural gas 
reserves additions. ‘Optimal’ is most frequently taken 
to mean ‘profit-maximizing.’ This model typically 
leads to a set of interrelated equations describing both 
the input demands and the supplies of reserves addi-
tions. Moreover, since the equations are interrelated, 
they must normally be estimated jointly and assume a 
particular form because some of the equations impose 
constraints on the forms that other equations can take.
A further degree of complication is added by 
the fact that data are not usually available on a firm-
by-firm basis, and, even if they were, it would be 
too complicated to estimate equations for all of the 
firms separately. Accordingly, optimization models 
typically are simplified by assuming that the optimi-
zation model (which is normally set out for a single 
firm) also holds at the aggregate level for the entire 
industry. This ‘aggregation’ assumption can come 
from two quite different premises. The first is a ‘true’ 
aggregation process, in which the sum of the optimi-
zation procedures of all the separate firms happens 
to lead to a total that is exactly the same optimization 
problem at the aggregate provincial level. However, 
most of the literature on aggregation suggests that the 
conditions necessary for this to happen are so extreme 
as to be very unlikely. (For instance, it might require 
the assumption that all companies have exactly the 
same knowledge and initial holdings of land.) More 
frequently, a more ad hoc assumption is made that 
the industry behaves as if it were like a single opti-
mizing decision-maker with characteristics reflecting 
the aggregate characteristics of the industry; or that 
the industry operates as if it consists of a number of 
‘representative firms’ who are all identical and behave 
in an optimizing manner. This representative firm 
approach might be seen as an example of a simpli-
fying assumption; that is, an industry consisting of a 
number of different firms, each in a different position, 
is assumed to behave as if it consisted of a number of 
identical representative firms.
This issue of simplifying assumptions lies at the 
heart of many of the disagreements about what is 
the ‘best’ oil-supply model. Is it valid, for instance, to 
build a model that looks at crude oil reserves addi-
tions alone, ignoring the joint-product connection 
with natural gas? Given that different oil pools are so 
different in characteristics, must the pools be treated 
separately as sources of reserves additions or lifted 
crude, or can a simpler, province-wide, aggregate 
model of oil supply be built? From a practical point 
of view, the aggregate models have great appeal since 
they are simpler and because they have far smaller 
data requirements. But can one move to the aggregate 
level and still derive a useful representation of indus-
try behaviour? These are open questions about which 
different analysts have different opinions, and the 
response may be different at different points in time or 
for different types of industry activity.
B.	Input	Measures:	Studies	of	Industry	
Expenditures
In 1984, as part of the Economic Council of Canada’s 
study of Canadian energy policy, Scarfe and Rilkoff 
undertook an econometric analysis of petroleum 
industry exploration and development expenditures in 
Alberta. The modelling framework was an inventory 
adjustment process in which companies are assumed 
to estimate an optimal level of petroleum reserves 
and undertake investment in such a way as to move 
towards this optimum. The optimal size of reserves 
is a function of expected profitability. Estimation of 
expected profitability is complicated by the dynamic 
aspects of industry activity: reserves additions may 
become more difficulty over time due to depletion of 
the stock of undiscovered reserves, but technological 
advances may make reserves additions less costly. All 
monetary values were in 1981 dollars, deflated with the 
Canadian Industrial Selling Price Index. The major 
variables that Scarfe and Rilkoff included in their 
equations were as follows:
•	 The	dependent	variables	that	they	were	trying	
to explain were the industry’s expenditures 
in Alberta for three categories of exploratory 
investment and four of development, as reported 
by the Canadian Petroleum Association (now, 
CAPP, the Canadian Association of Petroleum 
Producers).
•	 A	value (‘price’) of oil and gas reserves in the 
ground, derived from Uhler and Eglington (1983), 
with the expectation that higher prices generate 
higher profits and therefore higher industry 
expenditures. Essentially, this is an estimate of 
the present-value after-tax profit expected from 
a unit of reserves. It takes the expected future 
wellhead price of petroleum and reduces it to 
allow for future operating and development costs 
and for the delay involved in the depletion of oil 
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reserves (since a reservoir is typically drained 
over several decades). The reserves prices are 
in nominal dollars. The annual adjustments for 
operating costs (for the developed reserves price) 
and operating and development costs (for the 
undeveloped reserves price) are based on the 
industry’s average costs during that year. Total 
industry operating expenses are divided between 
oil and gas on the basis of the proportion of 
operating wells of each type. Development costs 
include a development well component based on 
the average cost of drilling a well and an oilfield 
equipment component based on average industry 
expenses in that year. For years prior to 1974, the 
actual crude oil price is assumed to represent 
future expected nominal oil prices. For 1974 and 
1975, it is assumed that producers expected the 
nominal price to rise by 5%/year, rising to an 
expectation of 10%/year from 1976 through 1981. 
Table 8.8 summarizes Uhler and Eglington’s prices; 
it shows average prices over five-year periods, 
including a wellhead price, a ‘netback’ price at 
the wellhead after operating costs and royalties, 
and both developed reserves and undeveloped 
reserves prices. Prices are in nominal dollars per 
cubic metre; the number in parenthesis shows the 
price as a proportion of the wellhead price. The 
last two columns show the estimated operating 
and development costs per cubic metre. As was 
discussed in Chapter Six, the average field price 
of crude fell in the 1950s, as Alberta oil penetrated 
more distant markets, and only began to rise 
markedly after international oil prices began to 
rise in the 1970s. The fall in the netback price 
as a proportion of the wellhead price after 1951 
and in the 1977–81 period reflects the increase in 
provincial royalties in 1952 and 1974. From 1947 
through 1976, average operating costs varied 
around $2.00/cubic metre, while development 
costs rose on average after the first decade but 
were relatively stable from 1956 through 1976. 
After 1974, both operating and development costs 
rose appreciably as wellhead prices increased, but 
by relatively less; that is, the value of oil in the 
ground rose somewhat faster than wellhead prices. 
For industry expenditures that applied to both 
oil and natural gas, weighted average petroleum 
prices were calculated with the weights given to 
oil as opposed to gas based either on a measure 
of the drilling ‘intent’ of producers or the relative 
numbers of completed oil or gas wells.
•	 Production of petroleum the previous period, 
with the expectation that higher production 
requires higher expenditures in order to increase 
reserves back up to the desired level. The variable 
used was a weighted average of the logarithms 
of the oil and gas output, the weights being the 
relative completion rates of oil and gas wells.
•	 The previous year’s expenditure, which is 
expected to correlate positively with this year’s 
expenditures. That is, one of the ‘independent’ 
explanatory variables was the one-year lagged 
value of the dependent variable being explained. 
This procedure is designed to allow for rigidities in 
the inventory readjustment process. For example, 
if a rise in the price of oil induces more investment 
this year, then this increase in investment will in 
turn be associated with more investment the year 
after, and so on. In fact, the size of the influence 
of the lagged dependent variable can be taken 
Table 8.8: Uhler and Eglington Oil Wellhead and Reserves Prices and Development and Operating Costs  
(nominal $/m3)
 Wellhead Price Netback Price Developed Undeveloped Operating Development 
   Reserves Price Reserves Price Cost Cost
1947–51 18.19 14.36 (.79) 6.42 (.35) 5.59 (.31) 1.98 0.64
1952–56 15.81 10.94 (.69) 4.39 (.27) 3 51 (.22) 2.08 0.59
1957–61 15.71 10.12 (.64) 4.03 (.26) 2.53 (.16) 2.75 1.01
1962–66 15.98 10.65 (.66) 4.59 (.28) 3.15 (.20) 2.46 0.96
1967–71 16.45 11.25 (.68) 4.15 (.25) 2.63 (.16) 2.09 1.02
1972–76 35.07 24.31 (.69) 14.93 (.43) 12.99 (.37) 2.87 0.93
1977–81 88.47 52.20 (.59) 38.25 (.43) 30.20 (.34) 6.37 3.01
Note: Numbers in parentheses show the value as a proportion of the wellhead price.
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as a measure of the speed with which industry 
behaviour adjusts to a rise in the petroleum price. 
(A value of zero means that all of the adjustment 
occurs in the initial year, and there is no effect on 
current expenditures through past expenditures. 
The closer the value comes to one, the longer the 
time it takes to fully adjust behaviour to the higher 
price. That is, a value appreciably greater than zero 
implies that the long-run elasticity of expenditure 
with respect to price changes is significantly 
greater than the short-run elasticity.)
Equations were estimated by simple Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression, using annual data from 
1957–81 (1960–81 for exploration expenditures). The 
equation estimated was of the following form, which is 
linear in the natural logarithms of the variables:
(investmentt) = a1(pricet)
a2(outputt)a3(investmentt–1)a4.
The four ‘a’ terms are the numerical coefficients 
that are estimated by the OLS procedure to provide 
the best fit to the data. In this form, the price and 
output coefficients are estimates of the short-run 
elasticities of expenditures with respect to that vari-
able. (Remember that elasticity shows the percentage 
change in one variable – e.g., exploration expendi-
tures – in response to the percentage change in 
another variable – e.g., the price of petroleum.) The 
long-run elasticities can be derived by dividing the 
short-run elasticity by one minus the lagged depend-
ent variable’s estimated coefficient. Table 8.9 shows 
some of Scarfe and Rilkoff ’s results, where coefficients 
that were significant at a 5 per cent level of confi-
dence are indicated with an asterisk (*). (This means 
that one can be 95% confident that the coefficient 
is not actually equal to zero.) The R-square value is 
the adjusted correlation coefficient, and it provides a 
measure of the per cent of variation in the dependent 
variable that is ‘explained’ by the equation.
It is not unusual to find that a large amount of the 
variation in a dependent variable is captured by a time 
series equation that includes the lagged value of that 
variable. Scarfe and Rilkoff note that both price and 
output are positively related to expenditures, as was 
expected. They found that they had to try a number 
of different forms of the price variable to derive what 
appeared to be reasonable results for the development 
equations, and two of the price elasticities (drilling 
and EOR) failed to pass the 5 per cent significance 
test; the estimated equation tracked the historical data 
most poorly in these cases. All the exploration equa-
tions and the field equipment development equation 
were based on prices weighted by the intent ratios. 
However, development drilling and total development 
expenditures used prices weighted by numbers of 
completions, and the EOR equation used the netback 
wellhead price. They noted that their results suggested, 
in comparing exploration and development, that 
“reserves prices … are more important with respect 
to exploration expenditures, … expenditure levels are 
more sensitive to production on the development side, 
… [and] the adjustment process is somewhat slower 
for exploration” (Scarfe and Rilkoff, 1984, p. 21). They 
also note that, in the long run, drilling expenditures 
are the only categories that are elastic in response 
to price.
Two further aspects of the Scarfe and Rilkoff study 
merit brief attention. One relates to an alternative set 
of regressions, which included a variable measuring 
the current ‘cash flow’ to the industry, after allowance 
for operating expenses (i.e., royalties, well-operating 
Table	8.9:	Estimated	Coefficients	in	the	Scarfe/Rilkoff	Oil	Expenditure	Model
Expenditure Price Output Lagged Dependent R2 Long-run price elasticity
Geological .1953* .1359* .6583* .85 .57
Exploratory Drilling .1657* .1294* .8914* .95 1.53
Land acquisition and rents .3432* .1227* .5376* .81 .74
All exploration .2495* .1282* .7328* .94 .93
Development drilling .1393 .1461* .8760* .92 1.12
Field equipment .2135* .4198* .4998* .95 .43
Enhanced oil recovery .1853 .2873* .5460* .79 .41
All development .1786* .2058* .6077* .91 .46
*	Significant	at	the	5%	level.
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costs, and land rentals). The production variable was 
dropped, in part because it correlated very highly with 
cash flow. The results were generally very similar to 
the ones reported earlier, although several equations 
had to be estimated with variants of the cash flow var-
iable before good results were obtained. This version 
was run because of frequent reports in the industry 
press that investment in the industry is constrained by 
available cash flow. In other words, there are capital 
market constraints that may make it difficult for firms 
to raise outside capital, so they must rely on their own 
funds. In general, the cash flow results seem quite 
unconvincing for a variety of reasons. They are not 
as strong as those with production as a key variable; 
Scarfe and Rilkoff had to experiment to find a cash 
flow variable that seemed to work in a satisfactory 
manner; a number of Canadian petroleum companies 
clearly were able to tap financial markets for funds; 
and the cash flow argument does not imply that all 
cash flow is spent, but that in some circumstances 
cash flow may constrain spending, so cash flow would 
not be a general influence on expenditures.
Scarfe and Rilkoff also found that their model 
seemed to fit the final year of their sample quite 
poorly, and, even after a revision in the price series to 
allow for less buoyant expectations in 1981 than the 
Uhler-Uffelman numbers, their model mis-forecast 
the observed expenditures in 1982. Exploration expen-
ditures, in particular, were significantly overestimated 
(by over 45%), as was development drilling (by over 
25%). They noted that total development spending was 
forecast quite well, and that the trauma of the National 
Energy Program provided a very unsettled period in 
which to attempt a forecast.
It is satisfying to find that a simple econometric 
estimation of industry expenditures in Alberta can 
generate results that seem plausible theoretically and 
have a relatively high degree of statistical validity. 
However, it is important to remind readers that this is 
only one part of the oil-supply process. It is still nec-
essary to determine how much petroleum production 
(in this case largely reserves additions) results from 
the expenditures.
It is also discouraging to see that, while many of 
Scarfe and Rilkoff estimated equations appeared to 
fit the historical data well, their results did not serve 
to provide a good forecast for even the first year after 
their sample period. This relatively poor forecast-
ing ability has also been found in a number of U.S. 
econometric petroleum supply models. It is, of course, 
a rather surprising result, given that the estimated 
equations typically fit the historical data well. One 
interpretation is that the modelling interest of econo-
mists tends to be attracted to the industry when unu-
sual events occur, and it is precisely at these times that 
the historical regularities are most likely to be broken. 
For instance, in stable times, current prices may form 
the basis of price expectations for most producers, 
but this may not be true in more revolutionary times. 
The economic model suggests that investment should 
reflect long-term price expectations, but these are 
largely unobservable.
A key question, then, is whether estimates like 
those of Scarfe and Rilkoff would regain their legiti-
macy as a forecasting tool once a more stable industry 
regime is established again. It is possible to undertake 
a rough test of this possibility by comparing the actual 
investment expenditures from the mid-1980s through 
the 1990s (after the industry had operated a number 
of years in a deregulated environment) with those 
implied by the Scarfe/Rilkoff econometric results. It 
is important to note that the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable will tend to keep the forecast ‘on 
track’ to some degree; that is, variables that are of 
major significance in affecting industry expenditure, 
but are missing from the model, will influence the 
actual level of expenditures in any particular year, and 
then this will influence the following year’s estimated 
expenditures. (That is, inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable in the estimating equation, not only accounts 
for lags in the ability to adjust expenditures, but 
also serves as a way to ‘capture’ the effect of missing 
variables.)
Our out-of-period forecast of total exploration and 
development spending in 1981 dollars to the year 1992 
uses a number of simplifying assumptions that impose 
obvious limitations on the interpretation of the results. 
However, it does provide a rough idea of whether 
the relationship estimated by Scarfe and Rilkoff over 
the period from the 1950s to the 1970s is reasonably 
predictive of industry activities once the trauma of 
the National Energy Program ended in 1985. Our 
forecast assumes: that the intent ratio data reported by 
Scarfe and Rilkoff for 1982 (p. 47), and used to obtain 
weighted petroleum price and production figures, 
continue through the forecast period; that the aver-
age of the 1979–81 ratio of reserves values to average 
wellhead prices (as reported in the CAPP Statistical 
Handbook for western Canadian crude) holds over 
this period; and that inflation in the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) as reported by CAPP tracks inflation in 
the Industrial Selling Price Index used by Scarfe and 
Rilkoff. The differences between forecast exploration 
and development expenditures (from the Scarfe and 
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Rilkoff equations) and the actual values (in millions of 
1981 dollars, and as a per cent of the actual value) are 
shown in Table 8.10. The forecast errors are very large.
It can be seen that the tendency to overestimate in 
the years of the National Energy Program (1984 and 
1985), remarked by Scarfe and Rilkoff, is present in 
this forecast, but that this tendency persists through-
out the entire period, even after deregulation in 1985. 
For exploration, the percentage forecast error drops 
noticeably in 1986, but soon rises again, and shows a 
general tendency to increase. For development, the 
percentage forecast error is smaller at the start of the 
period but rises throughout. Part of the forecasting 
error may be due to the simplifying assumptions that 
we have made; our percentage errors of 80 per cent 
and 45 per cent for 1984 are higher than the errors of 
45 per cent and 25 per cent noted by Scarfe and Rilkoff 
for 1982. Despite this, our simple simulation suggests 
that there was a persistent shift in the expenditure 
relationship from that estimated by Scarfe and Rilkoff. 
Of course, one would expect that the Scarfe/Rilkoff 
model would forecast much better for this period 
if it were re-estimated using data up to the end of 
the 1990s, but we have not undertaken this task. 
Moreover, the need to re-estimate the model to obtain 
valid coefficients suggests that there are some struc-
tural elements missing.
Desbarats (1989) provides an extensive critical 
review of the Scarfe/Rilkoff model. She thinks that 
the focus on expenditures as the key variable of 
interest is appropriate. However, her re-estimation of 
Scarfe/Rilkoff using a different (and longer) series for 
reserves values finds that the reserve price variable 
does not appear to be significant and that the esti-
mated coefficients seem to be very unstable. She sug-
gests that the exploration expenditure model needs to 
be drawn from a more precise theoretical foundation 
and that more sophisticated econometric techniques 
for analysis should be used. There are three main 
foundations of the model that Desbarats constructs. 
The first relates to the profit-maximizing equilibrium 
condition for the desired level of reserves, assuming 
that the production function for petroleum exhibits 
a constant elasticity of substitution. (The elasticity of 
substitution measures the ability to substitute between 
different inputs while holding production constant.) 
Desired reserves (and also total exploration spend-
ing) are a function of the level of petroleum output, 
the elasticity of demand for petroleum, the input cost 
of adding reserves, and the elasticity of substitution 
between resources and other inputs in generating 
petroleum production. Secondly, Desbarats argues 
that uncertainty in the exploration process is inevi-
table, so that the way in which producers form their 
discovery expectations is critical; this expectation is 
represented by the producers’ expectations regarding 
the size distribution of oil pools in the region, which 
may change over time as exploration proceeds. Finally, 
Desbarats accepts that there will be lags in the adjust-
ment of reserves to the desired level.
The resultant general model is far too uncon-
strained to be estimated with the limited time series 
data available: for example, there are no strong guide-
lines on the functional form that should be used; any 
number of lag structures are possible; determination 
of a precise cost of non-resource inputs is not possible 
given the variable number of inputs that might be 
used and uncertainty about the extent to which cer-
tain expenditures (e.g., geophysical) relate to current 
or future reserves additions. Finally, the joint-cost 
problem is present, since exploration expenditures 
will add both oil and natural gas reserves. Thus, while 
Desbarats uses sophisticated econometric procedures, 
the final exploration expenditure equation she gener-
ates reflects a certain amount of pragmatic judgment. 
We will reproduce the estimated equation for which 
she reports an R-square value of 0.99 and which was 
Table 8.10: Out of Period Forecast Based on the 
Scarfe/Rilkoff Model
 Exploration:  Exploration Development:  Development 
 Forecast  Forecast Forecast Forecast 
 – Actual  Error as % – Actual Error as % 
 ($106) of Actual ($106)  of Actual
1984 2,473.4 79.9 916.5 45.3
1985 2,506.3 87.5 966.3 49.0
1986 1,490.9 56.4 623.9 55.4
1987 1,718.3 70.8 740.3 59.5
1988 1,353.4 60.4 657.9 69.9
1989 1,550.8 76.3 756.0 73.6
1990 1,705.7 92.2 827.9 76.8
1991 1,454.4 87.7 767.4 88.2
1992 1,381.1 85.8 759.6 93.3
1993 1,329.6 85.6 765.2 99.4
1994 1,373.7 88.8 797.3 100.4
1995 1,523.7 102.7 873.4 101.3
1996 1,705.7 118.7 953.6 100.4
1997 1,577.9 113.3 912.0 105.4
1998 1,208.3 88.3 773.4 117.8
1999 1,610.9 121.8 940.3 109.3
2000 2,080.0 165.9 1,131.1 104.5
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based on annual data for the years 1949 to 1982. The 
dependent variable was real exploration expenditures 
(E), in 1981 dollars. Explanatory variables included: a 
two-year average of the real reserves price of oil plus 
the reserves price of gas (P; the reserves values are 
from Uhler and Eglington, and the units are $/m3 for 
oil and $/103 m3 for natural gas); the sum of oil and 
gas output (Q); the inflation rate (IR, as measured by 
the CPI); the ratio of reserves additions for natural 
gas to gas output (RAG/QG); this variable summed 
for natural gas and oil (RA/Q); and the difference 
between domestic and import oil prices (PD). Finally, 
some of the variables are lagged values; we use (–t) 
to represent a lag of t years. We do not report any of 
Desbarats evaluating statistics in the following equa-




Given the number of variables included in the equa-
tion, the estimation possesses relatively few degrees 
of freedom, and the underlying properties of the time 
series have not been subject to the tests that are now 
common in cointegration analysis.
Desbarats suggests that this model explains explo-
ration expenditures better than the Scarfe/Rilkoff 
model. The estimated coefficients generally have the 
expected sign; thus, a higher value for reserves addi-
tions stimulates more exploration expenditures, as 
does higher production in the previous year. Several 
variables are somewhat harder to interpret. Thus, the 
negative effect of an increase in production for the 
previous year leads Desbarats to speculate that scarce 
investment capital may be allocated away from explo-
ration to more intensive development when compa-
nies are trying to increase production rapidly. Desbar-
ats also notes that her model underestimates actual 
1980 investment spending, if she uses estimates based 
on the 1949–79 period and uses the results to forecast 
1980 expenditures. We suspect that, if the estimated 
coefficients for this period were applied to events after 
1985, including the lower real prices after that date, the 
model would tend to significantly overestimate actual 
expenditures, much as did the Scarfe/Rilkoff model.
Helliwell et al. (1989) undertook a detailed econo-
metric analysis of the Canadian petroleum industry, 
largely with the intent of analyzing the very extensive 
policy interventions from 1973 to 1985. Amongst other 
work, they estimated econometric equations for land 
payments (bonuses) for the crude petroleum industry 
in the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin, an area 
dominated by Alberta. We include discussion of this 
equation here because land payments are one type 
of industry expenditure. However, it is important to 
recognize that the size of bonus bids made for mineral 
rights is determined largely by the anticipated profits 
from the rights acquired; that is, rather than a cost 
item, land bonuses are best viewed as a part of eco-
nomic rent.
Helliwell et al. drew on annual data from 1951 to 
1985. Costs seem to have been divided between oil and 
gas on the basis of the relative footages of develop-
ment drilling. Amongst the variables used to explain 
the level of expenditures is what is called a ‘profit-
ability’ ratio. It is a little difficult to interpret their 
descriptions of how the profitability ratio is calculated. 
Their Figure 8.3 (Helliwell et al., p. 152) describes it as 
“Net Wellhead Revenue Divided by Marginal Cost,” 
while the text of the previous page says it is “real 
after-tax wellhead or field prices divided by the sum 
of real operating costs and the amortized exploration 
and development costs.” Neither of these descriptions 
seems adequate since each involves a ratio between 
a total and a per-unit measure. The profitability ratio 
(PR) for oil takes values ranging between about 0.6 to 
1.9 over the period from 1951 to 1985, and we interpret 
it as the ratio of a discounted value per unit of oil sales 
(after royalty and income tax), over a typical lifetime 
of a pool, divided by a per-unit ‘supply cost’ for capital 
and operating costs. The authors assume that wellhead 
prices remain constant at the level of the initial year. 
The notion of a supply cost or price was described 
above. The profitability ratio used was a three-year 
moving average, the current year and the two previ-
ous years, which helps level out extreme values and 
allows for lag effects in the responses of expenditure to 
changes in profitability.
With respect to oil land payments (L), the more 
significant equation (R-square = 0.3091) is:
lnL = 2.2714 + 1.1422lnPR + 0.4168lnCF,
where CF stands for industry cash flow, defined as 
revenues net of operating costs, royalties and income 
taxes. (t-values for the three estimated coefficients 
are 2.22, 3.75, and 2.73.) In this double logarithmic 
form, the estimated coefficients are elasticities, so a 
10 per cent rise in the profitability ratio implies an 
11.4 per cent rise in land payments. Note that factors 
that increase profits are also likely to raise cash flow, 
so land bonus payments would actually rise by more 
than this.
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One possible interpretation of the limited fore-
casting ability of aggregate industry expenditure 
models like that of Scarfe and Rilkoff is that relatively 
simple econometric estimation fails to provide a 
useful depiction of activity for a complex industry in 
a complex environment. With sufficient effort, and 
‘manipulation’ of explanatory variables like price, it 
will usually be possible to find some equation that 
seems to provide a reasonably good fit to the histori-
cal data. However, the failure to explicitly address the 
complexities of the industry almost inevitably means 
that the estimated equation will be of limited value in 
understanding how the industry actually functions or 
in forecasting future industry activities.
It may be useful, by way of conclusion, to discuss 
three somewhat different perspectives amongst econ-
omists who utilize econometrics to study petroleum 
industry behaviour.
(1) Some believe that it is possible to estimate rel-
atively simple single equations (‘reduced form 
models’) that are useful for forecasting and 
understanding industry behaviour. (For exam-
ple, Moroney and Berg, 1999, have estimated 
what they argue is a meaningful simple log- 
linear equation for lower-48 U.S. crude oil pro-
duction, based on time series data from 1950 to 
the 1990s. Yu (2003) finds that this model does 
not perform well for conventional oil in Alberta 
or western Canada.)
(2) Other economists believe that much more elab-
orate models are required if econometric anal-
ysis is to be useful. Some of the elaborations are 
in terms of econometric technique. (Kaufman 
and Cleveland, 2001, for instance, use co inte-
gration techniques to estimate a crude oil pro-
duction relationship for the United States that 
is very similar to that of Berg and Moroney.) 
Others argue that more elaborate underlying 
conceptual models are needed, thereby adding 
more variables to the explanatory equation, and/
or moving into more complicated estimation 
procedures in which a number of related aspects 
of industry activity (e.g., expenditures, reserves 
additions, and output) are explicitly treated as 
co-dependent, and are jointly estimated.
(3) Others feel that the uncertainties affecting the 
petroleum industry are so great that it may be 
futile to try to estimate long-term forecast-
ing equations, which are based on an attempt 
to capture fundamental causal relationships 
explaining industry behaviour. Instead, useful 
forecasting models must be largely ‘technical’ 
studies of the path of the dependent variable 
over time. Pindyck (1999), for instance uses 
the techniques of cointegration analysis and 
Kalman filters to try to derive a depiction of 
how crude oil prices have evolved over time; 
his model includes no explicit recognition of 
variables such as GDP, which economists might 
expect to affect the demand for oil and hence 
the price of oil.
Examples of all three types of econometric approaches 
will undoubtedly continue to appear in the literature.
C.	Output	Measures:	Studies	of	Reserves	
Additions or Production
Rather than looking at industry activity as the main 
variable to be explained, some researchers have looked 
at the results of industry activity in terms of volumes 
of oil produced. This could involve either oil-in-the-
ground (i.e., reserves added) or volumes of crude oil 
lifted to the surface. The expenditures required to 
attain this output could be estimated by assuming 
some particular cost function for oil supply. For exam-
ple, in a reserves addition model, it might be assumed, 
following historical trends, that the reserves added 
per unit drilling effort becomes smaller and smaller 
as a region matures; this relationship could be used 
to estimate the amount of drilling required to add the 
forecast reserves additions, and then the expenditures 
for this drilling could be calculated.
From an economic point of view, the problem 
of explaining the volume of oil output is intimately 
connected to the form of the oil-supply production 
function, which tells, at any particular point in time, 
the minimum quantities of various inputs required to 
produce any given amount of output. There have been 
different representations of the required inputs. In 
general, one might suppose that inputs include ‘land’ 
(i.e., areas over which petroleum rights are held), 
geological and geophysical (G&G) surveys, labour, 
materials (e.g., drilling mud), and various forms of 
capital equipment. The practical question of how to 
measure these inputs generates a variety of responses. 
Sometimes authors rely on largely physical measures 
(e.g., the number of wells drilled, or the number of 
feet drilled). Other authors use economic aggregates, 
for example, the real value of expenditures on drill-
ing. Since such measures are not perfectly correlated, 
it is possible for different studies to reach different 
The Supply of Alberta Crude Oil 201
conclusions, even working with essentially the same 
model.
A production function reflects the existing state 
of knowledge and, as has been discussed earlier, 
will change over time as knowledge and technology 
advance and as the stock of undiscovered resources 
declines. In the crude oil industry, in any large region, 
a particularly important source of knowledge change 
is the continuing discovery of new geological plays. 
For ease in modelling, it is frequently assumed that 
knowledge and technological changes are primarily 
‘exogenous,’ perhaps occurring at a relatively regu-
lar rate over time. However, technological changes 
may have a strongly ‘endogenous’ character, in 
which economic conditions in the industry affect 
the amount of new knowledge produced. Thus, for 
example, increased exploration makes discovery of a 
knowledge-shifting new oil play more likely. There are 
also possibilities related to what Leibenstein (1976) 
has called X-inefficiency. Companies may not always 
exploit all the profitable opportunities available, but 
some conditions may drive them to be more efficient 
in this regard; for example, rising production costs, 
which put downward pressure on profits, may spur 
application of unutilized cost-reducing technologies.
While the production function sets out current 
technological constraints, the actual level of produc-
tion hinges also on the specific point on the produc-
tion function that is selected. In the conventional 
economic model, this is a function of the prices of the 
output produced and the inputs that must be hired.
Without entering into a discussion of the range of 
possible econometric estimation procedures available 
or returning to the joint-product problem, it is easy 
to see that a large number of oil-supply models might 
be constructed. In what follows, we will summarize 
some aspects of a number of models of Alberta crude 
oil supply, treating them in order of publication. The 
focus here is on equations estimating the quantity 
of Alberta (or Western Canadian) crude oil output, 
whether lifted crude or reserves additions. As will be 
noted, many of the studies also include estimates of 
other variables, such as the unit cost of oil. (Explana-
tions of expenditures were reviewed in the previous 
section, and econometric estimates of cost functions 
will be covered in the next section.)
Russell Uhler’s influential work, emphasizing 
the depletability of oil plays, provides an excellent 
starting point (Uhler, 1976, 1979, 1981; and Uhler and 
Eglington, 1983). Uhler’s work might be seen as part 
of economics’ negative reaction to the famous earlier 
research of M. King Hubbert (Hubbert, 1956, 1962). 
Hubbert argued that conventional petroleum, as an 
exhaustible natural resource, would necessarily go 
from some starting point for production through a 
life history to zero production at some future date. 
Drawing on the history of oil reserves additions (and 
production) in the lower-48 states, he proposed that 
they would exhibit a period of increase, followed by a 
mirror image path of decline, with the reserves addi-
tion curve preceding the production one by about 
ten years. He proposed that the curves would look 
much like normal curves; formally, he proposed that 
cumulative output or reserves additions would follow 
a logistic curve. Initially, he fitted these curves by eye, 
but subsequent analyses used statistical curve-fitting 
procedures. Apart from the simplicity of Hubbert’s 
approach, and its appeal to notions of resource 
exhaustibility, his model derived great popularity from 
the fact that Hubbert was dead on in his forecast of 
1970 as the peak year for U.S. lower-48 oil production. 
Critics have pointed out, however, that production 
since 1970 has fallen off less rapidly than would be 
implied by Hubbert’s symmetric model and that it 
underestimated recoverable oil volumes.
Hubbert’s model struck many as far too simple. 
Some, for instance, pointed to the importance of geo-
logical plays in the crude oil industry and argued that 
the general pattern of reserves additions that Hubbert 
suggested might be appropriate for a single play, where 
accumulating knowledge and drilling effort initially 
allowed rising reserves additions, but where depletion 
of the play would eventually mean falling additions to 
reserves. Even within a single play, many thought that 
the more likely pattern was a short period of rising 
reserves additions as the best prospects were explored, 
followed by a lengthy decline period, rather than 
Hubbert’s symmetric rise and fall. But why would the 
same pattern be observed across all of industry activ-
ity, which would depend on the pattern of sequencing 
of oil plays? More fundamentally, it was argued that 
discoveries and production reflect a variety of factors, 
including changing economic conditions, government 
regulations, technological and knowledge changes, 
etc., which would make any number of production 
histories possible, not just Hubbert’s logistic one. Ryan 
(1973a,b) provided a cogent early criticism; his paper 
includes estimates of changing discovery patterns for 
a number of Alberta crude oil plays, with a tendency 
to falling reserves additions as plays mature. Falling 
reserves additions can be connected to the asymmetry 
in pool sizes within an oil play, with a small number of 
large pools and a large number of small pools. (There 
is some discussion of this issue in Chapter Five; Allais, 
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1957, was among the first to note the skewed size dis-
tribution, hypothesizing that the distribution was log 
normal, and McCrossan, 1969, provided evidence for 
Canadian oil and gas fields. Smith, 2010, provides a 
recent assessment of Hubert-type ‘peak oil’ models 
from an economic perspective.)
Uhler follows in this line of work by emphasizing 
the importance of geological plays in oil discoveries 
and accepting that the total amount of oil in a play is 
not unlimited. As is common in discovery-process 
models, the discovery process is viewed as an uncer-
tain process that involves sampling (i.e., discovering 
new pools) from an underlying distribution of pools 
that is log normal in size distribution.
Uhler’s 1976 paper develops such a stochastic 
model and sets out to estimate it empirically for two 
sets of regions in Alberta; results are reported for only 
one region, an area of about 13,300 square miles in 
Central Alberta. Strictly speaking, Uhler argues, the 
model should be applied separately to separate plays, 
but he notes that the major plays in Alberta are geo-
graphically distinct to a considerable degree. Uhler 
is concerned both with the nature of the production 
function for oil and gas discoveries and the associated 
cost functions. We will focus here on the reservoir dis-
covery model, setting out a brief, non-technical, over-
view, commenting on some of the measurement prob-
lems and giving a flavour of the results. The initial part 
of the model is concerned with the number of petro-
leum deposits that exploratory effort might locate in 
any specific time interval. Uhler reports results for 
both ninety-day and annual time intervals. Discov-
eries reflect three stochastic variables: the number of 
potential drilling sites available at any time; the like-
lihood that any particular site will be drilled; and the 
likelihood that a drilled site will hold a deposit. Uhler 
argues that the latter component reflects opposing 
tendencies. As drilling proceeds, more knowledge is 
gained, which enables an improved selection of drill-
ing sites; however, as drilling proceeds and more pools 
are discovered, there are fewer pools left to be located, 
making new discoveries more difficult. It is likely, he 
argues, that the first of these effects will be strongest 
in the initial phases of exploration and the second 
later on.
The specific form that he assumes for this process 
is as follows, where P(N = n) is the probability that the 
number of reservoirs discovered is equal to n:
P(N = n) = exp(–l)(l)n/n!
where
l = aDa exp[–b(Ct–1–K)2].
In this equation, D measures the amount of explora-
tory effort undertaken in the period, so that more 
exploration increases the number of discoveries. The 
variable C is the ratio of the cumulative exploratory 
footage drilled to the size of the area; it obviously 
increases as exploration proceeds. (The variables a, α, 
b, and K are parameters that are estimated by econo-
metric maximum likelihood procedures, so that the 
model best fits historical data.) Initially, C is very 
small, and as it rises the gap between it and K becomes 
smaller and smaller, so that the negative effect of the 
(C–K) term on l becomes smaller; that is, any given 
amount of exploratory effort (D) has more effect as C 
rises. But, after C exceeds K, the opposite is true, and 
as drilling proceeds, any given amount of exploratory 
effort generates fewer and fewer discoveries.
The final phase of Uhler’s model is estimating 
how much oil lies in the n discoveries made in any 
time interval. This could be defined as the number of 
discoveries (i.e., n) multiplied by the expected size of 
an average discovery (y). But what will determine the 
average discovery size? Uhler argues that the uneven 
pool size distribution and the tendency to find larger 
pools first drives the average discovery size lower, as 
captured in the following functional form:
logyt = logb–gCt–1.
There are a number of practical difficulties that arise 
in applying this model empirically, specifically that of 
defining what is meant by exploratory effort (D), and 
how to handle the joint-product problem since explor-
ation generates both oil and gas discoveries. Uhler 
elects to measure exploratory effort by the exploratory 
drilling footage undertaken in a period. He suggests 
that one would ideally like to separate drilling into 
oil-drilling and gas-drilling, based on the intent of 
the company undertaking the drilling, although he 
notes that drilling directed towards one product may 
still find a reservoir of the other. He does not credit 
oil pools with their associated or solution gas, or gas 
pools with the condensate present. In the absence of 
reliable intent data, and the rather arbitrary methods 
that might be used to separate exploratory footage into 
the oil/gas categories, he uses total exploratory footage 
in both the oil discovery and gas discovery equations. 
Finally, he notes that his discovery volumes “have not 
been adjusted for any expected appreciation, and these 
sizes are initial, not recoverable, magnitudes.” This 
means that the size of more recent discoveries may be 
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understated relative to earlier finds since there may be 
significant appreciation in these pools as development 
occurs, although the tendency to falling average dis-
covery size may reduce the significance of the failure 
to allow for appreciation. The reference to the size 
of discovery volumes is somewhat ambiguous about 
whether it means that oil-in-place is used or simply 
makes clear that initial reserves are used, rather than a 
later estimate of remaining reserves.
In his 1976 paper, Uhler does not report oil-supply 
results for the entire province of Alberta, so his paper 
is best understood as presenting a new petroleum 
supply modelling technique, which happens to have 
been applied to parts of Alberta for years up to 1972. 
The equations he has specified seem to fit the data 
reasonably well. The results show a pronounced ten-
dency in Alberta towards falling reserves discoveries 
over time for both oil and gas. For example, in the area 
studied, estimated oil discoveries based on his equa-
tions totalled 62,117 thousand barrels from May 12 to 
August 10, 1951, but only 2,786 thousand barrels from 
April 21 to July 20, 1972.
Uhler’s 1979 study builds on concepts from his 
1976 research in an application to the entire Alberta 
industry for years from the Leduc discoveries of 1947 
to 1975. He notes that, while it would be ideal to con-
sider separate oil plays, the absence of play-specific 
data for exploratory effort makes this difficult in prac-
tice; however, if each separate play tends to exhibit 
falling discoveries, and the sequence of plays itself 
exhibits a tendency to declining size, then the industry 
aggregate discovery data will also exhibit declining 
size. Since it is possible to accumulate reserves and 
successful well data by play, he proposes two discovery 
models, one using entirely aggregate provincial data, 
and a second that looks at total Alberta discoveries but 
retains some play-specific drilling information. Uhler 
suggests that discoveries in any period (y) might be 
seen as the separable product of a function (h(x)) of 
exploratory effort (x) and a function for discoveries 
(g(R)) based on cumulative discoveries (R) up to that 
date; the discovery part of this relationship could be 
set up for the entire province or for separate geological 
plays. This approach differs from the 1976 paper in a 
simplifying manner by not separating the effects of 
number of finds and average discovery size. A com-
plicating difference from the 1976 paper is the explicit 
inclusion of a translog production function (h(x)) to 
capture the effects of three different components of 
exploratory effort: exploratory drilling footage; land 
holdings; and geophysical crew-weeks. The g(R) func-
tion in this model is designed to capture the impacts 
of growing knowledge and depletion, and uses a func-
tion of the form:
g(R) = Aexp(–βR)
where A and β are parameters to be estimated. Note 
that this equation implies a steady tendency to declin-
ing discoveries as cumulative discoveries grow. (It is 
interesting that in his natural gas model, Uhler does 
not select this form, but one like the D function of 
the 1976 study, allowing for a positive initial effect of 
cumulative discoveries on this year’s discoveries due to 
greater knowledge.) He also discusses the possibility 
of a separate price effect on discoveries, although the 
reasons for including this are not as obvious as might 
be thought since one would expect that the main 
effect of petroleum prices is felt through the level of 
exploratory effort (x), which is already included in the 
model. Uhler notes that higher prices will tend to shift 
the classification of deposits from the non-commer-
cial to the commercial category, including previous 
discoveries; hence, higher prices will tend to have an 
effect on reserves additions in addition to the impact 
through current exploration.
Uhler, of course, faces data problems. Discover-
ies can be separated relatively easily into oil and gas 
categories (with some complications raised by the 
presence of condensate in gas pools and associated 
and solution gas in oil pools), based on the official cat-
egorization of reservoirs as oil or gas. However, there 
is ambiguity on how many reserves to credit to any 
one year; as in his 1976 research, Uhler uses the most 
recent ERCB estimates of initial reserves by year of 
discovery, with no attempt to increase recently discov-
ered reserves for possible appreciation in subsequent 
years. Exploratory effort of necessity raises joint- 
product problems, as discussed earlier in this book. 
These joint-product problems are both product- 
related (dividing activities between oil and gas) and 
temporal (relating an activity at one date to spe-
cific reserves additions). Uhler draws on data that 
separated exploratory drilling from 1947 through 
1970 by intent (‘oil,’ ‘gas,’ or ‘both oil and gas’). The 
‘both’ wells were treated as oil-intent. The ratio of 
oil-intent to total exploratory wells was then mul-
tiplied by the measures of total industry activity to 
derive oil-directed exploratory footage, geophysical 
activity, and land holdings. For years after 1970, it was 
assumed that the oil-intent well-drilling proportion 
in the years just before 1971 continued to hold. With 
respect to the timing issue, Uhler generally assumes 
that the current-year activities are associated with the 
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current-year discoveries; for land, he assumes that the 
amount ‘used’ in reserves additions is the average of 
the start-of-year and end-of-year acreages.
The separable multiplicative form of the reserves 
addition process (discoveries = h(x)g(R)) is linear in 
its logarithmic form. Rather than jointly estimating 
the equation, Uhler uses a two-stage estimation pro-
cedure, initially estimating the production function 
(h(x)), and then inserting the estimated annual values 
for h into the discoveries equation, and estimating the 
coefficients of the g relationship. It is this latter rela-
tionship that is of most interest here, the relationship 
that shows the negative impact on current reserves 
additions of rising cumulative reserves additions. 
Uhler estimates three versions of this equation. The 
first incorporates the separate impact of four major 
Alberta oil plays – Leduc, Pembina, Swan Hills, and 
Rainbow-Zama. Uhler suggests that the estimated 
equation fits the observed pattern of reserves addi-
tions quite well. As with actual reserves additions, the 
volumes estimated by the model exhibit significant 
year-by-year variability; in addition, the estimated 
equation tends to show pronounced peaks in the same 
years as the actual data. Such peaks typically reflect 
the emergence of a new oil play, which, of course, this 
equation captures quite well. He notes that the esti-
mated equation seems to miss spurts in reserves addi-
tions in 1952 (when significant Leduc discoveries took 
place), 1959 (Swan Hills successes), and 1964 (with the 
Gilwood play, which was not included as a separate 
play). In addition, actual discoveries from 1968 on 
were less than predicted by the model. In part, this 
might reflect the failure to apply appreciation factors 
to the more recent discoveries. However, it would also 
seem to stem from the apparent dearth of significant 
new oil plays in this period and the inclusion of only 
four oil plays in the estimation. That is, the effects of 
other oil plays in the period prior to 1968 will tend to 
be captured by the estimated coefficients for the four 
plays included, and hence these coefficients will tend 
to understate the rate of decline in discoveries within 
the typical play.
The other two equations that Uhler estimates are 
based on cumulative reserves additions for the entire 
province rather than for specific plays, one of the 
equations adding the wellhead oil price as a variable. 
It turns out that the oil price is not significantly related 
to reserves additions. This does not mean that the 
price of oil has no effect on discoveries; remember 
that the oil price has already entered Uhler’s model 
indirectly through its impacts on the level of explor-
atory effort. As noted earlier, Uhler’s equation is set 
up so that current reserves additions are a declining 
function of cumulative reserves additions (R), and 
the estimated negative coefficient for R is significant. 
However, the equation will obviously fail to show the 
assorted upward shifts in actual reserves additions 
that were captured by the equation that included 
the four separate oil plays. On the other hand, Uhler 
finds that the aggregate model generates estimated 
reserves additions that are closer to actual values 
for the last years under study (1968 to 1975) than the 
play-inclusive equation.
It is tempting to interpret Uhler’s findings as a 
good news/bad news story. On the one hand, it sug-
gests that our understanding of oil discoveries in the 
Alberta oil industry can be greatly aided by explicitly 
recognizing two relatively simple factors: the majority 
of the many separate oil discoveries occur in a small 
number of discrete plays, and each of these plays tends 
to exhibit strong depletion effects, with falling reserves 
additions over time. However, while such a model can 
be of great value in understanding past developments, 
it is problematic as a forecasting model since “it is my 
belief that a model cannot be constructed which can 
forecast exactly the point in time and the magnitude 
of a new play” (Uhler, 1979, p. 63).
Uhler and Eglington (1983). Uhler continued his 
research on Alberta oil reserves additions in work 
undertaken with Eglington for the Economic Coun-
cil of Canada’s major evaluation of Canadian energy 
policies in the early 1980s. The 1983 study contin-
ued to contrast play-specific and aggregate Alberta 
approaches, this time incorporating eight ‘geological 
formations and areas’ that accounted for 98 per cent 
of the conventional oil that had been discovered in 
Alberta up to 1981. The eight categories do not exactly 
correspond to separate oil plays but are typically 
dominated by such a play. As in the earlier research, 
this study continues to emphasize the significance of 
depletion effects, but it also moves towards a more 
explicit incorporation of the impact of economic 
circumstances.
In general, it is argued that producers can be seen 
as profit-maximizers operating under the constraints 
of resource limits and current production technolo-
gies, and therefore reserves additions will be positively 
affected by factors such as a higher price for oil and 
technological improvements, and negatively affected 
by things like higher oil royalties or increases in the 
costs of inputs. The main focus of the 1983 study is on 
discoveries (reserves additions, D) in relation to drill-
ing effort (E) and cumulative drilling (CE), which is 
hypothesized to fit the following functional form:
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D = A0EA1e–A2CE.
The A’s are coefficients to be statistically estimated.
As in Uhler’s 1979 study, this equation shows 
depletion effects with no allowance for initial rising 
finding rates as knowledge grows. Reserves addi-
tions are measured differently in this study; reported 
reserves additions for each year are used, which 
includes new discoveries plus appreciations in that 
year from discoveries in previous years. From this 
perspective, reserves additions are due to both explor-
atory and development drilling, so drilling effort 
includes both types of wells. Drilling effort (annual 
and cumulative) is measured by the number of wells 
penetrating the formation under study, whereas 
Uhler’s earlier work used footage drilled. Unlike the 
1979 study’s three-input production function, only 
the single measure of reserves addition effort is used. 
Uhler and Eglington argue that one would ideally 
like to use the number of well penetrations that were 
targeted at that particular formation and therefore 
measure wells by the number of wells that hit the 
particular formation and did not go any deeper. This 
will obviously fail to count wells that were targeted 
at a shallower formation but went deeper, either 
because the well accidentally was drilled deeper, or 
because the company was simultaneously interested 
in finding out about a deeper formation. There is a 
joint-product complication since there will typically 
be some non-associated gas pools found within any 
one of the eight specified formations/regions. Thus 
some wells may be drilled with a primary intent of 
finding gas rather than oil, and the total number of 
wells drilled with the intent of testing this formation 
will be affected by both oil and gas prices.
The net result is that Uhler and Eglington run a 
number of different cases for each of the eight forma-
tions/regions. These include two cases based on total 
well penetrations, one ‘unrestricted,’ based on the 
equation given above, and a second ‘restricted’ case in 
which the coefficient on the current drilling variable 
is set equal to one; this implies a unitary elasticity of 
reserves additions (D) to drilling effort (E), forcing 
changes in the efficiency of the reserves addition pro-
cess entirely onto the resource-depletion variable of 
cumulative drilling (CE). In most cases, the coefficient 
of the current drilling variable in the unrestricted 
model is relatively close to one, and it could be argued 
that constraining this variable to the same elasticity 
across all areas allows more direct comparisons of the 
depletion effects in different areas. For each region, 
they also estimate equations that show the discoveries 
of non-associated gas as a result of the drilling. 
Another set of estimates is based on separate oil-well 
and gas-well penetrations, where the total number of 
wells drilled are allocated between oil- and gas-intent 
wells on the basis of the proportion of oil-well com-
pletions to total well completions. Finally, factors 
unique to a particular area sometimes lead to another 
set of estimates. For example, the Upper Devonian 
category consists in large measure of the D-2 and 
D-3 plays, which began with Leduc in 1947 and were 
therefore quite advanced by the 1970s; however, in the 
later 1970s, a new play began in the Nisku formation, 
leading to a sharp increase in reserves additions. If the 
analysis were truly play-specific, one could treat this 
new play separately, but the use of broader groupings 
means that its impact is lumped in with the earlier 
plays in the Upper Devonian group. Uhler and Egling-
ton report equations both including and excluding the 
new Nisku discoveries.
There are obviously a large number of estimated 
equations in Uhler and Eglington, so their study is 
best seen as presenting ranges of likely results for the 
oil-producing areas. Table 8.11 gives a flavour of their 
findings. It shows the estimated coefficients in the 
restricted oil-reserves-additions equation using the 
total data available without allocating wells between 
oil and gas. That is, in terms of the equation above, it 
reports the estimated value for the constant (logAo) 
and the coefficient of the cumulative wells variable 
(A2); also shown are the coefficient of determination 
(R2) and standard errors of the estimated coefficients 
(in parenthesis; the coefficient has greater significance 
the lower the standard error relative to the size of 
the coefficient). Table 8.11 also includes estimates the 
authors made, on the basis of the reserves additions 
equations, of possible future reserves additions for 
each of the seven areas. (The eighth is Upper Creta-
ceous formations in southeast Alberta, which hold 
no significant oil volumes.) In brief, they asked what 
volume of incremental reserves would be economic 
based on the estimated reserves addition equation, the 
current (1981) real cost of drilling in that region/for-
mation, and the anticipated real market values of the 
discovered oil and associated and non-associated gas. 
The values of oil and gas are reserves values since their 
model looks at discovered volumes in the ground; 
as has been discussed above, a reserves price is less 
than the wellhead price for lifted petroleum since 
there are still additional costs to be incurred to lift the 
petroleum, and one must wait to receive much of the 
revenue since petroleum reserves are lifted over many 
years. Many estimates of future reserves additions 
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are possible, depending on the specific reserves 
additions equation chosen and the drilling cost and 
prices assumed. The results that we show assume a gas 
reserves price of $11.65/103 m3; oil reserves prices of 
$35.78/m3 and $70.00/m3 are shown. This $70.00/m3 
for developed reserves is about $11.10/b. It is doubt-
ful that the real value, in 1981 dollars, of developed 
oil reserves attained this level for any extended time 
in the 1980s and 1990s. The gas price and the lower 
oil price are the estimated reserves prices for 1981, 
based on Alberta wellhead prices of $117.12/m3 (about 
$18.60/b) for oil and $98.74/103 m3 (about $2.80/mcf) 
for gas.
It is striking that this analysis generates valid 
results for the model in all seven formations/regions 
but also suggests that the prospects for additional 
conventional crude oil reserves additions in Alberta in 
established oil plays are very restricted, except for the 
Upper Devonian plays. The Uhler/Eglington results 
cannot easily be related to more up-to-date Alberta 
statistics, but it is apparent that reserves additions 
have been significantly larger than was indicated in 
their analysis. In Table 8.12, we show ERCB initial oil 
reserves by geological formation for the years 1976, 
1999, and 2007; where possible, geological categories 
as close as possible to the Uhler/Eglington ones have 
been noted.
It can be seen that the geological formations as 
listed here generally hold somewhat more oil than 
similar formations in the Uhler/Eglington study. It 
can also be seen that the actual reserves additions 
from 1976 through 1999 were quite significant, even 
though oil reserves prices in real terms were below 
the $70/m3 assumed in the earlier table. (The decline 
in Beaverhill Lake reserves additions over the period 
reflects downward ‘Revisions and Extensions,’ mainly 
associated with modifications in the estimated effect-
iveness of EOR projects.) While some of the reserves 
additions over this period will reflect new oil plays, 
and small plays as of 1980 that were excluded from the 
Uhler/Eglington study, it would also appear that actual 
reserves additions within established plays exceeded 
those estimated by their model. In most of the plays, 
reserves additions, albeit generally rather small, 
occurred after 1999.
 Uhler and Eglington go on to estimate two 
aggregate models of oil reserves additions in Alberta. 
The first estimates the simple oil reserves additions 
equation for the entire province, with wells allocated 
between oil and gas on the basis of the proportion 
of completed wells that were classified as oil wells. 
The estimated coefficients are 4.278 for log A(0), and 
–0.069 for A(2)/1000; the respective standard errors 
are 0.419 and 0.021, and the equation has an R-square 
of 0.25. (Inclusion of dummy variables for the starting 
date of four successive oil plays, as might be expected, 
increases the R-square considerably to 0.47 and allows 
more rapid depletion effects as the A(2) variable 
Table	8.11:	Uhler	and	Eglington:	Coefficients	of	Reserves	Additions	Equations	and	Possible	Reserves	Additions
Formations/Region log A(0)  A(2)/1000 R- 1979 Reserves Reserves additions  Reserves additions  
	 Coefficient	 Coefficient	 squared	 (106 m3) @$35.78 (106 m3) @$70.00 (106 m3)
Upper Devonian/all Alberta 3.980 –0.146 0.11 554.4 47.7 57.9
  (0.052) (0.075)
Beaverhill Lake and Lower Devonian/all 5.41 –0.84 0.42 236.8 0 0 
Alberta except area 5 (far NW Alberta) (0.68) (0.21)
Mannville/all Alberta 1.67 –0.117 0.31 87.5 Minimal (due to Minimal (due to
  (0.30) (0.032)    gas-intent wells) gas-intent wells) 
Beaverhill Lake and Lower Devonian/ 5.990 –0.378 0.72 118.53 0 almost 0 
Area 5 (NW Alberta) (0.533) (0.067)
Upper Cretaceous/Area 8 (around 4.503 –0.494 0.23 163.05 0 0 
Pembina) (0.880) (0.179)
Viking/all Alberta 1.845 –0.41 0.09 29.65 3.95 8.58 
 (0.555) (0.240)
Mississippian/all Alberta 3.029 –1.167 0.36 54.47 0.01 (due to gas- 0.01 (due to gas- 
 (0.668) (0.291)    intent wells) intent wells)
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becomes –0.323.) However, in this model (without the 
oil-play dummy variables), no further reserves addi-
tions at all in Alberta are estimated to be economic at 
reserves prices of $70 or less per cubic metre. In other 
words, this model, while not restricted to existing oil 
plays, is even less optimistic than the findings from 
the separate established plays!
Their second aggregate model utilizes a different 
data set, closer to that used by Uhler in his earlier 
work. Reserves additions are measured by estimated 
appreciated reserves discovered, and the variables 
used to explain oil discoveries (OD) are the prices 
of oil and gas (P(o) and P(g), undeveloped reserves 
prices), a cost of drilling (c) and the cumulative 
number of oil discoveries (d, the variable used to 
capture depletion effects). The estimated equation 
(R-square = 0.27) is:
logOD = 4.416 – 0.440logP(o) + 2.82logP(g) + 
0.373logc – 0.0046d.
There is a strong depletion effect, but the oil price vari-
able shows fewer reserves discovered the higher the oil 
price. The coefficient on the gas price variable (2.82) 
suggests a very high elasticity of oil discoveries to gas 
prices. However, neither the price nor the drilling-cost 
variables are particularly significant. Overall, this 
model is not very satisfactory, and the lack of a reliable 
relationship between price and discoveries makes it 
impossible to estimate possible reserves additions as a 
function of the price of oil.
In summary, Uhler provides one of the most 
detailed approaches to modelling Alberta oil supply. 
His research generated a mix of useful and discour-
aging results. The presence of strong depletion effects 
in the oil reserves additions process was clearly 
demonstrated, as was the value of seeing reserves 
additions as embedded within a succession of geolog-
ical plays. However, as Uhler noted, the emphasis on 
oil plays poses major problems for forecasting models 
since it is impossible to predict when new plays will 
occur. In addition, much as in the NEB reserves esti-
mation models of the 1980s, it would appear that 
actual reserves additions in plays under study turned 
out to be larger than was estimated. There could be a 
number of reasons for this, including: (1) technolog-
ical developments that reduced the costs of adding 
reserves; (2) a tendency of the model to underesti-
mate the volumes of oil in smaller oil pools, perhaps 
because the data available provided less information 
about this part of the reserves base; and (3) the likeli-
hood that, while the model projects new discoveries 
of progressively smaller size, a few of the new finds in 
any play will actually turn out to be relatively large.
 Other Models. Foat and MacFadyen (1983) also 
looked at oil discoveries from a geological-play per-
spective, for nine Alberta oil plays. A geographical 
area was defined for each play, and reserves (R) were 
the reported appreciated reserves as of 1976. The 
cumulative number of wells that penetrated the for-
mation prior to the current year (CumPen) was used 
to capture depletion effects. Reserves additions were 
also argued to be determined by the number of for-
mation penetrations in that period (Pen). The specific 
form of the equation estimated was a simple one:
lnR = A + B(lnPEN) + C(CumPen),
where A, B, and C are estimated coefficients; B is 
expected to have a positive sign and C a negative sign. 
This assumes a negative exponential depletion effect. 
A number of different equations were estimated for 
Table 8.12: ERCB Oil Reserves by Formation, 1976 and 1999 (106 m3)
 1976 Reserves 1999 Reserves Change in Reserves, 1976–99 2007 Reserves
Upper Cretaceous: Cardium 284 297 13 294
Viking 49 62 13 68
Mannville 100 407 307 544
Mississippian 71 100 29 92
Upper Devonian: Wabamun, Nisku and Leduc 547 708 161 732
Upper Devonian: Beaverhill Lake 421 393 –28 408
Middle Devonian: Keg River 158 195 37 197
Other 183 350 167 400
Source: ERCB (and EUB) Reserves Reports (ST-18 and ST-98).
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different oil plays, including estimates for oil-in-place 
as well as reserves, and with the use of moving aver-
ages to smooth the data somewhat. A flavour of the 
results can be garnered from Table 8.13, which is for 
initial reserves for the annual (unsmoothed) data; 
1976 initial reserves are shown for each play in mil-
lions of barrels. The Cardium equation also included 
a ‘Dummy variable,’ which took the value of 1 in 
1953, the year of the initial Pembina discovery; the 
coefficient for this variable was 9.5, and it was highly 
significant.
A play-specific approach seems to capture some 
aspects of the reserves addition process. The coeffi-
cients on the penetrations and cumulative penetra-
tions variables have the correct sign in fifteen out of 
the eighteen estimates, and for four of the five largest 
plays the equation exhibits significance at the 5 per 
cent level, as does the tendency to negative reserves 
additions as cumulative reserves additions increase. 
The fit is not good for the smaller plays. Similar 
regressions were also run for the average size of a dis-
covery in an oil play, and, similarly, depletion effects 
were found for all plays, and at a 5 per cent signifi-
cance level for four of the five largest plays.
These results are entirely consistent with the 
somewhat ambiguous conclusions we have drawn 
from Uhler’s work: our understanding of past discov-
eries of oil in Alberta is greatly enhanced by utilizing 
a play-specific analysis, but the inability to foresee 
the appearance of new plays limits this as a forecast-
ing method.
The emphasis on depletion effects in oil plays in 
the Uhler and Foat and MacFadyen studies is consist-
ent with sophisticated discovery-process modelling in 
the 1988 study of Western Canadian oil potential by 
authors from the Geological Survey of Canada (1987). 
The GSC analysis was discussed in Chapter Five. One 
advantage of this modelling approach is that it gener-
ates results that show the tendency towards reduced 
reserves discovered as the play is depleted and also 
generates an estimate of the underlying distribution 
of oil pools in the play. Hence, one can match past 
discoveries with pools in the estimated distribution to 
derive a size distribution of undiscovered pools, some 
of which may be relatively large. This differs from the 
Uhler and Foat and MacFadyen approaches in which 
new finds are all progressively smaller. As will be 
recalled, the authors of the GSC study suggested that a 
different modelling technique had to be used for new 
and potential oil plays; they applied subjective proba-
bility techniques in these cases.
 Another example, applied to Alberta, is found 
in MacDonald et al. (1994). They approximate a 
general discovery-process model for three Western 
Canadian oil plays (two in Alberta) by an equation 
in which cumulative discovery volumes are related 
to the number of discoveries in the play and the 
square of the number of discoveries. They too find 
noticeable depletion effects. Their approximation, 
however, unlike the GSC discovery-process model, 
forces smaller discovery sizes onto forecast reserves 
additions.
Siegel (1985) includes an Uhler-type oil discovery 
equation in his study of the ‘information externality’ 
in oil exploration, as seen in the Rainbow-Zama play 
in northwestern Alberta. In brief, this externality 
applies when there is a depletion effect in explora-
tion; that is, there are a limited number of oil pools, 
Table 8.13: Foat and MacFadyen Model of Oil Discoveries in Nine Alberta Oil Plays
Play	and	year	of	first	discovery	 1976	initial	 Number	of	pools	 A	(estimated	 B	(estimated	 C	(estimated	coefficient	 R-square 
 reserves (106	b)	 discovered	 constant)	 coefficient	for	ln	Pen)	 for	CumPen)
Leduc, D-3, 1947 2,262 71 16.511* (5.37) .99111* (1.72) –.00891* (–8.49) 0.71*
Keg River, 1964 1,099 407 6.525 (1.20) 2.7592* (2.72) –.00320 (–1.40) 0.60*
Beaverhill Lake, 1957 1,000 20 19.610* (2.43) 0.65982 (0.32) –.01479* (–4.95) 0.55*
Cardium, 1953 966 59 1.0122 (0.10) 3.4651 (1.33) –.00396* (–1.94) 0.20
Nisku, D-2, 1947 559 58 4.9649 (0.80) 2.6347* (1.94) –.00248* (–3.86)    0.36*
Viking, 1949 173 39 4.1920 (0.29) 1.6794 (0.60) –.00063 (–1.42) 0.01
Granite Wash, 1956 43 15 15.125* (4.78) –1.1705 (–0.98) –.01952* (–1.84) 0.14
Slave Point, 1958 24  9 2.3409 (0.60) 1.4520 (1.60) .00081 (0.77) 0.08
Sulphur Point, 1967  3 13 14.05 (1.63) –0.2292 (–0.19) –.00632 (–1.00) 0.03
*	Significant	at	the	5%	level.
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which tend to be discovered in order of size, so that 
a new discovery depletes and degrades the stock of 
remaining undiscovered pools, creating a user cost of 
exploration in the process. (That is, exploration today, 
by depleting the stock of undiscovered prospects, 
increases the cost of future exploration.) The individ-
ual company will have no reason to consider the neg-
ative effect that its (successful) exploration has on the 
exploratory prospects of other firms; therefore, from 
a social perspective, there will tend to be more explo-
ration in any period than is socially desirable. (This 
and other possible externalities in exploration are dis-
cussed in Chapter Eleven.) Siegel uses quarterly data 
for the years 1965 through 1970, excluding three quar-
ters where no discoveries were reported. As independ-
ent variables, he includes the number of exploratory 
wells drilled this year (W), and both the cumulative 
number of wells (CW) and this value squared (CW2); 
including the two terms for cumulative drilling allows 
a nonlinear relation with both ‘depletion’ and ‘learn-
ing’ effects. The dependent variable is the volume of 
new discovery reserves (D), in thousands of barrels. 
Siegel’s equation has an adjusted R-square value of 
0.68 (t-statistics in parenthesis):
lnD = 7.4347 + .6557lnW + .00102CW – .0000009CW2
  (10.258) (3.488)  (1.268)   (–2.435)
Siegel notes that the depletion effect, generating 
diminishing returns from cumulative exploration, 
begins to offset the increasing returns from ‘learning’ 
when about 550 exploratory wells have been drilled. 
The nonlinear cumulative drilling relationship, which 
was not included in the Foat and MacFadyen analysis 
of this play, appears to have been important. Siegel 
also estimates similar equations for real exploratory 
costs in the Rainbow-Zama play, presumably explora-
tory drilling costs. He finds a unitary elasticity for the 
number of wells, and that the CW term is significant, 
with costs falling as cumulative drilling rises, indic-
ative of a learning effect in drilling costs, although 
technical changes or some time-related fall in real 
input costs would generate a similar result. There is 
no reason why depletion effects should influence total 
exploration costs, though such an effect would lead to 
increased per unit costs, as exploration activities find 
progressively less oil.
A somewhat different approach to estimating oil 
reserves additions (discoveries) is found in the exten-
sive econometric research of Helliwell et al. (1989). 
Their analysis covers the Western Canadian sedimen-
tary basin but is dominated by Alberta. The discovery 
variable (D) that they use is not reported reserves 
added but a variable they have created by dividing the 
total expenditures devoted to adding reserves by an 
estimated ‘adjusted’ marginal cost of adding reserves. 
(Their marginal cost estimate will be discussed below. 
This cost was ‘adjusted’ by reducing the estimated 
marginal cost somewhat to allow for the impact of 
regulations that encouraged investment in existing 
reserves rather than in new reserves additions.) To 
illustrate the discovery variable: if the (adjusted) 
marginal cost of adding reserves were $10.00/m3, 
and a total of $50 million were spent, then there 
would be 5 million cubic metres of reserves added: 
$50 million/$10.00/m3 = 5 million cubic metres. It is 
not altogether clear what went into the oil expendi-
tures: it includes real exploration and development 
expenditures, presumably excluding expenditures on 
gas plants; it is not clear whether exploration includes 
land acquisition costs, and there is a statement that 
costs are allocated between oil and gas on the basis of 
proportionate drilling footages for oil and gas devel-
opment wells.
 Results are shown for three equations, estimated 
in a double log form. All three include a constant and 
the same two explanatory variables, a ‘profitability 
ratio’ (P), and a ‘ratio of estimated to adjusted capital 
costs’ (CR), but differ with respect to the third var-
iable, which is either output (Q), cash flow (CF), or 
lagged land payments (L). As it happens, only the last 
of these three variables (L) had a significant effect, 
which is interpreted as reflecting the necessity of hold-
ing land before drilling, plus the exploration require-
ments on newly acquired land. The profitability ratio 
was discussed above, and, as noted, is a three-year 
moving average. The ratio variable (CR) is the ratio of 
the estimated marginal cost to the ‘adjusted’ marginal 
cost. The preferred form of the oil discoveries equa-
tion (R-square = .9053) is:
lnD = 3.0821 + 1.1957lnP + 0.4839lnCR + 0.5585lnL.
(t-ratios are 8.66, 9.88, 5.59, and 7.88, for the four 
estimated coefficients. Appendix 8.1 in Helliwell et al. 
provides a number of alternative econometric estima-
tions of the oil-discovery equation.) It can be seen that 
oil discoveries are estimated as being very elastic (1.2) 
with respect to the profitability ratio. The estimated 
elasticity of the cost ratio variable of 0.4893 shows 
an inelastic impact on discoveries; that is a smaller 
‘adjustment’ (implying a higher CR value) has a less 
than proportionate impact on reserves additions. Of 
course, the equation does not provide a perfect fit 
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to actual discoveries; Helliwell et al. note that their 
equation overestimated reserves additions from 1974 
to 1978 but underestimated them from 1979 to 1981. 
Overall, however, they view the fit as good, though 
their Figure 8.2a shows that the model significantly 
underestimated discoveries in 1985. So far as we know, 
there has been no report comparing their discov-
ery model’s forecast to actual discoveries after 1985, 
and the complexity of the cost ratio and profitability 
variables do not allow us to do so with any degree 
of reliability.
Finally, Livernois and Ryan (1987) addressed the 
reserves-discovery process for Alberta in a model 
that explicitly recognized the joint-product nature 
of exploration. They studied reserves of oil and nat-
ural gas by the year of discovery for the years 1948 
to 1979. Their model is complex, both theoretically 
and in terms of the econometric estimation. Alberta 
oil producers are assumed to be price-takers in both 
input and output markets. The production function 
involves the production of oil and gas discovery 
reserves through the utilization of four ‘inputs’: land 
acquisition and exploratory drilling, which can be 
varied by a producer, and two fixed factors, ‘the state 
of depletion,’ measured by the cumulative number of 
wells drilled so far, and geological knowledge, meas-
ured by cumulative geophysical crew-months. Under 
the assumption of profit-maximization, expected 
industry activity can be set out in terms of a profit 
function, and estimated ‘share’ equations showing 
revenues for the two outputs, and costs of the variable 
factors as a share of profits. As the extent of ‘separa-
bility’ and ‘jointness’ varied amongst the two outputs 
and the various inputs, there would be differences in 
the anticipated relationships between the variables in 
these equations. Separability, in this context, means 
that the output part of the production function can be 
separated from the input part, as is normally assumed 
by economists when they write a production function 
in the form X = f (L,K) where X is output, L is labour, 
and K is capital. Livernois and Ryan note that if, but 
only if, separability is true, one can legitimately model 
industry output as if it consisted of a single aggregate 
product, although problems do exist in construct-
ing such an aggregate and its price. Several types of 
non-jointness exist, the most frequently cited form 
implying that the output of a product (e.g., crude oil) 
is affected by its own price but not that of the other 
product (i.e., natural gas).
 Livernois and Ryan’s results are tantalizing, partly 
because of their ambiguity. At the broadest level, 
they are able to reject the hypothesis of separability, 
but they cannot reject that of non-jointness; how-
ever, despite this, they find significant and positive 
cross-price elasticities, implying that higher prices for 
one of the products will stimulate more discoveries 
of the other. Their results warrant further research 
and suggest that the results of much of the research 
on conventional crude oil supply, which assumes 
non-jointness and/or separability, must be accepted 
with caution.
Thus far, we have reviewed econometric studies 
that focus on either the total expenditures undertaken 
by the oil industry or on the additions of oil reserves 
in Alberta. We will now summarize several econo-
metric analyses that focus on the costs of adding 
reserves.
D. ‘Indirect’ Estimation of Costs
In Section 3, above, we looked at direct estimates of 
the cost of oil in Alberta in which the analyst divided 
actual expenditures by the actual amount of output 
that resulted. We noted that it is difficult to know how 
to interpret the results. The costs are an after-the-fact 
measure and therefore reflect the ongoing interplay 
of shifting supply and demand factors, as well as the 
inevitable stochastic dimension of oil discoveries. 
Thus, simple time trends in costs rarely convey unam-
biguous information: are costs rising because low-
cost conventional oil resources are depleting? Or is it 
because higher prices make the higher-cost resources 
look more attractive? Or a combination of these 
factors? One way to begin to address this issue is by 
undertaking more elaborate econometric analysis to 
see what factors affect the estimated costs; we call this 
an ‘indirect’ cost-estimation process.
Helliwell et al. (1989), discussed above, relate 
annual ‘marginal costs’ (C) of oil reserves additions 
to the cumulative volume of oil discoveries (CD). In 
their analysis, marginal costs appear to be annual real 
expenditures on exploration (drilling and G&G) and 
development divided by the reserves added through 
new discoveries and revisions and extensions. Years 
from 1952 to 1985 are included (except for 1976, which 
saw negative reserves additions, due to a significant 
downward revision of reserves in several pools). Their 
preferred equation also includes a variable (EP) from 
1982 to 1985 that shows the excess of the ‘new’ oil price 
in Alberta above the ‘old’ oil price; 1982 saw the exten-
sion of the higher price to certain development activi-
ties such as EOR. The estimated equation (Helliwell et 
al., 1989, p. 147) with the t-statistics in parentheses is:
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C = 0.4517 + 0.07807CD + 16.067EP. 
   (0.80)  (1.51)   (4.42)
The adjusted R-square value is 0.4846. This equation 
suggests that ‘depletion’ effects have been significant 
in pushing up the unit cost of reserves additions, and 
that a move to higher-cost reserves additions through 
development followed the extension of higher oil 
prices to such reserves in 1982. However, it is notable 
that the estimated coefficients are relatively unstable as 
the equation specification changes, such as by using a 
different time period. Also, the cumulative discovery 
variable is not highly significant.
We will briefly review two other studies of the 
costs of Alberta oil supply.
 Livernois and Uhler (1987) are primarily con-
cerned with models of natural resource extraction 
that view exploration as a process to reduce extraction 
costs by increasing the size of available reserves. They 
argue that the resource base should not be viewed as 
an aggregated whole, the size of which is inversely 
related to lifting costs. By way of analogy, think of 
a region’s reserves as being held in a giant cistern. 
Suppose that the greater the volume of oil present, 
the greater the pressure pushing down on the oil and 
the higher the output flow rate is through the spigot 
at the bottom of the cistern (and the lower the unit 
cost of production). Then adding more reserves will 
reduce per-unit lifting costs. But Livernois and Uhler 
argue that this picture does not fit the oil industry 
since reserves are not in fact an aggregate but the sum 
of many separate reservoirs. There is strong reason to 
assume that the industry faces depletion effects in the 
addition of reserves, in the sense that at any point in 
time the lowest-cost potential reserves tend to be the 
ones that are added, while those left undiscovered and 
undeveloped are those expected to be of higher cost. 
Such depletion effects in the reserves-addition pro-
cess mean that the incremental reserves added tend 
to be of higher cost; adding reserves in this model 
would not tend to reduce average lifting costs. What 
is required is a disaggregated model. Here the reduc-
tion of reserves in any single deposit (the ‘intensive 
margin,’ as they label it) will tend to increase extrac-
tion costs, as in the usual aggregated model. However, 
the addition of reserves (the ‘extensive margin’) may 
also lead to higher costs as more costly reserves addi-
tions take place.
Livernois and Uhler illustrate their model with 
data for Alberta oil costs over the years 1951 to 1982. 
Initially they estimate an ‘aggregate’ cost equation, 
which shows that the sum of real operating and capital 
costs (C) was positively related to the size of reserves 
(R), rather than exhibiting the negative connection 
suggested by the aggregate resource-depletion model. 
The equation also included the annual output level 
(Q), and, with an adjusted R-square of 0.83, was (with 
t-statistics in parenthesis):
C = –33.48+.00000206Q+.0000000316R–.029338(R)(Q). 
   (–1.3)  (3.4)    (2.9)    (–1.1)
They then draw on data for 166 oil pools discovered 
between 1950 and 1973 to do a cross-sectional estimate 
of oil extraction costs per pool (C(i)) in 1976. (These 
data were presumably generated as part of Livernois’ 
interesting study of pressure maintenance water injec-
tion procedures in Alberta oil pools; Livernois, 1987.) 
The estimated equation assumes that costs are related 
to the pool’s output rate (q(i)), the proportion of initial 
reserves yet unproduced (r(i)) and the cumulative 
number of oil discoveries made in Alberta prior to 
this pool’s discovery (N(i)). The estimated equation, 
with an R-square of 0.93, and t-statistics shown as 
before, was:
C(i) = –1,800,000+61.86q(i)–4,300,000r(i)+47.47N(i). 
    (–1.5)  (47.1)   (–2.0)   (3.3)
As can be seen, costs rise as reserves in the pool are 
depleted, and costs are higher the later the pool was 
discovered, indicating significant depletion effects at 
both the intensive (pool) level and the extensive (dis-
covery) level.
Livernois (1988) undertakes a joint econometric 
estimation of the marginal discovery costs of crude 
oil and natural gas in Alberta, using annual data from 
1955 to 1983. His interest, in part, is to address the 
joint-cost problem in exploration: producers searching 
for petroleum in Alberta find both oil and gas and are 
unable to separate their activities into a search for one 
of the products only. Hence, it may be inappropriate 
to estimate a discovery-cost relationship for oil alone; 
one would expect, for instance, that natural gas prices 
influence oil discoveries, and the strength of depletion 
effects for one of the products would affect discovery 
of the other.
Livernois begins with an optimization model in 
which producers operate to produce the joint products 
of oil and gas discoveries using three competitively 
produced inputs (land acquired for exploration, geo-
physical activities, and exploratory drilling). Cumu-
lative past exploratory drilling effort is included as an 
‘input’ variable, to capture the cost-reducing effect of 
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technological change and the cost-increasing effect of 
the depletion of the resource base as discoveries pro-
ceed. Discoveries are measured by the 1985 estimate 
of appreciated reserves by year of discovery. (That is, 
as discussed above, discoveries in any year are based 
on the 1985 estimate of the size of the pool, not the 
estimate that was made in the year of discovery.) The 
basic problem is one of minimizing the cost of the dis-
coveries, given the prices of the inputs and a produc-
tion function relationship tying the quantities of oil 
and gas discoveries to the quantities of the four inputs 
used. Livernois draws on economic theory that shows 
that this problem can be rephrased as the estimation 
of a cost function and of cost-share equations derived 
from that function. He assumes a ‘translog’ cost func-
tion, a flexible functional form capable of capturing 
a wide variety of interrelationships amongst the var-
iables. The model is complex, as are the econometric 
estimation procedures. Autocorrelation (serial corre-
lation) was found to be a problem; that is, there was a 
positive (rather than random) tie between year-to-year 
differences between the observed values of variables 
and the values estimated in the equation. Including 
a dummy variable to capture the new Keg River play 
starting in 1965 reduced this serial correlation some-
what, suggesting that the Keg River play had charac-
teristics somewhat different from earlier plays. The 
results showed that, in twenty-one of the twenty-seven 
years, the cumulative drilling effort variable acted to 
increase costs, suggesting that depletion effects were 
more significant than technological improvements. 
The exception was six consecutive years from 1973. 
Livernois notes that the negative effect had been small 
for several years prior to this, and that the widespread 
adoption of new computer techniques in geophysical 
analysis began in the late 1960s.
From his estimated cost equations, Livernois is 
able to calculate the marginal costs of finding addi-
tional units of oil and gas each year from 1956 through 
1983 (Livernois, 1988, p. 389). Both costs show consid-
erable variation from year to year but also a general 
tendency to increase. A simple time (t) trend for 
oil marginal finding costs (MC, measured in 1985$/
m3) yields an R-square value of 0.71 for the following 
equation (standard errors, rather then t-statistics in 
parenthesis):
ln(MC) = –415.4 +  0.211t. 
      (50.3) (0.025)
That is, oil finding costs were rising at 21%/year. (For 
natural gas, the annual average cost increase was about 
17%.) Finding-cost estimates generally smaller than 
estimates of the in-ground value of new reserves indi-
cate that the marginal finding cost is not a good proxy 
for the user cost of oil and gas; this is consistent with 
the resource models reviewed above, which include 
a depletion effect in the discovery process. Livernois 
notes that his finding-cost estimates do approach the 
in-ground value around 1970, then fall lower again. 
As a possible interpretation, he suggests that the most 
profitable exploration opportunities available at the 
low price level of the late 1960s had been pretty well 
exploited by 1970 and that it was only the sharp price 
rises after 1970 that made significant discoveries eco-
nomic again and therefore ‘resurrected’ the import-
ance of exploration depletion effects.
6. Conclusions
This chapter (along with the sections of Chapter Five 
reviewing discovery-process models like that of the 
Geological Survey of Canada) has surveyed much of 
the empirical economic literature on Alberta conven-
tional crude oil supply. The details are overwhelming 
and must leave the reader wondering whether any 
firm conclusions can be drawn from the forest of indi-
vidual results! However, the complexity of the findings 
reflects the complexity and inevitable uncertainties of 
the crude-oil-supply process. With the exception of 
the NEB, which has a government mandate to provide 
regular progress reports on the supply of and demand 
for energy in Canada, most analysts respond to the 
complexity of the oil-supply process by restricting 
their research to a small part of the activities of the 
total crude oil industry. As a result, there is no single 
model that stands out as providing the best descrip-
tion of Alberta oil supply.
On the basis of the literature we have reviewed, the 
following conclusions seem warranted:
•	 Crude	oil	supply	(industry	activity	and	resultant	
reserves additions and production) are responsive 
to economic signals. All else being equal, higher 
real prices net of royalties do generate more 
output.
•	 Resource-depletion	effects	have	been	apparent	
over time; there has been a general tendency 
for the real costs of producing oil in Alberta to 
increase, and most models that explicitly include 
some type of degradation effect find that it is 
significant. This is not to say that technological 
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progress has been unimportant, but the industry 
does seem to work its way through the underlying 
resource base by exploiting the lower-cost depos-
its first and then moving on to the higher-cost 
deposits.
•	 Notwithstanding	this	ranking	procedure,	there	is	
a great deal of stochastic instability in the reserves 
addition process. In any year, reserves additions 
may turn out to have been considerably less 
expensive or more expensive than was anticipated.
•	 Alberta	oil	supply	is	difficult	to	model	as	a	pro-
cess of tapping a single aggregate resource base. 
A number of the supply models point out the 
importance of recognizing the development of 
the industry in Alberta as progressing through a 
sequence of geologically distinct oil plays. How-
ever, while the oil play may be a critical unit for 
understanding oil supply, the problem arises that 
there seems to be no reliable way of anticipating as 
yet unrecognized new plays. This is a case in which 
the most useful way to understand the history of 
discoveries in Alberta is of limited value for fore-
casting purposes.
•	 There	seems	to	be	a	persistent	tendency	for	his-
torical models of oil supply (which includes pretty 
well all models) to underestimate longer-term 
oil supply. This tendency has been marked in 
the NEB’s work and also seems to have held for 
the burst of econometric modelling in the late 
1970s and 1980s. As mentioned, most of these 
models found relatively strong depletion effects 
in reserves additions and/or strongly rising unit 
costs. Particularly in light of the large fall in real 
oil prices after 1985, one might have expected that 
reserves additions since then would be minimal. 
While production of conventional crude oil since 
the mid-1980s has exceeded reserves additions 
most of the time, there have been continuing addi-
tions to reserves. This suggests that there has been 
some tendency for econometric models to under-
estimate the impacts of changing technologies and, 
perhaps, to fail to pick up new oil plays. The newer 
technologies could be major new techniques like 
horizontal drilling and 3-D and 4-D seismic but 
might also include the cumulative impact of many 
small new innovations in all aspects of industry 
activity, including the electronic revolution, which 
some observers cite in the productivity increases 
in the United States in the 1990s. We are unaware 
of any recent studies that have addressed in a 
formal way the importance of such technolog-
ical changes in the Alberta crude oil industry. 
Technological and knowledge change is a difficult 
variable to include in supply models since some 
of the changes lie in the minds of the companies 
supplying oil, and others may be embodied in a 
wide number of specific capital assets: how can 
this complex mix of tangibles and intangibles be 
measured? (Cuddington and Moss, 2001, look at 
U.S. petroleum supply and include a technological 
change variable measured by patent applications.) 
Of course, there is no way of being sure that the 
tendency to produce more than various oil-supply 
models have forecast will continue through 
the future!
This chapter concludes the part of the book that deals 
primarily with the ‘private’ sector’s role in the Alberta 
petroleum industry. We will now turn to a detailed 
examination of the role of governments, in other 
words to public policy analysis of the industry.
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Appendix 8.1 
National Energy Board: Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin Oil Supply Forecasts  
1. WCSB Potential Reserves Additions
Table A8.1: National Energy Board Reports: WCSB Potential Reserves Additions (106 m3)
Report Light: New Discoveries Light: EOR Heavy: New Discoveries Heavy: EOR Approximate Oil Price (US$/m3)
October 1974 270**    11.00*
September 1975 270**    12.00*
February 1977 77 156 99 173 14.00
September 1978 207 156 64 345 18.00
January 1981 225 302 80 169 38.00
September 1984 404 280 140 381 28.00
October 1986 308 367 125 378 18.00
September 1988 563 295 250 370 16.00
June 1991 521 295 270 320 17.50
December 1994 519 395 260 300 19.00
1999 666 253 229 187 18.00
Notes: 
*	 Approximate	price	in	the	year	the	report	was	issued	of	WTI	at	Cushing	Oklahoma.	Prices	are	in	nominal	dollars	(unadjusted	for	inflation).	It	should	be	noted	that	
reserves additions depend on forecast prices, which vary from report to report. This price is taken as representative of the anticipated price of oil in each report.
** Reserves additions over two decades of light and heavy crude.
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2. Productive Capacity of WCSB Conventional Light Crude 
Table A8.2: National Energy Board Reports: Productive Capacity of WCSB Conventional Light Crude (103 m3/d)
 Actual 1974* 1975* 1977 1978 1981 1984 1986 1988 1991 1994 1999
1974 230.1 321.8
1975 194.7 324.2 294.8
1976 174.1 318.6 280.5 239.6
1977 169.3 308.9 270.1 227.9
1978 165.6 289.2 252.7 212.0 222.9
1979 188.2 266.2 230.7 191.6 209.8
1980 173.7 247.1 209.8 169.7 193.7
1981 154.5 225.6 191.5 150.3 175.9 167.6
1982 150.7 205.0 174.3 133.3 159.5 156.4
1983 153.3 185.1 172.4 118.9 144.8 135.7 165.1
1984 164.5 166.1 139.0 106.6 131.6 123.6 167.7
1985 159.8 147.8 129.5 96.3 120.3 114.3 157.0 168.1
1986 149.3 131.9 116.1 87.9 111.1` 109.8 144.5 168.0
1987 152.3 118.4 104.1 80.4 102.2 104.0 134.5 158.2 159.9
1988 158.1 106.5 98.5 74.3 94.7 99.1 125.4 143.0 159.7
1989 148.2 96.1 90.4 68.8 87.7 94.8 116.8 130.0 152.2
1990 141.2 87.4 85.8 64.2 82.0 90.3 109.1 118.4 143.8 144.7
1991 137.7 79.5 82.2 60.2 77.4 86.2 102.3 108.4 135.3 137.4
1992 139.2 72.3 77.1 55.6 73.1 81.9 96.1 100.0 127.6 126.2
1993 143.9 65.9 72.8 52.9 69.4 78.2 90.6 93.0 120.6 117.2 142.1
1994 148.5  69.1 49.9 65.8 74.0 85.8 86.9 113.9 110.1 144.9
1995 145.1  68.0 46.9 62.1 68.1 81.7 81.6 107.4 104.4 150.9
1996 140.0     66.6 77.9 76.5 98.2 99.4 148.9
1997 135.1     64.9 74.0 72.4 94.7 94.7 143.5 132.0
1998 140.4     59.4 71.0 68.8 91.0 90.4 137.9 
1999 140.2     56.0 68.1 65.1 85.7 86.4 131.9 
2000 134.6     52.7 65.7 61.1 82.3 82.6 125.8 111.5
2001 127.3      63.5 57.7 78.8 80.4 118.9 
2002 119.4      61.1 54.7 75.4 76.0 112.5 
2003 91.8      58.9 51.7 72.2 73.0 105.5 
2004 87.6      57.0 49.0 69.3 70.3 99.9 
2005 83.9      55.1 46.6 66.5 67.9 94.6 101.1
2006 83.1         65.8 89.3 
2007 82.4         63.9 83.9 
2008 86.2         62.0 78.6 
2009 82.2         60.7 73.2 
2010 83.5         59.5 69.1 82.2
Note:
*Includes light and heavy crude and pentanes plus. The 1975 values were read off two graphs, so are approximate.
1988 and 1989 actual output from CAPP Statistical Handbook.
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3.	Productive	Capacity	of	WCSB	Conventional	Heavy	Oil 
Table A8.3: National Energy Board Reports: Productive Capacity of WCSB Conventional Heavy Oil (103 m3/d)





1978 32.2 32.4 34.5
1979 31.7 31.3 34.5
1980 31.7 30.0 33.5
1981 28.0 28.8 31.9 27.4
1982 28.7 27.8 31.1 23.6
1983 33.0 26.9 29.9 22.0 34.4
1984 37.6 26.1 29.1 20.6 37.6
1985 39.1 25.3 28.6 26.9 36.5 40.7
1986 39.9 24.6 29.1 28.4 34.2 41.2
1987 43.1 23.7 29.6 30.1 32.5 38.1 44.1
1988 45.4 22.9 30.5 31.6 31.4 34.5 44.9
1989 46.2 22.4 31.1 32.5 30.1 31.9 42.2
1990 49.8 21.8 31.5 33.7 28.7 29.5 40.6 49.6
1991 50.5 21.1 31.8 34.5 28.7 27.6 38.4 48.8
1992 55.4 20.5 32.3 34.6 28.3 25.9 36.3 48.1
1993 61.5 19.9 32.3 34.2 27.9 24.6 34.4 47.8 65.4
1994 65.7 19.2 32.4 33.5 27.5 23.7 33.1 48.3 73.9
1995 73.4 18.8 32.3 32.7 27.1 22.2 31.7 49.0 86.1
1996 82.3   31.5 26.8 22.1 30.5 49.5 89.6
1997 89.3   30.2 26.6 21.4 29.2 49.5 90.0 88.4
1998 85.2   28.8 26.2 20.5 28.0 48.7 88.2
1999 82.9   27.5 25.8 19.3 26.9 47.5 85.3
2000 89.0   26.0 25.6 18.7 26.0 46.2 80.7 82.5
2001 90.7    25.5 18.3 25.1 44.7 76.0
2002 88.0    25.4 17.7 24.1 42.3 71.8
2003 86.7    25.4 17.2 23.0 42.0 67.7
2004 86.5    25.4 16.9 22.1 40.5 64.0
2005 83.3    25.4 16.6 21.3 39.4 60.8 81.4
2006 82.0       39.0 58.0
2007 79.4       38.5 55.5
2008 73.6       38.0 53.5
2009 68.6       38.0 51.7
2010 67.2       38.0 50.4 60.0
Note: 1988, 1989 and 1990 actual from CAPP Statistical Handbook.
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4. Production of Synthetic Crude
Table A8.4: National Energy Board Reports: Production of Synthetic Crude (103 m3/d)
 Actual 1974 1977 1978 1981 1984 1986 1988 1991 1994 1999
1974 7.3 8.7
1975 6.8 9.5
1976 7.6 10.3 7.9
1977 7.2 10.3 7.9
1978 8.9 10.3 7.9 11.1
1979 14.6 18.3 16.7 21.5
1980 20.3 24.6 23.8 23.0
1981 17.7 31.0 27.0 24.6 20.0
1982 19.1 35.0 27.0 26.2 25.0
1983 25.4 45.3 28.6 28.6 28.0 23.5
1984 21.1 54.8 29.4 30.2 29.0 24.2
1985 26.7 63.6 30.2 35.8 29.0 25.0 26.1
1986 29.4 80.2 30.2 38.1 29.0 25.0 28.5
1987 28.7 93.0 34.2 47.7 29.0 25.0 28.5 28.5
1988 31.9 105.7 42.1 65.9 29.0 28.5 29.0 28.8
1989 32.6 115.2 50.1 75.5 29.0 28.5 29.5 30.5
1990 32.9 132.7 54.0 82.6 29.0 28.5 29.5 31.2 32.2
1991 35.9 146.2 67.5 89.0 29.0 28.5 29.5 32.5 33.4
1992 37.2 164.5 76.3 95.3 29.0 33.5 29.5 33.9 33.9
1993 38.6 183.5 81.0 103.3 29.0 38.5 29.5 34.9 34.8 38.9
1994 41.6  85.0 108.9 29.0 38.5 30.0 34.9 36.6 41.7
1995 43.2  89.0 115.2 29.0 38.5 30.5 34.9 36.4 43.8
1996 42.7    29.0 38.5 30.5 35.0 36.4 44.3 43.2
1997 45.5    29.0 38.5 30.5 35.0 37.6 45.2
1998 48.2    29.0 38.5 30.5 35.0 37.6 45.2
1999 45.9    29.0 43.5 30.5 35.0 37.6 45.2
2000 44.8    29.0 48.5 30.5 35.0 37.6 48.2 59.2
2001 48.4     48.5 30.5 35.1 37.6 54.2 
2002 59.1     48.5 30.5 35.1 37.6 54.7 
2003 80.9     48.5 30.5 35.1 37.6 55.2 
2004 95.5     48.5 30.5 35.1 37.6 56.5 
2005 86.9     48.5 30.5 35.1 40.0 57.0 87.3
2006 104.4        47.1 57.0 
2007 108.3        49.7 57.0 
2008 103.8        49.7 57.5 
2009 121.7        52.1 58.0 




Table A8.5: National Energy Board Reports: Production of Bitumen (103 m3/d)
 Actual 1977 1978 1981 1984 1986 1988 1991 1994 1999
1976 1.2 0.8
1977 1.2 0.8
1978 1.2 0.8 1.1
1979 1.5 0.8 1.6
1980 1.5 1.0 1.6
1981 2.0 1.3 2.4 2.0
1982 3.2 1.6 2.4 3.0
1983 4.0 1.6 3.2 4.0 4.0
1984 5.3 1.6 4.0 4.0 5.5
1985 8.1 2.4 4.8 5.0 7.0 8.3
1986 14.8 2.4 4.8 5.0 9.0 14.5
1987 18.4 2.4 4.8 5.0 11.0 16.0 18.4
1988 20.7 2.4 4.8 5.0 13.0 15.7 20.1
1989 20.5 2.4 4.8 5.0 15.0 16.0 25.2
1990 21.5 2.4 4.8 5.0 17.0 19.3 30.2 20.6
1991 19.4 2.4 4.8 5.0 19.0 20.0 30.8 20.9
1992 19.9 2.4 4.8 5.0 21.0 20.8 30.8 23.0
1993 20.9 2.4 4.8 5.0 23.0 21.5 30.9 24.6 21.4
1994 21.2 2.4 4.8 5.0 24.0 22.0 30.5 25.4 22.8
1995 23.7 2.4 4.8 5.0 25.0 22.5 30.2 26.5 24.7
1996 26.2   5.0 26.0 22.5 30.2 27.2 28.1
1997 37.8   5.0 27.0 22.5 30.9 27.5 33.4 37.8
1998 45.7   5.0 28.0 22.5 30.9 28.4 37.0
1999 38.8   5.0 29.0 22.5 31.3 31.9 41.3
2000 46.0   5.0 30.0 22.5 31.8 36.5 44.5 48.8
2001 49.2    31.0 22.5 35.0 39.1 44.2
2002 48.1    32.0 22.5 36.4 44.0 44.1
2003 55.5    33.0 22.5 37.8 47.9 43.8
2004 61.5    34.0 22.5 38.2 53.3 42.8
2005 70.0    35.0 22.5 39.4 55.9 42.2 68.8
2006 74.4       56.6 41.2
2007 80.3       57.3 40.9
2008 87.5       62.3 40.9
2009 90.5       67.5 40.8
2010 108.0       76.8 40.8 78.9
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I. FEBRUARY 1977 REPORT 
1995 production in 103 b/d
 Expected case Maximum case Minimum case
All oil 1032 1425 500
Syncrude 575 855 180
Oil excl oil sands 457 570 320
 
II. SEPTEMBER 1978 REPORT 
1995 production 103 b/d
 Base case High case Low case
Light from est. res. 196 196 196
Light from res. add. 195 388 111
Syncrude 725 1175 170
Heavy from est. res. 37 37 37
Heavy from res. add. 166 236 91
Bitumen 30 30 5
 
III. JUNE 1981 REPORT 
2000 production in 103 m3/d
	 Base	case	 Modified	base	 High	 Low
Conventional light 52.7 61.6 89.0 32.4
Conventional heavy 26.0 34.5 46.4 17.2
Syncrude 29.0 158.0 158.0 29.0
Bitumen 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
 
IV. SEPTEMBER 1984 REPORT 
2005 production in 103 m3/d
 Reference High Low
Established reserves 19 20 16
New discoveries 27 33 21
EOR 35 48 16
 
V. OCTOBER 1986 REPORT 
2005 production 103 m3/d
 Low High
Light established reserves 17.0 17.4
Conventional light EOR 14.0 15.9
Conventional light, discov. 15.5 22.9
Conventional heavy EOR 9.0 13.4
Heavy established reserves 2.4 2.5




VI. SEPTEMBER 1988 REPORT 
2005 production 103 m3/d
 Low High
Light established reserves 22.2 22.7
Light EOR 13.0 16.2
Light discoveries 31.2 31.5
Heavy EOR 6.5 9.4
Heavy established reserves 2.9 1.7




VII. JUNE 1991 REPORT 
2010 production 103 m3/d (Approximate values, read from a graph)
 Control High Low
Light and medium 188 235 115




Table A8.6: National Energy Board: Price Sensitivity Cases
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VIII. DECEMBER 1994 REPORT 
2010 production 103 m3/d
 Reference High Low
Light established res. 13.1 13.1 13.1
Light EOR 45.1 57.1 14.3
Light new discoveries 10.9 12.0 10.2
Heavy est. reserves 2.9 2.9 2.9
Heavy EOR 37.7 49.3 5.4
Heavy new discoveries 9.8 11.0 8.9
Syncrude 58.0 78.1 47.5
Bitumen 40.8 105.1 5.8
 
IX. 1999 REPORT 
2010 production in 103 m3/d
 $14,  $18, $18, $22,  
 current  current low low 
 supply  supply cost cost 
 trends trends supply supply
Conventional light 62.8 82.2 86.2 92.6
Conventional heavy 52.3 60.0 63.9 72.0
Synthetic 74.7 103.1 111.1 165.7
Bitumen 48.0 78.9 74.5 119.6
Table A8.6/continued
Part Two of this volume dealt primarily with the 
geological underpinnings of the Alberta oil indus-
try, the operation of oil markets, and the attempts by 
economists to build models to help us understand the 
workings of the oil-supply process and make better 
forecasts of future petroleum production. That is, the 
perspective was largely from the ‘private’ viewpoint of 
non-government decision-makers. (The main excep-
tion to this was in Chapter Seven, on the oil sands and 
heavy oil, where a number of government regulations 
were discussed in some detail.)
Part Three focuses on governmental regulation 
of the oil industry. Of course, this separation into the 
‘private’ and the ‘public’ is artificial; for example, the 
oil prices discussed in Chapter Six were affected by 
(and sometimes actually set by) government regula-
tion. This means that there is some overlap of material 
in Parts Two and Three, particularly between Chapters 
Six (Crude-Oil Output and Pricing) and Nine (Gov-
ernment Regulations: Trade and Price Controls).
The oil industry operates within a web of govern-
mental regulations. The purposes of such regulations 
are multifarious. Some, of course, are part of the 
necessity for government to establish an environment 
conducive to a complicated economic system: laws 
governing the ownership of private property and its 
use; safety and work regulations for labour; regula-
tions for banks and other capital markets; etc. We take 
this broad economic environment as given and focus 
on specific regulations related to the oil industry.
By way of introduction, there have been two quite 
different perspectives taken by economists on the pur-
pose of government regulation. A standard approach 
in conventional ‘welfare’ economics has been to sug-
gest that governments impose regulations in their 
position as representative of the public interest. Two 
broad objectives are then ascribed to governments. 
The first is increasing economic efficiency (which is 
often described as correcting problems of ‘market fail-
ure’ such as controlling the exercise of excess market 
power, offsetting assorted ‘externalities’ [such as pol-
lution] that markets do not recognize or handle ineffi-
ciently, and producing goods and services that the 
private sector cannot provide efficiently). The second 
government objective is making society more ‘equit-
able’ by appropriate policies of taxation and spending 
across different income levels or groups. In the context 
of a federal system such as Canada, the efficiency and 
equity concerns of different levels of government may 
be quite different, opening up the possibility of inter-
governmental conflict.
A second approach to understanding government 
policies is often called a ‘political economy’ perspec-
tive, which sees individuals, including government 
decision-makers, as largely self-interested. Govern-
ment officials are viewed as being highly responsive to 
the most vocal and powerful interest groups in society. 
These groups tend to be made up of those members 
of society who have the most to gain or lose from 
particular policy measures; conversely, if the individ-
ual is not much affected as an individual, then she is 
unlikely to exercise much political influence even if 
there are large numbers of people so affected.
We shall adhere in this book to the former, ‘public 
interest’ perspective, and bring it to bear on three 
main types of government regulation of the Alberta oil 
Part Three: Overview
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industry. Chapter Nine considers regulations directly 
impacting on the operation of the oil market in the 
form of price controls or measures affecting the export 
or import of oil. Chapter Ten deals with ‘conservation’ 
in the production of oil in the form of an output con-
trol program called ‘market-demand prorationing.’ 
Finally, Chapter Eleven examines regulations aimed at 
transferring revenue from the oil industry to the gov-
ernment; this might be called ‘oil industry taxation,’ 
but we prefer to refer to it as fiscal measures to ‘cap-
ture’ the economic rent earned by the industry.
Readers’ Guide: The most obvious examples of petro-
politics in the oil market are the instances in which 
governments elect to interfere with free market prices 
and the flows of oil in voluntary exchanges between 
buyers and sellers. From the viewpoint of traditional 
economic analysis, unless justified by special circum-
stances such policies are judged to generate ineffi-
ciencies in society. Canada, over the years, provides 
an interesting case study for a variety of government 
policies that have been designed to change the price 
of oil and/or to restrict the amount of oil imported 
or exported. In this chapter we provide descriptions 
and assessments of two significant policy regimes 
illustrating quite different market impacts. From the 
early 1960s to the early 1970s the National Oil Policy 
served to restrict the flow of oil imports into Canada 
and to keep the price of Canadian-produced oil 
above the world oil price. Immediately following this, 
until the mid-1980s, a set of regulations restricted 
exports of oil and held the Canadian price below the 
world level. This chapter discusses the rationale for 
these policies, the impact on various participants in 
the oil market, and their economic efficiency.
1. Introduction
In economists’ basic model of the economic market 
for a commodity, supply and demand forces interact 
to determine an equilibrium in which the market 
clears. This model, in its simplest form, abstracts 
from the roles played by the government. In fact, in a 
mixed capitalist economy such as Canada’s, the pres-
ence of the government is ubiquitous. One role is so 
much taken for granted as to be almost invisible. It is 
widely accepted that some agent is required to set and 
enforce the ‘rules of the game’ that allow coordinated 
production and exchange in what might otherwise be 
a chaotic ‘state of nature.’ This is often seen in terms 
of a ‘social contract’: members of society find it to 
be in their best interest to agree (for the most part) 
to obey the dictates of a government, which in turn 
imposes a set of rules and regulations governing the 
acquisition and utilization of private property and the 
rights of workers selling labourer services. Robbery is 
outlawed, so might is no longer always right; slavery 
is illegal, so employers may buy labour time but not 
indenture people; contracts become enforceable, so 
lenders will part with large sums of money and invest-
ors undertake productive activities that will not pay 
back for years. We do not imply unanimity amongst 
citizens on how far this role of government should 
extend; admirers of Ayn Rand and other libertarians 
may debate long and hard with social democrats and 
those of more collectivist views. For our purposes, 
however, we shall take the institutions of contract law, 
labour codes, and property rights (including the rule 
of capture, under common law) as given and focus on 
the additional government programs that have been 
devised with specific petroleum-related objectives 
in mind.
This chapter deals with regulations that set the 
price of oil and direct exchange (or trade) conditions. 
Of course many other programs, such as prorationing 
regulations (discussed in Chapter Ten) and taxa-
tion (discussed in Chapter Eleven), also have had 
CHAPTER NINE
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an impact on the supply of and/or demand for oil 
and therefore indirectly affect market prices and/or 
quantities.
Why might the government feel moved to step 
into the market to affect directly oil prices or the 
process of exchange? In the Canadian context three 
main justifications have been employed.
(i) Equity concerns. For obvious reasons, all else 
being equal, oil consumers prefer lower crude 
prices and oil producers (and the owners 
of oil-bearing land, especially the western 
provincial governments) prefer higher 
prices. Geographical disparities heighten the 
importance of these distributional concerns. It 
is true, of course, that oil consumers are spread 
throughout the country, as are shareholders 
in the oil companies, but the weight of crude-
oil-producing interests clearly lies in Alberta 
and adjacent parts of the Western Canadian 
Sedimentary Basin. It is also noteworthy 
that a significant proportion of oil company 
shareholders are non-Canadian. At the same 
time consumers predominate in the provinces 
east of Saskatchewan.
(ii) Oil as a ‘special’ commodity. Oil is not just any 
other good but an essential input for a modern 
industrial economy, especially in the short-run 
when most of our transportation and some 
of our residential heating and industrial pro-
cess capability is irrevocably based on refined 
petroleum products. Moreover, international 
petroleum supplies, centred so heavily in the 
unstable Middle East, are subject to unpredict-
able disruptions (vis., 1948; 1956–57; 1967–68; 
1973–74; 1978–80; 1990–91; 2003–4). Can 
unregulated markets be relied on to make deci-
sions regarding Canadian oil supplies that are 
in the best interests of the country?
(iii) Oil as a depletable natural resource. Conven-
tional crude oil is available in (unknown) but 
limited quantities as a resource in nature; it 
is a depletable and non-recyclable natural 
resource. Once again, it has been questioned 
whether unregulated crude oil markets will 
give adequate recognition to this. Might not 
producers tend to export low-cost reserves to 
foreign users at low prices, forcing Canadian 
consumers later on to rely on high-cost domes-
tic reserves or imports? (See, for example, 
Laxer, 1970, 1974; Willson, 1980.) In many 
cases this argument is tied to the interests of 
foreign-controlled oil producers, though the 
connection is not essential to the argument, 
and most Canadian-controlled firms have been 
as eager to see high output rates and, usually, 
exports, as the multinationals.
Chapter Six, in its discussion of output and prices, 
noted the importance of various government pro-
grams. This chapter will follow that one in treating 
separately three different time periods: the National 
Oil Policy (NOP) years 1961–72; the price control 
and National Energy Program (NEP) years 1973–85; 
and the deregulation and Canada–U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) and North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) years, 1985 until now. In each 
case, we shall first set out the main regulations and 
some elements of the policy discussions that pre-
ceded their introduction. We then discuss the impact 
of the regulations with particular emphasis on their 
economic efficiency. Before the more detailed his-
torical analysis, we shall briefly review constitutional 
responsibilities over natural resources such as oil and 
natural gas, which are of such importance in a federal 
state like Canada.
2. Constitutional Responsibility over 
Petroleum
The precise division of jurisdiction over energy mat-
ters between the federal government and the prov-
inces reflects both legislative acts and ongoing judicial 
interpretation. (For detailed discussion of the federal 
division of powers regarding energy, see LaForest, 
1969; Helliwell and Scott, 1981; Lucas and McDougall, 
1983; and Cairns, 1987. The Alberta Law Review each 
year has a section on oil and gas law, which frequently 
includes papers reviewing the past year in Canada 
and which detail any constitutionally significant laws, 
regulations, or cases.) Up to 1982, the prime deter-
minant of the division of powers was the British North 
America (BNA) Act (1867, with numerous amendments 
over the years passed by the UK Parliament). Since 
repatriation in 1982, it has been the Constitution Act 
(or Canada Act), as ratified by Ottawa and all the 
provinces except Quebec. The Constitution Act trans-
ferred all constitutional authority to Canada; it incor-
porates the various BNA Acts as part of the Canadian 
Constitution as well as such new features as the Bill of 
Rights and formulae for amending the constitution.
The BNA Act of 1867 (UK Statutes 30–31 Victoria, 
chap. 3) set out the basic division of powers between 
Ottawa and the provinces. Sections 91 and 92 are of 
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prime relevance. In Section 91 the federal government 
is assigned responsibility for the “Peace, Order and 
good Government of Canada in relation to all matters 
not coming within the Classes of Subjects of the 
Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the 
Provinces.” In addition to this residual authority, a 
list of specific areas of responsibility to the federal 
Parliament includes: “(2) Regulation of Trade and 
Commerce” and “(3) The raising of money by any 
Mode or System of Taxation.” The list of “Exclusive 
Powers” of the provinces includes (Section 92): 
“(2) Direct Taxation,” “(5) The Management and Sale 
of the Public Lands,” “(13) Property and Civil Rights 
in the Provinces,” and “(16) Generally all Matters of a 
merely local or private nature in the Province.” Section 
91 and 92 dealt with the power to “make laws”; Section 
109 held that, for the original four constituents of 
Canada (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Upper Canada, 
and Lower Canada): “All Lands, Mines, Minerals 
and Royalties” belonging to the separate constituents 
would remain under provincial ownership and 
control. Section 125 of the BNA Act prohibits the 
imposition of taxes on land belonging to Ottawa or 
the provinces.
Alberta became a province of Canada in 1905, 
but it was not until the BNA Act 1930 (U.K. 20–21 
George V, chap. 26) that it was given authority over 
the remaining Crown rights on land and minerals in 
the province. This act gave constitutional authority to 
the Alberta Natural Resources Act (Canada Statutes 
20–21 George V, chap. 3), which in turn recognized an 
agreement negotiated between Ottawa and Edmon-
ton regarding Crown lands. Crown rights over a 
small part of the province, in National Parks and on 
Indian Reserves, remained in the hands of the federal 
government.
From this description of powers, some pos-
sible areas of conflicted jurisdiction over petroleum 
resources can be seen. To what extent might the 
federal authority over trade and commerce interfere 
with provincial responsibilities for property and civil 
rights? What about the joint sharing of the direct tax-
ation field and exactly what is a direct tax? How far 
does the provinces’ control of Crown lands, mines, 
minerals, and royalties extend? Since this is not a 
study of the legal aspects of Canadian petroleum, we 
shall not pursue these issues in any depth. We would 
note that the majority of Alberta’s petroleum has been 
found on provincial Crown land, and that the prov-
ince has exercised its powers to govern the conditions 
of access to such land and payments associated with 
its use and the royalties assessed on petroleum pro-
duction. Some oil and gas is produced from freehold 
or federal Crown land within the province, and the 
province has introduced legislation governing activity 
with respect to this oil and gas as well as that from 
provincial Crown land. Included here are ‘conserva-
tion’ regulations governing production practices, land 
use, etc., and regulations requiring permits before 
natural gas can leave the province. The federal govern-
ment has long acted to regulate pipelines that cross a 
provincial border (to other provinces or the United 
States) and natural gas exports. Corporate income 
taxes on the petroleum industry have been shared 
between the two levels of governments.
Until the 1970s responsibilities over petroleum 
resources seem to have been shared between the fed-
eral and provincial governments in a largely amiable 
manner. These friendly relations eroded after 1972 
when the federal government moved to exercise direct 
control over oil and gas prices and to introduce new 
taxes on crude petroleum production and oil and gas 
exports. In some instances, the action taken involved 
joint federal-provincial agreement, but at other 
times – most notably in the Natural Energy Program 
of October 1980 – Ottawa acted alone. Eventually the 
governments agreed on how to handle these areas of 
shared jurisdiction, though some difficulties in inter-
pretation of the Canada Act remained.
The contentiousness of energy policies in the 
decade after 1972 may also help explain the special 
attention given to natural resources in the Constitution 
Act of 1982. An additional schedule (“The Sixth Sched-
ule”) was added to the act, which carefully defined 
“non-renewable and forestry resources,” indicating 
that the term refers to primary production but does 
not include refined petroleum products. In addition, 
Section 50 adds an entirely new section, Section 92(A), 
to the BNA Act. It reads:
92A. (1) In each province the legislature may 
exclusively make laws in relation to
 (a) exploration for non-renewable natural 
resources in the province
 (b) development, conservation and man-
agement of non-renewable natural 
resources and forestry resources in 
the province including laws in rela-
tion to the rate of primary production 
therefrom.
 (2) In each province the legislature may make 
laws in relation to the export from the 
province to another part of Canada of the 
primary production from non-renewable 
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natural resources and forestry resources 
in the province …, but such laws may not 
authorize or provide for discrimination in 
prices or in supplies exported to another 
part of Canada. …
 (4) In each province the legislature may make 
laws in relation to the raising of money 
by any mode or system of taxation in 
respect of
 (a) non-renewable natural resources 
and forestry in the province and the 
primary production therefrom … 
whether or not such production is 
exported in whole or in part from 
the province, but such laws may not 
authorize or provide for taxation that 
differentiates between production 
exported to another part of Canada 
and production not exported from the 
province.
In essence this section affirms the very broad nature 
of the provinces’ powers with respect to primary 
resources (including those not on Crown land), so 
long as the exercise of powers does not involve prices 
or taxes that discriminate against other parts of 
Canada.




Recall the discussion of Chapter Six. The 1947 Leduc 
discoveries stimulated a surge of oil-directed explora-
tion in Alberta that rapidly built up crude oil reserves. 
New markets were established for Alberta oil by con-
struction of the Trans Mountain Pipeline westward 
from Edmonton, reaching the Puget Sound in Wash-
ington State by 1954, and the Interprovincial Pipe Line 
(IPL) east from Edmonton reaching Toronto (Port 
Credit) in 1957. Crude oil prices were set so as to be 
competitive in the relevant watershed market, necessi-
tating price declines as the market was extended fur-
ther into central Canada, and, otherwise, following the 
delivered price of U.S. crude in the watershed market. 
(Recall, from Chapter Three, that the ‘watershed’ 
market is that market in which the delivered price of 
oil from two or more different regions is equal, so it 
serves as the competitive interface for the producing 
regions.) The operation of the major pipelines as 
common carriers and market-demand prorationing, 
implemented by the Alberta government, ensured 
that all producers had access to the market and that 
market expansion occurred in an ‘orderly’ manner; 
it also contributed to a situation in which there was 
high excess capacity in Alberta, with oil output in the 
late 1950s at less than 50 per cent of available crude 
production capacity. By 1959 international crude oil 
prices were beginning to decline, though U.S. prices 
were not, therefore shifting the competitive supply 
source in the Ontario market away from U.S. (e.g., 
Illinois) crude to Venezuelan and other international 
supplies. Oil producers, and the Alberta government, 
were eager to find new markets for Alberta oil, but 
there was disagreement about where to look – some 
were drawn to Quebec, others to the Midwest U.S.A. 
The latter possibility was problematic. The U.S. gov-
ernment, pushed by domestic oil-producing interests, 
had long been applying pressure on the major oil com-
panies and U.S. refineries to limit oil imports; then, in 
1959, the mandatory U. S. Oil Import Quota Program 
(USOIQP) was implemented.
With the important exception of market-demand 
prorationing (Chapter Ten), the crude oil market in 
Canada up to the late 1950s had developed in a largely 
unregulated manner. The two major crude oil pipe-
lines were incorporated under federal statute and sub-
ject to federal regulations under The Pipeline Act (13 
George VI, 1949, chap. 10). Under this act the Board 
of Transport Commissioners was given responsib-
ility to issue orders governing the construction of 
pipelines under federal jurisdiction and could, if it 
wished, declare oil pipelines to be common carriers 
(Section 39) and regulate traffic, tolls, and/or tariffs 
(Section 40).
In 1955 Parliament passed the Exportation of Power 
and Fluids and Importation of Gas Act (1955, chap. 
14), which gave the Governor in Council authority to 
require licences from the government in the export of 
petroleum and the import of natural gas. McDougall 
(1973) argues that the act was introduced largely due 
to concerns about natural gas exports from Ontario; it 
was never used to restrict crude oil shipments out of 
Canada.
Opposition to a Montreal pipeline was centred 
in, though not exclusive to, the major oil companies 
with Montreal refinery operations as well as Can-
adian crude production. The majors had reason to 
be concerned about the displacement by western 
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Canadian oil of Venezuelan and Middle Eastern crude 
supplied by their affiliates. Opponents of the exten-
sion to Montreal stressed the undesirability of both 
price declines for western crude and new regulatory 
schemes that would impose costs on Montreal con-
sumers or Canadian taxpayers. Moreover, it was asked 
“What happens if Middle Eastern or South Amer-
ican crude producers drop their prices to retain this 
market?” (Canadian Oil Companies, 1958).
2. The Borden Commission and the National Energy 
Board (NEB)
In October 1957 the newly elected Conservative min-
ority government appointed Henry Borden to head a 
Royal Commission on Canadian Energy. The Orders 
in Council establishing the Commission (P.C. 1957 – 
1386), noting Canada’s large energy resources base, 
argued that “the increasing need of energy for the 
growing industrial requirements of Canada renders it 
of the greatest importance to assure the most effective 
use of those resources in the public interest.” It further 
noted the importance of ensuring “that present and 
future Canadian requirements for energy are taken 
fully and systematically into account in granting 
licences for the export of energy.” Under the Order in 
Council, the Borden Commission was instructed to 
make recommendations on four specific matters (as 
well as any others it saw fit):
(i) the export of energy;
(ii) “the regulation of the transmission of oil and 
natural gas between provinces or from Canada”;
(iii) the duties of a National Energy Board (NEB), 
which the government intended to set up; and
(iv) specific measures regarding Trans-Canada 
Pipelines Ltd., the natural gas trunk line which 
government policy had insisted be laid entirely 
in Canada, instead of looping into the U.S. 
below the Great Lakes as IPL had done.
In this chapter, the recommendations regarding crude 
oil will be summarized. (Readers will also wish to 
refer back to the relevant section of Chapter Six. Breen 
(1993, pp. 457–65, 468–81) provides a thorough discus-
sion of the Borden Commission and its hearings.) The 
First Report of the Borden Commission was issued in 
October 1958 and dealt largely with the responsibilities 
of the NEB and with natural gas. The Commission’s 
recommendation that oil imports be subject to annual 
licensing was not adopted (Borden, 1958, p. 26). Nor 
was the recommendation that it be made “manda-
tory” for the Board of Transport Commissioners to 
regulate the “traffic, tolls or tariffs of oil pipeline com-
panies subject to the jurisdiction of the Parliament of 
Canada” (Borden, 1958, p. 27). The Commission felt 
that a different body should be responsible for assess-
ing Canadian energy needs and issuing licences of 
approval for activities than was responsible for exam-
ining shipment tariffs.
Chapter 3 of the Borden Commission’s First Report 
concerned the NEB, with twenty recommendations 
(Borden, 1958, pp. 43–48). Key recommendations 
with respect to crude oil were: (i) requirement of an 
NEB licence for all international or interprovincial oil 
or oil-product pipelines; (ii) requirement of annual, 
non-transferable licences for crude and product 
imports; and (iii) NEB administration of oil export 
licences. In addition, the NEB would have broad 
responsibilities for providing information on Can-
adian energy matters to the public and making energy 
policy recommendations to the government.
The National Energy Board Act was passed in 
1959 (Statutes, 1959, chap. 46). (Winberg, 1987, chap. 
9, looks at the structure and responsibilities of the 
NEB.) It established a five-member board, with each 
member appointed by the Governor in Council for 
a seven-year term. To some degree, its mandate was 
patterned on the Alberta Oil and Gas Conservation 
Board (OGCB) and indeed its first chairman (Ian 
McKinnon) was formerly chair of the Alberta Board. 
The NEB was set up as a court of record, with powers 
to hold hearings, examine documents and witnesses, 
and issue orders on matters under its jurisdiction. The 
NEB was given ongoing responsibility to monitor Can-
adian energy industries and issues of concern to fed-
eral policy and to report to and advise the government 
as “it considers necessary or advisable in the public 
interest” (Part 2, Section 22). Under Parts II to IV of 
the act, the board was given the responsibility to issue 
certificates governing the construction and operation 
of oil and gas pipelines under federal jurisdiction and 
the power to issue orders “with respect to all matters 
relating to traffic, tolls or tariffs” (Part IV, Section 50). 
While Part VI, Section 81, required licences for the 
export or import of natural gas, Section 87 allowed 
that the Governor in Council could extend this 
requirement to oil. This was not done in the 1960s.
The Second Report of the Borden Commission 
(Borden, 1959) dealt entirely with problems of the 
Canadian oil industry, particularly those related to 
the desire for expanded markets. (The discussion that 
follows is based largely on Bradley and Watkins, 1982.) 
In 1958, the Canadian oil market and pricing structure 
appeared to be in equilibrium. Canadian markets were 
supplied by three main sources – western Canada, 
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Venezuela, and the Persian Gulf. The Atlantic prov-
inces and Quebec drew from the latter two sources, 
B.C. and the prairies from the former. Ontario used 
largely western Canada crude plus some from Vene-
zuela and a significant volume of refined products 
from Montreal. Flows of U.S. crude into Ontario 
had become negligible. Alberta oil prices, in 1958, 
made Canadian-produced crude just competitive 
with U.S.-produced crude in the mid-continent 
northern states (e.g., Minnesota) but were not so 
high as to attract large volumes of foreign crude into 
the Toronto/Sarnia markets, nor so low as to make 
Alberta oil competitive with foreign crudes in Mont-
real. As was summarized in Chapter Six, a report pre-
pared by a U.S. petroleum consulting firm, Walter J. 
Levy, Inc., for a group of oil companies for submission 
to the Borden Commission, estimated that Alberta oil 
delivered to Montreal would cost $0.12/bbl more than 
Venezuelan crude (Levy, 1958, p. II-18).
This possibility of extending deliveries of 
Canadian-produced crude oil to the Montreal market 
was the most widely discussed option in submissions 
made to the Borden Commission. It was advocated 
with particular force by many of the western Canadian 
‘independents,’ crude oil producers without any 
ownership (either directly, or indirectly through some 
parent corporation) in refinery operations, and gen-
erally without any large crude oil production outside 
Canada, and certainly not outside North America. It 
was recognized, as the Levy analysis demonstrated, 
that Canadian crude was not competitive in Montreal. 
Levy (1958, p. viii) had concluded that “to establish 
Canadian crude at Montreal would therefore not only 
require the efforts of the Canadian oil industry to 
achieve competitive equality with foreign crudes. It 
would probably further require an explicit formula-
tion of public policy in support of Canadian markets 
for Canadian oil.” In essence, it was argued that it 
was desirable to attach western Canadian crude to 
the Montreal market, but not to reduce the price of 
Canadian-produced oil. This would require a formal 
public policy, such as direct subsidies to Montreal 
refineries purchasing Canadian crude, voluntary or 
mandatory oil import quotas and/or oil import tar-
iffs. It was also suggested that pricing practices might 
be implemented that cross-subsidized Canadian oil 
moving into the Montreal market. For example, the 
pipeline tariff on oil moving from Alberta to Montreal 
could be held at the level that made the Alberta oil 
competitive with foreign crude, and the tariff on other 
oil shipments (e.g., ‘short-haul’ crude) increased to 
recover the full cost of the Montreal line. Alternatively, 
price discrimination might be practised on crude oil 
itself, with a lower field price for sales in Montreal; 
this would raise formidable administrative problems, 
however, to ensure that the less-profitable crude oil 
sales were fairly allocated across all provinces. Most 
proponents of a Toronto–Montreal pipeline extension 
argued that such government intervention would 
be an enlightened move toward Canadian energy 
self-sufficiency and greater national security.
An alternative strategy was recommended by 
the majors (e.g., Imperial Oil Ltd., 1958). Under this 
proposal, the Ontario market would be reserved for 
Canadian crude oil (backing out some imported oil, 
mainly, as noted above, refined petroleum products 
shipped from Montreal). In addition, crude oil exports 
to the United States would be increased. The latter, as 
the majors recognized and critics emphasized, would 
require some special recognition of Canadian crude 
under the recent U.S. Oil Import Quota Program 
(USOIQP).
In July 1959 the Borden Commission’s Second 
Report appeared, recommending, at least as a first 
strategy, the proposals of the major oil companies. The 
Report included a detailed review of the development 
of the Canadian oil industry up to 1959, and summar-
ized the major arguments about a Montreal pipeline. 
The Commission noted excess oil-producing capacity 
and concluded “[h]aving regard to the trends in the 
discovery and growth of reserves in Canada, future 
Canadian requirements will not be jeopardized, in 
our opinion, if exports of crude oil are permitted and 
encouraged. Consequently, we do not feel that such 
licensing of exports by pipe line as has heretofore pre-
vailed need now be continued” (Borden, 1959, p. 125).
Both the appeal of and the problems with 
extending Canadian crude oil pipelines into Montreal 
to secure a larger Canadian market were thoroughly 
discussed, along with methods to achieve such an 
objective. For example, (Borden, 1959, p. 130):
In our opinion a customs duty … would, in 
itself, be of doubtful value in securing the con-
struction of the pipeline facilities. The vendors 
of the foreign crude oil to the Montreal refiners 
might well be prepared to make, either directly 
or indirectly, substantial reductions in posted 
prices in order to preserve the Montreal refin-
ery area. … Furthermore, the imposition of 
a nation-wide customs duty might have the 
effect of raising, unnecessarily in our view, 
the internal cost of a vital source of energy to 
Canadian consumers.
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The Commission also considered the suggestion 
“that a county conserves its resources of crude oil by 
importing foreign crude …,” but went on to remark 
that (Borden, 1959, pp. 130–31):
… the effect of such imports of foreign crude 
on exploration for and development of Can-
ada’s resources must be considered. The pri-
mary ability to make expenditures for explor-
ation and development comes from the actual 
and anticipated revenues from production. If 
expenditures on exploration and development 
are not incurred, the oil reserves may neither 
be discovered nor developed and therefore 
would not be readily available for future use. …
A healthy, strong and vigorous Canadian 
oil industry is clearly essential not only from 
the point of view of its importance to the 
Canadian economy but because this country 
should have ample supplies available to enable 
it, if necessary, to meet its own requirements 
as well as to supplement those of other coun-
tries which, during an emergency, might be 
dependent upon North American sources of 
supply.
The existence of high excess capacity undermined 
continued active exploration and development, so 
that the “problem is how best to increase the level 
of production of the oil industry in Canada to the 
point where such production will sustain a strong and 
healthy industry without adversely affecting the cost 
of energy to the Canadian consumer” (Borden, 1959, 
p. 133). Moreover, (p. 136):
Conditions of uncertainty and over-
production in the world oil industry are 
likely to continue for some years and world 
oil prices may decline further. If they do and 
the reduction is substantial and is reflected 
in lower well-head prices for Canadian crude 
oil, the results would be very serious for the 
Canadian industry.
The conclusion was (p. 138):
… that if there were an effective national 
policy ensuring the use of Canadian crude in 
domestic markets, now accessible by pipeline, 
and encouraging the use in those markets of 
products refined from Canadian crude, and 
if Canada were successful in the immediate 
future in substantially increasing its exports of 
crude oil to the United States, the production 
of Canadian crude could be maintained at a 
level adequate to sustain a strong industry and 
to provide the incentive for further exploration 
and development.
We have in mind a target level of produc-
tion by the end of 1960 approximating 700,000 
barrels per day.
Increased Canadian oil output, from the 1958 level 
of about 460,000 b/d, would, therefore, come from 
both displacement of crude imports and Montreal-
refined products in Ontario and increased exports. 
The Commission noted that a procedure of import 
licensing might be needed to achieve this end and that 
“[t]his system of licensing would lay the foundation 
for the building of pipeline facilities to transplant 
Canadian crude to Montreal, if and when it becomes 
necessary and desirable that they should be built” 
(Borden, 1959, p. 141).
The government’s receipt of the Borden Second 
Report was followed by declines in the international 
price of oil later that year, and again in 1960, thereby 
raising even further the cost of adding a protected 
Montreal market for Canadian crude producers.
3. The National Oil Policy
On February 1, 1961, Hon. George Hees, the federal 
Minister of Trade and Commerce, announced the 
National Oil Policy, basically ratifying the Borden 
Report recommendations. Adoption of the policy by 
producers and refiners was voluntary, though the min-
ister reminded industry that the government could 
always introduce compulsory regulations under Sec-
tion 87 of the NEB Act which gave the NEB the power 
to require authorization (licences) for imported and/
or exported oil (crude and products). The government 
set a production target level of 640,000 b/d in 1961, 
rising to 800,000 b/d by 1963, and noted that:
These targets are to be reached by increased 
use of Canadian oil in domestic markets west 
of the Ottawa valley, and by some expansion of 
export sales largely in existing markets which 
can be reached through established pipelines.
The growth in domestic use is predicated 
in particular on substituting in Ontario mar-
kets west of the Ottawa valley products refined 
from Canadian crude for those now supplied 
by foreign crude. …
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The increase in exports which is integral to 
the government’s program is wholly consistent 
with the growth of sales of Canadian oil 
contemplated when exemption from United 
States oil import controls was established, 
under which Canadian oil is relatively free to 
move into the United States by overland means 
of transportation. (Debates of the House of 
Commons, 9–10 Elizabeth II, Vol. II, 1960–61, 
pp. 1641–42).
The NOP was monitored by the NEB. The 1961 to 1963 
production targets were successfully met. A target of 
850,000 b/d was set for 1964 and surpassed. No fur-
ther output goals were set, but production continued 
to rise. The NOP continued until 1973, on a voluntary 
basis with one exception. Rising movements of motor 
gasoline across the NOP line induced the NEB, in 1970, 
to institute licensing of motor gasoline imports into 
Canada. Bertrand (1981, p. 42) shows imports and 
transfers of motor gasoline by independent refineries 
and distributors rising from 1,938 b/d in 1964 to 10,482 
in 1970. These figures exclude Gulf, Imperial, Shell, 
Texaco, and B.P.
4. The U.S. Oil Import Quota Program (USOIQP)
The success of the NOP depended upon the ability 
of Canadian crude producers to increase exports to 
the United States, which hinged on the treatment of 
Canadian oil under the USOIQP. Complete descrip-
tions of the genesis and impact of the USOIQP can be 
found elsewhere (e.g., Shaffer, 1968; Adelman, 1972; 
U.S. Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, 1970; 
Watkins, 1987a). We shall summarize the main provi-
sions as they applied to Canada.
Prior to 1942, crude oil and refined petroleum 
product prices in international trade were generally 
based on U.S. Gulf Coast prices, but after that Middle 
Eastern oil began to become relatively less expensive. 
By the early 1950s, significant volumes of crude from 
the Persian Gulf were beginning to move into the 
United States, much to the alarm of domestic U.S. oil 
producers. Concern about declining markets and/
or prices was often clothed in expressions of concern 
about U.S. national security. The U.S. government 
worked with the major oil companies in the mid-1950s 
to introduce voluntary oil import limits, but without 
complete success. (Bradley and Watkins, 1982, pp. 
78–80, provide an overview of the voluntary program 
and point out that U.S. oil imports rose from 8 per 
cent of U.S. demand in 1950 to 12 per cent by 1956. 
Also see Adelman, 1972.)
On March 10, 1959, mandatory limitations on 
crude oil imports were imposed by presidential 
decree, ostensibly for national security reasons under 
the Trade Agreement Extension Act (Proclamation 
#3379, 24 F.R. 1781). National security was a legitim-
ate cause for protectionist acts under the multilateral 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). The 
scheme was complex and became increasingly so. The 
broad outlines will be sketched here.
It is important to recall that the combination of the 
USOIQP and market-demand prorationing in the main 
U.S. producing states, especially Texas, held domes-
tic U.S. oil prices above international prices from 
1957 through 1972. With falling international prices 
from 1959 through 1970, the discrepancy widened, 
from perhaps $0.30 (US) per barrel in the late 1950s 
to $1.50/b by the end of the 1960s (Adelman, 1972). 
Refined petroleum product prices (and crude oil 
values) were based on the higher U.S. prices, so that 
anyone allowed to import cheap international crude 
oil automatically derived an extra profit. Expressed 
in other terms, the quota limitation prevented inter-
national oil supplies from driving U.S. prices down 
to the international level and meant a windfall gain 
to those refiners who were allowed to buy inter-
national oil.
How, then, were the quota volumes determined, 
and who was allowed to buy cheap international oil? 
Under the USOIQP, the United States was divided into 
two market areas, with different quota regimes. PAD 
(Petroleum Administration District) V consisted of 
the West Coast states, and imports were allowed to fill 
the gap between District V consumption and District 
V production (presumably at prevailing U.S. crude 
oil prices). The rest of the continental United States 
comprised PADs I to IV; here imports equal to 9.6 
per cent of consumption (“demand”) were allowed, a 
value that was changed in November 1962 to 12.2 per 
cent of PAD I to IV production. The right to purchase 
imported oil was given to individual refiners in PAD 
I to IV. All U.S. refineries received such allocations 
whether they imported oil or not, but particularly 
large allocations were given to “historical” importers; 
these were refineries that had been importing oil for a 
number of years and had been recognized under the 
earlier voluntary oil import controls. Higher refinery 
throughput generally meant the right to import more 
oil, or as it was called, a higher import “ticket.” What, 
then, happened to tickets awarded to refiners that did 
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not have a need to use them? The tickets could not be 
sold directly, so what value would the right to import 
oil have to a refiner in Montana or Minnesota with no 
direct access to cheap Venezuelan or Middle Eastern 
oil? Value was assured since the import tickets could 
be traded for domestic U.S. crude oil. For example, 
suppose that the price of U.S. crude oil was $3.00/b 
and Middle East oil were available delivered to the 
East Coast for $2.00/b. Then Refiner A in Minnesota 
could trade the ticket for one barrel of oil imports to 
Refiner B in Philadelphia in return for 1/3 of a barrel 
of domestic crude. The ticket therefore has a value 
of $1.00 (1/3 times $3.00). Refiner A could now pur-
chase an additional 2/3 of a barrel of domestic crude, 
thereby receiving a full barrel for an expenditure of 
$2.00. Refiner B could import one more barrel of 
foreign oil for $2.00, and a total cost of $3.00 includ-
ing the cost of the ticket bought from Refiner A. In 
this way, the benefits of importing low-cost foreign oil 
could be shared by all refiners, while the actual inflows 
of foreign oil would be to the most economic markets 
(farthest from domestic U.S. production and on the 
east coast).
Now, consider the position of Canadian oil under 
the USOIQP. The U.S. Cabinet Special Committee, 
which recommended mandatory oil import controls, 
did not advocate preferential treatment for Canada but 
did recommend special allocations for refiners unable 
to obtain sufficient domestic oil. Preferential treatment 
for Canadian oil in the Midwest was thus implied. The 
original presidential proclamation of March 10, 1959, 
applied to all U.S. oil imports. If Canadian oil were 
treated like all other imported oil, it would appear 
attractive to U.S. refiners only if priced competitively 
with other foreign crudes, allowance being made, 
of course, for location and quality differentials. (To 
continue the example of the previous paragraph, why 
would Refiner A in Minnesota use its crude oil import 
ticket to buy Canadian oil at $2.60/b when its ticket 
plus $2.00 would give it a barrel of domestic oil?) 
Special treatment of Canadian oil in U.S. markets was, 
therefore, essential to the strategy advocated by the 
majors, the Borden Second Report and the NOP.
On April 30, 1959, a presidential proclamation 
excluded overland imports from Canada and Mexico 
from the maximum allowable imports into the United 
States, except if the overall level of imports increased 
to an extent to seriously affect the intent of the 
USOIQP (Proclamation #3290 [24 F.R. 3527]).
The reasons for the change in Canadian status 
were not given, but two plausible ones come to mind. 
First, under the national security rationale, Canada 
qualified as a safe and secure source of supply. At the 
same time, it did not pose a great threat to domestic 
production because Canadian oil was not competitive 
beyond the northern border region. Second, the possi-
bility remained of Canada extending the Interprov-
incial Pipe Line to Montreal to displace Venezuelan 
imports in the Montreal market, which would have 
had serious repercussions for Venezuela. Canada was 
its second largest customer (16 per cent of Venezuelan 
crude oil exports went to Canada) (Shaffer, 1968, 
p. 122). The significance of such a threat to the political 
and economic stability of Venezuela would not have 
escaped the notice of the U.S. State Department. The 
treatment of Venezuela under the import program had 
always been a sensitive issue. In the original import 
control proclamation, reference was made to special 
hemispheric interests involving Canada and Vene-
zuela; it was intended that such interests be accom-
modated in the program. When exempt Canadian 
supplies displaced Venezuelan exports to the United 
States, Venezuela lobbied about what it saw as unequal 
treatment.
Exemption from mandatory quotas made 
Canadian oil more acceptable, but an offsetting aspect 
was an implicit penalty imposed on U.S. refiners using 
Canadian crude. Any refiner with access to Canadian 
crude could import it without a licence, but exempt 
imported crude did not count as refinery input in 
assigning import quotas. Only offshore and domestic 
crude qualified for this purpose. Consequently, the 
loss of import tickets from using Canadian crude 
constituted a clandestine tariff on it. This penalty 
on Canadian oil ensured that prices for Canadian 
crude oil remained below U.S. prices (as Chapter 
Six showed). However, the exemption from the U.S. 
import quota meant that the Canadian price could 
exceed the international price. Canadian oil thus had 
unique status in the U.S. market, neither like other 
imported oil nor equivalent to domestic U.S. produc-
tion. Refiners with access to Canadian oil faced no 
explicit limits on their purchases, but, because pur-
chase of Canadian oil reduced their import tickets, 
they were not willing to pay the full U.S. domestic 
price.
In November 1962, there were several changes 
to the USOIQP that affected Canada (Proclamation 
#3509, 27 F.R. 11985). One was a more rapid reduc-
tion of historical quotas for those refineries using 
Canadian crude oil. These refineries used their 
quotas to send foreign crude oil to coastal refineries 
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in exchange for domestic crude, mainly from North 
and South Dakota and Montana, leaving Canada very 
much a residual supplier of crude oil at such refineries 
(Shaffer, 1968, p. 160). The more rapid phasing out of 
historical quotas lowered an important entry barrier 
to Canadian oil. However, a 1968 decision to set a 
floor for historical allocations effectively guaranteed a 
minimum market for United States domestic crude at 
these refineries via the quota exchange route.
Another change that had a direct effect on Canada 
was the change in November 1962, noted above, in the 
basis of setting the overall level of imports for Districts 
I–IV. The maximum level of imports for any six-
month period was changed to 12.2 per cent of U.S. oil 
production (‘supply’) from 9.6 per cent of U.S. oil con-
sumption (‘demand’). The permitted level of overseas 
imports was established by deducting the estimated 
volume of overland imports from total authorized 
imports. This established a definite, though theor-
etical, upper limit on Canadian and Mexican imports. 
More important was the way additional Canadian 
imports directly displaced offshore imports, raising 
concern that the curtailment in overseas supply would 
reduce the supply of crude oil that might otherwise 
end up in the hands of independent refiners and deal-
ers competing in eastern seaboard markets. Regardless 
of the merits of this argument, it was significant that 
Canadian oil was perceived as a threat in certain areas.
The combination of the imports of Middle East 
oil into eastern Canada and shipment of western 
Canadian crude to the United States was also seen by 
some in the United States as a rather costly way of cir-
cumventing the import program, especially before the 
1962 inclusion of ‘exempt’ Canadian oil in the overall 
import umbrella. The argument was that imports of 
low-cost Middle East oil into eastern Canada released 
western Canadian oil to be sold at higher prices in the 
United States market. According to this view, there 
was still no improvement in security of oil supplies 
to the hemisphere and, in effect, Canada had served 
as a conduit for offshore oil to enter the United States 
market but at the higher Canadian price. Eastern 
Canadian consumers benefited at no cost to Canadian 
oil producers. The United States government made it 
clear that it did not approve of Canada increasing its 
oil exports to the United States by importing more 
foreign crude into Canada. Protection of Canadian 
markets under the National Oil Policy helped assuage 
these concerns, since markets west of the Ottawa 
River Valley would be served by Canadian oil despite 
the appeal of sales in the United States.
During the 1960s the Canadian and United States 
governments were frequently in contact about exports 
of Canadian oil to the United States. In 1967, the dis-
cussions culminated in an initially secret agreement, 
before the Interprovincial Pipe Line was extended 
to Chicago. This agreement sought to allay United 
States concerns by limiting the growth of Canadian 
crude oil exports. Canadian crude oil exports were 
apparently still seen as menacing the goals of the U.S. 
program in 1970, because in March of that year the 
first mandatory ceiling on Canadian crude imports to 
the United States was imposed (Proclamation #3969 
[35 F.R. 4321]).
By 1973, rising demand in the United States for 
crude oil could no longer be met under the quota 
system and in April of that year the mandatory system 
of oil import quotas was abolished (Proclamation 
#4210 [38 F.R. 4645]). It was replaced by a system 
of licence fees for oil imports. The licence fee was a 
continuation, at a slightly higher level, of the duty on 
imported oil that had been in effect during the volun-
tary and mandatory oil import programs. (The tariff 
on crude rose from 12.5 cents per barrel to 21 cents.) 
For the remainder of 1973, exemption from licence 
fees was granted to certain volumes of Canadian oil 
imports; the degree of exemption was to decline annu-
ally. But these provisions became irrelevant after 1973 
as Canada itself increasingly restricted exports of oil 
to the United States, as the NOP was abandoned.
From this discussion of the terms of access for 
Canadian oil under the USOIQP, two points should 
be clear. First, Canadian oil occupied a special pos-
ition. Second, although Canadian oil was given spe-
cial treatment, its penetration into U.S. markets was 
constrained in various ways. The reason for special 
treatment was simple. The legal justification for the 
USOIQP was security of supply, and Canadian oil 
transported overland to the United States was seen 
as more secure than overseas oil. Hence the decision 
to exempt Canadian oil from the formal quota pro-
visions. But Canadian oil never enjoyed unrestricted 
access to U.S. markets. As we have seen, various 
impediments emerged: hidden tariffs, quota exchange 
provisions, secret agreements, intergovernmental 
discussions, and the like. Nevertheless, some lobbies 
in the United States remained wary of the exempt 
status accorded to Canadian oil, in view of the fact 
that world oil had free access to eastern Canada. Over 
time, the security of supply objective of the USOIQP 
tended to be neglected and protection per se became 
the paramount issue.
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B. Economic Analysis of the NOP
Initially we shall discuss the effects of the NOP, in 
‘positive’ or descriptive terms; then we shall look at 
its economic efficiency (i.e., from an evaluative or 
‘normative’ point of view).
1. Effects of the NOP
Analysts sometimes fail to remark on the often dif-
ficult first step in describing the impact of a govern-
ment policy – determining what would have occurred 
in its absence. It is hard enough to know what has 
actually happened in the world, without speculating 
on hypothetical worlds, which, one assumes, have 
their own virtual reality. In the present instance, the 
NOP lasted for over a decade (1961–72) in an evolv-
ing world oil market with active policy-makers in 
addition to the Canadian federal government (most 
significantly, the U.S. government with its USOIQP). 
No one can know exactly how the Canadian crude oil 
industry, Canadian and U.S. oil refiners, the Alberta 
government and Oil and Gas Conservation Board 
(OGCB) and the U.S. government would have behaved 
in the absence of the NOP. But the following seems, to 
us, a plausible scenario.
First, the market-demand prorationing regulations 
of the OGCB would have continued to operate to hold 
excess Alberta crude oil production capacity off the 
market, thereby putting primary responsibility for 
determining the price and output of Alberta crude oil 
on the purchasing refiners. Second, given the IPL con-
nection from Alberta to Toronto, refiners would estab-
lish the posted price for Alberta crude oil at a level just 
competitive with imported crude oil and refined pet-
roleum products in Toronto. This would have implied 
declining crude oil prices in the 1960s as international 
prices fell. Third, especially with Canadian oil priced 
at the international level, U.S. refiners would increase 
their imports of Canadian oil. However, it is not at 
all clear that the level of exports to the United States 
would have risen beyond that actually observed; the 
USOIQP was, after all, designed to limit oil imports to 
protect the domestic industry, and international pol-
itical concerns of the U.S. State Department imposed 
limits on the willingness of the United States to see 
Canadian oil back Venezuelan and Middle Eastern 
oil out of the U.S. market. Moreover, at lower prices, 
the U.S. market would have appeared less attractive 
to Canadian oil producers. And remember that the 
NOP itself set out explicitly to encourage increased oil 
exports to the United States, something that was not 
occurring automatically. Also, the lower prices would 
make incremental investment in Canadian crude oil 
exploration and development less appealing.
Figure 9.1 provides an initial and oversimplified 
comparative static picture of the impact of the NOP. 
Presumably there was no impact in Canada east of the 
Ottawa River Valley (EORV). Consumers imported 
foreign oil at the international oil price under the 
NOP, just as they would have without the NOP. We 
shall not go into the argument that the major inter-
national oil companies EORV used their market power 
in refining to pay more than the prevailing oil price 
to their international crude-oil-producing affiliates, 
thereby overcharging Canadian consumers. Bertrand 
(1981) argues this forcefully, but the Restrictive Trade 
Practices Commission (1984) was not convinced, and 
Bernard and Weiner (1992) provide strong contrary 
evidence. (See also Bradley and Watkins, 1982.)
Figure 9.1 shows the Canadian crude oil market 
west of the Ottawa River Valley (WORV) in terms of 
simple supply/demand relationships that abstract 
entirely from market-demand prorationing. PI is the 
international price, and PU that in the United States. 
DC and S show the demand for oil by Canadians 
WORV and the supply of Canadian-produced crude 
oil. It is assumed that U.S. refiners would find 
Canadian oil attractive as soon as the price is far 
enough below PU but that a maximum of XY( = DU) 
barrels of Canadian crude oil would be accepted. The 
total demand for Canadian oil, then is DT (= DC + DU). 


















Figure 9.1 Canadian Oil WORV under the NOP
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would keep refiners from buying any until the price 
was P* or less. Figure 9.1 shows that without the NOP 
the Canadian crude oil market WORV would have 
been in equilibrium at point G; Canadian oil would 
sell at the international price (PI) and total oil produc-
tion (OC) would be divided between domestic sales 
(OB) and exports (BC). Under the NOP, the Canadian 
oil price rose to level PC (less than or equal to P*), with 
total output of OD divided between domestic (OA) 
and U.S. (AD = XY = DU) consumption.
The NOP was viewed as beneficial by domes-
tic crude oil producers but imposed costs on some 
domestic oil consumers. Figure 9.1 can be used to 
illustrate these effects. Consumers (WORV) under the 
NOP pay a higher price for oil (PC > PI) and purchase 
less (OA < OB). Total payments for crude oil change 
from OBFPI to OAJPC, which will involve an increase 
so long as the demand for crude oil is inelastic (i.e., 
the absolute value of the elasticity of demand is less 
than 1, as is certainly true in the short-run, and prob-
ably also in the long run). Under the NOP, producers 
increase sales of oil from OC to OD, and receive a 
higher price (PC > PI). Total receipts rise from OCGPI 
to ODMPC. U.S. consumers receive more oil (AD > 
BC), but pay more for it (PC > PI), while still paying 
less than for domestic U.S. oil (PC < PU).
The total increase in payments to Canadian 
producers, as represented by areas PIHMPC plus 
CDHG can be separated into a number of different 
components:
(i) CDMG is the increased cost of production 
of the incremental oil output, including the 
various tax and royalty payments made to 
governments by the crude oil producers, and 
the user cost of lifting the crude;
(ii) PIEJPC is the increase in payments by Canadian 
consumers to producers on the oil they buy at 
the higher price;
(iii) EFJ is a loss of consumers’ surplus due to 
reduced purchases of oil by Canadians as the 
price rises (various other measures of consum-
ers’ surplus are possible, see Willig, 1976);
(iv) the remaining area FGMJ is part of the 
increased payments by U.S. oil consumers 
for their oil imports, including the higher 
payments on the oil they would themselves 
buy at PI (i.e., area FGLK); U.S. consumers also 
pay for the lost value of oil purchases given 
up by Canadian consumers (area AJFB) and 
the cost of the increased Canadian production 
(CDMG).
The main weakness in Figure 9.1 is its failure to allow 
for the existence of large excess producing capacity  
for Alberta crude oil, and the operation of market- 
demand prorationing. In effect, there was not a con-
ventional well-defined supply curve for Alberta crude 
oil. Thus, for example, without the NOP, Canada could 
easily have supplied the full complement of feasible 
exports to the United States (i.e., XY = AD). Had this 
occurred, the impact of the NOP would have been to 
increase Canadian receipts on this oil, but not neces-
sarily to increase the volume of sales. (This implies 
that some other force, but a temporary one, was limit-
ing expanded oil sales to the United States up to 1961. 
The obvious candidate is uncertainty about whether 
Canadian oil policy would force a Montreal pipeline 
extension. Until that issue was resolved, pipeline com-
panies and Canadian producers might well be unwill-
ing to expand sales in the United States.)
One might also speculate on the investment 
impact of a price rise, if there is significant excess cap-
acity. Why add new reserves when unused productive 
capacity is available? Investment stimuli under pror-
ationing will be discussed again in Chapter Ten, but 
it was certainly a promise of Borden, governments, 
and the industry that the NOP would serve as a posi-
tive stimulus to exploration and development. If it 
encouraged more output, then any new reserves found 
were going to be needed sooner. And if the price were 
higher as well, this was only more inducement to 
increase investment. It is also important to realize that 
the market-demand prorationing regulations ensured 
a market for any newly added reserves, so that, all else 
being equal, a higher price made investment more 
profitable, and the producer did not have to wait 
until excess capacity disappeared before beginning 
to realize those profits. However, while there was, 
under market-demand prorationing, an upward slop-
ing supply relationship for additions to reserves, this 
cannot be translated into a conventional rising mar-
ginal cost curve for crude oil production, as Figure 9.1 
might initially be interpreted.
How large were the price effects of the NOP? They 
most certainly varied over time, since international 
oil prices declined after 1960, and then rose again in 
the early 1970s. The precise values would, of course, 
differ for various grades of crude oil. Table 9.1 pre-
sents approximate values using exports from the 
Niagara Peninsula as the interface market. Values 
are only approximate for several reasons, including 
the difficulty in obtaining completely reliable data 
on international crude oil prices at a time when dis-
counts were common and the lack of accurate data on 
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international tanker rates; the need to estimate costs 
for hypothetical pipeline routes; and the somewhat 
arbitrary nature of quality differentials. For Canadian 
and U.S. crude oil, posted field prices have been used. 
The international oil prices are drawn largely from 
Adelman’s estimate of third-party arms-length prices 
and reflect such factors as the disruption to oil values 
during the 1967/68 Arab–Israeli war. All prices have 
been translated into Canadian dollars per barrel of 
36° crude oil, using the year-end exchange rate. U.S. 
prices were always at least $1.00/b above international 
prices, and as much as $1.80 higher. U.S. prices also 
exceeded Canadian prices, by as much as $0.57/b, 
though usually by $0.25/b to $0.30/b. As can be seen, 
Canadian prices were significantly higher than inter-
national prices, by amounts ranging roughly between 
$0.80 and $1.45 per barrel. These differences may 
overstate the price effect of the NOP slightly, since they 
are based on the $0.11/b shipment cost reported by 
Bertrand (1981, vol. II, p. 38) for the Portland (Maine) 
to Montreal pipeline link; a hypothetical east coast to 
Toronto line for international crude would, presum-
ably, have a cost higher than this.
In conclusion, it is fair to say that, for most of the 
NOP years, Canadian crude oil prices were $1.00/b, 
or more, higher than international prices and about 
$0.30/b below the U.S. level.
2. Normative Analysis of the NOP
Evaluation of whether or not the NOP was a desir-
able policy requires criteria about what generates the 
‘public good.’ Initially we shall use the criterion of 
microeconomic economic efficiency, considering only 
the immediate effects in crude oil markets. We shall 
then offer some thoughts on other possible criteria for 
evaluating public policy, including equity concerns 
and possible externalities related to the level of macro-
economic activity and to national security.
It is sometimes not emphasized that normative 
evaluation of public policies necessitates careful 
Table 9.1: Crude Oil Costs under the NOP (36° API Crude to Detroit/Toledo Canadian $/b)
 Canadian Crude (C) US Mid-Continent Persian Gulf Crude (PG)  Differentials
  
Crude (US)
  US-PG US-C C-PG
1961 3.31 3.57 2.46 1.11 0.26 0.85
1962 3.41 3.70 2.55 1.15 0.29 0.86
1963 3.41 3.70 2.60 1.10 0.29 0.81
1964 3.41 3.65 2.26 1.39 0.24 1.15
1965 3.41 3.64 2.11 1.53 0.23 1.30
1966 3.41 3.71 2.19 1.52 0.30 1.22
1967 3.41 3.76 2.13 1.63 0.35 1.28
1968 3.41 3.84 2.74 1.10 0.43 0.67
1969 3.41 3.98 2.16 1.82 0.57 1.25
1970 3.71 3.92 2.25 1.67 0.21 1.46
1971 3.71 4.01 2.40 1.61 0.30 1.31
1972 3.71 3.93 2.54 1.39 0.22 1.17
Notes and Sources: Canadian Crude: Redwater 35° crude as reported in Watkins (1987a), plus $0.02 quality adjustment plus $0.77/b shipment cost as implied in 
Watkins (1987a, p. 48).
U.S. Mid-Continent Crude: Field price as reported in Degolyer and MacNaughton plus estimated pipeline tariff of US$0.45/b.  Watkins (1987a, p. 48) reports delivered 
costs	in	Detroit	of	Wyoming	sour	crude	(with	which	mid-Continent	U.S.	crude	would	have	to	be	competitive);	these	costs	exceeded	mid-Continent	field	prices	by	$0.53/b	
in 1965, $0.45 in 1967 and $0.50 in 1969. The year-end Canadian–U.S. exchange rate was used.
Persian Gulf Crude:	Saudi	Arabia	34°	prices	f.o.b.	the	Persian	Gulf	as	reported	in	Adelman	(1972,	pp.	183,190)	and	Griffin	and	Steele	(1986,	p.	18)	plus	Canadian	
$0.04/b quality adjustment plus a shipment cost to the North American east coast, which falls from US$0.78/b in 1961 to US$0.57/b from 1966 on. These are based on 
costs from W. Newton reported in Watkins and Bradley (1982, p. 115) of $0.88/b in 1959, $0.68/b in 1963 and $0.57/b in 1968. An additional Canadian $0.11/b was 
added for shipment costs from the East Coast; this was the Portland, Maine, to Montreal tariff (as reported in Bertrand, 1981, vol. II, p. 38). The end of year U.S.–Canadian 
exchange rate is used.
236 PETROPOLIT ICS
definition of a reference population. What appears 
a desirable policy from the viewpoint of Calgary’s 
citizens might or might not so appear for the entire 
province of Alberta or for all of Canada. Careful speci-
fication of the reference group is, perhaps, particularly 
critical for the objective of economic efficiency, since 
it is usually assumed that the impacts of a policy are 
important only insofar as particular individuals dir-
ectly feel them; that is, no allowance is made for feel-
ings of empathy or altruism that people may possess. 
(The objective of ‘fairness’ or ‘equity’ may presume 
widespread empathic sentiments.) In our evaluation of 
the NOP, which was a federal government policy, we 
assume that all of Canada serves as the referent, not 
just Alberta.
a.  Economic Efficiency of Crude Oil Markets
(i) Case 1. Figure 9.1 provides a starting point for our 
analysis. The economic efficiency of the NOP can be 
measured by the sum of all gains the policy generated 
for Canadians less the sum of all costs, or the ‘net 
social benefits’ (NSB), which may be either positive 
or negative. Initially we will work on what might be 
called a ‘domestic’ basis, evaluating benefits and costs 
as they occur within Canadian borders. The com-
parison involves the NOP in contrast to a non-NOP 
world where the external environment is ‘constant,’ 
that is, as it actually occurred. Hence, international 
oil prices are accepted as defining the value of oil in 
Canada, and the USOIQP is taken to exist, with its 
willingness to accord special treatment to Canadian 
oil, as part of ‘secure’ North American supplies. In 
Figure 9.1, exports to the United States without the 
NOP are shown as equal to the gap, at the world oil 
price, between western Canadian production and 
consumption. It is assumed that, for security of supply 
reasons, the United States would be more willing to 
absorb Canadian oil than any other international oil at 
the world price, so Canada would still obtain special 
treatment under the USOIQP. This assumption is ques-
tionable, as we do not know how Canadian oil might 
have been regarded had Canada not introduced the 
NOP. Had Canada not been exempt from the USOIQP, 
the volume of exports without the NOP might well 
have been lower than suggested in Figure 9.1.
Some of the effects of the NOP, as presented in 
Figure 9.1, cancel one another out. For example, area 
PIEJPC is a cost to Canadian oil consumers of higher 
prices due to the NOP, but it is received by Canadian 
oil producers as a benefit. Three specific effects in 
Figure 9.1 should be considered as possible compon-
ents in the Net Social Benefit. First, area EFJ is a loss 
of consumers’ surplus by oil consumers on the oil they 
would purchase at the lower price, but do not buy at 
the higher. (Recall that a demand curve can be inter-
preted as a marginal willingness to pay curve.) This 
is an example of what economists often call a ‘dead-
weight loss.’ Second, some oil is produced in Canada 
at marginal costs in excess of what it would cost to 
buy the oil in the international market, as measured 
by area GHM. Note, however, that some of the addi-
tional cost will represent payment to governments, 
which oil companies see as a cost, but taxpayers as a 
benefit. In addition, it should be noted that, in this 
case, the incremental output and reduced consump-
tion under the NOP go as increased exports to the 
United States. This may overstate export levels under 
the NOP. The United States would certainly not have 
allowed Canada to import offshore crude for re-ex-
port to the United States, but it also kept a close eye 
on imports of Canadian-produced oil. At the same 
time, the reduced export level indicated without the 
NOP, at the lower international price, also may be 
overstated, as it assumes that the United States would 
have been willing to accept all this Canadian oil under 
the USOIQP. That is, another possible benefit of the 
NOP may have been its effect in persuading the United 
States to exempt Canadian oil from the USOIQP. 
Finally, Canada received incremental revenue as a 
result of exports to the United States that occur at 
price PC under the NOP, instead of PI. The extra rev-
enue is given by the volume of exports (XY = AD) 
times the price rise (PC – PI), and is received by the 
producers. It can be seen that the extra export revenue 
(area EHMJ) covers both loss of consumers’ surplus 
(EFJ) and the incremental Canadian oil production 
cost (GHM). This leaves a net gain as a result of the 
NOP, equal to area FGMJ. From this view, Canada as 
a whole benefited from the NOP because it allowed 
us to move an expanded volume of exports into the 
higher priced U.S. market, therefore capturing for 
Canada some of the protectionist producer bene-
fits of the USOIQP. These benefits were captured by 
Canadian oil-producing interests (i.e., oil companies 
and shareholders and government taxes on the oil 
industry). However Canadian oil consumers (WORV) 
paid higher prices for crude as a result of the NOP, so 
suffered a cost.
(ii) Case 2. Other assumptions would generate dif-
ferent conclusions about what developments in 
Canadian oil policies would have been if the NOP had 
not been adopted. Suppose, for instance, that prices 
for Canadian-produced oil fell to the international 
level (PI), that Alberta market-demand prorationing 
regulations were relaxed to allow growth of exports 
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to the United States to the maximum level authorities 
there would tolerate, and that the Canadian govern-
ment imposed an export tax to capture the difference 
between the value of Canadian oil to U.S. refiners 
and the international price. With specific reference 
to Figure 9.1, one might assume that exports to the 
United States were allowed to increase to level XY (as 
did occur under the NOP), with the Canadian demand 
curve shifting, in effect to the dashed curve DT. Export 
tax revenue would be received which was at least as 
large as the extra revenue on export sales accruing to 
domestic producers under the NOP (i.e., area EHMJ 
equal to (PC – PI)(XY)). If Canadian crude oil sold for 
P*(>PC) in the U.S. market, and Canadian government 
authorities were able to gauge this value well enough 
to set the export tax at level (P* – PI), then there would 
be an additional gain to Canada. Recall that while 
Canadian-produced oil was attractive to U.S. refiners 
because it was exempt from the USOIQP, refiners did 
suffer some penalties in using Canadian oil instead 
of domestic U.S. crude, so that the maximum value 
of Canadian oil in the U.S. market (P*) would be less 
than the domestic U.S. prices (PU). In other words, we 
know that PC is less than or equal to P*, which is less 
than PUS, but the exact value of P* (at each year from 
1961 through 1972) within that range is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine.
Having defined the second case, let us now con-
sider the net effects on Canada of the NOP. In this 
case, there is no net gain to Canada on exports to the 
United States so long as the Canadian oil price (PC) 
approximates the price that would have been attained 
under an export tax. The net revenue gain on exports 
to the United States at prices above the international 
price would go to domestic oil producers under the 
NOP, instead of to the federal government in export 
tax revenue. However, the NOP, in this case, could be 
argued to generate two efficiency costs. First, there 
is the loss of consumers’ surplus (area EFJ in Figure 
9.1), since Canadian consumers WORV reduce their 
oil consumption when the NOP lifts prices above the 
international price. Second, the higher oil price would 
have induced incremental Canadian oil supplies to 
some extent, at costs in excess of those that would 
otherwise have occurred; i.e., in excess of the inter-
national oil price (area GHM in Figure 9.1). These two 
areas, EFJ and GHM would be deadweight losses of 
the NOP.
(iii) Estimates of the Net Social Benefits (Losses) of 
the NOP. We have now defined two cases that allow 
us to look at the economic efficiency of the NOP, 
each case involving a different assumption about how 
Canadian oil policies might have developed without 
the NOP. Case 1 essentially assumes that there would 
have been no federal oil policy, so that Canadian oil 
prices would have been set by international crude at 
the competitive interface in Toronto. Case 2 assumes 
this as well, but adds the assumption that the fed-
eral government would have utilized its authority to 
capture for Canada, by an effective crude oil export 
tax, the extra value of Canadian oil in U.S. markets. 
Since both are hypothetical histories of Canadian 
oil policies, we cannot be sure which (if either!) is 
more realistic. We would note that certain political 
difficulties attend crude oil export taxes (i.e., Case 2), 
including the possibility of objections from the U.S. 
government (perhaps with appeals to GATT princi-
ples), and Canadian intergovernmental frictions that 
would arise as producing provinces (Alberta, in par-
ticular) saw the federal government capturing large 
revenues from provincial resources. As we shall see, 
the federal government was willing to take on these 
problems, beginning in 1973, but this was in the face of 
dramatic changes in the international crude oil market 
and rising concerns about the ability of Canadian oil 
to continue to meet Canadian domestic needs. In our 
judgment, Canadian governments in the 1960s would 
have been less likely to implement export taxes on 
crude, so we see Case 1 as the more realistic basis for 
evaluating the NOP.
Other scenarios for Canadian oil policy without 
the NOP are, of course, imaginable. Readers might 
like to consider a third, and obvious, possible case, 
which we have not considered in detail. Suppose 
Canada had adopted a policy to extend the market 
for Canadian-produced oil to Montreal, with those 
volumes that would otherwise have been shipped to 
the United States going to the Montreal market, and 
with Canadian oil producers then subsidized (relative 
to international oil prices) by as much as sales WORV 
were subsidized under the NOP (i.e., to the price PC in 
Figure 9.1). That is, prices WORV and in Montreal were 
set at the higher NOP level (PC in Figure 9.1.) From 
the viewpoint of the economic efficiency of Canadian 
oil markets, the NOP, relative to the Montreal pipe-
line extension, would contribute the same net social 
benefits to Canada as our Case 1, plus one additional 
gain. (That is, the NOP would be preferable to the 
Montreal market case.) Under the NOP, consumers 
in Montreal could buy at the lower international oil 
price, and the Canadian oil volumes freed could be 
sold to foreign (U.S.) refiners at the higher price, gen-
erating a net gain to Canada. Additionally the lower 
price to Quebec users under the NOP would generate 
higher consumption and a consumers’ surplus gain. 
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Therefore, our Case 1 provides a lower bound estimate 
of the efficiency gain of the NOP relative to the Mont-
real market extension option that was so hotly debated 
at the Borden hearings.
Is there any way to estimate quantitatively the effi-
ciency effects of the NOP in Cases 1 and 2? The dollar 
values of the various areas from Figure 9.1 clearly 
depend on how large the price and output impacts 
are. Table 9.1 provided estimates of the two most rel-
evant prices (PI and PC). Oil export values have been 
taken from the CAPP Statistical Handbook. However, 
the size of the consumers’ surplus and incremental 
production-cost effects (EFJ and GHM in Figure 9.1) 
also depend on the shapes of the demand and supply 
curves. Order of magnitude estimates of the efficiency 
effects may be obtained with the aid of some simpli-
fying assumptions. In particular: (1) assume that the 
demand curve of Figure 9.1 is a straight line over the 
relevant range of prices (PI to PC) and that the (long-
run) elasticity of demand is (–0.6) at the output and 
price actually observed (i.e., at point J); (2) similarly, 
assume a straight line supply curve with an elasticity 
of supply of 0.3 at point M. Then, as the note at the 
bottom of Table 9.2 shows, it is possible to estimate 
the size of areas EFJ and GHM. We would emphasize 
that these estimates are only roughly indicative of 
the efficiency effects of the NOP, since they involve a 
number of rather arbitrary assumptions. In particular, 
the elasticity values are not based on careful empirical 
analysis of Canadian oil markets in the 1960s and fail 
to make any allowance for the short-run delays in 
adjusting oil production and consumption to price 
changes. (Short-run inelasticity would reduce the size 
of the consumers’ surplus, production cost, and export 
revenue gain effects.)
Table 9.2 includes estimated net efficiency effects 
of the NOP for each year from 1961 through 1972 in 
each of Case 1 and Case 2. Case 1 sees a net gain each 
year to Canada, totalling over $2.8 billion in undis-
counted dollars over the twelve-year period, and 
an average of $236 million per year. This would be 
the gain generated by the NOP if the outside policy 
regimes of the 1960s are taken as given, and a Can-
adian crude oil export tax is dismissed as a policy 
option. The NOP, from this perspective, allowed 
Canada to capitalize on the USOIQP by expanding 
sales to the United States at prices in excess of pre-
vailing international prices. The Case 2 result shows 
net social losses to Canada each year as a result of the 
NOP, totalling over $550 million from 1961 through 
1972, with an average loss of $47 million per year. This 
includes the consumer surplus losses and incremen-
tal production costs that occurred as a result of both 
Canada and the United States restricting international 
Table	9.2:	Economic	Efficiency	of	the	NOP:	Two	Cases	(106 current dollars)
	 Increased	Export	 Consumers’	Surplus	 Increased	Producer	 Net	Social	Benefits	 Net	Social	Benefits 
 Values (EXV) Loss (CSL) Costs (IPC)  (NSB) CASE 1  (NSB) CASE 2
1961 93.7 10.1 9.4 74.2 -19.5
1962 118.9 9.8 10.3 98.8 -20.1
1963 112.0 9.5 9.6 92.9 -19.1
1964 197.7 19.9 20.6 157.2 -40.5
1965 250.6 27.0 28.0 195.6 -55.0
1966 255.8 25.4 27.1 203.3 -52.5
1967 315.1 28.6 32.7 253.8 -61.3
1968 147.5 8.1 9.6 129.8 -17.7
1969 375.6 28.6 36.3 310.7 -64.9
1970 522.7 36.1 49.3 437.3 -85.4
1971 496.0 28.5 42.0 425.5 -70.5
1972 515.5 22.1 38.0 455.4 -60.1
Sum 3,405.1 253.7 312.9 2838.5 -566.6
Annual Average 283.75  21.1 26.1 236.5 –47.2
Notes: Increased export value is area EHMJ in Figure 9.1.
 Consumer’s surplus loss is area EFJ in Figure 9.1.
 Increased production cost is area GHM in Figure 9.1.
 CASE 1 NSB = EXV – CSL – IPC.
 CASE 2 NSB = –CSL – IPC.
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crude oil imports into North America. A similar effi-
ciency cost can be ascribed to the NOP, even in the 
presence of the U.S. restrictions on imported offshore 
oil, if Canadian policy had involved no NOP but an 
export tax on sales to the United States.
In both cases, the estimates of net social benefit (cost) 
must be interpreted as rough approximations since 
they were not derived from complete models of the 
North American oil market, which would allow for 
lags in demand and supply response and incorporate 
the effects of royalty/tax provisions and market- 
demand prorationing.
The $3.4 billion dollar difference in the estimates 
(from +$2.8 billion in Case 1 to –$0.6 billion in Case 
2) makes clear the importance of assumptions about 
what would occur in the absence of the NOP. Readers 
may form their own judgments in this regard. We 
would argue that efficiency losses were generated 
within North America by the decision to restrict 
access to cheaper foreign oil in the 1960s, but that 
the United States would have pursued this policy 
whether or not Canada did. It is harder to assess 
the status of Canada’s exemption from the USOIQP. 
During a period of falling international oil prices, 
would the United States have continued to allow such 
an exemption if Canada had not moved to protect 
the market for its crude and to support prices well 
above the international level? And if the United States 
had allowed continued exemption under these cir-
cumstances, would the United States have tolerated a 
sizeable export tax to raise the Canadian sales price 
close to domestic U.S. levels? On balance, we would 
be inclined to emphasize the Case 1 result – North 
American import restrictions generated efficiency 
Addendum to Table 9.2
The effects shown in Table 9.2 are estimated using:
• the Canadian and international prices of Table 9.1.
• actual export volumes as they occurred plus increased production 
and reduced consumption for hypothetical export volumes.
• estimates of reduced consumption WORV assume a demand 
elasticity of (–0.6) at the actually observed price and consumption 
along a straight line demand curve.
• estimates of increased production assume a supply elasticity of 0.3 
at the actually observed price and quantity along a straight line 
supply curve.
• Canadian production, consumption and exports are taken from the 
CAPP Statistical Handbook.
Derivation of quantity changes along the demand curves utilize the 
following procedure. (The supply case is analogous.) The demand 
curve	is	a	straight	line,	as	illustrated	in	the	figure	below,	with	elasticity	
E at point 1. The curve can be given by:
 Q = a + bP (Eq. 1)
Then, a is the horizontal intercept of the curve (when P = 0, Q = a), and 
b is the reciprocal of the slope of the demand curve (when P changes 
by 1, the quantity changes by b).
By	definition,
 E = (∂Q / ∂P)(P / Q) (Eq. 2)
where	∂Q	and	∂P are the instantaneous changes in quantity and  
price.	Therefore	∂Q/∂P is the reciprocal of the slope of the demand 
curve, or b.
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Since we know the values of P, Q, and E at point 1, we can calculate b.
From equation 1 we know that any change in quantity (Q) is related to 
a change in price (P) by
 ∂Q = b(∂P) (Eq. 4)
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Thus if we know P and Q (the observed market result), and assume a 
value for E,	we	can	calculate	the	change	in	quantity	(∂Q) associated 
with	any	given	change	in	price	(∂P).
With a straight line demand curve, the consumers’ surplus loss (CSL) of 
a rise in price from PI to PC is:









losses in the 1960s, but, in the second-best world of 
the USOIQP, the National Oil Policy generated a net 
social benefit to Canada. It is ironic that Canada and 
the United States restricted the import of offshore 
crude oil when its prices were relatively low, only to 
adopt policies after 1970 that encouraged more use 
of offshore oil when international prices were rela-
tively high. (For further discussion of these issues, see 
Watkins, 1987a and Bradley and Watkins, 1982.)
Moreover, many of the arguments about the NOP 
went beyond narrow assessment of changes in oil 
prices and output. We will now turn to several of these 
broader issues.
b. Other Effects of the NOP
(i) Equity (Distributional) Effects. Distributional 
effects of Canadian governments’ oil policies are often 
considered at two different levels, which overlap only 
imperfectly. (1) The first is a ‘functional’ level that 
considers, mainly, oil consumers and oil-producing 
interests (especially shareholders and other private 
ownership interests, and the citizens who benefit 
from changes in government revenues from the oil 
industry). (2) The second is the ‘geographic-polit-
ical’ level that considers various regional interests 
(especially net-oil-importing regions such as Ontario 
and net-oil-exporting areas such as Alberta). It must 
be recognized that the functional groups involve 
considerable overlap. A Canadian shareholder in 
Texaco is also an oil consumer and citizen. Citizens 
in an oil-producing region are also oil consumers. 
Moreover, it is impossible to trace the distributional 
effects of various oil policies with much precision. For 
example, neither the regional distribution of oil com-
pany shares, nor the impact on dividends and share 
prices of higher oil company profits and the attendant 
impacts on shareholders’ incomes and tax payments, 
is well documented. Consider another example: 
increased government revenues from the oil industry 
may lead to reduced tax payments by other sectors 
of the economy (but, if so, exactly where?) and/or 
increased government expenditures (but, if so, on 
exactly which programs, to whose benefit?). Therefore, 
our consideration of distributive effects of the NOP 
must be general, and any conclusion tentative.
We have emphasized that the impact of the NOP 
must be considered in relationship to some alterna-
tive set of circumstances. We shall follow the Case 
1 assumption discussed above in which the NOP 
is assumed to have generated a rise in the price of 
Canadian-produced oil above the international level. 
As a result, Canadian oil-producing interests (region-
ally, Alberta and Saskatchewan) benefited while 
Canadian oil-consuming interests, WORV (regionally, 
Manitoba, Ontario, and British Columbia), and U.S. 
refiners using Canadian oil suffered. Remember that 
Case 1 assumes that Canada would not have imposed 
an oil export tax in the absence of the NOP, so U.S. 
refiners would have been able to buy Canadian oil at 
the lower international price. As noted above, we have 
not assessed the willingness of the United States to 
accept imports from Canada in this hypothetical case 
but have assumed that the flows into the U.S. market 
would have equalled the difference between western 
Canadian production and consumption. If this would 
not have been allowed under the USOIQP, the NOP in 
Case 1 also had the advantage of increasing Canadian 
exports to the United States.
Figure 9.1 and Tables 9.1 and 9.2 provide some 
basis for estimating the size of these distributional 
effects. The net gains to oil-producing interests 
can be approximated by multiplying total sales of 
Canadian oil by the price increase due to the NOP, 
less the incremental rise in production costs induced 
by the price rise (i.e., area PIGMPC in Figure 9.1); this 
amounts to $5,109 million for the years 1961 through 
1972. Canadian consumers WORV paid more on oil 
consumed and suffered a consumers’ surplus loss (i.e., 
area PIFJPC in Figure 9.1); this adds up to $2,272 mil-
lion over the period. Finally, U.S. consumers paid an 
extra $3,401 million from 1961 through 1972. In Figure 
9.1 this is area EJMH.
At least three weaknesses in these rough estimates 
of the distributional effects of the NOP must be noted. 
First, we have used a partial equilibrium approach 
that considered the oil market in equilibrium, ignor-
ing other impacts on the economy. Brief discussion 
from a more general equilibrium perspective follows 
in the discussion of macroeconomic effects of the 
NOP. Second, the impacts have not been separated 
regionally, or in terms of impacts on citizens through 
government revenue changes as compared to cost or 
profit changes.
Third, we have abstracted from the foreign owner-
ship dimension of the problem. High levels of foreign 
investment in the Canadian petroleum industry imply 
that a significant part of the gain to oil producers 
would accrue to foreign shareholders either directly 
through higher dividend payments or indirectly 
through higher share prices in stock markets. Rough 
allowance for this can be made. Higher oil revenues 
would generate higher revenue to the government 
primarily through higher royalties; in 1972 the average 
Alberta crude oil royalty rate was about 16 per cent. 
The effective corporate income tax rate on oil indus-
try profits was no more than 10 per cent in the 1960s 
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(Canadian Tax Foundation, The National Finances, 
1972). Of the after-royalty and corporate tax profits, 
about 78 per cent could be allocated to foreign owners, 
using an average for non-resident ownership in the 
Canadian petroleum industry in the 1960s (EMR, 1973, 
vol. ii, p. 224). Some of this would have been subject 
to Canada’s dividend withholding tax (15% in 1970). 
On the basis of these assumptions, $3,014 million 
of the $5,109 million gain in production profits esti-
mated in the previous paragraphs would have gone 
to foreigners. $2,095 million would have remained 
with Canadians, shareholders or governments. (This 
is something of an understatement to the extent that 
competitive bonus bids on newly issued mineral rights 
would have increased as well.)
It is of importance to note that the efficiency 
measures of the NOP, as estimated above, would be 
altered if the profits accruing to foreign shareholders 
are treated as a net loss to Canada. Case 1 net social 
benefit would fall from $2.9 billion to minus $175 
million, and the Case 2 net social cost would rise 
from $567 million to $3,580 million, over the 1961 
to 1972 period. Expressed in terms of 1961 present 
values, of course, the numbers would be considerably 
smaller. Moreover, profits to foreign shareholders 
should properly be considered in relation to the 
normal profit return on total foreign capital in the 
Canadian oil industry. However, if the capital would 
have earned normal profits at international oil prices, 
all the increased profits due to the NOP would be 
economic rent, except for the normal profits already 
included in the supply curve calculations for incre-
mental production. One other aspect of this prob-
lem deserves brief comment. This is the question 
of whether profits accruing to foreign owners are a 
leakage from Canadian gains if, as was common in 
the petroleum industry, the foreign owners reinvest 
the economic rent in Canada. Proponents of foreign 
investment have generally seen such reinvestment as a 
benefit to Canada. Those critical of foreign investment 
have questioned whether this is a net contribution 
to investment (would Canadian sources have under-
taken the same investment?); they also argue that such 
reinvestment simply serves to turn economic rent 
into foreign owned assets, and this asset value will not 
itself be taxed, so it will leave the country as deprecia-
tion payments to the foreign owner. The high foreign 
ownership share in the oil industry helps to explain 
the emphasis placed on government rent collection as 
oil prices began to rise in the 1970s; the government 
would clearly have also wished to tax high rents accru-
ing solely to Canadian owners, but the issue received 
more urgency because of foreign ownership.
The NOP, as indicated, transferred spending power 
from consumers of oil in Canada WORV to producers, 
including governments in the oil-producing prov-
inces, mainly Alberta. It is difficult to assess whether 
or not the transfer of funds was harmful to Canadian 
objectives of a ‘fairer distribution of income.’ In part 
this is because of uncertainty about exactly what our 
desires are in this regard. Individuals may well have 
quite varied opinions. Moreover, one of the primary 
means of expressing our social preferences is through 
general elections, but these are decided upon many 
concerns, so cannot serve as a referendum on a single 
issue such as equity.
A second problem arises from the fact that there 
is insufficient evidence to tally the full distributional 
effects of the NOP. Tentative judgments may be 
possible. Waverman (1975) argued, with respect to 
energy price rises in the early 1970s, that the oil price 
increases, considered across broad income classes, 
appear to be somewhat regressive. He looked at direct 
household expenditures on energy in the year 1969 
plus estimated expenditures on public transportation 
and rental accommodation. Waverman found that for 
the average Canadian family 6.2 per cent of its spend-
ing was on energy. The poorest of his twelve classes 
(total expenditures of less than $3,000 per year) put 
8–9 per cent of spending into energy, while the highest 
expenditure group (over $15,000 per year) allocated 
only 4.3 per cent of spending to energy. Regional pat-
terns differed slightly. Thus, in Canada WORV, higher 
oil prices as a result of the NOP would fall somewhat 
more heavily on the poorer members of society.
As Waverman acknowledges, it is difficult to trace 
the indirect income distribution effects of energy 
price changes operating through the energy content 
of the goods and services that households purchase. 
He points out that energy input costs made up a rela-
tively small proportion of the total value of shipments 
for most Canadian industries. In 1970, for example, 
for eleven main industries, energy costs varied from 
1.0 to 5.4 per cent (paper and allied industries) of the 
value of shipments. For 1971, Powrie and Gainer (1976) 
report similar values (ranging from 0.31 per cent for 
clothing to 6.09 per cent for paper and allied products, 
averaging 1.99 per cent). Therefore, the indirect effect 
of higher oil prices on consumers due to the NOP 
would be small, regardless of how expenditures are 
spread over all the products of different industries.
Judgment about the income distribution effects of 
the NOP also hinge on the beneficiaries of increased 
payments, that is governments of producing prov-
inces and shareholders of the oil companies. Opposite 
effects hold. Increased payments to the governments 
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would seem, at worst, to allow some tax relief thereby 
sharing in whatever progressivity the tax system 
exhibits; at best, the extra revenue would give the 
government more revenue to attain its objectives, 
including whatever is regarded as equitable. On the 
other hand, the stocks of corporations, including oil 
companies, are undoubtedly distributed in a regres-
sive fashion with larger shares held by the relatively 
wealthy (and with a significant portion held by 
non-Canadians).
What can one conclude about the income distribu-
tion effects of the NOP? First, the size of the redistri-
bution is not particularly large; the average estimated 
loss of consumer surplus and estimated higher pay-
ments by Canadian oil consumers amounted to only 
0.2 per cent of Canadian GDP. Second, the regional 
distributional impacts were most evident with net-
oil-importing regions (Ontario, in particular, but 
also Manitoba and B.C.) transferring funds to the 
net-oil-exporting regions (Alberta, especially, and 
Saskatchewan). Third, the underlying functional 
distributional effects were from oil consumers – in 
all regions west of the Ottawa River Valley – to 
oil-producing interests, including Canadian govern-
ments (especially the oil-producing provinces) and 
owners and shareholders of the oil companies (includ-
ing non-Canadian shareholders). Most Canadians 
would probably feel that the net distributional effects 
were moderately unfavourable, especially insofar as 
gains accrued to non-residents and wealthy sharehold-
ers and consumer costs were borne more than propor-
tionally by poorer income groups.
(ii) Macroeconomic Effects. Initial pressure for 
changes in Canadian oil policy in the late 1950s came 
primarily from the Alberta government and crude oil 
producers who feared declining oil industry activities. 
Market expansion was not obviously forthcoming and 
the large overhang of spare productive capacity lim-
ited the appeal of new exploration and development. 
The problem was viewed as critical for the Alberta 
economy. The oil industry is capital, rather than 
labour, intensive. Much of the employment that is 
generated directly by the industry, as well as the bulk 
of income-generating spending, does not occur during 
the operating phase of the crude oil industry but as a 
result of investment. Therefore, continued exploration 
and development were viewed as a key to continued 
economic growth in Alberta. (The role of the pet-
roleum industry in the larger economy, and its tie to 
economic growth, will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Thirteen.)
Western and central Canada might experience 
quite different macroeconomic effects from increased 
sales of crude oil, at higher prices, as generated by 
the NOP. Expanded activity in Alberta involved some 
spill-over into, for example, Ontario, involving prod-
ucts like steel pipe. Despite such spill-over effects, it 
is expected that the overall effects would tend to be 
expansionary in the oil-exporting region and con-
tractionary in the oil-importing region. However, 
recall that the price of Canadian-produced crude 
oil remained pretty well constant in nominal dollars 
throughout the 1960s, so that the NOP had the effect 
of slowing the decline in real prices to customers west 
of the Ottawa River Valley, rather than actually raising 
prices. Moreover, many of the customers who paid 
more than world prices for Alberta crude oil were in 
the United States (Americans in general paid more 
than the world price, thanks to the USOIQP.) Thus, 
any net deflationary effects on central Canada were 
likely small.
One controversial further line of argument must 
be touched on. To the extent that conventional oil 
is a limited natural resource, it could be argued that 
policies that encourage more exploration and develop-
ment are not so much generating entirely new indus-
try activity, as simply advancing it in time. This would 
presumably be desirable to the extent that it encour-
aged development of a more permanently sustainable 
regional economy by accelerating the attainment of 
local economies of scale or agglomeration effects due 
to expanding population and market size. Such an 
exhaustible resource view might also see as desirable 
increased activity that levelled out cyclical fluctuations 
in the provincial economy. There is also the question 
of whether the extra production takes place in times 
of higher or lower prices; an ideal, and perfectly 
informed, social planner would prefer to concentrate 
production in the higher price periods, when the mar-
ginal value of the reserves are greater. In this regard, it 
is notable that the NOP inducement to higher exports 
came in a period in which, in retrospect, oil prices 
were relatively low. (And in the following period of 
high prices, as will be discussed in the next section of 
this chapter, exports were discouraged!) In fairness, 
however, it must be noted that few in the 1960s antici-
pated sharply rising oil prices.
We must again express scepticism about argu-
ments that lay heavy emphasis upon the exhaust-
ible nature of petroleum reserves (Adelman, 1990; 
Watkins, 1992). Depletion of oil deposits is primarily 
an economic phenomenon, reflecting a complex inter-
play of physical, technological, and economic factors, 
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with no clearly defined limit to the volumes of oil 
that may be produced. Increased industry activity in 
one period, then, cannot be seen as simply displacing 
similar activity in some later period.
(iii) National Security and Resource Depletion. For 
some, the NOP had national security implications. Oil 
is an essential input into the economy, particularly 
in the short run, and dependence in the 1960s upon 
supplies from developing countries, especially in the 
politically tense Middle East, raised security concerns 
in North America. However, the national security 
card is difficult to play. The issue has been more thor-
oughly debated in the United States than in Canada; 
see, for example, Bohi and Montgomery (1982) and 
Bohi and Toman (1996). We shall touch on the matter 
only briefly.
In the first place, the security implications of the 
NOP are rather difficult to specify. In part, this reflects 
the problem with defining an alternate scenario for 
the 1960s. In comparison to a continuation of the 
trends of the 1950s, it could be argued that the NOP 
increased national security by preserving markets 
WORV for Canadian crude and backing foreign oil 
products out of Ontario. But this might have hap-
pened anyway, although at falling international prices. 
However, compared to a Montreal pipeline extension, 
the NOP would be argued to provide less Canadian 
security of supply from disruptions in international 
oil flows since it left the Quebec market open to 
imported crude.
One must go beyond this to ask: what was the 
security of supply risk? Prior to 1960, there had been 
minor disruptions in oil supplies from the Middle 
East as a result of Arab–Israeli hostilities when Israel 
was founded in 1948 and during the 1956/7 Suez crisis 
when Israel, France, and the United Kingdom invaded 
Egypt. But the impact on oil shipments had been 
small, and Canada relied mainly on Venezuelan oil 
anyway. (In 1956 only a fifth of Canadian oil imports 
came from the Middle East, although the proportion 
was rising, up to just over 40% by 1960 [Simpson et 
al., 1963, p. 30].) Furthermore, even the theoretical 
nature of the security of supply risks is far from 
clearly defined. One might suppose that shortages of 
oil translate into reduced consumer satisfaction and 
reduced industrial output with associated losses of 
employment and profits, especially in the short-term 
when capital rigidities make it difficult to substitute 
away from oil into other energy forms. Ultimately, 
however, the security of supply problem is one of 
economic adjustment more than physical shortage. If 
international oil supplies are disrupted, the primary 
effects come in the form of increased prices, which 
serve to ration available supplies. The price rises dis-
courage the least-valued consumption and induce 
incremental oil production. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
when both Canada and the United States had con-
siderable excess production capacity, the latter option 
proved to be of considerable importance. A country 
that relied on its own oil to a considerable extent 
might avoid the negative effects of sharp and tempor-
ary rises in crude oil prices due to an international 
supply crisis, but this would require the imposition 
of price controls, subsidization of any imports that 
did occur, and prohibitions of incremental exports 
attracted by high international prices. The hazards of 
such a pricing policy, adopted by Canada after 1972, 
will be discussed below.
Some observers have also suggested that there are 
trade-offs between short-term and long-term sec-
urity of supply interests, since crude oil burned for 
its energy content is not a recyclable resource. (Less 
than 10% of oil has typically been used for non-energy 
purposes, such as lubricating motor oil, which may 
be partially recycled.) Given limited oil resources, 
increased utilization for security reasons in the cur-
rent period means, it is argued, less potentially avail-
able for the future and therefore higher security risks 
at that date. There is some merit to this argument, 
though its strict application is blunted by the obser-
vation (which we have made before) that the limits to 
oil production are variable economic ones rather than 
strict physical constraints. In any event, depletability 
has suggested to some authors that security of supply 
concerns may justify other measures than increased 
domestic oil output. Stockpiles, for instance, may be 
accumulated (perhaps from the international market) 
and held in readiness for a possible crisis; there is, 
then, no need to constantly run down domestic sup-
plies at a more rapid rate than current market condi-
tions would warrant.
On balance, we find no strong national security 
arguments for modifying our discussion of the effi-
ciency of the NOP.
C. Conclusion
Normative evaluations of economic policies must 
remain somewhat tentative, if only because not 
all observers stress the same objectives. We would 
argue that the combined decisions by Canada and 
the United States to protect the North American oil 
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industry generated net social costs to the continent 
in the 1960s. Higher oil prices than necessary meant 
consumer surplus losses and increased resource costs 
as higher-cost oil was produced.
However, if it is assumed that the USOIQP would 
have proceeded regardless of Canadian policy, evalua-
tion of Canada’s NOP must be somewhat tempered. At 
first glance, the most efficient policy would have been 
for Canada to follow declining prices in the inter-
national market while encouraging oil exports to the 
United States with an export tax to raise prices close to 
those of protected U.S. domestic crude. However, we 
suspect that U.S. government objections would have 
made this option impossible (Watkins, 1987a). From 
that point of view, the NOP can be seen as beneficial 
to Canada by encouraging greater use of sunk invest-
ments in oil-production capacity and allowing Can-
adian producers to capture some of the benefits of the 
high value of oil in the protected U.S. market.
Weighed against the gain are redistribution effects, 
with wealthier parties benefiting somewhat in com-
parison to poorer parties. Also, under royalty and tax 
regulations of the 1960s, a significant portion of the 
oil-producer gains accrued to foreign shareholders. 
The NOP appears to have had a stimulating impact on 
the Alberta economy. International security effects 
were minimal.
4. Strict Controls and the National 
Energy Program (NEP): 1973–85
A. The Policies
1. Background
The NOP had been established in 1961 against a 
background of falling international oil prices, a U.S. 
domestic crude oil protection policy (USOIQP), 
and high excess crude oil production capacity in 
Alberta. The universe had shifted by the early 1970s. 
International oil prices had begun to rise with the 
Teheran-Tripoli and Geneva Agreements, rising 
Canadian oil output had reduced spare production 
capacity, and Canadian crude oil reserves had begun 
to decline as production exceeded gross reserve 
additions.
The federal government’s Department of Energy, 
Mines and Resources undertook a review of Canada’s 
energy situation and in 1973 issued a comprehensive 
two-volume study. An Energy Policy for Canada, Phase 
1, provided an overview of Canadian energy industries 
and a number of policy options open to the federal 
government. This had initially been envisioned as 
the first step in a process of participatory democracy 
spread over a number of years. The options presented 
in An Energy Policy would generate a public debate 
about energy policy, which would in turn allow the 
government to formulate new policies reflecting some 
consensus of public opinion. Whether such a process 
would have generated consensus, rather than anger 
and opposing entrenched positions, is unclear. In 
any event, the federal government felt it necessary to 
circumvent the process by introducing major changes 
in Canadian energy policies in 1973 just as discussion 
of An Energy Policy was beginning. (Debanné, 1974 
looks at the Canadian oil industry in the years leading 
up to the direct control period. Many authors have 
described the policies in this period, including Ander-
son, 1976; Bradley and Watkins, 1982; Daniel and 
Goldberg, 1982; Dobson, 1981; Doern and Toner, 1985; 
Helliwell, 1979;Helliwell and Scott, 1981; Helliwell and 
McRae, 1981, 1982; Helliwell et al., 1989; McRae, 1982, 
1985; Norrie, 1981; Plourde, 1986; Scarfe, 1980, 1984; 
Watkins, 1976, 1977a, 1981; 1987a, 1989; and Waverman 
1980, 1984.)
2. Introduction of Strict Controls
In December 1972, the NEB issued a report on the 
Canadian crude oil situation that concluded that 
“production from all sources in Canada will not be 
able to supply the potential export and domestic 
market demand after 1973” and “the declining Western 
Province conventional maximum production rate … 
will be unable to supply the domestic market by 1986” 
(NEB, 1972, pp. 18, 19). In February 1973, the NEB rec-
ommended the imposition of direct controls on crude 
oil exports, and, on February 15, the Government 
ordered the NEB to commence the licensing of crude 
oil exports under Part IV of the NEB Act (P.C. Order 
1973 – 392). Licensing of crude and equivalent began 
March 1 and was extended to motor gasoline and 
middle distillates in June. On September 4, 1973, as 
part of its anti-inflation program, Ottawa imposed a 
five-month freeze (until the end of January 1974) on 
crude oil at the prevailing $3.80/b price. (The regu-
lated prices and those that follow, refer to 38° API 
gravity crude at pipeline terminals at Edmonton.)
Also in September, the NEB announced that it 
could not approve any further crude oil exports as 
the export price was too low. With frozen domestic 
prices, there was no obvious market remedy for this. 
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Therefore, on September 13, 1973, a federal export tax 
on crude, equal to $0.40/b, was introduced to make 
up the difference between the Canadian price and the 
value of the oil in U.S. markets. Following the OPEC-
generated price increases of mid-October, Ottawa 
raised the export tax to $1.70/b (in December), to 
$2.20 in January 1975, and then to $6.40/b in February.
These three direct control measures – export 
volume limits, government-fixed prices and export 
taxes – continued through to June 1985 as a mainstay 
of Canadian energy policy, although the policies were 
effectively eroded over time. They fit together as the 
formal mechanisms to keep Canada an island of low 
crude oil prices in a sea of high international prices. 
Fixing domestic prices assures low costs to domestic 
users. However, the high value in the international 
market will attract domestic oil producers and traders. 
Hence, export controls and/or export taxes are also 
required. Volume controls limited the quantity of oil 
that could move to the United States, and the export 
tax was to ensure that Canada would receive the full 
world value for oil.
By October 1973, the NOP had been effectively 
abandoned. Formal internment came on December 
3, 1973. In the House of Commons, Prime Minister 
Trudeau announced the new policy (Hansard, 1st 
Session, 29th Parliament, pp. 8478–80):
The new policy will abolish the “Ottawa Valley 
Line.” The Canadian market for oil will no 
longer be divided into two, one for domestic-
ally produced oil and another for imported 
oil. It will thus be a “one-Canada,” not a 
“two-Canada” oil policy. The western provinces 
will have a guaranteed outlet for increased 
production; and the eastern provinces will be 
guaranteed security of supply.
The creation of a national market for 
Canadian oil is one essential requirement of a 
new policy. Others are, first, a pricing mech-
anism which will provide sufficient incentives 
for the development of our oil resources; 
second, measures to ensure that any escala-
tion in returns and revenues as a result of any 
higher prices will be used in a manner condu-
cive to security and self-sufficiency; third, the 
establishment of a publicly-owned Canadian 
petroleum company principally to expedite 
exploration and development; fourth, the early 
completion of a pipeline of adequate capacity 
to serve Montreal and as required more east-
ern points; and fifth, intensification of research 
on oil sands technology to permit their full 
and rapid development.
The prime minister went on to note that the frontier 
and non-conventional resources were high cost so that 
“we must in the long run allow the price of domes-
tically produced crude oil to rise toward a level high 
enough to ensure development of the Alberta oil sands 
and other Canadian resources but not one bit higher.” 
Prices need not rise at once, however. Discussions 
would be undertaken with the oil companies and the 
Government of Alberta. Any oil price changes must 
reflect the national interest. In particular,
We will not be prepared to acquiesce in any 
situation in which windfall profits accrue to 
private corporations simply because of unusual 
and unpredictable circumstances of shortage 
created by major world oil producers for 
political and economic reasons of their own. 
Nor do we feel that it would be fair or just to 
have any windfall financial benefits accrue only 
to the producing provinces, leaving all the rest 
of the people of Canada with nothing but the 
burdens.
Prime Minister Trudeau also announced, with respect 
to oil, that “the federal government will continue to 
levy a tax, or, after February 1, a charge equal to the 
difference between our domestic price and the export 
price as determined by the National Energy Board.” 
Ottawa expressed a willingness to share the export 
tax revenue equally with the oil-producing provinces, 
but this did not occur. In addition, the one-price for 
Canada policy required the implementation of an Oil 
Import Compensation Program to compensate refin-
ers that purchased imported crude oil for the differ-
ence between the world price and the Canadian price.
Ottawa’s move to control oil prices and exports 
drew predictably hostile reactions from the oil 
industry and the Alberta Government. It also set the 
tone for a twelve-year intergovernmental imbroglio. 
Alberta provided the main opposition, with both 
practical and general objections. At the practical level, 
export limitations and low domestic prices would, all 
else being equal, reduce the revenue flowing to the oil 
industry, thereby impacting negatively on industry 
activity, the incomes of Alberta residents, and provin-
cial government revenues. At the more general level, 
Alberta questioned the constitutional validity of fed-
eral acts that affected the value and production levels 
of a particular commodity, especially one produced 
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mainly from provincial Crown land, and which was 
specified in the 1930 amendment to the BNA Act as 
being under provincial control.
3. Strict Controls before the NEP: 1973–80
a. Price Controls
The September 1973 price freeze at $3.80/bbl had been 
a unilateral federal act. The freeze was to last for five 
months, through January 1974, to allow the assessment 
of Canadian oil policies. Canadian oil prices had been 
slated to go to the world level at the end of the freeze, 
but this was forgotten with the quadrupling of inter-
national prices between September and December 
of 1973.
Table 6.3 provides crude oil prices at year end for 
the strict control period. Our concern here is with 
the regulatory background. January 1974 saw a First 
Ministers Conference, followed by informal talks in 
March at which the prime minister and ten provincial 
premiers agreed to increase the price for Canadian-
produced oil from $3.80 to $6.50/b for the period from 
April 1, 1974 through January 30, 1975. Regulation had 
moved from direct control by Ottawa into the forum 
of intergovernmental negotiation within the Canadian 
confederation. Why had this happened?
The eruption of OPEC as an effective cartel brought 
energy policy to the forefront of economic and pol-
itical decision-making everywhere in the world. 
Amongst the industrialized nations, Canada was in 
an exceptionally favourable situation with crude oil 
exports of 1,107,000 b/d in 1973 compared to imports 
of 927,000 b/d. The United States had the world’s 
largest crude oil output rate in 1973 but was still a net 
importer in the amount of 3,404,000 b/d. Mexico was 
still producing mainly for local use and the North 
Sea was just beginning to reveal its oil potential, so 
Norway and the United Kingdom did not become net 
exporters until 1975 and 1980, respectively. (Data are 
from OECD Oil Statistics Supply and Disposal reports.)
Within Canada, virtually everyone was affected by 
the revolution in oil prices. Consumers were hurt by 
oil price increases, especially in the short run when a 
very low elasticity of demand implied that expendi-
tures on oil would rise sharply. Consumers were also 
an unorganized group – all citizens were affected but 
had no effective spokesman. Their interests would 
presumably be voiced by their elected representatives, 
federal MPs and provincial MLAs. Governments, 
however, had broader concerns, since they also repre-
sented citizens in their shareholder, taxpaying, and 
consumer-of-public-services roles. Oil producers – 
companies, employees, and shareholders – benefited 
from oil price rises. There were well-established pro-
ducer interest groups, like the Canadian Petroleum 
Association (CPA), and producers would also expect 
that their elected representatives would give weight to 
their interests.
With oil in the public policy arena, the federal and 
provincial governments became the key players, and, 
amongst them all, Ottawa and Edmonton dominated. 
B.C. and Saskatchewan shared a petroleum producer 
stand with Alberta, to some extent, but Alberta was 
by far the dominant producing province. Ottawa pre-
sumably represented the concerns of all Canadians. 
As many observers have pointed out, the Liberal 
party was in power federally throughout most of this 
period – nine months in 1979 and the period after 
September 1984 are the exceptions. There was minimal 
Liberal representation for electoral districts (e.g., in 
Alberta) with strong oil-producer interests.
As economists, we are loath to enter into any 
lengthy analysis of underlying political processes. 
We are, however, unable to resist offering several 
comments (following on those of the Introduction 
to Part Three of this book). Governments themselves 
are prone to explain their behaviour from a ‘public 
interest’ point of view, in which case Ottawa would, of 
course, pay heed to the concerns of oil producers as 
well as any other interests of Canadian citizens. From 
this point of view, Ottawa reflects all Canadians while 
the Alberta provincial government represents the 
much smaller provincial constituency.
There are political economists who have sug-
gested that there are more ‘realistic’ views of the 
political decision-making powers than the public 
interest model. Some have suggested an ‘interest 
group’ approach in which governments are still seen 
as reacting to perceptions of the interests of citizens, 
but those perceptions are formed by the input from 
special interest groups in society. In this case, public 
policy tends to be dominated by the desires of rela-
tively small groups, which are affected in a major way 
by policy changes while large groups of individuals 
who are affected only in a minor way tend to remain 
unorganized and unheard. From this point of view, 
the oil-producer group should have had a dispropor-
tionate impact on government policies.
An alternative ‘realistic’ theory views government 
decision-makers as self-interested. Elected represent-
atives therefore are motivated to increase the ‘perks,’ 
power and prestige of their position. Or they tend to 
focus on maximization of the likelihood of re-election. 
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The latter motivation suggests that a government 
would be reluctant to write off the interests of any 
significant part of the electorate unless it means clear 
gains in support elsewhere. This approach suggests 
that governments are strongly motivated to put the 
best face on their actions, and that what matters is less 
the reality of policies than their appearance; unless 
one supposes a well-informed electorate, appear-
ance and reality may differ, especially on complex 
policy issues.
The reader may wish to speculate on which, if 
any – or all – of these views of government best fits 
the period of direct control over the Canadian oil 
industry. Books that emphasize the personalities and 
politics of Canadian petroleum policies in the dir-
ect-control era include Doern (1992), Foster (1982), 
and Simpson (1984).
As might be expected, a variety of points of view 
were expressed at intergovernmental conferences 
dealing with oil policy issues. Policy positions tended 
to reflect the most immediate interests of the province, 
but these were often somewhat complex and were 
generally filtered through an ideological prism. Thus, 
some insight can be gained by separating provinces 
into net oil exporters (Alberta and Saskatchewan) and 
net oil importers (the other eight). At the same time, 
several of the importing provinces had reasons to 
support petroleum-producer interests to some degree. 
British Columbia, for instance, was a net-natural-gas 
exporter, and possible offshore oil or gas potential 
became increasingly important to Newfoundland 
and Nova Scotia. Other provinces (e.g., Quebec) were 
particularly sensitive to federal government initiatives 
that might infringe on the powers of provincial gov-
ernments. The economies of the three most western 
provinces (and Manitoba to a more limited extent) 
were very much affected by the activities of the crude 
petroleum industry. However, B.C., Saskatchewan, and 
Manitoba also had NDP governments over at least a 
part of this period, which were more inclined to active 
government intervention than was the Alberta Pro-
gressive Conservative government.
Some flavour of the input into the federal-
provincial oil price negotiations can be gleaned from 
the policy statements issued at the April 9–10, 1975, 
Conference of First Ministers.
Newfoundland (F.D. Moores)
Concerned about rapid rises in oil prices. Saw 
provincial ownership of resources as a key factor. 
Eventually Canadian prices should go to the world 
price level.
P.E.I. (A.D. Campbell)
Reluctantly agreed that Canadian petroleum prices 
should rise over time to the continental (i.e., U.S.) 
level.
Nova Scotia (G. Regan)
No further increase in oil prices warranted. Oil com-
panies do not need the revenue the OPEC price implies 
in order to undertake more activity. High foreign 
ownership of petroleum companies is a concern. “I am 
unable to see why the Government of Alberta needs 
this extra revenue.”
New Brunswick (R.B. Hatfield)
Cannot support a further price rise. Price rises could 
be justified only if closely tied to a policy of domestic 
energy self-sufficiency.
Quebec (R. Bourassa)
Stable prices would help fight inflation, but increased 
prices would induce reduced consumption and more 
production. Advocates a gradual rise to the U.S. price 
level. 
Ontario (W.G. Davis)
Oil prices have not generated additional supply and 
have negative macroeconomic consequences. Keep 
prices constant, at least until inflation and unemploy-
ment rates are lower.
Manitoba (E. Schreyer)
(Did not refer to oil pricing.)
Saskatchewan (A. Blakeney)
‘Old’ oil price increases be held to the inflation rate. 
‘New’ oil would get a higher price. Extra revenue 
goes to the provincial and federal governments for an 
Energy Security Fund.
Alberta (P. Lougheed)
World prices set the appropriate price level.
B.C. (D. Barrett)
No oil price increase if the rise goes to the multi-
national petroleum companies. Some increase with 
extra revenue going to an energy fund would be 
acceptable.
Ottawa
To encourage conservation and new suppliers the oil 
price must rise toward the world level, but not neces-
sarily all the way up.
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The First Ministers Conferences included all eleven 
governments. Our discussion will emphasize only two 
positions, those of the federal government (‘Ottawa’) 
and the Alberta provincial government (‘Alberta’). In 
addition to those concerns that we have already dis-
cussed, two other issues of particular financial import 
for Ottawa should be noted. The first relates to the 
one-price oil policy for Canada. This involved subsid-
izing users of imported oil (in practice, oil refiners) for 
the difference between the higher world price and the 
lower regulated Canadian price. So long as Canadian 
oil imports and exports were approximately equal, this 
policy had no significant net financial impact for the 
federal government, since revenue from the oil export 
tax would match required subsidies. This would not 
be entirely true if Ottawa shared export tax revenues 
with producing provinces, but sharing was not the 
case in the 1970s. Of course, a decision to subsidize oil 
imports meant that the revenue involved could not be 
used in any other way. However, as oil exports to the 
United States were cut, this balance between oil export 
tax revenue and oil import subsidies would become 
more and more unbalanced, and the net financial 
outflow to Ottawa higher and higher. The lower the 
Canadian price was held, the greater the net cost to 
the federal treasury of the Oil Import Compensation 
Program.
Ottawa was also concerned about the impact of 
changing oil prices on the federal-provincial equaliz-
ation grant program. These grants were designed to 
equalize the ability of the provinces to provide services 
to their citizens and involved grants by Ottawa to the 
less-well-off provinces. The details were complex and 
were subject to periodic change; they have generated a 
large literature. (See, for example, Economic Council 
of Canada, 1982, and the discussion by various authors 
in the summer/autumn 1982 issue of Canadian Public 
Policy. The Appendix to Courchene, 2005, provides 
a summary of the equalization provisions related to 
natural resources from 1867 to 1982; Courchene notes 
that natural resource revenues have almost never 
entered fully into the Canadian equalization formu-
lae.) Higher petroleum prices generated higher bonus 
bid and royalty revenue for the petroleum-producing 
provinces and hence generated a higher equaliza-
tion grant obligation on Ottawa. The effect was pro-
nounced because the main beneficiary from higher 
oil and natural gas prices was Alberta, which was a 
high-income ‘have’ province. The effects would have 
been different had Alberta been a ‘have-not’ province, 
since higher petroleum revenues would have reduced 
its claims for equalization grants. Newfoundland 
and Nova Scotia have been very much concerned 
about the possible loss of such grants attendant on 
development of their offshore petroleum resources, a 
point of negotiation with Ottawa until an agreement 
was finally reached in early 2005. British Columbia, 
with a lot of natural gas production, was also a ‘have’ 
province, and Saskatchewan has been in some years. 
One way to minimize the equalization grant effects 
of petroleum price changes would be to amend the 
grant formula, but the recipient provinces would not 
welcome such a change. In January 1974, the agree-
ment had been amended to exclude about one-third 
of provincial natural resource revenues from equal-
ization obligations on the ground that this amount 
was being diverted into capital funds, like the Alberta 
Heritage Trust Fund, rather than being used to fund 
current provincial government activities. In 1982, the 
equalization formula was further modified, in the 
calculation of the relevant tax base, from a ‘national 
average standard’ to a ‘five province standard,’ which 
excluded Alberta and its petroleum revenues from 
inclusion in the equalization formula. Revenues were 
to be calculated on the basis of government receipts 
in five provinces, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Sas-
katchewan, and British Columbia, although average 
tax rates across all ten provinces were still utilized 
(Courchene, 1981, 1984). We shall not delve further 
into the connections between petroleum revenues and 
the equalization fund, but readers should be aware 
that Ottawa was acutely aware of these ties. Courchene 
(2005, 2006) provides a fascinating discussion of the 
equalization program, with particular emphasis on the 
treatment of petroleum resources revenues including 
the differing positions of different petroleum- 
producing provinces and possible strains in the system 
posed by the rise in oil and gas prices starting in 2003. 
See also Usher (2007).
To recapitulate, Canadian oil policy had moved 
into a stage of direct control. This involved inter-
governmental negotiation, with Ottawa and Alberta 
playing the leading roles. Alberta had a well-identified 
interest in higher petroleum prices and looked on 
OPEC’s world prices as the appropriate level. Ottawa’s 
interests were more divided. Lower oil prices were 
attractive to Canadian citizens as oil users, reduced 
the call on the federal treasury for equalization grants, 
and were presumed to give lower inflation rates and 
to lower unemployment, at least east of Saskatchewan. 
On the other hand, higher oil prices would encour-
age reduced oil use and higher production, therefore 
encouraging more Canadian energy self-sufficiency. 
Higher prices also reduced the drain on the federal 
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treasury for crude oil import subsidization. Moreover, 
some of the shareholders in oil companies were also 
citizens, and taxpayers would benefit from the higher 
government revenue from increased economic rent 
on oil. As the previous discussion indicated, Ottawa’s 
general approach was to allow for gradual increases 
in domestic oil prices towards the world level. The 
second revolution in world oil prices, 1979–81, inter-
vened before price equality was reached, so Canadian 
prices remained under government control.
The January–March 1974 First Ministers negotia-
tions had led to a crude oil price rise from $3.80/b up 
to $6.50. The April 1975 First Ministers Conference 
failed to reach agreement on a change in the crude 
oil price. In the June 23, 1975 budget, Ottawa, with 
Edmonton’s agreement, raised the crude price by 
$1.50/b to $8.00, for one year.
In spring 1976, intergovernmental negotiations 
failed to reach unanimity. Once again, Ottawa and 
Alberta were able to agree. The federal Energy min-
ister announced a $1.00/b price rise (to $9.00) on 
July 1, 1976, followed by $0.75 on January 1, 1977 (to 
$9.75/b). Again in the spring of 1977, consensus was 
not attained, with Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Ontario 
dissenting from the other eight governments (Oil-
week, May 16, 1977, p. 5). On June 27, federal Energy 
minister Gillespie announced a two-year agreement 
with $1.00/b price rises every six months. This would 
raise the crude price to $13.75/b by January 1, 1979, so 
long as the Canadian price did not exceed the price 
of Middle East oil or the average price of crude deliv-
ered to Chicago. (The U.S. Congress was, at this time, 
debating a proposal by President Carter to remove 
U.S. crude oil price control regulations.)
The expectation in June 1977 had been that the 
gap between the world oil price and the price of 
Canadian-produced crude would become smaller 
and perhaps disappear. This fit the federal govern-
ment’s 1976 Energy Strategy for Canada: Policies for 
Self-Reliance (Energy, Mines and Resources, 1976, 
p. 127), which argued:
We must continue the process that began in 
April of 1974, of phasing the price of domestic 
oil toward international levels. Canada does 
not necessarily have to go to international 
prices. Because we have domestic resources 
to develop, we have a degree of independence 
from the oil-exporting cartel that many 
countries do not enjoy and that is to our 
advantage. But if we do not raise our prices to 
levels at which those resources can be found, 
developed and delivered, we will find ourselves 
in the same position as those countries that do 
not have domestic resources. …
It is the federal government’s objective to 
see domestic oil prices increase to a level suf-
ficient to bring on new Canadian supplies. To 
the degree that this level is lower than inter-
national oil prices, it is a differential for the 
benefit of Canadian consumers and Canadian 
producers, industrial and agricultural. Should 
it be the case that a price sufficient to bring on 
Canadian supplies were to exceed international 
prices, it would be necessary to make a further 
decision, as we did in 1961, as to whether it 
is in our best interest to continue to develop 
our own resources or to import supplies 
from other countries. Such a decision would 
depend on the extent to which the appropriate 
Canadian price exceeds international prices, 
relative to the risks we would face as a nation if 
we removed our dependence on imported oil.
However, as shown in Chapter Three, after the revo-
lution in Iran, in late 1978, international oil prices 
increased rapidly and dramatically, leaving Canadian 
oil prices far behind.
Alberta agreed to a six-month postponement of 
the January 1, 1979 price increase, with an extension 
of the agreement with Ottawa to the end of June 1980, 
including another $1.00/b rise on January 1, 1980. 
Accordingly the crude price rose to $13.75/b (July 
1979), then $14.75 (January 1980). A tentative longer- 
term pricing agreement reached in the fall of 1979 
was aborted by the fall of the minority Conservative 
government in December. Negotiations between 
Edmonton and the new Liberal government in Ottawa 
covered the whole range of petroleum pricing and 
economic rent sharing issues. The two sides could not 
reach agreement. On August 1, 1980, Alberta, for the 
first and only time, unilaterally increased the crude oil 
price, by $2.00/b to $16.75. Ottawa, which had offered 
a $2.00 price rise, did not utilize the Petroleum Admin-
istration Act (see below) to override Alberta.
However, it was clear that the sudden jump in 
international crude oil prices starting late in 1978, and 
the prospect of further increases, had destroyed the 
Ottawa–Edmonton consensual approach to petrol-
eum policy.
Oil sands production proved to be an exception 
to the oil pricing formulae. As part of the protracted 
negotiations over the Syncrude project in late 1972 and 
1975, it was agreed that Syncrude oil would receive 
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world prices (see Helliwell and May, 1976; Pratt, 1976; 
and Helliwell et al., 1989, pp. 170–72). Output began 
from Syncrude in 1978, and, in August, Ottawa intro-
duced a tax on oil refiners on all oil they processed 
(the “Syncrude levy”) to provide the revenue in excess 
of that earned by Canadian crude prices for the oil 
sands output. In April 1979, as part of an agreement 
with Suncor to expand its oil sands plant, the world 
price was also granted to all of the output from 
this plant.
Relations between Ottawa and Edmonton 
exhibited what a psychologist might call ‘approach–
avoidance’ behaviour. The governments met and, 
from 1974 to 1979, agreed upon a level of price for 
Canadian-produced crude oil. At the same time, each 
was concerned with setting out an institutional infra-
structure that allowed it to meet its objectives in the 
face of opposition from the other.
Ottawa, for example, introduced the Petroleum 
Administration Act, which was passed on June 19, 
1975. Sections 6 through 9 established an oil export 
tax, with a level based on recommendations from the 
NEB. Section 22 allowed the federal government and 
producing provinces to agree on “mutually acceptable 
prices” for crude oil in Canada, but, in the absence of 
agreement, under Section 3 “the Governor in Council 
may, by regulation, establish maximum prices for the 
various qualities and kinds of crude oil.” (Sections 
49 and 52 did the same for natural gas.) Section 38 
allowed Ottawa to order the NEB to take control of 
flows of oil once they crossed a provincial border.
To help assert provincial rights over petroleum, 
Alberta passed the Petroleum Marketing Act, which 
was given assent on December 14, 1973. Section 2 
of the act set up the Alberta Petroleum Marketing 
Commission (APMC) as an agent of the government 
(Tyerman, 1976). Section 13 gave the APMC the power 
to acquire petroleum as a broker (i.e., intermediary 
between producers or buyers). At the provincial gov-
ernment’s request, the APMC would act as the sales 
agent for the province’s share of output (i.e., royalty oil 
and any of the province’s tar sands equity production; 
Section 15) and the lessee’s share of conventional crude 
(Section 21). That is, virtually all the provincial gov-
ernment’s crude oil would be marketed by the APMC. 
The APMC was given power to set prices, including 
quality differentials, and to determine which parties 
would be eligible as buyers of Alberta crude (Helliwell 
et al., 1989, pp. 42–43). In April 1981, the APMC took 
direct control of the marketing of crude oil; the refiner 
paid the APMC at the refinery gate and the APMC paid 
the shipment costs to the refinery.
b. Export Controls
By the end of 1973, the export price on Canadian 
crude was made up of three components: (1) the gov-
ernment fixed wellhead price, (2) transmission costs, 
and (3) the export tax. The level of the export tax was 
set so as to make up the difference between the lower 
Canadian price and the higher international (OPEC) 
price, which established the value of Canadian oil in 
U.S. markets. As was discussed in Chapter Six, with 
the passage of time the NEB found it necessary to 
distinguish more grades of crude oil, all at different 
tax levels (Table 6.4). We noted in Chapter Six that a 
government regulatory scheme which was simple in 
concept – capture for Canada the difference between 
international and domestic prices – proved to be 
increasingly complex and costly to administer in 
practice. Rising international oil prices, coupled with 
smaller increases in the domestic oil price, led to an 
export tax on light and medium crude of $26.00/b 
by 1980.
The volume of crude oil exports had been subject 
to NEB licensing since Ottawa’s March 1973 announce-
ment. Chapter Six documented the level of crude 
oil exports over this period (Table 6.4). The NEB set 
out the general criteria in an October 1974 report on 
oil exports, following public hearings on the topic. 
The board found that “a deficiency of supply to meet 
Canadian demand for feedstocks from indigenous 
oil is possible in the early 1980s” (NEB, 1974, p. 1-3). 
However, “if exports were immediately discontinued 
the Board believes that reserve addition rates would 
be no more than one-half of those that would be 
forthcoming if new reserves were to have immediate 
market access” (p. 4-4). Accordingly, the board pro-
posed a formula for allowable exports which looked 
forward for ten years and restricted exports the more 
pressing were anticipated Canadian needs. The export 
formula was (p. 4-8):
E = [P – (D + C)] (t/10)
where:
E is annual average volume available for 
export in a particular year;
P is forecast annual average oil producibility 
for that year;
D is forecast annual average “demand” for oil 
in western Canada for that year;
C is forecast incremental annual average 
demand which would have occurred had 
new conservation measures not been 
effective;
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t is the number of years from that year in 
which western Canadian “demand” rises 
to be equal to western Canadian supply 
(maximum of 10 years).
Each year, allowable exports were to be estimated 
by this formula. The NEB would then permit up to 
this volume of exports under month-long licences. 
The formula was designed to allow a phased adjust-
ment to reduced exports and was set up so as not 
to discourage Canadian oil conservation measures. 
The ten-year horizon in the formula was substan-
tially less restrictive than the longer-term one in the 
board’s gas export surplus tests. (See Chapter Twelve, 
Section 3.) Completion of the Montreal extension of 
Interprovincial Pipe Line would add some 200,000 
b/d to the western Canadian market. By 1976, oil 
exports were less than half the 1973 volume. The 
Sarnia to Montreal pipeline began operation in June 
1976. For technical reasons, it was held at 50 per cent 
of capacity at first, then 65 per cent, reaching 100 per 
cent in May 1978.
In its September 1975 report on the Canadian oil 
industry (NEB, 1975b), the NEB reviewed the surplus 
formula, then turned attention to complaints from 
heavy oil producers that Canadian refiners could not 
accept their crude oil and that the export licensing 
producers were unfairly restricting their market. 
“From information currently available, the Board does 
not see the need, at this time, to license heavy crude 
separately as a protection procedure for Canadian 
refineries.” However, in November 1976, the board 
changed its opinion and began the separate licensing 
of heavy crude oil. This procedure continued through 
to the deregulation date of June 1985. As Table 6.4 
shows, exports of light and medium crude oil were 
cut to zero by 1980, rising gradually after that to 
33,000 m3/d by the first half of 1985. Heavy oil exports 
exceeded light in every year from 1979 through the 
first half of 1985.
4. The NEP: 1980–85
The rapid rise in international prices after the 
revolution in Iran in late 1978 left the Canadian policy 
of a gradual transition to world oil prices farther than 
ever from realization. By early fall 1980, delivered 
prices of international crude oil were about $40/b 
in Montreal. A Canadian price of $17/b necessitated 
an export tax of $26/b. The minority Progressive 
Conservative government in Ottawa had fallen in 
December 1979 before a new oil price agreement could 
be realized with Alberta. The newly elected Liberals 
had included in their platform a “made-in-Canada 
oil price.” This meant a single price (apart from 
transportation costs) for all Canadians, whether they 
used domestic or imported oil, and a price that would 
not necessarily be based on the “artificial” OPEC ones. 
It was consistent with the underlying premise of the 
direct control period as set out by Prime Minister 
Trudeau back in December 1973. Alberta and the 
oil companies found it no more appealing in 1980 
than they had seven years earlier. Meetings between 
government officials from Ottawa and Edmonton 
continued during 1980 but were not considered to be 
productive. Nemeth (2006) offers a detailed review of 
the introduction of the NEP; she argues that internal 
federal government documents show that the federal 
government had no serious intent of reaching an 
agreement with Alberta, and that meetings were few 
and far from productive.
a.  The NEP. On October 28, 1980, Finance Minister 
Allan MacEachan introduced a federal government 
budget. The budget consisted primarily of a “National 
Energy Program,” crafted at the Department of 
Energy, Mines and Resources under Minister Marc 
Lalonde. What we shall refer to as the NEP is actually a 
series of eight sets of documents issued from October 
1980 to April 1984. The NEP began with the 1980 
budget speech but was modified in light of subse-
quent federal–provincial negotiations and changing 
circumstances in the oil market. (Scarfe, 1980, and 
Walker, 1981, amongst others, provide an overview of 
the NEP.)
Our concern here is with the oil-pricing provi-
sions of the NEP, but an overview of the program is 
required to set the stage. Minister Lalonde’s introduc-
tion was headed “An Energy Program for the People of 
Canada,” and announced “a set of national decisions 
by the Government of Canada” (EMR, 1980, p. 1) based 
on “three precepts of federal action” (p. 2):
•	 It	must	establish	the	basis	for	Canadians	to	seize	
control of their own energy future through 
security of supply and ultimate independence 
from the world oil market.
•	 It	must	offer	to	Canadians,	all	Canadians,	the	
real opportunity to participate in the energy 
industry in general and the petroleum industry in 
particular, and to share in the benefits of industry 
expansion.
•	 It	must	establish	a	petroleum	pricing	and	revenue-
sharing regime that recognizes the requirement 
252 PETROPOLIT ICS
of fairness to all Canadians no matter where 
they live.
Issues of revenue-sharing, which turned out to be the 
most contentious part of the NEP, will be discussed 
in Chapter Eleven (on taxation and the division 
of economic rent). We shall touch only briefly on 
matters of Canadianization insofar as they impact 
upon Alberta. For the most part, these measures deal 
with the stimulation of Canadian-owned companies 
(especially Petro-Canada, the national oil company) 
and applied with particular force to “Federal lands,” 
the potential petroleum basins in Canadian fron-
tiers outside Alberta. Crane (1982) provides a com-
plete case for the view that there is excessive foreign 
investment in the Canadian petroleum industry and 
how the NEP was designed to address this. The brief 
discussion in Chapter Six points out the contentious 
nature of these arguments. Halpern et al. (1988) pro-
vide a very useful assessment of Petro-Canada’s first 
decade. The Canadian government began to privatize 
Petro-Canada in the early 1990s, selling off its last 
equity holding, of just under 20 per cent, in 2004. The 
Petro-Canada Public Participation Act specifies that 
no single shareholder can own more than 20 per cent 
of Petro-Canada’s common shares, and that its head-
quarters must remain in Calgary. The share limitation 
condition would continue to be met under the merger 
between Petro-Canada and Suncor announced in 
March 2009 and effected at the start of August 2010.
Reasons for a continuation of crude oil price con-
trols were scattered through the report and included:
i. the existence of OPEC, so that “the oil market is 
not a free market” (p. 3); 
ii. because of the OPEC price increases “the 
economics of the industrialized world – 
including Canada’s – have been stretched to 
the point where the growth momentum of the 
pre-1975 decade has been halted, and in some 
cases reversed” (p. 5); 
iii. because “the Government of Canada has the 
responsibility to help the national economy 
adjust to OPEC’s shocks, and to see that the 
benefits and burdens are fairly distributed”  
(p. 11); 
iv. because it would be “a mistake” if Canadian 
prices reflected “the uncertainty and erratic 
movements in world oil prices, [so that] 
Canadian economic performance would be 
made even more vulnerable to the economic 
repercussions of the world oil situation” (p. 23); 
v. because “there is no need to punish consumers 
with large unexpected price changes” (p. 24); 
vi. because “prices for oil and gas will be a major 
determinant of the distribution of income 
between consumers and governments. The 
determination of such basic national policy 
simply cannot be left to the actions of a foreign 
cartel” (p. 24); 
vii. because “a price mechanism reflecting 
Canadian costs, not international oil prices, 
and which offer high and predictable returns 
for higher-cost oil industry sources, is a better 
way to provide the necessary incentive” (p. 24); 
and 
viii. “oil pricing policy should translate Canada’s 
relative strength in oil and other energy into a 
competitive advantage for Canadian industries, 
through prices that are below those prevailing 
in other industrial countries” (p. 25).
The NEP “would establish a new schedule of prices 
for domestic oil production, and a new price system 
to blend the costs of different sources of oil into one 
weighted average price to consumers” (p. 25). It is 
necessary to consider separately prices on Canadian 
oil production (which varied by category of oil), prices 
paid by Canadian consumers (which were “blended”) 
and prices paid by those importing Canadian oil 
(which included the oil export tax). We have already 
discussed the latter, where the NEB set the export tax 
at the level necessary to raise the Canadian producer 
price up to the world level.
The October 1980 NEP set up three categories of 
Canadian-produced oil (pp. 27–29).
1. Oil Sands, including all the Syncrude output, 
and the incremental output from the Suncor 
expansion in the late 1970s. An “oil sands refer-
ence price” was established at $38.00/b effective 
January 1, 1981. (This was the approximate world 
price netted back to Alberta at the time of the 
October 1980 budget.) Henceforth the oil sands 
reference price would be the lesser of the world 
price or a schedule of prices given by $38.00 
escalated each January by the Consumer Price 
Index. (A table [p. 26] showed the oil sands ref-
erence price rising to $79.65/b by January 1990, 
implying an initial inflation rate of 10 per cent, 
falling to 8 per cent by 1986.)
2. Tertiary Oil would receive a “tertiary oil refer-
ence price” on any approved tertiary recovery 
projects (i.e., EOR projects other than secondary 
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[waterflood] recovery). This price would be 
$30.00/b on January 1, 1981 (about 79% of the 
oil sands price) and would change annually “in 
a manner similar to the method of changing the 
oil sands reference price.”
3. Conventional Oil was the remainder of 
Canadian output. The price of 38° reference 
crude oil would be the lesser of the (quality 
adjusted) oil sands reference price or a sched-
uled price. The scheduled price involved a $1/b 
increase every six months (starting with a $1 rise 
to $17.75/b on January 1, 1981) up to July 1983, 
and a $2.25/b increase each six months for two 
years, and $3.50 each six months thereafter. “If 
by 1990 the conventional oil price” ($66.75/b on 
the schedule) “is still below that for reference 
price oil, consideration should be given to a 
more rapid rate of escalation.” (p. 27)
It was unremarked, but anomalous, that the scheduled 
price for conventional oil exceeded that for tertiary 
oil by July 1989. It was noted that different reference 
prices for other oils – e.g., frontier – “may be estab-
lished when more is known about the costs” (p. 29).
We shall comment briefly on the October 1980 
NEP oil production prices. First, the CPI escalation 
factors applied to oil sands and tertiary oil implied 
constant real prices over time. Second, there was no 
schedule of estimated world prices, but by showing 
rising Canadian prices over time it was implied that 
world real prices were expected to remain constant 
or rise. Third, if inflation were lower than expected, 
real conventional oil prices (with a fixed dollar incre-
ment) would rise more rapidly than the scheduled 
prices implied, and hit the oil sands price ceiling more 
quickly. Fourth, should real world prices fall, they 
would begin to determine Canadian prices (via the oil 
sands reference price and the tertiary price tied to it, 
and eventually the conventional oil price); that is, the 
“made in Canada” pricing policy held for rising world 
prices, but not for falling prices.
The “blending” process complicated the link to 
world prices. Canadian crude oil refiners would pay a 
“blended” price for the crude they took in through a 
combination of crude oil costs, levies, and subsidies. 
The starting point for a refiner would be the price 
for conventional Canadian crude oil or the price of 
imported oil, depending on which the refiner bought. 
Each refinery would be assessed a levy (“Petroleum 
Compensation Charge” or PCC), which included: 
(i) the old Syncrude Levy of $1.78/b (which would, 
presumably, also cover the excess of tertiary oil prices 
above conventional crude prices); and (ii) a new 
charge designed to cover the excess cost of imported 
crude. The latter was to commence at $0.80/b and 
rise by $2.00/b each January 1 from 1981 through 1983. 
The PCC would be $10.05/b by January 1, 1983. All 
refiners would pay the PCC. Refiners using imported 
oil would be paid a subsidy equal to the difference 
in price between conventional Canadian oil and the 
world price. Hence, all refiners would, in the end, 
be paying a “blended” price for oil. The price would 
be the same for all refiners (apart from transmission 
costs). (Quality differentials posed problems for such 
an oil import subsidy program. The NEP originally 
ignored these price differentials, but by 1982 had to 
begin to recognize them. See Helliwell et al., 1989, 
p. 37.) The government also announced, in the NEP, its 
intent to introduce an additional charge on all oil used 
in Canada to help cover the costs to the Government 
of Canada of its Canadianization program (NEP, 
p. 51). While the oil-pricing provisions of the NEP 
continued the general policy established back in 1973, 
they involve several refinements. Canadian prices had 
been held below world prices since 1973, but the NEP 
clearly set the price for Canadian oil consumers at the 
volume-weighted average of the prices paid to vari-
ous oil producers, plus the Canadianization charge. 
Refiners would buy domestic oil at the conventional 
oil price and imported oil at the world price, with 
importers of imported oil compensated for the differ-
ence, and all refiners would pay the same charge to 
cover the PCC and Canadianization charges.
The NEP stipulated that the “blended price will 
never exceed 85% of the international price or the 
average price of oil in the United States, whichever is 
lower” (p. 30). Obviously Canadian prices would be 
maintained below international prices. There were 
curiosities in this blended price ceiling, although they 
were not commented on in the NEP. In particular, 
consider the suggestion that  “if by 1990 the conven-
tional oil price is still below that for reference price 
oil, consideration should be given to a more rapid rate 
of escalation” (p. 27). How does this relate to the “85% 
of world price” ceiling for a blended oil price? (We 
shall abstract from tertiary oil with a price between oil 
sands and conventional oil, and the possibility of U.S. 
prices below world levels.) Clearly the price of conven-
tional crude must be less than 85 per cent of the world 
price, if the blended price is to be at 85 per cent or less. 
(The lower conventional price must compensate for 
oil imports at the world price.) The greater the pro-
portion of imports, the lower is the ceiling price for 
conventional oil.
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Simple algebra can be used to demonstrate these 
connections. Assume there are only conventional oil 
and oil imports, and that fc is the fraction of refiner 
oil that is met by Canadian production. Clearly (1–fc) 
is the import share. Let Pw be the world price. Then 
the 85 per cent limit on blended price implies that the 
maximum price for conventional oil (pcm) would be 
determined in the following equation:
(.85)pw = fc (pcm) + (1–fc) pw (Eq. 1)
Solving for pcm gives:
pcm = (fcpw–.15pw)/fc (Eq. 2)
For example, if Canada were self-sufficient (fc = 1), 
then the maximum conventional oil price (pcm) would 
be 85 per cent of the world level. But if imports meet 
50 per cent of Canadian demand, then the maximum 
conventional price would be 70 per cent of the world 
level. That is, the more dependent Canada is on 
imported oil, the lower the ceiling price on domestic 
conventional oil! This is a perverse result. We can 
only assume that it reflected the strong belief of the 
framers of the NEP that the real world oil price would 
continue to rise, so that the schedule of conventional 
prices was unlikely to hit the maximum price allow-
able. Consider, for example, the scheduled prices for 
July 1990 (NEP, p. 26) of $79.65/b for the oil sands 
reference price and $66.75/b for conventional oil. 
The conventional oil price is almost 84 per cent of 
the reference price. If the world real price had stayed 
constant (using the CPI inflation factors), then con-
ventional oil could receive the scheduled $66.75/b 
only if imports provided 7 1/2 per cent or less of 
Canadian consumption. (In equation 1 above, substi-
tute Pw = $79.65 and pcm = $66.75, and solve for fc.) The 
suggestion that the conventional price might acceler-
ate to the oil sands reference price would depend on 
even higher world oil prices. For example, if the con-
ventional price were to rise all the way to the oil sands 
reference price, and Canadian production met 80 per 
cent of refinery demand, the world price would have 
to be at least $98.03/b. If Canadian production were 
60 per cent of consumption, the world price would 
have to be $106.20/b before conventional oil could be 
priced at the oil sands reference price.
If the nominal world oil price remained at the late 
1980 level of about $38.00/b, and the import share 
stayed at about one-third, the ceiling price for con-
ventional oil would be $29.50/b, a level attained under 
the NEP schedule in January 1985. If the CPI increases 
implied by the oil sands reference price series were 
to prove accurate, they would imply a real price of 
conventional oil in January 1985 of about $20.75/b (in 
1980 dollars), a rise of 23 per cent above the August 
1980 price. Thus, it is not at all clear that the NEP price 
schedule, considered in real terms, would provide 
“strong encouragement for industry’s efforts” (p. 27). 
Only if inflation rates slowed appreciably would real 
conventional oil prices rise significantly.
The terms of the NEP (especially the tax com-
ponents discussed in Chapter Eleven) and its uni-
lateral nature brought an immediate retaliatory 
response from Alberta. Premier Lougheed made a 
province-wide TV appearance on October 30, 1980, 
just two days after the federal budget presentation, 
dramatically opening it with the statement that “the 
Ottawa government has, without negotiation, without 
agreement, simply walked into our home and occu-
pied the living room.” He announced that Alberta 
oil output would be cut back by 15 per cent (180,000 
b/d) in three equal steps commencing March 1, 
1981, with three month lags between steps. In addi-
tion, any pending synthetic crude projects would be 
put on hold. (In the event of a disruption in inter-
national supplies to Canada, Alberta would rescind 
the cutbacks.) The federal government responded by 
announcing that the Petroleum Compensation Charge 
would be increased to cover the cost of any addi-
tional crude imports, as happened on March 1 and 
June 1, 1981.
Serious negotiations between Edmonton and 
Ottawa began in early spring 1981, with agreement 
reached late in the summer. (James, 1990, considers 
the interactions between Ottawa and Alberta in the 
context of game theory.)
b. 1981 Memorandum of Agreement. The September 
1, 1981, agreement was to last for five years. It main-
tained the blended oil price concept but modified 
the October 1980 NEP oil price schedules and intro-
duced an additional category of Canadian oil pro-
duction. This was “new oil,” and it was given a “New 
Oil Reference Price” (NORP). NORP applied to most 
synthetic oil (including Suncor oil), oil from Canada 
Lands (the frontiers with Crown land owned by the 
federal government) and “new” Alberta conventional 
oil (p. 3). New oil included oil in pools discovered in 
1981 and later, bitumen from experimental and new 
projects begun in 1981 or later and additional pet-
roleum due to EOR schemes (other than waterflood) 
beginning in 1981 or later (p. 3). Syncrude oil would, 
essentially, receive the international price. A five-year 
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schedule of NORP prices in Montreal implied a well-
head price rising from $45.92/b January 1, 1982 in six 
month increments to $77.48/b in July 1986 (p. 4). (The 
January 1982 price was almost 10% above the oil sands 
reference price given in October 1980, and the July 
1986 price was 32% higher.) However, the world oil 
price set a ceiling for NORP (p. 5).
The remainder of Alberta crude was labelled “con-
ventional old oil.” Its price rose by $2.00/b October 1, 
1981, by $2.20/b on January 1 and July 1, 1982, and by 
$1.00/b every six months thereafter (p. 2). This meant 
a price of $23.50/b on January 1, 1982, compared to 
$19.75 under the October 1980 schedule; by July 1986 
the price of $57.75/b was $19.00 higher than that in 
the October 1980 schedule. Thus the late 1980 conven-
tional price was, ostensibly, almost 50 per cent higher 
under the September 1981 Memorandum than the 
October 1980 budget. However, the difference pre-
sumed rising world oil prices. Under the September 
Memorandum of Agreement, the old oil price was not 
to exceed 75 per cent of the world price (p. 2). So long 
as Canadian production served at least 60 per cent 
of the Canadian market, the price ceiling under the 
Memorandum of Agreement exceeded the October 
1980 maximum. The Memorandum noted (p. 1, in the 
Summary) that the July 1986 price was 75 per cent 
of a “moderate world oil price forecast.” It was also 
provided that if “the conventional old oil price has 
already exceeded the 75% limit, there will be no roll-
back or retroactive adjustment” (p. 64). Shortly after 
September 1981, the NORP was extended to almost all 
experimental oil projects and to pentanes plus.
As under the original NEP, the refiner purchase 
price would reflect the conventional old oil price 
plus the Petroleum Compensation Charge (PCC). 
“Subject to the fiscal undertakings contained in this 
Agreement, it is the intention of the government of 
Canada to set the level of the PCC so as to leave no 
revenue in excess of the amount required to finance 
oil import compensation and oil qualifying for the 
New Oil Reference Price, for the period 1981–1986” 
(pp. 8–9).
c. June 1982 Update. International oil prices failed to 
rise as the 1980 and 1981 NEP documents had antici-
pated, so the 100 per cent of world price provision 
immediately supplanted the NORP schedule. In June 
1982, Ottawa issued a NEP Update 1982 (EMR, 1982), 
which reaffirmed the goals of the NEP (“security,” 
“opportunity,” and “fairness”) and expressed “pleasure 
with progress made to date” (p. iv). The Update noted 
“a current price softness, and a perception that this 
may signal a more moderate price outlook” (p. 10) but 
went on to argue that “there seems to be a preponder-
ance of factors leading to higher, rather than lower, 
prices” (p. 10). On balance, “the outlook, however, 
is not necessarily for either low or high prices, but 
for uncertain prices” (p. 11). Despite this, for “plan-
ning purposes,” the Update assumed rising nominal 
prices, with the real price rising at 2 per cent per year 
after 1983.
In an effort to offer further support to Canadian 
production, the Update extended the NORP, as of 
January 1, 1983, to all tertiary recovery projects, all 
experimental projects and output from wells that 
had been suspended for at least three years (subject 
to qualifications related to provincial royalties) (pp. 
74–75). More significantly, a new category of oil was 
created, and allowed, as of July 1, 1983, 75 per cent of 
the world price. This was a SOOP (Special Old Oil 
Price) applicable to oil from pools discovered after 
1973 but before the NORP date of January 1, 1981.
d. 1983–85. The weakness in world oil prices con-
tinued, with OPEC reducing its price in March 1983 
from $34.00/b to $29.00/b (U.S. dollars for 34° Saudi 
Arabia oil in the Persian Gulf). Conventional old oil 
(at $29.75/b) now exceeded the 75 per cent of world 
price ceiling, so was frozen at that level. In June 1983 
a revision of the NEP extended the NORP to oil from 
infill wells and moved the SOOP to NORP. NORP, of 
course, was at the international price, well below the 
prices set out in the September 1981 schedules.
Thus the original NEP price increases, set under 
schedules that basically assumed Canadian oil prices 
would always be independent of and below world oil 
prices (the “made-in-Canada” pricing regime), were 
superseded by schedules expressing oil prices as a 
direct function of world oil prices. By the summer 
of 1984, essentially two types of oil were identified. 
“New” oil was syncrude, conventional oil discovered 
after 1973 and tertiary recovery; it received world 
prices. The remainder of production was “old” oil, 
accounting for about 60 per cent of total Canadian 
production; it received 75 per cent of the world 
price (or more, if the prevailing price of $29.75/
bbl was greater than 75 per cent of the world price). 
Within this basic distinction was a proliferation of 
categories of oil (ten in Alberta) on which new or 
old status was conferred. And it is remarkable how 
much old oil became new at the stroke of a pen! By 
mid-1984 the NORP, anticipated in the September 
1981 Memorandum to be $63/b by June 1984, was in 
fact $39/b.
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The convolutions in the various categories of oil 
produced and the complexities of oil import com-
pensation created myriad administrative headaches, 
especially with regard to appropriate quality differ-
entials and the lags involved in tying domestic prices 
to world prices. The complications led eventually to 
instances where some Canadian crude oils were priced 
above world levels. (For example, this would happen 
if world prices were weak while NORP prices were 
tied either to lagged world prices or to official OPEC 
prices which did not reflect current market discounts.) 
Under these circumstances, Canadian buyers would 
be under an incentive to purchase foreign crude even 
though Canadian oil was available, as some Mont-
real refiners were doing by 1984. Differential import 
compensation for crude oil and products also led to 
anomalies whereby it was cheaper to import foreign 
products into Canada, receive compensation, and shut 
in Canadian crude oil. Occasionally, the combination 
of import compensation and export taxes resulted in 
a situation where a product could be imported into 
one area of the country, with compensation paid by 
the federal government, then exported from another 
province and the export tax paid, with the original 
importer making a profit on the transaction. (Helliwell 
et al., 1989, pp. 46–47, provide somewhat more detail 
on import valuation and product differentials.)
By the time the new Progressive Conservative 
federal government was elected in September 1984, 
it had become clear that most elements of the NEP 
were insufficiently sensitive to the vagaries of the oil 
market. The steadily increasing world price, which 
had formed the backdrop to the NEP, had not mater-
ialized. The market for oil, with a heterogeneous prod-
uct, complex refineries, and a world market becoming 
increasingly ‘commoditized,’ proved difficult to regu-
late by direct control. Regulations became increasingly 
elaborate and costly to administer.
Change was at hand. (See Section 5, below.)
B. Evaluation of the Direct Control Period
1. Effects of Direct Controls
As discussed in our analysis of the National Oil Policy, 
the effects of a government program must be set out 
in contrast to a hypothetical situation, namely the 
world as it would have been without the program. 
Definition of this hypothetical world calls on the 
judgment of the economic analyst, and economists 
may well disagree. Our presumption is that rising 
world oil prices would have brought the NOP to an 
end in any event and that the alternative to direct 
controls would have been a largely unregulated crude 
oil market. (Presumably Alberta conservation regula-
tions, designed to ensure good production practices 
in oil reservoirs, would have continued.) The United 
States would have dismantled the Oil Import Quota 
Program, as it did in actuality. With the disappearance 
of spare production capacity in the United States, 
crude oil imports become the marginal source of 
crude oil supply. World oil prices would determine 
the price for Canadian-produced crude oil, as Can-
adian oil commanded the world price in U.S. markets, 
and met barrel-to-barrel with imported crude in the 
Niagara Peninsula. The U.S., eager to reduce reliance 
on crude from OPEC, and the unstable Middle East in 
particular, would welcome flows of oil from Canada. 
Potentially this could involve the diversion of western 
Canadian crude from the populated regions of south-
ern Ontario into markets in the United States closer to 
Alberta (the Midwest, including Chicago). We assume 
that the existence of an established pipeline link 
(Interprovincial Pipe Line) to Port Credit, plus likely 
opposition from Ottawa and the Ontario provincial 
government would mean that Canadian crude oil con-
tinued to serve the Toronto area. However, the Mont-
real extension would not have been built. If anything, 
pressure might have existed to build a west-flowing 
line from Montreal to allow imports into the Toronto/
Sarnia market.
The impact of the direct control period was to 
limit the volume of exports to the United States and 
to hold Canadian prices below the international level. 
The general effects on the crude oil market are illus-
trated in Figure 9.2. (Comparative static analyses like 
this have been used by many economists analyzing 
post-1973 Canadian oil policies. See Watkins, 1977a, 
1981; Waverman, 1975; Thirsk and Wright, 1977; and 
Powrie and Gainer, 1977. Waverman and Watkins, 
1985, focus on the impacts on the downstream oil 
industry.) This is a simplified ‘generic’ policy that 
holds the price to both Canadian producers and con-
sumers (pc) below the world price (pw). As we shall 
discuss below, the actual Canadian regulations varied 
over time and did not always exactly fit this simple 
analytical model. In Figure 9.2, Panel (a) shows the 
“western Canadian” market (WORV), while Panel 
(b) shows “eastern Canada” (EORV), following the 
established consumption regions as established under 
the NOP. In Panel (a), DWC is the western Canadian 
demand curve, and Sc the supply curve. In Panel (b), 
DEC is the eastern Canadian demand curve.
Government Regulation 257
In western Canada, the effect of direct controls 
on price was to hold the Canadian price below world 
levels (Pc < Pw) to encourage additional consumption 
(Q4 > Q1) and to discourage production (Q2 < Q5). 
Exports fell from (Q5 – Q1) to (Q2 – Q4). Oil consum-
ers benefit from reduced prices on the oil they would 
consume at the higher price; they pay an amount 
less indicated by area Pc AJPw. In addition, there is 
a consumers’ surplus gain of ABJ on the incremen-
tal output. The Canadian government gains export 
tax revenue equal to BDHI. Oil-producing interests 
(shareholders in oil companies and governments that 
receive payments from the industry’s economic rent) 
lose because of the lower prices and reduced con-
sumption. Total dollar losses of Pc EFPw plus Q2Q5ED 
are partly matched by reduced production costs of 
Q2DFQ5.
If there are additional limitations on the volume of 
exports, as was true, particularly for light and medium 
crude over the 1973 to 1985 period, then export vol-
umes could be further reduced to (Q3 – Q4) with a 
loss of revenue to producers of Q3Q2DC, a saving to 
producers of costs (Q3KDQ2) and a loss of export tax 
revenue to the government (CDHG).
In eastern Canada (Panel [b] of Figure 9.2), the 
decision to impose a made-in-Canada price (Pc) lower 
than the world price (Pw) generates increased con-
sumption (Q1Q2). Consumers benefit from reduced 
payments on what would be bought at the higher price 
plus a consumer’s surplus gain (Pc BDPw). Taxpayers 
finance oil imports in the amount of Pc BCPw. It can be 
seen that the export tax revenue will partly or entirely 
balance import subsidies, depending on whether 
or not exports are less than, equal to, or greater 
than imports.
Figure 9.2 illustrates, in general, the effects on 
Canadian oil markets of the direct government con-
trols from 1973 to 1985. The precise impacts are more 
complex. For example, beginning with Syncrude in 
1977, and with increasing complexity thereafter, some 
Canadian production was allowed prices higher than 
the rest of output, with the price to consumers lying 
between the world price and the lowest producer 
prices. Another example relates to the oil export 
volume limitations and taxes, which varied depending 
upon the grade of the crude oil, with tighter volume 
limits and higher taxes on lighter crudes. Estimation 
of the impact of the oil price and export controls over 
the 1973 to 1985 period is, therefore, difficult.
Moreover, as was noted above, the impacts of poli-
cies can be assessed only in relation to that never-seen 
universe that would have occurred had the policies 
not been imposed. We shall assume that Canadian 
prices would have been at the world level and that the 
U.S. market, in its desire to reduce dependence on 
OPEC oil, would have been willing to absorb whatever 
exports Canadian producers would have been will-
ing to make. Since Canada is a small producer at the 
global level, we assume that an absence of Canadian 
price controls would have had no effect on the price 
of international crude. Hence the crude oil price con-
trols meant lower prices to Canadian consumers and 
producers than would otherwise have occurred. The 
impact on the federal government is more compli-
cated, since it would not have received oil export tax 
revenue (or such receipts as the Syncrude Levy) but 
would also not have had to subsidize oil imports. Fur-
ther, as Chapter Eleven discusses, the revenue received 
by the federal government from the oil industry is 
determined in part by the crude oil price; after 1980, 
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Figure 9.2 Canadian Oil under the NEP
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under the NEP, and no one can know what the tax (or 
rent collection) provisions might have been had the 
government not proceeded with the price control pro-
visions of the NEP.
Export levels are also subject to great uncertainty. 
We assume ready willingness of the United States to 
accept Canadian oil and presume there were amounts 
available that would be excess to consumption levels 
(at the world price) in established Canadian markets 
for Canadian crude (i.e., WORV). Restrictions under 
the USOIQP had disappeared. However, amounts 
available would depend in part on the Alberta 
market-demand prorationing regulations and in part 
on the balance over time between reservoir depletion 
and reserves additions at international price levels. 
One might assume that high exports in the mid-
1970s would have absorbed excess capacity and run 
down domestic oil producibility more rapidly – this, 
after all, was the concern that led to export limits on 
crude in the first place. But, as we have noted, crude 
availability is less a physical phenomenon than an 
economic one, and the greater demand for oil and 
higher prices would offer a stronger inducement to 
add reserves thereby supporting or even increasing 
export capabilities.
Helliwell et al. (1989) undertook detailed econo-
metric analysis of the Canadian petroleum industry, 
including estimation of equations to describe aggre-
gate production and consumption decisions. Those 
equations can then be utilized to provide estimates of 
how the industry might have behaved had conditions 
been different. Thus, their Chapter 10 looks at the 
actual course of events in the overt control period, 
1973–85, and compares them with four other sets of 
circumstances that might possibly have occurred. One 
of the scenarios assumes that Canadian oil and natural 
gas prices had been free to move to market-clearing 
levels throughout the 1973 to 1985 period, and that 
export volumes were also largely uncontrolled. (Since 
industry expenditures depend on oil and gas prices, 
it is necessary that some assumption be made about 
gas market regulations as well as those for crude oil. 
We would note that the assumptions about crude are 
relatively uncontroversial – Canadian domestic and 
export prices follow world levels, and any feasible 
production in excess of domestic requirements is 
exported. The appropriate assumptions for natural 
gas are harder, for reasons set out in Chapter Twelve. 
Helliwell et al. basically assume a fixed ratio of gas to 
oil prices, and that gas export volumes equal histor-
ical levels after 1979 when the United States exhibited 
signs of gas surplus.) Helliwell et al. find that in the 
deregulated case oil export volumes are much higher 
than were observed historically, being “relatively con-
stant over most of the simulation period, averaging 
about 260 million barrels per year (113,000 m3/d) 
during the 1974–85 period and then falling gradually” 
(p. 200). Table 6.1 shows that actual oil exports from 
Alberta did increase substantially with deregulation 
rising to about 104,000 m3/d by 1993 from some 
43,000 m3/d in 1984. This was still below 1973 exports 
of almost 160,000 m3/d. However, it suggests that the 
Helliwell et al. estimate of Canadian exports of 113,000 
m3/d without regulations from 1974 to 1985 is quite 
reasonable. In the absence of the overt controls, the 
Sarnia–Montreal pipeline extension would not have 
been built. So at least a part of the increased exports 
would be met, not by increased production, but by 
increased imports into Quebec. (Deliveries of Alberta 
oil to the Montreal market hit a peak of 42,000 m3/d 
in 1980.)
The price effects of the overt control period are 
somewhat difficult to establish exactly. Table 6.3 
provides a record of year-end prices for the main cat-
egories of oil, but prices changed at various points of 
time during the year, and it must be remembered that 
different prices applied to different categories of crude. 
Table 9.3 provides a summary of pricing in the 1973–85 
period on the assumption that there are three categor-
ies of oil: imported crude, domestic “old” crude, and 
(for 1982–85) domestic “new” crude. It is assumed that 
synthetic crude from the tar sands received the world 
price, which was true for most of the period, and held 
for all new projects. We have not shown the “Special 
Old Oil Price” (SOOP), which applied to oil discovered 
from 1974 to 1980 and received a price between the old 
and new oil prices; this category existed for only one 
year, from mid-1982 to mid-1983, whereupon it was 
“NORPed” into the new oil category. Table 9.3 does not 
make complete allowance for quality differentiation 
problems, but the price differences shown are repre-
sentative of those that existed in the overt price con-
trol years. Prices for “old” oil were less than $1.00/bbl 
below world prices when crude prices were frozen in 
late 1973 and were generally held $2.50 to $4.00 lower 
through to the sharp increase in OPEC prices, which 
began in late 1978. The differential then grew rapidly, 
to over $22.00/bbl by 1981, subsequently falling as 
Canadian prices rose and international prices began 
to weaken.
By early 1985, immediately prior to deregulation of 
Canadian crude prices, the price of old oil was about 
$8.00/b below the international level. (Recall that 
“old” oil, in essence, was production from any reserves 
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proved up prior to the start of 1980, except that reserve 
additions associated with new discoveries from the 
start of 1974 through 1980 were allowed higher prices 
beginning in 1982, first as SOOP, then NORP. Oil from 
enhanced recovery projects beyond waterflooding 
was also largely shifted to these categories.) “New” oil 
prices were identical to old until the September 1981 
Memorandum of Agreement, then, starting January 1, 
1982, were given the NORP values (which turned out 
to be the international level) from 1982 on. More diffi-
cult to assess accurately is the netback on lifted oil or 
reserves additions, which depend not just on oil prices 
but also on taxes and costs; such netbacks play an 
important role in the oil supply models discussed in 
Chapter Eight. Scarfe (1984), amongst others, provides 
some netback estimates for the NEP years.
Prices to energy users throughout Canada were 
the old oil price plus a variety of “consumer levies,” 
designed to generate the overt control policy’s “made-
in-Canada” blended price. (Consumers also paid 
actual or hypothetical transmission costs from Alberta 
to their market.) The levies include: the “Syncrude” 
charge introduced in 1978, the Canadianization 
charges introduced in 1981, and the charges designed 
to cover the costs in excess of old oil prices for imports 
and new oil introduced with the NEP. Until 1978, the 
differential between the world price and the lower 
price paid by consumers was the same as the price 
differential for producers. After that, the differential 
was smaller for consumers than producers of old oil; 
the peak consumer price subsidy of over $18/b was hit 
in 1980, but it fell sharply after that to under $2.00 by 
1983–85. The consumer subsidy was, in fact, much less 
than anticipated in the NEP or the 1981 Memorandum, 
but this was because international prices did not rise 
as rapidly as those agreements expected.
Table 9.3: Average Annual Prices of Oil in the Overt Control Period ($/b)
 World Price (PW) Canadian Producer Prices Consumer Levies Consumer Price (PC) Price Differentials
 ‘Old’ Oil (PO) ‘New’ Oil (PN) PW-PO PW-PN PW-PC
1973* 4.57 3.80 3.80 0 3.80 0.77 0.77 0.77
1974 9.74 5.825 5.825 0 5.825 3.915 3.915 3.915
1975 11.20 7.25 7.25 0 7.25 3.95 3.95 3.95
1976 11.46 8.525 8.525 0 8.525 2.935 2.935 2.935
1977 13.58 10.25 10.25  0 10.25 3.330 3.330 3.330
1978 14.76 12.25 12.25 0.05 12.30 2.51 2.51 2.46
1979 21.09 13.25 13.25 0.45 13.65 7.84 7.84 7.39
1980 35.75 15.583 15.583 1.47 17.023 20.167 20.167 18.697
1981 41.38 18.875 18.875 8.14 27.015 22.505 22.505 14.365
1982 39.99 24.625 39.99 7.45 31.075 15.365 0 8.915
1983 35.23 29.75 35.23 4.91 34.66 5.48 0 0.57
1984 36.99 29.75 36.99 5.30 35.05 7.24 0 1.94
1985* 37.79 29.75 37.79 7.69 37.44 8.04 0 0.35
Notes: 
*	=	last	four	months	of	1973	and	first	five	months	of	1985.
World price is the average cost of oil imports at Montreal as reported in the CAPP Statistical Handbook less $1.31/b for Edmonton–Montreal pipeline transmission. (This 
was the June 1985 pipeline tariff as reported in the 1986 Canadian Petroleum Monitoring Survey of the Petroleum Monitoring Agency.)
Canadian prices are those set by regulation as Edmonton prices of ‘par crude.’ Prices are time-weighted averages. Until the 1981 Memorandum of Agreement only 
synthetic crude oil, and starting with the October 1980 NEP, a small amount of tertiary crude, received a higher price than old oil. Accordingly, a different new oil price is 
not recorded until 1982. It is assumed that new oil received the world price beginning in January 1982.
Consumer levies are the petroleum compensation charge (PCC), special compensation charge (SCC), and Canadianization of oil special charge (COSP), as reported in the 
1986 Canadian Petroleum Industry Monitoring Survey of the Petroleum Monitoring Agency. The levies are time-weighted averages for the year.
Consumer price	is	the	old	oil	price	plus	the	consumer	levies.	This	is	defined	at	the	Alberta	border.	For	consumers	in	other	markets,	the	differential	with	world	prices	
would be smaller than this suggests because of the added transmission component.
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2. Normative Analysis of Strict (Overt) Controls
As with our discussion of the NOP, we shall begin with 
an analysis of the efficiency of the policies focussing 
on the oil market in isolation, after which we shall 
briefly consider other possible reasons for the govern-
ment regulations.
a.  Efficiency of Strict Controls
In comparison to an unregulated market with Can-
adian oil prices set by world crude oil prices, the 
period of overt controls, culminating in the NEP, 
served to keep prices to Canadian oil producers and 
consumers lower than they would otherwise have 
been. In addition, a crude oil pipeline extension to 
Montreal took place, which would otherwise not likely 
have occurred, and crude oil exports – mainly of light 
oil – were restricted. The restriction was likely of a 
greater volume than implied by the diversion of Can-
adian oil from the export market to Montreal. Viewed 
through a political lens, the main effect was to benefit 
crude-oil-consuming interests across the country at 
the expense of crude-oil-producing interests (centred 
largely in Alberta). Such effects are, however, largely 
transfers from one group of Canadians to another 
and therefore cancel without net efficiency effects. 
Economic efficiency looks quite different from a nar-
rower Alberta perspective, where there is a significant 
outflow from the Alberta government, Alberta oil 
producers, and others in the province to other parts 
of Canada. (See Mansell and Percy, 1990, Appendix A, 
for an assessment of this at the government level). As 
Figure 9.2 illustrated, from a Canadian perspective, 
the low price policy does have two types of efficiency 
cost (or deadweight loss). First, it engendered incre-
mental oil consumption with values to consumers less 
than the world oil price (which represents the oppor-
tunity cost to the country of the oil consumed); that 
is, the gain in consumers’ surplus from using the oil 
was less than the cost of the oil. Second, the low price 
discouraged the addition of supplies even though the 
cost of the incremental oil was below its value in inter-
national markets; that is, there was a loss of economic 
rent to the country. In addition, there were the costs of 
building and operating the Sarnia–Montreal leg of the 
Interprovincial Pipe Line.
Table 9.4 provides approximate estimates of the 
size of these efficiency losses. (Analysis begins with 
1974, since the price freeze began only in September 
1973, and prices were held only slightly below inter-
national levels for the rest of that year.) The method 
utilized is identical to that applied in analyzing the 
efficiency of the NOP. In particular, straight line supply 
and demand curves were assumed with elasticities of 
0.3 and –0.6, respectively, at the observed production 
and consumption points. (Thirsk and Wright, 1977, 
amongst others, apply this approach using a variety 
of elasticity assumptions.) Our elasticities are taken 
to be representative of the long run. The approach is, 
therefore, static, even though the underlying processes 
are dynamic. For example, short-run rigidities in 
adjustment are not taken into account, and there is no 
formal allowance for the ongoing effects of reserves 
additions. Moreover, unlike the NOP years, when Can-
adian oil prices were relatively fixed, the overt control 
period saw significant changes in prices. This implies 
some inconsistency between two key assumptions. 
For example, a straight line demand curve will have 
different elasticities at every price (with a higher elas-
ticity at higher prices). (Unless the supply curve passes 
through the origin, it, too, will have different elastici-
ties at every price.) Yet we have assumed a constant 
elasticity in each year at whatever price was observed, 
and prices tended to rise significantly over the period, 
implying hyperbolic demand and supply functions. 
Clearly our calculations must be taken as indicative of 
efficiency effects, not precise estimates.
We have ignored the operating costs of the 
Montreal pipeline but include the capital cost and 
an assumed 10 per cent required rate of return on 
un-depreciated capital; the line was assumed to be 
depreciated on a straight line bases over twenty-five 
years (i.e., 4%/year). The economic rent inefficiency 
was assumed to apply to conventional oil only, since 
incremental tar sands projects were allowed the world 
price throughout the period.
The inefficiencies of the price and trade control 
regulations were large, as Table 9.4 shows, with an 
average annual value of over $1.2 billion. In the peak 
year (1980), they amounted to $6.3 billion, which 
was 2 per cent of Canadian GDP. The costs tended 
to become lower from 1974 to 1978 as Canadian oil 
prices approached world prices but ballooned in the 
next two years as world oil prices exploded. They fell 
sharply thereafter for several reasons. When world 
oil prices levelled off, and then began to soften, the 
gap between Canadian and world prices narrowed 
once again. Recall that this was fortuitous, rather 
than a matter of policy, as the October 1980 NEP and 
September 1981 Memorandum were wrong in their 
forecasts of rising OPEC prices. A second factor was 
the major change initiated in the 1981 Memorandum 
to allow higher (as it happened, world) prices for a 
potentially large volume of new oil. Table 9.4 assumes 
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that all potential incremental oil supplies received the 
world price after 1981, so that no further economic 
rent losses occurred. In fact, this underestimates rent 
losses, since the incorporation of different supply 
sources in the new oil category took place more grad-
ually than that implies. For example, the full world 
price for extension drilling new additions in pools 
discovered between 1974 and 1980 was not granted 
until mid-1983. Further, some potential incremental 
oil production never received the world price. Con-
sider the abandonment decision. Prices lower than 
the world level for oil from wells in pools discovered 
prior to 1974 would generate an earlier shutdown 
time. However, since these pools have relatively low 
output rates and high operating costs, the rent fore-
gone would be relatively small. (This is, however, a 
rather perverse result in a policy that took energy 
self-sufficiency as an important objective). The Annual 
Reports of the APMC record payments to Alberta oil 
producers for the crude handled by the APMC, includ-
ing the payments above the old oil price for SOOP and 
NORP. They suggest that the proportion of Alberta oil 
production classified as “new” rose from 4 per cent in 
1982 to 38 per cent by 1985.
Overall, the overt control period generated large 
inefficiencies in the Canadian crude oil market. By the 
end of the period, the inefficiencies had been reduced 
significantly. However, this was in part accidental as 
world oil prices weakened and came only with a com-
plex administrative structure with more and more 
different categories of crude, some ten by 1984.
b. Other Aspects of Strict Controls
Other reasons for the pricing and trade poli-
cies adopted in the overt control period include 
macroeconomic stabilization, national security, 
Table	9.4:	Efficiency	Costs	of	Overt	Controls	(106 Canadian dollars)
 Consumption Losses Economic Rent Foregone Montreal Pipeline Costs Total
1974 498.83 259.08 0 757.91
1975 398.20 181.08 185.00 764.28
1976 191.86 77.28 18.50 287.64
1977 214.85 83.25 17.76 315.86
1978 95.00 38.76 17.02 150.78
1979 847.93 386.63 16.28 1,250.84
1980 4,230.48 2,013.01 15.54 6,259.03
1981 1,451.16 1,871.57 14.80 3,337.53
1982 417.16 0 14.06 431.22
1983 1.43 0 13.32 14.75
1984 16.86 0 12.58 29.44
1985 0.48 0 11.84 12.32
Total 8,364.24 4,910.66 336.70 13,611.60
yearly Average 760.39 446.42 30.60 1,237.42
Notes: 
The yearly average is for 1974 through 1984.
The analysis assumes straight-line demand and supply curves over the relevant price ranges. An elasticity of demand of –0.6 and an elasticity of supply of 0.3 are 
assumed.	For	the	mechanics	of	the	calculation	of	efficiency	losses,	see	the	discussion	in	Table	9.2.
Consumption losses: Assumes that the demand curve passes through the point given by the consumer price of Table 9.3 and an estimate of Canadian crude oil utiliza-
tion as derived from Annual Reports of the NEB. This estimate is derived by adding crude oil imports to production and subtracting exports. (It therefore abstracts from 
stock changes and net product imports.) The consumer price subsidy is given by the difference between world price and consumer price reported in Table 9.3.
Economic rent foregone: Assume the supply curve passes through a point given by the new oil price of Table 9.3 and a production level equal to Canadian production as 
reported in the NEB Annual Reports less Syncrude production as reported in the ERCB Annual Statistic Summary. The price differential due to the policy is given by the 
world price–new oil price differential of Table 9.3.
Montreal pipeline: The 1975 Annual Report	of	the	NEB	noted	the	issuance	of	a	public	certificate	on	May	21,	1975	(#OC-30)	for	construction	of	the	520-mile	30”	diameter	
line.	Estimated	capital	cost	was	$185	million.	It	was	assumed	that	this	sum	was	spent	in	1975.	Operating	costs	other	than	return	on	capital	were	assumed	to	be	insignifi-
cant. Capital is assumed to be depreciated over 25 years on a straight-line basis, and a 10% return on undepreciated capital included as a cost of the line.
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conservation, and rent-sharing. Similar arguments 
were discussed when we reviewed the NOP, though 
the direction of connection ran the opposite way in 
the overt control period, since prices were held below 
world levels, rather than above as during the NOP. We 
shall comment only briefly on three of the arguments 
and will save most of our discussion of rent-sharing 
issues for Chapter Eleven.
Macroeconomic Stabilization. Rising international oil 
prices have been implicated in the ‘stagflation’ (con-
current recession, or slow growth, and inflation) that 
began to characterize many economies in the 1970s. In 
brief, it was argued that rising oil prices (which tended 
to pull up the prices of other energy products) pro-
vided a ‘cost-push’ effect on price levels. Since prices 
of many goods tend to be rigid in a downward direc-
tion, a rise in the price of a key input such as energy 
can generate a rise in the average price level, and if 
other inputs – e.g., labour – operate to increase their 
prices as general price levels rise, additional upward 
price pressure is created. At the same time, the higher 
payments for energy – especially payments to OPEC – 
meant that consumers had less to spend on other 
goods and services so the demand for them fell, gen-
erating recessionary pressures and higher unemploy-
ment rates. OPEC members were, in the aggregate, net 
savers in the years immediately following an oil-price 
increase, so their spending did not rise by enough 
to offset spending declines by oil consumers. Nor, of 
course, did OPEC members necessarily distribute extra 
spending geographically in the same proportions as 
their extra earnings. OPEC’s utilization of funds was 
commonly referred to as a ‘recycling’ problem. (These 
macroeconomic arguments about the effect of changes 
in oil prices have been controversial. A review and 
sceptical view is Barsky and Kilian, 2004.)
Evidence on this issue is discussed by Helliwell 
et al. (1989, chap. 11) for Canada. They note that the 
direct recessionary effects of an energy price rise on 
a net energy importing nation is generally supple-
mented by indirect recessionary impulses as other 
countries suffering from recessions reduce their 
imports of goods and services from this country. 
Qualifications to the analysis may be required for a 
country like Canada, which was a net energy exporter 
in 1973, since higher energy prices mean increased 
international earnings and a stimulus to invest-
ment in energy industries. Helliwell et al. use a large 
macroeconomic model, with a well-structured energy 
sector – the MACE (Macro and Energy) model – to 
simulate the operation of the Canadian economy 
under a variety of scenarios.
What would have happened had Canadian polices 
been the same in the overt control period except that 
petroleum prices were allowed to go to world levels? 
They find that Canadian real GNP would have been 
lower in every year by amounts ranging from one half 
of one per cent to 2.5 per cent; price levels would have 
been higher (pp. 212–14). However, the implication 
that higher oil prices tend to be stagflationary for 
Canada requires further consideration. In particular, 
a second simulation looks at both world pricing for 
petroleum and a policy of unregulated exports (espe-
cially for oil). In this case, price levels are still higher 
than was actually observed in the overt control period 
(except in 1984 and 1985), but real GNP is slightly 
lower only in 1974 and higher in other years, by as 
much as 3.5 per cent in 1983 (pp. 213–14). The domestic 
price controls and export limitations together, then, 
seem to have reduced inflation slightly but generated 
reduced real output.
Of course, both simulations involve comparison to 
a world history in which OPEC raised crude oil prices 
dramatically. What were the combined effects of the 
OPEC price shocks and the Canadian policies? Helli-
well et al. address this by a hypothetical simulation 
in which world oil prices rise smoothly over time as 
the general price level of expenditures in the United 
States did over this period. They find (pp. 223–25) 
stagflationary effects in what actually occurred relative 
to this hypothetical scenario without the sharp OPEC 
oil price changes; that is, the oil price increases tended 
to reduce real GDP and increase inflation. However, 
the extra inflation and reduced GDP are both smaller 
as actually observed than they would have been had 
Canada pursued a deregulated petroleum pricing 
policy. “Overall, the results suggest that domestic 
policies – especially domestic pricing policies – were 
successful in moderating to some extent the impact 
of the OPEC price shocks in the 1970s. … The results 
also indicate, however, that domestic policies had far 
less impact on the economy than the price shocks 
themselves” (p. 225). Helliwell et al. do not report a 
gradual price rise scenario where both price deregu-
lation and no oil export restrictions are considered; 
the earlier results suggest that this might exhibit a 
less pronounced recessionary effect than was actually 
observed.
Overall, the evidence in Helliwell et al. suggests 
that the policy of holding Canadian petroleum prices 
below world levels taken by itself did have the effect of 
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moderating the recessionary and inflationary effects 
of higher world oil prices in the 1974–85 period. Such 
gains must of course be set against the other effects 
of the policies, including the administrative costs of 
the programs and the efficiency losses. It is also fair to 
ask whether alternative macroeconomic stabilization 
policies might not have better attained the macro 
objectives. Moreover, it must be noted that macro-
economic stabilization seems unlikely to have been a 
prime rationale for the program since other policies 
of overt control period appear to have worked against 
relatively higher real growth. As was discussed above, 
the oil export limitations tended to reduce Canadian 
GNP, and so, according to Helliwell et al.’s simulations, 
did the various petroleum tax changes introduced 
by provincial and federal governments as petroleum 
prices rose.
Security of Supply. Amongst the measures of the 
direct control period were those limiting oil exports 
and extending the Interprovincial Pipe Line (IPL) to 
Montreal. After 1976, Montreal refineries began using 
western Canadian oil. Construction of the pipeline 
had the direct backing of the federal government; 
tariffs for the extension were subsidized until 1980, 
and after that the costs were spread over all the costs 
of the IPL system (i.e., ‘rolled in,’ so that Montreal 
refiners did not have to pay the full incremental cost 
of the extension). The eastward flow of Alberta oil as 
far as Montreal clearly required a regulatory directive. 
Even under the NEP, oil imports to Montreal started 
to rise in 1983 as regulated prices lagged behind weak-
ening international prices. With deregulation in 1985, 
exports of western Canadian crude oil to the United 
States increased, and exports to Montreal fell. By 1990, 
the Sarnia–Montreal extension was mothballed, and 
Canada once again relied on imports for Montreal 
refineries. In fact, by the mid-1990s, many were specu-
lating on whether the line should be reversed to allow 
imported crude into the Ontario market, as finally 
occurred in 1999.
The key question is whether this policy generated 
a national security benefit, and, if it did, whether it 
was commensurate with the costs of the policy. We 
shall not analyze this issue with any rigour but must 
express our scepticism about the national security 
argument. It is true that international crude oil move-
ments have been prone to disruption, especially those 
originating in the Middle East. However, analyses of 
the 1967, 1973/74, 1979/80, and 1990/91 crises show 
that the actual net losses of crude oil were very small 
relative to world consumption and that perceived 
shortages have been shared relatively equitably across 
the world. Further, Canada joined other members 
of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1975 to 
formalize a shared shortage plan. More fundamen-
tally, perhaps, several analyses suggest that the main 
‘shortages’ in previous crises were as much due to gov-
ernment regulations (e.g., “gasless Sundays”) as to the 
supply disruptions.
The increased willingness of countries to rely upon 
market mechanisms during supply crises – as evi-
denced by actions in the 1990 Gulf War – also affects 
the national security argument. Here, higher prices 
provide the conservation incentives needed to cope 
with the supply disruption and no ‘shortages’ appear 
because the market clears at the higher prices. Market 
reliance also casts doubt on the IEA emergency shar-
ing agreement since rising prices will spread the 
adjustments throughout the world without the neces-
sity for formal government allocation measures. A 
number of analysts have suggested that there is still a 
role for the utilization of strategic stockpiles to help 
blunt any crisis-induced price panics that might result 
from less than fully rational, destabilizing, changes 
in expectations.
Much is often unformulated in the national secur-
ity argument. Which uses of oil are critical to national 
security? And why wouldn’t these needs be among 
those that continue to be met during a crisis? To our 
mind, the more critical security of supply issues relate 
to the stability of market mechanisms during a crisis 
and the equity effects of a crisis (e.g., the impact upon 
the very poor of a large, sudden rise in the price of 
fuel oil used for heating). The first problem requires 
joint international monitoring in the market, whereas 
the brunt of the second most logically falls on social 
support programs. Neither is well addressed by the 
decision to hold domestic oil prices below world levels 
and to limit exports.
Conservation. Energy policies have often been justi-
fied on ‘conservation’ grounds, generally in terms of 
decreasing current use in order to increase supplies 
available in later periods. While such a claim might 
be made for the oil export regulations discussed in 
Section 3, it is harder to do so for the overt price con-
trols. As a package, oil and gas price levels were held 
lower than would have been expected on the basis 
of world prices, therefore encouraging more current 
consumption. While the high price of gas exports in 
the early 1980s did discourage foreign use of Canadian 
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gas, this seems to have been an unintended conse-
quence of the uniform border pricing policy and the 
emphasis on the substitution (replacement) value of 
the gas. By 1983, the government had introduced a 
volume discount plan to encourage higher exports. 
(Natural gas policies are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Twelve.)
Rent Sharing. As was noted in our discussion of 
Figure 9.2, a main effect of holding Canadian oil 
prices below the world level is to transfer revenue 
from oil producers to oil consumers. There is an added 
regional dimension to this since crude oil production 
is so concentrated in one part of the country. In 
such circumstances, concern with the distribution of 
rent between producing and consuming interests is 
likely to be felt by the central government. A regional 
government in the producing area, such as Alberta, is 
most likely to be concerned jointly with maximizing 
the size of the economic rent going to producing 
interests and with increasing the share of this rent, 
which goes to the government instead of companies. 
As we saw in our discussion of the NOP, the direct 
impact of lower oil prices tends to be moderately 
progressive across consuming groups, and the 
wealthier tend to benefit most from higher dividend 
payments from, or share prices for, oil companies. 
These equity concerns seem to have been a major 
impetus behind the federal government’s policies in 
the overt control period. This conclusion is reinforced 
by the observation that the package of measures 
introduced with the October 1980 NEP also included 
new taxes designed to capture more rent for the 
federal government.
Since the equity objectives of the overt control 
policies are so tied up with the issue of rent-sharing, 
we defer further discussion to Chapter Eleven, apart 
from one observation. One might justify the efficiency 
costs of the oil pricing policy on the grounds of equity 
gains, but this argument is valid only if there were 
no way to attain the equity objectives while allowing 
Canadian oil prices to rise to world levels. Are gov-
ernments unable to capture and redistribute a large 
share of rent as oil prices rise? And can the two levels 
of government not agree to share this rent? Our gen-
eral view is that the inefficiencies of the overt control 
period were a largely undesirable and unnecessary 
cost of governments’ search for an effective economic 
rent-sharing policy. However, Nemeth (2006) argues 
that the problem was not simply the difficulty in 
agreeing on how to share the economic rent from 
petroleum, but that the Lougheed government in 
Edmonton and the Trudeau government in Ottawa 
had completely different views on the contribution 
of petroleum to the economy; in her view, Lougheed 
saw the resource as Alberta’s and essential to an active 
provincial economic diversification policy, while Tru-
deau believed in a strong central government utilizing 
the oil profits to fund federal programs of benefit to all 
Canadians.
5. Deregulation and the Free  
Trade Era: 1985–
The deregulation of Canadian crude oil, based on the 
Western Accord, began on June 1, 1985. We argued in 
Chapter Six that the adjustment to the new environ-
ment took place quickly and easily. (This contrasts 
with natural gas, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Twelve.) However, there was one new type of govern-
ment action that could affect the Alberta petroleum 
industry – free trade agreements. The Canada–U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) became effective January 
1, 1989; most of the provisions of this agreement were 
rolled into the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which admitted Mexico and became effect-
ive on January 1, 1994. Our discussion draws primarily 
upon Schwartz et al. (1985), Watkins (1991b, 1993, 
1994), McDougall (1991), Plourde (1988, 1991, 1993, 
2005), Plourde and Waverman (1989), Watkins and 
Waverman (1993), Bradley and Watkins (2003), Doern 
and Gattinger (2003),Brownlie (2005) and Angevine 
(2010a).
A. Provisions of the Agreements
Since energy trade between Canada and Mexico is 
minimal, and the key provisions of NAFTA regarding 
energy trade between Canada and the United States 
replicate the provisions of the FTA, we shall outline the 
key clauses of the FTA.
Chapter 9 of the FTA (Chapter 6 of the NAFTA) 
deals with energy and is in part based on the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): “subject to 
the further rights and obligations of this Agreement 
(FTA) the parties affirm their respective rights and 
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) with respect to prohibitions or 
restrictions on bilateral trade in energy goods” (#902 
of the FTA, p. 145). Concomitantly, the United States 
agreed to partially lift its ban on exports of Alaskan 
crude oil and allow Canada to import up to 50,000 
barrels per day.
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Basically, the existing GATT provisions (Article 
XX(l) and (j), “the ensuring of domestic supplies”; 
XX(g) “conservation”; and XI(2a) “emergencies”) are 
codified and strengthened. Governments cannot set 
minimum price requirements for exports or imports 
(#901, Section 603 in the NAFTA) nor are export taxes 
allowed (#903, Section 604 in the NAFTA). “Neither 
Party shall maintain or introduce any tax, duty, or 
charge on the export of any energy good to the other 
Party, unless such tax, duty, or charge is also main-
tained or introduced on such energy good when des-
tined for domestic consumption” (FTA, p. 146). Article 
905 of the FTA (Article 608 of the NAFTA) allows 
direct “high level” consultation if regulatory processes 
other than price factors are considered odious (FTA, 
p. 147):
If either Party considers that energy regulatory 
actions by the other Party would directly 
result in discrimination against its energy 
goods or its persons inconsistent with the 
principles of this Agreement, that Party may 
initiate direct consultations with the other 
Party. For purposes of this Article, “an energy 
regulatory action” shall include any action, in 
the case of Canada, by the National Energy 
Board, or its successor, and in the case of 
the United States of America, by either the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or the 
Economic Regulatory Administration or their 
successors. Consultations with respect to the 
actions of these agencies shall include, in the 
case of Canada, the Department of Energy, 
Mines and Resources and, in the case of the 
United States of America, the Department of 
Energy. With respect to a regulatory action of 
another agency, at any level of government, the 
Parties shall determine which agencies shall 
participate in the consultations.
The Annex to Article 905 (Article 608 in the NAFTA) 
concerning oil and gas reads (FTA, p. 150):
1. Of the tests set under subparagraph 6(2)(z) of 
the National Energy Board Part VI Regulations 
on the export of energy goods to the United 
States of America, Canada shall eliminate the 
“least cost alternative test,” described in sub-
paragraph 6(2)(z)(iii).
4. It is understood that the implementation of this 
Chapter includes the administration of any “sur-
plus tests” on the export of any energy good to 
the other Party in a manner consistent with the 
provisions of Articles 902, 903 and 904 (Articles 
608 of the NAFTA).
Article 906 (Government Incentives for Energy 
Resource Development) (Article 608 in the NAFTA) 
allows for “existing or future incentives for oil and 
gas exploration, development and related activities in 
order to maintain the reserve base for these energy 
resources” (FTA, p. 147).
Article 907 (Article 607 of the NAFTA) allows for 
restriction of imports and exports of an energy good 
only in the event of National Security.
Article 907 (Annex 608 in the NAFTA) states that 
if there is inconsistency between the “Agreement on 
an International Energy Program” (IEP) and Chapter 
9 of the FTA, the provisions of the IEP shall prevail. 
Thus, for example, as a member of the International 
Energy Agency, Canada’s obligations to share oil in 
the event of a severe disruption in oil supplies would 
override the “proportionality” provisions of the FTA.
The FTA does allow for the export surplus test that 
governed Canadian gas exports from 1959 to 1986, but 
it would be subject to the proportionality requirement 
(Section 904 of the FTA; Section 605 of the NAFTA). 
That section is the most contentious of the energy 
sections of the Agreement. It reads as follows (FTA, 
p. 146):
Either Party may maintain or introduce a 
restriction otherwise justified under the 
provisions of Articles XI:2(a) and XX(g), (i) 
and (j) of the GATT with respect to the export 
of an energy good of the Party to the territory 
of the other Party, only if:
(a) the restriction does not reduce the propor-
tion of the total export shipments of a spe-
cific energy good made available to the other 
Party relative to the total supply of that good 
of the Party maintaining the restriction as 
compared to the proportion prevailing in 
the most recent 36-month period for which 
data are available prior to the imposition of 
the measure, or in such other representative 
period on which the Parties may agree;
(b) the Party does not impose a higher price 
for exports of an energy good to the other 
Party than the price charged for such energy 
good when consumed domestically, by 
means of any measure such as licences, fees, 
taxation and minimum price requirements. 
The foregoing provision does not apply to a 
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higher price which may result from a mea-
sure taken pursuant to subparagraph (a) that 
only restricts the volume of exports; and
(c) the restriction does not require the disrup-
tion of normal channels of supply to the 
other Party or normal proportions among 
specific energy goods supplied to the other 
Party such as, for example, between crude 
oil and refined products and among differ-
ent categories of crude oil and of refined 
products.
Total supply is defined in the FTA as “shipments to 
domestic users and foreign users from: (a) domestic 
production, (b) domestic inventory, and (c) other 
imports (as appropriate)” (FTA, p. 148).
The “as appropriate” determination of imports 
rests on location. For example, the Canadian maritime 
provinces rely solely on imported oil. An increase in 
demand in these provinces would increase imports 
and thus the potential exports of Canadian oil to the 
United States – this increase would not be “appro-
priate.” The ambiguous phrase “as appropriate” will 
spawn different interpretations.
The NAFTA is notable for its special treatment of 
Mexican energy industries, but it essentially carries 
forward the FTA provisions regarding trade in petrol-
eum between Canada and the United States, but with 
a few modifications. For example, the “proportional-
ity” requirements do not apply to Mexico and clause 
603 prohibits maximum as well as minimum export 
and import prices. Article 609 of the NAFTA extends 
the definition of “energy regulatory measures” cov-
ered by the agreement to include those of “sub-federal 
entities,” including, for example, Alberta’s Energy 
Resources Conservation Board (ERCB). Plourde (1993, 
pp. 62–64) notes that the agreement, negotiated by the 
federal government, is not legally binding on prov-
incial agencies; however, if the federal government 
cannot persuade a provincial body to eliminate any 
violation of a NAFTA provision, the federal govern-
ment may have to provide compensation for the vio-
lation. Article 603 of the NAFTA also goes beyond the 
FTA in allowing export and import licensing schemes 
for energy products, so long as other provisions of the 
agreement are not violated. Such licences were not 
explicitly recognized by the FTA, although the NEB 
has utilized them for over three decades.
The FTA and NAFTA include, as well, (in section 
11 of NAFTA) provisions respecting investment that 
require each party to the agreement to accord equal 
status in investment possibilities to other parties as 
are given to domestic investors. This is most clearly 
set out in Article 1102 on ‘National Treatment’ (article 
1602 in the FTA), which states:
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another 
Party treatment no less favorable than that 
it accords, in like circumstances, to its own 
investors with respect to the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, con-
duct, operation, and sale or other disposition 
of investments.
2. Each Party shall accord to investments of 
investors of another Party treatment no 
less favorable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investments of its own 
investors with respect to the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition 
of investments.
3. The treatment accorded by a Party under 
paragraphs 1 and 2 means, with respect to a 
state or province, treatment no less favorable 
than the most favorable treatment accorded, in 
like circumstances, by that state or province to 
investors, and to investments of investors, of the 
Party of which it forms a part.
4. For greater certainty, no Party may:
(a) impose on an investor of another Party 
a requirement that a minimum level of 
equity in an enterprise in the territory of 
the Party be held by its nationals, other than 
nominal qualifying shares for directors or 
incorporators of corporations; or
(b) require an investor of another Party, by 
reason of its nationality, to sell or otherwise 
dispose of an investment in the territory of 
the Party.
There are some constraints on the applicability of 
the clause with respect to investment, including the 
exemption of Mexican energy industries (Annex 3 
in NAFTA) and Article 1114 setting out the govern-
ment’s right to maintain environmental, health, and 
social policies.
The FTA also included dispute resolution mechan-
isms, extended in a slightly stronger form in NAFTA, 
which provide more formal avenues of recourse to 
Canada and Mexico in dealing with their larger trad-
ing partner.
Up to 2012, no action has triggered NAFTA’s 
energy-dispute mechanisms or official interpretations 
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of any of the more controversial clauses with respect 
to oil and gas trade.
B. Implications of the Provisions
In the deregulated oil environment, the free trade 
agreements have had minimal impact. Their main 
effect is in the constraints they impose upon gov-
ernment actions that would involve a move back to 
regulations typical of the pre-1985 period. It makes 
the manipulation of markets by price controls more 
difficult, and it discourages any sort of policy dis-
crimination. For example, oil export taxes are pre-
cluded. Plourde (1991) argues that government-en-
forced price discrimination to favour domestic over 
foreign consumers, as in the overt control period, 
would be prohibited. However, prices or subsidies 
could still be set by government fiat, for example, 
differentiating between sources of production, so 
long as the discrimination is not between foreign 
and domestic users. The provisions with respect to 
foreign investment close the door on policies that 
would favour Canadian companies over those from 
the United States. Roth (2009) argues, with respect to 
the oil sands royalty changes under discussion, and 
finally introduced, in 2007–2009, that the NAFTA 
foreign investment provisions may offer protection 
against government royalty changes to U.S. companies 
in Canada that are not available to domestic Can-
adian producers and would require compensation be 
paid to the foreign companies; however, as of 2012, 
no U.S. investors had sought compensation under 
NAFTA rules.
The “proportionality” clause has proved to be the 
most controversial feature of the free trade agree-
ments, particularly for crude oil where both countries 
rely to a significant extent on unstable imports from 
off the continent. As noted above, this clause provided 
that if energy supplies were restricted to one of the 
countries for reasons of conservation, supply shortage, 
or price stabilization, then the share of available sup-
plies for export purchase could not fall below the aver-
age export share over the previous three-year period. 
Critics have argued that this provision unduly con-
strains Canadian policy by limiting the country’s abil-
ity to protect its own citizens in the event of another 
international oil crisis or by inhibiting a policy change 
that attempted to retain Canadian petroleum for 
Canadian users in light of fears about the depletion of 
low-cost domestic deposits. (Laxer and Dillon, 2008, 
provide a strong statement of this position.)
Watkins and Waverman (1993) find that Canadian 
exports of oil and gas to the United States would likely 
have been substantially higher after the 1973 oil price 
shocks had the FTA been in effect. They also argue 
that such higher export volumes would have been 
beneficial, providing Canada with higher export rev-
enues and increased petroleum industry activity and, 
perhaps, inhibiting to some extent OPEC price rises. 
It should be noted that the free trade agreements do 
not necessarily prohibit all schemes that might direct 
supplies from the export market to domestic users, 
but the regulations would have to be much more laby-
rinthine than the more obvious ones used in the overt 
control period, and the policies could not be obviously 
discriminatory. This is another way of saying, again, 
that the agreements have the effect of pushing the gov-
ernments towards energy policies with relatively low 
levels of regulation.
It should be noted that the proportionality clause 
does not guarantee a country the same average 
volume of imports, or even the same share of the other 
country’s supply, as held in the previous thirty-six 
months; as noted before, the clause is invokable only 
under a specified set of circumstances. Moreover, 
it refers to “availability” or “access,” but the entire 
amount would not necessarily be purchased. If, for 
example, Canada relies upon higher prices to clear 
the oil market during a supply crisis, U.S. customers 
might well reduce their share of imports below 
the average of the previous three years. Where the 
proportionality clause would apply seems to relate 
to cases in which Canada undertakes measures that 
interfere with normal market decisions and which 
thereby restricted U.S. consumers’ ability to take 
delivery of Canadian energy for which they are willing 
to pay the going price. Laxer and Dillon (2008) give 
three examples in which Canadian government 
policies might trigger the proportionality clause: 
restricting production in Canada for conservation 
reasons; shipping oil further east for security reasons, 
and diverting natural gas to petrochemical feedstock 
use. From this perspective, the clause is less about 
guaranteeing fixed access by U.S. consumers to 
Canadian oil than it is a commitment on the part of 
the Canadian government not to introduce policies 
(such the Direct Control period price controls) that 
effectively set lower prices for Canadian consumers 
than those in the United States. Up to the spring of 
2013, there has been no occasion for testing how the 
proportionality clause would operate. The agreements 
provide for consultation in the event of disputes 
between the countries.
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The FTA and the NAFTA provide an important 
landmark in North American economic relationships. 
With respect to Canadian crude oil, there is still sub-
stantial room for specific federal or Canadian policies 
on a variety of issues, including regulations aimed at 
exploration and development, taxation, environmental 
policies, and the like. What is constrained is the ability 
to use export taxes, tariffs, or blatantly discriminatory 
ways of differentiating between Canadian and U.S. 
consumers. This is entirely consistent with the moves 
to deregulation taken in 1985.
6. Conclusion
We join most economists in being sceptical about the 
desirability of policies that interfere in the operation 
of competitive markets in determining the price of a 
commodity. Oil is an international good, and Canada 
is a small enough producer that we operate essentially 
as a price-taker for crude. That is, the world price sets 
the ‘opportunity cost’ of Canada’s oil: it is the amount 
that we must pay for imported oil, and the amount we 
give up if we divert oil from export to domestic users.
If we hold the domestic price above the world 
price, as we did west of the Ottawa River Valley under 
the National Oil Policy from 1960 through 1972, we 
encourage under-consumption and overproduc-
tion. Should domestic prices be held below world 
prices, as from 1973 to 1985 including the National 
Energy Program, we generate over-consumption and 
under-production. Some have seen a reciprocal sym-
metry in these two periods, of equal length and with 
opposite effects: a period where oil consumers (the 
‘East’) subsidized oil producers (the ‘West’) followed 
by a balancing period the other way around. However, 
our analysis suggests that the level of transfers were 
much higher in the second period, thereby offsetting 
the apparent symmetry. More fundamentally, there are 
ways to transfer funds between regions or individuals, 
if this is what is desired, that do not involve the ineffi-
cient allocation of a particular commodity.
Our view is that the NEP can best be understood 
in terms of what economists call ‘rent-seeking.’ Gov-
ernments respond to the interests of certain subgroups 
of society by introducing programs that benefit them, 
albeit to the cost of other groups in society and with 
overall efficiency losses. Pressure for such policies 
is often strongest when conditions are undergoing 
change – and significant adjustments in the world oil 
price are a major point of change for the petroleum 
industry. Moreover, it seems common in human 
nature that cries for action are loudest when the 
change generates losses. (People are happy to garner 
gains quietly. Moreover, losses seem to have more 
psychological impact than gains of equal size, a phe-
nomenon often called ‘loss aversion.’ See Kahnemen 
and Tversky, 1982, and Thaler, 1995.) Hence many 
North American oil-producing interests called out 
in the late 1950s when world oil prices fell, and con-
suming interests were more vocal in the early 1970s as 
OPEC prices rose.
There is one other undercurrent of thought that 
we find largely unconvincing. This is that conventional 
market mechanisms, including free trade, are inappro-
priate for a commodity such as oil. The arguments 
are rarely well formulated, and, in fact, often mix two 
somewhat different concerns. One is that of national 
security, tied to oil’s crucial role in a modern indus-
trial economy. However, we interpret energy security 
as an international issue and would argue that the 
market mechanism itself generated useful reallocation 
during the past four major international oil supply 
crises. The second argument is that market mech-
anisms fail to allocate depletable natural resources 
optimally. For example, this argument might say that 
it was inappropriate for Canada to export low-cost 
oil in the 1950s and 1960s at low prices, when it might 
have met Canadian needs (or earned higher export 
revenues) in the environment of high prices in the 
1970s and 1980s. Our view is that oil companies do in 
fact operate in a forward-looking manner in order to 
maximize their profits (especially if certain common 
property problems are overcome; see Chapter Ten). 
Moreover, we see little evidence that governments are 
more prescient or effective than the private sector. For 
example, Ottawa and Alberta encouraged oil exports 
in the low price 1960s; during the high price years of 
the NEP, Ottawa discouraged exports; by the mid-
1990s, when oil prices were much lower, policy was 
again in support of greater exports. The NEP avowed a 
goal of self-sufficiency but invoked price controls that 
encouraged more oil use and discouraged production.
From this point of view, the move to deregulation 
in 1985 and the commitment to free markets implied 
by the FTA and NAFTA were eminently sensible 
policies.
Readers’ Guide: This chapter deals with a set of 
regulations used in Alberta and many other North 
American jurisdictions to offset harmful effects of the 
‘rule of capture,’ a legal provision that says that the 
petroleum from a reservoir where access is shared 
by several producers is not owned until it is brought 
to the surface. Producers therefore have an incen-
tive to lift the oil rapidly to capture it before their 
competitors do. As a result, the pool is not drained 
efficiently, and total recovery may be greatly reduced. 
The Government of Alberta adopted a variety of 
measures to control this problem, including minimum 
well-spacing regulations (to limit the number of wells 
drilled), ‘unitization’ incentives to encourage com-
panies to join together and produce from the pool as 
a single unit, and market-demand prorationing. The 
latter was a controversial approach through which the 
government estimated the consumption of oil from 
the province, and restricted total production to this 
volume, allocating (‘prorating’) it to individual produ-
cers. However, such regulations interfered with the 
normal operation of the oil market, and the specific 
manner in which output was prorated across oil com-
panies could generate significant inefficiencies. This 
chapter focuses on market-demand prorationing, with 
particular emphasis on the extent to which the regu-
lations encouraged higher cost production methods 
within a reservoir than were necessary. Readers not 
interested in the fine details of the regulations may 
wish to read only sections 1 and 6.
1. Introduction
In the petroleum industry the word ‘conservation’ 
is used in two distinct ways. It may refer to the con-
sumption side of the oil market, where it is normally 
refers to accomplishing the same tasks with reduced 
use of petroleum. From an economic perspective, 
higher oil prices are an effective way to encourage 
such conservation. In this chapter, we discuss a major 
feature of ‘conservation’ on the production side of 
the petroleum market. Here the term has referred 
to a variety of regulations designed to improve the 
physical recovery of petroleum from underground 
reservoirs. Most of these relate to perceived ‘external-
ities’ in the market, where petroleum producers, in the 
absence of regulation, are not motivated to consider 
the entire impact that their activities have on others. 
Governments have imposed a variety of regulations 
designed to address such concerns. Many of these are 
not discussed in detail in this book, including such 
examples as requirements to re-inject natural gas into 
the reservoir (rather than flaring it); regulations on 
the use of water, and the disposal of water produced in 
conjunction with petroleum; rules to reduce the risks 
and safety hazards of well blowouts and spills includ-
ing well abandonment procedures, etc. In the North 
American petroleum industry, common property 
rights within oil reservoirs (the rule of capture) have 
induced government authorities to regulate produc-
tion by setting quotas for individual producers. This 
is called ‘prorationing,’ and is a typical part of regula-
tory systems intended to promote conservation in the 
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sense of maximizing oil recovery and especially in the 
sense of protecting leaseholder’s property rights.
Chapter Four of this book included a brief theor-
etical analysis of the rule of capture and crude oil 
prorationing regulations. It will be recalled that the 
rule of capture is a provision of the legal system, often  
inherited through British common law tradition. 
(Daintith, 2010, provides a detailed review, from a 
legal perspective of the acceptance of the rule of cap-
ture in the United States, and the various regulatory 
responses to it. Low, 2009, reviews the legal basis of 
the rule of capture in Canada.) The rule of capture 
credits ownership of a fugacious resource to the party 
that captures it, therefore implying that crude oil 
within a shared reservoir is unowned, that is common 
property to those producers with access to the reser-
voir. The implications of the rule of capture are par-
ticularly large for light and medium crude oil pools 
with good permeability since such crude may migrate 
quite readily from one part of the reservoir to another.
The nature of the land tenure system is import-
ant. In North America, the size of surface area plots 
leased or owned by oil producers tends to be small 
in relation to the areal extent of individual oil pools. 
Some analysts have associated this with what Daintith 
(2010) calls an ‘accession’ system, where mineral rights 
are held by surface rights owners and sold or leased 
by them, as was true for much of the prospective pet-
roleum area of the continental United States; because 
of small surface holdings, or larger surface acreages 
being separated into smaller parcels of mineral rights, 
petroleum leases were typically much smaller than 
the oil pool. Daintith, however, notes that the same 
problem may arise with a ‘domanial and regalian’ legal 
system in which mineral rights are held in ownership 
by the monarch or state, if the state issues small acre-
age petroleum rights to private producers. Of course, 
the issue of protecting the property rights of the indi-
vidual surface rights land owner, which played a major 
role in the United States, is not of concern under the 
domanial system since all the oil drained from the 
pool comes from the state-owned oil rights. (Alberta 
exhibits both legal systems, as the province holds 
ownership of mineral rights over most of the land area 
of the province, but some early private surface right 
land grants included mineral rights as well.) Within 
Alberta, as in the United States, most reservoirs have 
been shared. Companies therefore have been under 
strong pressure from the rule of capture to lift oil 
quickly, before the neighbours do likewise. The results, 
at pool and industry levels, are vastly different than 
might be expected if reservoirs were developed under 
unitized conditions. Unitization occurs when produ-
cers sharing an oil pool cooperate to introduce a single 
petroleum authority for the pool, sharing jointly in 
costs and revenues. Individual producers are therefore 
unable to capture oil for themselves at the expense of 
other companies.
At the individual pool level, the rule of capture 
induces high levels of development investment, high 
initial output rates, and rapid production decline, 
often with reduced ultimate recovery from the pool. 
Such loss of reserves was the ‘physical waste’ that 
attracted early proposals for ‘conservation’ regula-
tions in the crude oil industry. In addition, there 
was a desire to protect correlative property rights, in 
the sense of the mineral rights owners’ reasonable 
claims to lift the petroleum to which they have access. 
(Daintith, 2010, chap. 7, provides discussion of the 
experience in the United States.)
At the industry level, the rule of capture tends to 
generate price instability. Rapid output increases from 
a new oil play, resulting from intensive development, 
drive the price down, especially with a very inelastic 
short-run demand for oil. A little later output will 
tend to fall as a result of high production decline in 
the pools in this play, and the decreased supply will 
push prices higher. Market prices will tend to fluctuate 
markedly as new oil plays succeed one another. This 
market price instability also led to calls for govern-
ment regulation. (Daintith, 2010, chap. 9, provides 
an extended and valuable discussion of the regula-
tory response in the United States, from a legal point 
of view.)
Many observers of the crude oil industry called 
for compulsory unitization as a way to eliminate both 
the pool-specific and industry-wide effects of the rule 
of capture. While economists have generally been 
strongly inclined to favour unitization, it has been 
demonstrated that unitization may fail to be optimal 
from an economic point of view if reservoirs contain 
both oil and natural gas, with separate rights for the 
two products, and depending on how the agreements 
handle the inevitable uncertainties about reservoir 
characteristics and market developments (Libecap 
and Smith, 2002). Still, unitization has usually been 
favoured as a way to allow more efficient develop-
ment of petroleum reservoirs. It may be asked why 
voluntary unitization was not common, since it would 
reduce, if not entirely eliminate, the inefficiencies 
suffered at the pool level by operators. This would be 
an illustration of the application of the famous Coase 
theorem (Coase, 1960). Coase argued that, in the 
absence of ‘transactions costs,’ private decision-makers 
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would be driven to negotiate agreements that maxi-
mize the net value of assets. The rationale for Coase’s 
proposition is simple. Suppose that agreements have 
no costs of implementation, monitoring, or enforce-
ment. Then a rearrangement of the use of an asset 
which generates aggregate additional benefits to par-
ticipants greater than aggregate additional costs would 
allow all participants to move to a preferred position 
(i.e., experience a net gain); rational decision-makers 
would exploit all such opportunities.
How does the Coase theorem apply to the oil 
industry and to the rule of capture? Under the rule of 
capture, the present value lifetime profits from an oil 
reservoir are not maximized. Producers tend to ignore 
the user costs of depletion in their current output 
decisions. That is, they focus on immediate costs and 
revenues and do not give much weight to the future 
profit implications of today’s production decision. 
Why leave crude oil in the ground for future profits 
if your neighbour is likely to capture the oil before 
you plan to produce it? However the economic waste 
of the rule of capture – the reduced net present value 
of the oil pool – could be avoided by an agreement 
amongst all producers to operate the pool as unit in 
the maximum profit manner, and all producers could 
be made better off.
This brings us back to the question: why were vol-
untary unitization agreements uncommon? Several 
explanations spring to mind. Some economists have 
suggested that decision-makers are not as rational 
as conventional thinking suggests and may tend to 
value changes in position quite differently depending 
whether they are ‘framed’ as ‘gains’ or ‘losses’ (e.g., 
Thaler, 1995). In particular, ‘loss aversion’ (also called 
the ‘status quo’ effect) is common, in which, even 
apart from risk aversion, decision-makers tend to 
put more weight on what is viewed as a loss than 
they do on an equal-sized gain. This could serve as 
a disincentive to sign a unitization agreement if the 
agreement is seen as a loss of current profits in return 
for a gain of future profits. Second, there are very 
significant transaction costs in negotiating a unit 
operation in an oil pool, especially if all producers 
and all landowners must voluntarily agree to sign. 
This was particularly significant in the United States, 
where there were typically many freehold land hold-
ers with a stake in the pool. Third, the presence of 
uncertainty – about the size of a pool and the dynam-
ics of reservoir depletion – greatly complicates the 
agreement process (Libecap and Wiggins, 1984, 1985; 
Wiggins and Libecap, 1985). The essence of a unitiz-
ation agreement is the shares in operation granted to 
the various companies, and in the presence of uncer-
tainty there may be genuine disagreement about what 
these shares should be. Further, reasonable estimates 
of reservoir size, pressure mechanisms and flow rates 
are not known until a number of years after the initial 
discovery. Will negotiation of a unitization agreement 
be delayed until this information is gathered? If so, 
are the companies who first drill into the pool to be 
denied production until this date, and, if not, what 
production rates will they be allowed? Fourth, since 
different companies enter the pool at different times, 
especially if it is a large deposit, the early entrants (and 
the landowners from whom they have purchased oil 
rights) have a strong interest to drill rapidly before 
other companies enter and before an agreement can 
be negotiated, and hence may believe that they will 
profit more under the rule of capture than through 
unitization. Also, some leaseholders tend to hold out 
for additional rewards to sign an agreement, which 
can bedevil negotiations. Finally, some parties have 
expressed fear that agreements might fall foul of com-
bines (anti-monopoly) regulations.
As a result, in the United States voluntary uni-
tization agreements tended to be restricted to pools 
that had few operators; the rule of capture held sway 
in most cases. Many observers called for compul-
sory unitization agreements, which were adopted 
in Saskatchewan. As Daintith (2010) discusses, the 
U.S. federal government can require unitization if 
operations are likely to damage reservoir recovery 
mechanisms in reservoirs on federal lands such as in 
offshore areas of the United States. A number of other 
North American jurisdictions, including Alberta, have 
similar regulations. However, the main government 
response to the rule of capture was to introduce mar-
ket-demand prorationing.
Within North America, the first instance of pro-
ration of oil production by a public regulatory agency 
was in Oklahoma in 1915, but the most significant 
factor was probably its adoption by Texas in 1932 
(Lovejoy and Homan, 1967; McDonald, 1971; Breen, 
1993; Daintith, 2010). Proration of oil production by 
government regulation was introduced in Alberta 
in 1938, for the Turner Valley Pool, and remained in 
effect until the late 1980s.
Economists have frequently alleged that proration 
is inefficient, especially as practised in the United 
States (Adelman, 1964). The impact of proration on 
the economic efficiency of oil production in Alberta 
is analyzed in what follows (derived from Watkins 
1971, 1977c). The empirical analysis is restricted to 
measurement at the ‘intensive’ margin, that is, within 
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oil reservoirs. Insufficient data exist to allow reliable 
estimation of the efficiency of prorationing at the 
‘extensive’ margin, that is, in the allocation of provin-
cial output among different oil pools.
An oil reservoir investment model is used to 
define theoretical optimum reservoir well spacing, 
subject to the regulation of production by proration 
in Alberta. Well spacing determines the number of 
wells in a reservoir, which constitutes the main cost of 
reservoir development.
Inter alia, the following issues are addressed. Have 
the proration schemes imposed in Alberta induced 
inefficient development and production? If so, is 
such inefficiency widespread or concentrated in rela-
tively few reservoirs? If the latter, is there a dominant 
reser voir variable? Have operators been activated by 
profit maximization, within the constraints imposed 
by proration? Has the efficiency of proration been 
significantly affected by the types of proration plans 
adopted? Would full unitization have produced sig-
nificant economies? And are the other regulatory 
paraphernalia, especially well spacing regulations, an 
important adjunct to proration? While not discussed 
in this study, the location of wells, in addition to the 
number of wells allowed in a pool (i.e., well spacing) is 
also important; in particular, provisions that specify a 
minimum distance for wells from the lease boundary 
reduce the impact of the rule of capture. In addition, 
Alberta has compulsory ‘pooling’ regulations that 
require producers with acreage holdings smaller than 
the minimum well spacing to be added to larger par-
cels, rather than drilling wells themselves (Low, 2008, 
p. 821). This reduces capture while assuring that the 
small producer obtains its share of oil production.
In what follows, the background to proration in 
Alberta is traced in Section 2. In particular, the three 
main schemes of proration employed are outlined: the 
1950, 1957, and 1964 plans. The latter plan essentially 
governed production until the demise of market- 
demand proration in the late 1980s. For reasons that 
concern their nature, subsequent analytical attention 
is primarily directed towards the 1950 and 1957 plans, 
rather than the 1964 version.
Sections 3 and 4 parallel each other. The first parts 
of each section concern the theoretical framework. 
Then optimum patterns of reservoir development 
under the 1950 and 1957 proration plans are estimated. 
The optima measure incentives under proration itself 
by excluding the effect of external factors such as the 
land tenure system and well spacing regulation.
Estimates of diseconomies resulting from pro-
ration for the reservoirs analyzed in Sections 3 and 4 
are made in Section 5. Analysis is undertaken both 
in relation to the actual well spacing patterns, which 
reflect many factors, including proration, and in rela-
tion to the theoretical optimum spacing values which 
exclude external influences. The significance of the 
results in relation to the 1964 plan is also discussed.
The main conclusions of the analysis are summar-
ized in Section 6. Appendix 10.1 gives details on the oil 
reservoir development model employed.
2. Prorationing in Alberta
As outlined earlier, sustained growth of the Alberta 
oil industry commenced with the discovery of the 
Leduc field in 1947. Continuing substantial discoveries 
resulted in growing surplus capacity. By 1950, excess 
capacity in one large field alone, Redwater, amounted 
to some 84 per cent of total Alberta oil production. Of 
importance in the development of excess productive 
capacity were changes in provincial land regulations in 
July 1947, which discouraged concentration of reser-
voir ownership and stimulated intensive development 
well drilling, given the rule of capture.
In September 1950, the industry requested 
Alberta’s Oil and Gas Conservation Board (OGCB) to 
administer a scheme of market-demand proration. 
Breen (1993) provides a detailed history of the OGCB 
from its beginnings in Turner Valley in 1932 through 
to 1962. The 1932 Oil and Gas Conservation Act, 
creating a Turner Valley Gas Conservation Board, was 
challenged in court by a small natural-gas-producing 
company and found unconstitutional. The 1938 
Oil and Gas Conservation Act created a Petroleum 
and Natural Gas Conservation Board (PNGCB), 
an independent regulatory board with legislatively 
defined powers to regulate oil and gas production 
and to administer other provincial regulations on the 
industry. (See Breen, 1993, chaps. 2 and 3.) Section 
8 of the act (S.A., 1938, chap. 15) gave the Board 
responsibility for:
(a) preventing the exhaustion from a petroleum 
providing area of the energy necessary to 
produce petroleum by methods shown to be 
uneconomic … to the end that the maximum 
alternate recovery of petroleum can be attained;
(b) prorationing the production of petroleum or 
natural gas from the wells in any area to the eco-
nomic markets available in such manner that an 
uneconomic reduction of price is not brought 
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about and in such a manner that an equitable 
share of the available market for petroleum or 
natural gas is available to each producing well.
Note that these guiding directions explicitly require 
conservation of “maximum ultimate recovery,” “eco-
nomic markets” and the “uneconomic reduction of 
price” and an “equitable share” of markets. These 
principles remained in the board’s mandate, even as 
it evolved into the Oil and Gas Conservation Board 
(OGCB, 1957), the Energy Resources Conservation 
Board (ERCB, 1971), and the Energy and Utilities 
Board (EUB, 1995), before being transformed back to 
the ERCB in 2007. Amongst the board’s first orders in 
1938 were prorationing regulations for both oil and gas 
in the Turner Valley field.
The board introduced a province-wide proration 
plan on December 1, 1950. Major changes to the plan 
were made in 1957 and 1964. The nature of the original 
plan (the 1950 plan) and the major changes to it are 
described below. Subsequently, the virtual elimination 
of excess production capacity in the 1980s made mar-
ket-demand prorationing – but not other regulations – 
redundant. The Conservation Board has maintained 
a variety of other conservation regulations to govern 
oil and gas production practices. Minimum well spa-
cing will be discussed further below. We also take as 
given the Maximum Permissive Rate (MPR) restric-
tions, which set a ceiling on well output rates based 
on technological factors and are designed to prevent 
undue damage to reservoir natural drive. Regulations 
restricting the flaring of associated gas and governing 
practices such as disposal of waste water, handling 
blowouts, abandoning and sealing wells, etc. are 
socially important but will not be discussed.
A.	The	1950	Plan
The plan (Petroleum and Natural Gas Conservation 
Board, 1951; Breen 1993, pp. 289–317) assigned a fixed- 
variable production quota to each eligible well. The 
fixed portion, called an “economic” allowance, was 
graduated with well depth and was intended to com-
pensate for the major costs of drilling and operating 
wells. The variable portion was calculated by allocat-
ing the remaining market demand (after satisfaction 
of all the economic allowances) in proportion to well 
productive capacity. The latter was represented mainly 
by the maximum permissive rate (MPR).
Symbolically, the production quota under the 
1950 plan assigned to a well in reservoir j at time t was 
ft,j = ea,j + mjAFt, where ft,j = well production quota, 
reservoir j, time t; ea,j is the economic allowance for 
this well; mj = well capacity (defined by well MPR), 
reservoir j; AFt = allocation factor. The numerator 
of the allocation factor was the market demand (Vt) 
less the provincial sum of economic allowances; the 
denominator was the total provincial well capacity at 
time t. Thus, AFt = (Vt – ∑ea)/∑m.
By virtue of the economic allowance, the 1950 plan 
guaranteed the long-term and short-term profitability 
of any well capable of economic operation. This had 
important implications for reservoir development, as 
shown later.
B.	The	1957	Plan
The first major change to the 1950 plan was announced 
by the OGCB on August 30, 1957 (Oil and Gas Con-
servation Board, 1957; see also Breen, 1993, chap. 7). 
Two main aspects of the 1950 plan were altered. The 
changes were made over a transition period, with full 
implementation by January 1, 1960.
First, the single economic allowance schedule was 
replaced by a two-tier system, involving an initial 
economic allowance for a seven-year period after 
initial pool development, subsequently replaced by a 
lower operating economic allowance. Both allowances 
remained graduated with well depth. The purpose of 
the two-tier system was to prevent indefinite continu-
ance of an economic allowance that would allow mul-
tiple recovery of some investments, especially drilling 
costs. Second, the allocation factor (see above) was 
applied to the well’s MPR less its economic allowance, 
rather than to the MPR alone, as in the 1950 plan. This 
was called the residual MPR method.
Symbolically, the 1957 plan is represented as:
ft,j(1,7) = ei + (mj  – ej)AFt, ft,j8(8,n) = eo + (mj – eo)AFt,
where ei = initial economic allowance; eo = operating 
economic allowance; and the other variables are as 
defined above, although the denominator of the allo-
cation factor (Aft) becomes total provincial capacity 
less total economic allowance (∑m – ∑ea). The brack-
ets (1,7) and (8,n) following ft,j indicate the period in 
years after development of the pool that the formula 
applied; n is the reservoir life.
While the changes defining the 1957 plan are 
significant, nevertheless essentially they represent 
refinements to the 1950 plan. In contrast, the 1964 plan 
involved significant structural alternations.
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C.	The	1964	Plan
Extensive hearings were held by the OGCB in 1963 on 
virtually all aspects of the proration plan, and in mid-
1964 the board outlined a new plan, for full imple-
mentation by 1969 (Oil and Gas Conservation Board, 
1964b).
The two-tier economic allowance was abolished 
and replaced by a single and substantially reduced 
minimum allowance, which compensated only for 
operating costs and certain other recurring expendi-
tures; it continued to be graduated with well depth. 
And it applied strictly as a ‘floor,’ not as an initial 
entitlement, as in the 1950 and 1957 plans.
Demand was to be allocated among reservoirs 
in proportion to reserves without reference to well 
capacity or the number of wells in a reservoir. Within 
reser voirs, demand was to be distributed in propor-
tion to the acreage assigned to a well (well spacing), 
subject to minimum allowance.
Symbolically, the 1964 plan was: ft,j = [(aw/At,j)(ut,j – 
ct,j)/2]AFt, or ma,j, whichever will be greater, where 
aw = well spacing; At,j = area of reservoir j, time t; 
ut,j = ultimate reserves, reservoir j, time t; ct,j = cumu-
lative production, reservoir j, time t; maj = well min-
imum allowance reservoir j. Ultimate reserves are 
remaining reserves plus cumulative production. The 
numerator of the allocation factor was simply the 
market demand Vt; the denominator was the sum of 
the provincial ultimate reserves, u, less one-half total 
cumulative production, c (i.e., ∑u – [∑c/2]).
Thus, the 1964 plan removed the guarantee 
of long-run well profitability inherent in the 1950 
and 1957 plans but continued to assure short-run 
profitability.
The main concern of the analysis below is with the 
relation between proration and the development of 
individual reservoirs. The strong positive relationship 
between the number of wells drilled in a reservoir 
and reservoir quotas under the 1950 and 1957 plans is 
therefore of special importance. But under the 1964 
plan well quotas were essentially independent of the 
number of wells in the reservoir. Consequently, in 
terms of impact on the intensity of reservoir invest-
ment, attention is concentrated on the 1950 and 
1957 plans.
The analysis employs a reservoir investment 
model, which is outlined and discussed in Appen-
dix 10.1. The main variable governing planned 
reservoir development is the number of wells. The 
model assumes the reservoir operator will maximize 
expected present value profits. The profit-maximizing 
criterion translates into one of maximizing present 
value profit per acre, given uniform well spacing 
within each reservoir. The value of well spacing that 
maximizes present value profit per acre is designated 
sj*, the optimum spacing value for reservoir j.
D. The End of Prorationing
The expansion of markets for Alberta oil, falling 
reserves additions generating declining remaining 
reserves, and the ongoing depletion of pools discov-
ered in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s gradually removed 
the need for stringent prorationing regulations. 
Increased knowledge about reservoir dynamics also 
led more companies to voluntary adoption of uni-
tization agreements, a practice that may have been 
spurred by the Conservation Board’s powers to force 
such agreements if necessary to increase the recovery 
of oil.
In the 1980s an increasing number of pools were 
put on “good production practise” (GPP) status and 
were exempt from market-demand proration and 
maximum rate limitations. Often these pools had been 
in production for many years so that output rates had 
naturally fallen below the MPR regulated level, and 
companies had little incentive to install new equip-
ment. (The board could re-establish MPR limits if the 
pool’s natural energy was unnecessarily damaged.) By 
1990, some 75 per cent of Alberta oil reservoirs were 
GPP pools (ERCB, 1990).
With deregulation in 1985, light sweet oil exports 
to the United States became significant again. Output 
rose, spare production capacity dwindled, and the 
reserves to production ratio was low. Effective on June 
1, 1987, the ERCB announced a six-month experiment 
to rescind market-demand-prorationing regulations 
and allow a market-oriented system to operate in 
which producers and buyers were free to negotiate 
agreements. The new system would be monitored, 
presumably to ensure that smaller producers were not 
frozen out of the market and that oil reservoirs were 
not damaged. Problems were, evidently, minimal as 
the new arrangement was made permanent in Nov-
ember 1987. By 1989, market-demand prorationing in 
Alberta was at an end, after thirty-seven years.
3. Optimum Well Spacing: The 1950 
Alberta Proration Plan
This section briefly discusses incorporation of the 
formulas defining well production quotas under 
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the 1950 plan in the reservoir investment model 
(Watkins, 1971, 1977c). The model is then applied to 
the actual reservoirs developed under the 1950 plan to 
calculate optimum well spacing, given the regulatory 
constraints imposed by proration. The results are 
compared with the actual well spacing recorded for 
each reservoir.
A.	Well	Quota	and	Profit	Functions
As shown above, the well quota for the 1950 plan 
was a function of a fixed “economic” allowance, well 
capacity (the MPR), and the allocation factor. Further 
specification of the quota function requires attribution 
of a functional form to the latter two elements.
An examination of values for the MPR and well 
spacing disclosed a linear relationship, but with dif-
ferent linear coefficients by reservoir. The choice of 
a functional form for the allocation factor was made 
on the basis of recorded expectations. A parabolic fit 
gave a close approximation. Moreover, a U-shaped 
curve was more consistent with then expected trends. 
Industry opinion in the mid-1950s generally antici-
pated an initial rate of growth in capacity exceeding 
that in demand; hence the allocation factor would fall. 
The relationship was expected to reverse as Alberta 
became more fully explored and opportunities for oil 
exports to the United States increased.
Insertion of the MPR and allocation factor rela-
tionships in the quota function permits specification 
of well production rates as well spacing (s) varies, 
subject to the constraint that cumulative well pro-
duction not exceed its reserves. Inherent here are the 
assumptions that the well has the physical capability 
to produce the assigned level of production, that 
reservoirs are homogeneous, and that well spacing 
is independent of the allocation factor. The latter 
assumption is consistent with the reservoir investment 
model. Nevertheless, for a reservoir of exceptional 
areal extent (such as Pembina), dense spacing would 
result in the reservoir economic allowance being suffi-
cient to significantly affect the allocation factor. How-
ever, other analysis suggested that AFt was a relatively 
unimportant determinant of optimum spacing, s*, 
and thus the assumption that AFt is exogenous is not 
distortive. Reservoir profit functions are then derived 
by substituting the relevant reservoir quota function 
in the general present value profit per acre function 
given by Eq. (7) in the Appendix.
More specifically, the present value profit (PVP) 
per acre is evaluated for a feasible range of well spa-
cing for any reservoir by iterative substitution in the 
investment model (see Eq. (7) of Appendix). The well 
spacing value corresponding to the maximum value 
of PVP per acre then is ascertained. The reservoir 
life corresponding to the estimated s* will indicate 
whether it is a reasonable solution in terms of industry 
time horizons.
The main features of the data employed are: the 
pools all had a developed area greater than 160 acres 
(smaller pools would tend to be developed by the 
reser voir delineation process itself); well and ancillary 
facility costs by pool were derived from cost-depth 
correlations based on industry data; an average royalty 
rate of 10 per cent was adopted, based on average roy-
alties paid, 1950–56; an allowance for dry development 
wells was made by inflating estimated productive well 
costs by 8 per cent; and an 8 per cent discount factor 
based on recorded long-term bond yields, the typical 
petroleum industry financial structure (debt-equity 
ratios), and an allowance for risk.
B.	Optimum	Well	Spacing,	1950	Plan
This section summarizes the results of calculations of 
optimum well spacing for seventy-five oil reservoirs 
that commenced production over the period 1950 
to 1956.
It is emphasized that the optima are constrained 
and should not be confused with the optima that 
would apply in the absence of institutional and other 
restrictions. The main constraint, of course, is that 
production is set by the 1950 Proration Plan; other 
constraints are the assumptions underlying the reser-
voir model used. Moreover, the results are theoretical 
and do not necessarily represent a realistic choice 
for an operator. In practice, such a choice was lim-
ited by lease ownership divisions in a reservoir and 
other regulatory restrictions (as discussed below). 
The importance of the results lies in the broad indi-
cation they give of incentives inherent in the 1950 
Proration Plan.
The crude mean optimum reservoir spacing value 
(s*) was 147 acres, with a standard deviation of 212 
acres and a range of 3 to 1,400 acres. With the excep-
tion of only one pool, all indicated reservoir lives 
were less than twenty-five years. The distribution of 
optimum spacing by reservoir was skewed towards the 
lower well spacing values.
The calculation of the crude mean gives each res-
ervoir equal weight, regardless of size. If optimum well 
spacing values (s*) were weighted by implied optimum 
number of wells (q*), the resultant weighted mean 
optimum spacing fell to 101 acres, mainly reflecting 
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the increased weight of five pools with exceptionally 
small values of s* (q* = reservoir area (Aj)/optimum 
well spacing (s*j).)
A frequent criticism of the 1950 and 1957 Alberta 
proration plans was the encouragement they provided 
for close well spacing (defined as 80 acres or less). The 
range of optimum spacing computed clearly shows 
that under the 1950 plan for many pools this is not the 
case; the extent to which such encouragement existed 
depends on the properties of each individual reservoir.
More detailed analysis of the results by particular 
reservoir characteristics – such as shallow and deep, 
low and high reserve density – reveals that the dom-
inant variable determining optimum well spacing 
under the 1950 plan was the reserve density (reserve 
per acre) of the reservoir. A high reserve density 
exerted a strong incentive towards very close spacing; 
conversely, for low reserve density, maximization of 
present value profits would be achieved by the adop-
tion of relatively wide spacing. These relationships 
appeared to hold irrespective of the values for other 
determinants, for instance prices and depth. Recall 
that depth sets capital and operating costs and partly 
determines the rate of production (since the economic 
allowance was graduated with depth).
Tests of several of the assumptions underlying the 
analysis, including royalties, well productivity decline, 
and the discount rate, indicated that the main approxi-
mating assumptions underlying the analysis were 
satisfactory (Watkins 1971, p. 27).
C. Comparison of Theoretical and Actual Well 
Spacing,	1950	Plan
The main purpose here is to show the degree to which 
the theoretical well spacing was consistent with actual 
well spacing. In turn, this will indicate whether the 
theoretical analysis is reasonable.
As mentioned, the theoretical results assume 
complete freedom of choice of well spacing, while in 
reality an operator’s choice was circumscribed in sev-
eral ways. For example, minimum spacing levels and 
standard spacing patterns are set up by Alberta’s Oil 
and Gas Conservation Board (OGCB). From 1950 to 
1956, minimum spacing was 40 acres per well. Alter-
nate spacing patterns were confined mainly to 80, 160, 
or 320 acres per well, with generally only one pattern 
prevailing in a reservoir. Alberta government land 
regulations provided an opportunity through surren-
der provisions, and subsequent resale of the petroleum 
rights, for competing operators to acquire acreage in a 
new reservoir. The varied ownership interests within 
a reservoir tended to induce adoption of a spacing 
pattern that reflected the smallest area under lease. 
Also, well spacing choice might be constrained by the 
physical nature of the reservoir (for example, narrow 
irregularly contoured reservoirs or small reservoirs 
discourage wide spacing). The adoption of a forty-acre 
minimum well spacing standard by the OGCB seemed 
wide in relation to historical well spacing levels in the 
United States, where much of the Canadian petroleum 
industry experience, both regulatory and private, was 
garnered. This probably induced a tendency to adhere 
to the minimum permissible standard, rather than to 
venture to wider levels; such levels at one time were 
believed to inhibit efficient drainage of a pool. Thus 
the force of tradition should not be underestimated as 
a factor restraining an operator’s choice of well spa-
cing. Moreover, its impact would be accentuated by 
the division of lease ownership within a reservoir.
This background proves useful in comparing the 
estimated optimum well spacing levels under prora-
tion (s*) with the corresponding actual well spacing 
recorded (sa) for the seventy-five pools examined. 
Overall, the comparisons between theoretical and 
actual spacing showed that differences could be attrib-
utable to: the factors alluded to above, especially min-
imum spacing regulations and the division of lease 
ownership within reservoirs; variations between esti-
mated and actual drilling costs; and inherent restraints 
placed on wider spacing by reservoirs small in area 
(Watkins, 1971, pp. 257–64). This result provides confi-
dence in the theoretical method of analysis adopted to 
measure well spacing incentives under the 1950 plan. 
It is inferred that operators were motivated by profit 
maximization, within the constraints set by regula-
tions and proration.
4. Optimum Well Spacing: The 1957 
Alberta Proration Plan
This section essentially parallels Section 3 but deals 
with the 1957 plan. Assumptions and symbols in that 
section that apply equally here are not repeated.
A.	Well	Quota	and	Profit	Functions
Similarly to the development of the 1950 plan well 
production formula, further analysis of the 1957 plan 
well quota function (see earlier) requires assignment 
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of a specific function form to the MPR and the alloca-
tion factor.
No changes were made to the MPR function itself 
under the 1957 plan, so, as before, the MPR is treated 
as a linear function of spacing. The selection of a 
suitable functional form for the allocation factor was 
predicated on both industry and government expect-
ations of future trends as revealed by contemporary 
projections. The projections were found to be well 
represented by a linear function of time (in contrast 
with the earlier U-shaped curves).
The quota function may now be expanded to 
incorporate the assumed form of the MPR and alloca-
tion factor functions. As before, profit functions are 
developed for appropriate ranges of well spacing by 
inserting the quota function in the reservoir invest-
ment model (Appendix, Eq. (7)), after inclusion of the 
cumulative production-reserves constraint. The details 
are burdensome. The reader is referred to Watkins 
(1971). The earlier summary of the main aspects of the 
reservoir data applies equally to the 108 pools exam-
ined here. Based on 1957 to 1964 evidence, the values 
set for the three parameters common to all reservoirs 
were: average royalty rate, 10 per cent; dry develop-
ment well allowance, 10 per cent; annual discount rate, 
10 per cent.
B.	Optimum	Well	Spacing,	1957	Plan
Optimum well spacing (s*) was estimated for 108 
reser voirs that commenced production over the 
period 1957 to 1964. The theoretical optima are those 
that obtain given the constraints on production set by 
the 1957 plan. The same caveats listed for the 1950 plan 
results apply here. The crude mean optimum spacing 
value was 240 acres per well, with a standard deviation 
of 294 acres and a wide range of 9 to 1,500 acres. If the 
optimum spacing values were weighted by the implied 
number of wells for each reservoir, the resultant 
weighted mean is 88 acres, considerably less than the 
unweighted value.
The range of theoretical optimum spacing indi-
cates that criticism of the 1957 plan (Oil and Gas 
Conservation Board, 1964b) on the grounds that it 
encouraged the drilling of “unnecessary development 
wells” (i.e., relatively dense spacing) is not universally 
valid. For many pools, no incentive existed for dense 
spacing. Thus, as for the 1950 plan, the extent to which 
dense spacing was encouraged by the 1957 plan is 
clearly dependent on the particular physical and eco-
nomic characteristics of an individual reservoir.
The more detailed analysis of the results by reser-
voir categories suggested that, in common with the 
1950–56 group of pools, the key variable determining 
optimum well spacing was the reserve density of 
a pool.
C. Comparison of Theoretical and Actual Well 
Spacing,	1957	Plan
The results in Section 4.B assume an operator would 
not be subject to external constraints in exercising his 
choice of well spacing. In reality, the operator’s free-
dom was restricted, as discussed in Section 3.C. These 
restrictions apply equally to the 1957–64 period. But 
in 1957, minimum well spacing in roughly the eastern 
half of the province was increased to 80 acres (in the 
western half, 40 acres was retained). In 1962, a min-
imum well spacing of 160 acres was adopted for the 
entire province (for new oil reservoirs).
The analysis of actual (sa) and optimum spacing 
(s*) follows the same lines as for the 1950 plan. The 
conclusions were also the same. That is: spacing 
regulations, fragmentary ownership, data variations, 
and other factors accounted for significant variations 
between sa and s*, which in turn suggests the theor-
etical analysis is sound.
5.	Efficiency	of	Production	under	
Prorationing in Alberta: Intensive 
Diseconomies
Our purpose here is to estimate by how much pro-
duction costs under proration in Alberta exceeded 
those under a more efficient system. As mentioned 
earlier, the analysis is confined to the efficiency of the 
distribution of production within reservoirs (intensive 
diseconomies), rather than efficiency of the distribu-
tion of output among reservoirs (extensive disecon-
omies). Definitive measurement of the latter would 
require model simulation of the Alberta oil industry 
in the absence of proration. That daunting task is 
not attempted.
In what follows, first, intensive diseconomies are 
defined and discussed. Second, estimates are made 
of apparent actual diseconomies for the group of 
reservoirs examined in Sections 3 and 4. Next, disec-
onomies that would have been incurred had the reser-
voirs been developed on the hypothetical optimum 
spacing calculated in Sections 3 and 4 (hypothetical 
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diseconomies) are estimated. The implications of the 
hypothetical and actual results are also discussed.
A. Intensive Diseconomies
Intensive diseconomies are measured by comparing 
the production costs of output allocated by proration 
with the costs of producing the same volume of oil 
using the minimum number of wells necessary. The 
latter condition generally is achieved when reservoir 
lease ownership is not effectively divided and com-
plete flexibility of production within a reservoir pre-
vails, such as would hold under full unitization. Thus, 
the diseconomies estimated in the following sections 
approximate those resulting from proration compared 
with production under full unitization, assuming the 
distribution of production between reservoirs were 
fixed. (As discussed above, higher costs than would 
have been incurred had output been allocated differ-
ently between reservoirs is an ‘extensive’ diseconomy 
of prorationing.)
Section 2 identified three proration plans: the 
1950, 1957, and 1964 plans. The regulation of produc-
tion within a reservoir under the 1964 plan tended 
to result in effective conditions within the reservoir, 
closely comparable to those under full unitization 
(Watkins, 1971). Under the 1964 plan, no incentive 
existed to install or maintain capacity in excess of allo-
cated quotas, although inefficiencies might still result 
through the land tenure system itself, or through poor 
reservoir delineation. These latter factors are external 
to proration per se. It follows that the 1964 plan did 
not involve intensive diseconomies as defined before-
hand: they are relevant only to pools developed under 
the 1950 and 1957 proration plans. It also follows that 
any estimated diseconomies may be interpreted as 
differences between reservoir output costs under the 
1950 and 1957 plans and under the 1964 plan, since 
the suggestion is that any estimated inefficiency could 
have been largely eliminated had the provisions for 
the distribution of production within a pool under the 
1964 plan been in force.
To estimate intensive diseconomies incurred 
under the 1950 and 1957 plans, a distinction is made 
between actual and hypothetical diseconomies. Actual 
diseconomies are estimated on the basis of the actual 
well production and capacity data available for the 
reservoirs examined. Hypothetical diseconomies are 
those that would have resulted from development of 
reservoirs under the theoretical optimum spacing 
patterns dictated by the proration formula discussed 
in Sections 3 and 4.
The distinction is useful since it will indicate the 
degree to which actual diseconomies, which reflect the 
influence of proration and external constraints such 
as the land tenure system, are correlated with disecon-
omies that would result from development on theor-
etical optimum spacing under proration, from which 
external restrictions are excluded.
B. Actual Intensive Diseconomies
To estimate actual diseconomies, the same method 
was applied to both groups of reservoirs used in the 
analysis of the 1950 and 1957 plans, the 1950 to 1956 
group and the 1957 to 1964 group.
In essence, actual intensive diseconomies were 
estimated by the difference between actual reser-
voir installed capacity and peak actual production 
(Watkins, 1971). Any such surplus capacity was trans-
lated into an implied number of surplus wells by 
division by average well capacity. In turn, the surplus 
wells were converted to estimated surplus capital and 
capitalized operating costs (assuming a thirty-six-year 
reservoir life).
On this basis, total surplus capital costs and cap-
italized operating costs for the 183 reservoirs examined 
were $271 million. The significance of this number is 
indicated by translating the surplus investment it rep-
resents to an equivalent number of exploratory wells. 
About 2,500 extra exploratory wells could have been 
drilled (assuming $100,000 per well, costs in dollars 
of the day): this is an increase of close to 40 per cent 
over the number actually drilled in Alberta over the 
1950–64 period.
The majority of the estimated diseconomies are 
concentrated in a relatively small number of pools. 
For the 1950–56 group, total surplus capital costs in 
fifteen pools accounted for 85 per cent of the corres-
ponding total for all seventy-five pools. The average 
ratio of required wells to actual wells was 84 per cent. 
However, this is heavily influenced by the high ratio 
of 98 per cent for the large Pembina reservoir, which 
accounts for approximately half of the required and 
actual wells; if Pembina were excluded, the average 
ratio becomes 71 per cent. The apparent efficient 
development of Pembina under proration, in an inten-
sive sense, is significant. (Recall here our concern is 
with efficiency given a fixed distribution of output 
amongst reservoirs. If such output were allowed to 
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vary, to reduce extensive diseconomies, it would not 
necessarily follow that the degree and timing of the 
development of Pembina was efficient.)
For the 1957–64 group, eleven pools accounted for 
84 per cent of total surplus well capital costs for all 108 
pools. The average ratio of required to actual wells was 
77 per cent.
For the combined period 1950 to 1964, the average 
ratio of required to actual wells was 82 per cent. Thus, 
on an average, about one development well in five 
drilled in the oil reservoirs discovered in Alberta over 
the period 1950 to 1964 was surplus, under the prevail-
ing distribution of production among reservoirs.
In Section 5.A, reference was made to production 
within a reservoir under the 1964 plan being closely 
comparable to production under full unitization. 
Hence the results in this section indicate the potential 
savings available had the 1964 plan provisions been in 
effect during the period considered. The efficiency of 
proration, then, is significantly affected by the form of 
proration imposed.
C. Hypothetical Intensive Diseconomies
In Section 3, theoretical optimum well spacing given 
the constraints of the 1950 Proration Plan was esti-
mated. An important question is the extent to which 
reservoir development under theoretical, optimum 
well spacing would have resulted in the installation of 
spare capacity. That is, to what extent would pursuit 
of maximum present value profit be consistent with 
the deliberate installation of excess capacity, given the 
proration formula in operation?
Such diseconomies are measured by first deter-
mining the peak level of output, called f *max, reached 
by a reservoir assuming it were developed under its 
computed optimum spacing, s*. Efficient production 
requires wells to be produced at capacity. The latter is 
defined as the authorized capacity, the MPR. (While 
the MPR was a regulatory formula, it nevertheless 
is a reasonable representation of actual capacity.) If 
f *max were constrained by the MPR, no intensive dis-
economies would be incurred by the choice of s* as 
well spacing since the theoretical capacity of the wells 
drilled on optimum spacing would be utilized at some 
point in the reservoir’s assumed life. However, if there 
were redundant capacity, theoretical diseconomies 
would occur.
For such reservoirs (that is, where the theoretical 
capacity, defined as the product of the number of 
wells drilled on optimum spacing and the well MPR, 
exceeded f *max), the implication is that f *max would 
have been produced more efficiently by increasing 
well spacing and producing the resulting reduced 
number of wells at their MPR. If this wider spacing 
were designated smax, a cost saving by developing a res-
ervoir on the spacing smax can be imputed. This is com-
posed of two elements: capital and operating costs. 
The expression for capital costs is: Cs = wA [(1/s*) – 
(1/smax)], where Cs = capital cost saving, w = cost of 
well; s* = theoretical optimum spacing under pro-
ration; smax = efficient spacing; A = reservoir area. The 
capitalized operating cost saving, Ys, between reser-
voir development on spacing smax and s* is: Ys = Ay 
[ai n*/s*) – (ai nm/smax)], where y = annual operating 
costs per well; i = discount rate; n* = reservoir life 
under spacing smax; nm = reservoir life under spacing 
smax and ai is the annuity factor, discount rate i. For 
detailed development of these formulae see Watkins 
(1971, pp. 325–30, 338–40).
As mentioned above, hypothetical surplus costs 
would only be incurred for those reservoirs where 
the well MPR exceeded the calculated maximum well 
output (i.e., m > fmax). Of the total of seventy-five 
reser voirs in the 1950–56 group, thirty-four fell in 
this category. Hypothetical diseconomies for these 
pools totalled $464 million; similarly to the actual dis-
economies, most were concentrated in a few pools: six 
pools accounted for 88 per cent. Hypothetical surplus 
costs were only relevant to twenty of the 108 reservoirs 
in the 1957–64 group; total hypothetical diseconomies 
amount to some $179 million and were concentrated 
in a few reservoirs: four accounted for 83 per cent of 
estimated surplus well capital costs. The mix of pools 
in the 1957–64 group is of course different from the 
earlier group, which prevents proper comparison 
between the hypothetical results. Nevertheless, the 
lower figure for total diseconomies ($179 million) 
compared with the 1950–56 group ($464 million) is 
expected, having regard for the smaller total acreage 
of the 1957–64 group and the lower average reserves 
per acre.
The much higher total diseconomies under theor-
etical spacing compared with the estimated actual 
diseconomies mainly reflects the elimination of min-
imum spacing regulations in the theoretical analy-
sis. This suggests that the minimum spacing levels 
imposed by the OGCB were important in negating 
incentives to install additional excess productive cap-
acity in certain reservoirs. In the absence of such regu-
lations, the economics of reservoir development under 
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the 1950 and 1957 proration plan formulae would have 
encouraged very close spacing in high reserve density 
reservoirs and substantial investment in redundant 
capacity.
6. Summary and Conclusions
A. Analysis of Prorationing in Alberta
The importance of the rule of capture in precipitating 
proration in 1950 is confirmed. The most significant 
aspect of the 1950 and 1957 Alberta proration plans 
was the attempt to guarantee long-run well profitabil-
ity by the “economic” allowance. In contrast, the 1964 
plan eliminated the former guarantee, although short-
run well profitability was assured. Under the 1950 and 
1957 plans, there was a close correspondence between 
the number of wells in a reservoir and the volume of 
production allocated to it. The 1964 plan severed this 
relationship. This is important because the number of 
wells is the most significant determinant of reservoir 
production costs.
Reservoir development incentives given pro ration 
have been appraised by constructing a simplified 
reservoir investment model. Theoretical optimum 
well spacing is defined as the value of well spacing 
that maximizes present value profit per acre. The 
theoretical values so determined measure the inher-
ent influence of the proration formulae, since other 
constraints on the choice of well spacing, for instance 
regulatory restrictions, are excluded.
The calculation of optimum well spacing, given 
the control of production by proration, for the 183 
largest reservoirs developed under the 1950 and 1957 
plans shows that, while the distribution of optimum 
spacing by reservoir is skewed towards lower levels, 
the range is very wide. Thus the general proposition 
that the 1950 and 1957 plans of themselves encouraged 
inefficient well spacing is rejected. Instead, such ineffi-
ciency was found to depend on the characteristics of 
the individual reservoirs.
The analysis discloses that the dominant variable 
determining optimum well spacing for a given reser-
voir is its reserve density (reserves per acre). Both 
the 1950 and 1957 plans produced strong incentives 
towards very close spacing in reservoirs with high 
reserve densities.
A comparison of the theoretical results with actual 
well spacing values by reservoir showed broad con-
sistency, after consideration of institutional limitations 
on actual spacing and possible biases in the data used 
for the theoretical calculations. This suggests the 
theoretical analysis employed is sound and that oper-
ators were motivated by profit maximization within 
the constraints imposed by proration.
The extent of extensive diseconomies among 
different reservoirs has not been assessed but must 
have been significant. Production capacity was well 
above actual production throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, with as much as half of capacity lying unused. 
Therefore, there was spare capacity in the more pro-
ductive lower-cost pools while production took place 
in the higher-cost ones. However, without a very 
detailed and complex intertemporal aggregate oil 
supply model of the Alberta industry, incorporating 
stochastic elements in a reasonable manner, it is not 
possible to simulate how the exploration and develop-
ment in the province might have proceeded under 
unitized conditions, so a reliable estimate of extensive 
diseconomies is not available.
For the same reason, it is not possible to tell with 
any precision the impact of prorationing on Alberta 
crude oil prices. In terms of direction of effect, the 
appearance of significant excess capacity beginning 
in the late 1940s suggests that prices were held higher 
than would otherwise have been the case – certainly 
higher than the rule of capture would have generated. 
The comparison with unitized conditions is less clear, 
although the rush of new discoveries after Leduc in 
1947 would have put significant downward pressure on 
prices, likely pushing prices even lower than actually 
occurred in order to increase sales in markets reached 
by pipeline extensions and to attract even more distant 
markets. Lower prices, however, would tend to inhibit 
exploration and development, so that the timing and 
sequencing of discoveries and reservoir development 
would have been quite different under unitization 
from what was observed. It becomes problematic, 
therefore, to speculate on how different oil prices 
might have been in the 1960s.
The relative stability of crude prices under 
market-demand prorationing is also notable, with 
occasional changes in the 1947 through 1962 period, 
and a constant (nominal) price from then through to 
1970. (See Table 6.2.) Market-demand prorationing 
tends to induce such price stability by transferring 
to the pro rationing authorities the power to adjust 
production to meet demand at prevailing prices. 
Moreover, the rigidity of crude oil prices contrasts 
sharply with the day-to-day price volatility that has 
characterized Alberta crude oil markets since deregu-
lation in 1985.
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However, two main points of caution must attend 
any comparison of the historical level and stability 
of Alberta crude oil prices with a never-observed 
(counterfactual) history of prices under unitization. 
The first relates to market structure. In Chapter Six,  
we characterized the industry as one of oligopoly- 
oligopsony and such markets are frequently charac-
terized by rigid prices. The uncertainty is whether 
prorationing simply sanctioned a pattern of rigid 
prices, which the industry would have attained 
anyway, or whether the existence of prorationing was 
what allowed the companies to behave in this way. 
Our inclination is to the latter hypothesis. This is con-
sistent with the extreme instability in crude oil prices 
in the United States under the rule of capture in the 
years 1860 through 1930, prior to the introduction 
of market-demand prorationing, and the rigidity of 
prices after 1930 when market-demand prorationing 
by state governments become common. It is useful to 
consider two separate issues here, price stability and 
the extent to which the market was managed. It is 
clear that market-demand prorationing was successful 
in avoiding the extreme price instability that charac-
terizes the rule of capture. Prorationing also seems to 
have limited output expansion by allowing the majors, 
in their role as purchasers of crude oil, to impose 
limits on the volumes of crude produced. Remember 
that refiners nominated volumes of oil they would buy, 
and the Conservation Board allocated this amount 
over potential producers. The interesting question is 
whether market expansion might have occurred more 
rapidly under unitization (without proration).
The second caution relates to conditions in the 
United States, which served as a major competitive 
interface for Alberta crude from 1947 on. Here oil 
prices were also affected by government regulations, 
particularly market-demand prorationing in the main 
oil-producing states and (after 1959) the oil import 
quota scheme. The relative stability of U.S. oil prices 
would have reflected back to Alberta even in the 
absence of market-demand prorationing in the prov-
ince. Moreover, lower prices for Alberta oil would 
probably not have generated significantly higher sales 
in the United States, given U.S. concern about the level 
of oil imports.
As was argued in Chapter Four, Alberta is a rela-
tively small player in the international petroleum 
industry and produces significantly less oil than 
the United States; hence the oil price effects of pro-
rationing in Alberta were probably relatively minor, 
linked to minor adjustments in the competitive 
interface for Alberta oil. However, the price effects in 
North America, and in the international market prior 
to the mid-1950s, of market-demand pro rationing 
in all North American jurisdictions combined, 
were significant.
B.	Efficiency	of	Prorationing	in	Alberta
Assessment of the economic efficiency of a govern-
ment regulatory program such as market-demand 
prorationing requires that the activities under the 
program be compared to what would have occurred in 
its absence. In the case of prorationing, there is some 
ambiguity as two quite different states of the world 
suggest themselves as alternatives: one in which the 
rule of capture operated freely and a second in which 
reservoirs were unitized. Prorationing in combina-
tion with other regulations (in particular minimum 
well spacing) clearly reduced the overinvestment and 
price instability associated with the rule of capture. 
However, economists have long argued that pro-
rationing fails to internalize the real externality associ-
ated with the rule of capture, that is, the lack of clearly 
defined property rights over the oil in the ground 
(Adelman, 1964; Lovejoy and Homan, 1967). One 
criterion of economic efficiency that we have utilized 
in our comparison of market-demand prorationing 
to unitized conditions is that of cost minimization: 
clearly economic efficiency requires that oil be pro-
duced in a least-cost manner.
Our formal quantitative analysis concentrated on 
efficiency in relation to a fixed distribution of output 
between reservoirs (intensive efficiency). This is an 
important restriction because it excludes the measure-
ment of efficiency for varying output configurations, 
such as might arise if minimization of the cost of a 
given level of total provincial production was sought 
(extensive efficiency). Thus, the numerical estimate of 
total diseconomies represents a minimum level.
1. Extensive Diseconomies
As mentioned beforehand, we have no basis for 
estimating how much higher total inefficiencies 
were, once extensive diseconomies are included. 
Diseconomies are the incremental costs of producing 
crude under prorationing, as opposed to effective 
unitization. Extensive diseconomies would occur as a 
result of developing and operating higher-cost projects 
(e.g., small pools, deep pools, low-productivity pools, 
high-cost EOR schemes) when low-cost projects (e.g., 
large, high-productivity, high-permeability pools) 
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are restricted by prorationing. Whereas the intensive 
diseconomies involve incremental costs of developing 
specific pools, the extensive diseconomies involve 
different costs among pools.
There is reason to suppose that the extensive 
diseconomies were significant. In particular, as has 
been noted elsewhere in this chapter, many of the 
large, productive pools operated at a small portion of 
installed capacity during the 1950s and 1960s. At the 
same time, many small less-productive pools were 
guaranteed output by prorationing. Discovery allow-
ances, and high allowances to cover investment costs 
under the 1950 and 1957 schemes, made exploration 
for and development of such small reservoirs econom-
ically attractive. It would have been more efficient to 
draw more heavily upon the lower-cost pools before 
undertaking expenditures on higher-cost pools, 
though uncertainty in exploration makes a strict 
scheduling of pools in ascending order of cost impos-
sible to achieve.
As discussed above, there are insufficient data 
to allow a reasonable estimate of the size of these 
external diseconomies. Detailed pool-by-pool cost 
estimates are not readily available. More seriously, 
it would be necessary to simulate the history of the 
Alberta crude oil industry under unitization, includ-
ing the evolution of market prices and the sequence 
of discoveries, in order to compare the costs of this 
hypothetical history with what actually occurred. This 
implies a large-scale optimization model of the indus-
try, and such a model does not exist.
2. Intensive Diseconomies
Realized intensive diseconomies were measured by 
comparing production costs for peak reservoir output 
under proration with the estimated minimum costs 
of producing the same output. The comparison indi-
cates that, for the 183 reservoirs examined, on average, 
about one in five of the actual development wells 
drilled was superfluous. Total actual intensive dis-
economies incurred under the 1950 and 1957 proration 
plans were estimated as $271 million (without adjust-
ment); the majority was located in relatively few pools. 
These diseconomies reflect, not only proration itself, 
but all other institutional factors affecting reservoir 
development and production, for example, minimum 
well spacing regulations and the land tenure system. 
They approximate the savings realizable if a regime of 
compulsory unitization had been imposed.
No inherent incentive for installation of surplus 
productive capacity within reservoirs existed under 
the 1964 plan, and hence the estimates of disecon-
omies also indicate the potential for savings had the 
provisions of this plan for the distribution of produc-
tion with reservoirs been in effect from 1950 onward. 
A further conclusion is that the efficiency of proration 
is fundamentally affected by the form it takes.
If the same 183 reservoirs had been developed on 
the calculated optimum well spacing under the 1950 
and 1957 proration plans, total intensive diseconomies 
would have been some $643 million, considerably 
higher than the estimate of actual diseconomies. The 
difference between the hypothetical results, which 
assume no restriction on choice of spacing, and the 
actual diseconomies suggests that the imposition of 
minimum well spacing regulations played an import-
ant role in preventing inefficiency, especially in reser-
voirs of high reserve density. It illustrates the way in 
which one set of rules may need bolstering by another: 
regulations breed.
Since full implementation of the 1964 proration 
plan in 1969, the kinds of inefficiencies cited above 
largely disappeared. Some changes were made to 
the plan in the 1970s, but they were not structural. 
Thus in large measure the provisions of the 1964 plan 
remained in effect until the absorption of spare oil 
production capacity made prorationing redundant in 
the late 1980s.
3. Market Equilibrium
Under prorationing, Alberta crude oil prices were 
relatively stable, exhibiting none of the wasteful price 
instability expected under the rule of capture. In fact, 
it can be argued that prices were too stable under 
prorationing, thereby interfering with the efficient 
market signals expected under unitization without 
government production limits. As suggested above, 
one would have anticipated somewhat greater price 
movement in response to underlying changes in 
demand and supply than was in fact observed in the 
1950s and 1960s. The flurry of discoveries following 
Leduc would normally have pushed prices even lower 
than was seen in the 1950s, the lower prices serving 
both to encourage greater consumption in the mar-
kets for Alberta oil and to discourage further supply 
increases until prices had risen again. This suggests a 
different timing of industry expenditures, with some 
of the exploration and development expenses occur-
ring later than actually occurred. Society would bene-
fit because the present value of expenses in the crude 
oil industry would be less (due both to delay and any 
cost-saving technological advances).
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Three counterarguments, not necessarily inde-
pendent of one another, can be raised against these 
criticisms of market-demand prorationing’s impact 
upon the price of oil.
The first counterargument questions the desirabil-
ity of a reliance on free markets for crude oil, even if 
oil pools were unitized. If individual producers fail 
to anticipate future market conditions in a rational 
manner, then a unitized oil market might still tend 
to generate unnecessarily large cycles of price and 
output; these would be similar to, though not neces-
sarily as extreme as, those under the rule of capture. If 
regulatory authorities are better able to foresee future 
market conditions, they might utilize a regulatory 
device such as market-demand prorationing to reduce 
price variability. Of course, one would have to balance 
the administrative costs and inefficiencies of pro-
rationing against the benefits of greater price stability.
Many economists are unconvinced by the basic 
premises of this argument. They are sceptical that gov-
ernments can read the future of markets better than 
participants in the industry and that current invest-
ment and production decisions are based on irrational 
forecasts of the future. The idea of ‘rational expecta-
tions’ in economics does not say that forecasts are cor-
rect, since there is inescapable uncertainty about what 
is going to happen. It says that rational forecasts make 
full use of available information so that any deviation 
between what actually occurs and what was expected 
is random error. The status of rational expectations in 
complex macroeconomic systems is very controver-
sial; it is more readily accepted by economists in the 
somewhat simpler microeconomic environment of 
markets for individual products.
The key issue is the effectiveness of profit maxi-
mization by producers. Somewhat more formally, 
utilizing the conceptual apparatus of Chapter Four, the 
question is whether producers make due allowance for 
the ‘user costs’ of oil production. Thus, for example, 
economic theory suggests, not only that lower prices 
today inhibit investment and production today, but 
that the anticipation of these lower prices in earlier 
periods will have inhibited investment in those earlier 
periods. We find it hard to believe that most of the 
industry’s investors, certainly the successful ones, are 
persistently myopic, and so much so that government 
controls on production levels would be justified. 
Despite this scepticism, three issues deserve further 
empirical analysis.
One is the suggestion that industry investment 
is driven more by the desire to generate immediate 
or early cash flow than by profit maximization. For 
example, even though present value profits might be 
greater if the company sat on its mineral rights for 
several years before investing, the desire for faster, 
earlier returns might stimulate immediate investment. 
This suggests a bias by the industry towards over-
investment and rapid depletion of oil pools, even 
under unitized conditions. We are, as noted, sceptical 
about the significance of this argument, but know little 
empirical work that addresses it.
A related issue that has received little quantitative 
analysis is the extent to which various government 
regulations may push companies to invest earlier than 
they might wish to do so if they were unconstrained 
in their pursuit of maximum profits. For example, 
Crown mineral rights must often be drilled on within 
several years or automatically transferred back to 
the government. 
Another dimension relates to the efficiency of 
corporate decision-making tools. Most companies 
do rely heavily upon investment criteria that empha-
size profit maximization. This would include both 
the net present value and the internal rate of return 
(discounted cash flow rate or ‘hurdle’ rate) criterion. 
(See, for example, Van Meurs, 1970, or McCray, 1975.) 
However, it is not clear that the application of these 
criteria adequately allow for uncertainty about the 
future. It is common to handle such uncertainty using 
a single value for uncertain variables. Sometimes 
the decision-maker may simply say “we don’t know 
what the future will bring, so let’s use today’s value.” 
In this case, decision-making will tend to be myopic 
in the sense that it lags behind any persistent trends. 
This view has a long history amongst oil analysts. For 
example, Frank (1966) suggested that the oil indus-
try is inherently unstable in part because of cycles 
of over- and underinvestment, which have ongoing 
price effects. Many economists found Adelman’s (1972) 
counterarguments convincing, that the industry tends 
to be inherently stable (if the rule of capture is offset) 
because, in part, of the forward-looking nature of the 
investment decision. In this case, decision-makers 
do not automatically utilize today’s value. The value 
selected may be a different expected value (for 
example, a probability weighted average of future 
values that are seen as possible). However, the net 
present value calculated using the single certainty 
equivalent number will be an inaccurate measure of 
expected profit unless net present value (profit) is 
a linear function of various values of the uncertain 
variable (MacFadyen, 1988). It has also been argued 
that there are a number of cognitive biases that are 
common in processing information about uncertain 
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situations (Kahneman et al., 1982). More recently, 
it has been suggested that conventional net present 
value techniques tend to be biased in favour of cur-
rent investment over delay. At its most basic level, this 
would reflect a tendency to assess a current invest-
ment project on a “yes or no” basis, without explicitly 
comparing it to a delay option. At a more complex 
level, it has been argued (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) that 
current investment involves a cost in the form of a 
foregone ‘option value,’ which net present value tech-
niques typically ignore. For example, if one is uncer-
tain whether next period’s price will be high or low, 
delay of investment gives one the option of investing 
or not depending on the price level actually observed; 
investing today means that this option is foregone.
On balance, in the absence of any strong empirical 
evidence, we remain unconvinced that an effectively 
competitive unitized oil industry would involve 
severely biased investment and production decisions. 
Even if it were demonstrated, we would need to be 
persuaded that the government could do better, and 
even then, market-demand prorationing does not sug-
gest itself as an appropriate regulatory program.
A second argument in support of market-demand 
prorationing relies on ‘second-best’ considerations. 
In particular, it notes that Alberta in 1950 was facing 
a petroleum market where U.S. oil provided the main 
competition and also potential markets. However, 
market-demand prorationing, with all its inefficien-
cies, was in place in a number of the main producing 
states, and it was becoming increasingly clear during 
the 1950s that there were limits on the willingness of 
the U.S. government to tolerate higher oil imports. 
Moreover, we have noted the oligopoly/oligopsony 
nature of Canadian oil markets. Alberta oil, there-
fore, was not entering an effectively competitive free 
market. The theory of second-best implies that a 
program which would be inefficient in a ‘first-best’ 
(i.e., perfectly competitive) world may not be so in 
a ‘second-best’ world. A plausible line of argument 
would note that Alberta oil prices would necessarily 
be tied to prices in watershed markets and that reli-
ance on an unregulated private sector to sell under 
these conditions was undesirable because the oligop-
olistic major oil companies would have favoured their 
crude-oil-producing affiliates over the independents. 
Prorationing did ensure that all producers were 
allowed to produce. However, it has not been dem-
onstrated, so far as we know, that it was optimal to 
extend the market for Alberta oil to Toronto and no 
further. Moreover, this line of argument provides no 
support for the intensive and extensive diseconomies 
generated by prorationing.
A third line of argument may, however, supple-
ment the second. It is a close cousin of the ‘optimal 
tariff ’ argument, which suggests that a country 
selling an export good may gain (in the absence of 
retaliation) by imposing a tariff, effectively exercis-
ing market power to raise the price of the good and 
gain more revenue. The price-increasing effects of 
market-demand prorationing may, therefore, have 
been inefficient from a global or even total Canadian 
perspective, but they may have been beneficial to 
Alberta, particularly to the extent that the provincial 
government gained through higher royalty and bonus 
bid revenues. (However, higher production costs, 
endemic to prorationing, would tend to reduce bonus 
bids.) Once again, however, this argument offers no 
justification for the specific regulations under the 1950 
and 1957 plans, which generated large intensive dis-
economies. And a price support – output allocation 
program like market-demand prorationing seems 
destined to involve external diseconomies by failing to 
ensure that only the lowest-cost oil is produced.
C. Conclusion
The rule of capture induces rapid, and inefficient, 
exploitation of a region’s crude oil resource base. The 
Alberta Government and oil industry were well aware 
of this. With the rush of new discoveries after the 1947 
Leduc find, the government moved (in 1950) to adopt 
the regulatory response most common in the United 
States – market-demand prorationing. (Daintith, 2010, 
chap. 13, provides a valuable review of the rule of cap-
ture and assorted responses to it.) Alberta’s regulations 
were in place until 1989. The effects were major.
One effect of market-demand prorationing in 
North America was to eliminate the market price 
instability that had been so pronounced under the 
rule of capture. The Alberta scheme fitted into a North 
American oil market in which crude prices were 
already much stabilized by prorationing in the major 
U.S. producing states. The Alberta regulations did, 
however, significantly reduce the flexibility with which 
Alberta oil interacted with the rest of the continental 
crude oil market. The details of these interactions have 
been discussed in Chapters Six and Nine of this book.
Proponents of market-demand prorationing 
would argue that it allowed an orderly expansion of 
Alberta crude into more distant markets and ensured 
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that all producers, even the smallest independent, 
was ensured a portion of that market (i.e., it did act 
to protect correlative property rights), and satisfied 
notions of equity that embraced the opportunity to 
produce from any reservoir. Critics of the scheme 
might accept the argument, in part but would go 
on to argue that market-demand prorationing had 
major disadvantages relative to compulsory unitiza-
tion as a way of controlling the excess of the rule of 
capture. In particular, it may have blunted the forces 
of market adjustment, thereby restricting the ability 
of both buyers and sellers to respond to changing 
circumstances. In particular, it inhibited the full price 
decline and market expansion that the discoveries of 
the 1940s and 1950s warranted. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, the somewhat higher prices and, especially, 
the guaranteed-production, served as an incentive 
to continued exploration and development when the 
Alberta industry was operating at less than 50 per cent 
of productive capacity.
Expressed in other terms, as a result of market- 
demand prorationing, the industry incurred sig-
nificantly higher costs than were necessary. This 
channelled resources into the crude oil industry that 
society might have utilized beneficially elsewhere. 
The higher costs involved both external diseconomies 
(use of oil from higher-cost pools when lower-cost 
pools had unproduced oil available) and internal dis-
economies (higher incremental and operating costs 
within pools than was necessary). The size of the 
external economies has not been estimated. The inter-
nal diseconomies relate to specific regulations in the 
1950 and 1957 prorationing schemes that encouraged 
excess development in oil pools. The 1964 regulations 
removed these incentives. The external/internal dis-
economies were large.
Therefore we conclude that prorationing was 
beneficial in offsetting the worst effects of the rule of 
capture but that there were significant inefficiencies 
attendant to the Alberta market-demand prorationing 
regulations compared to the option of compulsory 
unitization. The inefficiencies potential in the pro-
rationing regulations, compared to unitization, were 
offset in part, but only in part, by well-spacing regula-
tions. Since the rule of capture is in effect in Alberta, 
the end of market-demand prorationing in 1989 left 
control of the negative effects of the rule to voluntary 
unitization and to other regulations, such as min-
imum well-spacing, well location regulations, pooling 
regulations and the authority of the ERCB to order 
maximum output levels (‘rateable take’) if one party 
can demonstrate reduced recovery due to the rule of 
capture (Low, 2009, Section 5, D).
Appendix 10.1: A Reservoir Investment Model under Proration in Alberta
Reservoir development and production costs are 
primarily a function of wells drilled (well density): 
in Alberta, a representative figure for development 
drilling costs would be about two-thirds of reservoir 
development expenditures. Hence well spacing is of 
fundamental importance. Fuller treatment of the fol-
lowing model to estimate the effects of prorationing 
can be found in Watkins (1971).
It is assumed that:
(i) each reservoir is sufficiently small in relation to 
the industry that its development plan would 
not affect factor prices;
(ii) the reservoir produces no gas,
(iii) the reservoir is under unified ownership,
(iv) the purpose of the reservoir owner(s) is to 
maximize present value pre-tax profit from the 
mineral rights it holds in the reservoir.
It is only for exceptionally large reservoirs in terms of 
area (e.g., Pembina) that the first assumption would 
not hold. The second assumption is not stringent: 
gas production could be easily accommodated in the 
reservoir model. The third assumption is necessary 
to measure well spacing incentives under proration 
independently of the effect of the land tenure system. 
The pre-tax specification in assumption (iv) acknow-
ledges the complexities of petroleum taxation and is 
justified also for consistent treatment of reservoirs 
owned by different companies.
Given these assumptions, the reservoir operator 
will attempt to ascertain a schedule of production that 
would maximize present value profits:
        nj  
MaxPj = max ∫ (Rt,j – Ct,j)Dt dt (1) 
       0 
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where:
Pj = present value profits, reservoir j,
Rt,j = expected revenue function at time t, 
reservoir j,
Ct,j = expected cost function at time t, reservoir 
j,
nj = expected production life function, 
reservoir j,
Dt  = expected discount function, time t.
Each function is discussed below.
The Revenue Function
Expected revenue at time t is the product of expected 
price, net of royalties, and the rate of production. 
Oil royalties in Alberta were, up to a certain level of 
production, rate-of-production sensitive. However, 
for simplicity, royalties were expressed as a fixed pro-
portion of unit price, and the sensitivity of results to 
this assumption was tested. Historically, beyond 1952, 
no general price trends were apparent in Alberta. 
Hence the expected price of Alberta crude oil for 
each reservoir was treated as a constant, although 
such prices varied by reservoir. Also, the extant price 
structure was assumed to accommodate fluctuations 
in production from a reservoir. In short, the producer 
is presumed to be a price taker. Given proration, this 
assumption is entirely reasonable.
Under proration, well production was prescribed 
by the proration formulas outlined in Section 2, sub-
ject to maximum rate limitations mainly defined by 
the maximum permissive rate (MPR), designated for a 
well in reservoir j as mj.
If a single well spacing pattern prevailed in the 
reservoir, and if the number of productive wells were 
qt at time t, the level of reservoir output, ft,j, would be 
defined as:
ft,j = qt,j f(t) (2)
where f(t), the rate of well production, is the lesser of 
the prorated quota or the MPR. (The presumption that 
spacing is uniform in a reservoir is compatible with 
controls exercised by the OGCB. Few reservoirs were 
developed on more than one spacing pattern.)
Equation (2) assumes the maximum rate of pro-
duction and the well production quota would be suffi-
cient to specify the level of well production. However, 
oil reservoirs are generally characterized by declining 
well productivity as the reservoir is depleted, given 
constant technology. It is unlikely the omission of 
decline rates will result in significant error when pro-
duction is prorated because the impact of productivity 
decline is experienced primarily when the reservoir is 
produced at capacity while proration fundamentally 
assumes the existence of excess capacity. Productivity 
decline does not affect well production rates until 
productivity falls below production quotas: these 
conditions tend to be confined to the later stages of 
a reservoir’s life. (For confirmation of these points, 
see Muskat, 1949. Nevertheless, the sensitivity of the 
results to the incorporation of productivity declines 
was tested.)
In summary, the revenue function for reservoir j is
Rt,j = pj ft,j (3)
where pj is net of royalty and ft,j is given by Eq. (2).
The Cost Function
The cost function comprises productive development 
well costs, dry development well costs, ancillary facili-
ties, and operating costs. A simplifying assumption is 
made that all investment expenditures are incurred 
in the first year of reservoir development (year zero). 
This is reasonable for small reservoirs but question-
able for reservoirs large in area. However, in terms 
of present value profits, the effect of concentrating 
development in period zero is to some extent offset 
by the corresponding assumption that full production 
commences in period one. Productive development 
well costs are the product of the number of productive 
wells (qj) and the average costs of drilling and com-
pleting a well. Dry development wells are impossible 
to anticipate precisely, but their historical frequency in 
relation to productive wells is known. A dry develop-
ment well costs less than a productive well. Hence, 
dry hole costs are represented by the product of the 
cost of productive development wells, the ratio of dry 
development wells to productive wells, and the ratio of 
the costs of a dry development well to productive well.
Detailed data that would permit proper analysis 
of expenditures on ancillary (above-ground) reservoir 
facilities were not available. The variable to which 
ancillary investments is most obviously related is the 
number of productive wells (qj); it remains the best 
variable with which to approximate ancillary facilities, 
and thus these costs are the product of the number of 
wells and ancillary costs per well. Ancillary facilities 
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are a minor proportion of typical reservoir costs, 
which limits the significance of any specification error.
Well operating costs tend to be insensitive to the 
rate of production and are incurred over the life time 
of the well. No Alberta data for examining trends in 
operating costs over time were readily available, but 
data were available linking operating costs to reservoir 
depth. Hence, operating costs at time t were the prod-
uct of the number wells (qj) and average annual costs 
per well.
In summary, the costs function is:
Ct,j = qj(wj(1 + b1b2) + aw) t = 0, (4) 
 = qj yj t = 1, 2, …, n, 
where: 
wj = drilling and completion costs of 
productive well, reservoir j,
b1 = ratio of dry developments wells to 
productive wells,
b2 = ratio of cost of dry development well to 
productive well,
aw = ancillary costs per well,
yj = annual well operating costs, reservoir j.
Reservoir Life and Discount Rate Functions
The reserves of oil in a reservoir (rj) are assumed to 
be distributed uniformly over its area, an assumption 
made by many engineering analyses. Since it is pre-
sumed that maximum production rate regulations 
apply, recoverable reserves are not affected by the rate 
of production and therefore rj is constant for each 
reservoir.
Thus, the reservoir life function, nj, may be deter-
mined from the expression:
    nj  
rj = ∫ ftj dt (5) 
  0 
In practice, some limitation on industry’s time hor-
izons is normal: twenty-five years is frequently used.
The discount rate, i, is assumed to be fixed 
over time for any one reservoir. This acknowledges 
difficulties in forecasting discount rates and reflects 
general industry practice in Alberta.
An additional assumption, mainly for math-
ematical convenience, is that discount rates are con-
tinuous. Thus the discount function is:
Dt = e–it. (6)
Optimization under Proration
Equations (3) to (6) now may be inserted in Eq. (1) 
to give:
    nj 
Pj = ∫(pj ft,j – qjyj)e–itdt – qj(wj(1 + b1b2) + aw). (7) 
   0 
This, then, is the function the operator should seek 
to maximize in planning reservoir development. 
Expression (7) is simplified. The general problem of 
optimum reservoir development is very complex. For 
example, see Goodnight et al. (1970), and Miller and 
Dyes (1959).
The main variable on which choice is exercised 
in planning reservoir development is the number of 
wells. With uniform well spacing prevailing in any 
one reservoir, this choice may be translated into one 
of well spacing. Thus, given constant reserves per acre, 
optimum profitability will be achieved by the well spa-
cing value that will maximize present value profit per 
acre. Thus, the value of spacing, sj, which will maxi-
mize Pj/Aj for reservoir j is sought, where:
Pj = present value profit, reservoir j,
Aj = acreage, reservoir j,
and the required reservoir parameters for the calcu-
lation of Pj are given. This value of sj is designated sj*, 
the optimum spacing value for reservoir j. Although 
given a sufficient production life, a reservoir could 
be drained by only a few wells (Craze and Granville, 
1955), minimum market requirements, and facility 
capacities, for instance, pipeline throughputs, and 
normal time horizons impose a practical limitation on 
well spacing width.

Readers’ Guide: Nowhere are the petropolitical 
dimensions of the petroleum industry more pro-
nounced that in the area of rent sharing. Because of 
depletability and the heterogeneity in the quality of 
petroleum deposits, plus periods of high international 
prices due to the exercise of oligopoly power, many 
oil and gas reservoirs earn revenues far in excess of 
necessary production costs. Governments have a 
number of reasons to feel they have a special claim on 
the resultant profits (economic rent), most frequently 
because the natural resource is regarded as the prop-
erty of the populace in the region, and also for ability 
to pay reasons since the economic rent is a surplus 
in excess of what private parties require in order to 
produce the petroleum. However, it difficult to devise 
a method of sharing the economic rent that yields a 
high share to the government but has minimal effects 
on the activity of the petroleum industry. This chapter 
reviews the mechanisms used to transfer economic 
rent from the Alberta crude oil industry to Canadian 
governments, with special emphasis on the problems 
arising in a federal state where two levels of govern-
ment may feel that they each have a claim on the 
economic rent.
1. Introduction
This chapter deals with fiscal measures affecting the 
Alberta petroleum industry, covering all types of 
payments by the industry to government, including 
taxes, rentals, royalties and bonus bids. Emphasis is 
on conventional crude oil, although, as will be seen, 
many of the measures affected other aspects of the 
petroleum industry. (Chapter Seven looked at aspects 
particular to the oil sands, and Chapter Twelve does 
the same for natural gas.) The issue is complex. In 
part this reflects the constitutional realities that played 
such an important part in our discussion of pricing: 
both provincial and federal governments have legit-
imate taxation powers. Within this framework, taxes 
may be imposed by governments for many reasons. 
Broadly, a tax may aim to change industry behav-
iour, or it may try to generate revenue with as little 
impact on behaviour as possible. In this chapter we 
shall assume that the latter purpose (‘neutrality’) pre-
dominates. Petroleum taxation is important because 
the industry is expected to generate significant profits 
beyond normal levels. In natural resource industries, 
such profits are frequently called ‘economic rents.’ A 
significant proportion of the fiscal burden on the pet-
roleum industry reflects the claims that government 
may make on these economic rents as the primary 
resource owner. However, monies paid to govern-
ments in their role of resource owner differ from those 
paid as general taxes by all businesses.
Three main sections follow. The first is conceptual, 
on the taxation interests of government (especially the 
province), the meaning of the term ‘economic rent’ 
and some of the different forms of ‘rent collection’ 
(taxation or ‘fiscal take’). The second presents an his-
torical review of the main rent-collection measures 
of the Alberta provincial government, while the third 
looks at federal government tax policies. Our attention 
is on provincial Crown land, rather than the relatively 
small areas of freehold mineral rights and federal 
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Crown land in Alberta, which have rent-collection 
regulations of their own. In addition, income tax pro-
visions will be discussed under the federal measures, 
although this tax has in fact been shared between the 
two levels of government.
2. Conceptual Matters
A. Governments and Economic Rent
A potential producer of petroleum must obtain the 
legal right to necessary inputs, including both surface 
rights to land under which petroleum lies and under-
ground rights (‘mineral rights’) to claim any products 
found beneath the surface. Governments are directly 
involved for two reasons. First, they set up the insti-
tutional framework within which private parties can 
exchange goods and services. Provisions of law hold 
here, including those registration and arbitration pro-
cedures under which oil companies pay compensation 
for the use of surface land in surveys, drilling, produc-
tion, and transmission. Second, and of special interest 
in the context of petroleum, since the BNA Act of 1930, 
most of the mineral rights in the province of Alberta 
have been the property of the provincial government 
(‘the Crown’), and as owner of the petroleum rights 
the government has an abiding interest in the condi-
tions under which companies engage in petroleum 
exploration and production.
It is useful, analytically, to separate the provincial 
government’s role as owner from its role as rule-maker 
for economic exchange. This is important since the 
government predominates but does not have complete 
initial ownership over Alberta underground mineral 
rights and must, therefore, set up rules for exchange 
for private resource owner to oil company transfers 
and for government resource owner (Crown land) to 
oil company transfers. Viewed in this light, it is com-
monly argued that the prime goal of the government 
as resource owner is to obtain the maximum present 
value revenue from its mineral rights. The government 
represents the public as the owner of Crown mineral 
rights. Presumably it could set up discriminatory rules 
that favour the owners of mineral rights over produ-
cers or consumers or surface land owners. It has not 
obviously done so. However, it has been willing to use 
its powers to discriminate between itself and private 
mineral rights owners. For example, in 1972–73, it 
forced the owners of Crown leases to accept much 
higher royalties (or a new tax). Private mineral rights 
owners who had negotiated leases with fixed royalty 
arrangements did not benefit from this provincial 
government policy and had no power to force such 
changes on leaseholders.
The argument is not that the Alberta govern-
ment is interested only in petroleum revenue. Goals 
such as environmental protection and conservation, 
including the assurance of adequate supplies for future 
generations of Albertans or Canadians and the eco-
nomic development of the province may be relevant. 
However, these goals apply to both Crown oil and 
oil from non-Crown land, and so require regulations 
governing all Alberta oil production. Within whatever 
regulatory climate is established for the industry as a 
whole, we assume that the provincial government can 
be seen as wishing to maximize the present value of 
the revenue it receives from Crown land. Several pos-
sible exceptions to this assumption can be raised.
For example, the increase in petroleum revenues of 
the Alberta government after 1973 were undoubtedly 
resented by many citizens and government authorities 
elsewhere in Canada and induced increased federal 
taxes. Higher Alberta petroleum revenues, all else 
being equal, had financial implications for the federal–
provincial taxation equalization agreements, with 
even Ontario shifting toward the ‘have not’ category 
(Courchene, 1976, 1981, 2005). In such circumstances, 
there could be some advantage to the government of 
Alberta in spreading oil and gas revenues out over 
more time, even if the present value of total revenue is 
somewhat reduced as a result.
A second argument also suggests that the govern-
ment might issue mineral rights with an eye more to 
the timing of receipt of revenue than to maximization 
of the present value of receipts. In practice, it may 
not be possible to separate the receipt of revenue by 
the government from the uses to which the funds are 
put. For example, the greater the current revenue of 
the government, the stronger the pressures to utilize 
funds now even on relatively trivial projects. Given 
the electoral process, it has been argued that govern-
ments may undertake expenditures with an eye more 
to short-term political payoff than to long-term gains. 
Governments might then either try to generate rev-
enue earlier so to have access to such politically useful 
funds or to delay receipt of funds so as to reduce the 
temptations to spend rashly. This line of thinking may 
be even more realistic – though more analytically 
complicated – if it is argued that political parties rep-
resent particular special interests. These arguments 
will not be considered in this book, although we 
would suggest that their surface plausibility should not 
exempt them from reasoned empirical consideration. 
After all, they presume a general lack of awareness 
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by the electorate of what does constitute long-term 
economic gain and the ability of well-primed public 
‘bribes’ to secure political rewards.
There are also more indirect ways in which the 
gains derived from public petroleum revenues are 
not independent of the timing in which the revenue 
is generated or used. For example, if oil monies 
significantly increase net provincial income per 
capita in Alberta relative to the rest of Canada, then 
in-migration can be expected. Such an effect reflects 
the way in which the government utilizes the funds. 
Migration to Alberta would likely be lower if the gov-
ernment spent its oil revenues on direct money grants 
to already-established residents or on long-term loans 
to people outside the province, than if the funds were 
used to reduce sales and income taxes. Regardless of 
the specific use to which the revenue is put, potential 
migrants may be affected by reports of the size of cur-
rent government earnings. However, the government 
may wish to spread its earnings out more evenly over 
time, attracting fewer in-migrants, to the greater bene-
fit of current residents. Alternatively, the government 
might be attracted by higher immigration, more rapid 
growth, and the hope for a larger economy.
Given the difficulties in sorting through these 
options, we shall simply assume that the government 
is interested in maximizing revenue from its own 
(Crown) land.
The idea of the maximization of net economic 
returns from petroleum is a slippery one. (The liter-
ature on natural resource rents and rent-collection is 
huge. Interested readers might refer to Cairns, 1985; 
Crommelin, 1975; Crommelin and Thompson, 1977; 
Gaffney, 1967; Kemp, 1987; McDonald, 1963, 1970; 
Scott, 1976; Van Meurs, 1971; and Watkins and Scarfe, 
1985.) Interest centres on what might be called ‘ex post 
economic rent’: The excess of revenue from the sale of 
petroleum above the actual labour, capital, material, 
and other input costs (including a ‘normal’ profit to 
the entrepreneurs) of finding, developing, and lifting 
the petroleum. To suggest that the government wishes 
to maximize its revenue as landowner is to suggest 
that it wishes to capture all of this economic rent. As 
a basis for mineral rights policy, this concept of avail-
able revenue must be interpreted carefully in at least 
three major regards.
1. Quasi-Rents
Economic rent should not be confused with ‘quasi-
rent,’ or short-term rents, where an input has already 
been put in place (e.g., a piece of capital equipment 
like well-pipe, or a service like the drilling cost of an 
exploratory well) and hence is ‘sunk’ or ‘fixed.’ Prior to 
commencing activities, a company has no fixed costs; 
all are variable. But, after a reservoir is in produc-
tion, exploration and some development costs will be 
sunk. A government might be tempted to look solely 
at the costs specific to productive oil and gas pools 
(the successful exploratory well, all the development 
wells, flow lines, etc.) and try to take as tax revenue 
any excess of producer receipts over these costs 
(including a suitable return to compensate for normal 
profits). After all, pretty well any informed observer 
of the Alberta industry could pick out a number of 
the most profitable individual pools and say that these 
generate a great excess of revenue over costs. To tax 
individual oil pools on such a basis, however, would 
also tax the quasi-rents for exploration and therefore 
tend to drive the industry out of business. Dry holes 
are common, and inevitable, in the conventional oil 
and gas industry and therefore must be allowed for as 
a cost. Unfortunately, the size of necessary exploration 
costs is difficult to estimate and may necessarily be 
ambiguous or arbitrary due to the joint product nature 
of exploration. It will be recalled that a joint product 
process is one in which a single activity (like explor-
ation) yields more than one valuable output (e.g., oil 
and gas pools and information which is valuable over 
many years in selecting sites at which to drill explora-
tory wells). Since expenditures on the activity generate 
all the outcomes, there is no valid way to allocate the 
expenditures to separate outcomes (e.g., oil pools), 
although a variety of methods are often applied to 
simplify analysis.
It could be argued that a decision to tax quasi-
rents would be rational, once the industry has discov-
ered pretty well all the low-cost petroleum expected 
in the region, since further exploration is not likely 
anyway. Apart from the difficulty in determining 
when this condition is met, there are obvious political 
and ethical problems since it amounts to expropria-
tion (of exploration assets) without compensation. If 
the industry is largely foreign-owned, however, this 
may be appealing to some people, who argue that 
much of the exploration expenditures of the major 
foreign-owned firms have come from ‘excessive’ after-
tax profits (earned in the past).
2. Ex Ante and Ex Post Profits
In a world of perfect certainty, the profits accruing 
from a venture would be known before the venture 
began (and, of course, there would be no dry holes). 
But we live in a world of uncertainty. This is evident 
for the petroleum industry, dependent as it is upon 
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a natural resource invisibly stored thousands of feet 
below the surface with profits tied to the vagaries of 
international and domestic politics. The industry’s 
actions are based upon its expectations (that is, upon 
expected or ex ante rents). If the landowner (e.g., the 
government) were to impose fees higher than the ex 
ante (expected) rent of a project, then the company 
would not normally undertake the activity. From 
this point of view, the Alberta government is inter-
ested in expected profits as well as the actual eco-
nomic rent earned. (This distinction is discussed in 
Watkins, 1975.)
How do the actual (ex post) profits relate to the 
expected (ex ante) profits? The two differ because: 
(1) ‘unexpected,’ that is unforeseen, events may occur, 
and (2) of all the possibilities that were foreseen, only 
one actually takes place. One might generate a fine 
academic debate about whether these are really two 
separate issues: Are any occurrences ever completely 
unforeseen, or are they foreseen but assigned a very 
low probability? The essential point is that actual 
occurrences are specific so that the ex post rent is 
single-valued, while the ex ante rent incorporates 
a wide variety of possible specific futures. That the 
actual rents earned (ex post economic rents) are 
most visible must not cloud the fact that it is the ex 
ante expectations of the producer (after expected 
payments to the landowner and government) that 
determine behaviour. Expressed in other terms, the 
rent-collection measures of the government are both 
a revenue-sharing and a risk-sharing device: The 
government collects a share of the expected revenues 
from the venture and also derives some share of any 
deviation in actual revenues from what was expected.
3. Allocative Role of Economic Rents
There has always been some haziness in the theoretical 
analysis of profits. It is recognized that financial capital 
must earn a normal return on investment, equivalent 
to the risk-adjusted return such funds might earn else-
where in the economy. Beyond this, it is often argued 
both (1) that any profits above this normal level are 
excess and therefore can be taken away and (2) that 
expectations of above normal profits are the essential 
signal to attract new resources to those industries in 
which net investment is desired (because input prices 
have fallen or technological changes have lowered 
costs or demand increases have occurred). Obviously 
the two arguments conflict: If all profits above the 
normal level were taxed away, then excess profits 
could not serve their allocative role. One response is 
that in a well-functioning competitive marketplace 
long-run excess profits will not occur. However, 
through well-designed corporate profit taxes, a share – 
but not all – of any short-run profits above normal 
profit can be captured by the government. Hence the 
incentive function is maintained. But how are long- 
and short-run profits to be differentiated? And what 
share of short-run profits is required to induce more, 
and faster, investment?
The prospect of earning a supernormal profit may 
also serve as an incentive to hold costs down, there-
fore maximizing the size of before-tax excess profits. 
From the opposite point of view, in the extreme, if a 
company were able to reduce taxes on a one-for-one 
basis as other costs rise, it would have a strong incen-
tive to inflate costs. This would allow companies to 
capture profits by disguising them as costs, providing 
‘gold-plated’ services at much higher costs than are 
necessary with attendant benefits to management. 
Or the producer may simply be able to operative 
inefficiently, exhibiting what some economists call 
X-inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1976).
A further incentive dilemma exists with respect 
to the economic rent from a natural resource such as 
petroleum. If the Alberta crude petroleum industry 
were effectively competitive, long-run monopoly 
profits are not anticipated. However, the limited and 
depletable natural resource base, and cost and location 
differences, mean that economic rents will exist. That 
is, revenues from the sale of petroleum (especially 
from the most productive deposits) will exceed costs 
of production even after allowance is made for normal 
profits and all the essential dry-well exploratory effort 
(i.e., quasi-rents). In other terms, reservoirs with costs 
lower than those for the marginal deposit necessary 
to clear the market will generate a ‘differential’ rent 
due to their relatively lower cost. Effective competi-
tion does not compete away such profits, particularly 
since the number of high-quality petroleum fields 
is limited, and new entrants cannot expect to find 
such pools. (We abstract here from the ‘open access’ 
problem, which will be discussed below.) In addition, 
what we have called economic rent in the oil industry 
includes a ‘pure scarcity’ value (often called the ‘user 
cost,’ as in Chapter Four), and as such it can be argued 
to serve an important allocative role. A barrel of oil 
is scarce and can be used only once. To which time 
period should the producer allocate it – should it be 
produced this year or left in the ground for the future? 
Obviously, from the producer’s point of view, it should 
go to the period that generates the largest (present-
value) profit for the oil pool (subject to contractual 
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arrangements and other factors). It is important that 
the government (as mineral rights owner) devise a 
scheme for the capture of economic rents that does 
not interfere unduly with this time-allocative role.
In summary, the government as mineral rights 
owner might be argued to have as its objective the 
maximization of the present value of the revenue it 
receives from the issue of such rights. This can be 
interpreted as meaning that the government wishes 
to capture the ex post economic rent from crude pet-
roleum production. At the same time, it should not 
take quasi-rents (e.g., revenue required for exploratory 
efforts such as general geophysical work and inevitable 
dry holes); it must remember that industry behaviour 
is governed by ex ante (expected) rents; it must ensure 
that returns to producers continue to serve an alloca-
tive function, in determining the best time period in 
which the oil should be produced; and it is desirable 
to maintain a strong incentive to efficient operations 
and new investment, when conditions warrant addi-
tional production.
B. Policy Instruments
Obviously if the government is to capture economic 
rent from the petroleum industry, some financial 
mechanism is essential. Many can be imagined; we 
shall discuss two that have been rejected in Alberta 
and then briefly review theoretical aspects of several 
that have been adopted.
1. Two Methods Not Adopted
Public Monopoly. Seemingly, all economic rent from 
provincial Crown lands would be captured by the 
Alberta government if Crown lands were entirely 
exploited by a government oil company (National Oil 
Company or NOC). This approach has not been fol-
lowed in Alberta, in part for ‘philosophical’ reasons. 
Provincial governments, whether Social Credit or 
Progressive Conservative, have professed faith in free 
enterprise. Advocates of this viewpoint advance many 
arguments against a public monopoly petroleum 
company. Such a company concentrates too much 
power in a single entity, would be too subject to polit-
ical influence, would stifle the diversity of viewpoints 
essential in an industry with so much uncertainty, 
would tend to have inefficient management (since the 
managers would probably have no financial share in 
successful ventures), and would hence dissipate most 
rents in high costs. A number of these arguments are 
amenable to empirical analysis, but the debate func-
tions much more on an emotional-political level. At 
that level, the socialist answer has been a non-starter 
in Alberta. Crommelin (1975) argued that a Crown 
corporation should be established to undertake pre-
liminary exploratory drilling, but in competition 
with private companies, not as a monopoly. He also 
suggested that the Crown company participate in 
private-sector leases, in place of Crown royalties, as 
a way for the government to share in economic rent. 
The Alberta government never established such a 
Crown corporation.
Public Utility-Type Regulation. A public board 
might be established to monitor individual company’s 
operations and to take any excess of revenues over 
allowed costs. The public utility regulatory approach 
has normally been recommended for industries that 
are ‘natural monopolies,’ that is, where the average 
cost of production declines as output expands. Hence, 
efficient production dictates a single producer. But this 
creates a monopoly that is likely to be able to gener-
ate supernormal profits by exercising market power. 
In this case, it might be judged desirable to regulate 
prices so that revenues are just high enough to cover 
costs. However, the crude petroleum industry is an 
increasing cost industry, capable of supporting many 
firms. As noted above, economic rent is generated 
due to the scarcity value of oil as a non-renewable 
resource, and because of the varying quality of pet-
roleum deposits, so will exist even in the absence of 
monopoly or oligopoly forces. Hence, the natural 
monopoly argument for regulation is not valid.
Many economists are sceptical of a public utility- 
type approach. It would be a complex, and costly, 
administrative task, given the large number of com-
panies active in Alberta. Beyond this, however, many 
economists have doubts about the efficiency of the 
regulatory procedure. It is usually advocated only 
in those cases in which the structure of the market 
is such that effective competition seems impossible. 
For one thing, there are difficulties in determining 
the exact level of the ‘normal profit’ component of 
cost. Given the disincentive effect of too low a rate of 
return, there may be a tendency to set the return too 
high, in which case companies have a ‘residual’ profit 
motive to expand their capital structure. At its worst, 
this can lead to significant ‘gold-plating.’ The larger 
the capital expenditures, the greater the allowable 
return to the company. In this way, costs may expand 
significantly, dissipating economic rent, with com-
panies using too highly capital-intensive production 
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practices. If the revenue requirements to cover costs 
are established correctly, the allocative role of prof-
its has been banished along with the economic rent. 
Therefore, the utility-type regulation to capture rents 
for the government would have to be supplemented by 
output allocation and cost control regulations for each 
individual company. In essence, then, this regulatory 
approach comes to resemble the public monopoly 
approach, but with a higher administrative cost.
2. Financial Instruments Actually Used
No attempt will be made to discuss all possible ways 
in which a landowner might obtain revenue from the 
crude petroleum industry. Rather, the measures used 
by the Alberta government will be noted, along with 
a brief review of the major advantages and disadvan-
tages of each. We shall give attention to three issues: 
The extent to which the approach makes allowance for 
all necessary costs, the impact on ex ante (expected) 
rents (including risk-sharing aspects), and effects 
upon the allocative function of rents.
The measures will be discussed in verbal terms. 
In addition, graphical analysis, like that introduced in 
Chapter Four, will be used. The impacts of rent- 
collection measures will differ according to the specif-
ics of the device and the project. It is not possible to 
show, graphically, all possibilities, since many factors 
affect the expected and actual sizes of economic rents 
earned. At this time, we shall examine a single oil 
project in a single year, using a medium-run perspec-
tive. One limitation of this approach is that it does not 
explicitly consider the effect of various rent-collection 
measures on the exploration decision, or on the inter-
temporal allocation of production. With respect to 
exploration, the producer would have to consider the 
impact of the rent-collection regulations on each of 
the possibilities foreseen (i.e., a dry hole, a small oil 
discovery, a large oil discovery, a small gas discovery, 
a large gas discovery, etc.). By looking at a discovered 
pool, much of this information has been gathered 
(though the exact size and characteristics of the pool 
are not well known until some development occurs). 
Exploration costs are sunk costs, although they may 
be relevant for tax purposes.
For a discovered pool, the pre-tax economic rent 
available will be a function of the cost of producing 
the oil and the price of oil. Since these graphs take 
exploration costs as sunk, what is labelled economic 
rent will include the ‘quasi-rent’ necessary to cover 
these exploration costs. In the following graphs, we 
show high- and low-rent pools by varying only the 
second of these two factors, the price of oil. Available 
economic rent (defined as the product of output and 
the difference between price and average production 
costs) is shown as the shaded areas in Figure 11.1. In 
subsequent graphs, the shaded area is the rent cap-
tured by the government. In the graphs, the curves 
MPC1 and APC1 represent, respectively, the marginal 
and average private before tax production costs of oil. 
For simplicity, the average and marginal cost curves 
are drawn as upward-sloping straight lines. Since oil 
production from the limited resources of the pool is 
subject to diminishing returns, the cost curves must 
eventually have a positive slope. Expressed in other 
terms, incremental production implies rising costs, as 
new wells must be placed in less-favourable locations, 
or because additional wells interfere with flow rates in 
existing wells, or because expensive enhanced oil- 
recovery techniques must be used. In the subsequent 
graphs, MPC2 and APC2 represent costs to the produ-
cer including the relevant payment to government.
Figure 11.1 includes an additional curve, labelled 
MC*. Its intersection with the price line (demand 
curve) shows the desired output level of a perfectly 
competitive profit-maximizing firm. That is, pro-
duction occurs at Q* where price equals marginal 
cost. MC* includes the ‘marginal user cost’ of the oil 
produced. As discussed in Chapter Four, this is the 
present value of the reduction in future profits that 
results from producing this barrel now. The user cost 
is actually a part of the economic rent (on the last 
barrel produced the economic rent and marginal 
user cost are identical); it explains the time-allocative 
function of prices. Since the graphs become exces-
sively complicated if the MC* curves are shown, we 
have included it only in Figure 11.1. Subsequent figures 
show the expected level of output (Q) under the finan-
cial scheme, relative to Q*, thereby illustrating the 
allocative effect of the scheme.
As noted, Figure 11.1 has two parts that differ in 
the assumed price level: Part B shows a higher real 
oil price. To the extent that producers are uncer-
tain about the future level of oil prices, the ex ante 
(expected) economic rent for an oil project can be 
imagined as a probability weighted average of the two 
price cases. It is also possible that the higher price is 
entirely unexpected.
It is not easy in these single-year graphs to show 
the time-allocation problem and the effect of a tax 
measure on lifetime revenues of the company and 
government. For example, some of the government 
revenue from a price rise may consist of revenue that 
would have been received anyway but is obtained 
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now rather than later because the price rise induces 
the company to shift output toward the present. (A 
real price rise can also be expected to increase ultim-
ate recovery, as more oil can be recovered profitably 
from high-cost pools.) Figure 11.1 Part B suggests that 
a price rise will generate more output in the current 
period; it has been drawn with the same MC* curve 
as Part A. In fact, a rise in the current price will often 
increase expected future prices and therefore shift the 
MC* curve up (the user cost, based on the expected 
profit from future production, rises). In most circum-
stances, then, output in the current year will rise as the 
price rises, but not by as much as Part B suggests. Of 
course, introduction of a tax will also affect producers’ 
expectations about future profits, and therefore shift 
the MC* curve. As mentioned above, new MC curves, 
showing production costs, user costs, and taxes, 
have not been shown in the figures but would inter-
sect the price line vertically above the output levels 
(Q) chosen.
Complexities are rampant, but it is hoped that 
the verbal and graphical discussions that follow will 
convey the key information. Five financial schemes 
will be discussed, each separately, although the 
Alberta government has actually used them concur-
rently. The first four have been provincial regulations: 
(i) competitive bonus bid; (ii) land rental; (iii) sliding- 
scale ad valorem royalty based on production; and 
(iv) sliding-scale ad valorem royalty based on price. 
The fifth is the corporate income tax, which has func-
tioned, with only minor qualification, as the province’s 
share of a federal tax, so will be discussed in detail 
when Ottawa’s tax schemes are evaluated (in Section 
3). Moreover, the government of Alberta has not 
applied such a tax as a part of its Crown land mineral 
leasing policy but assesses it on all petroleum compan-
ies in the province, just as on all other private corpor-
ations. By and large, the corporate income tax has not 
aimed specifically at resource rents but at corporate 
profits generally.
a. Competitive Bonus Bid
The competitive bonus bid (the shaded areas in Figure 
11.2) is the only financial payment that is clearly ex 
ante. In this figure, the curve labelled ATC includes 
the average cost of the bonus bid. Since it is a fixed 
sum, the average bonus bid per unit of output (the dif-
ference between the ATC and APC1 curves) becomes 
smaller and smaller as output rises. Also, since it is a 
sunk cost, it does not affect the marginal cost curves, 
or the output level (Q*). The size of the bonus (the 
shaded area) is the same in Parts A and B since it is a 
sum that was paid in the past. In Part A, it is assumed 
that at a low price for oil, economic rents are insuffi-
cient to recover the past bonus bid, so at the optimal 
output level the average total cost is higher than price, 
but the average production cost (apart from the bonus 
bid) is lower than price.
Petroleum rights are issued to the company that 
offers the highest dollar bid, and that sum is paid 
whether or not the land is subsequently drilled, and, if 
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drilled, whether dry or with a small or large discovery. 
It is a ‘voluntary’ payment (whose magnitude is deter-
mined by the company bidding) and will never exceed 
ex ante (anticipated) rent. Being ex ante, it is a sunk 
cost when any production occurs, so should not affect 
the rate of production. In a very competitive bidding 
situation, companies will be willing to bid close to 
their estimated ex ante rents; therefore, such a scheme 
will leave the company some of the ex post rent from 
unusually (unexpectedly) low-cost fields and take 
more than the ex post rent of dry wells and high-cost 
pools. In other words, the fact that some pools turn 
out to be very productive and profitable is not, by 
itself, sufficient reason to suppose that a scheme of 
competitive bonus bids is inefficient. Finally, because 
of its ex ante nature, a competitive bonus bid will not 
give the government a share of rent changes due to 
‘unexpected’ events. (‘Unexpected’ in this context 
means both those outcomes that were not foreseen at 
all, and cases in which the actual result differs from 
the average expected result.) So long as companies 
engage in active competition in bonus bidding, and 
the average result that actually occurs corresponds 
closely to the expected average result, a competitive 
bonus bid is an attractive way for the landowner to 
capture ex ante rents.
Obviously risk falls upon the company making 
the winning bid. This may lead to regret and second 
thoughts on the part of the landowner selling mineral 
rights, if ex post rents turn out to be unexpectedly 
large. (Comparing Parts A and B, none of the extra 
rent due to an unexpected price rise goes to the gov-
ernment, and if prices remain low, the company may 
generate a loss on this reservoir.) On the other hand, 
a landowner in virgin territory with a high probabil-
ity of no oil may prefer a positive bonus bid to the 
absence of royalty revenue in the event of a dry hole.
Bonus bids may fall short of the government’s 
assessment of the value of the mineral rights. This 
may happen if the bidding process were oligopsonis-
tic (with few bidders), or if bidders collude, or if the 
government is more optimistic about the property 
than companies are. However, it would also occur if 
companies are more risk-averse than the government 
or if company discount rates exceed the government’s 
‘social rate of discount.’ In this event, the government 
might prefer to rely less on bonus bids and more on 
payments that accrue as oil revenues are earned. The 
timing of land sales is also critical since any excess of 
the government’s valuation over the private sector’s 
will increase with rises in the time between the land 
sale date and the expected start of oil production.
There may be an offsetting phenomenon, which 
generates bonus bid revenue to the government in 
excess of ex ante rents. This is known as the ‘Winner’s 
Curse,’ and refers to the tendency for winning bids to 
go to the bidder that is most optimistically inaccurate 
in assessing the value of the property. (Kahneman 
et al.,1991, and Kagel and Levin, 2002, provide over-
views.) It is not clear how important the Winner’s 
Curse is in petroleum rights bidding by oil companies. 
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Recommended bidding strategies are designed to 
make some allowance for it, and studies of bidding for 
mineral rights in the United States suggest that bids 
approximate ex ante land values. (See, for example, 
Gilley et al., 1986, and Mead, 1984, 1994). We provide 
some evidence on the Alberta experience below.
b. Land Rental
A rental payment is an annual charge for each acre 
held. As shown in Figure 11.3, it has the effect of 
raising the operator’s costs. It has been assumed that 
higher output does not involve greater acreage, so 
no incremental land rental is incurred by producing 
more. The rental payment is therefore a marginal cost 
associated with the decision to produce the first unit 
of output and raises the average cost curve through-
out. The high marginal production cost for the first 
unit of output is not shown. As with the bonus bid, 
the unit rental becomes smaller and smaller as more 
is produced, so the APC2 curve approaches the APC1 
curve. A land rental does have an effect upon the 
production decision since it will induce the operator 
to abandon land more quickly thereby saving the 
rental cost. This is illustrated in Part A, in which the 
producer in the low-price case is shown to cease pro-
duction. (That is, actual production (Q) is zero, since 
price is less than average production cost at the output 
level where price equals marginal cost.) There would 
also be an output effect through the marginal user cost 
component, with earlier production seeming more 
attractive since it saves later rental payments. This is 
not shown in the figure. Obviously a rental payment 
high enough to approximate ex post rent on the most 
profitable outcomes would dissuade all other ventures. 
It would also induce early abandonment of a profitable 
venture, as production decline occurs. Finally, it would 
reduce the anticipated (ex ante) rent on ventures and 
discourage exploratory, and some development, effort. 
Since payments cease when mineral rights are aban-
doned, some of the industry’s risk is shared with the 
government. Overall fixed rental payments are not 
suitable as the major rent-collection measure.
There are two main reasons that land rentals might 
be used. First, they generate revenue for the govern-
ment from acreage that is non-productive, and hence 
capture some of the ex ante rent when actual (ex post) 
rent is zero. The second reason does not relate to the 
capture of economic rent. The use of land for petrol-
eum purposes may involve giving up the value from 
some other land use (e.g., forestry or wilderness) or 
may necessitate expenditures by the government (e.g., 
road construction and maintenance). If such social 
costs exist, the government may assess land rents to 
cover them. Rentals may also be imposed to cover the 
general administrative costs the government occurs in 
regulating the industry.
c. Ad Valorem Royalty, Sliding-scale Based on Output
An ad valorem royalty is a gross royalty based on rev-
enue (i.e., it is some proportion of revenue). In a strict 
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sense, the royalty might be based on volume of output, 
as has been the case in Alberta, but once output is 
sold at the prevailing price, the royalty is equivalent 
to percentage of revenue. A sliding-scale royalty has 
variable proportions: in this case, a higher royalty rate 
is assessed against higher output levels. Therefore, a 
higher price and/or a higher production level imply 
a higher dollar payment per cubic metre. Because 
it raises the cost of output, it encourages lower pro-
duction and earlier abandonment, and, by affecting 
expected profitability, inhibits investment in reserves 
additions. A sliding-scale royalty based on production 
may induce the operator to spread production more 
evenly over the life of the pool, and, perhaps, operate 
the pool for a greater number of years, than would a 
flat-rate royalty or, even, no royalty (although cumula-
tive output will normally be reduced). This is because 
reducing production in the earlier years means a lower 
royalty rate. With this royalty, more profitable out-
comes tend to be assessed a higher per unit charge: a 
higher price raises the royalty and higher output wells 
tend to have a lower average operating cost. (A higher 
output level will mean that costs that are fixed for the 
well are spread over a larger volume so per unit cost 
is less.) However, some high-output wells may still 
have high costs and therefore not be able to support a 
high royalty rate. This could be true of very deep wells, 
those in unfavourable geographical locations, those 
based upon an enhanced recovery scheme, etc. This 
type of royalty will also gather more revenue when 
the actual average result involves either more output 
or a higher price than the average result expected. (If 
average profits are higher because per unit costs are 
lower, the royalty does not generate more revenue 
since it is based on gross revenues.) Clearly the royalty 
involves the government bearing a share of risk. For 
another example, dry wells make no payment to gov-
ernment since the tax is entire ex post and based on 
production. An ad valorem sliding-scale royalty, then, 
cannot collect all the potential economic rent (either 
ex ante or ex post) since it reduces oil exploration and 
production. At the same time, its flexibility makes it 
preferable to rental payments as a measure to collect 
economic rent.
Figure 11.4 assumes that as the pool output rate 
rises, the average output per well becomes smaller 
and smaller (due, for example, to well interference). 
A sliding-scale royalty based on the well’s output rate 
(as has been the case in Alberta) means that the mar-
ginal cost of the royalty becomes smaller as the pool 
production rate increases, so the distance between the 
marginal cost curve excluding the royalty (MPC1) and 
the marginal cost curve with royalty (MPC2) becomes 
smaller as output rises. Since the royalty hinges on the 
value of the oil, the unit royalty payment for any given 
output rate is somewhat higher in the high-price case 
(Part B). Higher costs due to the royalty are shown as 
reducing the output rate. Once again, the shaded area 
shows the revenue flow to the government.
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d. Ad Valorem Royalty, Sliding-scale Based on Price
Figure 11.5 shows a flat-rate ad valorem royalty for 
each unit of output, but with a higher rate the higher is 
price. Accordingly a price increase raises the per unit 
royalty payment both because the same percentage of 
price would now mean a higher charge and because 
the percentage rate rises. (For instance, a 20% royalty 
would generate $2/b at a price of $10/b and $4/b at a 
price of $20/b. If, in addition, the royalty rate rose to 
30% as the price rose, an extra $2 would be generated 
for a total royalty of $6/b at the $20 price.)
A sliding-scale based on price obviously brings in 
a larger proportion of the economic rent from produc-
tion at higher prices than would a flat-rate royalty, but 
it also eliminates more production of higher cost oil. 
By making such oil less profitable, it also reduces the 
ex ante (expected) rent of new exploratory prospects 
and so will reduce the total number of mineral rights 
purchased, and the level of exploration. It does, how-
ever, ensure that if the price of petroleum exceeds the 
average expected price (so that ex post rents exceed 
ex ante rents) the government derives a significant 
share of the unanticipated (‘windfall’) gain. As with 
other types of royalties, risk is shared between the 
companies and the government, although companies 
bear a relatively greater share of the negative market 
outcomes than the positive. (For example, if the price 
fell by a dollar, the royalty might decline by 20 cents, 
whereas if price rose by a dollar, the royalty might 
rise by 30 cents. The company bears 80% of the price 
decline, but enjoys 70% of the increase.)
e. Corporate Income Tax
Analysis of the corporate income tax is complicated 
by the fact that governments already assess such a tax 
on the corporate sector generally, whereas our inter-
est is in a special tax on income to capture economic 
rent. As noted earlier, Alberta has not applied such an 
income tax on Crown mineral leases (Saskatchewan 
has), but it is a frequently recommended option. 
Essentially such a tax is some percentage of revenue 
less allowable costs: normally all exploratory costs 
are deductible on some basis. The general results are 
depicted in Figures 11.6. The tax is shown to increase 
the firm’s costs, and hence to lower output (from Q* 
to Q). It also reduces ex ante rent, thereby serving as 
a disincentive to exploration. The increase in costs is 
not an inevitable part of a tax on net income but com-
monly occurs for two separate reasons. Firstly, capital 
expenditures can normally be deducted from revenue 
as a cost but must usually be amortized over a period 
of years so that the present value of the capital cost 
deduction for tax purposes is less than the expenditure 
itself; hence the tax falls upon a part of capital costs, 
the effect being greater the greater the proportion of 
costs that must be expensed over time. Secondly, an 
income tax usually makes incomplete allowance for 
normal profits as a cost; that is, the required return on 
equity capital is not treated as a cost. Hence this part 
of cost is taxed, the effect being greater the greater 
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the proportion of activities financed by equity capital 
and the higher the necessary risk premium for such 
capital. Usually interest payments on debt capital are 
deductible as an expense so the corporate income 
tax does not fall on this cost of financing. An income 
tax, then, unless very carefully drawn up, does have 
a disincentive effect upon investment (ex ante rent 
expected by the company is reduced and may become 
negative) and may induce output reductions and 
earlier abandonment. Unless the tax rate is very high, 
however, such effects will probably be minimal except 
for the projects at the very margin of acceptability.
There is also the problem that income taxes have 
usually been applied on a corporate basis, whereas the 
problem at hand relates to profits on specific projects. 
This raises the additional difficulty of assuring that 
the tax regulations allow for recovery of all necessary 
costs, including dry-hole exploratory expenditures. 
(As was discussed in Chapter Seven, Alberta did 
introduce a profit tax on oil sands projects. Since the 
resource base is well mapped out, such projects do 
not have an exploration cost component; therefore, it 
is not difficult to ‘ring-fence’ each project and define 
the relevant costs for purposes of the tax.) It may also 
be politically difficult for the government if expendi-
tures exceed revenues for many years, so the producer 
appears to be paying zero tax (since tax payments will 
be forthcoming only in the future when revenues rise 
above costs).
A variant on the income tax has been suggested 
for mineral resources, in the form of a ‘net royalty’ or 
“resource rent royalty,” which would amount to some 
percentage of each year’s net cash flow; the govern-
ment could actually make payments to a company in 
years in which expenditures exceed revenue, but it 
is more common to suggest that negative cash flows 
be carried forward along with an appropriate rate of 
return. (For an example of this tax, see Garnaut and 
Clunies-Ross, 1977.) Watkins and Bradley (1987) note 
that there are difficulties in establishing such a tax, 
particularly on a project-by-project basis where deter-
mination of an appropriate level of cost for pre-project 
expenses is difficult and necessarily somewhat arbi-
trary. Also, it is not clear that all investors, or all types 
of projects, will have the same risk-adjusted meas-
ured rate of return (‘hurdle rate’) to apply to losses 
carried forward.
f. Conclusion
The theoretical discussion seems to point to the 
attractiveness of competitive bonus bids (so long as 
the bidding process is effectively competitive); com-
panies should be willing to bid close to the full ex ante 
economic rent, but such payments would have no 
effect upon the industry’s activities. Other payment 
schemes tend to induce earlier abandonment of pools 
and discourage exploration, though such disincentives 
are less for payments closely tied to the profitability 
of the venture. Competitive bonus bids do have dis-
advantages, however. Bonus bids, since they are based 
upon expected (ex ante) profits, are not responsive at 
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all to events that generate actual (ex post) profits on 
the average project above the expected level; in theory, 
this works in both negative and positive directions, 
but it is the latter, as typified by the OPEC prices rises, 
starting in the 1970s, that attracts most interest. Hence 
governments may wish to supplement the competi-
tive bonus bid with measures that are responsive to 
changing circumstances, although such rent-collection 
devices will, of course, reduce the size of bonus bids. 
The inevitable disincentive effect of such measures 
must be recognized as well, unless the measure applies 
only to outcomes the industry discounts entirely. It is 
apparent that the key issue here is risk. Since the gov-
ernment bears none of the outcome-risk with a bonus 
bid, the probability of after-the-fact regret is signifi-
cant. Behavioural economic research suggests that the 
regret at ‘losing’ the high value from very profitable 
projects is likely to be much more keenly felt than the 
gratification from receiving bonus bids on ventures 
(e.g., dry holes) that turn out to be unprofitable.
Risk is significant in another sense. Private indus-
try is commonly supposed to exhibit risk-aversion; 
this is often posited for smaller companies and for 
larger companies on very expensive projects. It has 
been suggested that risk-aversion may have less 
influence than commonly supposed, given the possi-
bilities for risk-spreading in financial markets, the 
risk-sharing characteristics of the income tax laws 
and the risk-pooling possibilities in the petroleum 
industry (see Stiglitz, 1975). Theoretical discussion of 
the impact of risk and risk preferences on financial 
terms of mineral lease contracts can be found in Hyde 
(1978) and Leland (1978). Risk-aversion reduces the 
size of bonus bids that companies offer and may also 
lessen the competitiveness of the bidding process. 
Moreover, it may accentuate the effect of any imper-
fections in capital markets. Detailed evaluation of 
these arguments is not possible here, but they can be 
easily summarized. Risk-aversion implies that com-
panies will calculate a maximum bid that is smaller 
than the present value of the expected economic rent; 
unless the government is equally or more risk-averse, 
it is smaller than the value of the property as viewed 
by the government (given identical expectations about 
the property). Moreover, if smaller companies are 
more risk-averse, or if capital markets demand higher 
returns from them due to risk, then the bidding pro-
cedure, and certainly winning bids, will be dominated 
by a smaller number of generally larger companies.
Hence, the government may be reluctant to 
rely solely upon competitive bonus bids for its rev-
enue, and may supplement them with a variety of 
other rent-collection measures. (Cairns, 1985, sim-
ilarly argues for use of a variety of rent-collection 
measures.)
Thus far, we have been concerned with those 
clauses in the Crown land mineral rights agreements 
that generate revenue for the provincial government. 
Brief comment should be made on financial sub-
sidies, which are intended in large part to offset the 
disincentive effects on exploration of the various tax 
measures just discussed. (The disincentives are even 
greater when allowance is made for various federal tax 
levies on the industry.) Included in such provincial 
subsidies are geological and geophysical incentive 
plans or exploratory drilling incentive plans that allow 
some part of these costs to earn cash rebates or to be 
credited against royalties, rentals, and bonuses owing. 
Royalty reductions or holidays on successful explora-
tory wells in new plays or new fields are another 
common incentive. Also common have been rules 
that give the government the power to reduce royalties 
by administrative order, if it is judged desirable (e.g., 
if abandonment of the well might otherwise occur). 
As suggested, such measures are best viewed, in the 
context of mineral rights policy, as a method of offset-
ting the disincentive effects of non-neutral financial 
terms. In this light, the efficiency of the subsidy can 
be measured by two criteria: (1) the extent to which 
the desired activity is encouraged, and (2) the extent 
to which loss of government revenue from ventures 
that would have taken place without the subsidy 
is minimal.
3. Non-Financial Conditions Attached to  
Mineral Rights Issue
a. Acreage
From an economic point of view, it is desirable that 
the area of the mineral right correspond to the eco-
nomically efficient size of operation; thus the pur-
chaser of the right can undertake activities at the 
lowest per unit cost and not waste economic rent in 
unnecessary expenses. Areas larger than this could 
be granted, but that runs some risk of reducing the 
number of firms in the industry and therefore the 
amount of competition.
But what is the efficient size of a mineral rights 
issue? For productive acreage, given the various uni-
tization and conservation schemes in existence, an 
area small enough to support a typical well or pro-
duction platform in a wide-spacing pattern would be 
sufficient. This would probably be smaller in onshore 
oil pools than offshore; in Alberta, it might be as small 
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as 1,280 acres (2 sections), although this is, in part, a 
function of reservoir production characteristics.
It is rare, however, that a parcel of land is sold as 
a productive entity; generally there is a significant 
chance of a dry well. For exploratory ventures, the 
prime output is knowledge, and exploratory know-
ledge normally has implications for more than the 
immediate location. For how large an area? This 
is in large part a function of how extensively that 
region has been explored up until the moment; the 
greater past exploratory effort the smaller can be 
efficient-sized mineral leases.
Major problems arise in relatively unexplored 
areas, however. Knowledge from a single well may 
have value over a wide area. Unless the company has 
mineral rights over the entire area, a ‘free-rider’ prob-
lem arises: the company will underexplore, and under-
value the mineral right since it is unable to capture the 
full benefit of the information itself. It would rather 
wait and let someone else generate the information. 
This free-rider problem can be somewhat mitigated 
if the company is allowed to keep private any infor-
mation gained, but that conveys a type of monopoly 
power to the company and is likely to induce others 
to duplicate its efforts, which is wasteful of society’s 
scarce resources.
This seems to argue for the issuance of large 
areas in mineral rights, if very little exploration has 
been undertaken. Against this must be balanced 
two counterarguments of particular weight if the 
government relies upon competitive bonus bidding 
as a method of rent collection. (1) The competitive 
implications are unattractive since there is potential 
for a very high degree of concentration of resulting 
reserves. Furthermore, if bonus bidding is used to cap-
ture economic rent, the larger the area the higher the 
bid desired, but the more difficult this front-end load 
makes it for smaller companies. (2) In the presence of 
risk-aversion, unexplored areas have greater risk and 
therefore a more severe negative effect upon bonus 
bids. Since all areas will, at one point, be unexplored, a 
large proportion of productive leases will have initially 
been generated by large-area mineral rights issues on 
which bonus bids would be low due to risk-aversion. 
Also, the risk-sharing characteristics of bonus bids 
mean that the government exposes itself to consider-
able after-the-fact regret.
For these reasons, governments may wish to use 
quite different mechanisms for acreage in well-ex-
plored and unexplored regions. In the former, small-
area leases can be issued, although there is a potential 
open access problem in exploitation if leases cross 
pool boundaries. (This is the rule of capture problem 
discussed in Chapter Ten.) For virgin territory, two 
approaches are commonly suggested. One is for the 
government to undertake an exploratory well-drilling 
program itself, thereby generating knowledge about 
the broad geological details and reducing the risk for 
operators; since subsequent wells will tend to convey 
information that is site-specific, issues of mineral 
rights to relatively small areas will be efficient. Of 
course, the government is bearing all the risk at this 
stage, and critics of government involvement would 
point to the danger that excessive drilling and other 
inefficiencies would generate high costs. However, a 
careful government drilling program would reduce 
risk for others and save companies the costs of such 
general knowledge gathering, therefore enabling them 
to select well sites more carefully. For both reasons, 
the competitive bonus bids on mineral rights issued 
should be higher than they would otherwise be, unless 
the government drilling program demonstrates that 
prospects over the entire area are much worse than 
was previously expected.
The second approach is for the government to 
issue a mineral right that is for exploration only, but 
allows selective, but not complete, conversion to a 
production lease; part of the land must be returned to 
the government for subsequent resale. The company 
stands to derive a major benefit from knowledge it 
gains in exploration, but the government retains a 
share of mineral rights for resale when general geo-
logic risk is reduced. In this case, the competitive bid 
for exploration rights should be larger than if the com-
pany had access to only a small area, insufficient to 
realize all the economies of exploration. At the same 
time, the government has reduced the magnitude of 
the revenue losses to itself due to a lack of competition 
or the presence of risk-aversion.
As this discussion makes clear, the optimal area to 
be covered in a single issue of Crown mineral rights is 
not obvious.
b. Work Commitments
Often mineral rights include a provision that, unless 
a certain amount of exploratory expenditure occurs, 
the right must be returned (‘relinquished’) to the 
Crown. Such measures are often justified on the 
grounds that the more exploration the better: after all, 
isn’t knowledge always valuable, and aren’t we better 
off the more oil we have? From an economic point of 
view, the answer to both questions is “Yes,” so long 
as the knowledge and oil are costless. Otherwise, the 
cost must be balanced against the benefit. From the 
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viewpoint of a land owner attempting to maximize 
his revenue, work commitments are questionable, if 
the oil market, including the process of issuing rights, 
is effectively competitive. In this case, work commit-
ments are unnecessary since the company, in attempt-
ing to maximize its own profits, would be willing to 
undertake some level of exploration expenditure in 
any event. If required work commitments exceed this 
expenditure, the prime effect is to reduce the amount 
of economic rent the company expects and therefore 
the size of the bonus bids. If the required work com-
mitment is less than the company plans on spending, 
the requirements have no effect. (Occasionally the 
expenditure under the work commitment is made 
deductible from the rental and bonus owing; the main 
effect of such a scheme is to increase the size of the 
maximum bonus a company is willing to pay. Suppose 
a company places the net value on a piece of land at $1 
million. If an exploratory well will cost $500,000 and 
the bonus paid can now be reduced by that amount, 
how much will the company be willing to bid before 
claiming the credit? The answer is $1.5 million!)
The main theoretical rationales for work com-
mitments relate to imperfect competition, imperfect 
knowledge, and industry risk. Work commitments 
obviously increase the cost of holding land and there-
fore inhibit larger companies from moving to mon-
opolize petroleum land by acquiring large acreages 
and holding them idle. Even in a competitive industry, 
work commitments will inhibit the tendency of firms 
to acquire land early, long before they might wish to 
drill on it; in the presence of risk-aversion, such early 
acquisition is liable to reduce the present value of 
economic rent gained by the government. (Since more 
information is available later, risk is less.) In light of 
these considerations, provision for moderate work 
requirements may be judged advantageous, although 
the dangers of excessive drilling and attendant rent 
loss must be borne in mind. In addition, one of the 
main purposes of exploration is to generate the know-
ledge that reduces uncertainty about underground 
geology and the location of oil and gas plays. Work 
commitments help to bring new knowledge to light 
sooner, and, to the extent that the knowledge becomes 
generally available, allow industry and government to 
reap the benefits.
c. Duration
In an effectively competitive industry, without risk- 
aversion, mineral rights issues could be issued for 
perpetuity. Since firms could not hold oil deposits 
off the market for monopoly gain, they would time 
their activity to maximize their profits; with the lease 
operated to generate maximum economic rent, com-
petition should generate a maximum competitive 
bonus bid. On productive mineral acreage, leases 
of indefinite term (i.e., until production ceases) are 
necessary if the operator is to schedule output in the 
early years consistent with the maximum lifetime 
net present value of the deposit. Leases of limited 
term (like an expectation of nationalization) tend to 
encourage excessive and wasteful current production. 
Hence leases should be renewable so long as produc-
tion is likely.
However, on non-productive mineral right hold-
ings, the government might desire to impose a time 
limit for the reasons discussed in the previous para-
graph – it reduces the likelihood of monopolization of 
mineral rights and helps avoid low competitive bids by 
risk-averse firms attempting to acquire mineral rights 
long before they wish to drill. At the same time, those 
companies that do acquire rights early may now drill 
earlier, even if the economic rent is reduced by doing 
so. (For example, it might be economically desirable to 
await the geological information from a well the same 
firm is drilling on a site three miles away, but with the 
time limit on leases the firm may not be able to wait.) 
Remember that drilling is a cost to society and the less 
we can get away with, for any given amount of oil, the 
better off we are.
d. Timing of Sales
How quickly should the government issue its mineral 
rights? Once again, in an externality-free world of 
perfect competition, risk neutrality, and perfect capital 
markets, this issue would be irrelevant. The govern-
ment could issue all the rights by competitive bonus 
bid on ‘Day One,’ and each parcel would sell for an 
amount equal to the present value of the maximum 
economic rent expected from the land. Companies 
would wait to explore and produce from the land until 
the expected profit was at a maximum.
In the real world, however, the imperfections dis-
cussed above suggest that the government spread out 
sales over time. Imperfections in capital markets and 
risk-aversion mean that it is desirable not to place too 
heavy a financial commitment for bonus bids on the 
industry at one time. The desire to encourage more 
small companies (for more competition) argues the 
same way. The effect of risk-aversion on bonus bids 
and the willingness of the government to bear some 
of the general geological risk by awaiting informa-
tion suggest the advantage of delaying sale of much 
of the land in a region until some exploratory results 
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are in. It was noted above that the government might 
have strong reasons for including work commitment 
provisions and limited terms in the lease provisions 
but that such clauses run the danger of encouraging 
excessively high-cost exploration (i.e., overdrilling): 
this danger can be mitigated by spreading the sale of 
mineral rights over time. Finally, if mineral right sales 
are spread over time, the ‘open access’ problems of the 
exploration process may be reduced.
e. Open Access and Petroleum Exploration
Discussion of ‘open access’ arose in the previous sec-
tions. At risk of repetition, some elaboration of this 
concept is desirable. The term ‘open access’ is used 
to describe the often undesirable situation in which 
property rights to an asset are initially unowned but 
can be captured by the first party to claim them. If 
capturing and holding the asset (e.g., mineral produc-
tion rights on a piece of land) were costless, then com-
panies would be motivated to snap up the property 
right as quickly as possible, so long as any possibility 
of profit exists. The asset would then be withdrawn 
from production until the date at which it generated 
maximum profit. If holding the asset does involve 
costs, then companies will be inclined to try to capture 
the land so long as the expected cost is less than the 
expected profit. Suppose that the real resource cost 
is higher the longer the asset is held or that the prob-
ability of obtaining the asset is greater the more that 
is spent: then there is a powerful incentive for parties 
to spend all the expected profit in order to obtain the 
legal right to the asset. Open access in this case means 
that all the expected profit is dissipated in higher 
costs; there will seem to be no economic rent!
With perfect competition, no risk aversion, etc., 
the government could issue the rights through com-
petitive bonus bids and capture all the rent, but in the 
real world the government has valid reasons for pre-
ferring to spread sales over time. Open access explains 
why companies would be eager to take any land that is 
offered, as soon as it is offered, so long as the expect-
ation of any profit exists. Therefore open access also 
helps explain why a policy of spreading mineral rights 
issues over time is desirable. It may also help explain 
why the government reserves the right to refuse the 
sale of mineral rights if the highest bid is felt to be too 
low. If rights are costless, companies wish to own the 
mineral right simply to prevent a competitor from 
gaining it, even if there is an extremely low expecta-
tion of the land actually containing oil. In the absence 
of a floor price – reservation price – by the govern-
ment, companies would submit very low bids on just 
about any parcel, even if they had not analyzed it to 
estimate its expected economic rent. Especially early 
in the life of the industry in a region, before any major 
discoveries, it is likely that all land would have low 
expected values, and open access would induce firms 
to acquire mineral rights over the entire area with very 
low bids.
The problem of open access within a single reser-
voir was discussed in the previous chapter. To what 
extent is undiscovered oil also ‘fugacious’? If no one 
knows where it is for sure, until drilling takes place, 
the deposits might be labelled fugitive, and, as argued 
above, companies will acquire mineral rights as soon 
as possible. However, so long as the government issues 
such mineral rights by competitive bonus bidding, 
the company should be willing to bid away all antici-
pated economic rent. So long as the mineral right 
gives exclusive rights to any oil beneath the surface (as 
ensured, for example, by prorationing or unitization 
regulations), there should be no overbearing incentive 
to dissipate possible rents in excessive exploration. 
(Presumably some incentive exists to overspend at 
the pre-acquisition stage.) The only exception to this 
would be where firms are completely unable to distin-
guish the relative attractiveness of potential drilling 
sites prior to exploratory drilling. But then all acreage 
would command the same per acre bonus bid, which 
clearly is not true. However, if the rights have clauses 
limiting the term of the rights or work commitments, 
then wasteful exploration (too much drilling, too 
early) may occur, and a schedule of phased-in leas-
ing would be desirable. Finally, in a world with less-
than-perfect competition, risk-aversion, and great 
geological, engineering, economic and political uncer-
tainty, the government would likely be able to generate 
more economic rent by spreading the issuance of 
mineral rights judiciously over time, rather than issu-
ing them as soon as any interested companies express 
an interest.
C. Conclusions
The government of Alberta has responsibility to estab-
lish regulations over the entire petroleum industry to 
ensure maximum benefit to the province. It happens 
that a large majority of the prospective petroleum- 
bearing land has provincially owned (Crown) mineral 
rights. It is commonly suggested that as the landowner 
the provincial government might be viewed as trying 
to maximize the present value of payments it receives 
from these mineral rights. However, for a number of 
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reasons set out above – the importance of maintaining 
incentives for efficient operation, the existence of 
uncertainty, and the inevitable inefficiencies in various 
rent-collection instruments – we would argue that 
this is an unattainable ideal. Watkins (1987b, p. 328; 
2002a), for instance, suggests that the government 
should aim at “obtaining a preponderance of, rather 
than all, the apparent and uncertain long-run eco-
nomic rent,” perhaps “two thirds to three quarters.” 
In Alberta, since the provincial government adopted 
explicit objectives for various departments and agen-
cies in the 1990s, the aim has been to obtain a certain 
percentage of the petroleum industry’s “net operating 
revenues,” defined as industry sales revenues less 
operating costs, administration expenses, and taxes. 
The Annual Report of the Department of Energy sets 
the target at 20 to 25 per cent, a target that was largely 
met by the province until the international oil price 
rises in the mid-2000s. No indication is offered of the 
percentage this would yield of economic rent, but it is 
apparent why the province would adopt the standard 
it does. Net operating revenue can be clearly defined 
each year, whereas economic rent is based on life-
time profits and can only be known with certainty at 
the end of a project’s life. Therefore, the government 
desires to establish a method of issuing mineral rights 
on Crown land to private companies which (1) pays a 
high proportion of profits to the government, (2) does 
not unduly deter exploration and development, and 
(3) does not induce premature abandonment of pools 
or excessively costly exploration, development, and 
production techniques. Governments also have an 
interest in maintaining relatively steady and predict-
able revenue streams. This makes planning and finan-
cing of expenditures easier and minimizes self-control 
problems that might encourage the government to 
increase spending unduly in years with unusually high 
revenues. However, stability in resource revenue may 
be very difficult to attain. Government revenue is, of 
course, only partly a function of the rent-collection 
instruments utilized; variation in the levels of pro-
duction of oil and gas and, especially, sale prices will 
also affect revenue, and these are not under govern-
ment control. Governments may, then, try to increase 
predictability and stability in two ways. The first is to 
ensure that at least some of the rent-collection meas-
ures are ones that provide relative revenue stability. 
For example, since the volume of land held has often 
been more stable than prices, land rentals provide a 
more predictable revenue flow. However, as was noted 
above, since rentals are not directly tied to profitabil-
ity, they are not very efficient as a way to capture rent. 
The alternate approach is to accept that government 
resource revenues will be unstable, because the flow of 
economic rent is unstable, and to attack the problem 
of predictability at the opposite end, the utilization of 
resource revenues. This involves revenue stabilization 
funds, which build up in years of higher government 
revenues and are run down in years of lower revenue. 
Chapter Thirteen briefly reviews Alberta’s experience 
with such funds.
Simple economic analysis suggests that competi-
tive bonus bids have much to recommend them, so 
long as the bidding process is open and competitive, 
since such schemes should not affect marginal explor-
ation or production activities. However, this requires 
payment before a venture commences; such a heavy 
front-end load may discourage smaller companies, 
especially if ready access to financial capital is difficult 
for them. In addition, almost all the risk is borne by 
the private companies rather than the government. If 
companies are risk-averse, this will reduce the size of 
bonus bids they are willing to make. Moreover, with 
a scheme of competitive bonus bids, the government 
will not benefit from unusually or unexpectedly bene-
ficial conditions affecting the industry as a whole.
Hence, there are strong reasons for the govern-
ment to supplement the ex ante financial process of 
competitive bonus bidding with a flexible ex post tax 
scheme, such as sliding-scale royalties or an income 
(profits) tax.
Given the weaknesses of the competitive bonus 
bidding procedure, governments have reason to 
consider the imposition of other-than-financial obli-
gations to the mineral rights issues including work 
commitments, clauses for partial relinquishment of 
the area to the government, and limits on the duration 
of the lease. Also, careful attention must be given to 
the timing of issue of mineral leases, with staggered 
sales conferring likely benefits to the government. 
Partly this is because it allows more time to determine 
the really valuable plots of land, as successful explor-
ation occurs, and partly it helps in attaining greater 
stability in revenue flows, by spreading bonus bids and 
other payments over more years. It is difficult to say 
with any degree of authority exactly what these lease 
provisions should be. While a considerable literature 
discusses characteristics of an optimal taxation regime 
for capturing the economic rent from petroleum, 
we are unaware of any convincing research setting 
out the optimal pattern of non-financial lease terms. 
Crommelin (1975) and Crommelin et al. (1976) dis-
cuss the problem for Alberta, noting its importance, 
but the complexities of possible provisions and the 
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complications of the common access dimension make 
definite conclusions difficult.
3. Alberta Government Policy
A. Introduction
The intent of this section is to review the main details 
of the Alberta government policy on Crown mineral 
rights. Ballem (1973) provides a discussion of oil and 
natural gas leases in the Canadian context, for free-
hold leases. And Thompson (1965) contrasts petrol-
eum land policies in Canada and the United States. 
We draw on the Annual Reports of the government 
departments responsible for mineral rights and on 
Crommelin (1975), Somerville (1977), and the 2002 
review from the Department of Energy. Breen (1993), 
chap. 1, provides a more detailed review of the federal 
regulations in the years up to 1930. He notes that they 
included most of the main features that appeared in 
subsequent provincial regulations. The actual regula-
tions have been multifarious and subject to periodic 
change; to summarize, all these details would be both 
tedious and irrelevant. Rather, the major characteris-
tics of the regulations and the most important changes 
will be noted. We will follow this review of the regu-
lations with some general evaluative comments based 
on the theoretical discussion above, supplemented, 
where possible, by relevant statistics. Finally, several 
case studies of the effectiveness of rent-collection in 
Alberta will be reviewed.
B. Alberta Regulations
1. Pre-1930
Until the BNA Act of 1930 (British North America 
Act, 1930, 20-21 Geo. V, c. 26 (U.K.)), Crown land 
rights in the prairies were held by the federal gov-
ernment. Ottawa had transferred some of the min-
eral rights in Alberta to private hands through three 
main mechanisms.
(i) When Canada acquired the lands of the 
Northwest Territories from the Hudson’s Bay 
Company in 1869, the HBC was given title to 
5 per cent of the land in the south-central belt 
of the prairie provinces – a total of 2.4 million 
acres in Alberta.
(ii) Ottawa’s support for the C.P.R. in building the 
transcontinental railway included land grants 
with attached mineral rights. Other smaller 
land grants to railways were made, for a total 
of 13 million acres.
(iii) Initial grants of land to homesteaders, under 
the Dominion Lands Act of 1872, included the 
mineral rights; only with Privy Council Order 
No. 1070 of October 31, 1887, were mineral 
rights beneath such land reserved for the 
Crown. Hence, mineral rights are in private 
hands on land that was homesteaded before 
1887. Such areas are relatively small in Alberta 
(larger in Saskatchewan and still larger in 
Manitoba, given the earlier date of settlement 
as one moves to the east).
The mineral rights held in private hands make up a 
relatively small part of Alberta’s sedimentary basin 
and are concentrated in the south and central parts. 
Here oil producers have been able to lease privately 
owned mineral rights, as well as Crown. Often the 
financial terms on privately issued leases were more 
favourable to companies than on Crown leases: private 
landowners could not arrange the same open com-
petitive bidding process as the Crown and lacked the 
various tools of the Crown to encourage renegotiation 
of leases in the face of changing market conditions 
such as those after 1973.
The presence of adjacent Crown and private min-
eral leases explains the inclusion of “offset drilling” 
provisions in Crown leases, as is common in freehold 
leases: if a productive well on a neighbouring lease is 
productive, this provision allows the Crown to order 
the leaseholder to drill a well to prevent drainage from 
under the Crown land, with a resultant loss of royalty 
revenue to the government.
Effective in 1931, most of the Crown acreage 
was transferred to the province: this included both 
unleased mineral rights and the outstanding mineral 
leases issued by Ottawa prior to the transfer. Holdings 
of mineral rights were as follows (in thousands of 
acres) (Alberta. Department of Mines and Minerals, 
1972, p. 1):
Federal: Dominion parks 13,434 (8.2%)
 Indian reserves 1,328 (0.8%)
Provincial government 132,620 (81.2%)
Freehold: Railways 13,032 (8.0%)
 H.B.C. 2,404 (1.5%)
 Other 564 (0.3%)
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The first explicit federal regulations allowing issuance 
of petroleum rights on Crown land were promulgated 
in 1890s; through 1930, a number of further regula-
tions were introduced (Klassen, 1999, pp. 183–85). 
Initially petroleum rights could be obtained on appli-
cation, for relatively small areas, subject to a $1/acre 
rental and a 2½ per cent gross royalty, both on suc-
cessful ventures. Various modifications subsequent 
to 1898 foreshadowed elements that were common 
in later regulations. Rental fees were made payable 
whether or not discovery occurred (1910); on areas in 
forest reserves, one half the area taken in lease was set 
aside as Crown Reserve for possible subsequent sale 
by competitive bid (1920/21); royalties were charged 
in various ways – for example, a royalty holiday was 
utilized (1910/1919 leases, good on oil until 1930) and 
royalties were left to the discretion of the Governor-
in-Council subject to a range with a minimum of 2½ 
per cent in the first five years of production, 5 per cent 
in the next five years, and 10 per cent after (1920). 
Generally, the maximum size of an individual lease 
was 1,920 acres, and leases were obtained by simple 
application. There were annual work commitments 
but leases could be consolidated by a company in 
this regard. Leases had a life of twenty-one years and 
were renewable for another twenty-one. In the second 
through fifth years, expenditures on unsuccessful 
leases could be used as a credit against the lease  
rental.
2. 1930–47
On October 31, 1930, a total of 18,868 leases covering 
2,460,962 acres were transferred to the province (an 
average size per lease of 130 acres), generally with 
provision for a 5 per cent royalty. In the first full fiscal 
year of provincial operation (April 1, 1931 to March 
31, 1932), the provincial government received $10,883 
in royalties and $87,456 in lease rentals. Alberta’s first 
provincial regulations governing issuance of Crown 
oil and gas rights appeared as O.C. 669-31 in June 1931 
(under the provisions of the Provincial Lands Act) and 
allowed the lieutenant governor-in-council to estab-
lish royalty rates and set up leasing regulations similar 
to those for Dominion (federal) leases. We shall not 
detail the Alberta provisions but will summarize the 
major aspects.
a. Royalties
The royalty rates on crude oil were gross ad valorem 
royalties (that is, a percentage of the gross sales value) 
as follows:
January 1931 to December 1934 5%
January 1935 to December 1939 10%
January 1940 to June 1941 12½%
June 1941 to May 1951 5 to 15% sliding
  scale based on out- 
  put per well (with an 
  option to select a 
  12.5% flat rate)
Table 11.1 shows annual royalties received in fiscal 
years ending in 1931 through 1948. The major increase 
in revenue following 1936 reflects the share of Crown 
land in the Turner Valley (Rundle Formation) oil pool 
discovered in that year, as well as some increases in oil 
prices over the period.
b. Issuance of Rights
(i) Leases. Initially Alberta followed the federal prac-
tice of issuing mainly leases, over relatively small 
acreages. As noted, there were 18,868 federal leases 
when Alberta took over the Crown reserves. By 1934, 
Table 11.1: Alberta Government Revenue  
from Petroleum, Fiscal years 1930/31 to 1947/48  
(103 dollars)
 Royalties Rentals Bonuses
1930a 110.8 87.5 0
1931 106.1 57.7 0
1932 73.2 42.2 0
1933 73.5 81.5 0
1934 61.3 92.8 11.4
1935 117.5 116.2 0.8
1936 108.3 361.0 76.4
1937 273.5 320.2 11.2
1938 522.8 409.8 3.4
1939 523.3 373.4 4.4
1940 523.3 262.4 3.7
1941 658.9 213.5 1.0
1942 630.2 287.8 3.6
1943 550.4 249.2 7.2
1944 708.2 606.9 54.1
1945 588.9 541.0 34.5
1946 610.2 287.5 0.3
1947 875.2 733.2 26.4
Sources and Notes:
a  6 months from October 1930 to March 1931.
The highest petroleum revenue source each year is indicated in bold.
Data are from Annual Reports of the Department of Lands and Mines.
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the number had fallen to 3,888; it increased after the 
Turner Valley oil discovery (to a pre-1950 peak of 
6,518 in 1939) then fell back to 2,315, covering 843,000 
acres at the start of 1948. Generally, the maximum 
lease area was 1,920 acres (3 sections); there was a 
rental of $1/acre (often 50 cents/acre in the first year, 
prior to 1941, which could be reduced by undertaking 
expenditures).
Annual Reports of the provincial Department of 
Lands and Mines in the 1930s indicate that rentals 
foregone as a result of exploration were about equal 
to rentals received. Over the entire 1930–47 period 
rentals contributed 72 per cent as much revenue to 
the province as did royalties. The combination of 
generally poor drilling results, work requirements, 
and a continuing annual rental kept the turnover 
of leases relatively high. The small lease area meant 
that small companies and individual investors could 
easily acquire leases, but a charge of $1,280/year on 
a 2-section lease was a significant investment. Even 
for a large company, to hold such a lease for five 
years would involve a present value cost of $5,290.00, 
which is significant for a small area lease with, in 
most circumstances, a relatively small chance of an 
oil reservoir. F. K. Beach (1954) reports that, of 567 
wells drilled in Alberta to 1946, only 27 or 4.8 per cent 
found oil. Suppose that there was, generally, a 5 per 
cent change of success, and that twenty leases were 
therefore required to yield a likely find: the present 
value cost of twenty such leases, if held an average five 
years, would be $105,000 – a high cost given the aver-
age size of a find expected in Alberta at that time, and 
the prices of the 1930s. An average exploratory well in 
1946 probably cost about $90,000. Of course, some of 
this cost might be credited against lease rentals.
(ii) Exploratory Permits. Under federal regulations, 
companies could also obtain ‘prospecting permits’ 
that allowed conversion to lease; these covered rela-
tively small areas and relatively few were issued. 
Commencing in 1936, the province began to intro-
duce more liberal regulations for exploratory per-
mits, which have, since then, been variously called 
“permits,” “reservations,” “drilling reservations,” and 
“licences,” each with its own peculiar set of conditions. 
These covered much larger areas than the leases and 
earlier permits and normally provided for partial 
conversion to lease, with the remainder returned to 
the Crown. They were for a relatively short term (often 
less than a year) and had a work requirement. At the 
start of fiscal 1936/37, there were fifty-four such min-
eral right issues covering 240,436 acres (for an average 
of 4,450 acres each); by 1940/41 there were twenty-two 
with an acreage of 443,431 (average 20,150) and by 
1947/48 there were seventy-two, with an acreage of 
7,438,105 (average 103,300). The rental per acre was 
much lower than on a lease, 5 cents/acre. By the later 
years such exploratory permits were of short duration 
and conveyed no right to lift oil; conversion to lease 
was necessary for that.
(iii) Crown Reserves. In 1937, regulations were 
established setting up areas of “Crown Reserve” – a 
separate category of provincial Crown land. Included 
were: fourteen large areas of “provincial Reserves”; 
in unsurveyed land, an area adjoining to and equal 
in size to any lease issued; all land in forest reserves; 
all Crown rights in odd number sections of town-
ships north of T52 (i.e., Edmonton), and certain other 
smaller acreages. The government could issue leases or 
exploratory rights from Crown Reserves, using com-
petitive bonus bids if it wished. The Crown Reserves 
ensured a continued strong land interest by the prov-
ince in areas in which exploration was demonstrated 
to be productive.
(iv) Bonus Bids. Bonus bids were used, but not 
extensively, in years prior to 1948. Table 11.1 includes 
the total of bid revenue for fiscal years beginning in 
1930 through 1947: it provided only 2 per cent of total 
Alberta government petroleum revenue. With the 1947 
Leduc discovery, bonus bid revenue rose considerably. 
Breen (1993, pp. 280–81) outlines Alberta’s five-month 
experiment with royalty bidding. Some saw this as a 
way to encourage participation of smaller companies 
(since up-front costs are reduced and exploratory risk 
shared with the government). The larger companies 
objected, and the Conservation Board pointed out 
that higher royalty rates encouraged early abandon-
ment. The government abandoned the approach.
c. Conclusion
Years prior to 1947 yielded few exploratory successes 
in Alberta. The provincial government held mineral 
rights to over 80 per cent of the area of the province, 
but outstanding leases in any year never amounted 
to more than 1.3 per cent of this total area, and even 
cumulative exploratory permits issued over the period 
covered acreage smaller than 18 per cent of the provin-
cial Crown-rights area. (Some such exploratory rights 
issues may have overlapped, of course.) At the start 
of 1947, leases outstanding amounted to 0.8 per cent 
of the area of Crown land and exploratory rights to 
5.6 per cent. Economic and technological conditions 
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meant that most of the drilling that had taken place 
was relatively shallow.
At the same time, a mineral rights policy had 
evolved, which:
(1) distinguished between large-area exploratory 
rights and much smaller acreages that allowed 
production as well;
(2) kept a share for the government of unleased 
acreage in Crown Reserves adjoint to acre-
age that was leased, especially in the western, 
the central, and the north-central parts of the 
province;
(3) exacted an ex post payment (i.e., conditional on 
discovery) in the form of royalties;
(4) ensured continuing revenue through land rent-
als and also discouraged companies from hold-
ing areas idle unless they had real expectations 
of success; and
(5) opened the door to the use of competitive bonus 
bids.
Into this environment exploded the news of the Leduc 
discovery by Imperial Oil in early 1947. The find was 
large; it was also in a deep and heretofore unexplored 
formation. The industry began to move into explora-
tory high gear, and the province took a long hard look 
at its mineral leasing policy.
3. 1948–73
This period covers the years from the discovery of 
Leduc through the main Alberta oil plays to the 
revolution in oil prices brought about by OPEC, span-
ning the development of the Alberta oil industry to 
maturity. While a number of regulatory changes were 
made over the period, there was a relatively consistent 
framework for Crown mineral rights. Production 
of oil or gas required a lease; while leases could be 
consolidated for certain purposes, individual leases 
were generally restricted to a maximum size of nine 
sections (5,760 acres) and required a rental payment 
per acre and an ad valorem royalty on production. 
Exploratory rights could be rented and covered larger 
areas. They did not convey a right to production but 
could be partially converted into leases, with the 
above-described rental and royalty provisions. The 
land not converted to lease was relinquished back to 
the government; these surrender provisions were new 
and ensured that the government retained land in the 
areas of ongoing exploration. Rights to new leases 
(i.e., those not converted from exploratory rights) 
were sold by competitive bonus bid. Exploratory 
rights were for a relatively short term, while leases 
lasted longer, indefinitely if production occurred. The 
underlying rationale for these general conditions can 
easily be perceived from the theoretical discussion 
above. The government offered some incentive for 
knowledge-gathering (exploration) and installed a 
mechanism to capture a high proportion of antici-
pated rent. At the same time, through royalties and the 
relinquishment provisions in exploration rights, the 
government bore a share of risk, including that associ-
ated with entirely unexpected developments and with 
low-probability events that became reality. What fol-
lows covers some of these general provisions in greater 
detail. The 1947 Leduc find, and the subsequent surge 
in industry interest, brought changes in all parts of 
the Alberta provincial mineral rights legislation, 
commencing with the introduction of an entirely new 
Mines and Minerals Act in 1949. Subsequent changes 
in regulations regarding Crown mineral rights were 
generally consistent with the spirit of this major piece 
of legislation.
a. Royalties
The Mines and Minerals Act of 1949 gave the lieuten-
ant general-in-council the authority to change royalty 
rates, subject to the limitation of a maximum rate 
of 16⅔ per cent (one-sixth) during the first twenty-
one-year term of the lease. Effective June 1, 1951 (O.C. 
808/51), a new sliding-scale schedule was set up with 
rates from 5 per cent up to 16⅔ per cent. This was 
realized by a rising marginal royalty rate: the mar-
ginal royalty was 5 per cent for the first 600 barrels 
per month of a well, rising to 20 per cent for monthly 
output between 1,800 and 4,500 barrels from the well. 
(Appendix 11.1A shows the detailed royalty schedules 
for years from 1951 on.)
The general revision of petroleum regulations 
in 1962 involved new royalty rates. The 16⅔ per cent 
ceiling rate was maintained; this was the ceiling for 
twenty-one-year leases under the 1949 rules and for 
the new ten-year leases the government began to 
issue in 1962. The new royalties involved only three 
marginal rates: a well paid 8 per cent on the first 750 
barrels per month, 20 per cent on each of the next 
1,950 barrels, and 16⅔ per cent on anything above that. 
For all wells, except those producing more than 4,050 
barrels per month, the new royalty schedule involved 
a higher rate.
The next royalty change on oil was introduced in 
1972 (under the Mineral Taxation Act), effective at the 
start of 1973 (Government of Alberta, April 1972). It 
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was designed to provide the province with a larger 
share of the revenue from the price rises that had 
begun in 1970. (Under the 1962 schedule, the govern-
ment obtained an average royalty, in 1970, of 15.1 per 
cent, so would get 15.1 cents of each $1 per barrel price 
rise on oil from Crown leases.) The new act provided 
for: (1) a new, higher, royalty schedule on newly issued 
leases or those old leases being extended beyond the 
primary term of ten or twenty-one years; (2) the appli-
cation of this schedule to old leases still in the primary 
term which voluntarily submitted to the new schedule; 
and (3) a new reserves tax on freehold production and 
output from old Crown leases which did not volun-
tarily adopt the new royalty schedule. Since the gov-
ernment was soon to abrogate unilaterally the royalty 
ceiling on outstanding leases, and since the reserves 
tax was to be made equivalent in revenue terms to the 
new royalty scheme, only the royalty scheme will be 
discussed here. The new royalty schedule began with 
a marginal rate of 5 per cent, rising to 25 per cent on 
any output in excess of 1,200 barrels per month for 
the well; the average royalty also began at 5 per cent 
and rose asymptotically to 25 per cent. Wells with an 
output per month less than 180 barrels paid a lower 
marginal royalty under the new regulations; wells with 
an output of less than 360 barrels per month paid a 
smaller average royalty under the new regulations. 
Wells with output in excess of these values paid higher 
royalties.
It should be noted that the Alberta royalty regu-
lations also included a provision that allowed an 
operator to ask for royalty relief, if the well would 
otherwise be abandoned.
Table 11.2 shows the rapid rise in royalty payments 
after the 1947 Leduc find.
b. Issuance of Rights
(i) Production Rights. Leases were required for pro-
duction. The revised regulations of 1949 under the 
new Mines and Minerals Act established procedures 
for petroleum leases:
(1) they were to be twenty-one-year leases, renew-
able for a further twenty-one years of while 
production lasted;
(2) a lease could be a maximum of nine sections 
(5,760 acres) in a regular square or rectangular 
(maximum eight sections) pattern with the 
length no more than twice the width;
(3) a rental of $1/acre/year was charged;
(4) royalties would be set by order-in-council with a 
ceiling of 16 2/3 per cent during the first term;
(5) the minister could order drilling on a lease and 
customarily did after the tenth year if none had 
been undertaken.
Leases could be acquired in two ways: by selection 
from land to which the company had exploration 
rights (e.g., reservations; see below) or by purchase as 
a lease from Crown Reserves (see below) by competi-
tive bonus bidding. The regulations gave the govern-
ment considerable leeway to dispose of mineral rights 
“as the Minister sees fit”: virtually all rights since the 
late 1940s have been disposed of by competitive bonus 
bids, either in leases or in exploration rights convert-
ible to lease. In the early years, some petroleum and 
natural gas reservations on unexplored land were 
an exception. In 1962, the leasing regulations were 
changed, under the new Mines and Minerals Act, to 
restrict the initial term to ten years, renewable for a 
further term or as long as production continued; the 
minister could – but, as a matter of practice, did not – 
order drilling after the fifth year.
(ii) Exploration Rights. Exploratory rights under the 
1949 act consisted, initially, of petroleum and natural 
gas (P&NG) reservations:
(1) a reservation covered a relatively large area 
(maximum 100,000 acres);
(2) it had a rental per acre starting at 10 cents/acre 
in the first term and rising to about 25 cents/
acre in the third year;
(3) they were for an initial term of four months, but 
could be extended for up to two years;
(4) there were drilling requirements (50 per cent of 
which could be applied as a credit against the 
first year’s rent on any leases taken out);
(5) up to 50 per cent of the area could be taken in 
leases but in a checkerboard fashion including 
only 50 per cent of any single township, and 
subject to the restrictions on lease size noted 
above. (The remainder of the land entered 
Crown Reserves and could be reissued by the 
government in leases or exploration rights.)
Between 1951 and 1962, several new types of explora-
tory rights were introduced, with characteristics 
similar to the P&NG Reservations. Crown Reserve 
Drilling Reservations, first issued in 1954, were sold 
by competitive bonus bid on land in Crown Reserves 
with a rental of 25 cents/acre each six months; they 
had a maximum term of three years and were partially 
(usually 25 per cent) convertible to leases in the same 
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Table 11.2: Payments to the Alberta Government, Fiscal years 1947/8 to 2011/12 (106 Dollars)
Part A: 1947/48 to 1971/72
 Crude Oil and Natural Gas Royalty Oil and Natural Gas Rentals Bonus Bids Oil Sands Royalty and Rentals
1947 0.9 0.7 0.0 0
1948 1.8 2.3 8.9 0
1949 3.6 5.9 23.5 0
1950 5.2 9.4 29.4 0
1951 11.0 14.6 25.0 0
1952 13.5 17.5 25.9 0.1
1953 18.6 19.7 58.1 0.1
1954 20.2 18.3 42.4 0
1955 28.8 20.3 77.1 0.2
1956 37.3 35.3 71.0 0.1
1957 32.8 28.8 60.9 0.5
1958 25.4 28.3 55.7 0.4
1959 27.3 30.3 83.5 0.5
1960 27.7 29.2 45.8 0.7
1961 39.2 30.0 54.0 0.8
1962 51.0 36.9 32.3 0.7
1963 56.7 36.6 54.9 0.6
1964 62.1 44.6 94.4 0.8
1965 68.6 54.5 129.8 0.7
1966 80.2 49.9 114.2 0.9
1967 94.1 51.4 79.1 1.0
1968 105.1 52.7 128.9 2.3
1969 121.1 58.8 77.5 3.1
1970 143.7 56.2 35.3 2.4
1971 174.6 58.4 34.0 3.0
 
Part B: 1972/73 to 1984/85
 Crude Oil Natural Gas and Oil and Natural Bonus Bids Freehold Oil Sands Oil Sands Incentive 
 Royalty NGL Royalty Gas Rentals  Mineral Tax Royalty Rental Credits
1972 172.3 70.0 51.4 81.7 69.1 3.8 1.5 (10.1)
1973 302.1 70.0 51.4 81.7 69.1 8.2 1.5 (10.1)
1974 956.4 231.5 52.4 80.9 45.4 13.9 2.2 (15.3)
1975 975.4 519.1 52.7 141.0 54.1 15.4 4.5 (33.4)
1976 1,049.3 721.7 57.8 207.8 76.3 19.1 4.8 (49.2)
1977 1,323.2 980.8 64.8 736.1 76.5 23.8 5.1 (75.1)
1978* 1,617.9 1,196.2 69.0 677.5 96.5 27.8 5.2 (71.4)
 (1,775.7) (1,300.9) (75.0) (707.5) (96.8) (30.6) (5.7) ((104.0))
1979 1,899.9 1,509.9 64.3 1,057.7 99.9 46.2 5.0 (98.7)
1980 1,970.1 1,903.0 84.2 758.8 145.8 224.9 4.4 (148.5)
1981 2,179.8 1,956.3 91.0 556.9 134.8 299.7 4.8 (157.9)
1982 2,339.8 1,873.4 85.4 336.5 155.9 362.3 9.5 (121.3)
1983 2,883.1 1,694.1 79.5 487.0 160.0 303.8 6.5 (73.9)
1984 2,867.6 1,942.4 83.4** 662.1 185.5 185.5 na (128.0)
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manner as P&NG Reservations; they covered a smaller 
area (twenty sections) and had to be drilled to a par-
ticular formation. Beginning in 1951, Crown Reserve 
Natural Gas Licences (and in 1952 Natural Gas Leases) 
were introduced: they allowed exploration for natural 
gas if a particular formation in that area had already 
proved to contain natural gas and were specific to that 
formation; they had a life of three years with a rental 
of 5 cents/acre each month; they were convertible to 
natural gas leases in part or total depending upon the 
amount of exploration undertaken.
In 1962, a major change was made when an area 
of the province named “Block A” was created. It was 
an area considered very well explored, and hence not 
Table 11.2/continued
Part C: 1985/86 to 2011/12
 Crude Oil Natural Gas and Oil, Oil Sands and Bonus Bids Freehold Oil Sands Incentive 
 Royalty NGL Royalty Natural Gas Rentals  Mineral Tax Royalty Credits
1985 2,735 1,806 85 724 189 25 (44)
1986 1,005 1,097 77 292 96 11 (169)
1987 1,359 1,011 74 761 92 23 (197)
1988 957 989 74 409 71 19 (580)
1989 1,126 961 72 389 69 28 (375)
1990 1,325 1,080 94 416 76 39 (500)
1991 1,038 839 105 261 75 31 na
1992 1,009 1,069 102 167 73 65 na
1993 787 1,410 106 717 84 66 na
1994 1,095 1,257 116 978 102 209 na
1995 1,057 1,003 116 319 102 312 na
1996 1,386 1,299 131 525 117 512 na
1997 914 1,660 148 1,071 131 192 na
1998 450 1,467 142 464 112 59 (249)
1999 1,103 2,441 141 743 134 426 (188)
2000 1,500 7,200 147 1,159 256 712 (144)
2001 987 4,030 148 970 319 185 (109)
2002 1,177 5,126 153 566 202 183 (84)
2003 981 5,450 154 967 288 197 (82)
2004 1,273 6,439 153 1,262 306 718 (102)
2005 1,463 8,388 156 3,490 334 950 (111)
2006 1,400 5,988 159 2,463 317 2,411 (174)
2007 1,655 5,199 159 1,128 247 2,913 (44)
2008 1,800 5,834 160 1,112 261 2,973 0
2009 1,848 1,525 158 1,165 124 3,160 (1,119)
2010 2,236 1,416 161 2,635 127 3,723 (1,774)
2011 2,284 1,304 169 3,312 127 4,513 (25)
Sources and Notes:
*	 In	this	year	the	department	changed	its	revenue	reporting	from	a	receipts	basis	to	an	accrual	basis	(including	accounts	receivable	and	accrued	interest).		The	first	of	
the reported values is on the receipts basis, so comparable to earlier years; the second set of values is on an accrual basis, so comparable to later years.
** Includes oil sands rentals. 
The largest revenue source each year is highlighted in bold.
Parentheses indicate a payment to the industry by the government.
From 1998 on the all incentive credits are royalty tax credits. 
Data are from Annual Reports of the Alberta government department overseeing the petroleum industry, variously the Department of Mines and Minerals, Department 
of Energy and Natural Resources, and Department of Energy.
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viewed as likely to hold any major undiscovered oil 
plays. Block A covered the central, southern and east-
ern parts of the province (townships 1 to 64, i.e., south 
of a line through Cold Lake), east of the fifth merid-
ian, and here the exploratory rights were to consist of 
permits. Permits had a higher rental than the various 
licences or reservations, equal to 50 cents/acre, but 
were entirely (100%) convertible to lease.
Rental payments formed an important part of 
total government petroleum revenue in this period, 
as can be seen in Table 11.2. Over this period, rental 
payments usually contributed 20 to 30 per cent of 
government petroleum revenue, although the share 
had fallen to 10 per cent by 1973.
(iii) Crown Reserves. This consisted of mineral rights 
in those areas specifically set aside by the govern-
ment as well as land relinquished from reservations 
or licences. It was available for subsequent sale by the 
government in the form of leases (if close to a success-
ful venture) or exploratory rights.
(iv) Bonus Bids. Competitive bonus bids were 
required on most mineral rights issued after 1947. 
Obviously this is one mechanism of allocating a scarce 
resource among competing producers. Further, it is an 
allocation procedure that tends to favour those pro-
ducers who are most efficient, since lower costs tend 
to mean higher expected profits, and therefore higher 
bonus bids. As discussed above, under competitive 
conditions, the government can capture a high pro-
portion of the expected (ex ante) economic rent from 
the land.
Bonuses formed a major part of government 
petroleum revenue after 1947 but were also more 
vari able than either royalties or rentals (see Table 
11.2). Royalties and rental payments for productive 
leases are ongoing payments that are spread over the 
entire life of a petroleum deposit; hence the effect 
of a change in conditions in the oil market is felt on 
the stream of such payments. A bonus bid, however, 
reflects the entire expected capitalized net value of the 
asset, and the full impact of a change in the expected 
profits of a project is reflected in that single bid. Bonus 
bids, therefore, tend to reflect changes in geological 
and economic conditions much more immediately 
and markedly than do royalties or rentals. The vari-
ability in bonuses can be related to geological factors 
(payments rose following the first major Devonian 
finds in 1947, the Pembina find in 1953, the Keg River 
find in 1964) and to changed economic conditions 
(payment rose significantly with oil price rises in the 
early 1970s).
c. Conclusion
The years from 1947 through 1973 saw the maturation 
of the conventional Alberta oil industry in a market 
environment that was relatively stable. Beginning 
with the Leduc find in 1947, a major rise in petroleum 
exploration quickly took place with drilling through 
the 1950s and 1960s testing new areas both geograph-
ically (with increasing numbers of wells going into the 
northern and foothills areas) and geologically (with 
more wells testing horizons down to Pre-Cambrian 
basement rock). By the start of 1973, a total of 10,985 
exploratory wells (excluding outpost wells) had been 
drilled in Alberta. This amounted to about 0.05 of 
a well per square mile of sedimentary basin area in 
Alberta; of course, this is an average, with many parts 
of the basin less intensively explored, and many wells 
not passing through all potentially petroliferous geo-
logical horizons. The intensity of exploration by 1973 
was still significantly less than the average for the 
onshore lower-48 states in the United States but was 
much higher than that for any other petroleum-pro-
ducing nation. There were changes in the prices of 
oil and natural gas over this period, but the year-to-
year changes were minor as compared to the OPEC-
induced price changes after 1972.
Given that the provincial government was reluc-
tant to undertake a government-run exploratory 
drilling program, the regulatory environment was 
successful in achieving two main objectives: (1) ensur-
ing that exploration proceeded at a level high enough 
to generate continuing geological knowledge about 
promising areas of the province that were relatively 
lightly explored; and (2) ensuring that a significant 
portion of economic rents were captured by the prov-
ince. Large area exploratory reservations and permits 
helped to encourage exploratory activity, while the 
relinquishment provisions ensured that the province 
would bear some of the risk of exploration and main-
tain an interest in those locations newly discovered to 
hold profitable oil and gas deposits. It should be noted 
that the checkerboard leasing pattern that resulted 
contributed to the rule of capture problem discussed 
in detail in Chapter Ten. Large amounts of money 
were raised by rentals, bonuses, and royalties; in addi-
tion, Alberta derived some revenue from its share of 
the corporate income tax.
The reliance on rentals and gross royalties might 
be judged inefficient since both are production-based 
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taxes that make no explicit allowance for costs; hence 
they may tend to encourage earlier abandonment of 
producing wells and discourage some exploration and 
development. In contrast, the competitive bonus bid is 
effective in distinguishing between projects of higher 
and lower expected profitability. However, both pol-
itical and theoretical factors argue against sole reli-
ance upon competitive bonus bids. In political terms, 
governments find it important to demonstrate that 
resource industries are paying taxes to the government 
while production occurs. Beyond this, in a world of 
uncertainty, competitive bonus bidding procedures 
have risk-sharing characteristics that transfer all risk 
to the companies. Usually, governments will wish to 
assume some of this risk, particularly if risk-aversion 
leads companies to offer low competitive bids or if the 
lack of knowledge means that the bidding process on 
some mineral rights is not effectively competitive.
Critics might argue that rentals and royalties were 
not a suitable form by which to generate revenue 
additional to competitive bonus bids. A preferable 
alternative would be a corporate income tax designed 
explicitly to fall on the economic rent from petroleum 
production. Recall, from above, that such a tax would 
differ from the usual corporate income tax by allowing 
for the deduction as a cost of an allowance for return 
to equity capital. There are, of course, administrative 
problems in designing such a tax, but it has much 
to recommend it since it should be relatively neutral 
(i.e., have few disincentive effects). However, there 
are disadvantages.
In practical terms, a net profits tax might have 
involved jurisdictional problems in the Canadian fed-
eral system. In the period before 1974, it was accepted 
by Ottawa that rental payments, royalty payments, and 
(after 1962) competitive bonus bids paid to provincial 
governments could be deducted as a cost of business 
for the corporate income tax; the province could not 
be sure that the same treatment would be accorded to 
a net profit tax. Beyond this, there are disadvantages 
to a net profits tax in an industry in which the open 
access problem may be severe: increased exploratory 
expenditures could serve to drive the net profit and 
government revenue towards zero. Rental and gross 
royalty payments, since they are an inescapable cost, 
do not have this characteristic; competitive bonus 
bids may act as the major cost category that absorbs 
the incremental expenditure induced by open access, 
especially if the government limits the number of 
mineral rights issued each period.
However, the non-neutrality (inefficiency) of the 
rental/royalty payment schemes must be admitted. 
Clearly, the adoption of a sliding scale based on pro-
duction was designed to minimize the bias, on the 
presumption that higher-cost oil would tend to come 
from lower-output wells. Many of the basic operating 
costs of the well would be written off over a smaller 
amount of output, and declines in petroleum output 
in wells as depletion progresses are often accompanied 
by greater water production and higher disposal costs. 
The movement from a 5 per cent minimum royalty 
rate to an 8 per cent rate in 1962 may have increased 
the inefficiency of the royalty, but the minimum rate 
was reduced to 5 per cent again in 1973. However, it 
is not only low-output wells that have high per unit 
costs, so a gross royalty may have significant disincen-
tive effects of other types. Two examples follow. First, 
there are relatively small reserve pools that have high 
initial production rates per well (but a small number 
of wells); all else being equal, the exploration cost per 
barrel will tend to be relatively high for a small reserve 
pool of this type and a significant royalty burden could 
inhibit exploration. Second, one might suppose that 
many wells producing under conditions of enhanced 
recovery (EOR) will have relatively high production 
rates, and therefore high marginal and average royalty 
rates; but the EOR expenditures may also be large, and 
the royalties might make the venture unattractive. No 
quantitative studies have assessed the magnitude of 
these disincentive effects, but it is clear that, by the 
end of the 1947–73 period, the technological options 
for EOR recovery were significantly greater, and the 
average oil discovery size was becoming smaller, so 
that the disincentive effects of rentals and royalties 
may have become more significant. Against this, how-
ever, the government could balance the rising real 
prices of oil in North American markets.
By the early 1970s, the most dissatisfying feature 
of the mineral rights arrangements for Crown land, 
from the viewpoint of the government, was probably 
the risk-sharing aspect. None of competitive bonus 
bids, rentals, and royalties (with a maximum rate of 
16⅓%) were very responsive to unexpected changes 
in economic rent, particularly rises due to increased 
oil prices in world markets. One could argue that the 
government of Alberta became more willing to bear 
risk as the 1950s and 1960s passed and the province 
became wealthier. Alternatively, one might argue 
that the risk-sharing preferences of the government 
were essentially unchanged, but by the early 1970s 
the government was suffering after-the-fact regrets, 
when the higher-than-expected value of oil became 
apparent. In these circumstances, the concerns were 
somewhat different for newly issued, as opposed to 
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previously issued, Crown mineral rights. On the min-
eral rights still to be issued, the competitive bonus 
bid could be expected to capture at least a portion of 
the higher anticipated value due to rising oil prices. 
Even on these rights, however, the competitive bonus 
bid did not allow the government to bear a share of 
the increasing market risk. In the early 1970s, it was 
clear that OPEC was beginning to show international 
economic muscle; moreover, the heavy reliance of the 
world upon OPEC oil, and the short- and medium-
term inelasticity of international petroleum demand 
and supply (outside OPEC), meant that large rises in 
oil prices would be beneficial to OPEC. But no one 
knew exactly how high prices could go before OPEC 
began to suffer from significantly reduced sales, nor 
how likely it was that individual OPEC members could 
cooperate to the extent necessary.
The government of Alberta responded by impos-
ing higher taxes to capture some share of increased 
industry profits. These changes, in 1973, eventually 
involved higher royalty rates on all except the lowest 
output wells. The government maintained the appear-
ance of abiding by the clauses of the previously issued 
petroleum leases by making the increased royalty 
voluntary for leases still under their initial ten-year 
term (for leases issued after 1962) or twenty-one-year 
leases (for leases issued before 1962). Companies that 
did not agree to the higher royalty were, however, 
assessed a new mineral reserves tax. While the indus-
try cannot have found these higher taxes surprising, 
they regarded them with trepidation. In part, this 
reflected the non-neutrality of a gross royalty with 
its investment and production disincentives. Beyond 
this, however, it was now apparent that the provincial 
government was quite willing to change tax arrange-
ments if it felt that its share of the actual rent earned 
was ‘too low.’ It was less clear what would happen if 
events turned out to be particularly unfavourable and 
the government’s share of the rent was ‘too high.’ As 
a result the political risk perceived by the industry 
was clearly increased, and companies would now be 
justified in expecting a smaller share of the economic 
rent from the more positive market situations seen as 
possible. Thus, while rising real market prices for oil 
and natural gas in the early 1970s should have had the 
effect of attracting more investment to the industry, 
the market stimulus to invest was offset to some extent 
by the higher royalties and by a perceived increased 
probability of higher taxes.
This problem might have been minimized if the 
government had moved to a net profits tax of some 
kind in the early 1970s. Such a tax is closer to neutral 
in effect than a gross royalty and has very clear 
risk-sharing characteristics. However, the change from 
the prevailing royalty system is marked, as it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to express a profits tax as a 
percentage of the volume of output, as had been the 
case thus far with the royalty. It was suggested above 
that the province may have seen three problems with 
a profits tax – its implications under the Canadian 
federal system of government, its relationship to the 
open access characteristics of petroleum exploration, 
and the difficulties in allocating costs, given the joint 
product nature of petroleum activities. However, 
given the federal–provincial jurisdictional disputes 
over petroleum taxation, which were to erupt with 
full-force in the mid-1970s, we can argue with benefit 
of hindsight that some federal–provincial agreement 
on rent and risk sharing in the early 1970s would have 
been most desirable. Also, the overall exploration of 
the province had advanced considerably by the early 
1970s, so that the open access problems were probably 
much reduced.
In any event, the failure to find a satisfactory solu-
tion to the rent-collection and risk-sharing problems 
led to a turbulent decade after 1973 when international 
oil prices skyrocketed. One might ask whether the 
rent-collection scheme in Alberta was efficient in 
collecting ex ante (expected) rents. The question has 
not been answered in a satisfactory manner, although 
the amount of revenue paid by the industry clearly 
was large. Several studies of land sales associated 
with specific exploratory plays in the 1960s and early 
1970s found that most of the anticipated economic 
rent on the leases sold was captured by the govern-
ment (Watkins, 1975, and Watkins and Kirby, 1981). 
Watkins also noted that the government did not cap-
ture unanticipated rents. Industry spokesmen might 
point to the aggregate revenue and expenditure data 
that showed industry expenditures exceeding revenue 
in Alberta for all years before 1961 and with cumu-
lative revenues from 1947 falling short of cumulative 
expenditures at the end of the year 1973. Clearly, any 
gap between revenues and expenditures on equipment 
and materials was more than absorbed by payments 
to governments. But such annual cash flow data are 
an inappropriate indicator of the efficiency of the 
rent-collection process for three major reasons. First, 
petroleum deposits are capital assets with long lives 
and the major expenditures tend to be very heavily 
front-end-loaded. As a result, the total division of 
economic rent cannot be determined from annual 
data over a part of the industry’s life. Secondly, actual 
payment and receipt data are not necessarily a valid 
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indicator of the division of anticipated rents. Thirdly, 
the efficient collection of economic rent also implies 
that industry activity proceeds in an optimal manner 
so that rents are not dissipated for open access rea-
sons. Hence, one is concerned not so much with 
actual revenues and expenditures from petroleum 
sales as with the ideal flows: this is a very complex 
problem and has not been carefully examined for 
Alberta.
4. 1974–2012
Canadian oil prices had begun to rise in 1970, follow-
ing U.S. oil prices and the increasing taxes imposed 
by OPEC commencing with the Teheran-Tripoli 
agreements. Industry spokesmen in the late 1960s had 
spoken of the need for higher oil prices, often justify-
ing the requirement with reference to the depletable 
nature of petroleum deposits, and the inherent need 
to progress to less-productive deposits. One can see 
that the industry would wish to see higher prices for 
its product, and the discovery rate for large volume 
low-cost petroleum reserves had fallen off, within 
North America at least. In the international context, 
however, it is less clear that oil price increases were 
inevitable. From the perspective of the late 1960s, real 
international prices had actually been falling since 
1959, with increasing competition, and the reserves to 
production ratio for OPEC as a whole exceeded thirty 
in the late 1960s, indicating large available reserves; 
moreover, by North American standards, most OPEC 
nations were very lightly explored. It is hard to know 
whether companies in Alberta in the late 1960s were 
actually assessing projects under the expectation of 
price rises for oil. In any event, the quadrupling of 
the international posted price for OPEC oil between 
October 1, 1973, and January 1, 1974, raised inter-
national oil prices by an amount that far exceeded 
anyone’s expectations. The value of energy throughout 
the world increased since any additional production 
tended to displace high-priced OPEC oil.
From the viewpoint of oil-producing compan-
ies in Alberta, the international oil price rises were 
welcome; much higher profits could be earned on 
all oil discovered before January 1974, and the full 
range of potential new projects was more attractive. 
Other Canadian groups viewed the price rises with 
less favour. Consumers were alarmed by the increased 
price of energy and, as discussed in Chapter Nine, 
their concerns found an outlet in government’s energy 
pricing regulations. The governments that shared 
in the economic rent from petroleum were also 
concerned about the increasing value of Canadian 
petroleum, particularly since neither federal nor prov-
incial petroleum taxes were designed to capture a high 
share of the rent from unexpected price increases. 
The competing rent-collection objectives of Ottawa 
and Edmonton gave rise to the jurisdictional disputes, 
which dominated the Canadian energy scene from 
1974 through 1985. Hyndman and Bucovetsky (1974) 
provide a perspective from the start of this period 
while Helliwell et al. (1989), Plourde (1989), and 
Watkins and Scarfe (1985) are among the many auth-
ors who discuss Alberta and Ottawa rent-collection 
measures in this period.
Table 11.2 shows petroleum industry payments to 
the Alberta government over this period.
a. Royalties
The rising value of oil immediately made the 1973 
royalty schedule (and Mineral Resource Tax) seem 
inappropriate to the Alberta government. Effective 
April 1, 1974, a “supplemental” oil royalty was intro-
duced in addition to the “basic” royalty assessed 
under the January 1973 schedule. (See Appendix 11.A 
for more details.) The purpose of the supplemental 
royalty was to capture for the government a fraction 
of the increased revenue to the industry from price 
rises above the 1973 level. The prevailing price was 
established as a ‘Par’ price, and the supplemental roy-
alty was assessed on its excess above a ‘Select’ price, 
which was initially set at $4.11/b, representative of the 
1973 price. The government argued that most oil found 
before 1974 was expected to be profitable at prices that 
prevailed before that date and hence could bear a rela-
tively high supplemental royalty. However, many pro-
jects that might be undertaken after 1973 would appear 
attractive at the new higher oil prices but would not 
have been undertaken at earlier prices. These projects 
obviously would generate less economic rent and 
hence were assessed a lower supplemental royalty. 
The supplemental royalty therefore distinguished 
between “old” oil (that from reserves as of April 1974) 
and “new” oil. The supplemental royalty was tied 
to the basic royalty, which, it will be recalled, was a 
sliding-scale royalty with lower rates for low-output 
wells. (In July 1979, a significant adjustment was made 
for low-output wells, with the minimum basic royalty 
rate tending towards zero as output fell to zero.) On 
higher-production wells, the supplemental royalty 
was essentially designed to capture 65 per cent of any 
price rise above the early 1974 level on old oil, and 35 
per cent on new oil. (Appendix 11.1 A shows the actual 
formula.)
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The unilateral move to higher federal taxation 
of the petroleum industry in 1974 (higher corporate 
income taxes, achieved in part by the disallowance 
of royalties paid to provincial governments as a cost 
of doing business) led to several modifications of the 
Alberta regulations. The base price (revenue above 
which was subject to the supplemental royalty) was 
raised by 60 cents per barrel on January 1, 1975, and 
the maximum supplemental royalty on old oil was 
reduced from 65 per cent to 50 per cent of the revenue 
increase, effective July 1, 1975, then further reduced to 
45 per cent in April 1982.
Other significant modifications were made in 
1982, once again in large part in response to the fed-
eral tax initiatives under the 1980 National Energy 
Program (NEP) and September 1981 Memorandum of 
Agreement between Ottawa and Edmonton, and to the 
NEP Update announced by Ottawa in 1982. In part, 
the changes involved recognizing two new classes 
of oil created by the NEP and the Memorandum. 
Royalty regulations had to be specified for NORP oil; 
essentially this was oil found after December 31, 1980, 
which would receive the New Oil Reference Price 
(international price subject to some qualifications). In 
addition, oil found between 1973 and 1981 was also to 
get a higher price than conventional old (pre-1974) oil, 
but less than the NORP; the royalty regulations had to 
recognize the higher price of such oil. Both categories 
of oil were recognized as “new oil” under the Alberta 
regulations and hence assessed a maximum supple-
mental royalty rate of 35 per cent. By April of 1981, 
the average royalty rate on old oil was 43 per cent; 
for new oil it was 25 per cent. Approximately 75 per 
cent of provincial output was old oil (Canadian Tax 
Foundation, Provincial and Municipal Finances, 1981).
In April 1982, Alberta announced two measures 
that reduced provincial royalty rates. The ‘Select’ price 
against which the price rise for the supplemental 
royalty was to be calculated was raised to $40.90/
m3 ($6.50/b). Secondly, the supplemental royalty on 
old oil was now designed to take 45 per cent of the 
increased revenue rise rather than 50 per cent. In June 
1985, the royalty formulae were further modified to 
take 40 per cent of the revenue increase on old oil 
and 30 per cent on new. (This was initially a two-year 
program but was extended indefinitely in October 
1986; in addition, the new oil percentage of increased 
revenue was cut to 27 per cent so long as the oil price 
was below $30/b.)
Starting on January 1, 1993, the royalty formula 
(presumably the Select price) was subject to annual 
revision to reflect changes in the GDP price deflator, 
and a separate Par price was established for heavy oil. 
Oil discovered after September 1, 1992 was labelled 
‘third-tier’ and would be assessed royalties ⅓ lower 
than in the formula for new oil. In addition, third-tier 
wells producing less than 20 m3/month are exempt 
from royalties. Also, the maximum royalty rates were 
reduced with a ceiling rate of 35 per cent. There were 
thus, for royalty purposes, four different categories of 
conventional crude oil in the province: old oil, new 
oil, third-tier oil, and heavy oil. The royalty schedules 
exhibited common characteristics across all categories 
of oil – higher royalty rates as production rises and at 
higher prices of oil – but the specific factors (and aver-
age royalty rates) differ, with old oil paying the highest 
royalties. Alberta Energy (2003) provided a detailed 
summary of tax and royalty regulations for the four 
western Canadian provinces, including Alberta. In 
2005, 26 per cent of Alberta conventional light and 
medium oil output was classed as ‘old,’ 56 per cent as 
‘new’ and 18 per cent as ‘third tier’ (Alberta Royalty 
Review Panel, 2007, p. 57).
The sharp rise in crude oil prices after 2003 
sparked renewed interest in the petroleum royalty 
formula. For example, the Pembina Institute under-
took comparisons of government petroleum revenues 
in Canadian jurisdictions with those in Norway and 
Alaska, finding, over the years from 1995 to 2002, that 
the latter jurisdictions gathered over 90 per cent of 
available economic rent, while Alberta captured just 
under 70 per cent. Pembina argued that the Alberta 
royalty take was unacceptably low (Pembina Institute, 
2004). While several earlier critiques of the Alberta 
rent-collection system had compared shares of gross 
revenues, the Pembina study took into account esti-
mated costs of production, therefore allowing the 
authors to speak of shares in ‘economic rent.’ Pembina 
considered ‘average’ petroleum operations, in the 
sense that they used total regional revenues and costs, 
which, they recognized, failed to distinguish amongst 
individual ventures of varying cost; expressed differ-
ently, their analysis could not address the important 
question of the impact of taxes and royalties on the 
marginal investment project. The differences between 
the Alberta oil industry and those of other areas are 
significant. For example, Alberta had far more oil 
wells than producing regions such as Alaska and the 
North Sea, with an average commercial oil pool size 
of about 300,000 barrels in Alberta as compared 
to a world average of just over 100,000,000 barrels 
(Alberta Royalty Review Panel, 2007, p. 50). The 
large number of wells in Alberta partly reflects pool 
characteristics; it also results from more intensive use 
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of reservoirs than in some parts of the world (e.g., 
OPEC), and the well-drilling incentives of prorationing 
discussed in Chapter Ten. It should also be noted 
that the Pembina analysis approached the tricky joint 
product problem by transforming natural gas into oil 
on an energy-equivalent basis, rather than treating 
the oil and gas royalties separately. Unfortunately, in 
the Pembina study, production costs are measured by 
combining annual investment costs per barrel of oil 
reserves added (i.e., oil-in-the-ground) with operat-
ing costs per barrel of oil lifted (Pembina, 2004, p. 6). 
As discussed in Chapter Eight, this would tend to 
understate unit costs by failing to allow for the delay 
in transforming reserves into lifted oil and implicitly 
assumes that the costs of establishing reserves now are 
a reasonable measure of the costs of oil lifted now for 
which investment occurred in the past. The authors 
of the study admit that it is difficult to accept their 
precise numbers as entirely accurate; however, since 
the same method was applied to all jurisdictions, they 
suggest that their results do demonstrate that Alberta’s 
petroleum rent-collection regime is less effective than 
those of a number of the other areas. In 2010, the 
Parkland Institute published a review of revenue and 
rent shares in the conventional petroleum industry 
in Alberta, which also argued that the government 
was leaving substantial rents in the hands of the pri-
vate sector and failing to meet its own objectives for 
shares of rent and revenue captured. However, from 
an economic point of view, there are problems with 
their estimation procedures as they do not undertake 
life-cycle estimation of projects to estimate economic 
rents, and their methodology seems to ignore the 
required return to undepreciated capital after the year 
of investment (Parkland Institute, 2010).
The Pembina and Parkland  conclusions contra-
dict an early study frequently cited by the industry 
and referred to in the 2007 Report of Alberta Royalty 
Review Panel (p. 24); this was a 1997 study by Van 
Meurs of a large number of oil and gas royalty systems 
in the world. Van Meurs found that Alberta stood in 
the middle in terms of the share of rent captured.
However, particularly with the rising oil and gas 
prices after 2003, there was widespread speculation 
in the province that the government’s share of eco-
nomic rent was no longer satisfactory. In early 2007, 
the government appointed a panel to investigate the 
province’s petroleum rent-collection regulations. The 
Report of the panel began by noting that “Albertans 
do not receive their fair share from energy develop-
ment” (Alberta Royalty Review Panel, 2007, p. 7). This 
conclusion stemmed to a significant degree from an 
updated study by Van Meurs (cited on p. 23 of the 
Panel Report) and simulations undertaken for the 
panel by the Department of Energy (Appendix to the 
Alberta Royalty Review Panel Report, 2007), which 
suggested Alberta received relatively low shares of 
economic rent in comparison to a number of other 
jurisdictions in North America and the world, as 
simulated for a variety of ‘typical’ projects at assorted 
price levels. Since the similar 1997 Van Meurs analysis 
had found that Alberta stood in the middle in terms 
of rent collection, the main reasons for the low rank-
ing were the rise in oil prices, the relative insensitivity 
of Alberta royalties to oil price, reductions in the 
Canadian corporate income tax rate, and the failure, 
unlike many other governments, to modify regula-
tions in light of the large price increases after 2003. 
The Report and the background material provided by 
the Alberta Department of Energy (2007a, b) provide 
a valuable overview of Alberta regulations and their 
strengths and weaknesses, although they did not pro-
vide much discussion of the risk-sharing aspects of 
rent-collection schemes, and paid little attention to the 
interactions between bonus bids and royalties.
In essence, the Royalty Review Panel recom-
mended that the existing system be simplified by 
eliminating the vintage distinctions (old, new, and 
third-tier) and dropping the various royalty reduction 
incentive schemes. Average oil royalty revenue would 
be increased through a new royalty structure, which 
would involve two separate sliding-scale royalties, one 
volume-dependent, and the other price-dependent. 
The new schedules would reduce the royalty rate for 
low-output wells but significantly increase the high-
est rate (to 50% from 35%) at higher output and price 
levels (Alberta Royalty Review Panel, 2007, pp. 71–73). 
Based on simulations across a number of output rates 
and oil prices, the panel estimated that the rent share 
of conventional oil accruing to the provincial govern-
ment would rise from 44 per cent to 49 per cent (p. 7), 
ignoring any impacts through bonus bids.
Later that year (October 2007), the Alberta gov-
ernment issued its response to the recommendations 
of the panel (Alberta Department of Energy, 2007c). 
The government announced new conventional oil 
royalties to become effective at the beginning of 2009. 
Given the very high prices in effect in 2007, one might 
question why there was a delay in implementing the 
new royalty formula, but the revision did address the 
panel’s concern that the previous formula was insuffi-
ciently responsive to high international oil prices. The 
panel’s recommendations to eliminate the distinction 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ oil was accepted, and some of 
the incentive programs for conventional oil were to 
be eliminated as the panel had recommended. (Two 
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enhanced oil recovery programs were to be retained.) 
A new two-part royalty formula was announced, 
which sounded very much like what the panel had 
recommended: separate sliding scales for output level 
and prices, with the maximum royalty rate increasing 
from 35 per cent to 50 per cent. At low-output rates 
and low prices, the royalty rate would be 0 per cent, 
for example, at prices as high as $85/b, so long as 
output was 10 m3/month or less, and at output rates 
as high as 145 m3/month, so long as the price was 
$20/b or less. For very low production of 5 m3/month 
or less, the royalty would hit a maximum rate of 9 
per cent so long as the oil price was at least $125/b. At 
prices of $20/b or less, the maximum royalty would 
be 26 per cent at output rates of 749 m3/month or 
more. The highest rate of 50 per cent would not apply 
unless price was at least $70/b, and the output rate 
high enough (e.g., at least 677 m3/month at the $70/b 
price). Compared to the royalty formula it replaced, 
the new regulations generated lower royalties than 
the old formula at lower prices (below about $65/b, 
depending on the well output rate), and higher rates 
above that, and also garnered lower royalties on 
low-output wells. The new royalty schedule was to 
become effective January 1, 2009. Given the high 
prices of international oil, commencing as early as 
1999, many critics thought that the government had 
unduly delayed revisions to the royalty rates; by the 
start of 2009, prices had fallen considerably below the 
peak of early summer 2008.
The new regulations drew forth criticism from 
the industry, especially as oil prices fell dramatically 
after mid-2008. In November 2008, the government 
announced a transition period for the new royalty 
regime, under which companies commencing drilling 
wells between a depth of 1,000 m and 3,500 m after 
2009 could select a transitional royalty schedule that 
would delay the new rates until January 1, 2014. The 
government also appointed a Competitiveness Review 
Committee, which pointed out that Alberta’s share in 
western Canadian industry activity had fallen after 
2007 and that Alberta’s royalties were generally higher 
than those in Saskatchewan and B.C., especially in 
the earlier years for more productive wells (Sierra 
Systems, 2010; Alberta, 2010). In May 2010, a modifi-
cation was made to the royalty schedules, reducing the 
maximum royalty rate from 50 per cent to 40 per cent, 
effective January 1, 2011. (The revised schedule also 
reduced royalty rates slightly for some wells at prices 
around $100/b. The formulae for the two part royalty 
are shown in Appendix 11.1.)
As can be seen in Table 11.2, royalty payments to 
the Alberta government rose tremendously after 1973, 
reflecting both energy price rises and the increased 
royalty rates. The revenue flows from royalties far 
exceeded either rental or bonus payments. The table 
includes gas and natural gas liquids (NGL) royalties 
as well as oil royalties, and it can be seen that, by 
the 1990s, natural gas royalty revenue became larger 
than conventional oil royalty revenue, reflecting both 
higher relative gas prices and proportionately higher 
gas output. By 2000, natural gas royalties were far in 
excess of oil royalties. However, declining gas output 
and, particularly, prices meant that in 2009/10 and 
2010/11, for the first time in over a decade, conven-
tional oil royalties exceeded natural gas royalties. 
Beginning in 2009/10, the largest royalty contribution 
to the provincial government came from the oil sands.
(Chapter Twelve deals with natural gas royalties and 
Chapter Seven with oil sands royalties.)
Several more technical aspects of the oil royalty in 
the 1974 through 2012 period deserve brief comment. 
The precise definition of “new” oil was obviously of 
concern to producers since the supplemental royalty 
is so much lower for such oil. Oil in pools discovered 
after March 31, 1974, could clearly be considered new 
oil. More difficult to handle was oil from pools  found 
earlier but which may have been thought unprodu-
cible under the lower prices that existed before 1974. 
The definition of new oil was therefore expanded to 
include oil discovered before April 1, 1974, but: (1) out-
side delineated pool boundaries as of April 1, 1974; 
(2) in enhanced recovery schemes that commenced 
after January 1, 1974; and (3) from pools that had not 
produced any oil for at least three years.
Another set of problems existed with respect to 
the wide variation in producing rates from Alberta 
wells. The incremental royalty was geared to recover a 
percentage of the price rise for oil above the 1974 level 
but was implemented by a formula that tied the sup-
plemental royalty to a production-based sliding-scale 
royalty. Therefore, the incremental royalty could take 
exactly the desired percentage of the revenue increase 
only at one specific output rate. Both the basic and 
supplemental royalties would be higher for wells 
with a higher output rate than this, and both would 
be lower for wells with a lower output rate. Prior to 
1979, the components of the supplemental royalty 
were devised to capture the desired amount of rev-
enue from a well with the average output rate in the 
province. However, as a result of production decline, 
the average output rate was falling over time; as a 
result the rising price of oil in the late 1970s generated 
progressively higher incremental royalty rates on 
revenue increases for high-output wells. In 1979, the 
province decided to modify the incremental royalty 
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in the future on the basis of a well producing 120 b/d 
(572.1 m3/month) even though the average production 
from an Alberta oil well continued to fall.
b. Issuance of Rights
The basic principles of mineral leasing, as established 
in the 1947–73 period, remained in force, while num-
erous changes in detail were made. (Alberta Energy, 
2002, provides detailed review of land tenure policies.) 
Exploration rights are issued by competitive bonus 
bids and are convertible in whole or part to lease. 
Lease areas are also issued by competitive bonus bid, 
generally on smaller areas. Effective July 1, 1976, leases 
were issued with a five-year term reduced from the 
ten-years under the 1962 regulations. The rental rate 
is currently $2.50 per year per hectare. The lease will 
revert to the Crown unless drilling commences within 
the five-year initial term, although the Crown may 
allow an extension of up to three years. Holders of 
leases issued before 1976 were also required to drill on 
their leases or relinquish them. There were provisions 
that allowed leases to be grouped in respect of drilling 
requirements. The government has moved to separate 
leasing to some extent by depth and occasionally by 
product (e.g., a natural gas lease). Starting in 1976, 
companies that did not drill into deeper formations 
for which they held petroleum rights, while producing 
from shallower formations, were required to relin-
quish the deeper mineral rights back to the province, 
which could then be resold. In 2008, the government 
announced that it would require relinquishment of 
rights as well to shallower formations above produ-
cing pools.
Effective June 30, 1978, the issuance of “reserva-
tions” ceased, although exploratory permits continued 
to be issued in the form of “licences,” which had been 
introduced two years previously. Licences had a rental 
fee of $2.50 per hectare, a term that varied from two to 
five years depending on the location in the province, a 
maximum area varying from twenty-nine to thirty-six 
sections, depending on location, and were convertible 
in part or in whole into leases, depending upon the 
depth of the well drilled.
The province was divided into three areas – Plains, 
Northern, and Foothills – with increasing maximum 
size and licence term in this order. Presumably, the 
Plains area is more fully explored and less costly to 
drill than the Northern, while the Foothills is still 
less explored and more costly. In a sense, the 1976 
regulations turned the entire province into an area 
like “Block A” under the 1962 regulations, in recogni-
tion of the maturity of exploratory effort. Large area 
exploration rights with partial relinquishment to the 
Crown were no longer viewed as necessary to ensure 
adequate bonus bids. (Reservations under the 1957 
regulations would cover up to 100,000 acres, or over 
150 sections.) As noted above, provisions were also 
introduced in 1976 and extended in 1985 for the rights 
to deeper areas to revert to the Crown if companies 
produced from or drilled to shallow depths. From 
1976 to 1998, companies could earn a waiver on the 
rental on licences, if they engaged in early drilling. In 
July 1990, the rental rate was set at $3.50 per hectare 
for all petroleum rights.
In 1995, the government set up an Industry 
Advisory Committee to assess the petroleum land 
tenure system (Alberta Energy, 2002). No clear con-
sensus emerged, but the government continued to 
consult with industry and introduced revised legis-
lation and regulations in 1998 and 2000. The pro-
visions follow the spirit of the previous regulations. 
There are now two types of mineral rights, licences 
and leases, which may cover all geological formations 
or only those above or below a certain geological 
zone. Companies may request that mineral rights 
be offered for sale, but allocation is by sealed bonus 
bid. Maximum and minimum areas and duration 
are defined, varying in the Plains, Foothills, and 
Northern parts of the province. Licences have drilling 
requirements, although these may be combined across 
neighbouring licences; drilling extends the term of 
the licence, and such licences are treated as a lease and 
therefore allow production of oil and gas. Lease provi-
sions continued as set out in 1976.
As Table 11.2 shows, bonus bids continued to 
provide significant revenue to the province, with the 
revenue rising as oil prices also increased. Of course, 
the bonus payments related to mineral rights where 
discoveries would pay the “new” oil and gas royalties. 
Bonuses tended, as before, to be more variable than 
rentals or royalties. Once again, the magnitude of 
bonus payments can be related to geological factors 
(e.g., the land boom in the West Pembina area in 
1977), political factors (the industry reaction to the 
NEP in 1981), and economic factors (oil price changes, 
as, for example, the surge in 1997 and fall in 1998).
c. Incentive Schemes
The period after 1973 was characterized by a new 
development in provincial regulation: a wide var-
iety of incentive schemes were introduced in order 
to encourage industry activity. It might be thought 
that such schemes would be unnecessary in a period 
when oil and gas prices were increasing significantly, 
but two other factors are important. First, one might 
expect that as the industry matures the remaining 
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undiscovered prospects look less attractive (of course, 
technological change and new knowledge may offset 
this). If the government wishes to maintain continuing 
activity in the petroleum sector, incentives of some 
sort may be necessary. Second, and related to the first, 
is the tax burden factor. As has been evident, the prov-
incial government does not rely primarily on profits 
taxes, and therefore the industry will be dissuaded 
from some types of activities due to the royalty-tax 
burden. (Ottawa, until the 1980 NEP, relied upon the 
corporate income tax, but this is not a completely neu-
tral tax and is certainly not so when companies may 
not deduct royalty payments as a cost.)
Since 1974, the provincial government has utilized 
many different types of ‘incentive’ programs, and 
the specific regulations governing them have been 
changed frequently. EnviroEconomics (2010) pro-
vides a review of Canadian royalty and tax provisions, 
including various incentive programs, within the con-
text of various ‘subsidies’ granted to the oil industry. 
They suggest that ‘subsidies’ to the petroleum industry 
in Alberta in the years 2004–2009 amounted to 5.7 
per cent of the value of production. Their definition 
of ‘subsidy’ is quite broad; for example, it treats the 
incentive programs as subsidies, rather than as poli-
cies, for example, designed to offset inefficiencies in an 
ad valorem royalty. 
We shall not set out all the details, but, in terms of 
broad classes, the major incentive schemes included 
the following:
Exploratory Drilling Incentive Program. This was 
first introduced in 1972 and involved a five-year roy-
alty holiday on successful wildcat oil wells (finding oil 
in a previously unproductive structure); in addition, 
each foot of wildcat well earned a credit that could be 
claimed by the company against royalties owed. The 
scheme was maintained in various forms from 1972 to 
2009 and was expanded to include a two-year royalty 
holiday for wildcat gas discoveries, higher credits for 
deeper footage and more remote parts of the province, 
credits made applicable to bonuses as well as royalties, 
and the deep footage of deep-pool exploratory tests 
eligible for a credit.
Geophysical Incentive Program. This was introduced 
in 1975 and continued through 1982, although with 
greatly reduced incentives after 1979. In mid-1983, it 
was reintroduced and continued to 2008. It allowed 
a portion of the cost of seismic surveys to serve as 
payment or credit against other provincial tax rev-
enue owed by the company so long as the survey met 
certain criteria and the results were offered for sale 
to others after three years. The province was divided 
into three regions, with higher credits in the more 
remote areas.
Royalty Credit. Effective in 1975, all companies in 
the province could claim a $1 million credit against 
royalties owed to the province. Most significant pro-
ducers paid well over $1 million per year in royalties. 
(An average royalty rate of 35 per cent on an oil price 
of $10.00 per barrel would require about 286,000 
barrels per year, or 783 barrels per day, to yield $1 
million.) Therefore, for most companies, the royalty 
credit would increase total corporate after-tax profit 
but not affect the marginal royalty rate on corporate 
output. However, for small producers, owing less 
than $1 million in royalties, the marginal and average 
royalty rates on incremental output became zero. In 
October 1981, the royalty credit amount was increased 
to $2 million, and then to $4 million in April 1982. 
It was subsequently lowered again, and changed to a 
to-be-specified percentage (%) of the first $X of roy-
alty paid. Both ‘%’ and ‘X’ were changed periodically 
in relationship to the price of oil, with a lower royalty 
credit as the oil price was appreciably higher. Also, in 
January 1975, the provincial government announced 
that royalties paid would be deductible as a cost 
of business for the provincial part of the corporate 
income tax. Other royalty credit regulations have been 
introduced, including one for ‘third-tier’ exploratory 
wells drilled after September 1992 (a twelve-month 
royalty holiday, up to $1 million in value), and, from 
the same date, a royalty holiday on the first eight 
thousand cubic metres produced from a previously 
inactive well. Also effective after September 1992, wells 
that had been producing at low-output rates were 
accorded a maximum royalty rate of 5 per cent on the 
next sixteen thousand cubic metres of production. The 
royalty credit program was dropped in 2006.
Petroleum Incentive Payments (PIP). The National 
Energy Program introduced a scheme of subsidy 
payments for exploratory and development activities. 
Such payments were to be higher for companies with 
greater Canadian ownership, for exploratory expendi-
tures and on frontier lands. In the September 1981 
Agreement with Ottawa, the Government of Alberta 
agreed to take over payment of the PIP grants for oil 
industry activities in Alberta.
The conditions governing PIP payments in Alberta 
were as follows: The scheme was to last until 1986. 
The amount of the PIP payment was deducted from 
the cost of the capital expenditures for the purposes 
of capital consumption allowances in the corporate 
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income tax. In effect, the PIP payment was taxable, 
although the tax payment might be deferred to the 
future, depending on the taxable position of the com-
pany and the capital consumption allowance provision 
for the activity concerned. The PIP payments were 
phased in gradually (as the ‘earned depletion allow-
ance,’ see below, was phased out). By 1984, on prov-
incial Crown lands in Alberta, the PIP grants covered 
15 per cent of exploration costs for companies with 
50–75 per cent Canadian ownership and 35 per cent of 
exploration costs if the ownership rate exceeded 75 per 
cent. Development costs were covered to the extent of 
10 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. Companies 
with less than 50 per cent Canadian ownership did not 
receive PIP grants. In the 1981–82 fiscal year, Alberta 
paid about $1.7 billion under the PIP program. PIP 
grants ended with the demise of the NEP under the 
Western Accord in June 1985.
Well-Servicing Grants Program. In April 1981, the 
government announced a program for 1981 and 1982 
whereby 50 per cent of the cost of maintenance, repair, 
and service of a well would be paid for by the prov-
ince, to a maximum of $75,000 per well, for wells on 
provincial Crown land. The program was extended 
to cover injection, water disposal, and observation 
wells in August 1981, and for about 25 per cent of the 
drilling cost of development wells (varying with depth 
and location in the province). The province allocated a 
total of $250 million to the program.
Enhanced Recovery Incentives. In 1976, authority was 
given to the lieutenant-general-in-council to reduce 
the royalty rate to 5 per cent on approved experi-
mental projects. Effective in 1977, any new ‘tertiary’ 
enhanced recovery project (beyond the waterflood 
stage) could apply to have the royalty assessed on 
revenue less the incremental costs of the scheme, 
thereby reducing the effective royalty rate (moving 
closer to a profits tax); total royalties paid must still 
be as high as they would have been with primary and 
waterflood (‘secondary’) recovery. In 2002, additional 
royalty reductions were introduced for EOR schemes 
that utilized CO2.
Horizontal Well Incentives. After July 1991, reduced 
royalties were granted to horizontal wells, based 
on the number of vertical wells made unnecessary. 
Presumably the intent was to encourage this new tech-
nology and to allow for the disincentive under an out-
put-based sliding-scale royalty for higher output wells. 
In 1993, horizontal extensions to existing vertical wells 
were also granted reduced royalties. The program was 
eliminated at the end of 2008 in line with the recom-
mendations of the Royalty Review Panel.
Deep Exploratory Well Royalty Credit. This program, 
announced in 2008, allowed relief from up to $1 mil-
lion in first year production royalties for exploratory 
well deeper than 2,000 metres.
Royalty Drilling Credit. Effective for 2009–11, this 
granted a credit against royalties for wells drilled in an 
amount up to $200/m drilled.
New Well Royalty Reduction. Wells drilled between 
2009 and 2011 were granted a one-year royalty rate 
of 5 per cent. The 2011/12 budget announced that the 
provision would be made permanent.
d. Conclusion
Two major weaknesses of the Alberta rent-collection  
policy haunted the 1970s and came to the fore again 
after the turn of the century. First, the reliance upon 
competitive bonus bids as a way to distinguish 
between high- and low-profit ventures left the prov-
ince without a significant share of the unexpected rent 
increase associated with rapidly increasing world oil 
prices after 1970. The resultant move to raise royalty 
rates, in combination with the rent-sharing disputes 
with Ottawa, could not help but raise the political risk 
perceived by the industry.
The second problem relates to the weaknesses of 
the ad valorem royalty as a rent-collection device. 
Since it is based upon gross revenue rather than net 
revenue (profits), it can easily become a high burden 
on particular projects, thereby discouraging invest-
ment or causing earlier abandonment of oil pools. 
If the royalty is set low to avoid these effects, it is 
ineffective as a rent-collection device. Therefore, it 
normally becomes necessary both to introduce com-
plex royalty provisions that differentiate between 
broad classes of pools and also to introduce a variety 
of supplemental measures that offer incentives to 
those activities that have been discouraged through 
inefficiencies in the royalty. There are at least four 
main problems with this approach: it is administra-
tively complex and costly; it seems likely to increase 
the political risk to companies; it is difficult to know 
the exact costs of the various programs and the overall 
incentive effect; and it is virtually impossible to fine-
tune (with gross royalties and incentives) so that the 
unique rent-generating characteristics of each project 
is recognized.
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Watkins and Scarfe (1985) review the output and 
price-sensitive royalty scheme of 1974 and assess its 
effectiveness as a rent-collection device in the follow-
ing terms (pp. 28–29):
In terms of efficiency of rent collection, we 
assume that the elasticity of royalties with 
respect to well production and price at any 
point in time should exceed unity, implying 
that the marginal royalty rate would exceed the 
average. However, the marginal rate should not 
be punitive; rather it should be comfortably 
below unity.
… We find that the elasticity of royalties 
with respect to the rate of production starts 
at 2 for low production levels and eventually 
approaches unity at high production levels. 
While the elasticity exceeds unity, the royalty 
formula is not well calibrated with resource 
quality because the changes in royalties 
become less onerous at higher levels of well 
production.
How do royalties vary with prices …? 
The elasticity of the volume of royalties with 
respect to price is a rather curious creature, 
asymptotically approaching zero as price 
increases become very large. The elasticity is 
less than unity for the values currently inserted 
in the royalty formula for both new and old 
oil. However, if we look at royalty revenues, 
the picture becomes rather different. The elas-
ticity of royalty revenues with respect to price 
exceeds unity, implying that marginal royalty 
revenues exceed the average as prices increase. 
But the elasticity falls as price rises. Again, we 
conclude that the royalty structure is not well 
calibrated to capture economic rents arising 
from unanticipated rises in oil prices.
With respect to bonus bids, Watkins and Scarfe argue 
(pp. 29–30):
Alberta’s other main device for obtaining eco-
nomic rent is bonus bidding. If foresight and 
competition were perfect and sealed bids were 
submitted on all petroleum properties, the 
bidding process would mop up any remaining 
foreseeable economic rent. The term remaining 
rent here refers to the residual after deduc-
tion of taxes, rentals, and royalties, which are 
treated as costs in bid determination. However, 
competition is not perfect because bidders 
seldom have equivalent information for a lease; 
competition may not be sufficiently intense; 
deficient foresight will ensure discrepancies 
between ex post and ex ante rents; and, most 
importantly, because of the lease retention 
provisions described earlier, not all production 
leases are subject to bids. Nevertheless, the evi-
dence suggests competition among bidders in 
Alberta is sufficiently strong to allow the gov-
ernment to capture a large portion of ex ante 
rents on leases that are put up for bid.
Thus bonus bidding will tend to pick up 
remaining rents arising from quality dif-
ferentials but not from unanticipated price 
increases. Neither will it pick up rents not 
absorbed by royalties on properties for which 
bids do not have to be made. In this way, the 
Alberta land system provides strong incen-
tives for successful exploration – an additional 
reward for risk takers – as long as the rewards 
are not negated by other measures – such as 
the federal tax and pricing regime.
There is no detailed empirical analysis of the disin-
centive effects of the Alberta Crown mineral rights 
revenue terms. (Appendix 11.1 B provides further 
discussion of possible disincentive effects of a gross 
royalty, and shows, for four different well output rates, 
how royalties on crude oil differed across the various 
Alberta regulations from 1951 on.) In practice, it was, 
of course, almost impossible to separate the effect of 
the provincial royalty rate increases from the new fed-
eral tax initiatives of the 1970s. Four effects might be 
noted. Firstly, projects that are only marginally accept-
able without such a royalty will become unacceptable 
with the royalty. Unless the royalty can be argued to 
cover a social cost that the project sponsors have failed 
to consider, this is an undesirable result. Secondly, a 
gross royalty will encourage premature abandonment 
of operating wells since a royalty is viewed by the 
producers as a variable operating cost. This is par-
ticularly important for wells that have high operating 
costs apart from the royalty since such wells will be 
running at high-output levels and therefore facing 
high marginal royalty rates even as they approach 
the economic date of abandonment. In Alberta, this 
problem has been offset at least to some extent by 
the provision that producers can ask for royalty relief 
to forestall abandonment. Thirdly, the disincentive 
effect of a gross royalty will be particularly heavy on 
those projects that have a relatively high ratio of costs 
to revenues and those that have a lower probability 
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of failure. Finally, a royalty schedule may also induce 
output shifts over time, in addition to the incentive 
to abandon earlier. In Alberta, until the late 1980s, 
the ability to change the intertemporal depletion of 
the reservoir as a result of royalty regulations was 
inhibited by market-demand prorationing regulations.
The Alberta royalty schedule will offer a general 
(but not invariant) incentive to reduce the current 
output from a well and to shift this output into a 
future period. This was true for two reasons. First, the 
present value of any fixed percentage royalty based on 
a fixed price will be less the further in the future the 
royalty is. Second, with a sliding-scale royalty based 
upon output, it is possible to reduce the marginal and 
average royalty rates by shifting output from high- 
volume periods to lower-volume periods. Since oil 
pools, and most oil wells, tend to exhibit production 
decline, this means shifting some output from the 
earlier to the later years. On the other hand, since the 
royalty is assessed on a per-well basis, it may encour-
age more rapid depletion through more infill drilling, 
which raises the pool output rate and depletes reserves 
faster but leads to a lower output per well and may 
therefore reduce the royalty rate.
At first glance, it may appear somewhat contra-
dictory that the Government of Alberta in the 1970s 
should have both unilaterally raised royalties on 
Crown lands and introduced a variety of royalty credit 
or incentive payment schemes applicable to industry 
activities on Crown lands. But the reliance on gross 
royalties as the main rent-collection device explains 
their somewhat contradictory actions: royalties are 
relatively poor as a risk-sharing device, so changing 
market conditions call for a revamping of the regu-
lations; but higher royalties to capture a share of the 
ex post rent tend to have disincentive effects, which 
must then be addressed by new measures. Hence, by 
the early 2000s, the Alberta conventional oil royalty 
scheme had evolved into a complex web of regu-
lations: variations in rates for several classes of oil, 
by type and vintage; variations in rates for different 
output rates; variations in rates for different prices; 
and a number of lowered royalty rates for specific 
types of oil production. (See Alberta Department of 
Energy, 2007, for a summary.)
Table 11.2 includes data for years since 1973 on 
Government of Alberta revenue from the petroleum 
industry. Also shown, where available, are the costs 
of various incentive schemes, although it is difficult 
to know whether all costs are directly included here, 
since some of the royalty credit and holiday provisions 
will be reflected in a smaller total for royalties, rather 
than recorded as a cost. This is an example of a ‘tax 
expenditure.’ (The years are not all strictly comparable 
since the reporting system for revenue was changed 
in 1979 to an accrual basis. Two sets of figures are 
included for the fiscal year 1978–79, one set on the 
old basis and the second on the new accrual basis.) 
The significant rise over the decade in both petrol-
eum revenue and the exploration drilling incentives 
is apparent. The revenue effects of the royalty holiday 
mechanism are not apparent.
A tremendous increase in the sales revenue from 
Crown leases is apparent after 1973, suggesting that 
this is still an effective means of capturing ex ante rent 
and that expected profits of new ventures did increase, 
despite the various new taxes the industry faced. The 
fall in Crown rights sales revenues after 1980 may 
reflect the influence of the NEP, although it is hard to 
be sure of this since bonus payments are unstable over 
time. Table 11.2 also shows revenues from gas royalties, 
the tar sands, and the freehold mineral reserves tax. 
(Prior to 1975, the latter includes some revenue from 
Crown lands under the mineral reserves tax.)
After international oil prices rose to new highs 
(in nominal terms), the 2007 Alberta Royalty Review 
Panel recommended simplification of this system by 
eliminating the vintage distinctions and the incentive 
programs; it also suggested new schedules of price- 
and output-based rates that would reduce royalty 
rates for less productive wells and raise them for more 
productive wells, especially at higher price levels. In 
October 2007, the government announced changes to 
be effective at the start of 2009 that were largely con-
sistent with the recommendations of the review panel. 
These changes would preserve the long-established 
structure of the Alberta oil rent-collection system (i.e., 
reliance on bonus bids, rentals, ad valorem royalties, 
and the corporate income tax) while increasing total 
payments to the Alberta government, especially in 
an environment of high oil prices. Under this roy-
alty regime, Mintz and Chen (2010) looked at the 
‘effective marginal tax and royalty rate’ for an 80 b/d 
well in Alberta and found it was appreciably higher 
than in other Canadian provinces or in Texas. While 
this meant more rent would be collected on such a 
well, it also suggested a greater inhibition of mar-
ginal investments.
Then, in 2010, the government announced reduc-
tions in the royalty rates effective January 1, 2011, 
which moved them much closer to those prevailing 
prior to 2007, with a maximum rate of 40 per cent 
(as compared to 35 per cent in 2007); the government 
retained lower rates at lower prices and for lower 
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output wells. There is something of a paradox in these 
changes. The motivation was concern that the old roy-
alty regulations generated insufficient revenue in what 
many assumed to be a new higher-priced environ-
ment. However, given continuing production decline 
in operating reservoirs and declining discoveries and 
discovery size due to the maturity of the conventional 
industry, the final impact of the new regulations 
(with lower rates at the low-output end) may well be 
reduced conventional oil royalty receipts. A sense of 
déjà vu may have been enhanced by the government 
decision to introduce a number of new incentive pro-
grams as well.
In essence, the same problems we have noted 
before still held true: the government elected to rely 
upon royalties as the main rent-collection device, 
which allowed risk-sharing with industry, but a gross 
ad valorem royalty necessarily has disincentive effects. 
Perhaps the royalty review of 2007–2010 represents 
a missed opportunity to move towards a net royalty 
system. A first step would have been to recognize 
operating costs as a deduction before royalties are 
applied; incremental development costs could also 
have been recognized as an allowable expense. To go 
further, given the successful adoption of a net-profits 
tax on oil sands projects, perhaps the time would have 
been ripe to adopt a similar tax on conventional crude 
oil and natural gas. There are, as discussed above, 
some thorny issues involved here, particularly with 
respect to definition of allowable costs, including the 
difficulty in incorporating dry hole exploration costs. 
It would be necessary for companies to maintain an 
agreed-upon cost accounting for conventional oil and 
gas activities in Alberta, so obvious questions would 
arise, particularly for companies active in more than 
conventional activities and outside the province as 
well as within. Mintz and Chen (2010) suggested that 
the time might be suitable to move from a gross roy-
alty to a cash flow tax. If allowance is made to carry 
forward negative balances with an appropriate interest 
charge, this approximates a net profit (or resource 
rent) tax. However, problems might arise since the 
cash flow tax is normally applied on a company basis, 
whereas Alberta Crown royalties are a part of the 
mineral rights provisions on specific properties. In 
any event, in 2010, the province decided to stay with 
much the same system as in the past, but with a some-
what larger maximum royalty rate if prices move to 
high levels.
In conclusion, one could argue, in retrospect 
at least, that it would have been preferable for the 
Alberta government to have shifted from reliance 
upon gross royalties to reliance upon some type of 
net profit tax or net royalty, even as early as the 1970s. 
(In a different approach, Crommelin, 1976, suggested 
that the province consider a shift from competitive 
bonus bids to competitive royalty bidding; compared 
to competitive bonus bids, this would be expected to 
give the province a greater share of rising rents due to 
price increases, but poses a problem with earlier aban-
donment, assuming the royalty rate bid is high.) As 
was discussed in Chapter Seven, the ‘generic’ oil sands 
royalty introduced in the mid-1990s was a net royalty, 
with a gross royalty floor. A profit tax or net royalty is 
very responsive to changing economic rent, including 
unexpected variations; that is, it has very desirable 
risk-sharing properties, and, if designed carefully, 
small disincentive effects. One major disadvantage of a 
net profits tax relates to open access problems, but if it 
is used in conjunction with bonus bids, and if mineral 
rights sales in any region tend to be spread over time, 
open access problems should not be severe, particu-
larly when the main geological features of the region 
are quite well mapped. However, given that reliance 
upon royalties continued, it is easy to understand why 
the royalty regulations involved sliding scales (based 
on production level, vintage, and price), and why 
the government was drawn to a variety of incentive 
schemes. We will not address the legal problems that 
may have inhibited the province in replacement of the 
conventional gross royalty with a net royalty or profit 
tax, given that the leasing arrangements with compan-
ies specified a gross royalty obligation and the status of 
petroleum-industry-specific profit taxes are not clear 
under the federal corporate income tax.
4. Federal Regulations
A.	Pre–1973
Prior to the transfer of most Crown mineral holdings 
to the provincial government in 1930, Ottawa had the 
responsibility to set rent and royalty provisions on 
Crown land in Alberta. We shall not review the details 
(see Breen, 1993, chap. 1) but would note that by 1930 
they included a number of provisions that were later 
adopted in the provincial regulations described above, 
including: fixed lease acreages, drilling requirements, 
per-acre lease rentals, a relatively low ad valorem roy-
alty, relinquishment provisions and the possibility for 
issuance of some rights by bonus bids. After 1930, the 
federal government no longer had a significant role 
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in Alberta in setting out the petroleum rights tenure 
regulations, except on the remaining areas of federal 
Crown land.
Before 1973, the main federal provision affecting 
the distribution of economic rents from provincial 
Crown lands was the federal corporate income tax. 
(We abstract from payments on oil production by 
unincorporated producers.) Under the BNA Act, both 
federal and provincial governments were allowed to 
impose income taxes (“direct taxes”), so responsibility 
here has been shared. Summaries of corporate income 
tax provisions can be found in various ongoing pub-
lications of the Canadian Tax Foundation. These also 
provide a very good summary of the various tax rental 
and sharing arguments, which have, in essence, let 
Ottawa set the provisions of the tax while provincial 
governments have been free to set a provincial tax 
rate. It should also be noted that our examination of 
revenues associated with the corporate income tax 
on petroleum production abstracts from any reduc-
tions in personal income tax payments as a result of 
the partial integration of the corporate and personal 
income taxes. (This refers to provisions such as the 
non- or lower taxation of capital gains and the divi-
dend tax credit in the personal income tax code. We 
view these as ways of reducing the double taxation of 
corporate profits, although it is notable that these per-
sonal income tax advantages were not reduced as the 
corporate income tax rate was reduced in the 1990s 
and 2000s.) Amongst various summaries of federal 
income tax regulations for crude oil production, we 
have drawn particularly on Helliwell et al. (1989, chap. 
5 and Appendix 5.1) as well as various issues of The 
National Finances, issued annually by the Canadian 
Tax Foundation. We review the main features of the 
tax system but do not present many of the smaller 
adjustments or document the changes in tax rates.
Simply put, the corporate income tax is a tax on 
the “taxable profits” of corporations. Procedurally, as 
far as Alberta is concerned, the federal government 
sets the tax regulations and a tax rate (e.g., 46%); it 
then specifies an “abatement” (e.g., 12 percentage 
points, reducing the federal tax rate to 34%) that 
allows each provincial government to impose its own 
corporate tax rate (e.g., if Alberta imposes a rate of 
11%, the total corporate income tax rate would be 
45%). Governments might on occasion impose tem-
porary surcharges or reductions on top of the basic 
tax rate.
Taxable profits are corporate revenues less allow-
able deductions. The complexity of the tax code lies 
largely in the variety of ways in which these deduc-
tions may be calculated. With reference to the crude 
oil industry, it is useful to note eight classes of deduc-
tions. Specific provisions for each of these classes 
have been subject to change, but the general nature of 
provisions up to 1973 will be indicated in the following 
list. (The provisions are those for corporations whose 
“principal business” was petroleum production.)
(1) Operating costs: These were deducted as 
incurred.
(2) (Intangible) Exploration expenses: These 
are generally viewed by economists as capital 
expenditures, since they are undertaken with 
the intent of generating assets (petroleum 
deposits) of long life. They were expensible 
(100% deductible) as incurred.
(3) (Intangible) Development Capital: Was also 
expensible as incurred.
(4) (Other) Capital Assets: Could be written off 
over a number of years, as set out in a number 
of “capital consumption allowance” schedules, 
depending on the type of capital.
(5) Interest expenses: Deductible as incurred. 
No deduction was allowed for the return on 
equity capital.
(6) Payments to other governments: Rentals, 
royalties, and bonus bids were deductible as 
incurred. (This only applied after April 1962, for 
bonus bids.)
(7) Other deductions: Mineral industries, includ-
ing petroleum, were allowed an additional 
deduction, called the ‘depletion allowance,’ 
equal to one-third of profits (revenues less costs 
as specified in the tax code). This was a ‘net’ 
depletion allowance, as compared to the U.S. 
‘gross’ allowance, which was a certain percent-
age of revenues. Other allowable deductions 
have included an “investment tax credit,” which 
reduced the corporate income tax owing on the 
basis of new investment spending, with a higher 
credit if spending occurs in parts of the country 
that are economically depressed.
(8) Loss carry forward: Since there are no pro-
visions for ‘negative taxes’ (payments by the 
government if taxable corporate profits are 
negative), there were provisions to carry neg-
ative taxable income values (“losses”) forward 
indefinitely as deductions in later years.
The corporate income tax itself and the depletion 
allowance in particular have been the source of much 
controversy. Many dimensions of this dispute have 
been captured in the studies of, hearings before, and 
reports of the federal Royal Commission on Taxation 
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(the Carter commission), which reported in 1966. The 
main arguments in these debates are noted, briefly.
Corporate Income Tax. Economists have not gen-
erally been enamoured of the corporate income tax. 
The public popularity of this tax is easy to see: “I’d 
rather corporations pay taxes, than I do.” This is a 
myopic view because ultimately it must be people 
who pay taxes. If the tax is viewed as one on the profit 
income of the owners (shareholders) of corpora-
tions, it may involve double taxation of income, since 
the dividends and increased share values that flow 
from higher corporate profits are themselves (pot-
entially) subject to taxation under personal income 
tax regulations. Moreover, theoretical and empirical 
evidence both dictate that the broader impacts of the 
corporate income tax may be quite different than is 
generally thought. In particular, the mobility of capital 
across sectors (e.g., the corporate and non-corporate 
parts of the economy), and internationally, must be 
considered. In the extreme, if capital were perfectly 
mobile and Canada were such a small part of the 
world economy that events here had minimal effects 
upon rates of return earned elsewhere, then the after-
tax return to equity capital would have to be the same 
both in the presence and the absence of the corpor-
ate tax. (Otherwise capital would leave the country 
until the reduced level drove returns up to the world 
level.) But this implies that the money to pay the tax 
must come from the tax being shifted forward onto 
consumers in higher prices and/or back onto input 
suppliers (e.g., wages) in lower prices. (This is typically 
effected in part by abandoning investments which fail 
to earn enough to cover the required minimum return 
plus the tax.) From this point of view, the corporate 
income tax is, in fact, largely a mix of a sales tax and a 
wage tax, rather than a tax on capitalists!
Some critics of the corporate income tax have sug-
gested that there may still be two valid reasons for the 
tax, though one might ask whether special taxes rather 
than a general corporate income tax might not be a 
better means. The first reason relates to returns accru-
ing to foreign capital since shareholders in foreign 
countries are not subject to Canadian personal income 
taxes. The second relates to that portion of profits 
in excess of the ‘normal profits’ to owners of equity 
capital. This would include, for example, monopoly 
profits, short-term high profits and (most importantly 
in the case of petroleum) any economic rents from 
mineral production. From an ‘ability to pay’ view of 
taxation, such rents are a particularly attractive tax 
base, for reasons clearly discussed in Section 1 of this 
chapter. The Carter Commission favoured a complete 
integration of corporate and personal income taxes to 
avoid any double taxation, and the favourable treat-
ments of capital gains and dividend income in the 
personal tax code have moved the Canadian system in 
that direction.
Depletion Allowance. Accepting the existence of 
a corporate income tax, further controversy was 
aroused by the depletion allowance accorded to min-
eral industries. Some flavour of this debate in the 
United States can by found by reading McDonald 
(1963, 1970). For Canada, see the studies for the Carter 
Commission by Bucovetsky (1964) and Burton (1966). 
Most economists were not convinced by the argu-
ment that, since it was necessary to allow companies 
to deduct from their revenues an allowance for the 
declining value of all their capital assets (a capital 
consumption allowance or CCA), and the oil or gas 
pool was obviously the most important asset of petrol-
eum companies, there should be a special allowance in 
addition to the usual CCAs. Companies were already 
allowed to deduct the capital expenditures necessary 
to find and develop the pool. If taken literally, the 
argument would say that economic rents from petrol-
eum deposits (i.e., the ‘value’ of the asset) should not 
be taxed at all, even though economic rents are usually 
viewed as a very attractive tax base.
Hence debate about the depletion allowance 
shifted to arguments about whether there were specific 
characteristics of the petroleum industry that justified 
special tax treatment. Discussion followed two broad 
paths, the first whether the corporate income tax itself 
discriminated unduly against the oil industry and the 
second whether there were externalities in oil pro-
duction that justified a tax incentive. Along the first 
stream, proponents of the depletion allowance argued 
that the high capital intensity of the oil industry, its 
reliance on equity financing, and the high degree of 
risk meant that the corporate tax fell particularly heav-
ily on the petroleum industry and that the necessity 
of passing on the resultant high income taxes would 
generate a contraction in the petroleum industry 
relative to other sectors of the economy. Opponents of 
the depletion allowance pointed out that many other 
industries are also risky and that there are numerous 
ways in which companies may share or spread risk in 
petroleum investment. Several studies of stock market 
prices, using the ‘capital asset pricing model’ (CAPM) 
of efficient capital markets, suggest that oil compan-
ies, particularly smaller crude producers, do seem to 
require a somewhat higher rate of return than many 
other industries reflecting somewhat greater undi-
versifiable risks in crude oil investment (Quiran and 
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Kalyman, 1977; DataMetrics, 1984). However, Cairns 
(1985) argues that risk arguments for preferential taxa-
tion of resource industries have little justification.
The CAPM suggests that in a well-developed 
economy, with extensive and well-functioning capital 
markets, opportunities exist for risk-averse investors 
to diversify their portfolios. For example, they may 
invest in many different projects or put their funds 
into mutual funds where their money is pooled with 
that of many other investors and spread over many 
ventures. Thus, for example, the risk of finding no oil 
on a wildcat well can be reduced if a large number of 
wells are drilled at a variety of locations. A large com-
pany may be able to do this by itself; a smaller com-
pany may accomplish the same thing by entering into 
joint ventures with other oil explorers. If individual 
investment risks can be offset by combing the invest-
ment with a larger portfolio, then risk-averse investors 
do not require extra compensation for the risk of their 
specific projects. Only risk that cannot be so diversi-
fied will require a risk premium.
The second line of argument proposed special tax 
incentives for the petroleum industry in order to gen-
erate additional net social benefits in the form of cor-
rected externalities such as greater national security or 
increased economic activity in petroleum-producing 
regions. Critics, in turn, pointed out the contradictory 
aspects of national security arguments (e.g., greater 
production now uses up resources more quickly, 
thereby running the risk of increasing later depend-
ence on imports) and questioned any plans to stimu-
late further reserve additions when prorationing was 
already holding oil capacity out of production and 
reserves to production ratios for natural gas were so 
high. Some proponents of special tax treatment for 
mineral industries argued that they were justified 
on grounds of both efficiency and equity since other 
major Canadian industries already obtained gov-
ernment support in such forms as subsidies or price 
supports (for some agricultural goods) and high tariffs 
(for some manufacturers, as initially adopted in John 
A. Mcdonald’s National Policy of the 1870s).
The effectiveness of the depletion allowance was 
also questioned. For one thing, the tax deduction 
accrued as a result of past activities (i.e., those gener-
ating current revenue) and so were not obviously tied 
to current exploration and development investment. 
In fact, by reducing taxable income, current invest-
ment made it more difficult for companies to claim the 
depletion allowance. In a similar manner, the deple-
tion allowance was less valuable to companies that 
had not yet moved into a taxable position and more 
valuable to older, established, and larger producers, 
especially those with downstream income against 
which the depletion allowance might be claimed. 
These larger, vertically integrated companies typically 
had significant foreign ownership as well.
It is hardly surprising that the debate over the 
depletion allowance became highly politicized. 
Consumer and taxpayer groups, and political repre-
sentatives from constituencies where such interests 
predominated, generally expressed opposition, while 
mineral industry groups and most spokesmen in 
regions with good mineral prospects offered support. 
Our general view is that neither side convincingly 
proved its case in economic terms but that cases for 
special treatment of one group should be soundly 
founded before they are enshrined in the tax code.
In any event, in the early 1970s, the effective rate of 
corporate income tax on the crude petroleum industry 
was low. (That is, the ratio of taxes paid to reported 
profits was low.) In part, this reflected the depletion 
allowance provision, which, by itself, reduced the 
effective rate of taxation by a third. In part, the low 
rate was misleading, simply reflecting anticipated con-
ditions in a capital-intensive industry that had been 
growing rapidly so that much of the expected income 
tax to be paid was deferred to a later date when rev-
enues would exceed deductions. Another reason for 
low income tax payments (though not for a low effect-
ive rate) was the deductibility of rentals, royalties, and 
bonus bids as an expense. Bonus bids, in particular, 
tend to eat up anticipated pre-tax profits, if they are 
deductible. (Consider for example a company facing a 
33⅓% corporate income tax, and looking at a project 
with an expected before-tax profit of $1 million. The 
after tax profit, then, would be $666,667. What is the 
maximum amount the company would be willing to 
bid? The answer is not $666,667, but $1 million, with 
zero income tax anticipated.)
Volume 4 of the Carter Commission Report, in 
1966, had reviewed arguments about the depletion 
allowance and pretty much accepted Bucovetsky’s 
(1964) conclusion that the allowance was not war-
ranted. The commission therefore recommended that 
the depletion allowance be phased out. It also rec-
ommended that both development expenditures and 
bonus bids (and other costs of acquiring a petroleum 
property) should be subject to capital consumption 
allowances spread over time, rather than deducted 
immediately. The petroleum industry reacted vocifer-
ously to these proposals. In fact, many of the Carter 
Commission proposals were extremely controversial, 
so much so that no major changes were immediately 
forthcoming in the tax code. The provisions with 
respect to the oil industry finally introduced in the 
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1971 budget announced that the net depletion allow-
ance would be replaced in 1976 by an ‘earned deple-
tion allowance’ of one-third of intangible exploration 
and development expenditures (subject to a ceiling of 
33 1/3% of net income); acquisition costs of proper-
ties (e.g., bonus bids) would not earn depletion, nor 
would depreciable assets as compared to the intangible 
development expenses.
The result of these tax provisions was that, up to 
1972, Ottawa earned little revenue from the crude pet-
roleum industry, compared to Alberta or the oil com-
panies. It is difficult to determine the rent shares for 
the three parties (Ottawa, Alberta, and the oil com-
panies) and even more difficult to decide what ‘fair’ 
shares would be. We will return to these issues below.
B.	1973–1985
1. 1973–1980
The explosion in international oil prices beginning 
in 1973 detonated the latent federal concerns about 
Ottawa’s share of petroleum rents. At one level, the key 
policy issue was the precise meaning of the objective 
of fairness or ‘equity.’ It can readily be appreciated 
that not all Canadians would exhibit the same pref-
erences. The industry was inclined to argue that its 
efforts and willingness to bear risk should guarantee 
it a significant share of any unanticipated profits. 
Moreover, the logic of decision-making under uncer-
tainty implied that it was only fair that the industry be 
allowed to earn above-normal profits if they accrued 
as a result of a favourable state of the world which 
had been seen as possible but given a probability of 
occurrence smaller than one; after all, this was the 
meaning of risk-sharing. Governments, on the other 
hand, saw large sums which had to be unexpected 
windfalls. (They might also have argued that it would 
have been a foolish company indeed that did not 
factor higher expected taxes into any scenarios based 
on these high price levels.) However, Ottawa and 
Edmonton would not necessarily agree on how any 
extra revenues going to government should be div-
ided between them. Edmonton saw the resources as 
a part of the provincial wealth, a status recognized 
in the BNA Act (as amended, in 1930), and particu-
larly so for the provincial Crown land. Ottawa, on 
the other hand, recognized provincial primacy but 
saw the resources as a part of the natural heritage of 
the larger Canadian community. Ottawa also viewed 
its position as unfairly weak by virtue of the chance 
historical development of petroleum tax regulations. 
The federal share of revenues was very low as a result 
of the provincial tax treatment accorded the indus-
try, where the main provincial fiscal tools (royalties 
and bonuses) pre-empted the federal tax base. Large 
revenue increases for the petroleum-producing prov-
inces also had implications for Ottawa’s expenditures, 
as the equalization payments to ‘have-not’ provinces 
depended on average revenue receipts of all provinces. 
Hence, sharply rising payments to the western prov-
inces, as petroleum prices increased, left petroleum 
receipts by Ottawa largely unchanged, while gener-
ating expenditure obligations to Ottawa under the 
equalization program.
We have noted that the oil price controls, which 
began in 1973, can be seen, at least in part, as one of 
the federal responses to the rent-sharing problem. 
These applied across Canada and can be seen as a 
combined gross production tax (or royalty, which 
reduces the gross revenue to producers) and con-
sumption subsidy. (As was discussed, this policy also 
drove the government to introduce an export tax on 
oil to ensure that U.S. consumers paid the OPEC price; 
the government also decided to subsidize oil use for 
consumers who purchased imported oil.)
Ottawa also moved on the tax front. The 
November 1974 budget of the newly re-elected Liberal 
government under Pierre Trudeau re-introduced 
a number of proposals from the May 1974 budget 
that had not passed Parliament prior to dissolution. 
It brought in earned depletion at once (instead of 
delaying until 1976), and imposed a ceiling of 25 per 
cent of net income (instead of 33⅓%). Intangible 
development expenditures were now to be treated as 
depreciable expenditures, written off on a 30 per cent 
declining balance basis; land acquisition costs such 
as bonus bids were also to be depreciated in this way. 
These changes could be argued to reduce somewhat 
the special tax status accorded the petroleum industry, 
and to make the main remaining stimulus – the deple-
tion allowance – more directly related to the increased 
activity it was designed to encourage. The govern-
ment may have viewed these changes as desirable in 
themselves or may have felt that special status was less 
necessary as oil and gas prices rose.
A second avenue of change in the 1974 budget 
was far more controversial; it was aimed at curbing 
somewhat the ability of the provinces to appropri-
ate entirely the federal corporate income tax base. 
Royalty payments to provincial governments would 
no longer be deductible as an expense. The measure 
was designed largely to ensure a federal tax share 
in additional profits resulting from future price 
rises. Since it would mean an immediate rise in the 
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petroleum industry’s tax payments, even at low oil 
prices, Ottawa also moved to reduce the federal tax 
rate on petroleum profits by about 20 per cent. (The 
nominal corporate income tax rate of 50 per cent 
was already cut back by 10 percentage points as an 
“abatement” to the provinces for their own corporate 
income tax; a further 10 percentage points were now 
allowed on oil and gas production profits. The abate-
ment was 15 points for tar sands mining projects.) In 
June 1975, this abatement procedure was replaced by 
a new deduction in calculating taxable income; this 
was a “Resource Allowance” equal to 25 per cent of net 
oil and gas income, defined as revenue less operating 
costs and capital consumption allowances, but not the 
depletion allowance, the intangible exploration and 
development costs, or interest payments. (As noted 
above, the Government of Alberta had responded 
in December 1974 with a “royalty tax deduction” to 
reduce the industry’s royalty payments by an amount 
equivalent to the provincial corporate income tax 
receipts derived from royalty revenues.)
The combined effects of price controls, higher 
provincial royalties, and the non-deductibility of roy-
alties for the federal corporate income tax allowed 
governments to capture significant shares of the 
much-larger petroleum rents due to rising world oil 
prices. However, the new measures raised concerns 
that the real after-tax return to new exploration 
and development was no higher than it had been 
in the early 1970s. As was discussed above, Alberta 
responded to this with royalty regulations that set 
lower rates for “new” oil and gas and royalty credit 
schemes, including a variety of exploration incentive 
programs. Ottawa also responded with an investment 
tax credit of 5 per cent of tangible asset expenditures 
(June 1975 and March 1977) and a higher additional 
depletion allowance for very high-cost wells (two 
thirds of the cost of a well in excess of $5 million) 
(May 1977). (The latter was called “superdepletion” by 
some, and the “Dome” allowance by others, since it 
would apply only to the very high-cost wells drilled in 
frontier areas like the Arctic, where Dome Petroleum 
was particularly active. Dome Petroleum was widely 
viewed as one of the few Calgary oil companies to 
have particularly close ties to the federal Liberal party! 
The federal government had an obvious interest in 
spurring development on federal Crown lands.)
Then, beginning in late 1978, the second inter-
national oil price explosion began. This overlapped 
with federal elections, including the replacement of 
the Liberal government with a minority Progressive 
Conservative government under Joe Clark, a gov-
ernment defeated in the House of Commons in 
December 1979 in a vote on the budget. Alternative 
energy policies were a major election issue, with the 
Liberals formally defending the “made-in-Canada” 
pricing policy that they had been following since 1973. 
(See Chapter Nine, on oil prices. It should be noted 
that the Clark government had reached an agree-
ment with Alberta on oil and gas price increases but 
with Canadian oil prices still held below world levels. 
Amongst the numerous books covering this period 
are Simpson, 1984, Foster, 1982, and Doern and Toner, 
1985.) In April 1980, the newly elected Liberal major-
ity government implemented several measures from 
the defeated Clark government budget, including 
adoption of a 10 per cent declining-balance capital 
consumption allowance for bonus bids and other 
land-acquisition costs.
Then the government launched the National 
Energy Program as a part of the October 28, 1980, 
federal budget.
2. The NEP: 1980–85
The complex petroleum pricing provisions of the NEP, 
with its many modifications, were already discussed 
in Chapter Nine. The tax provisions related to three 
main objectives: generating revenues for Ottawa, fur-
thering Canadianization of the industry, and encour-
aging the discovery and development of new oil and 
gas reserves.
a. Incentives
The incentives included the introduction of a new 
incentive program based on subsidies, rather than 
reduced taxes as before, combined with reductions 
in the depletion allowance. The depletion allowance 
on development expenditures would be eliminated 
immediately (except for “integrated oil sands pro-
jects, enhanced recovery projects and heavy crude oil 
upgrades,” which still qualified for a 33⅓% allowance; 
NEP, p. 39). The depletion allowance on exploration 
would be retained for “Canada Lands” (i.e., areas 
of federal Crown land, mainly the frontiers in the 
north and offshore); earned depletion on exploration 
expenditures would be phased out over four years 
for other areas, including provincial Crown and free-
hold land.
The new subsidies came in the form of the 
Petroleum Incentives Program (PIP), with grants that 
varied depending on the type of activity (exploration 
or development), the location of activity (Canada 
Lands or not), and the ownership of the company 
(Canadian ownership ratio [percentage] or COR): the 
grants varied as a percentage of expenditure from 0 to 
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80 per cent and were higher on Canada lands, higher 
for exploration expenditures, and higher for compan-
ies with greater Canadian ownership. On “provincial 
Lands” (provincial Crown and freehold), no grants 
were available to companies with less than 50 per cent 
COR. Exploration expenditures received a PIP of 15 per 
cent (rising from 0 per cent in 1981 to 10 per cent the 
next tax year as depletion was phased out) for com-
panies with a COR between 50 and 75 per cent. If COR 
was over 75 per cent, the grant rose to 35 per cent of 
expenditures. For development (including tar sands 
projects, crude oil upgrades, and tertiary oil projects), 
the PIP rate was 10 per cent for COR between 50 and 
75 per cent, and 15 per cent if COR exceeded 75 per 
cent. (Remaining depletion allowances applied to 
expenditures net of the PIP grants.)
b. New Federal Taxes
The NEP introduced a Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Revenue Tax (PGRT), a Natural Gas and Gas Liquids 
Tax (discussed in Chapter Twelve), a Canadian 
Ownership Charge (COC), and a Petroleum 
Compensation Charge (PCC). The last two (previ-
ously discussed in Chapter Nine) involved additions 
to field prices in obtaining delivered prices of crude. 
In brief, the COC was developed to help cover the 
costs of acquisition for Petro-Canada as it expanded 
by purchasing assets from other companies; the PCC 
passed on to Canadian consumers the costs involved 
in buying higher-priced oil in the form of imports 
and tar sands output and were an essential part of the 
‘blended’ oil price system. It will be recalled that there 
had also been in place, since 1973, an oil export charge 
to capture the difference between Canadian border 
prices and the value of oil in the United States as set by 
world prices. The NEP announced that oil export tax 
revenue would be split equally between Ottawa and 
the provinces.
The PGRT was “set at a rate of 8% of net operat-
ing revenues related to the production of oil and gas, 
including income from oil and gas royalty interests. 
Deductions such as those for exploration and develop-
ment expenditures, capital cost allowances, and 
interest, will not be allowed” (NEP, p. 38). The PGRT 
would not be deductible in calculating income taxes. 
The PGRT was a slightly modified version of a gross ad 
valorem royalty, modified in that it allowed the deduc-
tion of operating costs (other than royalties).
Alberta’s reaction was immediate and negative. 
Two days after Ottawa introduced the NEP, Premier 
Lougheed announced cutbacks in conventional oil 
production (a total of 180,000 b/d, to be implemented 
in three stages from November 1980 to July 1981) and 
the cessation of any approval for new tar sands pro-
jects. These steps clearly demonstrated Alberta’s prior-
ity over natural resources but, in practice, led mainly 
to reduced revenues for the province and allowed 
Ottawa to complain about the increased cost of higher 
oil imports.
Negotiations led to the September 1, 1981, 
Memorandum of Agreement between the two govern-
ments. Alberta agreed to maintain its existing royalties 
and incentive programs and “not to adjust or modify 
its current royalty and freehold tax system so that it 
will generate more revenue for the Government of 
Alberta than continuance of the system now in effect 
would yield” (p. 13). Alberta also took over admin-
istration and payment of the PIP grants in Alberta 
(p. 16). Ottawa’s PGRT was maintained, with the PGRT 
rate increased to 16 per cent, but subject to a fur-
ther deduction, a “Resource Allowance” (p. 10); the 
Resource Allowance was to be 25 per cent of produc-
tion revenues, in effect reducing the PGRT rate to 12 
per cent (p. 17). In addition, Ottawa was to introduce 
a new tax, the Incremental Oil Revenue Tax (IORT), 
“at a rate of 50% on incremental old oil revenues after 
deduction for the related Crown royalties” (p. 10). Old 
oil was that “from a pool initially discovered prior to 
January 1, 1981” (p. 2) but excluding oil revenues in 
“old” pools that came from additional EOR schemes, 
other than water flooding, after the end of 1980. The 
incremental revenue to which the tax applied was the 
increase in old oil revenue (under the Memorandum) 
above that generated by the October 1980 NEP price 
schedules; as noted, incremental royalties, but not the 
PGRT, were deductible from this incremental revenue 
(pp. 17–18).
It will be recalled that international oil prices 
did not rise as quickly as projected in the NEP or 
Memorandum, and frequent modifications were made 
in the NEP provisions. Some changes occurred in 
the 1982 NEP Update. The IORT, which began at the 
start of 1981, was suspended after May 1982 (p. 74). In 
addition, the PGRT rate was reduced for one year to 
14.67 per cent (effectively 11 per cent after the resource 
allowance) (pp. 74–75). In addition, companies were 
allowed a $250,000 PGRT credit (p. 74); this was raised 
to $500,000 at the start of 1985. In the 1983 budget, the 
PGRT was waived on EOR projects that were granted 
provincial royalty relief, up to the time of recovery of 
all expenditures that qualified for earned depletion.
c. Impact of Regulations
Two issues should be discussed: the effect of the fed-
eral tax regulations in terms of economic efficiency, 
and their impact upon rent sharing (which might be 
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labelled an ‘equity’ matter). The two issues are, in fact, 
interdependent, just as the tax provisions of the NEP 
are interconnected with the pricing regulations.
The complexity of the federal tax laws can, at 
one level, be viewed in the same way as the increas-
ingly complex pricing provisions of the NEP. Policies 
designed to capture some of the gains from higher 
international oil prices – controlled domestic prices 
and the PGRT – offered disincentive effects to incre-
mental investment that called forth new incentive 
measures – higher prices on “new” oil, the PIP grants. 
The PGRT was subject to particular criticism. Watkins 
and Scarfe (1985) remark that its impact on well aban-
donment was probably small, since operating costs 
(but not royalties) were deductible, but that it had a 
disincentive effect on exploration and development 
since these costs were not. PIP grants, like depletion 
allowances, are a rather blunt instrument for stimulat-
ing investment, since they are available to all eligible 
projects, even if the project is one that would have 
been undertaken in the absence of the incentive pro-
gram. (We would note that a part of any ‘excessive’ 
subsidy maybe transferred to landowners through the 
bonus bidding process.) These programs may exist to 
offset inefficiency in the rent-collection system, but 
economists frequently argue that it would be prefer-
able – both more efficient and cheaper in adminis-
tration costs – to have a tax in the first place that is 
efficient. The preferred alternative is a profit-based tax, 
rather than a gross royalty or close-to-gross royalty 
like the PGRT.
It is also evident that the PIP grants, ‘superdeple-
tion,’ and revised earned depletion provisions were 
discriminatory since they offered higher return to 
investment on Canada Lands and by companies with 
higher Canadian ownership. How the Canadianization 
provisions will be viewed is of course a function of 
how sympathetic one is to the underlying objective. 
Canadian firms did expand during this time period 
relative to foreign-owned ones, though part of this 
came through the acquisition activities of Petro-
Canada. The extra incentive to invest on Canada 
Lands (or in ventures like tertiary recovery projects, 
which received special tax or price treatment) would 
tend to generate excessively high costs for petroleum 
to the extent that funds flowed to these projects rather 
than lower-cost more-conventional projects, which 
did not have the same advantages.
The actual rent-distribution impacts of the overt 
control period are more difficult to assess. In part, this 
is because there are no firm criteria for evaluating the 
fairness of rent divisions: Ottawa and Alberta, citizens 
of Calgary and those of Halifax, shareholders in oil 
companies, and self-employed truckers may well have 
quite different ideas of what is ‘fair.’ It certainly seems 
true that the Government of Alberta relied strongly 
on its constitutional ownership of the resource base 
as support for a large provincial share, while Ottawa 
stressed the communal nature of the Canadian feder-
ation and the extreme and exceptional nature of the 
OPEC oil price rises. The companies were inclined 
to see both governments as ganging up on them – 
sometimes separately (as in the new Alberta royalty 
schedules in 1973 and 1974 and Ottawa’s NEP), and 
sometimes in tandem (as in the 1981 Memorandum of 
Agreement). While accepting that desires about rent 
division are likely to differ among various parties, it 
seems germane to ask whether there might not have 
been some reasonable compromise that would have 
avoided the prolonged and bitter fifteen-year battles 
of the 1970s and early 1980s and the very complex and 
problematic regulatory environment that ensued.
An early interesting suggestion came from Gainer 
and Powrie (1975), who noted that it might be useful 
to separate Alberta’s policies into those of the mineral 
rights owner and those of the provincial government. 
If mineral rights were privately owned, the royalty 
revenue received by the landowner would be taxable 
as income (of the mineral rights owner, of course, not 
the oil company). Hence Ottawa, through its income 
tax provisions, would receive a share of the increased 
value of oil. This result was circumvented in the case 
of provincial petroleum land by the constitutional 
prohibition of one level of government taxing the 
other. An agreement between Edmonton and Ottawa 
might have been reached in the mid-1970s, after the 
OPEC oil price rises began, with the problem resolved 
as follows: investment incentives are no longer needed 
at these prices (depletion goes); provincial royalties 
should not be deductible in calculating income taxes; 
and any new taxes on the industry should be shared in 
the same proportion as these arrangements implied. 
For example, if the corporate income tax rate were 50 
per cent, with four-fifths going to Ottawa, and if the 
Alberta royalty took 40 per cent of any increase in 
price, then of every $1 rise in price, 50 per cent would 
go to Alberta, 40 per cent to Ottawa and 10 per cent 
to the industry. (Edmonton’s share would be higher 
and the industry’s lower to the extent that firms’ bonus 
bids on new projects increased; Ottawa’s share would 
also be lower since bonus bids were deductible for 
income tax purposes.) However, it should be empha-
sized that, while this proposal might meet some 
views of fairness, it has the effect – already noted 
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above – of increasing the significance of the royalty. 
(In the example, the royalty is effectively raised by the 
income tax rate of 50 per cent.) But gross royalties 
are not an efficient means of collecting economic rent 
because of their inhibitory effects on investment and 
production. In addition, Boadway et al. (1983) note 
that the Gainer/Powrie approach of treating provincial 
resources as if privately held is only one way of view-
ing the fairness of regional taxation shares; they also 
argue that the Gainer/Powrie suggestion fails to give 
adequate weight to the legal basis for the allocation of 
resource property rights and equalization payments 
in Canada.
The impact of the federal tax initiatives on the 
sharing of economic rent is difficult to assess precisely. 
The issue at hand is not the distribution of the current 
year’s petroleum revenue amongst industry, Ottawa, 
and the provincial governments. Economic rent refers 
to the present value of the future stream of revenues 
in excess of costs. Hence it is necessary to allocate 
some portion of past expenses to future output so that 
quasi-rents are not included in the measure of profits. 
Even more difficult is the task of estimating the future 
profits that are to be shared; those depend on uncer-
tain future prices. And the amount of economic rent, 
and its shares, will also change as the level of industry 
activity changes.
Three approaches were used to estimate the 
impacts of the various royalty, tax, and pricing provi-
sions of the overt control period. The first looked at 
total industry revenue (or revenue less certain costs) 
and asked how this revenue was divided amongst 
the two levels of government and industry. The 
second approach defined specific petroleum invest-
ment projects and assessed how actual or proposed 
fiscal regimes affected project profitability. The third 
approach was conceptually most appealing, but by far 
the most complicated; it involved the construction 
of a detailed model of the entire petroleum industry, 
and then simulating the overall effects of alternative 
fiscal regimes.
The first approach was used in many of the gov-
ernment documents issued during the overt control 
period. For example, in the 1980 NEP, the government 
focussed on the sharing of “oil and gas production 
income” (p. 13), noting that Ottawa’s share had been 
very low, though rising from 5.3 per cent in 1972 to 8.8 
per cent by 1977. (The industry share fell from 69.2% 
to 40.7% while the provincial governments’ increased 
from 25.5% to 50.5%.) Under the NEP, it was estimated 
that the federal share of revenues would rise to 24 
per cent for the years 1980–83, with the industry at 
33 per cent and the provinces at 43 per cent. (Since 
industry would have to pay costs out of its revenues, 
so rent is less than ‘production income,’ this clearly 
understates the government shares of rent and over-
states the industry’s.) Under the Memorandum of 
Agreement of September 1981, revenue shares were 
estimated for the 1981–86 period at 25.5 per cent to 
Ottawa, 44.3 per cent to Alberta and 30.2 per cent to 
the industry (p. 22). Modifications of the forecasts 
in light of lower oil prices in the NEP Update 1982 
gave shares for the 1981–86 period of 19.3 per cent 
for Ottawa, 28.4 per cent for the provinces, and 52.3 
per cent for the industry (p. 77, with operating costs 
included, as in the Memorandum, to give consistency 
with the previous shares). The sharply reduced gov-
ernment share reflects both the lower oil prices (to 
which provincial royalties and the PGRT are very 
sensitive) and also the increased incentives to the 
industry, which began after 1981. It is important to 
realize that these shares underestimate the govern-
ment rent shares for two reasons: as noted above, there 
is no allowance for costs, and the impact of the policy 
of holding prices below world levels are not included 
in the analysis. The Update estimated that industry 
revenues would be some 31 per cent higher over the 
1981–86 period if international pricing set petroleum 
values. This benefit of holding oil prices down accrued 
to all Canadian consumers, including those in the 
petroleum-producing provinces. (As indicated above, 
the price-control policy was equivalent to a royalty on 
oil production and a subsidy to oil consumption.)
A second approach to gaining a handle on the 
rent-sharing complexities of the various federal and 
provincial energy policies was to analyze specific 
petroleum investment projects. These might be either 
hypothetical new investment projects or some sort 
of hybrid average project. One way to do this was to 
examine ‘netbacks’ on oil projects, where the netback 
was usually defined as the price after taxes and royal-
ties. The results, under the NEP, hinged on the taxa-
tion status of the producer, as well as on the extent of 
Canadian ownership (if PIP grants were considered). 
The June 1982 NEP Update, for instance, estimated 
1982 netbacks for a ‘large producer’ (‘small producer’) 
at $6.57/b ($10.75/b) on oil classified as ‘old’ under 
Alberta royalties, $10.57/b ($14.78/b) for ‘new’ oil (post 
April 1, 1974 under Alberta regulations), and $17.04/b 
($25.89/b) for NORP oil (p. 80). Wilkinson (1984, 
p. 61) shows actual and projected netbacks from 1975 
to 1986, drawn from Scarfe and Rilkoff ’s work (1984). 
He reports netbacks on old oil for a large producer 
starting at $5.23/b in 1975, hitting $6.49 in 1980, then 
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falling to $4.20 in 1981, and recovering to $5.88 in 1982. 
The values on new oil for a large producer show more 
improvement ($6.52/b in 1975; $8.53/b in 1980; $7.20 
in 1981; and $9.35 in 1982). These are all in nominal 
dollars, so make no allowance for inflation from 1975 
to 1982. It is clear that the rise in netbacks is much 
smaller than the increases in the world oil price.
But such netbacks are just a preliminary step on 
the way to calculating project rent shares: project costs 
must be incorporated, and future prices and taxes 
included. (It should be noted that such calculations, 
if based on the price forecasts of the various NEP 
documents, would turn out to considerably overstate 
revenues and any taxes [like the IORT] closely tied to 
revenue gains; this is because the NEP was wildly opti-
mistic in its oil price forecasts.) Numerous such analy-
ses were undertaken by governments, industry, and 
private researchers. Examples include DataMetrics 
(1984), Copithorne et al. (1985), MacFadyen et al. 
(1985) and Kemp (1987; see especially the discussion 
by Watkins, 1987b).
By way of illustration, the studies by Copithorne, 
MacFadyen, and Bell simulate the distribution of 
economic rent for two different size oil pools under 
a number of different prices and fiscal regimes. One 
pool was labelled ‘prolific.’ It had an assumed total 
exploration cost of $53 million, and contained fifty 
identical wells with drilling costs of $1.1 million each 
and operating costs of $53,500/well/year; each well 
had an initial output rate of 175 b/d (27.8 m3/day) and 
an annual exponential decline rate of 10 per cent. 
(All dollar values are in 1982 Canadian dollars.) The 
‘modest’ pool also held 50 wells declining at 10%/
year, but with a much lower initial output rate of 60 
b/d/well and lower costs ($26 million in exploration, 
development costs of $937,000/well, and operat-
ing costs of $44,500/well/year). Ten different fiscal 
regimes were considered, as were three different prices 
($135, $270, and $405/m3). The project was assumed, 
for corporate income tax purposes, to be entirely 
equity financed, and investors were assumed to be in 
a taxable position for the corporate income tax. Total 
economic rent at a 15 per cent discount rate, and the 
division of the rent amongst companies, Ottawa, and 
Alberta were calculated for each of the sixty cases (two 
pools times three prices times ten fiscal regimes). At 
the lowest price of $135/m3 (about $21.50/b), which is 
most representative of crude oil prices immediately 
after 1985, the prolific pool had a total profit (eco-
nomic rent) of $167 million; profit for the modest pool 
was $16 million.
Table 11.3 summarizes rent shares at this lowest 
price for the two pool types under six different 
fiscal regimes:
(i) The Canadian corporate income tax with a 
47% rate (using tax provisions as of 1985); 
(ii) Fiscal regime (i) plus the 1973 Alberta ‘basic’ 
royalty; 
(iii) Fiscal regime (ii) plus the Alberta ‘supple-
mental’ royalty for ‘new’ oil (using the 1981 
values for the royalty factor and ‘Par Price’); 
(iv) Fiscal regime (ii) plus the Alberta ‘supple-
mental’ royalty for ‘old’ oil; 
(v) Fiscal regime (iv) plus non-deductibility 
of royalties for the federal portion of the 
corporate income tax (including the ‘Resource 
Allowance’ as introduced in 1975); and 
(vi) Fiscal regime (v) plus the PGRT and PIP grants 
as in the 1981 Memorandum of Agreement.
In the table, the italicized values are the cases in which 
the after-tax expected profit is negative, so that one 
would anticipate that the project would not be under-
taken and no rents would actually accrue to govern-
ments. (Data from MacFadyen et al., 1985, p. 131.)
Comparing fiscal regime (i) to regimes (ii), (iii) 
and (iv), it is easy to see the effect of provincial royal-
ties in reducing the federal tax base. Similarly, com-
paring regime (iv) to regime (v) and (vi), the recovery 
in Ottawa’s share with non-deductibility of royalties 
and the PGRT is evident. The basic corporate income 
tax and the Alberta 1973 ‘Basic’ royalty left a high rent 
share with the private investor (over one-third of the 
rent in the case of the prolific pool); hence the move 
by governments to increase rent shares as the oil price 
rose in the early 1970s. However, the table also makes 
clear the dangers of a high reliance on royalties or 
near royalties like the PGRT. Otherwise, profitable 
pools may be made uneconomic, in which case com-
panies will be unwilling to invest, and no payments 
will accrue to governments, as was the case under all 
royalty regimes for the ‘modest’ pool.
Kemp’s (1987) analysis was similar. It involved two 
steps. The first looked at ‘rental’ shares under three 
different fiscal regimes (pre-NEP [1979], NEP [1984], 
and post-NEP [1986]) for the half-cycle economics 
(excluding exploration costs) for three Alberta oil 
pools of different size. Three different investment cost 
levels are considered, as are four different oil price 
forecasts: (i) $27/b, (ii) $27/b rising at 2% per year, 
(iii) $27/b falling at 3% per year, and (iv) $17/b for 
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Table 11.3: Rental Shares for Two Hypothetical Alberta Oil Pools Under Six Different Fiscal Regimes (Copithorne, 
MacFadyen and Bell) (%) 
A.	Prolific	Pool	 Companies	 Ottawa	 Alberta
(i)  Corporate Income Tax (CIT)  52.1 36.6 11.3
(ii)  CIT and Basic Royalty (BR) 33.0 23.7 43.3
(iii)  CIT, BR and Supplemental Royalty (SR) (‘new’ oil) 23.6 17.4 59.0
(iv)  CIT, BR , SR (‘old’ oil)  11.8 9.6 78.5
(v)  CIT, BR, SR (‘old’) royalties non-deductible for federal CIT (ND)  (1.7) 22.9 78.8
(vi)  CIT, BR, SR, ND and PGRT and PIP grants (4.0) 37.4 66.6
 
B. Modest Pool Companies Ottawa Alberta
(i)  Corporate Income Tax (CIT)  45.1 43.2 11.7
(ii)  CIT and Basic Royalty (BR) (0.1) 11.6 89.0
(iii)  CIT, BR and Supplemental Royalty (SR) (‘new’ oil) (23.3) (3.1) 126.4
(iv)  CIT, BR , SR (‘old’ oil)  (51.5) (22.7) 174.2
(v)  CIT, BR, SR (‘old’) royalties non-deductible for federal CIT (ND)  (78.9) 0.3 175.8
(vi)  CIT, BR, SR, ND and PGRT and PIP grants (64.0) 60.2 103.7
Notes: Assumes an oil price of $135/m3.
 A value in parenthesis indicates a loss (negative rent share).
1986 and $20/b after (all prices are in real dollars). On 
the basis of this information, Kemp could calculate 
revenue and costs, including tax payments for many 
different cases. (There are 108 cases: a three [fiscal 
regimes] times three [pool types] times three [cost 
conditions] times four [oil prices] design.) The lowest 
volume oil pool was generally uneconomic, even at 
the $27/b price, so only the other two pool sizes are 
shown. Table 11.4 reports the shares of ‘profits’ (or 
Net Present Value or ‘economic rent’) accruing to the 
companies, Ottawa, Alberta, or consumers at a 10 
per cent real discount rate, assuming a $27/b price, 
and for various combinations of type of pool, level of 
development cost, and fiscal regime. (The numbers 
are approximations, since they have been read off 
graphs in Kemp’s book. Recall that these are based on 
half-cycle costs, so make no allowance for exploratory 
costs. Some of the rent was captured by consumers 
under the pre-NEP fiscal regime since oil prices were 
held below world levels, and the world price is taken 
as the determinant of oil values. There is not a similar 
consumer share under NEP regulations, even though 
the average price of oil in Canada was held under the 
world price; this is because the pools were assumed 
to qualify for ‘NORP’ (the New Oil Reference Price), 
which was, essentially, the world price. ‘Low,’ under 
NEP, refers to low Canadian content and, hence, low 
PIP payments; ‘High’ means high Canadian content 
and higher PIP grants.)
Unlike with the MacFadyen, Copithorne, and Bell 
pools, none of the fiscal regimes make the higher-cost 
pool uneconomic. (But remember that the half-cycle 
analysis does not include exploration costs. That is, 
if a pool were discovered of the sizes considered by 
Kemp, his analysis suggests that the company would 
be willing to develop the pool under all four fiscal 
regimes.) The output sensitivity of the royalty regimes 
and the profit sensitivity of the corporate income 
tax are shown by the higher company shares for the 
smaller pool than the larger. However, the company’s 
rent share tends to become smaller as pool develop-
ment costs rise. (Kemp and Watkins call this a ‘regres-
sive’ feature of the fiscal regimes.) Higher Canadian 
ownership raises the company share marginally in the 
NEP cases; the effect is small because in Alberta the 
PIP grants associated with development were small. 
The table makes clear the dramatic impact of the NEP 
in increasing Ottawa’s share of the economic rent, at 
the expense of the company. Finally, it is noteworthy 
that the company’s share of rent is higher under the 
post-NEP than the pre-NEP (1979) regulations. Since 
Ottawa’s share is also slightly higher, one might think 
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that all of the increase in private share came at the 
expense of Alberta. However, a significant part of the 
higher corporate share can be seen to have come from 
the removal of price controls; these reduced benefits 
to consumers should be seen as a reduced rental share 
for Ottawa. Finally, in comparison to the NEP fiscal 
regime, the post-NEP period shows that higher com-
pany profits came mainly out of Ottawa’s share.
Overall, it looks as if, during the period from 1975 
through deregulation, Alberta maintained a relatively 
constant share of the economic rent, while Ottawa 
and the companies traded off shares. This accords 
with the feeling that many companies seem to have 
had in the NEP days that Alberta was more con-
cerned with protecting its petroleum revenues than 
it was in fighting Ottawa on behalf of the petroleum 
companies. (Note that the Kemp analysis, unlike that 
of MacFadyen, Copithorne, and Bell, begins after 
Ottawa had increased its petroleum revenues by the 
non-deductibility of royalties for corporate income 
tax purposes.)
The second step in Kemp’s analysis involves the 
addition of the exploration decision. This has three 
features: first, the cost of the exploratory effort (geo-
logical and geophysical activity and exploratory 
drilling) must be considered; second, there is the 
probability that any given exploratory venture will 
come up dry; and third, if a discovery is made it could 
be small or large. With respect to the third of these 
characteristics, Kemp assumes conditional probabil-
ities of discovery for thirteen different possible oil 
pools, a mix of three possible pool sizes and five pos-
sible cost conditions. (The sum of these probabilities is 
one; the smallest pool size is regarded as uneconomic 
[‘dry’] in the two highest cost cases, reducing the fif-
teen possible cases to thirteen.) With respect to the 
first of the exploratory factors, Kemp looks at two 
cases, a $1 million or a $5 million exploratory pro-
gram. And for the second, he considers three different 
drilling success rates (one in 5, one in 10 and one in 
20). Finally, he does calculations for four different 
annual discount rates (0, 5, 10, and 15%), and considers 
both low and high Canadian ownership under the 
NEP. Kemp shows results for many possible cases. 
(With two oil prices used [$27/b and a ‘collapsed’ price 
scenario of $17/b rising to $20/b], four fiscal regimes 
[as in Table 11.4], two levels of exploration cost, three 
success rates, and four discount rates, there are 192 
possible cases.)
Table 11.5, above, shows the shares of economic 
rent going to governments (Alberta and Ottawa com-
bined) at a 10 per cent discount rate for a $5 million 
Table 11.4: Kemp’s Rental Shares under Different Cost Conditions and Fiscal Regimes (%)
 A. LARGE POOL B. SMALL POOL
Fiscal Regime and Low  Medium  High Very High Very Very Low  Medium High   Very High Very Very 
Rent Recipient Cost Cost Cost Cost High Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost High Cost
Pre-NEP: Company 30         29        28        26        23        38        37        36        31        25
 Alberta 39     40    41    43    47    32    33    34    38    44
 Ottawa 23 23 22 22 21 23 22 22 21 21
 Consumers    8             8           9 9           9           7           8          8           10           10
NEP (Low): Company        15        14        13        10        8        20        20        21        15        6
 Alberta  42    42    44    45    50    36    36    37    41    50
 Ottawa 43 44 43 45 42 44 44 42 44 44
NEP (High): Company 17 17 16 13        9        20 19 18 16 10
 Alberta 41    41    42    43    45    35    35    36    38    40
 Ottawa 42 42 42 44 46 45 46  46 46 50
Post-NEP: Company 39 39 39 36 31 49 48 48 45 40
 Alberta 36    36    36    39    42 25 26 26 30 37
 Ottawa 25 25 25 25 27 26 26 26 25 23
Notes: ‘Low’ and ‘High’ refer to COR (Canadian Ownership Ratio).
 Price of oil is $27/b.
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exploration program. Results are shown for both 
a ‘high’ ($27/b) and ‘low’ ($17/b for a year rising to 
$20/b) oil price. It is important to know that no allow-
ance is made for bonus bids, so the Alberta share of 
rent would be higher than implied by these numbers. 
In Table 11.5, a ‘0’ means that this exploration project 
would not be undertaken even if no payments were 
made to governments; that is, the before-tax expected 
profit is negative. Numbers in italics indicate that 
governments would take more than 100 per cent of 
the available rent, so that companies would not be 
expected to invest under this fiscal regime (and gov-
ernments would get no revenue).
Once again, the very high shares of rent going 
to the government under the NEP are apparent. The 
importance of the Canadian content provisions of 
the PIP grants are also clear, especially as the success 
rate falls (so exploratory drilling expenses are more 
significant). It is also demonstrated, once again, that 
high fiscal burdens can easily discourage investment. 
Comparison of Table 11.4 with Table 11.5 also shows 
that what may appear to be a fair and reasonable fiscal 
take for governments based on the operating and 
development costs of a pool (as in Table 11.4) may well 
be excessive when the necessity of exploration is taken 
into account (as in Table 11.5).
The third approach to assessing the impact of the 
varied Canadian oil industry fiscal regimes from 1973 
to 1986 was to build a model of the entire petroleum 
industry and simulate the impact of actual and pro-
posed tax, pricing, and royalty changes. Such work 
was undertaken by John Helliwell of the University 
of British Columbia and a number of academic col-
leagues. Helliwell et al. (1989) provides an example 
of this approach. (For other examples, see Helliwell 
and McRae, 1981, 1982; Helliwell et al., 1983; 1986.) 
These researchers have built a large-scale model they 
call MACE (for Macro and Energy), which explicitly 
embeds energy supply and demand behaviour 
within a macroeconomic model of the Canadian 
economy. While a Canadian model, rather than an 
explicitly Alberta model, it does provide results for 
the Canadian petroleum industry that are broadly 
representative of what one might expect in Alberta (as 
the largest petroleum-producing province in Canada). 
We will summarize some of the key rent-sharing find-
ings of Helliwell et al. (1989). Here the MACE model 
was used to compare five regulatory regimes for the 
Canadian petroleum industry. The first is labelled 
‘Actual’ and shows the observed historical experience 
(with an appended forecast for 1987 to 1990). We shall 
consider three of the four hypothetical regulatory 
regimes with which they deal:
(i) A ‘Price Deregulation’ case in which historical 
fiscal and export policies were the same as the 
actual, but Canadian oil prices were allowed to 
follow world levels while natural gas prices in 
Toronto were set at 85 per cent of the cost of an 
equivalent amount of delivered energy in the 
form of crude oil;
(ii) A ‘Pre-Reform’ case utilizes the pricing and 
fiscal regimes of 1970, prior to the provincial 
royalty revisions of the early 1970s and such 
federal programs as price controls, earned 
depletion (as opposed to 33.33% net depletion), 
and non-deductibility of royalties for the 
federal share of the corporate income tax;
(iii) A ‘Current’ case, with provisions as of 1987, 
after deregulation.
Table 11.5: Kemp’s Government Rent Shares for a $5 million Exploration Program under Four Different Fiscal 
Regimes at High and Low Prices (10% discount rate) (%)
 A. High Oil Price ($27/b) B. Low Oil Price ($17/b rising to $20/b)
Fiscal Regime Success Rate Success Rate Success Rate Success Rate Success Rate Success Rate 
 1:5 1:10 1:20 1:5 1:10 1:20
Pre-NEP 67.7 74.7 122.8 71.5 150.0 0
NEP-Low Canadian Ownership 90.9 105.0 203.0 100.8 149.1 0
NEP-High Canadian Ownership 85.1 91.4 136.0 89.5 111.1 0
Post-NEP 67.5 74.3 121.5 75.1 100.8 0
Note: A value in italics means that governments capture more than 100% of the hypothetical economic rent. Therefore, the private investor would be unwilling to under-
take the project and the government would receive no revenue.
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 (In all cases we consider Canadian export 
provisions for oil and natural gas are assumed 
to hold as they did historically.)
From their model, Helliwell et al. can estimate the 
amount of economic rent generated by the Canadian 
petroleum industry and the divisions of that rent 
amongst interested parties. It must be noted that their 
measure of economic rent in this large-scale model is 
different from the measure of real (or potential) total 
discounted profits on oil projects as utilized by Kemp 
and MacFadyen, Copithorne, and Bell. Instead, they 
estimate ‘flow rents’ on an annual basis from 1974 
through 1990. These flow rents are, in effect, the con-
sumers’ surplus generated by the difference between 
regulated and unregulated petroleum prices, producer 
profits, and the revenues received by governments 
from the petroleum industry. As noted, the MACE 
model includes the entire Canadian economy, so it 
considers the general level of taxes, including excise 
(sales) taxes and the corporate income taxes generally 
paid by industries in Canada; their measures of rent 
include adjustments to allow for both of these factors. 
For example, unusually high excise taxes on oil would 
raise prices, generating losses of flow economic rent 
(consumers’ surplus) for consumers. Also, oppor-
tunity costs on capital are allowed as a cost for both 
private producers and for governments on tax revenue 
collected. For details, see Helliwell et al. (1989, p. 193). 
Table 11.6 provides estimates of shares in annual flow 
rents for three years (1974, 1981, and 1986) in the four 
cases noted above. (Numbers are approximate, as 
estimated from graphs in Chapter 10 of Helliwell et al., 
1989. Dollar amounts in the model are in real 1971 dol-
lars. The total flow rents in the Actual case were about 
$4.0 billion in 1974, $10.1 billion in 1981, and $0.7 
billion in 1986. The amount of rent each year differs 
in the other cases because changes in the regulatory 
climate change the levels of petroleum consumption, 
production, and investment. The italicized values are 
in cases where the total flow rent from the petroleum 
industry is negative; in such cases, a negative share 
indicates a positive rent flow.)
The 1986 numbers are difficult to interpret because 
the total flow rents were small (leading to large per-
centages for the components) and negative under 
two of the regulatory environments (reflecting the 
lower prices in 1986 than 1981 and even, in real 1971 
dollars, lower than in 1974). The numbers show that 
the pre-reform (1970 regulations) rents to the federal 
government were low (the federal share is defined as 
that for Ottawa plus consumer rents). In both 1974 and 
1981, the rent share actually received by the federal 
government was greatly increased from what it would 
have been under the 1970 regulations. This increase 
was due in large part to the price-control regulations; 
for example, in 1981, the federal government share was 
52.5 per cent of the flow rents, whereas it would have 
been only 14 per cent without the price control regu-
lations. It can also be seen that the current regulations 
imply a higher share for governments than the 1970 
regulations but leave appreciably more for the indus-
try than did the regulations in the overt control period 
(that is, the Actual case).
3. 1985–2010
The March 1985 Western Accord between Ottawa and 
the petroleum-producing provinces ushered in the 
current ‘deregulated’ environment. The PGRT was to 
be phased out over three years, and the IORT, PCC, 
Table 11.6: Flow Rent Shares under Four Regulatory 
Regimes, 1974, 1981, and 1986 (Helliwell et al.) (%)
1974 Producers Provinces Ottawa Consumers
Actual 5.0 60.0 15.0 20.0
Price Deregulation 25.0 62.5 25.0 (12.5)
Pre-Reform 57.1 41.1 14.3 (12.5)
Current 42.9 50.0 19.6 (12.5)
 
1981 Producers Provinces Ottawa Consumers
Actual 12.9 34.7 12.9 39.6
Price Deregulation 35.5 50.5 14.0 0.0
Pre-Reform 135.2 46.3 (83.3) 1.9
Current 58.0 48.2 (8.6) 2.5
 
1986 Producers Provinces Ottawa Consumers
Actual 5.0 60.0 15.0 20.0
Actual (142.9) 342.9 71.4 (171.4)
Price Deregulation (1800.0) 2600.0 0.0 (700.0)
Pre-Reform 97.8 (71.1) 57.8 15.6
Current 142.1 (152.6) 73.7 36.8
Note: Numbers in parentheses are negative shares, that is, a net loss.
The	two	italicized	cases	have	a	negative	total	flow	rent,	with	the	parenthesized	
values showing a positive rent amount.
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COC, and NGGLT were abolished, as was the PIP 
grants system. Removal of PGRT was accelerated, with 
the tax abolished as of October 1, 1986.
With these changes, the federal government once 
again was in the position of obtaining revenue from 
the crude petroleum industry largely through the 
mechanism of the corporate income tax. It is also 
important to recall that under deregulation Ottawa no 
longer ‘collects’ a share of petroleum industry (poten-
tial) revenues by holding domestic oil prices below the 
international level. (We do not consider other features 
of the general tax system as federal sales taxes which 
apply to input purchases by all industries. We are 
also looking at the oil industry in Alberta, so exclude 
consideration of federal government regulations on 
companies exploring federal Crown land.) Unlike in 
the pre-1973 period, the rent-capturing effectiveness 
of the corporate income tax was increased since the 
depletion allowance had been phased out, and royalty 
payments to provincial governments were no longer 
deductible as a cost in calculating the income taxes 
owing to Ottawa. (Remember that royalties were still 
deductible, in effect, for the Alberta government por-
tion of the corporate income tax.) However, the policy 
since 2000 of significantly reducing corporate tax 
rates has reduced its effectiveness as a tool for captur-
ing economic rent.
Since 1986, with one major exception, the main 
changes affecting the petroleum industry have been 
the same changes in corporate tax regulations that 
affect all industries, as well as occasional modifica-
tions in the capital consumption allowance deduction 
schedules for equipment classes of special importance 
to the petroleum industry. The 2002 federal budget 
introduced a significant change, essentially reverting 
to the pre-1974 situation, as the Resource Allowance 
was removed, and the deductibility of royalties was 
re-instated; these changes have been phased in, 
becoming entirely effective in 2007.
In 2013, the federal corporate income tax rate was 
15 per cent, and it had been falling for a number of 
years; the Alberta provincial corporate income tax 
rate was 10 per cent. (Small businesses pay even lower 
rates.) The reductions in the corporate tax rate were 
one of the reasons that the Alberta government share 
of economic rent fell after 2000; this contributed to 
the royalty modifications discussed above. Mintz 
and Chen (2010) find that the ‘effective marginal tax 
rate’ for the conventional petroleum industry is lower 
than the average rate for corporations, largely due to 
favourable capital depreciation provisions. (They also 
argue find that the combined income tax and royalty 
burden on a marginal investment is higher for petrol-
eum than the industrial average.)
5. Conclusion
Economic rent lies at the heart of the most controver-
sial aspects of Canadian petroleum policies.
Since petroleum is a depletable natural resource, 
or, more precisely, since petroleum is a resource of 
limited extent and with considerable heterogeneity 
amongst deposits, it is to be expected that conven-
tional crude oil and natural gas will earn revenues 
in excess of the expenditures and normal return on 
capital required to produce them. Since the price 
of oil tends to the level required to cover the cost of 
the last unit of production needed to meet market 
demand at that price (except in price-influencing 
OPEC nations), all the units of production with a 
cost lower than this marginal unit will earn a profit 
(or ‘economic rent’). But this definition just begins 
to uncover the complexities attendant to the con-
cept of economic rent. In a world of uncertainty, for 
example, it is important to distinguish between the 
anticipated (ex ante) economic rent, which stimulates 
behaviour, and the actually occurring (ex post) eco-
nomic rent, which depends on how natural, engin-
eering, economic, and political uncertainties actually 
unfold. Further, economic rent may be defined as the 
excess of revenues above costs (including as a cost 
the risk-adjusted ‘normal profit’ return required on 
investment), but it also serves an allocative role. Thus, 
the anticipation of such rents is a primary stimulus 
to investment. (The suggestion, implicit in the world 
of many simple economic models, that $1 of extra 
profits is just as motivating as $10 million, does not 
ring true.) And anticipated profits across time play a 
key role in the scheduling of reserve depletion. More 
formally, another component of economic rent is the 
user cost (sometimes called ‘replacement cost’) that 
typically accrues to even the highest cost unit because 
petroleum is a non-renewable resource. This user cost 
is an excess of revenue above costs, but it performs an 
important allocative role in the intertemporal deple-
tion of oil reserves. For these reasons, there is some 
uncertainty about how much of the economic rent 
should be left in the hands of the private petroleum 
companies in order to ensure economically efficient 
resource production.
To these ambiguities must be added those 
attached to the key ‘equity’ question: “Which parties 
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have claims on the economic rents and in what pro-
portions?” Competing claims might reasonably be 
entered by petroleum producers, holders of the min-
eral rights on petroleum-bearing lands, petroleum 
consumers, and governments (on behalf of citizens 
and taxpayers generally). In Canada, most mineral 
rights are Crown rights, so the mineral rights owner 
and government roles are often exercised by the same 
party. In the Canadian federal system of government, 
claims on the economic rent might be made by one or 
both levels of government (i.e., Ottawa or Alberta).
Prior to 1973, when the economic rents from the 
petroleum produced in Alberta were relatively small 
by later standards, the federal government was will-
ing to exercise a modest claim on industry profits, 
through a corporate income tax that offered incentives 
to invest in the oil industry. Alberta gained significant 
revenue from the industry largely through its role as 
the main holder of mineral rights (using bonus bids, 
rentals, and royalties).
However, the surge in international oil prices in 
the early 1970s increased petroleum rents dramatic-
ally and ushered in more than a decade of turmoil 
in which governments moved to increase their share 
of economic rents far above what they would have 
earned under the pre-1973 arrangements and in which 
Ottawa and Alberta jockeyed for position. Ottawa, 
in particular, thought that Canadians ‘in general’ (as 
represented by the federal government, of course) 
should obtain significantly more of the petroleum 
industry’s economic rents. However, Ottawa faced the 
problem that its primary means of generating revenue 
(the corporate income tax) used a tax base that could 
be entirely pre-empted by the provinces’ main ways of 
generating more revenue (i.e., bonuses and royalties). 
The industry felt itself caught in the middle of this 
intergovernmental battle, facing a dizzying array of 
new and higher fiscal burdens and a growing complex 
of incentive programs designed to offset the disincen-
tive effects of the higher government revenue claims.
Deregulation in 1985 brought a return to the 
simple fiscal arrangements that had been in force 
before 1973 but with the differences that: (i) royalty 
rates in Alberta were considerably higher, except on 
very-low-output wells; (ii) the special provisions in the 
corporate income tax favouring the crude petroleum 
industry were largely gone, apart from some rapid 
deprecation allowances; and (iii) the federal govern-
ment ensured a share of the economic rent for itself by 
the disallowance (until 2007) of full deductibility as a 
cost of royalties paid to provincial governments.
On balance, the current (2013) fiscal regime for the 
Alberta conventional petroleum industry, while con-
sisting of a complex web of royalty, tax and incentive 
programs, generates a large revenue flow to govern-
ments without imposing large inefficiencies in terms 
of reduced or biased industry behaviour. But it should 
have been possible to get to this point without the 
massive pains inflicted in the ‘overt control’ period 
from 1973 to 1985. The reliance on ad valorem royalties 
(based on total revenue rather than profits) contrib-
uted to a system of considerable complexity, with roy-
alties varying across four classes of oil (three vintages 
of light oil plus heavy oil) plus a number of specific 
royalty-reduction ‘incentive’ schemes designed to 
recognize categories of presumed higher-cost oil.
The major rises in oil prices after 2004 brought 
that scheme under some pressure, as the regulations 
implied that, at best, the government royalty would 
capture 35 per cent of a price increase, while industry 
would receive 65 per cent (which would, however, 
be subject to the corporate income tax). In October 
2007, the Alberta government announced acceptance 
for conventional crude oil of the main recommenda-
tions of a Royalty Review Panel, simplifying royalties, 
effective at the start of 2009, by removing vintage and 
incentives schemes and modifying the royalty rates 
to reduced rates on low-output wells, but applying 
significantly higher rates (a maximum of 50%), on 
higher-output wells at high prices. However, within 
two years, the government backed off, reintroducing 
a number of incentive programs and cutting back 
on the royalty increase (primarily by reducing the 
maximum to 40%), in effect reverting to regulations 
close to those pre-2007, with a marginally higher ceil-
ing rate (about 14% larger, effective at high crude oil 
prices and/or more moderate prices for high-output 
wells) and reduced rates for low-output wells and at 
lower prices (prices within the historical range prior 
to 2004).
After deregulation in 1985, the federal government 
relied on the corporate income tax for its share of eco-
nomic rent from Alberta conventional crude oil. (The 
province also has a corporate income tax.) However, 
the policy of reducing the corporate tax rate has 
reduced its effectiveness as a rent-collection device.
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Appendix 11.1: Alberta Crude Oil Royalty Regimes, 1951 to 2012
A. Royalty Regulations
June 1951 Regulations










April 1, 1962 Regulations





January 1, 1973 Regulations
Output Rate (b/month) Royalty (Barrels)
0–1200 (  X  + 5 )  X    120     100
4500– 180 + 25%(X–1200)
 
April 1, 1974 Regulations
Royalty (b/month)
S + kS(A – B) 
    A
Where S is the January 1973 royalty, A is the Par Price, B is the Select Price and k is the Royalty Factor.
Notes:
(1) The Par Price (A) is the selling price of the oil. The Select Price (B) is a price lower than the selling price, selected to derive a 
base above which revenue increases (A–B) can be derived.
(2) The second part of the royalty formula is designed to capture part of the revenue increase due to higher oil prices (A–B). The 
royalty factor (k) is set to allow the government to capture the desired amount of the revenue increase. Lower royalty factors 
were set on ‘New Oil’ (that discovered after March 1974) than on ‘Old Oil’ (that discovered prior to April 1974).
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(3) After 1974 the Par Price (A), Select Price (B), and royalty factors (k) were subject to periodic change, as was the definition of 
oil that qualifies for the lower ‘New Oil’ royalty rate.
Briefly, starting in 1982, a new oil category was created called ‘NORP Oil,’ which was assessed as ‘New Oil’ but allowed 
a higher Par Price; essentially this was oil discovered after 1980 and allowed the world price under the National Energy 
Program (NEP, see Chapter Nine for details).
(4) As noted, the Par Price (A) was the selling price of oil (defined as the average Alberta wellhead price). The Select Price (B) 
was initially set at $4.11/b, raised to $4.71/b on January 1, 1975, and then again to $6.50/b on April 1, 1982.
(5) As noted, the royalty factor (k) was designed to take as royalties some percentage of the revenue in excess of the Select Price, 
but a smaller percentage for ‘New’ than ‘Old’ oil. A complication arose because this ‘supplemental’ royalty was based on the 
‘basic’ 1973 royalty, which was output sensitive. Accordingly, it was necessary to define the k factors both with reference to 
the following variables: the Par Price (A), the Select Price (B), the type of oil (New or Old), the proportion of incremental 
revenue the government wished to capture, and the output rate of the ‘reference’ well for which the incremental revenue share 
was defined. As a result, the royalty factors (k) were changed frequently. (They are not reported here but can be found in 
Lewis and Thompson). Several of the key changes (apart from changes in the selling price of oil) will be noted here. Initially, 
royalties were based on the average output of an Alberta oil well, but in 1979 the government began to base the royalty 
on a ‘reference well’ with an output of 3,600 b/month. Initially, royalty factors were set so as to capture 65 per cent of the 
incremental revenue on ‘Old’ oil and 35 per cent on ‘New.’ For ‘Old’ oil, the government share of supplemental revenues was 
reduced to 50 per cent (July 1, 1975), then 45 per cent (April 1982), then 40 per cent. The ‘New’ oil percentage was reduced to 
27 per cent at prices below $30/b and 30 per cent of extra revenue above $30/b.
July 1, 1979 Regulations
The 1974 royalty formula was retained but the ‘basic’ royalty (S) was changed from the 1973 regulations. (The for-
mula was set out in cubic metres per month, but we show it in barrels for comparability with the previous royalty 
formulae.)
Output Rate (X) (b/month) Royalty (b/month)
0–1200 X2 / 8000
1200– (.25)(X–1200) + 180
Note:
In this formula, as the output rate tends to 0, so does the royalty rate, whereas the previous formula had a minimum rate of 5 per 
cent. A well with 100 b/month would have a royalty of 1.25 b/month under the 1979 regulations and 5 b/month under the 1973 
regulations. Since the supplemental royalty is applied to the basic royalty, the supplemental royalty is also lower for low-output 
wells under the 1979 regulations.
January 1, 2009 Regulations (as amended in 2010)
Royalty rate = rp + rq, (minimum 0%, maximum 40%)
Price Component (rp), (maximum 35%):
 Par Price(PP) < $250/m3:  rp = ((PP–190)*.0006)*100
 $250.00/m3 < Par Price(PP) < 400.00/m3:  rp = (((PP–250)*.001) + .036)*100
 $400/m3 < Par Price(PP):  rp = (((PP–400)*.0005) + .186)*100
 Par Price(PP) > 535/m3:  rp = (((PP–535)*.003) + .2535)*100
Quantity Component (rq), (maximum, 30%):
 Q < 106.4 m3/month:  rq = ((Q–106.4)*.0026)*100
 106.4 m3/month < Q < 197.6 m3/month:  rq = ((Q–106.4)*.001)*100
 197.6 m3/month < Q < 304 m3/month:     rq = (((Q–197.6)*.0007) + .0912)*100
  Q> 304 m3/month:  rq = (((Q–304)*.0003) + .1657)*100
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B. Comparative Royalty Payments
One way to compare the various Alberta oil royalty regulations is to calculate the royalties owing under a number 
of different royalty schemes. It is also desirable to look at royalties under different conditions since the royalty rates 
have been output and price sensitive.
We consider ten different royalty regimes, as follows:
R51: June 1951 Regulations
R62: April 1962 Regulations
R73: January 1973 Regulations
R74O: April 1974 ‘Old’ Oil Regulations
R74N: April 1974 ‘New’ Oil Regulations
R82O: April 1982 ‘New’ Oil Regulations
R82N: April 1982 ‘Old’ Oil Regulations
R91O: Regulations in effect as of Dec. 31, 1991, on ‘Old’ oil.
R91N: Regulations in effect as of Dec. 31, 1991, on ‘New’ oil.
R2011: Regulations in effect as of January 1, 2011.
It must be remembered that the supplemental royalty from 1974 on included a royalty factor that was adjusted as 
the price of oil changed, so the royalties were aimed at the price level in effect at the date the scheme was applied. 
The approximate prices were: $6.50/b in April 1974, $23.00/b in April 1982 for old oil and $40.00/b for new, 
$21.00/b in December 1991, and $85/b in January 2011.
Four price levels per barrel are considered, representative of prices over most of the period from 1947 through to 
2000:
P1: $2.50 P3: $13.00  
P2: $6.50 P4: $25.00
Four output levels for the well are also considered:
O1: 100 b/month O3: 10,000 b/month 
O2: 1,000 b/month O4: 20,000 b/month
Output Level 1 (100 b/month)
Royalty Scheme P1: $2.50 P1: $2.50 P2: $6.50 P2: $6.50 P3: $13 P3: $13 P4: $25 P4: $25 
 Royalty Royalty  Royalty Royalty  Royalty Royalty Royalty Royalty 
 $/b Rate (%) $/b Rate (%) $/b Rate (%) $/b Rate (%)
R51 $0.125 5 $0.325 5 $0.650 5 $1.250 5
R62 $0.200 8 $0.520 8 $1.040 8 $2.000 8
R73 $0.146 5.8333 $0.379 5.8333 $0.758 5.8333 $1.458 5.8333
R74O $0.146 5.8333 $0.557 8.5648 $1.512 11.6299 $3.275 13.1011
R74N $0.146 5.8333 $0.392 6.0295 $0.900 6.9148 $1.835 7.3397
R82O $0.031 1.25 $0.081 1.25 $0.250 1.92 $0.562 2.25
R82N $0.031 1.25 $0.081 1.25 $0.213 1.63 $0.455 1.82
R91O $0.031 1.25 $0.081 1.25 $0.231 1.78 $0.508 2.03
R91N $0.031 1.25 $0.081 1.25 $0.183 1.4 $0.369 1.48
R2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Output Level 2 (1,000 b/month)
Royalty Scheme P1: $2.50 P1: $2.50 P2: $6.50 P2: $6.50 P3: $13 P3: $13 P4: $25 P4: $25 
 Royalty Royalty  Royalty Royalty  Royalty Royalty Royalty Royalty 
 $/b Rate (%) $/b Rate (%) $/b Rate (%) $/b Rate (%)
R51 $0.235 9.4 $0.61 9.4 $1.222 9.4 $2.35 9.4
R62 $0.275 11 $0.715 11 $1.430 11 $2.750 11
R73 $0.333 13.33 $0.867 13.33 $1.733 13.33 $3.333 13.33
R74O $0.333 13.33 $1.485 22.84 $4.032 31.01 $8.734 34.94
R74N $0.333 13.33 $1.045 16.08 $2.397 18.44 $4.893 19.57
R82O $0.313 12.5 $0.813 12.5 $2.500 19.23 $5.615 22.46
R82N $0.313 12.5 $0.813 12.5 $2.125 16.35 $4.548 18.19
R91O $0.313 12.5 $0.813 12.5 $2.313 17.79 $5.082 20.33
R91N $0.313 12.5 $0.813 12.5 $1.825 14.04 $3.694 14.78
R2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 $0.820 3.28
Output Level 3 (10,000 b/month)
Royalty Scheme P1: $2.50 P1: $2.50 P2: $6.50 P2: $6.50 P3: $13 P3: $13 P4: $25 P4: $25 
 Royalty Royalty  Royalty Royalty  Royalty Royalty Royalty Royalty 
 $/b Rate (%) $/b Rate (%) $/b Rate (%) $/b Rate (%)
R51 $0.417 16.67 $1.083 16.76 $2.167 6.67 $4.167 16.67
R62 $0.417 16.67 $1.083 16.76 $2.167 6.67 $4.167 16.67
R73 $0.595 23.8 $1.547 23.8 $3.094 23.8 $5.950 23.8
R74O $0.595 23.8 $2.650 40.77 $7.200 55.36 $15.59 62.36
R74N $0.595 23.8 $1.866 28.7 $.279 32.91 $8.734 34.94
R82O $0.595 23.8 $1.547 23.8 $4.760 36.61 $10.690 42.77
R82N $0.595 23.8 $1.547 23.8 $4.046 31.12 $8.659 34.63
R91O $0.595 23.8 $1.547 23.8 $4.403 33.87 $9.676 38.7
R91N $0.595 23.8 $1.547 23.8 $3.475 26.73 $7.034 28.14
R2011 $0.488 19.5 $1.372 21.1 $3.055 23.5 $7.000 28.0
Output Level 4 (20,000 b/month)
Royalty Scheme P1: $2.50 P1: $2.50 P2: $6.50 P2: $6.50 P3: $13 P3: $13 P4: $25 P4: $25 
 Royalty Royalty  Royalty Royalty  Royalty Royalty Royalty Royalty 
 $/b Rate (%) $/b Rate (%) $/b Rate (%) $/b Rate (%)
R51 $0.410 16.67 $1.083 16.67 $2.167 16.67 $4.167 16.67
R62 $0.410 16.67 $1.083 16.67 $2.167 16.67 $4.167 16.67
R73 $0.610 24.4 $1.586 24.4 $3.172 24.4 $6.100 24.4
R74O $0.610 24.4 $2.717 41.8 $7.378 56.75 $15.983 63.93
R74N $0.610 24.4 $1.913 29.42 $4.387 33.74 $8.9454 35.83
R82O $0.610 24.4 $1.586 24.4 $4.880 37.54 $10.961 43.84
R82N $0.610 24.4 $1.586 24.4 $4.148 31.91 $8.877 35.51
R91O $0.610 24.4 $1.586 24.4 $4.514 34.72 $9.920 39.68
R91N $0.610 24.4 $1.586 24.4 $3.562 27.40 $7.211 28.84
R2011 $0.488 19.5 $1.372 21.1 $3.055 23.5 $7.000 28.0
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Comments
(1) The price insensitivity of the royalty rate in the 
1951, 1962, and 1973 regulations is apparent. The 
addition of the supplemental royalty in 1974 
served to increase the royalty rate as the price 
of oil rose above a specified level. This level was 
increased from $4.11 in 1974 to $6.50 in April 
1982, as is evident in the tables. (Under the 1982 
and 1991 regulations, the royalty rates are the 
same at the $2.50 and $6.50 prices.)
(2) Since the supplemental royalty in the 1974–2009 
period was based on the basic royalty, it too was 
output-sensitive, but it increases the basic roy-
alty by the same percentage for all output levels. 
The basic royalty is given by S so the percentage 
rise in royalty (with the supplemental royalty) 
can be represented as follows:
S + S ( k(A – B) )      A    = 1 + k(A – B) 
   S         A  .
Thus the percentage increase in the royalty is 
not sensitive to the output rate (though the 
base royalty is). It is affected by k (for exam-
ple, whether the oil is ‘new’ or ‘old,’ the former 
assessed a lower royalty increase) and by the 
level of oil prices (a higher price [A] means a 
greater percentage increase in the royalty). Note, 
however that the increase in the royalty rate 
slows as the price becomes higher. (This can be 
seen in the table; compare, for example, the roy-
alty change as price rises from $6.50 to $13.00 
with the change as the price rises from $13.00 
to $25.00. More formally, the derivative of the 
royalty formula with respect to price changes 
can be shown as (where R is the royalty):
∂R = skB 
∂A   A2
(3) The low-output case (O1, 100 b/month) illus-
trates the increased rate sensitivity at low-output 
rates of the 1979 change to the basic royalty, with 
the rate falling from 5.8 per cent to 1.25 per cent. 
The 2011 regime eliminates royalties entirely 
on low-output wells, even at higher prices than 
considered here. That is, the new regulations 
will generate reduced revenue at price levels 
observed prior to 2000; the higher ceiling 
royalties become effective only at prices above 
the highest ($25/b) shown in these tables.
(4) The general reduction in royalty rates at higher 
prices from 1974 to 1982 to 1991 is also appar-
ent, particularly for ‘old’ oil between 1974 and 
1982. It is important to note that the royalty 
rates at the $13.00 and $25.00 prices under the 
1974 regulations are somewhat misleading since 
regulators selected the royalty factors (k) in light 
of prevailing prices, which in 1974 were closer to 
$6.50.
C.	Royalty	Inefficiencies
If the industry were assumed to be operating in an 
efficient manner in the absence of royalties, their 
imposition might change industry behaviour, cre-
ating economic inefficiencies. There are three main 
examples:
1.  Investment Disincentives
Since Crown royalties are payments made to the 
Alberta government, they are seen as costs by the 
company and therefore reduce the anticipated profits 
from investment. Hence, higher-cost projects may 
be made unprofitable by the royalties. This would 
be the case if the expected rise in royalty payments 
exceeds the expected profits from the investment. As 
the tables above illustrate, royalties are especially high 
for high-output projects, so investment disincentives 
would be especially high for projects expected to pro-
duce a lot of oil (per well) but which have relatively 
low anticipated profits. This could be because their 
oil-production costs are high, as is often true for deep 
wells in hostile environments (the foothills or far 
north of the province) and for EOR projects. This may 
also be true for projects that have a high dry-hole risk 
(e.g., new field wildcats aimed at new geologic plays), 
though it must be noted that the anticipated royalties 
must also be adjusted by the probability of success.
A simple investment model may help illustrate 
these points. Suppose a company foresees only two 
possibilities, a dry well or a productive one, and that 
p is the expected probability of success. Let I repre-
sent the expected cost of drilling the exploratory well, 
PVR represent the expected present value revenue of 
a successful well, and PVC represent the incremen-
tal present value costs of a success (i.e., completion, 
development and operating costs). Assume, for 
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simplicity, that the royalty is a flat r per cent of rev-
enue, so the present value royalty is given by rPVR. 
Let EMV(b) stand for the expected profit of the pro-
ject before the royalty is imposed, and EMV(a) be the 
expected profit after the royalty. Then we can repre-
sent the percentage change in expected profit due to 
the imposition of a royalty as:
EMV(a) – EMV(b) =    –(p)(rPVR)     
   EMV(b)    (p)(PVR – PVC) – I 
.
If the royalty makes the project unprofitable (i.e., 
EMV(a) < 0), then the absolute value of the numerator 
will exceed the value of EMV(b), and the expression 
will be smaller than –1; investment will not proceed. 
The numerator will be higher in absolute value terms 
the higher the royalty rate and the higher the prob-
ability of success. A value of –1 or less is also more 
likely the higher are exploration, development, and/or 
operating costs.
It might be noted that this formulation ignores 
‘option value’ considerations. The presence of roy-
alties, which are subject to unilateral change by the 
government, may increase the perceived risk of 
investment in the industry. Since an investment in 
oil exploration cannot be reversed once it has been 
undertaken, companies may prefer not to invest 
immediately (that is, invest less), thereby keeping 
the irreversible investment option open pending a 
reduction in uncertainty about what the government’s 
intentions are.
2. Output Timing Inefficiencies
Crude oil pools can be drained in a number of dif-
ferent ways, depending on the number of infill wells 
drilled. Generally speaking, a greater number of wells 
will deplete the deposit faster (increase the initial pool 
output rate, but with a higher decline rate); but the 
average well-output rate will be smaller. The invest-
ment decision asks whether the increased present 
value of revenues from faster depletion compensates 
for the higher costs of more wells. With an output- 
sensitive royalty, there is an extra inducement to infill 
drilling, since the lower average well-output rate will 
reduce the royalties paid. However, the existence of 
royalties (apart from their output-sensitivity) exerts 
a contrary influence. Output generates royalty obli-
gations, which are a cost; by delaying production, the 
present value of this extra cost can be reduced, offer-
ing an incentive to reduce initial output levels. This 
could be accomplished most readily by drilling fewer 
wells, though it could also be attained by having more 
infill wells, but running them at less than capacity 
(which also keeps the royalty rate down). Given these 
contrary impulses of a crude oil royalty, generaliza-
tions are difficult, with the effects of the royalty regu-
lations hinging on specific reservoir characteristics.
3. Pool Abandonment Inefficiencies
By increasing the producer’s operating costs, a royalty 
will induce earlier abandonment of the pool, with 
an attendant loss of output and reserves. We can set 
up a simple example to illustrate the effects under a 
number of circumstances.
Recall that a well is normally abandoned when its 
output rate falls to the level where the revenue gener-
ated just covers operating costs. The effect of a gross 
ad valorem royalty is to reduce the amount of output 
that remains with the producer (at a royalty rate of r 
per cent, the producer keeps [1–r] of the output). Thus 
we could approximate the effect of a flat rate royalty 
in the following manner: if q(T) were the output rate 
at which abandonment would occur in the absence 
of a royalty, then with a royalty the well would be 
abandoned when the output rate is (1 + r)q(T). (We 
implicitly assume that both price and per unit operat-
ing costs are constant across time.) We could then ask 
how much sooner the well is abandoned as a result of 
the royalty. This is clearly a function of the production 
decline rate (a; we assume exponential decline). How 
long does it take for output to fall from (1 + r)q(T) to 
q(T) if the annual decline rate is a per cent? In other 
words, solve for t in the following equation:
q(T) = (1+r)q(T)e–at ,
whence (taking the natural logarithm of both sides): 
t = ln[(1+r)q(T)] – lnq(T) 
     a      
.
For example, if the abandonment rate without a roy-
alty were 100 b/month (1,200 b/year), the royalty rate 
were 6.5 per cent and the well decline rate were 10 
per cent per year, then abandonment would occur 
0.63 years earlier due to the royalty. One could now 
ask how much cumulative output is lost as a result of 
earlier abandonment. This would be t years of output 
starting at level (1 + r)q(T) with an a per cent decline 
rate. Or:
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 t        (1+r)q(T) – (1+r)q(T)e–at ∫(1+r)q(T)e–atdt =      
a
 
0                  .
In the previous numerical example, this would total 
780 barrels. (This is for one well; most oil pools con-
tain more than one well.)
The following tables illustrate the effects of a 
flat rate royalty on abandonment under a variety of 
conditions:
Number of Years Earlier Abandonment Occurs
Royalty Abandonment Decline Rate 
Rate, r Output Rate, q(T)
 a = 5% a = 10% a = 15%
6.5% 100 b/month 1.3 0.6 0.4
7.5% 100 b/month 1.5 0.7 0.5
19% 1,000 b/month 3.5 1.7 1.2
31% 10,000 b/month 5.4 2.7 1.8
44% 10,000 b/month 7.3 3.7 2.4
 
Reserves Lost (Barrels)
Royalty Abandonment Decline Rate 
Rate, r Output Rate, q(T)
 a = 5% a = 10% a = 15%
6.5% 100 b/month 1,560 780 520
7.5% 100 b/month 1,800 900 600
19% 1,000 b/month 45,600 22,800 15,200
31% 10,000 b/month 744,000 372,000 248,000
44% 10,000 b/month 1,056,000 528,000 352,000
 
Reserves losses are higher, as would be expected, at 
higher royalty rates and for wells with higher aban-
donment rates (i.e., wells with higher operating costs). 
The lower the well’s decline rate, the higher are the 
reserve losses. A sliding-scale royalty based on output 
means that royalty rates fall as wells undergo produc-
tion decline, thereby lessening the incentive to early 
abandonment.

Thus far, this book has concentrated mainly on the 
crude oil industry. Part Four goes beyond crude oil to 
consider three other issues.
The petroleum industry is complex in any 
number of ways. At the beginning of activities, a 
major source of complexity lies in the joint-product 
nature of the industry. A joint-production process 
is when one product cannot be produced without 
another. The petroleum industry produces liquid 
(‘crude’) oil and natural gas. Both consist of hydro-
carbon compounds and have often been generated 
by the same prehistoric forces. Moreover, pools of 
liquid oil invariably hold natural gas (‘associated gas’), 
and many natural gas pools (‘non-associated gas’) 
include some liquid products (‘natural gas liquids’ 
and ‘condensate’). Exploration companies may have 
expectations (and hopes) about which product their 
efforts will yield – certain areas, for example, may be 
thought ‘gas-prone.’ But the inevitable uncertainties of 
exploration mean that attempts to direct effort to one 
product rather than another are imperfect. Hence it is 
inevitable that oil-producing companies (or regions) 
are also natural gas producers. Oil and natural gas are 
strongly linked beyond the joint-production phase. 
They are both valued largely for their energy content. 
However, while the crude production linkages are 
largely complementary, the consumption linkages are 
primarily competitive (substitutive). Chapter Twelve 
provides an overview of the Alberta natural gas indus-
try. Of course the joint-product relationship means 
that much of what we have said about the ‘crude oil 
industry’ is relevant to the ‘natural gas industry.’ In 
this chapter, we shall discuss natural gas in a manner 
broadly analogous to our discussion of oil in Parts 
Two and Three. We will look initially at the historical 
development of natural gas reserves, production, and 
prices. Then we will move to the regulatory environ-
ment with particular emphasis upon trade and price 
controls and royalty provisions.
Chapter Thirteen is concerned with the ‘macro-
economic’ role of the petroleum industry. Since it is 
a major industry, its activities will affect the Alberta 
provincial economy. This chapter examines the con-
tribution of the petroleum industry to the Alberta 
economy and explores several important policy issues 
related to this contribution, illustrating once again the 
importance of ‘petropolitical’ concerns.
Finally, in Chapter Fourteen we briefly speculate 
on the lessons that other jurisdictions might take from 
Alberta’s experience with the petroleum industry.
Part Four: Overview

Readers’ Guide: Crude oil and natural gas are dif-
ferent products, but highly interconnected. At the 
consumption level, they are both used primarily as 
energy products and hence are highly competitive 
in many uses. Thus the prices of the two products 
exhibit interdependency, though not a fixed ratio. 
On the production side, both are naturally occurring 
hydrocarbons, so a region with resources of oil typ-
ically also has natural gas resources, as has been the 
case in Alberta. This chapter examines the evolution 
of natural gas markets and regulations in Alberta over 
the lengthy history in which natural gas moved from 
being a relatively unimportant by-product of crude 
oil to a product of greater value to Alberta than con-
ventional crude oil. Many of the regulatory issues with 
respect to natural gas mirror those discussed with 
respect to crude oil in previous chapters, so the ana-
lytical arguments about oil often apply also to natural 
gas. However, unlike crude oil policies, both Alberta 
and Canada have had direct regulations on natural 
gas sales outside the region that have been based 
on anticipated natural gas consumption needs within 
the region. This chapter provides a detailed review of 
these regulations.
1. Introduction
This chapter parallels the discussion of oil in previous 
chapters, but with respect to natural gas production. 
As above, we focus on natural resource production, 
with only the briefest attention to the downstream 
activities of natural gas processing, transmission, and 
distribution. Nor do we investigate such joint prod-
ucts of lifting natural gas as natural gas liquids (NGLs) 
or sulphur; and, as noted before, the environmental 
impacts of the petroleum industry are outside our 
purview. (Guichon et al 2010, provide a review of 
a number of important issues in Alberta regarding 
the ownership of NGLs and their removal from the 
gas stream.)
As with oil, government involvement in the 
Canadian natural gas industry is pervasive, not only 
concerning what might be viewed as normal practice, 
such as the setting of taxes, royalties, and the like 
(fiscal systems) and utility regulation (pipeline tariffs), 
but extending to specific policies directed towards nat-
ural gas exports, both in terms of quantities (export 
licensing) and pricing – even within the prevailing 
climate of deregulation. These are the issues covered 
here. As was the case with crude oil, the threads of 
development, markets, and regulation tangle in a com-
plex petropolitical web.
Following several preliminary comments in this 
Introduction, the chapter is organized in five sections. 
Section 2 looks at the evolution of natural gas output 
and prices. Section 3 examines policies governing the 
quantity of Alberta natural gas exports at both the 
provincial and federal levels. Section 4 concerns gov-
ernment controls on the price of natural gas, as well as 
fiscal systems, including royalty regulations. Section 5 
is a brief conclusion.
By way of introduction, however, several com-
ments should be made about natural gas transmission. 
CHAPTER TWELVE
The Alberta Natural Gas Industry: Pricing, 
Markets, and Government Regulations
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Shipment is, arguably, a more important stage of the 
natural gas industry than of the crude oil industry. 
This is because gas is a more volatile product than 
crude oil, and also less concentrated in energy content, 
so that a larger volume of gas than oil must be trans-
ported to deliver the same quantity of energy. High 
volume, long-distance shipment of natural gas lagged 
many decades behind such shipments of oil, awaiting 
technical developments in high-pressure pipelines, 
and transmission charges normally make up a higher 
proportion of delivered gas costs than oil costs. Since 
the volume of gas shippable by a pipeline rises more 
than proportionately to the diameter of the pipe, pipe-
line transmission exhibits economies of scale. (That 
is, the unit cost of shipment falls as the quantity of gas 
moved increases.) This ‘natural monopoly’ aspect of 
gas pipelines has given rise to public interest concerns. 
One response was the regulation of gas transmission 
tariffs on a cost of service basis. Despite this, as will 
be discussed below, the Government of Alberta and 
many natural gas producers worried that the main 
interprovincial gas transmission companies (espe-
cially TransCanada PipeLines [TCPL], now called 
TransCanada Corporation, which moved gas eastward 
from Alberta) had market power that allowed them 
to keep Alberta gas prices artificially low.
Also, in the 1950s, the Alberta government granted 
a single company almost exclusive rights to gather and 
move natural gas to the provincial border for export. 
(The company was Alberta Gas Transmission Limited, 
AGTL; in the 1970s, this company diversified consider-
ably, including into ex-Alberta gas transmission and 
petrochemical production, and was renamed NOVA 
Corporation of Alberta; NOVA merged with TCPL in 
1998. Throughout this period relatively small volumes 
of gas have been moved to Alberta gas consumers by 
Alberta natural gas distribution companies instead of 
by AGTL/NOVA.)
AGTL, and its successors, have transported gas on 
a regulated cost of service basis, but there has been 
much controversy about the nature of the transmis-
sion charge, which, for much of the period, was set 
on a ‘postage stamp’ basis; that is, all Alberta gas paid 
the same tariff regardless of the transportation dis-
tance involved. The field price received by a natural 
gas producer is usually a ‘netback’ price, the price in a 
major ‘market’ area, for example, the main gathering 
terminal for export sales at the Alberta border, less 
the transmission tariff to that market. Hence a postage 
stamp tariff, in contrast to one where each producer 
pays the transmission cost associated with moving 
its gas, tends to favour producers more distant from 
markets and using more expensive newer facilities 
relative to producers close to the border gathering 
terminals or using older largely depreciated facilities. 
(Since the freehold leases tended to be concentrated 
in the more southern part of the province, it also 
involved their cross-subsidizing the more distant 
Crown leases.) Discussions amongst NOVA and 
assorted interested parties after 1996 yielded no agree-
ment on this controversy, and in 1999 NOVA applied 
to change the pipeline tariff process. Decision 2000–
2006 by the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (EUB) 
allowed replacement of the postage stamp tariff with 
“Receipt Point Specific Rates,” which could vary with 
distance and volume of gas moved, and also removed 
NOVA’s monopoly on the construction of ‘lateral’ 
pipelines to connect gas pools to the main NOVA pipe-
lines. (NEB, 1996, provides a useful review of changes 
in natural gas pipeline regulation, and the declining 
role of transmission companies in contracting natural 
gas, in the decade following deregulation in 1986.) In 
2009, after application by TCPL/NOVA, regulation of 
the Alberta system was transferred from the ERCB 
to the NEB on the grounds that it formed an integral 
part of TransCanada’s intercontinental gas transmis-
sion network.
From this brief review of gas transmission, we now 
turn to more detailed discussion of other issues. (In 
addition to other references in this chapter, Helliwell 
et al., 1989, chaps. 4 and 5, provides a good survey of 
Canadian natural gas market evolution and regula-
tions up to 1990. See also Winberg, 1987, chaps. 3 and 
4. Angevine, 2010b, provides an overview from the 
perspective of the year 2010.)
2. Natural Gas Production and Pricing
Table 12.1 includes summary statistics on key dimen-
sions of the Alberta natural gas industry for years 
since 1947. Much of the data parallels that for crude oil 
in earlier chapters of this book. Our discussion of the 
natural gas industry will be much less detailed than 
that of oil and will emphasize the features of natural 
gas markets and regulations that differ from crude oil.
A. Resources and Reserves
In ground natural gas resources in Alberta can be div-
ided into ‘associated’ and ‘non-associated’ categories. 
The former are the gas volumes within crude oil pools, 
The Alberta Natural Gas Industry 353
Table 12.1: Alberta Natural Gas Reserves, Production, Deliveries and Prices, 1947–2012
 Established Remaining Marketable R/P Deliveries Average Gas Price/ 
 Marketable Marketable Production Ratio (106m3) Wellhead Price Oil Price
 Reserves Reserves (106 m3) (Years) 
 (109 m3) Additions   Alta Other U.S.A ($/ ($/mcf) 
  (109 m3)    Canada  103 m3)
1947 n.a. n.a. 924 n.a.    2.40 0.07 0.14
1948 112 n.a. 1,062 105.1    2.32 0.07 0.11
1949 129 18 1,150 112.1    2.24 0.06 0.12
1950 145 17 1,425 101.8    2.08 0.06 0.11
1951 207 61 1,607 128.8    2.17 0.06 0.14
1952 295 88 1,785 165.2    3.32 0.09 0.22
1953 372 76 2,043 182.1    3.29 0.09 0.21
1954 431 59 2,453 175.7 2,291 15 0 3.28 0.09 0.20
1955 490 59 3,002 163.2 2,730 19 0 3.32 0.09 0.22
1956 520 65 3,208 162.1 2,948 26 0 3.42 0.10 0.22
1957 582 65 3,781 153.9 3,229 639 4 3.22 0.09 0.22
1958 686 110 5,242 130.0 3,362 2,036 4 3.23 0.09 0.24
1959 768 89 7,074 108.6 3,738 3,498 3 3.22 0.09 0.23
1960 879 120 9,058 97.0 4,000 5,264 3 3.22 0.09 0.23
1961 880 13 11,868 72.5 4,012 4,744 2,803 4.29 0.12 0.29
1962 912 50 17,504 50.3 4,319 5,426 7,191 4.51 0.13 0.32
1963 928 36 19,532 47.6 4,555 6,415 8,115 4.94 0.14 0.32
1964 992 86 21,903 45.3 4,649 7,589 8,747 5.17 0.15 0.32
1965 1,058 90 24,039 44.1 5,032 8,746 8,693 5.10 0.15 0.32
1966 1,073 41 25,409 42.4 5,346 8,999 9,673 5.33 0.15 0.33
1967 1,119 74 27,400 40.8 5,646 9,251 11,152 5.49 0.16 0.35
1968 1,224 135 31,038 39.5 5,827 10,198 13,407 5.51 0.16 0.35
1969 1,273 88 36,735 34.7 6,474 12,974 14,948 5.46 0.16 0.35
1970 1,279 46 42,874 29.8 6,835 15,655 17,531 5.69 0.16 0.36
1971 1,276 45 47,529 26.9 7,164 16,366 20,879 5.60 0.16 0.32
1972 1,269 45 52,189 24.3 7,926 19,941 21,457 5.89 0.17 0.33
1973 1,397 183 55,521 25.2 8,266 22,734 21,672 6.62 0.19 0.30
1974 1,487 147 56,817 26.2 8,646 24,272 20,562 10.46 0.30 0.29
1975 1,451 21 58,142 25.0 9,213 24,319 21,125 21.79 0.62 0.48
1976 1,502 106 59,456 25.2 9,656 24,749 21,783 35.34 1.00 0.67
1977 1,568 128 62,666 25.0 11,388 25,740 22,571 45.69 1.29 0.72
1978 1,665 163 61,600 27.0 12,588 25,642 20,402 52.57 1.49 0.69
1979 1,718 123 66,200 26.0 13,185 25,554 22,946 59.84 1.69 0.73
1980 1,747 92 62,070 28.1 13,465 24,703 19,356 82.51 2.34 0.85
1981 1,795 117 61,950 29.0 13,362 25,716 18,434 87.19 2.47 0.74
1982 1,853 119 64,113 28.9 14,069 25,318 19,937 94.31 2.67 0.59
1983 1,826 39 60,590 30.1 13,721 24,241 17,771 100.39 2.84 0.51
1984 1,798 41 65,819 27.3 15,086 27,112 19,057 103.28 2.92 0.50
1985 1,768 43 72,849 24.3 15,881 27,368 23,155 99.00 2.80 0.47
1986 1,720 22 64,945 26.5 15,109 27,416 18,236 77.74 2.20 0.66
1987 1,652 0 69,940 23.6 14,541 25,763 24,979 59.98 1.70 0.43
1988 1,628 65 80,963 20.1 16,679 26,616 32,694 54.02 1.53 0.52
1989 1,649 108 83,479 19.8 17,527 26,952 33,367 54.73 1.54 0.44
1990 1,647 88 84,578 19.5 17,340 25,966 35,706 55.18 1.56 0.36
1991 1,626 58 89,286 18.1 16,941 24,897 40,193 48.65 1.38 0.39
1992 1,595 73 98,860 16.2 17,809 27,973 48,801 48.68 1.38 0.38
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lying as a gas cap and/or dissolved within the crude 
oil. Output of such gas, associated with crude oil, is 
governed by oil output rates. Moreover, this natural 
gas is often re-injected back into the oil reservoir 
(‘recycled’) to aid in the recovery of the oil.
Non-associated gas is derived from deposits that 
are predominantly gaseous hydrocarbons (methane, 
for the most part). However, natural gas pools will 
hold varying amounts of hydrocarbons heavier than 
methane (e.g., natural gas liquids [NGLs] comprised 
of  ethane, butane, propane, and pentanes plus). The 
‘wetter’ the gas pool, the higher the proportion of 
these NGLs, and the more likely it is that the develop-
ment and output levels for the pool will be affected by 
market conditions for these products as well as those 
for natural gas. Natural gas normally passes through 
a processing plant to remove some or all of the NGLs 
before the gas is moved to market. Natural gas plants 
Table 12.1/continued
 Established Remaining Marketable R/P Deliveries Average Gas Price/ 
 Marketable Marketable Production Ratio (106m3) Wellhead Price Oil Price
 Reserves Reserves (106 m3) (Years) 
 (109 m3) Additions   Alta Other U.S.A ($/ ($/mcf) 
  (109 m3)    Canada  103 m3)
1993 1,535 59 110,658 13.9 17,963 30,437 55,573 60.08 1.71 0.52
1994 1,496 74 119,688 12.5 18,067 31,805 64,530 68.07 1.93 0.55
1995 1,489 123 124,024 12.0 18,905 32,095 67,195 49.99 1.41 0.37
1996 1,378 10 131,743 10.5 22,197 36,184 68,834 58.90 1.67 0.36
1997 1,284 30 133,243 9.6 20,643 37,352 69,167 70.96 2.01 0.48
1998 1,240 93 136,782 9.1 16,730 43,028 67,040 69.70 1.97 0.67
1999 1,207 110 141,034 8.6 20,805 43,813 67,184 88.68 2.51 0.58
2000 1,211 144 142,239 8.5 23,054 45,028 66,064 162.34 4.59 0.67
2001 1,184 116 139,942 8.5 20,513 42,136 64,359 198.39 5.61 1.01
2002 1,171 134 137,483 8.5 21,403 39,190 78,015 139.48 3.95 0.65
2003 1,122 87 134,732 8.3 25,431 29,574 74,460 224.62 6.36 0.97
2004 1,127 146 135,824 8.2 24,225 30,572 75,713 228.84 6.48 0.83
2005 1,120 126 136,838 8.2 22,744 36,037 72,943 301.75 8.54 0.86
2006 1,115 126 136,261 8.2 27,697 34,720 73,979 240.86 6.82 0.64
2007 1,069 95 135,735 7.9 28,180 35,322 72,294 235.66 6.67 0.58
2008 1,098 155 127,953 8.6 31,223 37,529 62,119 283.86 8.03 0.49
2009 1,056 82 118,374 8.9 32,361 36,651 52,366 142.86 4.04 0.38
2010 1,025 83 112,804 9.1 32,107 29,352 49,552 137.98 3.90 0.29
2011 945 70 104,975 9.0 34,137 29,682 45,397 125.36 3.22 0.22
2012 916 58 n/a n/a 35,402 29,775 39,817 n/a n/a n/a
Notes and Sources:
Column (1): From EUB, ERCB, and OGCB Reserves Reports (ST-18 and ST-98). Marketable gas excludes gas for reinjection purposes and NGLs that will be removed at gas 
plants.
Column (2): From EUB, ERCB, and OGCB Reserves Reports. 1949 and 1950 were estimated as the change in remaining reserves plus production.
Column (3): From CAPP Statistical Handbook.
Column (4): Column (1) divided by Column (3).
Columns (5), (6) and (7): From ERCB and OGCB Alberta Oil and Gas Annual Statistics, and Cumulative Annual Statistics of the Alberta Oil and Gas Industry; from 1993 
on, ERCB/EUB, Alberta Energy Resource Industries Monthly Statistics (ST-3). Deliveries generally add up to less than marketable production (Column (3)) because of 
line	losses,	pipeline	fuel,	and	other	shrinkage,	and	because	the	figures	come	from	different	sources.	Data	are	not	available	on	deliveries	prior	to	1954,	but	marketable	
production went almost entirely to Alberta.
Column (8): CAPP Statistical Handbook. The Alberta average wellhead/plant gate price.
Column (9): From Column (8). 1 cf = .0283 m3.
Column (10): Derived from data in CAPP Statistical Handbook. The Alberta average wellhead/plant gate natural gas price and average wellhead crude oil price were 
translated into dollar costs per joule of energy and the ratio taken.
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have included field plants and ‘straddle plants’ located 
at several points on the main NOVA transmission 
lines. In a series of decisions starting in 1981, the ERCB 
approved construction of ‘deep-cut’ natural gas plants 
that remove almost all the non-methane hydrocar-
bons. (These plants were controversial because the 
gas moving from the deep-cut facilities to the straddle 
plants had little NGL content, so the straddle plant 
was not needed for this gas. The board affirmed that 
the gas producer retained ownership rights for the 
gas and NGLs until the gas was sold, so could remove 
NGLs prior to sale of the gas. As mentioned above, 
we shall not discuss gas processing or NGL markets 
and regulations.)
The volume of hydrocarbons in place in a pool 
(the natural gas ‘resource’) forms the basis for ‘market-
able’ natural gas reserves. In place volumes must be 
adjusted for the recovery factor (the proportion of in 
place gas that will be lifted) and for losses and shrink-
age in operations (e.g., volumes that will be injected 
back into the ground for conservation reasons, adjust-
ments to volumes due to differences in temperature 
and pressure in the reservoir and at the surface, and 
the NGLs that will be removed before the gas goes to 
market). (See the ERCB, 2010, Reserves Report, ST-98, 
pp. 5.13–15.) Non-associated natural gas reservoirs 
show higher recovery factors than crude oil reservoirs 
(about 80% in Alberta as compared to 25%).
The most recent estimate of the conventional 
Alberta natural gas resource base is that it holds 9,203 
109 m3 of conventional natural gas. Of this, there 
are 6,528 109 m3 (232 Tcf) of potentially marketable 
reserves (ERCB, 2013, Reserves Report, ST-98, p. 5-23; 
and EUB/NEB, 2005); this is a ‘medium-case’ estimate. 
Cumulative production up to the end of 2012 has been 
4,425 109 m3 and 916 109 m3 was estimated to lie in 
established reserves, leaving 935 109 m3 (14%) still to 
be added. (The EUB/NEB estimated ‘low’ case market-
able reserve potential at 5,765 109 m3 and ‘high’ case 
potential at 7134 109 m3.)
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 12.2 show the 
changes since 1948 in Alberta’s remaining conven-
tional marketable natural gas reserves and reserves 
additions. As can be seen, gas reserves grew rapidly 
through to 1970, and again in the mid- to late 1970s, 
hitting a peak of 1,853 109 m3 (65.4 Tcf) in 1982. In 
twenty-six of the thirty years from 1982 to 2012, 
marketable gas reserves declined; that is, production 
exceeded reserves additions. However, the decline 
is not as pronounced or as long-standing as that for 
conventional crude oil. Recall from Chapter Five that 
Alberta’s conventional crude oil reserves have been 
in decline since 1969; by the start of 2013, remaining 
oil reserves were at about 22 per cent of the peak 1969 
level. Remaining gas reserves in 2012 were at 49 per 
cent of their 1982 peak. In other words, since the early 
1970s, Alberta’s conventional petroleum reserve base 
has been shifting more towards natural gas.
Reserves additions for gas, as for oil, show great 
year-to-year variation, as would be expected in an 
industry with pervasive geological uncertainty. In 
contrast to the conventional crude oil industry, nat-
ural gas reserves additions do not show as dramatic a 
decline over time as do liquid hydrocarbon reserves 
additions. Obviously, natural gas has been of increas-
ing relative importance at the exploration level over 
the past two decades.
The rising importance of natural gas relative to 
oil could reflect a variety of factors including: (i) a 
larger and more homogeneous group of undiscovered 
natural gas reservoirs, so that depletion effects in the 
discovery process are less significant for gas than oil; 
(ii) a larger inventory by 1970 of observed, but not 
developed or proved up, natural gas pools as com-
pared to oil pools; (iii) gas-pool-specific technological 
changes in exploration and development; and (iv) a 
shift in industry effort away from exploration and 
development of crude oil toward natural gas. These are 
not independent factors. For example, a more attract-
ive remaining gas reserve base would induce a shift in 
relative industry effort toward gas. We are unaware of 
any empirical model that provides valid measures of 
these four factors but believe that the first is of par-
ticular significance, followed by the fourth and then 
the second.
Non-conventional sources of natural gas have 
been growing in significance within North America, 
including Alberta. (We consider gas from the Alberta 
‘deep basin,’ in the northwestern part of the province, 
much of which lies in small pools in low permeabil-
ity rock and is therefore difficult to produce, to be 
conventional gas.) Non-conventional natural gas is 
a heterogeneous category including coal bed meth-
ane, gas trapped tightly in shale (where it is typically 
spread thinly through the shale rather than occurring 
as a concentrated pool), gas hydrates, and various 
synthetic gases (e.g., biogas or gasified coal). Since the 
turn of the century, two of these, coal bed methane 
and shale gas, have attracted significant investment 
within North America and appear to be available in 
large volume at costs that are within the range of his-
torical gas prices. Alberta’s ERCB has studied only coal 
bed methane in any depth. (Alberta has uncharted 
shale gas potential as well. In its 2011 Reserves Report, 
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the ERCB indicated that, while it “expects to publish 
in-place resource estimates soon, the estimate of 
established reserves will likely be delayed until suffi-
cient data are available to conduct a reasonable assess-
ment of shale gas recoverability,” p. 5-20.) Methane 
may be held in coal seams either as free gas or within 
the coal itself. Vast coal resources lie beneath much 
of central and southern Alberta, as has been demon-
strated in core samples from many wells drilled by the 
petroleum industry. Many producing (conventional) 
gas wells pass through coal seams; some of these have 
been modified to allow commingled production of 
conventional gas and coal bed methane.
In 2010, the ERCB provided an ‘initial determina-
tion’ of Alberta’s coal bed methane resource in place, 
based on a study from the Alberta Geological Survey, 
of 14 1012 m3 (500 Tcf), which is a third larger than 
its estimated resource base for conventional natural 
gas (ERCB, 2010, Reserves Report, ST-98, p. 5-9). What 
portion might ultimately be recoverable is unknown, 
and only a small part is included in reserve estimates; 
the ERCB reported (p. 5-2) 2012 remaining recoverable 
reserves of coal bed methane as 56.7 109 m3, 6.2 per 
cent of conventional gas reserves. Thus, as of early 
2013, there is large potential for coal bed methane (and 
for shale gas) in Alberta, but insufficient development 
to permit large volumes to qualify as reserves.
B. Production and Delivery
Column (3) of Table 12.1 shows Alberta marketable 
natural gas production from 1947. Output grew tre-
mendously to a peak in 2000, at an average rate of 
over 9 per cent per year. Except for the decade from 
1977 to 1987, rapid growth was the norm up to the 
mid-1990s. (1957 output was 310% more than 1947; 
1967 was 620% higher than 1957; 1977 was 130% over 
1967; and 1992 was 40% over 1987; but 1987 was only 
10% above 1977.) However, in the later 1990s, growth 
slowed, hitting a peak output rate in the year 2000 
and then trending downward, albeit relatively slowly. 
One might expect production to follow the decline 
in remaining reserves, and at some point it must. 
However, continued development investment can 
delay or reduce the output decline as reserves are used 
more intensively. (In this case, the reserves to produc-
tion [R/P] ratio will fall, as happened in Alberta from 
1983 to 2007, as shown in Column (4) of Table 12.1.) 
After 2007, however, this ended and output of natural 
gas fell markedly.
Coal bed methane (and a minimal amount of shale 
gas, for the last few years) is included in Column (3). 
The ERCB estimated coal bed methane production at 
5.6 109 m3 in 2012, just under 6 per cent of Alberta’s 
natural gas production (ERCB, 2013, Reserves Report, 
ST-98, pp. 5-2 and 4). In 2012, the board noted (p. 
5-19) that commercial coal bed methane produc-
tion began in 2002, very much aided by horizontal 
well-drilling advances that allow multiple completions 
within a single horizon. In contrast to conventional 
gas output, that from coal bed methane has been 
increasing since 2002 and is expected to make up a 
rising share of Alberta’s natural gas production.The 
ERCB has examined the appropriate regulatory frame-
work for non-conventional gas and issued a report 
looking at other regulatory approaches within North 
America (ERCB, 2011).
The production rises in the first two decades, as 
with crude oil’s first decade after Leduc, are closely 
tied to the extension of pipeline linkages from Alberta, 
particularly the TransCanada PipeLine (TCPL), east 
to Ontario, which was begun in 1957 and completed 
in 1958, and the Alberta and Southern connection to 
California, completed in 1961. (Alberta and Southern 
operated as a gas purchaser. It was a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Pacific Gas and Electric, a Northern 
California distributing company, which also owned 
Alberta Natural Gas and Pacific Gas Transmission, 
the two pipeline companies that moved gas from 
the Alberta border to California.) Gas exports to 
Montana began in 1951 in small volumes through 
the Canada–Montana Pipeline. In the late 1960s, 
Consolidated Natural Gas began to contract Alberta 
natural gas reserves for a new export pipeline to the 
mid-western United States. However, for reasons dis-
cussed in Section 3, this project was not approved by 
the National Energy Board.
We would emphasize three ways in which Alberta 
natural gas and its associated market development 
differed from convention crude oil. Natural gas was 
initially viewed as a by-product; regulation of the nat-
ural gas industry was greater and earlier; natural gas 
had a more limited market.
The natural gas reserves to production (R/P) 
ratio provides an initial introduction to these points 
(Column (4) in Table 12.1). Until the 1990s, Alberta’s 
gas R/P ratio was far higher than that for conventional 
crude. The ratio exceeded 100 from 1948 through 1959 
before the completion of the TransCanada PipeLine; 
it fell sharply after that but remained at twenty-four 
years or greater through 1986. After 1986, it fell again, 
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and by the mid-1990s was approaching the level of the 
conventional crude oil reserves-to-production ratio.
Looking at the R/P values in excess of 100 prior to 
1960, one might ask: Why would companies add more 
to natural gas reserves if inventories (reserves) were 
so high relative to output? And why wasn’t output 
increased much more rapidly in these circumstances? 
The answers, in essence, are that “they didn’t” and 
“they couldn’t.” At the time, natural gas reserves were 
largely the unintentional by-product of crude oil. 
Exploration (and development of associated gas in 
crude oil reservoirs) is a joint product process that 
generates both crude oil and natural gas reserves in 
a petroleum basin. Natural gas reserves rose rapidly 
as a result of the active corporate search for crude oil 
reserves. In other words, the build-up of natural gas 
reserves in the 1940s and 1950s was unintentional.
Opportunities for exploitation of natural gas 
pools were more limited than for oil pools. Both had 
to await the development of large-diameter contin-
ental pipelines from Alberta, and so entry into new 
markets was delayed. And the natural gas market was 
continental, not overseas. The high cost of moving 
gas, especially by ocean, makes transportation a more 
critical component of delivered price. As a result, it 
was harder for natural gas, than for crude oil, to break 
into more distant markets. Since transmission costs 
are relatively high, the difference between developed 
prices in central Canada and field prices in Alberta 
must be higher for natural gas than for crude oil. 
Consequently, there was increased likelihood either 
that delivered prices would be too high to capture 
sales as large as might be hoped or that the field price 
would be so low that rapid development did not 
appear an attractive proposition.
The nature of regulation in gas markets provided 
further restraints on increased output, particularly 
with respect to exports. Specifically, both the Alberta 
Oil and Gas Conservation Board (OGCB), in 1950, 
and the federal National Energy Board (NEB), in 1959, 
introduced requirements that further gas exports 
from a region would be allowed only if they were 
seen as surplus to regional requirements. In effect, 
this required the maintenance of large inventories 
(reserves) before ex-regional sales could occur. Such 
surplus tests were in existence through the mid-1980s 
and served to keep the gas R/P ratio high. Gas exports 
rose tremendously in the 1960s, but, beginning in 
1970, a period ensued in which new gas export per-
mits were denied. (These tests are discussed in detail 
in Section 3 of this chapter.)
The gas market, like crude oil, was subject to strict 
price regulation from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. 
Table 12.1 shows that gas exports fell sharply after 
1979; the decline was to levels well below authorized 
volumes, indicating that export prices had been set 
higher than compatible with allowable exports. After 
1986, the gas market, like oil, moved to deregulation 
and exports could rise without rigid surplus test 
requirements; sales to U.S. customers increased and 
the R/P ratio fell.
The nature of the relationship between buyers 
and sellers also differed greatly between the Alberta 
crude oil and natural gas markets as the Alberta 
petroleum industry grew after 1950. For oil, as dis-
cussed in Chapter Six, refiners bought from crude oil 
producers (often within a single vertically integrated 
company) and hired the use of transmission facilities. 
There were long-standing trading relationships but 
long-term contracts were rare, and the price paid for 
crude was the current posted price. From the 1940s 
through the 1960s, natural gas was purchased from 
the producer by a natural gas transmission company 
(or a local Alberta utility) under a long-term contract 
with relatively rigid prices for the contract term. The 
transmission company, in turn, signed long-term 
contracts with local gas distribution companies. Since 
there were few transmission companies, and since 
the surplus regulations hindered those aimed largely 
at exports, the Alberta natural gas market was oli-
gopsonistic (tending toward monopsony when only 
TransCanada was actively contracting). This market 
structure, and the surplus regulations, made it difficult 
for producers to market natural gas.
It has been argued that natural gas requires long-
term contracts because pipelines and distributing 
utilities must install so much capital to service cus-
tomers and because customers are so dependent on 
the natural gas they receive. Many public regulatory 
bodies required that utilities sign long-term contracts 
to ensure gas supplies. Such contracts also contributed 
to high R/P ratios and dictated a somewhat differ-
ent development pattern for natural gas pools than 
oil pools in North America. Natural gas reservoirs 
generally commenced with a lower initial output 
rate relative to reserves; further, rather than allowing 
production decline to begin relatively early in the 
pool’s life, the producer often continued development 
drilling so as to maintain a constant output level for a 
number of years.
The thesis that natural gas requires long-term con-
tractual arrangements and oligopsonistic purchasing 
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was not much challenged until the 1970s. However, 
developments in the late 1980s saw gas markets evolv-
ing toward the more open, competitive, short-term 
sales arrangements common in crude oil markets and 
a far greater number of companies involved in active 
trading of natural gas. In its assessment of the first 
decade of deregulation in the Canadian natural gas 
market, after 1986, the NEB noted that the share of gas 
purchased for customers by local utilities had fallen 
from 91 per cent of the market in 1985 to 41 per cent, 
that short-term sales arrangements were of increasing 
importance, that many companies now purchased nat-
ural gas in the producing region and purchased trans-
mission services from the pipeline company, and that 
even long-term natural gas sales contracts typically 
had prices that were wholly or partially tied to natural 
gas spot prices (NEB, 1996).
In summary, the pattern of change in Alberta gas 
production and deliveries can be divided into four 
periods. A by-product phase held from 1947 to the 
late 1950s, characterized by growing local sales and 
high and generally rising R/P ratios as gas discoveries 
followed from oil-directed exploratory activity. There 
was a market penetration phase from 1959 through 
1971 when pipeline links to other Canadian and U.S. 
market areas allowed rapid production growth and 
declining R/P ratios. Natural gas was developing as 
a product itself, beyond by-product status. A tightly 
regulated period ensued from 1972 to 1986 when 
prices and exports were strictly controlled, with 
relatively constant R/P ratios and less sales growth. 
Finally, deregulation began in 1986 with rapid output 
growth directed mainly to exports, a falling R/P ratio, 
even greater independence of natural gas and oil 
supply decisions, and the entry of many new players 
into buying and selling natural gas in Alberta.
Sections 3 and 4 will discuss the changing govern-
ment regulations that attended these developments in 
the natural gas markets.
C. Prices
1. Market Expansion, 1947–71
Alberta natural gas prices from 1947 are shown in 
Table 12.1, columns (8) and (9). Column (8) shows 
average prices at the wellhead or plant gate in dol-
lars per thousand cubic metres (103 m3); dollars per 
thousand cubic feet (Mcf) are shown in column (9). 
Column (10) compares average Alberta field natural 
gas and crude oil prices, by looking at the price of a 
given quantity of energy in the form of natural gas as a 
proportion of the price of the same amount of energy 
from crude oil.
The nominal (current dollar) price of natural 
gas fell somewhat immediately after 1947. It jumped 
sharply (by over 50%) in 1952, as buyers began to 
contract large volumes in anticipation of large ship-
ments from Alberta. From 1952 to 1971, nominal prices 
tended upwards, but at a slow rate (less than 3% per 
year, just about the average inflation rate) so that in 
1971 the real average wellhead price of gas in Alberta 
was almost exactly what it had been in 1952 (using 
the Consumers Price Index). Output grew by almost 
thirty times over this period, suggesting that the 
evolution of the Alberta natural gas market over the 
first twenty-five years after Leduc was predominantly 
supply driven, with large reserves seeking market 
outlets. This interpretation is consistent with the high 
R/P ratios observed. Purchases of natural gas for 
sale outside Alberta were normally under long-term 
contracts between the gas producer and the major 
natural gas pipeline companies (TransCanada for 
shipments east and Westcoast for shipments west). 
The contracts established relatively fixed prices for 
natural gas, with a base price (in cents per Mcf) and 
small periodic increases, as can be seen in Column (9) 
of Table 12.1 for years from the early 1950s through to 
the end of the 1960s. Contracts sometimes included 
a ‘most-favoured-nation’ clause, which would accord 
higher prices in newly signed contracts to the gas sold 
under older contracts. This is a clear disincentive to 
the buyer to offer higher prices on new contracts.
By the early 1970s, natural gas producers and the 
Alberta government were expressing concern about 
the ‘low’ level of natural gas prices and the inflexibil-
ity of pricing provisions in the long-term contracts, 
which were common at the time. (Hamilton, 1974, 
provides a good review of the Canadian situation at 
this date.) These concerns were stimulated in part by 
the rise in oil prices, which began in the early 1970s, 
and were the subject of investigation in a report of 
the Stanford Research Institute (1972). As is shown 
in column (10) of Table 12.1, the prices of Alberta 
natural gas relative to crude oil had been rising con-
sistently from 1948 to 1970. In 1971, this was reversed. 
Increasingly the presumed undervaluation of natural 
gas was tied to what was called its high ‘commodity 
value’; this valuation concept was given a prominent 
role in Alberta legislation in the early 1970s governing 
the arbitration procedure to be used in renegotiating 
gas sales contracts. However, as a basis for pricing, the 
concept of the commodity value of natural gas turned 
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out to be hopelessly ambiguous. What might the term 
mean? A brief discussion in general terms will help set 
the stage for the later discussions of Alberta natural 
gas policies in the 1970s.
2. A Digression on ‘Commodity Values’
The appeal of the term ‘commodity value’ in the early 
1970s was clearly related to differences in the prices 
of crude oil and natural gas and was a shorthand way 
of saying that natural gas is an energy commodity 
like oil, so its price should be closely connected to 
the oil price. In other words, it was implied that in a 
well-functioning natural gas market, gas should not be 
viewed as a separate commodity, but as part of a larger 
energy commodity. The most simplistic view runs as 
follows. Consumers demand and are willing to pay 
for energy. It is possible to substitute other goods or 
services for energy, but generally this cannot be done 
very easily; so energy has no perfect and few close 
substitutes. Within the energy category, however, con-
sumers just need a power source and different energy 
products are close substitutes in this regard. Therefore, 
energy products should be priced at much the same 
level per unit of energy content. The implicit view of 
the natural gas market is given in Figure 12.1. Here 
PCO is the price of natural gas if it were at the same 
level per joule of energy as current crude oil prices. 
The simple commodity pricing argument views the 
demand curve for natural gas as DNG; it is very elastic 
around PCO because of the assumed almost perfect 
substitutability of crude oil and natural gas. Then, as 
shown, the supply curve for natural gas could vary 
widely, and the price of natural gas would still be near 
the oil-based price. Some observers further argued 
that, because of its convenience and clean burning 
properties, natural gas was actually a ‘premium’ fuel 
relative to oil, so should command a higher price than 
the thermal equivalence price. The appeal of the argu-
ment to Alberta gas producers and the rent-collecting 
Alberta government is plain; after all, gas prices in 
1972 were just one third of crude oil prices (in the 
field) on the basis of thermal content (joules or Btus).
Of course, the simple commodity price theory would 
require an explanation of why natural gas prices 
were not at their ‘true’ commodity value. Part of any 
explanation lies in the difference between short-run 
and long-run equilibria. In the short-run market, 
participants are constrained by existing capital equip-
ment. In particular, pipeline and distribution facilities 
may not be in place, and consumers may not possess 
gas-fired equipment. Thus, the short-run demand 
curve is much more inelastic than the long-run one 
(like curve D* in Figure 12.1). If gas supply were large, 
the natural gas price could be well below the oil-based 
“commodity” price. However, in Alberta in 1970 nat-
ural gas prices had been far below that value for at 
least twenty years (since the Leduc find). That was 
plenty of time for most long-run capital investment 
decisions to be undertaken. Why had gas prices risen 
so little compared to oil? And why was the relative 
price falling in the early 1970s? Explanations typically 
emphasized four linked factors: (i) the oligopsonistic 
nature of the industry, with a few gas purchasers able 
to force low prices; (ii) the presence of long-term 
contracts, which tied up large gas volumes at low and 
rigid prices for many years; (iii) limitations on the 
freedom to export gas, which inhibited new buyers 
from entering the market; and (iv) inherent differ-
ences in transportation costs.
Now let us consider some flaws in the simple 
commodity-pricing argument. Two related problems 
stand out: complications posed by geographically 
separate markets and problems related to energy 
substitutability. Geographic differences highlight 
the transmission cost differences between crude 
oil and natural gas. If natural gas were priced at the 
energy equivalent commodity value for crude oil in 
Alberta, then its price would be relatively higher than 
crude oil in markets outside Alberta, and it would be 
overpriced. Proponents of simple commodity-value 
pricing quickly conceded this point but went on to 
suggest that natural gas should be priced at the oil 
level in the most distant major market (e.g., Toronto 
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natural gas lower than crude oil but still higher than 
historical levels.
It would also imply, if the simple commodity-value 
approach were correct, that markets closer to Alberta 
than the distant ones would rely entirely on natural 
gas to the exclusion of oil. That this would not be the 
case (was not the case at even lower gas prices) high-
lights the other main weakness of this approach.
Natural gas and crude oil are not perfect substi-
tutes in use. For one thing, energy consumers buy 
natural gas but almost never use crude oil; they pur-
chase various refined petroleum products (RPPs). One 
might think that this gives an advantage to natural gas, 
allowing a higher energy price than crude oil, since oil 
must incur additional refining charges before it gets 
to consumers. Remember, however, that refining is a 
joint product process; while the entire slate of RPPs 
must, in the long-run, earn sufficiently more than 
crude costs to cover refining costs, not all individual 
RPPs must be priced above crude. RPPs exhibit a wide 
range of prices per unit of energy content. Under the 
simple commodity theory, with which of these should 
natural gas be commodity-priced?
The presumed perfect energy substitutability of 
natural gas and crude was too unrealistic an assump-
tion to serve as a basis for gas pricing. We mentioned 
that many gas producers were quick to argue that gas 
had a cleanliness and convenience advantage over oil 
in the eyes of most households, so might be expected 
to enjoy a ‘premium’ over crude oil prices. This obser-
vation did not take the argument far enough. For 
example, for a rural farmhouse far from a natural gas 
distribution system, natural gas would be far more 
‘inconvenient’ than light fuel oil. The fact is that there 
are many different energy (and non-energy) uses of 
RPPs and natural gas and the different fuels are sub-
stitutable to varying degrees in these uses, and only 
occasionally close to perfect substitutes. For virtually 
all the main uses of natural gas, there are RPPs that 
are technologically capable of serving as substitutes, 
though convenience factors may lead customers to 
prefer one fuel to another. (Some cooks swear by gas 
stoves in preference to electric, kerosene, or wood 
ones.) However, there are RPPs for which natural gas 
is not an attractive substitute (e.g., aviation fuel, motor 
gasoline, asphalt).
As a result, one would not expect the long-run 
demand curve for natural gas to be perfectly elastic 
at the crude oil energy price. Some users would be 
willing to purchase gas even if it cost more than this, 
while many oil users would need prices of natural 
gas far lower before they would shift. Berndt and 
Greenberg (1989, p. 84), for example, report long-run 
own price elasticity of demand estimates for natural 
gas in Canada ranging from –0.3 to –0.7; those are not 
even elastic, let alone perfectly elastic. To return to 
Figure 12.1, the long-run demand curve for natural gas 
will look more like D* than DCO, and it would only be 
by purest chance that supply conditions were such as 
to give a price at PCO. We do not deny that natural gas 
demand is affected by oil prices, as would be expected 
of goods which are substitutable. (Higher crude oil 
prices generate an increase in the demand for nat-
ural gas, and higher competitive gas prices; but only 
by chance would the higher gas price be an energy 
equivalent to oil.)
What, then, of the commodity value approach to 
natural gas pricing? One might hold on to the concept 
in one of two ways, but neither is particularly useful. 
The simple approach might be saved by saying that 
there is some use of gas in a market (at the margin) 
in which one expects that the long-run equilibrium 
prices of natural gas and some RPP would be equal in 
energy terms. Presumably, this would be a relatively 
important (large) market for gas and one in which 
natural gas and the RPP are close to perfect substitutes. 
Some analysts, for instance, focused on the market 
for low temperature process heat in large industrial 
uses in the Toronto area, in which natural gas com-
petes with heavy fuel oil. There are always marginal 
uses, but which they are, and whether or not any of 
them involve near-perfect substitutability with an oil 
product, will be a function of the entire constellation 
of factors determining the supply and demand for 
natural gas. Therefore, the simple commodity-values 
approach does not serve as a general method for 
determining natural gas prices. Rather, the appeal of 
the concept in Alberta in the early 1970s seemed to be 
much more political, as a way for critics to emphasize 
the presumed monopsony power of TransCanada 
PipeLine as a buyer, transporter, and seller of 
natural gas.
Alternatively, one might turn to a more complex 
‘commodity-value’ approach, which is, in concept, 
a reversal of the previous one. Here, one argues that 
natural gas is a commodity whose value should be 
determined by the free interplay of demand and 
supply factors. In other words, rather than tying the 
gas price directly to some other commodity, this 
approach stresses the separation (or uniqueness) of 
gas as a commodity. In fact, the prevailing view of the 
natural gas market has evolved since 1970 from the 
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simple commodity-value theory to this more complex 
one, but it seems somewhat disingenuous to still claim 
to be using a ‘commodity-value’ approach!
However, this view of natural gas as a commod-
ity does tie into the research that emphasizes the 
“commoditization” of the world crude oil market 
(Verleger, 1982, 1986). In this context, the term ‘com-
modity’ refers to a relatively homogeneous and stor-
able product that is widely traded within a market 
setting that exhibits significant price variability. 
“Commoditization” of a market refers to the transition 
from a rigid, highly controlled market with relatively 
fixed prices to a more flexible market. The price flex-
ibility is generally associated with a heavy reliance on 
spot sales, in preference to long-term contracts with 
inflexible prices. The instability in prices that results 
serves as a stimulus to the development of futures and 
options markets. It is sometimes suggested that such 
commodity markets must be effectively competitive, 
so that prices will tend to equilibrium values where 
supply equals demand. In fact, this need not be the 
case, as is illustrated by the commoditization of the 
world oil market. OPEC clearly exercises oligopolistic 
power, but so long as it functions as a quantity-fixing 
cartel there may be large numbers of traders in spot 
markets and oil prices will be very flexible. (See 
Chapter Three.) In retrospect, it is the idea of ‘com-
moditization’ rather than the idea of ‘commodity 
value’ that captures the essence of concerns about low 
natural gas prices in the early 1970s. What was really 
at issue was not, in fact, the precise correspondence 
between crude oil and natural gas prices but the 
inflexible nature of the long-term purchase contracts 
and oligopsonistic price rigidity in the market.
3. Price Controls, 1972–86
a. Domestic Prices
On January 17, 1972, Alberta premier Lougheed 
announced that the ERCB would be instructed to 
investigate the pricing of Alberta natural gas. Order in 
Council 204/72 of February 16 made this official, with 
the ERCB directed to advise the government on four 
matters:
(a) factors that influence field prices for natural gas 
and their suitability in the Alberta public interest,
(b) the pricing provisions of prevailing contracts 
for the purchase of natural gas for marketing 
outside the province and their suitability in the 
Alberta public interest,
(c) present and anticipated field prices of natural 
gas in Alberta and their suitability in the 
Alberta public interest,
(d) possible modifications or alternatives to 
current practice affecting field price, which 
would enhance the benefit to all residents of 
the province.
The ERCB immediately commenced public hear-
ings, which lasted until June, and issued its Report in 
August (ERCB, 1972b). This lengthy report provided a 
review of the Alberta natural gas marketing and con-
tracting procedures. It discussed a variety of factors 
influencing natural gas prices, with particular empha-
sis on the demand for gas and the degree of competi-
tion in the market. With respect to the latter,
the Board does not agree that prices would 
have reached their present level without pur-
chasing competition among Trans Canada, 
Alberta and Southern and Consolidated. The 
Board agrees with the producers that compe-
tition in field purchasing has declined since 
the refusal by the NEB of the authorization of 
increased exports of gas to the United States. 
The Board considers that competition in field 
purchasing of gas is vitally important to the 
Alberta public interest. (p. 7-4)
In discussing factors that should influence price, the 
board argued that
it is in the Alberta public interest for gas to be 
priced at its commodity value in the market-
place. The Board accepts that in some end uses 
gas may be priced lower than alternative fuels, 
while in other applications it may be priced 
higher. In the Board’s view it is important, 
however that, for the aggregate market the 
price of gas be comparable to that of alternate 
fuels. Further, the Board believes it to be in 
the Alberta public interest that the field price 
of gas reflect its field value – the commodity 
value less adjustments for transmission and 
distribution.
The Board expects that under the pres-
sure of the gas shortage in North America, 
the field price of gas in Alberta will be influ-
enced increasingly by its commodity value in 
all market areas. The Board recognizes that 
because of the long term contracts common in 
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the gas industry, and the regulatory time lag, 
gas prices cannot under present circumstances, 
be expected to adjust immediately to changing 
market conditions. It believes changes are 
required in contracts and in regulatory process 
to permit a quicker response of field price to 
changing conditions in the market. (p. 7-8)
On the natural gas supply side, the costs of exploration 
through to field processing of gas were seen
as the factor which determines, whether, at 
any level of price, a sufficient incentive exists 
for a producer to explore for and develop 
new reserves. … The Board does not believe 
that costs have had much direct effect on field 
prices in the past nor that they will or should 
have much direct effect in the future. (p. 7-24)
Since the board acknowledged that gas supply costs 
varied across deposits, the implication is that Alberta 
was seen as a price taker in natural gas markets and 
that the value of alternative fuels would determine the 
appropriate gas price. The board did note that
the term commodity value was used exten-
sively at the hearing but not defined in any 
precise manner. The Board believes that most 
people using the term meant by it the max-
imum price that could be obtained in a specific 
regional market area having regard for the mix 
of end use and the prices of competitive fuels 
in the area. Commodity value does not imply 
that gas be priced equivalent to competing 
fuels in each class of applications in the market 
area but rather that it be so priced on a total or 
overall basis. (p. ii)
The board’s emphasis upon the demand side of the 
market as determining values was somewhat contra-
dicted by its suggestion that gas prices would have to 
be much higher by the early 1980s, essentially to cover 
the costs of Arctic gas (ERCB, 1972b, p. 9-13).
After looking at prevailing market conditions, 
and the level of prices and other contract provisions 
for Alberta gas exports, it concluded “that the actual 
field price for Alberta gas is less than the field value 
by some 10 to 20 cents per Mcf. … [A]nd therefore 
concludes that current field prices are not suitable in 
the Alberta public interest” (p. 9-9). Established price 
escalation factors would leave gas prices well below 
these field values. Most contracts (governing some 
85% of Alberta’s gas exports) included renegotiation 
clauses, such that “the Board believes that providing 
there is free negotiation between seller and buyer and 
effective competition in buying the future field prices 
will approach the future field value and thus be in the 
Alberta public interest” (p. 9-14). However, effective 
competition required the removal of restrictions on 
exports from Canada on gas where removal from 
the province of Alberta had already been approved. 
Moreover, in many contracts with provision for 
renegotiation, this happened at five-year intervals, so 
that there could be considerable time lags in attaining 
appropriate field prices. The board noted that only 30 
per cent of contracted gas volumes were governed by 
most-favoured-nation clauses (which passed on to 
this contract any higher prices offered by the buyer in 
another gas purchase contract) (ERCB, 1972b, p. 8-13).
The board recommended that “competition in the 
buying of Alberta gas be increased” (p. 11-4), which 
would require authorization for increased exports to 
the United States. It also recommended that govern-
ments act to remove “unnecessary restrictions and 
delays operating against the realization of the field 
value of gas” specifically better monitoring of export 
prices and values and quicker responses of public 
utility regulators in passing on gas price increases 
(pp. 11-4, 5). The board did “not believe Government 
intervention with respect to the contract provisions 
is necessary or desirable” so long as the government 
let producers and purchasers know that contracts 
should reflect full field values when first negotiated, 
have adequate price adjustment clauses (plus 3–4% per 
year), and include provision for price redetermination 
of field values as frequently as practicable (at least 
each five years) (pp. 11-7, 8).
On November 16, 1972, the provincial govern-
ment essentially endorsed the board’s findings, urging 
the renegotiation of contracts in light of field values 
higher than prices. Renegotiation each two years 
should be a standard feature of contracts. The ERCB 
was asked to provide a report in spring 1973 assess-
ing the status of old and new contracts in light of the 
government’s gas pricing objectives (i.e., attainment 
of prices at higher levels equivalent to “commodity 
values”). The board’s July 1973 Report found that prices 
in new contracts were noticeably higher and that 
many old contracts had been renegotiated with higher 
prices and generally with two-year price renegoti-
ation provisions (ERCB, 1973). Some 52 per cent of 
authorized gas removals reflected such higher prices, 
although many of the contracts still had prices less 
than the board’s estimated commodity value.
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A follow-up Report by the ERCB (ERCB, August 
1974) found that the field value of natural gas had risen 
sharply due to “interfuel competition” (i.e., OPEC oil 
price rises), from $0.29/Mcf at the start of July 1972 to 
$1.12/Mcf at the start of July 1974 (p. 2-7). These were 
based on a weighted average cost of refined petrol-
eum products to Toronto users less an allowance for 
natural gas distribution costs in Toronto. The board 
thought that commodity values would be about the 
same in Montreal and much higher in California, 
where oil prices were higher (p. 2-8). The board noted 
that prices had been renegotiated, and two-year price 
redetermination accepted, in contracts covering some 
96 per cent of gas leaving Alberta. The board esti-
mated the average field price of gas leaving Alberta 
would be $0.46/Mcf, as compared to $0.16/Mcf two 
years earlier. The increases were clearly viewed as 
desirable by the provincial government but had come 
about largely through supplier–purchaser contract 
negotiations.
The government had not been entirely passive, 
however. It had announced that the level of prices 
would be a key ingredient in the assessment of new 
permits to remove natural gas from the province, 
and requests by TransCanada Pipelines (TCPL) for 
additional gas to be placed under permit were shelved 
by the government on the grounds of inadequate 
prices. Moreover, legislation was introduced (the 
Alberta Arbitration Amendment Act, RSA 1973, chap. 
88, Section 16.1) to ensure that price redetermination 
clauses in energy contracts would be applied in such 
a way as to ensure prices for gas at a level consistent 
with what would be expected under effective com-
petition. The legislation saw this as the “commodity 
value,” which would be derived from the price of 
substitutable fuels plus premiums reflecting “inherent 
special qualities of gas.” Prices on new contracts rose 
sharply in the summer of 1972 when a new purchaser, 
Pan Alberta Gas Ltd., entered the market, offering an 
initial field price of $0.38 per Mcf, some $0.15 more 
than TCPL was offering. TCPL’s lower offer prices are 
consistent with the behaviour anticipated of a monop-
sonistic buyer; TCPL’s preference for lower prices was 
strengthened by the presence in some of its existing 
long-term purchase contracts of most-favoured- 
nation clauses.
Thus, despite TCPL’s dominance as a purchaser, 
which the NEB’s denial of new gas export permits 
in 1971 had reinforced, there was inexorable upward 
pressure on gas prices, and from a variety of sources. 
Purely economic forces included rising prices for 
crude oil, which increased the attractiveness of natural 
gas as a fuel, and the entry of a major new gas pur-
chaser (Pan-Alberta). Regulatory pressures came 
from the acceptance of the Alberta government of a 
commodity value standard for gas prices, which was 
utilized by the government in assessing gas removal 
permits and formalized as the proper basis for gas 
price redetermination procedures. As shown in Table 
12.1, the average field price of Alberta natural gas 
rose from $0.17/Mcf in 1972 to $0.19 in 1973, $0.30 
in 1974, and $0.62 in 1975. In the spring of 1975, an 
arbitration board awarded a price of $1.15/Mcf, effect-
ive November 1975, in a price renegotiation dispute 
between TCPL and Gulf Oil Canada.
The reliance upon market-pricing procedures for 
natural gas (albeit with strong pressure for higher 
prices from the governments of Alberta and B.C.) 
contrasted sharply with the regulated pricing environ-
ment for crude oil, which had been in place since the 
September 1973 oil price freeze. Gas prices could have 
been left unregulated, as with coal, another energy 
product that competes with oil-based fuels. This, how-
ever, was unlikely, given that most of the factors that 
had led Ottawa to regulate crude oil prices also held 
for natural gas: it provided a large share of Canadian 
energy in markets west of Quebec (far larger than 
coal, and higher than oil in more western markets); 
the value of natural gas was strongly affected by oil 
prices, which in the absence of oil price regulation in 
Canada meant OPEC prices; Canada was a large nat-
ural gas producer, and net exporter, so that a “made-
in-Canada” price was feasible. The fact that Canadian 
natural gas producers were also crude oil producers 
may have led policy-makers to feel that symmetric 
regulatory treatment was desirable. At a more political 
level, the rapid increase in natural gas prices after 1972 
could be seen as pitting the interests of natural gas 
producers concentrated in Alberta and northeast B.C. 
against the interests of natural gas consumers spread 
across a much larger part of the country (i.e., in mar-
kets as far east as Montreal).
In 1975, Ottawa passed the Petroleum Adminis-
tration Act. (Edie, 1976, summarizes the main legal 
issues associated with the federal and provincial gas 
pricing provisions in this period.) Under Section 52, 
this gave Ottawa (through the NEB) the power and 
responsibility to set the price of gas crossing provincial 
boundaries. Section 50 gave the minister responsible 
for energy the power to enter into gas-pricing agree-
ments with any province. The June 1975 federal budget 
announced that Ottawa and Alberta had reached an 
agreement on natural gas prices under which they 
would set gas prices. The exact regulations and the 
364 PETROPOLIT ICS
economic implications will be described in more 
detail in Section 4 of this chapter. From November 
of 1975 through November of 1986, Canadian natural 
gas prices were set by governments. The Government 
of Alberta allowed a discount on gas sold within the 
province. Alberta gas sold elsewhere in Canada was 
at price levels set, for the most part, by joint Alberta–
Ottawa agreement. Average wellhead price levels are 
Table 12.2: Regulated Natural Gas Prices, 1975 to 1985
 Domestic Gas Prices Export Gas Price3
  Toronto Gate1 ($/106 BTU) Alberta Border2 ($/106 BTU) U.S. ($/106 BTU) Canadian ($/106 BTU)
1975 (November 1) 1.25 0.78  1.60
1976 (July 1) 1.405 0.92  
1976 (September 10)    1.80
1977 (January 1) 1.505 0.99  1.94
1977 (August) 1.68 1.16  
1977 (September 21)   2.16 2.36
1978 (February 1) 1.85 1.26  
1978 (August 1) 2.00 1.41  
1979 (May 1)   2.30 2.68
1979 (August 1) 2.15 1.54  
1979 (August 11)   2.80 3.29
1980 (November 3)   3.45 4.05
1980 (February 1) 2.30 1.64  
1980 (February 17)   4.47 5.20
1981 (September 1) 2.60 1.94  
1981 (April 1)   4.94 5.95
1982 (September 1) 2.96 1.82  
1982 (February 1) 3.55 2.07  
1983 (August 1) 3.80 2.32  
1983 (February 1) 3.99 2.57  
1983 (April 12)   4.40 5.43
1983 (July 13)   Base 4.40 5.43
    VRIP4 3.40 4.20
1983 (August 1) 3.99 2.82  
1984 (February 1) 3.99 2.98  
1984 (August 1) 4.15 2.98  
1984 (November 1)   * 
1985 (February 1) 4.14 2.98  
1985 (June 1) 4.06 2.98  
1985 (November 1) 4.06** 2.98** *** 
Source: Royal Bank, “The North American Natural Gas Industry,” and DataMetrics Limited.
Notes:
1. After September 1981, the Toronto city gate price was set by adding transportation charges and the excise taxes to the regulated Alberta border price.
2. Prior to September 1981, the Alberta border price was determined by netting transportation charges from the Toronto city gate price.
3. After 1977, the Canadian export price was set in U.S. dollars.
4. VRIP is ‘volume related incentive price.’
* Canadian exporters were given the option of negotiating gas prices with the proviso that these prices not be less than the wholesale price of gas at the Toronto city 
gate.
** Domestic prices frozen until November 1, 1986, when full deregulation took effect.
*** Floor price for exports is the adjacent border domestic price.
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shown in Table 12.1, rising to a peak of $2.92/Mcf 
in 1984, before falling back, with oil prices, to $2.20 
in 1986.
Regulated prices for domestic and export gas over 
the price control period (November 1, 1975 through 
October 31, 1986) are shown in Table 12.2 in dollars 
per million BTU (which is approximately the same as 
the price per Mcf). From 1975 to the September 1, 1981, 
Memorandum of Agreement between Ottawa and the 
Alberta government, the price of natural gas was fixed 
at the Toronto city gate; the Alberta border ‘price’ was 
the Toronto price net of transmission charges from 
Alberta to Toronto. After September 1981, the Alberta 
border price was fixed by regulation and the Toronto 
city gate price was the Alberta price plus transmis-
sion charges, plus a new federal tax on natural gas 
(discussed in Section 4.6.2). As can be seen, natural 
gas prices increased sharply under regulation, just as 
crude oil prices were increased. (See Chapters Six and 
Nine; recall that Canadian domestic crude oil prices 
were held below international crude prices.) After 
1983, as world crude oil markets weakened, gas prices 
were held constant at the Alberta border at $3.00/Mcf.
b. Export Prices
As Section 4 will set out in more detail, the National 
Energy Board was given the responsibility for over-
seeing natural gas export prices (NEB Act, Section 
83(a)). In the 1950s and 1960s, natural gas for export 
was purchased on much the same basis as gas for 
domestic use, that is, under long-term contracts with 
quite rigid pricing provisions. The OPEC-induced 
oil price increases of the early 1970s increased the 
attractiveness of Canadian gas to U.S. users but did 
not immediately generate higher contract prices. In 
September 1970, the federal government ordered the 
NEB to monitor export prices; “where in the opinion 
of the Board there has been a significant increase in 
prices for competing gas supplies or for alternative 
energy sources, the Board shall report its findings 
and recommendations to the Governor in Council” 
(NEB, 1970, p. 2-1). In its July 1974 Report on Natural 
Gas Export Pricing, the board concluded “considering 
that in all cases the border price has fallen well below 
the Board’s estimate of the current value of the gas, 
it would seem that a major increase in price to a uni-
form border price for all export licenses is appropriate 
to the circumstances” (NEB, 1974a, p. 5-28). The board 
recommended a minimum price of $1.00/Mcf. On 
September 20, 1974, Ottawa, after consultation with 
the producing provinces, set a one dollar per Mcf 
border price effective January 1, 1975. In its March 
1975 Report, the NEB recommended that the price 
be increased to $1.60/Mcf, and the federal govern-
ment concurred. Table 12.2 shows gas export border 
prices from November 1975 on, as set by regulation. 
It was noted above (see Column 7 of Table 12.1) that 
gas exports fell after 1979. Effective July 13, 1983, gas 
exporters were given more flexibility in negotiating 
export prices. Initially, this involved a VRIP (volume 
related incentive price), which allowed reduced prices 
on volumes in excess of a certain amount (e.g., 50% of 
authorized exports). In November 1984, export price 
regulations were further relaxed; buyers and sellers 
were free to negotiate prices with a floor equal to the 
Toronto city gate price, and later (November 1985) a 
floor equal to the domestic price at the export border 
point. The average export border price peaked at 
$6.06/Mcf in 1982, falling each year after that to $3.35/
Mcf in 1986 (Watkins, 1989, p. 120).
4. The Deregulated Era, 1986–
Many economists would argue that the period of 
natural gas price controls beginning in 1974 sowed 
the seeds of its own destruction, much as had the 
overt oil control period discussed in Chapter Nine. 
Gas pricing and export provisions were subject to 
ongoing review and modification as new ‘problems,’ 
such as falling exports and rising excess deliverability, 
manifest themselves. The industry, the government 
of Alberta, and many independent analysts argued 
for a dismantling of controls and acceptance of a 
deregulated natural gas market. The Western Accord 
of March 1985, which accepted June 1, 1985, as the date 
for deregulation of the oil market, also stressed the 
need for a more “flexible and market oriented pricing 
system” (p. 3) for gas (Canada, 1985a). On October 
31, 1985, Ottawa and the three natural-gas-producing 
provinces (Alberta, B.C., and Saskatchewan) signed an 
Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices (some-
times called the Halloween Agreement), following 
recommendations of a task force established under 
the Western Accord (Canada, 1985b). The intent of 
the agreement was to “foster a competitive market for 
natural gas in Canada, consistent with the regulated 
character of the transmission and distribution sectors 
of the gas industry.” Furthermore, “effective November 
1, 1986 the prices of natural gas in interprovincial trade 
will be determined by negotiations between buyers 
and sellers,” as had been the case since 1984 for gas 
exports (though exports were subject to a price floor).
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However, natural gas could not be deregulated 
with the same ease as crude (see Watkins, 1991a). 
Amongst reasons for this were:
(i) The different nature of natural gas regulation, 
in particular the export regulations, which had 
encouraged very high reserves to production 
ratios for gas. Deregulating natural gas was, in 
this respect, analogous to tearing down a dam, 
something that might best be carried out in 
a series of careful steps rather than at once as 
with crude oil.
(ii) The very concentrated buyers’ side of the 
market, in which TCPL had long operated both 
as the major gas transmission facility and as 
the prime buyer of natural gas in the field. In 
contrast, oil pipelines functioned as common 
carriers.
(iii) The prevalence in the market of long-term 
contracts between natural gas producers 
and the purchaser, so that neither volumes 
produced nor prices paid exhibited immediate 
flexibility in response to changing market 
conditions, although most contracts had 
moved to two-year price renegotiation just 
prior to the price control regime of 1975.
More detail on how deregulation of natural gas 
actually occurred will come in Sections 3 (on export 
limitations) and 4 (on prices). (See also Watkins, 
1991a, and Bradley and Watkins, 2003.) At this point, 
we will simply remark that since 1986 North American 
natural gas markets have been revolutionized. (Since 
the late 1980s the NEB has produced a continuing 
series of useful reports on Natural Gas Markets; 
NEB, 1992, 1996, 1997, and 2002 are particularly good 
reviews of the evolution of Canadian gas markets 
after 1986.) Canadian export limits have been largely 
dismantled – a result which has been entrenched in 
the Canada–U.S. FTA and NAFTA. The large transmis-
sion companies have been joined by numerous other 
buyers of natural gas in the field, including large con-
sumers and a variety of gas trading companies. At the 
same time, the transmission companies have shifted 
to common carrier status; tariffs are still regulated, 
but others have right of access to ship gas. Rigidities 
in sales arrangements have been largely eliminated, as 
increasing volumes of natural gas are exchanged in the 
spot market, and as long-term contracts have adopted 
increasingly flexible pricing arrangements. The trans-
mission and gas trading activities of the major trans-
mission companies have been separated (‘debundled’); 
for example, in 1986, TCPL set up Western Gas 
Marketing Limited (WGML) as a wholly owned sub-
sidiary to handle its purchases and sales of natural gas.
Table 12.1 shows changes in the average field price 
of Alberta natural gas since 1986. Prices fell dramat-
ically after 1985, as did oil prices internationally and 
in Canada. In part, the lower gas prices reflected the 
decreased value of crude oil, but increasing deregu-
lation also led to rapid increases in the production 
of natural gas, putting downward pressure on the 
price. Natural gas prices remained lower throughout 
the 1990s than they had been in the first half of the 
1980s, even in nominal terms. The price of natural gas 
relative to oil varied as a function of different market 
developments for the two products; in general, from 
1985 through the 1990s, gas was relatively lower-priced 
than it was in the price control period. This is not 
surprising given the very high R/P ratio for gas relative 
to oil at the start of the deregulation period and the 
relatively greater ease of natural gas reserve additions 
in the province.
However, the average field price of Table 12.1 
covers a wide variety of sales arrangements, not all at 
identical prices. For instance, by the mid-1990s, sig-
nificant volumes of gas were moved under four differ-
ent types of sales arrangements (NEB, 1992, 1997).
(1) In part as a legacy of the long-term contractual 
agreements common in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
early 1970s, companies such as WGML and Pan 
Alberta acted as ‘supply aggregators,’ which 
purchase gas from large numbers of separate 
gas pools for resale, largely to natural gas dis-
tribution companies (‘LDCs’ or local distri-
bution companies that operated as ‘demand 
aggregators’ for large numbers of individual 
consumers). The field price for gas traded in 
this manner was usually negotiated annually 
between the supply aggregator and the pool 
of gas purchasers, and held for a November 1 
to October 31 contract year; beginning in the 
1990s, more and more of these contracts moved 
to agreed-upon flexible pricing provisions tying 
prices to Alberta spot market natural gas prices.
(2) Individual term contracts (for longer than 30 
days) have been negotiated between an indi-
vidual producer and a purchaser (which may 
be a natural gas user or a trading company that 
operates as a market intermediary) for sale of 
gas in the producing region. Typically the field 
price of this gas is tied to a thirty-day average of 
reported spot market price.
The Alberta Natural Gas Industry 367
(3) Individual term contracts between a producer 
and a purchaser for sale in the consuming 
region. Typically the price in the consuming 
region is tied to spot markets, and the field price 
received by the producers will be this price less 
the transmission cost for the gas. For a producer 
that has contracted space over the long-term 
on a pipeline, the transmission charge will nor-
mally consist of a small “commodity charge” to 
cover the fuel and other operating costs of the 
pipeline place a larger “demand charge” to cover 
the capital cost of the pipeline. If the producer 
has not already contracted pipeline space, it 
must be purchased at current prices, which may 
be the very low commodity charge if the pipe-
line has spare capacity, but much more if there 
is none.
(4) A spot sale (for less than thirty day’s exchange) 
may be negotiated between a producer and an 
interested buyer. As the number of intermedi-
ary trading institutions (e.g., electronic bulletin 
boards) has increased, it becomes increasingly 
likely that spot sales occurring at any point in 
time will all be at ‘identical’ prices (allowing for 
any gas quality differentials). The tendency to 
equal prices was also facilitated prior to 2000 
by NOVA’s reliance on a ‘postage stamp’ tariff for 
gas shipped within Alberta.
In a well-functioning, fully integrated North 
American natural gas market, one would expect that 
natural gas field prices under these various sales 
arrangements would be relatively close to one another, 
since the various alternative sales arrangements are 
close substitutes for one another from either a buyer’s 
or a seller’s point of view. Some field price differences 
would remain, reflecting varying transmission costs, 
depending upon how transportation is handled (i.e., 
paid by the producer or the buyer; bought on a longer- 
term contract or at prevailing rates). In addition, less 
flexible pricing arrangements will generally differ 
from spot prices; thirty-day averages will lag any spot 
price trends, and one-year prices should approximate 
expected average spot prices but not reflect any 
unexpected (random) market developments. In a 
well-functioning market there could also be some 
small differences between prices in different contracts 
reflecting differing risk preferences (e.g., one-year 
contracts have a reduced risk of price change as com-
pared to a series of spot contracts over the year). The 
growing commoditization of gas markets, for example 
NYMEX natural gas futures, offers other ways for 
companies to reduce market risks. Another indication 
of increased commoditization is the major rise in gas 
storage capacity, which is serving to reduce the sea-
sonal variation in natural gas prices.
On balance, by the early 1990s, Alberta natural 
gas had become part of a flourishing and flexible 
integrated North American natural gas market. This 
implied that Alberta natural gas prices would be 
closely tied to those in the United States, with price 
changes reflecting all supply, demand, and transporta-
tion changes across the continent. Traditional trading 
regions will tend to evolve over time along with the 
integrated market. Deregulation has seen a rapid rise 
in exports relative to domestic Canadian sales. By 
1995, there had been new pipeline links established 
between Ontario (the largest market for Alberta nat-
ural gas from the early 1960s on) and U.S. producing 
centres, providing further evidence of today’s inter-
dependence in continental natural gas markets, and 
harkening back to Waverman’s hypothetical analysis 
of efficient, integrated North American gas markets 
in the 1960s (Waverman, 1973). The rise in exports 
of Alberta gas was indeed dramatic, as exports more 
than tripled from 1986 to 1993.
In the 1990s, increased attention was focused on 
the market impact of transmission facilities. Spare 
capacity in transmission out of the province leaves 
field prices and production volumes very sensitive 
to supply and demand changes elsewhere on the 
continent. This is particularly true as increased com-
petition enters the transmission industry. In this 
respect, the opening of the Alliance pipeline in late 
2000 was important, running from Alberta to Illinois, 
connecting with the U.S. Midwest pipeline grid, and 
offering competition to TCPL on eastward natural 
gas shipments. Spare capacity in the pipelines means 
that space can be purchased for ‘commodity’ charges 
only (i.e., pipeline operating costs); if this is done by 
gas producers, it implies higher field values (netbacks 
for the gas). On the other hand, if there is no excess 
pipeline capacity then Alberta sales volumes and field 
prices will be less responsive to changes in market 
conditions elsewhere in North America. Furthermore, 
shipment costs will reflect operating and capital costs 
(commodity and demand charges), implying a larger 
gap between delivered prices and field values than if 
spare pipeline capacity exists.
Natural gas producers will favour spare pipeline 
capacity under these conditions. Of course, transmis-
sion companies will be willing to install new capacity 
only if they expect to recover both operating and 
capital costs. These complications would not exist if 
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we lived in a world of perfect certainty and with per-
fectly malleable capital: in such a world, new pipeline 
capacity could be constructed (and deconstructed) 
exactly as required. However, with both demand and 
supply uncertainties, and economies of scale in nat-
ural gas pipelines, new facilities must be large and are 
planned and constructed over a number of years in 
anticipation of future market conditions. The regional 
gas market may, then, operate for some period of 
time in a short-run equilibrium that differs from the 
anticipated long-run equilibrium. For example, this 
could be with unused pipeline capacity and ‘higher’ 
netback prices. Such a situation typically conveys its 
own market message, inducing adjustment towards 
the long-run equilibrium; in this case, a higher field 
price attracts more output that will fill the spare pipe-
line capacity. Similarly, if pipeline capacity is fully 
booked, a rise in market prices may fail to translate 
back into higher field prices, but the increased margin 
between market and field prices serves as an incentive 
to contract new supplies and construct additional 
pipeline facilities.
The commoditization of the North American 
natural gas market has raised these new uncertain-
ties for participants in the market, a major change 
from the days of long-term contracts with almost 
all gas brought and sold by the pipeline compan-
ies. Moreover, the adjustment problems seem to be 
more pronounced in the North American natural gas 
market than in the crude oil market, where prices are 
primarily determined by the world market and where 
domestic markets are ready to accept any domestic 
crude available before drawing on OPEC supplies.
As Table 12.1 illustrates, starting in 1999 Alberta 
natural gas prices began to rise dramatically, to the 
highest level they have attained (at least in nominal 
dollars); the average price in 2006 was $8.54/Mcf, and 
it had been as high as $11.38/Mcf in October of 2005. 
(See the Alberta Department of Energy, Alberta Gas 
Reference Price History.) These high prices reflected 
increasing tightness in North American natural gas 
markets and the loss of upward flexibility in produc-
tion as reserves-to-production ratios in both Canada 
and the United States fell below ten. In the early years 
of the new century, there was much uncertainty about 
whether these high prices would be temporary or 
long-lived. Economists would expect that significant 
price increases will generate long-term production 
increases and consumption declines. However, some 
industry spokesmen suggested that geological pros-
pects for large increases in low-cost production were 
unlikely, and that North America would have to 
rely increasingly on gas that is high cost (e.g., hard 
to produce ‘tight’ gas that is in reservoirs with low 
permeability and such non-conventional sources as 
coal bed methane, shale gas, or new supply sources 
that have high transmission costs, such as Alaska and 
Arctic gas or imported liquefied natural gas [LNG]). 
On the consumption side, the sharp rise in oil prices 
starting in 2003 inhibited substitution out of natural 
gas into refined petroleum products.
As Table 12.1 shows, natural gas prices fell from 
the October 2005 peak; by 2009, the average well-
head price in Alberta was $4.04/Mcf. The Alberta 
Department of Energy reported a monthly natural 
gas price below $4/Mcf for every month from April 
2010 to February 2013, ranging from $1.58/Mcf to 
$3.69/Mcf. Price expectations by 2013 were much 
less optimistic than they had been several years ear-
lier, reflecting in large part the increased availabil-
ity in North America, despite falling gas prices, of 
non-conventional gas from coal bed methane and, 
especially, U.S. shale gas. Horizontal drilling tech-
niques have been particularly critical in lowering 
costs of these non-conventional gas sources. Vidas 
and Hugman (2008) provide a useful survey of North 
American non-conventional gas resources and pos-
sible producibility. U.S. shale gas output rose by 25 
times from 2000 to 2012, rising, from 1.67 per cent 
of U.S. natural gas supply to 34 per cent (EIA, 2013, 
Figure 91, p. 79).
We might return to the issue of ‘commodity 
pricing,’ or, more generally, the relationship between 
natural gas and oil prices. As Table 12.1 illustrates, in 
the late 1990s, the price of natural gas relative to crude 
oil increased sharply in Alberta, from less than 0.4 in 
the mid-1990s to just over 1 by 2001; it remained at 
relatively high levels for about five years, before plun-
ging down, below 0.3, by the year 2011. It is clear that 
full commodity pricing equivalence has not held in 
Alberta (where the price of natural gas and oil would 
exhibit the same price per unit of energy content, 
so the relative price would always equal one). Nor 
is there a one-to-one correspondence in changes in 
crude oil and natural gas prices on an energy-con-
tent basis (where the relative price would remain 
unchanged). Plourde and Watkins (1998) utilized 
statistical co-integration analysis to examine the link 
between crude oil and natural gas prices from late 
1975 through 1999. They found that the prices moved 
together during the regulated price period (1975 to 
mid-1985); this would be expected, since gas prices 
tended to be set in relation to oil prices, as mentioned 
above and reviewed in more detail in Section 4, below. 
Similar connections were found in what they labelled 
the deregulated period (from 1988 on), but “a rather 
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different picture emerges when the deregulation 
period is split into earlier and later parts. The relation-
ship between upstream prices of crude oil and natural 
gas has weakened as deregulation has progressed.” 
This suggests that the natural gas market has become 
increasingly sensitive to supply and demand factors 
specific to natural gas as the time since deregulation 
has lengthened and is consistent with a gas market 
in which pricing and contract volumes have become 
increasingly flexible and short-term. Serletis and 
Rangel-Rui (2004) also find increasing independ-
ence of oil and natural gas prices in North America; 
however, Brown and Yücel (2008) and Hartley et al. 
(2008) argue that a long-term link still exists, so long 
as allowance is made for such factors as weather and 
storage.
Finally, we should briefly discuss the increased role 
of natural gas storage within North America. Markets 
for Canadian natural gas generally exhibit signifi-
cant seasonality, with particularly high demand from 
residential and commercial users during the winter 
season, as much as six times higher than in summer 
(NEB, 2008, p. 17). In the absence of ready and cost-
less production variability or storage capabilities, this 
seasonality generates seasonal price variability and 
higher transmission costs. (The former because prices 
are higher during the peak season; the latter because 
pipeline facilities must meet peak demand and are 
not fully utilized throughout the year.) While gas can 
be stored in containers, most gas storage is below 
ground. Gas storage facilities increased particularly 
rapidly in North America with the deregulated mar-
kets that developed beginning in the mid-1980s. (EIA, 
1995 and 2006 provide a good overview of natural 
gas storage. Hartley et al. 2008, and Brown and Yücel, 
2008, provide statistical analysis showing that stor-
age affects natural gas prices.) By storing gas during 
off-peak times (seasons) and releasing it during peak 
times, the seasonal variability in gas prices can be 
reduced; of course, gas stocks are also available to 
meet unexpected events (e.g., unusually cold weather). 
Storage facilities have been installed in both gas-pro-
ducing and consuming regions and have been built by 
gas transmission companies, gas producers, and other 
parties who hope to profit from owning such facilities 
either for their own gas trading or by leasing space to 
other parties.
In Alberta, a number of old reservoirs have been 
converted to gas storage, with a total capacity at the 
end of 2012 of 11,417 106 m3, and a maximum deliver-
ability of 178.7 106 m3/d (ERCB, 2013, Reserves Report, 
ST-98, Table 5.8). At this deliverability rate, the facility 
would be drained in two months; storage facilities are 
capable of much faster drainage than a conventional 
gas pool but have correspondingly higher lifting costs.
3. Alberta and Canadian Natural Gas 
Protection Policies
We use the term ‘removal’ to refer to the movement 
of natural gas beyond Alberta’s borders, irrespective 
of whether it is destined for markets in other parts 
of Canada or in the United States. We use the term 
‘export’ to refer to the movement of natural gas to 
the United States. After the 1950s, no distinction was 
made at the provincial level in terms of gas removals, 
whether to other regions of Canada or to the United 
States. The national controls solely relate to exports 
destined for foreign markets. Any party wishing to 
export gas from Canada must surmount both relevant 
provincial and national hurdles.
Alberta’s policies governing removal of natural 
gas are outlined below. These policies are crucial, not 
only because about 85 per cent of Canada’s established 
gas reserves are located in Alberta, but because the 
policies initially followed at the national level by the 
National Energy Board (NEB) after its inception in 
1959 were closely allied to those of Alberta – and 
indeed after that remained in symbiotic relationship 
with them. Policies pushed by the NEB are dealt with 
after the discussion of Alberta’s initiatives in the pro-
tection arena. (This discussion is largely based on 
Watkins, 1982a, 1990. See also Winberg, 1987, chap. 5.)
A. Development of Alberta Policy
The growth in Alberta’s reserves of natural gas was 
sufficiently rapid after the Second World War that by 
1950 they represented a very considerable inventory in 
relation to existing markets. This build-up in reserves 
provoked plans for large-scale removal of gas from the 
province. The Alberta government became concerned 
about future shortages if use of the province’s gas 
reserves were not adequately controlled.
1. The Dinning Commission and Early  
Alberta Legislation
In November, 1948, the Alberta government appointed 
a commission headed by Robert J. Dinning to investi-
gate the province’s natural gas situation. The ‘Dinning 
Commission,’ as it became known, submitted a 
report in March 1949 that strongly recommended 
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that Albertans have first claim on the province’s gas 
reserves. This recommendation did not fall on deaf 
ears, and in 1949 the Alberta Legislature passed the 
Gas Resources Preservation Act.
The intent of the act was outlined by Premier 
Manning in his Budget Address of 1950 (March 3, 
1950, p. 6):
The Government’s first and foremost respons-
ibility is to protect the interests and welfare of 
the people of this Province. … To this end, no 
application for the export of natural gas will be 
given favourable consideration until such time 
as the Government is satisfied beyond question 
that … there are sufficient gas reserves to meet 
the present and future domestic and industrial 
requirements of this Province. When fully 
satisfied that a surplus exists over and above 
these requirements, the Government will 
approve the export of such surplus with each 
application being considered on its own merits 
and in the light of all prevailing circumstances.
The key passages of the act were (Chapter 157, Statutes 
of Alberta):
The Board shall not grant a permit for the 
removal of any gas or propane from the 
Province unless in its opinion it is in the public 
interest to do so having regard to:
(a) the present and future needs of persons 
within the Province and
(b) the established reserves and the trends in 
growth and discovery of reserves of gas or 
propane in the Province.
The board referred to here was the Alberta Oil and 
Gas Conservation Board (OGCB; after 1970, and 
again in 2007, it was renamed the Energy Resources 
Conservation Board, ERCB, and, from 1994 to 2007, 
the Energy and Utilities Board, EUB).
The 1949 act was amended frequently. However, its 
overall nature and purpose did not change materially. 
Significantly in 1984 another clause was added to con-
siderations (a) and (b) listed above, namely: “(c) the 
expected economic costs and benefits to Alberta 
of the removal of gas or propane from Alberta” 
(Gas Resources Preservation Act, 1984, Section 5(3)). 
Moreover, conditions to be attached to a permit were 
to refer to the price of the gas and to “other factors 
relevant to the expected economic benefits to Alberta” 
(Section 6(d)). In 1986, clause (c) was replaced by a 
general criterion, which will be discussed later.
2. Initial Policy of the Alberta Conservation Board
The intent of the Gas Resources Preservation Act – 
adequate protection of Alberta consumers – was clear, 
but the manner by which such protection would be 
implemented was not. In essence, it was left for the 
Conservation Board to adorn the legal skeleton with 
regulatory flesh.
Initially, the board interpreted its mandate con-
servatively, and as a result most early applications 
to export gas from the province were refused. The 
original regulatory framework required the board 
to be satisfied that Alberta’s established gas reserves 
were sufficient to meet the province’s forecast annual 
gas requirements, including peak day, for a period 
of thirty years, plus any extant export commitments 
(including their peak-day requirements), before 
authorizing gas exports (OGCB, 1961, pp. 4–5).
In essence, then, the protection formula was a 
straightforward comparison of stocks and future 
demands on them. If the bins (established reserves) 
were full – exceeding thirty years of estimated future 
consumption plus any already authorized exports – 
the harvest was available for export. In symbols, the 
export formula was:
     30  
Gs = REST – ∑ Ai – E – f (PD30) (1) 
      i=1 
where
Gs = surplus gas.
REST = established gas reserves, Alberta.
Ai = estimated Alberta gas requirements, 
year i.
E = remaining authorized exports.
f(PD30) = reserves necessary to protect Alberta 
peak-day requirements in the 
thirtieth year.
The figure for established reserves was adjusted by 
deducting reserves found but considered beyond eco-
nomic reach. The reserves set aside to meet peak-day 
requirements were often called ‘cushion’ gas.
Because of constraints on distribution systems 
within the province, protection of the province’s 
gas requirements was also considered on a detailed 
regional basis. Thus, even if Alberta enjoyed an over-
all gas surplus under the formula, removals from a 
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particular area might be denied because of a perceived 
local shortage.
The reason for selecting thirty years as the period 
of protection was not identified at the time of adop-
tion, but it seemingly was largely a matter of judg-
ment, based on the life of a typical gas reservoir, the 
period of amortization of a major investment and the 
period over which new technology and developments 
would be expected to influence energy supply (G.W. 
Govier, interview, Canadian Petroleum, November 
1978, pp. 61–64).
Exporters needed to ensure most of their gas 
supply was under contract – the guideline evolved by 
the board eventually became 80 per cent of the pro-
spective export volumes (OGCB Report 69-D, 1969c, 
p. 63). This provision was intended to avoid distribut-
ing export permits in a way tantamount to the award 
of hunting licences.
In addition to protecting Alberta requirements 
under the surplus formula, the removal permits them-
selves provided for local utilities to access gas under 
permit in the event of local shortages. These ‘fail-safe’ 
clauses were:
… a condition that the permittee will supply gas 
or propane at a reasonable price to any com-
munity or consumer in Alberta that is willing 
to take delivery of gas or propane at a point on 
the pipeline transmitting the gas or propane or 
at a processing plant producing the propane and 
that, in the opinion of the Board, can reasonably 
be supplied by the permittee; … (Gas Resources 
Preservation Act, 1984, Clause 6(f))
3. Policy Developments in the 1950s
The decade was marked by gradual relaxation by the 
board of the strict canons of policy it initially adopted. 
Relaxation was consistent with continued growth in 
Alberta’s gas reserves, the development of transmis-
sion and distribution systems within the province, and 
the attachment of firm markets outside the province. 
The way the policy was relaxed is outlined below.
First, the Alberta Gas Truck Line Company 
Limited (later NOVA and now part of TransCanada), 
a common carrier under provincial jurisdiction and 
control, was established in 1957 to serve as an efficient 
means of gathering gas from various fields within the 
province for transportation to points of removal. The 
inception of the trunk line system, the further growth 
and geographical scatter of the province’s reserves, and 
the extensions in utility company distribution systems 
increased the degree of supply flexibility within the 
province and enabled the board to put less weight 
on regional discrepancies in both supply and future 
requirements. Later, regional aspects were virtually 
eliminated from the board’s deliberations.
Second, the consistent growth in the province’s gas 
reserves resulted in the board adopting a less conserv-
ative approach in estimating the supply available to 
meet future requirements. By 1958, the board allowed 
for satisfying some part of future Alberta require-
ments from new discoveries. In this vein, established 
reserves were allocated to meet annual requirements 
for twenty-six to thirty years and peak day require-
ments for twenty-five years. Reserves to be developed 
in the future were assumed to meet the remaining 
annual and peak-day requirements at the end of the 
thirtieth year, as long as reserve growth remained 
consistent. Such reliance on new discoveries to satisfy 
a portion of future Alberta requirements marked a 
significant policy change.
Third, before 1959, the board recognized pref-
erence for ex-Alberta Canadian requirements for 
Alberta natural gas before recommending removal 
of gas to foreign markets. Thus the policy made only 
gas surplus to Alberta’s needs plus the immediate 
contractual requirements of other Canadian provinces 
eligible for export from Canada and required that 
adequate future reserves based on growth trends be 
available to satisfy estimated Canadian requirements 
(other than Alberta’s) over a twenty-five-year period. 
Such responsibilities were effectively transferred to the 
federal government’s National Energy Board (NEB) 
in 1959.
Fourth, by 1959, the Conservation Board con-
sidered that the trends in reserves growth were suf-
ficiently well founded to justify giving full weight 
to reserves to be developed in the next two to five 
years in assessing total reserves available to satisfy 
requirements. Specifically, in applying the gas removal 
formula after 1959 the board formally included a two-
year reserve growth figure to meet future demand. In 
the vernacular, this allowance became known as ‘trend 
gas’ (OGCB, Report 66-C, 1966, pp. B2–B3). Typically, 
this meant protection of future Alberta requirements 
from established reserves was set at the equivalent of 
about twenty-five years.
In effect, then, the Alberta export formula which 
held sway when the NEB entered the fray was:
        30  
Gs = REST + 2Tg – ∑ Ai – E – f (PD30) (2) 
        i=1 
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where Tg = annual allowance for ‘trend gas,’ 
and other symbols are as before.
4. Policy Changes in the 1960s
Two main policy changes were made in the 1960s: one 
in 1966, the other in 1969. The first was designed to 
increase near-term protection for Alberta consumers, 
and the second was to increase reliance on future dis-
coveries in assessing gas supply. In addition, an adjust-
ment was made in 1964 to established reserves to add 
back a proportion (usually 50 per cent) of established 
reserves ‘beyond economic reach’ that might land up 
as ‘within economic reach’ over the thirty-year protec-
tion period, and to subtract reserves deferred for con-
servation reasons (OGCB, Report 64-1, 1964c).
a. 1966 Changes
The 1966 change introduced a two-tiered definition 
of surplus, distinguishing between a ‘contractible’ and 
a ‘future’ category (OGCB, Report 66-C, 1966). The 
contractible surplus compared established reserves 
with contractible requirements, where the latter was 
defined as thirty times Alberta’s first-year requirement 
(30A1) plus permit related requirements. Thus, the 
contractible surplus was:
Cs = REST – 30Ai – E (3)
where Cs = contractible surplus, and other 
symbols are as before.
Any gas surplus to the contractible requirements 
was presumed to be available for contracting to meet 
Alberta’s future requirements.
The future surplus compared future reserves with 
future requirements. The former were primarily the 
‘trend gas’ allowance, plus certain reserves subtracted 
from established reserves that may be available within 
the thirty-year period, mainly ‘deferred’ gas plus dis-
covered gas that may become within economic reach 
over thirty years. Future requirements were the thirty-
year projected Alberta requirements less requirements 
already included in the contractible category (30A1), 
plus reserves required to meet estimated peak-day 
demand in the thirtieth year. (Actually, the portion 
of these requirements that reserves dedicated to 
them could deliver over the thirty-year period.) An 
allowance was made here for contractible reserves 
still available to meet peaking requirements in the 
thirtieth year. The future surplus formula can be 
approximated by:
     30  
Fs = Tg – ( ∑ Ai – 30A1) – f (PD30) (4) 
     i=1 
where Fs = Future Surplus
Issuance of a permit required a positive contractible 
and overall (contractible plus future) surplus.
The intention of the contractible surplus initia-
tive was to “focus on the established gas available for 
immediate contracting to meet Alberta requirements” 
(OGCB, Report 66-C, 1966, p. 30).
The concern the board saw was that its previous 
test did not evaluate the ability of local utilities to con-
tract for future supplies. The board concluded (OGCB, 
1966, p. 30) “that a method of assessment which would 
focus on the established gas available for immediate 
contracting to meet Alberta requirements is desirable 
and would to some extent afford a greater degree of 
protection to local consumers of gas.”
At this junction, the board also slightly opened 
the door for more reliance on ‘trend’ gas, a chink that 
in 1969 – as described below – became wider. No 
changes were contemplated for reserves set aside in 
the future surplus calculation to satisfy requirements 
for delivery, that is, requirements other than those for 
‘cushion’ gas. But to provide for peak-day deliverabil-
ity, the board decided: “to give weight to more than 
the two-year growth in reserves when considering the 
cushion gas protection” (OGCB, 1966, p. 30).
b. 1969 Changes
The main change in 1969 was to the calculation of 
‘trend’ gas, of which two elements were identified: the 
average annual reserve growth rate and the number 
of years to which the growth rate was to apply (OGCB, 
Report 69-D, 1969c, pp. 17–18). The board decided 
the growth rate in gas reserves should be based on 
the most recent ten-year period, not the long-term 
post-1950 period, but retained some flexibility in just 
how it would project the growth rate. In terms of the 
number of years of growth, the board saw its use of 
two years as conservative and adopted instead a for-
mula that used estimated ultimate reserves to indicate 
the extent “to which reliance may be placed on future 
gas reserves” adding, however, that “prudence dic-
tates that potential reserves should be assessed on a 
conservative basis” (OGCB, 1969c, p. 25). The formula 
adopted by the board was:
TG = ((RPOT – REST)/Q)/10 (5)
where
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TG = years of reliance on future gas reserves; 
rounded up or down to the nearest half 
year.
RPOT = estimated potential, initial marketable 
Alberta reserves.
REST = established initial marketable reserves in 
Alberta at the time of application of the 
formula.
Q = current output
It noted the formula has (OGCB, 1969c, p. 26) “the 
desirable characteristics of reducing the number 
of years of such reliance as the remaining potential 
reserves of the Province decrease. The Board believes 
the denominator of 10 used in the formula is reason-
able at the present time.”
Under this mechanism, then, the future gas 
reserves used in the future surplus was calculated by 
extending historical growth TG years into the future. 
At the time of its implementation, the new formula 
increased the number of years of reliance on new dis-
coveries from the earlier two years to about five years: 
a substantial adjustment.
5. Policy Changes in the 1970s
The board’s procedures for determining surplus gas 
were reviewed in 1976 and 1979. The changes adopted 
in 1976 were modest; those in 1979 were substantive. 
In addition, the question of gas pricing intruded in the 
early 1970s.
a. Natural Gas Pricing and Removals
Before 1972, the Alberta Board’s evaluation of removal 
proposals made no specific reference to price, 
although as part of its broad understanding of the 
economic feasibility of a proposal, the board reviewed 
pricing information. This situation changed after the 
gas-pricing imbroglio of 1972, when on the grounds of 
price the Alberta government withheld the approval of 
permits to TransCanada PipeLines Ltd. (TCPL). (For 
more discussion, see Section 4 on natural gas pricing. 
Basically, rising oil prices in the world and North 
America were felt by many to increase the value of 
natural gas, but prices in natural gas contracts, both 
old and new, were slow to rise.) At this time, the board 
had also reviewed the question of Alberta gas pricing, 
and, after issuance of its report in August 1972 (ERCB, 
Report 72-E-VG, 1972b), a policy statement was tabled 
in November in the Alberta legislature called “Alberta 
Government Statement on New Natural Gas Policies 
for Albertans.”
Here the government urged accelerated price re- 
determination on all gas contracts and required pur-
chasers of gas for removal to file pricing information 
with the board. Moreover, the government indicated 
its intent to “assess pending and future permits for 
export of gas from the Province in light of this policy 
statement.” Given this injunction, the board as part of 
its export application review began to “offer its views 
on the suitability of the field prices, in the contracts of 
the applicant, in relation to the Alberta Government 
policy” (ERCB, Report 74-G, 1974, pp. 1-6, 1-7).
Inclusion of pricing as a removal criterion con-
tinued until the 1975 gas-pricing agreement between 
the Alberta and federal governments made it irrel-
evant. With deregulation, it emerged again, albeit in a 
somewhat subdued form (see below).
b. 1976 Changes
The two main issues were how reserves under con-
tract to holders of removal permits in excess of permit 
authorizations should be treated and how detailed 
‘deliverability’ schedules should be used in determin-
ing any surplus.
The first issue arose because of a perception that it 
would be desirable to have most of Alberta’s require-
ment met by direct contracts with producers, while 
at the time evidence had suggested local utilities were 
experiencing difficulties in contracting for gas.
In essence, no changes were proposed to the extant 
procedure for determining current, future, and over-
all surpluses (see equations (3), (4), and (5), above). 
Attention focused on a refinement to the ‘current 
surplus’ test component, which did not identify the 
volumes of gas actually available for contracting by 
local utilities but was a key indicator of whether there 
were proved reserves surplus to current requirements. 
The new hurdle introduced by the board, called the 
‘availability for contracting test,’ was intended to 
determine (ERCB, Report 76-C, 1976, p. 3-5) “whether 
there are sufficient reserves available to permit the 
Alberta Utilities and other Alberta consumers to 
contract directly for the province’s general require-
ments (30A1).” The mechanism was to deduct from 
the current reserves used in the ‘current surplus’ cal-
culation (namely, proved reserves within economic 
reach less those deferred for conservation reasons), 
those reserves under contract to holders of removal 
permits, to identify reserves available to Alberta users; 
from this figure “reserves required for contracting by 
Alberta users” (30A1) was subtracted to then define 
“the surplus of reserves available for contracting” 
(ERCB, 1976, p. 3-5).
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The policy implications of this embellishment 
were as follows: if the ‘contracting’ surplus were zero 
or positive, enough gas would be available for con-
tracting to satisfy the 30A1 requirement; if the figure 
were “modestly negative,” the board would look at the 
gas that might be made available by permit-holders to 
Alberta utilities; if a significant deficit existed, no new 
permit volumes would be authorized even if the con-
tractible and overall surplus calculation were positive 
(ERCB, 1976, p. 3-5).
The question of deliverability arose because of 
declines in the productivity of older gas reservoirs. 
The board rejected deliverability as a separate surplus 
test but intended to develop more detailed deliverabil-
ity schedules as part of its background analysis. And if 
a serious deliverability problem became apparent, “the 
Board would likely refuse a removal application even 
if current, future and availability for contracting sur-
pluses were found to exist” (ERCB, 1976, p. 3-10).
c. 1979 Changes
The 1979 changes reshaped the board’s methodology 
for determining surplus gas and were comparable in 
extent to the adoption of the dual surplus calculation 
in 1966. The major changes were to (ERCB, Report 
79-1, 1979):
•	 continue	with	the	current	surplus	test	but	to	
reduce the associated protection allowance for 
30A1 to 25A1;
•	 replace	the	future	and	overall	tests	with	a	
deliverability test to assess whether long-term 
annual requirements can be met (deliverability is a 
general term used to denote an actual or expected 
rate of gas production);
•	 suspend	the	“availability	for	contracting”	test.
The reduction in protection under the current surplus 
test presumed conditions had changed quite radically 
from when the 30A1 formula was introduced: there 
was greater confidence now in estimates of reserves 
and requirements; and long-term consumer protec-
tion might increasingly devolve on gas supplies from 
the substantial coal deposits with which the province 
was endowed. The supposition was that the level of 
protection should “have regard for the normal con-
tracting period. … In the Board’s view this suggests 
protection in the order of 20A1 to 25A1. In recognition 
of the NEB’s adoption of 25A1 (see below), the Board 
also decided to select 25A1 as an appropriate protec-
tion period” (ERCB, 1979, p. 4-2).
The future surplus test was seen by the board as 
“not completely successful” (ERCB, 1979, p. 4-4), and 
the “method of allowing for future reserve growth is 
very conservative and consequently, yields misleading 
results” (ERCB, 1979, p. 4-6). The board suggested the 
purpose of the future surplus test could be achieved 
more successfully by a “broad assessment of demand 
and supply” (ERCB, 1979, p. 4-4). The availability for 
contracting test was dropped because the circum-
stances that led to its implementation were no longer 
present “nor … likely to occur in the foreseeable 
future” (ERCB, 1979, p. 4-6).
The supply side of the long-term assessment of gas 
supply–demand relationships was to be handled by a 
deliverability test, involving (ERCB, 1979, p. 4-7):
… the best estimate of the annual productive 
capacity of both established and future reserves 
and would be compared to forecast Alberta 
requirements. The forecast period should be at 
least as long as the term of the requested permit 
but the Board for its own analysis probably 
would make its projection for a 25-year period.
The precise degree of reliance on gas discoveries was 
not identified in the report. Apparently the board was 
to make its best estimate of future reserve growth over 
the period of analysis without tying the estimate into 
any specific ‘trend’ gas formula.
The board expected that if the future deliverability 
test disclosed a significant supply deficit, conditions 
would be placed on permits and lesser volumes for 
removal would be authorized, but the board wanted 
to (ERCB, 1979, p. 4-8) “retain sufficient flexibility 
in interpreting the deliverability test so that it could 
judge each application on its own merits and authorize 
such volumes as it considers to be appropriate under 
the circumstances.”
No changes were made to the Alberta surplus 
test between 1979 and 1986, but in 1987 the test was 
reviewed – a commitment made by Alberta in the 
October 1985 Agreement with Ottawa to make the con-
trols more compatible with a ‘market oriented pricing 
system’ (Agreement, 1985, clause 23(1)).
Changes have been made to the legislation and 
most recently to that governing the issuance of export 
permits from Alberta. The latter was quite important 
in terms of accommodating deregulation. Moreover, 
the Alberta government issued a policy statement on 
long-term protection of Alberta natural gas consum-
ers. All these matters are reviewed below.
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6. Post-1979 Legislative and Policy Resonances
As mentioned earlier, in 1984, the Alberta Gas 
Resources Preservation Act was amended. The provi-
sion for diverting exports to meet any local shortages 
was written into the act, rather than simply appended 
to export permits. More importantly, a cost-benefit 
criterion was added to the requirements and reserves 
features to which the board was to “have regard” in 
granting permits, namely, “(c) the expected economic 
costs and benefits to Alberta of the removal of gas or 
propane from Alberta” (Gas Resources Preservation 
Act, 1984, Section 5(3)).
To accommodate the intent of the 1985 federal–
provincial Agreement, the act was amended in 1986 to 
remove the clause (c) criterion in granting a removal 
permit and replaced with a general criterion, namely, 
“(c) any other matters considered relevant by the 
Board” (Gas Resources Preservation Act, 5A 1986 
C1753). The former clause (c) (cost-benefit) criterion 
has since been included as one of the ministerial con-
ditions attached to removal permits. The new general 
criterion left the board with quite a lot of latitude.
Under the revised act, gas could not be removed 
from Alberta unless under a permit issued by the 
ERCB. Once the ERCB granted a permit, the permit 
was forwarded to the Alberta Minister of Energy for 
final approval. It is at this stage that conditions can 
be imposed if the government so chooses. Until the 
start of the one-year transition for implementing 
the October 31, 1985, Agreement, no conditions were 
attached to the permits, with the exception of a 
now-defunct British Columbia LNG project for which 
Alberta natural gas was to be supplied.
However, ministerial permit conditions emerged 
during the transitional period. They include:
(a) Surplus test requirement – gas should not be 
removed from Alberta after July 1, 1987, unless 
the Minister of Energy was satisfied with the 
surplus test review then being undertaken by 
the NEB and the ERCB.
(b) Market requirements – permittees could not 
serve a market other than the one filed by the 
permittee with the Department of Energy.
(c) Incrementality condition – permittees were not 
allowed to displace an existing market served 
under a contract in force on October 31, 1985, 
unless the Minister allowed so.
(d) Delivery commencement – gas would not 
be removed if pipeline deliveries did not 
commence within the ninety-day period follow-
ing permit issuance.
(e) Contract carriage condition – if gas were 
moved in a provincial distributor’s system out-
side Alberta, then the law in that province must 
provide for the possibility of the transporter of 
the gas being able to arrange for transportation 
service on that distribution system.
At the same time, the federal authorities urged the 
Alberta government to give heed to the following 
principles in revising its surplus determination pro-
cedures (letter from Marcel Masse, Minister of EMR to 
Neil Webber, Alberta Minister of Energy, undated but 
October 1986).
•	 Market	forces	will	ensure	that	natural	gas	supply	
and demand will balance.
•	 Certain	categories	of	end	users	will	continue	
to require explicit supply protection because of 
their inability to switch readily to alternate fuels 
and to contract directly with producers for their 
supply needs. It can be assumed that the period 
of protection required by those consumers will 
correlate to the contractual arrangements entered 
into on their behalf.
•	 However,	where	end	users	elect	to	contract	
directly for gas supply on a short-term or a long-
term basis, it was assumed these contractual 
arrangements would provide the level of supply 
protection desired.
•	 Natural	gas	marketed	for	sale	outside	of	Canada,	
should be presumed to be protected by the 
contractual arrangements underlying the sale.
•	 Natural	gas	imported	to	Canada	can	be	presumed	
to contribute to the protection of reasonably 
foreseeable requirements.
•	 Surplus	determination	procedures	should	not	
be considered as a substitute for private sector 
contractual arrangements.
Subsequently, the Alberta government issued a “dir-
ective” that the ERCB consider certain policy par-
ameters in its review of natural gas protection, all in 
the context of the intent of the Agreement to provide 
freer access to domestic and export markets and to 
achieve a market-oriented pricing system (letter from 
Neil Webber, Alberta Minister of Energy to Vernon 
Millard, Chairman ERCB, October 28, 1986).
Specifically, the Alberta government suggested 
that provision be made for “reasonable needs” of end 
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users unable to contract directly with producers (typ-
ically residential, commercial, and small industrial 
users served by utilities), but not for end users (typ-
ically industrial users) capable of arranging security 
of supply through their own contracting activities. 
The latter were seen as not requiring mandated pro-
tection. Moreover, the government thought it possible 
to devise surplus procedures that would not distort 
market forces, which were seen as reliable arbiters to 
balance supply and demand. Surplus determinations 
were not to be viewed as a substitute for private-sector 
contractual arrangements to meet market require-
ments (Policy Statement by the Government of Alberta 
Respecting Long-Term Protection for Consumers of 
Natural Gas, October 1986).
7. The 1987 Alberta Surplus Test
Not surprisingly, the climate of natural gas deregula-
tion initiated in 1985 and the policy directives of both 
the federal and provincial governments described 
beforehand fostered further relaxation of Alberta 
policies. The 1987 policy afforded a fifteen-year period 
of protection for Alberta’s so-called “core” markets 
(residential, commercial, and small industrial), plus 
protection of non-core contracted requirements, in 
contrast with the previous twenty-five-year protection 
period for all (core and non-core) markets (ERCB, 1987).
In more detail: at any point in time, the gas 
reserves available for export from Alberta were 
defined as the difference between total available 
reserves and Alberta’s requirements for the core 
market, plus amounts under contract to non-core 
(larger industrial) Alberta markets, plus remaining 
export permit commitments. Symbolically, the for-
mula looked like:
GS = REST – 15C1 – CNC – PFS – E (6)
where:
GS = surplus gas.
REST = established gas reserves.
C1 = core market requirements, current year.
CNC = contracted non-core market requirements.
PFS = permit related fuel and shrinkage.
E = remaining authorized exports.
At that time, the following values approximately held 
for each component of (6); units are in trillions of 
cubic feet (Tcf ’s) at 1,000 BTU/cf.
REST = 59.2; 15C1 = 3.5; CNC = 1.7; PFS = 4.0; 
and E = 40.0
Inserting these values in (6) yielded a volume of gas 
reserves available for inclusion in new export permits 
of some 10 Tcf.
However, while the Alberta government blessed 
relaxation of the surplus test, at the same time it tight-
ened controls over the conditions governing removal 
of gas from the province. An amendment to the Gas 
Resources Preservation Act was passed in June of 
1987, which gave the Alberta government the power 
to impose ministerial conditions on all gas removal 
permits, including permits issued before enactment of 
this amendment. This retroactive feature was intended 
to prevent gas from flowing to domestic markets at 
“discount” prices under certain existing gas removal 
permits that had hitherto provided for gas sales under 
virtually any terms. The government also moved (in 
1988) to base royalties on natural gas from Crown 
leases on the highest of the actual sales price or 80 per 
cent of the average Alberta field price, hence discour-
aging “excessive” price discounting.
In early 1995, the Alberta government dropped 
the permit removal conditions for short-term con-
tracts, thereby giving producers greater flexibility in 
negotiating gas sales. Also, Alberta core market users 
were given freedom to enter into direct gas purchase 
arrangements. In the event that Alberta domestic 
use began to impinge on available supplies, short-
term permits would be the first to be relinquished, 
particularly as Alberta users bid on available supply. 
Should market disruptions lead to local shortages, 
legislation provides for diversion to the local market 
of gas licensed for removal, although the proportion-
ality provisions of the Free Trade Agreement among 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico may then kick 
in. (See the discussion of the Free Trade Agreements 
in Chapter Nine.)
This section has reviewed the details of the 
Alberta policy to regulate ex-provincial natural gas 
sales to ‘protect’ Alberta consumers. The complex-
ity of the protection formulae and their frequent 
modification attest to the difficulty of the task and 
may partly explain the willingness to allow a greater 
reliance on market mechanisms in the natural gas 
market as deregulation gained favour after 1984. 
Section C, below, offers some evaluative comments 
on the gas protection policies, but before doing that 
we will review the federal export control polices for 
natural gas.
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B. Development of Federal Policy
As mentioned above, initially the Alberta Board 
included protection for Canadian requirements in 
its removal formula, but inevitably this responsibility 
devolved on the federal government itself, and specif-
ically on the National Energy Board (NEB), established 
in 1959. (McDougall, 1982, chaps. 4, 5 and 6, discusses 
Canadian policy with respect to exports from before 
1959 and up to 1971. He also reviews the Borden 
Commission’s recommendations on natural gas.)
The motivation for federal policy can be traced 
back to the Report of the Royal Commission on 
Canada’s Economic Prospects, which contained the 
following recommendation (Royal Commission on 
Canada’s Economic Prospects, 1957, p. 146):
In order that a sound and comprehensive 
policy may be worked out with regard to 
development, exports, imports and consump-
tion of forms of energy in Canada, we propose 
that a national energy authority be established 
which would be responsible for:
(a) advising the Federal Government and, 
upon request, any provincial government 
in all matters connected with the long-term 
requirements for energy in its various forms 
and in different parts of Canada; methods of 
promoting the best uses of energy sources 
from a long-term point of view; export policy, 
including such questions as the further 
refining of oil and gas in Canada and the 
disposal of by-products; coal subsidies, etc.
(b) approving, or recommending for approval, 
all contracts or proposals respecting the 
export of oil, gas and electric power by 
pipeline or transmission wire.
As Bradley remarks (1972, p. 3), “the recommendation 
displays primary concern with establishing policies 
that make certain that Canadian energy resources 
be developed with regard to Canadian needs for 
these resources, and it implies that one way in which 
this goal might be frustrated would be by excessive 
exportation.”
1. The Legal Framework
Control by the federal government on exports of 
natural gas was implemented by the National Energy 
Board Act of 1959. Section 81 provides that no export 
of gas from Canada shall take place except under 
licence, while Section 82 provides for issuance of 
licences under such terms and conditions as pre-
scribed by the regulations. Section 83 of the act said:
Upon an application for a license the Board 
shall have regard to all considerations that 
appear to it to be relevant and, without limiting 
the generality of the foregoing, the Board shall 
satisfy itself that:
(a) the quantity of gas or power to be exported 
does not exceed the surplus requirements 
for use in Canada having regard to trends in 
discovery of gas; and
(b) the price to be charged by the applicant for 
gas or power exported by him is just and 
reasonable in relation to the public interest.
Note the similarity between the wording of clause (a) 
and Alberta’s Gas Resources Preservation Act. However, 
the specific reference to price in clause (b) did not 
correspond to the Alberta statute; in Alberta, the 
price issue was subsumed at that time in the general 
admonition of public interest.
The duration of any export licence was not to 
exceed twenty-five years (see Act, Section 85(b)). The 
act also enabled the NEB to revoke or alter any export 
licence it may issue, but (NEB, 1970, p. 10-2):
… it is a premise of the Board’s approach … 
that once a license for firm export for a fixed 
period has been issued, it should not be dimin-
ished in effect or put in jeopardy so long as the 
conditions of license are observed. (Reliability 
of licenses was seen as desirable both) … in 
equity to producers, exporters, United States 
importers and consumers of gas licensed for 
export, and in the interest of orderly develop-
ment of relations between Canada and the 
United States in respect of natural gas.
Originally the Federal Power Commission in the 
United States had viewed Canadian natural gas sup-
plies as insecure. To the board, this also entailed the 
use of “reasonable caution” in assessing Canadian 
requirements to avoid any potential conflict between 
reliability of exports and first preference being given 
to Canadian customers. This is important in terms of 
interpreting the mechanisms that emerged.
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The treatment below of federal policy is not quite 
as detailed as that for Alberta. The interested reader is 
referred to Watkins (1982a) for further details.
2. Initial Policy and Policy Changes in the 1960s
Again, it was up to a regulatory board to develop 
procedures to apply the statute. The procedures 
developed by the National Energy Board (NEB) were 
very similar to Alberta’s – a characteristic not entirely 
divorced from the fact that the NEB’s first chairman 
was formerly chairman of the Alberta Conservation 
Board. Thus, in its first gas export report in 1960, 
the NEB saw a thirty-year period as appropriate for 
calculating “reasonably foreseeable” Canadian gas 
requirements (NEB, 1960). An allowance for Canadian 
requirements and proposed exports was deducted 
from established reserves, but a more distinct division 
was made between the current and an overall or future 
surplus calculation than employed by the Alberta 
Conservation Board at that time.
A twenty-one-year period (1960–80) was selected 
as that for which requirements should be met from 
presently established reserves. In the case of Alberta, 
such protection, necessitated by provincial policy, was 
extended to thirty years. The requirements elsewhere 
in Canada were levelled at the 1963 rate for the balance 
of the twenty-one-year period. The NEB’s rationale for 
selecting 1963 as a base was (NEB, 1960):
… in general it has not been practicable for 
pipeline companies to obtain contracts for 
the purchase and sale of gas for incremental 
requirements commencing three or four 
years in the future. Incremental requirements 
beyond the 1963 level accordingly have been 
allocated to future discoveries of gas. In every 
case, all requirements accruing after 1980 are 
assumed to be met from future reserves.
Note here the intention that, excepting Alberta, the 
protection for ongoing requirements from established 
reserves over the twenty-one-year period was dictated 
by commercial contractual practices.
Symbolically, the current surplus calculation was:
       3         30  
Cs = REST – E – ∑ A(EA)i – 18A(EA4) – ∑ Ai (7) 
      i=1          i=1 
where
Cs = “current” surplus.
A(EA)I = requirement for all provinces excluding 
Alberta, year i.
A(EA)4 = fourth-year requirement for all prov-
inces excluding Alberta.
Ai = Alberta requirement, year i.
E = authorized exports, and other symbols 
as defined previously.
The future surplus calculation effectively embraced 
the current surplus calculation. The increment in gas 
demand for all Canadian provinces other than Alberta 
between the fourth year (1963) and the twenty-first 
year (1980), plus all demand from the twenty-second 
year (1981) to the thirtieth year (1989), plus thirti-
eth-year, peak-day requirements were to be satisfied 
from yet-to-be discovered reserves (i.e., trend gas). 
The trend gas allowance was set at some 2.5 trillion 
cubic feet (Tcf) per annum for at least the next ten 
years, and thereafter on a somewhat decreasing scale. 
Thus the “future” surplus was:
       30  
Fs = Cs+30Tg –[∑A(EA)i–18A(EA4)]–f(PD30) (8) 
       i=1 
What is significant in this formula is that while the 
framework remained the same as Alberta’s the pro-
visions were considerably more liberal. Established 
reserves only protected the equivalent of about 
twenty-one to twenty-two years of the first-year 
gas requirements for provinces other than Alberta, 
compared with some twenty-five years of cumulative 
projected requirements in Alberta, while continuous 
extrapolations of trend gas – not just for the two years 
in the Alberta future surplus calculations – were used 
to protect all future demand (excluding Alberta) from 
year four to year twenty-one.
Interestingly, the export permits issued by the 
NEB never provided a loophole similar to that in the 
Alberta permits, whereby local utilities could access 
export gas in the event of local supply exigencies. But 
the NEB Act gave the NEB the right to alter any licence 
it issued, which allowed for possible diversion of gas 
to the domestic market. In effect, this was a “force 
majeure” type of clause.
Some minor adjustments were made in 1965. More 
substantive changes were made in 1966 (NEB, 1966). In 
essence, the “current” surplus formula simply became 
the difference between established reserves and 
twenty-five times the fourth-year requirement (a4) 
plus already authorized exports, thus:
CS = REST – 25a4 – E (9)
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In terms of the future surplus calculation, the 1966 
report of the NEB treated future supply as com-
prising: available reserves; established reserves to 
become contractible between the fifth and thirtieth 
year, comprising nearly all the reserves currently 
beyond economic reach plus all deferred gas; and 
twenty years of long-term trends. Future require-
ments were: Canadian requirements projected over 
thirty years; terminal-year peak-day protection; and 
existing export licences. Thus, the future surplus was 
approximated by:
        30  
Fs = REST + 20Tg – ∑ Ai – E – f(PD30) (10) 
        i=1 
In 1967, price entered the picture. (See Section 4.2, for 
more detail.) The NEB adopted three specific price 
guidelines, which in effect fleshed out clause 83(b) of 
the NEB Act. The adopted guidelines were as follows. 
The export price (1) should cover all costs, (2) should 
be fair compared to prices charged to customers in 
Canada next to the export point, and (3) should not 
be noticeably lower than the prices of substitute fuels 
(NEB, 1967, p. 3-19).
Subsequently, the second price test was more 
formally defined as 5 per cent above the “adjacent” 
Canadian price (NEB, 1971). To facilitate application 
of these guidelines, in 1970 the NEB Act was amended 
to ‘unhook’ the gas export price set by the board from 
any price written into gas export contracts.
3. Policy Changes: The Formula in 1970
In 1970, the NEB’s current surplus calculation re-
mained similar to the Alberta Board’s then “contract-
ible” surplus calculation, namely, total existing supply 
– consisting of established reserves, less adjustments 
for deferred reserves, reserves beyond economic 
reach, and pipeline losses and shrinkage, plus imports 
of gas (mainly minor amounts into Ontario) – was 
compared with current Canadian requirements plus 
authorized exports. Canadian requirements distin-
guished between other areas of Canada and Alberta.
The NEB did not use a formal future surplus 
calculation comparable with that employed by the 
Alberta Board. Instead, the current surplus test was 
extrapolated, with established reserves augmented by 
a fixed long-term growth rate of 3.5 Tcf per year (NEB, 
1970, pp. 4-40 and 4-41). The policy implications of 
the results of the extrapolation were left quite open, 
but, of course, satisfaction of the current surplus test 
remained a necessary condition for any award of 
export permits. In the main, the extrapolation was 
used to determine by how much the long-term growth 
rate in reserves might have to vary to provide the same 
degree of protection fifteen to twenty years in the 
future as the policy granted in the initial year (NEB, 
1970, p. 10-13).
The NEB’s policy at that time also covered some 
more peripheral aspects, including the need for (NEB, 
1970, p. 10-15):
… sound development of those pipeline trans-
mission systems which are the means of pro-
viding gas service to Canadian consumers. The 
carrying of export gas should be a profitable 
activity, which, when undertaken by trans-
mission systems serving Canadian customers, 
should make available to such customers a share 
in the economies of scale and such benefits as 
may arise from the contribution of exports to 
the financial health of the transmission system. 
In effect this means that where a choice has to 
be made between licensing exports by a project 
wholly oriented to export and a project which 
serves Canadian customers and export custom-
ers, if all other factors were equal the choice 
would have to be in favor of the project serving 
Canadian as well as export customers.
Also, in 1970, the NEB recognized that established 
transmission systems may receive licences for less 
than the twenty-five-year maximum provided by 
the statute but a new export system might have to be 
given a longer initial licence to enable the project to 
be financed. One concern was that too great a dedi-
cation of gas reserves to export commitments could 
force Canadian requirements beyond the short term 
to be met from gas discoveries in relatively high-cost, 
remote areas. Shortening the export permit period 
would assist in meeting this kind of objection, and 
fifteen years was the period the NEB thought appro-
priate, except possibly where extension would be 
necessary to finance new pipelines or major looping 
programs (NEB, 1970, p. 10-21).
In essence, the 1970 formula held until a sub-
stantial change was made in 1979. But after denial of 
export applications in 1971, the formula was effectively 
in abeyance during most of the 1970s.
4. The 1979 Changes
The NEB issued some criteria for determining surplus, 
on which the 1979 formula review was predicated. The 
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criteria were that the surplus formula should: be easily 
understood and applied; incorporate gas deliverabil-
ity rather than reserves in the supply considerations; 
be flexible to respond to changing circumstances; 
provide continuing protection for Canadian demand 
throughout any period of export; provide incen-
tive and encouragement to the gas industry; satisfy 
licensed export commitments to the extent possible; 
and reserve to Canadians any benefits from conserva-
tion restraints undertaken by Canadians (NEB, 1979b, 
p. 94).
After an extensive review, the NEB adopted a tri-
partite test procedure: current deliverability, current 
reserves, and future deliverability. Under current 
deliverability tests (NEB, 1979b, p. 95):
… it would be necessary to demonstrate a 
surplus of annual deliverability from estab-
lished reserves in excess of the sum of total 
annual Canadian requirements and author-
ized exports for a minimum period of highly 
assured protection. This test would be used to 
determine the upper limit of the maximum 
annual quantities that might be surplus during 
a period of highly assured protection.
The NEB set the “highly assured” protection period as 
a minimum of five years.
Surplus deliverability – an annual quantity – 
would be:
SDi = DEi – Ai – Ei (11)
where
SDi = surplus deliverability, year i.
DEi = Deliverability from established reserves, 
year i.
Ai = Canadian requirements, year i.
Ei = authorized exports, year i.
The NEB suggested tests solely relying on deliverability 
could lead to excessive industry activity to increase 
deliverability at the expense of developing new 
reserves. Thus, a reserves test was deemed necessary 
to maintain a “reasonable relationship” between estab-
lished reserves and deliverability, defined as:
CS = REST – E – 25A1 (12)
Licences for export of gas could be granted but should 
not exceed the maximum total quantity surplus under 
the reserves test and should fall within the limits 
established by the current deliverability test.
In considering new exports that met both the 
current deliverability and the current reserves test, 
the NEB was concerned to ensure such exports 
would not result in deficiencies over the longer term. 
Accordingly, under the future deliverability test (NEB, 
1979b, p. 95),
… annual quantities of gas could be deemed 
to be surplus if the forecast deliverability from 
established reserves and reserve additions, etc., 
exceeded expected Canadian demand plus 
authorized exports for a reasonably foreseeable 
period. At present the Conservation Board 
believes this period of future deliverability 
protection should be some ten years.
Thus the future deliverability was to ensure: first, that 
any proposed exports that might satisfy the first two 
tests would not cause a future deliverability short-
fall within a ten-year period; and second, if the NEB 
granted a licence term in excess of that indicated by 
deliverability from established reserves, the extended 
licence would be limited by projected deliverability 
from future reserves. The NEB indicated “frontier” 
natural gas reserves would not be included until it was 
satisfied that the transportation facilities would be 
constructed.
5. The 1982 Policy Change
In the early 1980s, significant underlifting of author-
ized exports, along with slow growth in domestic 
natural gas demand and relatively abundant supply, 
triggered another review by the NEB of its export 
formula.
As discussed, the 1979 decision involved a trium-
virate of tests – current reserves, current deliverabil-
ity, and future deliverability – all of which required 
satisfaction. Moreover, for any exports dependent on 
reserve additions, the export licence was conditional. 
If gas deliverability were less or if Canadian require-
ments were greater than estimated when the licence 
was granted, these conditional export authorizations 
could be reduced or revoked (NEB, 1982, p. 12).
In its 1982 decision, the NEB renamed and modi-
fied the current reserves test, now calling it the 
“Reserves Formula” (NEB, 1982, p. 16). The modifi-
cation related to the allowance for existing licensed 
exports: the amount set aside was adjusted to reflect 
the maximum quantities exportable under existing 
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licence conditions; previously, the amount set aside 
reflected the remaining licensed quantities, whether 
exportable or not. The Reserves Formula set the 
maximum surplus available for export and could be 
written:
CS = REST – E’ – 25A1 (13)
where
E’ = quantities exportable under existing licences 
and other symbols as previously defined.
The current deliverability test adopted in 1979 was 
dropped. Instead, a deliverability evaluation was 
adopted involving “best” estimates of future gas supply 
and demand, comprehending: (a) deliverability from 
established reserves and future reserve additions; 
(b) expected Canadian requirements; and (c) esti-
mated exports under existing licences. In essence, 
points (a) and (b) subsumed elements in the 1979 
current and future deliverability tests. The allowance 
for exports was a forecast by the NEB of exports that 
would be taken under existing licences, rather than 
the maximum annual exports licensed. The decision 
in 1979 to exclude supply from frontier regions unless 
transportation facilities were to be constructed was 
upheld in the 1982 decision.
The new deliverability appraisal did not cite min-
imum protection periods – the five- and ten-year 
periods previously adopted in the 1979 current and 
future deliverability tests. Rather, “the Board will use 
its judgment to determine the annual deliverability 
profile which may be deemed surplus to Canadian 
needs” (NEB, 1983, p. 17).
The intention of the revisions was to provide more 
flexibility in determining surplus gas, subject to the 
upper limit represented by the Reserves Formula. The 
NEB noted that its new procedures were similar in 
structure to those of the Alberta Conservation Board.
The specific export surplus tests were used for 
awarding export licences. In addition, the NEB made 
provision for limited short-term exports for up to two 
years – a new departure. Such flexibility was intended 
to expeditiously permit exports to “replace quantities 
foregone because of regulatory or construction 
delays associated with long term licenses, or to take 
advantage of a new market opportunity” (NEB, 1983, 
p. 21).
On the pricing front, the 1970s saw emergence 
of uniform border prices for all gas exported to the 
United States (Watkins and Waverman, 1985). It 
was not until July 1984 that a more flexible pricing 
policy was adopted. And in 1985 export gas prices 
were deregulated subject to the adjacent border price 
test that the price to U.S. buyers be not less than the 
price for Canadian buyers purchasing gas near the 
border-crossing point (Canada, Western Accord, 
1985).
6. The 1986 Policy Change
Deregulation of the Canadian petroleum industry 
in 1985 provoked a further review of the export for-
mula. The changes mark elimination of the cherished 
reserves test, a test that was seen as resulting in exces-
sive inventory carrying costs and as not being needed 
in a market-sensitive pricing environment. The NEB 
pronounced its expectation of being “able to place 
increasing reliance in the future on the responsiveness 
of supply and demand to price and less reliance on 
the size of currently established reserves in protecting 
future Canadian requirements” (NEB, 1986c, p. 23).
The new surplus determination procedure was 
based on the ratio of reserves to production, called 
the R/P Ratio Procedure, entailing four steps. First, 
the maximum potential surplus is calculated for each 
year as the amount by which annual supply, defined as 
remaining reserves divided by a stipulated R/P ratio, 
exceeds estimated annual demand (domestic demand 
plus already authorized exports). The stipulated R/P 
ratio was set at fifteen. The second step consisted of 
an array of trial “profiles and durations for possible 
additional exports” to identify years in which the 
R/P ratio might drop below fifteen. The third step 
was the “Productive Capacity Check,” replacing the 
Deliverability Appraisal. Here productive capacity 
would be assessed to see whether forecast demand 
could be met, especially for years during which the 
actual R/P ratio might fall below fifteen. The final step 
is to determine the “most appropriate” export profile 
predicated on the preceding steps and on security 
of supply if the R/P ratio dips below fifteen, on the 
capacity of the existing infrastructure to produce and 
transport new exports, and on the estimated net eco-
nomic benefits to Canada.
The procedure was intended to embody “a com-
bination of security of supply and flexibility which the 
Conservation Board considers to be appropriate in the 
context of market sensitive pricing and the maturity of 
the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin” (NEB, 1986c, 
p. 24).
In essence, then, the (upper bound) total 
surplus was:
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   n  
S = ∑ [ RESTj – Aj – Ej ] (14) 
  j=1  15   
where
j = year counter.
n = projection period, and other symbols, as 
defined earlier.
Although the NEB had adopted an R/P ratio of fif-
teen, this ratio was seen as one varying over time in 
response to changing conditions, especially to reflect 
the desired margin between actual and stipulated R/P 
ratios. The adjacent border price test was dropped in 
October 1986. Instead, general surveillance of export 
pricing was instituted (letter from Marcel Masse, 
Minister of EMR to Roland Priddle, Chairman of the 
NEB, October 29, 1986).
7. Mandated Surplus Test Abandonment, 1987
Almost as soon as the ink was dry on the 1986 policy 
change, a further review was set in motion. Hearings 
on prospective revisions were completed in May 1987.
The federal government – which in effect initi-
ated the review – mentioned some parameters it felt 
should be considered. These include the implications 
for surplus determination of: growth in direct sales to 
domestic customers; imports of gas from the United 
States; and renegotiation of domestic prices under 
long-term “system” gas contracts. Moreover, the 
then Minister of Energy had clearly indicated that as 
market forces increase more emphasis should be given 
to contractual arrangements – distinguishing between 
core and non-core customers – than to the formalities 
of surplus calculation. The implication seems to be 
that it might be desirable for the government to mon-
itor the market to ensure that buyers of natural gas 
enter into contracts that protect the long-term inter-
ests of their core customers.
In light of the minister’s pointed strictures, it was 
not altogether surprising that the NEB had decided to 
eliminate the mandated surplus test entirely and allow 
gas exports to be determined in large part by market 
forces (NEB, 1987, pp. 24–27). No transition period was 
provided in this move to deregulate gas exports.
Under the new market-based procedure (MBP), 
the NEB would hold public hearings on any applica-
tion to export natural gas under contracts lasting at 
least two years. The hearings would include a com-
plaints procedure to ensure that all Canadian users 
can gain access to additional supplies of gas under the 
same terms proposed for the export sale. Prospective 
gas exporters had to submit an export impact assess-
ment at the hearing demonstrating that the proposed 
exports are surplus to Canadian gas requirements. 
As well, exporters had to provide evidence to the 
board that the proposed sales are in the Canadian 
public interest.
The MBP also required the NEB to monitor 
Canadian energy markets on an ongoing basis. And 
the board was to conduct periodic studies analyzing 
natural gas supply, demand, and prices to determine 
whether Canadian gas requirements continued to be 
met under this new policy.
Note that, although the surplus formula was 
dropped, the legislation still enjoins the NEB to only 
approve exports surplus to ‘foreseeable’ requirements. 
In effect, the meeting of the surplus test devolved on 
the prospective exporter with the NEB appearing to 
act more as an adjudicator between domestic and 
exporting interests.
On March 15, 1989, the reliance upon MBP was 
furthered when “the Board decided it would no longer 
use benefit-cost analysis in considering gas export 
license applications and decided that, with respect to 
contract flexibility, it would operate on the presump-
tion that, where contracts are freely negotiated at arm’s 
length, they would be in the public as well as the pri-
vate interest” (NEB, 1990, p. 31).
As was noted in Section 2, following deregulation, 
the natural gas market continued to evolve toward 
greater contractual flexibility, including greater reli-
ance on spot markets. A growing volume of gas was 
exported under short-term contracts. The 1994 Annual 
Report of the NEB noted that 35.4 billion cubic metres 
of gas in 1994 would be exported under contracts 
of two years or less. This was about one half of total 
exports, as contrasted with 30 per cent of exports in 
1986. No public hearing was required, and, while the 
NEB presumably continued to monitor the gas prices, 
such exports were generally presumed to be in the 
public interest. By 2001, about 80 per cent of Canadian 
gas exports were short-term.
NEB hearings were still held for gas exported 
under contracts with duration longer than two years. 
Most frequently, these were associated with the con-
struction of new facilities either to move the gas or for 
consumption (e.g., a gas-fired electricity generating 
plant). Presumably, the buyer and/or pipeline desired 
an assurance of gas supply before financing and/or 
building the new facility. The appropriate focus of 
such hearings was left somewhat vague under the 
MBP, with its presumption that freely negotiated 
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deals are likely to be in both the private parties’ and 
the public’s interest. Formal criteria for establishing 
whether a “surplus” exists have been dropped, leaving 
some domestic interests worried about long-term 
Canadian supplies but with no obvious procedure for 
showing that exports are excessive. A party applying 
for a long-term export licence was obliged to inform 
potential Canadian purchasers of the intent and that 
they were offered access to the gas on the same terms 
as the U.S. buyers. This amounts to a ‘complaints pro-
cedure,’ and if no prospective Canadian buyer offers 
objections, the licence will normally be granted. (This 
‘complaints procedure’ to market-based exports differs 
in basis from the ‘fair market access procedure’ for 
crude oil discussed in Chapter Nine.)
Some government export hearings have seen 
intervener groups arguing that the environmental 
impacts of natural gas exports should be assessed so 
that the full social costs and value of the gas are taken 
into account before export authorization is given. 
The environmental concerns expressed relate in part 
to any damage caused to the Canadian ecosystem 
by gas production that would imply a social cost of 
gas higher than private production costs, apart from 
royalty (tax considerations). Concern has also been 
expressed about the effects of gas utilization in the 
United States (e.g., if conservation or benign renew-
able energy forms are abandoned), where the price 
paid may exceed the social value of gas consumption. 
Thus far, the NEB has not been persuaded that these 
concerns are significant enough to warrant formal 
modification of the MBP.
Now that the gas protection policies of Alberta 
and the federal government have been described, we 
will offer some evaluative comments.
C. Economic Analysis of Natural Gas 
Protection Policies
The obvious complexity of the regulations to gener-
ate protection for natural gas consumers – and the 
frequent modifications to the regulations – makes 
detailed analysis difficult and tedious. Instead, we 
focus on two related issues: (1) what were the general 
effects of the regulations? and (2) were they a desirable 
form of regulation?
1. Reserves and Supply
The natural gas protection policies involved potential 
restrictions on sales to customers outside the region 
(ex-Alberta or ex-Canada). They operated by com-
paring ‘available’ natural gas volumes to projected 
regional consumption in order to determine whether 
a surplus existed. The initial regulations used a ‘stock’ 
concept of availability, by employing reserves. As time 
passed, more ‘flow’-related concepts were admitted 
to measures of availability, beginning with the admis-
sion of projected future discoveries and eventually 
leading to more emphasis upon deliverability than on 
reserves. Despite such changes in regulations, their 
primary effect was to require large industry inven-
tories in support of current sales. (The discussion 
below draws substantially on that in Bradley, 1972. 
Waverman 1972, 1973, considers the trade effects of 
the policies.)
All the surplus formulae identify current stocks 
as one element and then make varying provisions for 
future stocks. Current stocks correspond to the notion 
of working inventory. In the context of surplus poli-
cies, they normally consisted of established reserves 
less certain volumes deferred for conservation rea-
sons and less an allowance for reserves currently 
uneconomic, called ‘beyond economic reach’ reserves. 
An example of conservation reasons would be cycling 
schemes, where natural gas is cycled back into the 
reservoir to recover liquids that might otherwise be 
lost if the reservoir were produced on a normal basis. 
Established reserves comprise both proved reserves – 
those believed to exist with virtual certainty under 
prevailing economic conditions and technology – and 
a proportion of probable reserves. Probable reserves 
are those that may be recovered in the vicinity of 
proved reserves but where there is some degree of 
geological, engineering, or operational risk.
Established reserves do not constitute the resource 
base. The latter is at the behest of nature: the total 
amount present in the earth’s crust within a given 
geographic area. Established reserves are only a frac-
tion of reserves that might become available if prices 
rose or technology improved, quite apart from those 
reserves that may be added in the normal course of 
exploration under prevailing conditions.
The distinction between proved reserves and 
beyond economic reach reserves – expected reserves 
in discovered but undeveloped reservoirs – is shown 
in Figure 12.2. Here, the current price is designated Pc. 
To the left of the vertical broken line, proved reserves 
are shown in blocks of ascending cost, all with costs 
lower than Pc. To the right of the line are shown blocks 
of reserves with costs exceeding Pc, the beyond eco-
nomic reach category. Figure 12.2 is static, simply clas-
sifying established reserves according to whether they 
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are economic to produce at prevailing prices or not; 
it is an example of what, in Chapter Four, was called a 
‘resource stock supply curve.’
Another way of looking at supply is to map stocks 
of reserves into rates of output and examine dynamic 
aspects over time. This is done in Figure 12.3, where 
various conventional supply curves are shown. The 
leftmost curve, labelled S1, relates to output from 
established reserves given installed capacity. It is long-
term in the sense that the prevailing price, PC, is suf-
ficient to cover both operating and investment costs, 
but the fixed installed well capacity precludes any 
increase in output beyond Q1, irrespective of price. 
The curve labelled S2 represents additional capacity 
added by more intensive development of reserves 
already economic to produce. The assumption is that 
additional development can take place at much the 
same unit cost of output as beforehand.
The curve in Figure 12.3 labelled S3 extends the S2 
curve by including output from known discoveries not 
economic to develop at prices below PC. The curve S4 
illustrates the outward shift in supply in response to 
exploration, at various price levels. More generally, the 
curve S3, which represents supply from current estab-
lished reserves, can be viewed as shifting to the left as 
these reserves are depleted, but this may be offset by 
shifts to the right as new reserves are discovered and 
developed.
Overall, it is fair to say that the basic uncertain-
ties governing the exploration process make supply 
analysis difficult. Hence, widely accepted estimates 
of the price elasticity of supply are elusive. Figure 
12.3 suggests such elasticity arises not only from new 
exploration inspired by higher prices but via increased 
recovery from existing reserves. An indication that 
the latter is not trivial is provided by estimates of the 
Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) in 1972 
that an increase in the field price of gas would lead to 
a lower abandonment pressure, improved economics 
of developing marginal gas reserves, and increased 
recovery of oil field solution gas (ERCB, 1972b, p. 6-12). 
At that time, the ERCB estimated than an increase 
in the field price of gas of 10 cents would increase 
Alberta’s established reserves by about 10 Tcf (ERCB, 
1972b, p. 6-14). Given a field price at the time of about 
$0.16/Mcf and initial recoverable reserves of some 
60 Tcf (ERCB, Reserves Report, 84-18, Table 8-2), this 
translates into a crude supply elasticity of 0.27 with 
respect to established reserves. A higher elasticity 
would result from the inclusion of reserve additions 
associated with higher prices.
That the surplus tests were associated with 
unusually high inventories is strongly suggested by 
the much higher reserves to production (R/P) ratios 
of natural gas than crude oil from the late 1950s on, 
after connections to ex-Alberta markets had been 
established. The R/P ratio was also lower for the U.S. 
natural gas industry than the Canadian (e.g., 10 in the 
U.S. in 1980, and 28 in Alberta). This evidence would 
be stronger if there were a ‘natural’ R/P ratio that 
might be used as a standard of reference. For example, 
at what R/P ratio would a unitized, effectively com-
petitive industry operate? It has been suggested that 
an R/P ratio in the order of ten would be likely. Much 
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Figure 12.3 Natural Gas Supply
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lower and intensive use of reserves probably damages 
ultimate recovery. Much higher and the investments 
to establish reserves would be waiting unnecessarily 
long for payout. Despite these arguments, it is impos-
sible to be precise about a ‘natural’ R/P ratio. For one 
thing, the ratio is bound to be affected by short- and 
medium-term lags and uncertainties. Large discov-
eries, for instance, may have to wait a number of years 
for the development of transmission facilities and 
new markets. Beyond this, the optimal drawdown 
of reserves (especially via infill drilling) should vary 
with current and anticipated market conditions. For 
example, suppose new discoveries generate produc-
tion increases and begin to drive down current prices, 
while leaving longer-term price expectations relatively 
unchanged. Then future profits will begin to appear 
relatively more attractive (the ‘user cost’ becomes a 
more significant proportion of cost) and the optimal 
R/P ratio will rise. In spite of these caveats, an Alberta 
natural gas R/P ratio consistently in excess of twenty-
five throughout the period of regulatory gas protec-
tion policies is remarkable.
The reader may well ask the question: why would 
there be any excess or surplus of established reserves 
at any point in time, as the various surplus formulae 
discussed earlier presume? The reasons are fourfold. 
First, some natural gas reserves occur in conjunction 
with oil reserves and so their availability is not cali-
brated to natural gas market requirements. Second, 
the exploration process is not well defined direc-
tionally. While some areas are more gas prone than 
others, it is not possible to channel exploration activity 
specifically towards gas. Indeed, the initial build up 
of Alberta’s gas reserves after World War II largely 
resulted from what was intended as oil-directed 
exploration. Third, surplus policies themselves could 
encourage accumulation of reserves in excess of those 
required on a normal commercial basis. In other 
words, such policies can become self-fulfilling. Fourth, 
market imperfections may preclude market clearance. 
The first two of these reasons would account for sur-
plus reserves for some period of time, but not per-
sistently over the thirty-five years from 1950 through 
1985. The last two reasons could explain continuing 
excess stocks.
2. Analytics of Gas Export Limitations
At the most basic level, the natural gas protection 
policies served to limit shipments of gas from the 
region (Alberta or Canada, depending upon whether 
the regulations were by the Alberta government or 
the NEB). The impact of policies to restrict exports 
can be examined in the context of resource rents (see 
Bradley, 1972). The illustration below is couched in 
terms of exports from Canada, for ease of exposition. 
But the analysis would apply equally to removal of gas 
from Alberta.
The following analysis compares two extreme 
possibilities, no exports and completely unrestricted 
exports. The latter has been approximated since 
deregulation and the FTA in the late 1980s, although, 
as we shall see, short-run and long-run adjustments 
differ. Prior to that, exports from Canada were limited 
by the gas protection policies but were not nil.
Figure 12.4 compares the two cases. DC is the 
Canadian demand for natural gas. PU is the price at 
which the U.S. natural gas market would clear if no 
imports were allowed. At lower prices, U.S. consum-
ers want more gas and producers provide less. The 
lower the price, the higher the ‘excess demand’ in the 
United States. This excess demand (E) translates into 
a demand for Canadian gas. In Figure 12.4 the total 
demand for Canadian gas is shown by DC + E.
In reality not all of such excess demand in the U.S. 
market would be added to the demand for Canadian 
gas. There could be other sources of gas available to 
the United States, for example offshore (LNG) and 
Mexico. Moreover, regional aspects and constraints 
on the flexibility of pipeline systems would preclude 
Canada filling the entire gap. But our exercise is theor-
etical and such adjustments would not detract from 
















Figure 12.4 Natural Gas Export Limitations
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Given a Canadian policy that prohibits exports, 
the market clearing price would be PC and QC.
Given an open, competitive market, the equilib-
rium price and output as shown in Figure 12.4 (at 
point C, where SC intersects DC + E) would be P* and 
Q* respectively. Output absorbed by the domestic 
market would be Q’C, which would be lower than the 
quantity (QC) absorbed domestically when exports 
are inhibited and the equilibrium is where domestic 
supply (SC) meets domestic demand (DC). The reason 
for the reduction in domestic consumption with an 
open market is of course the impact of higher prices 
compared with the case of the closed economy. The 
quantity of exports is Q* – Q’C.
Who might be the gainers and losers under a per-
missive export policy? The immediate gainers would 
be the Canadian natural-gas-producing sector. The 
producing sector embraces the interests of privately 
and publicly owned companies and governments that 
obtain revenues from it. In comparison with a closed 
market, production sector rents increase by the area 
PCBCP* in Figure 12.4. Natural gas consumers in the 
United States would also gain since some portion of 
their excess demand would be satisfied.
The losers would be Canadian natural gas con-
sumers. The reduction in consumer surplus (com-
pared with a closed market) is represented by the area 
PCBEP* in Figure 12.4.
Since the welfare loss felt by consumers is more 
than offset by production-sector gains, ostensibly a 
sufficient portion of the extra revenues enjoyed by 
the production sector could be transferred to con-
sumers to make them as well off or better off than 
under a closed economy (Kaldor-Hicks Compensation 
Principle). The net improvement in rents and thus 
welfare is represented by the area ECB in Figure 12.4.
In this sort of calculus, what happens to the 
economic rents is crucial. Bradley (1972) outlines 
two extreme cases. The first is where the additional 
production-sector rents escape any taxes and royalties, 
where the entire industry is foreign-owned, and where 
all the rents leave the country. The second extreme 
case is where all the additional production-sector rent 
accrues to governments that redistribute monies to 
consumers to ensure they are no worse off than under 
a closed system.
The realities, since large-scale exports of Canadian 
natural gas commenced in the 1950s, lie between 
these two extremes. Exports have been permitted but 
are nevertheless restricted by the surplus and other 
policies. The tax system does capture considerable 
amounts of economic rent via lease sales, royalties, 
permits and rentals, and income taxes. Not all the 
industry is foreign-owned, and foreign owners do 
not immediately repatriate additional rents. Note 
that when the surplus policy is binding, this can have 
repercussions for domestic prices if domestic con-
sumers enjoy some monopolistic power. Certainly 
the regime prevailing at the time of writing under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
is the nearest Canada has had to a totally permissive 
export policy.
One modification to the analysis of Figure 12.4 
should be introduced. It is well established that U.S. 
natural gas pricing regulations in the 1960s and 1970s 
served to hold prices below market clearing levels 
(MacAvoy and Pindyck, 1975). In Figure 12.4, this 
is shown by Pr. If this price also applied to imports 
from Canada, as was the case, then Pr would serve as 
an equilibrium price (due to U.S. regulations). There 
would be excess demand in U.S. markets equal to 
Ed, of which an amount X would be met by imports 
from Canada. 
3. Impacts of the Gas Protection Policies
The Alberta and Canadian policies did not in fact 
prohibit exports – the regulations were more com-
plex than an absolute prohibition and operated more 
indirectly. Thus the analysis above illustrates the type 
of effects expected but fails to provide a reasonable 
explanation of how the surplus policies operated. 
That the general effects were as illustrated is suggested 
by Waverman’s (1973) linear programming model of 
North American natural gas flows in the 1960s. He 
finds that more Canadian gas was used in domestic 
markets, and less exported, than would be expected 
in a deregulated North American gas market. Exactly 
how the surplus policies operated to generate these 
results is less clear. For example, exactly why did the 
natural gas protection policy generate large reserves 
relative to production? The explanation must lie in the 
behaviour of the various market participants. There 
is no full behavioural model of the Alberta natural 
gas industry, including wide latitude in development 
options for natural gas producers. Rowse (e.g., 1986, 
1987, 1990) has built an ambitious and valuable oper-
ations research model of the Canadian gas industry 
that develops conditional forecasts of both produc-
tion and consumption behaviour, but it assumes 
elasticity and resource cost parameters, rather than 
estimating them historically, and contains limited 
reserve development options. The same can be said 
of the Canadian components of the North American 
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Regional Gas (NARG) model developed by a private 
consulting firm, Data Resources Inc., and widely used 
by Canadian private firms and governments (includ-
ing the NEB in its Supply/Demand Reports). However, 
economic analysis provides some guidance as to the 
effects of the natural gas protection policies.
Historically, the consumption side of the market 
for Alberta natural gas has included a limited number 
of buyers, thereby taking an oligopsonistic form. 
Within Alberta, most of the gas has been purchased 
by the two main utilities. (Known as Northwestern 
Utilities and Canadian Western Natural Gas for much 
of their lives, they were acquired by ATCO in 1980.) 
Buyers for removal of gas from the province have 
mainly been the large gas transmission companies, 
TransCanada Pipe Line (for sale in Canada and the 
United States east of Alberta), Westcoast Transmission 
(which primarily contracts gas in north eastern B.C., 
for sale in B.C. and the U.S. Pacific Northwest) and 
Alberta and Southern (for sale on the U.S. Pacific 
coast, mainly California). All these large buyers have 
been rate-regulated on a cost of service basis.
At first glance, the Alberta and NEB surplus tests 
for export of natural gas might be viewed as a con-
trolling device that allowed buyers to obtain an oli-
gopsonistic result of lower prices. (Here, lower prices 
means in comparison to an effectively competitive 
market.) The necessity of preserving sufficient supplies 
to meet internal needs would serve as a significant 
barrier to entry to buyers from outside the region who 
could not be guaranteed regulatory approval for gas 
removal from Alberta or Canada. However, the usual 
oligopsonistic preference for low prices on inputs 
is not fully operative in this case; since the utilities 
and transmission companies are rate-regulated, they 
cannot generate higher profits by buying inputs (i.e., 
field gas) low and then selling output (i.e., delivered 
gas) high. Hence, the impact of the natural gas protec-
tion policies on the buyers’ side of the market must be 
somewhat more subtle than this.
We would emphasize two effects. First, the restric-
tions did imply a potential (or binding) limitation on 
competition between regional and ex-regional buyers, 
and hence may have allowed lower prices within the 
region than outside, as the analytical model suggested. 
A gas seller would prefer a lower-priced contract with 
a buyer from within the region to a higher-priced 
contract with an ex-regional buyer that ran some 
probability of being overturned because there was no 
regional gas surplus. However, one would expect these 
price effects on new contracts only when the region 
was judged to have a very small or no export surplus. 
(This held for Alberta only in the early 1980s, and for 
Canada as a whole after 1970.) In the 1980s, the gas 
surplus tests may have had a positive effect on the 
appearance of gas export pipelines since they helped 
to ensure that exports would not be interrupted and 
such reduced risk made the financing of the pipe-
lines easier.
A second effect of the surplus tests was the stimu-
lus it offered to long-term contractual arrangements 
between buyers and sellers and to the appearance on 
the market of uncontracted reserves. Until the 1980s, 
the gas-protection policies essentially required twenty-
five or more years of reserves in support of current 
sales. Buyers may have been induced to contract vol-
umes for this length of time, thereby removing the 
reserves from the hands of other potential buyers. 
However, given the limited number of buyers, espe-
cially when the gas surplus restrictions were binding, 
the regional buyers could afford to leave some reserves 
uncontracted. The seller would have no alternate 
buyer within the region, and ex-regional buyers would 
be disallowed if there were no gas surplus. Long-term 
contracts plus any uncontracted reserves would con-
tribute to a higher R/P ratio.
Moreover, the long-term contracts tended to have 
inflexible pricing terms. In contracts signed in the 
1950s and 1960s, prices were often fixed with small 
escalation factors, and there was generally no provi-
sion for frequent or drastic renegotiation of price. This 
likely reflected the risk preferences of the regulated 
utilities: stable prices meant that sales were also likely 
to be stable, and the risk of losses in demand reduced. 
Sellers may also have preferred relatively stable prices, 
but even if a seller did not, the oligopsonistic nature of 
the market would give it little choice. As was discussed 
in Section 2 of this chapter, the inflexibility in gas 
contracts, and limitations in Canadian exports under 
the gas surplus tests, posed a real dilemma for Alberta 
energy policy-makers when international crude oil 
prices began to shoot up in the early 1970s, pulling the 
value of natural gas along.
Our discussion of the natural gas protection 
regulations have dealt primarily with the buyers’ side 
of the market. It has been noted that the regulations 
probably served to strengthen the position of buyers 
in their negotiations with natural gas producers. At 
any given level of natural gas prices, the export surplus 
regulations would tend to increase the effective cost of 
reserves and to reduce their effective price. The regu-
lations raised the investment cost of gas reserves since 
reserves would have to be carried for longer before 
sale (Hamilton, 1973). This could come about in two 
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ways. First, the regulations led to contracts in which 
relatively high reserves were held per unit of output 
(i.e., pools tended to be depleted slower rather than 
faster). Second, new reserves might go uncontracted 
for a longer time. With respect to price, unless the 
natural gas price was expected to rise very rapidly, the 
present value of the revenue received from the reser-
voir is reduced when the gas output is delayed; that is, 
the effective value of a unit of gas reserves is reduced.
Our argument may begin to seem contradictory. If 
the gas-protection regulations tended to inhibit invest-
ment in reserve additions, how can they contribute to 
higher than expected R/P ratios? In part, the response 
lies in the individual contracts, which, as noted above, 
tended to involve large reserves in support of produc-
tion, as was, in fact necessitated by the gas-surplus 
regulations. But part of the answer must also lie in the 
aggregate market results of the gas-surplus policies. 
Here, we would suggest that these policies, for natural 
gas, served to induce significant price stability (rigid-
ity) in the natural gas market, much as market- 
demand prorationing did for crude oil. Hence one 
does not observe the downward pressure on natural 
gas prices in the 1950s that the rapid growth in gas 
reserves might have led one to expect. The higher gas 
prices meant somewhat less consumption. In addition, 
higher prices increase the attractiveness of reserves 
additions, tending to offset the negative stimulus 
of delayed production. Both reduced consumption 
and higher reserves additions operate to increase the 
R/P ratio.
We hesitate to offer a complete normative analysis 
of the gas-protection policies that were in place from 
1950 to the mid-1980s. Some comments are in order. 
A number of observers (e.g., Hamilton, 1973) have 
stressed the negative effects of the increased costs 
associated with high R/P ratios. More inputs than were 
necessary were drawn into the natural gas industry, 
when society might have used them elsewhere.
Economists are generally critical of policies that 
reduce the reactivity of markets, thereby inhibiting 
consumer and producer responses to changes in 
underlying market conditions. In the case of inflex-
ibility in natural gas prices, the beneficiaries would 
seem to be the natural gas consumers at the expense 
of producers, as the analytical model suggests, 
although it is hard to be definite in this regard. (The 
view that gas-surplus tests must benefit consumers is 
suspect since the policies also induced high reserve 
levels in support of consumption, and therefore did 
not necessarily generate lower prices.) We judge it 
likely by the late 1960s that the policies were probably 
holding prices lower than they would otherwise have 
been. From the mid-1970s to 1986, as Section 4 of this 
chapter details, natural gas prices were fixed by the 
government. Thus the gas-protection policies may 
have redistributed some of the benefits of Canadian 
natural gas to Canadian consumers and away from 
U.S. consumers and producing interests (including the 
Alberta government and foreign shareholders in the 
petroleum companies).
As was discussed above, deregulation brought 
the loosening and eventual abandonment of the 
long-standing gas-protection policy. This occurred in 
conjunction with other changes in North American 
natural gas markets, including the Canada–U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) and NAFTA. Beginning in the 
1970s, new buyers had begun to appear for natural gas. 
This accelerated in the 1980s in both Canada and the 
United States as high-volume gas consumers, mar-
keting consortia, and other trading partners began to 
contract for natural gas and lease-delivery space in the 
major transmission lines. Long-term contracts were 
revised to become much more flexible, shorter-term 
contracts became increasingly common, and an active 
spot market for natural gas developed.
The result was a revolution in Canadian natural 
gas markets even greater than that in crude oil mar-
kets. Canadian gas sales, particularly exports to the 
United States, rose rapidly after 1986, as shown in 
Table 12.1. The R/P ratio fell dramatically, from 24 in 
1985 to 8.3 by 2003. And natural gas prices became 
much more flexible as increasing volumes are sold 
under shorter-term (e.g., two years or less) contracts 
or under longer-term contracts with prices renegoti-
ated frequently.
And what of protection of gas supplies for 
Albertan and Canadian consumers? The changes in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s have led to a situation in 
which natural gas consumers are protected in much 
the same manner as they are in the consumption of 
any other commodity – by the market. Impending 
scarcity puts upward pressures on prices, which indu-
ces consumers to conserve natural gas and draws forth 
greater supplies. Consumption by Canadians is war-
ranted only if Canadians are willing to pay as much 
as foreign buyers; otherwise, the gas is exported and 
Canada derives the export revenue. McDougall sug-
gests that the NEB’s policies in the 1960s were biased 
towards encouraging exports, as indicated by the loos-
ened restrictions in estimating domestic supply, and 
that price tests were never taken very seriously, at least 
so far as determining the economic value of gas in the 
export market is concerned (McDougall, 1975, chap. 
5). He interprets the prime purpose of the exportable 
surplus policy as the “protection” of Canadian gas 
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consumers, but expressed largely as trying to ensure 
access to low-cost supplies. Exports, he argues, draw 
on low-cost supplies and therefore force domestic 
consumers to rely on higher cost volumes.
This raises a fundamental question: are there 
any reasons that natural gas should not be treated as 
another economic commodity? The gas-protection 
regulations implied that there were, though exactly 
what these were was not made clear. Three possibil-
ities come to mind, all related to prohibition of gas 
removal (exports), although are all debatable.
First, natural gas is a depletable natural resource 
and therefore, it might be argued, should be reserved 
for Canadians, especially if the free market is unable 
to allocate depletable resources efficiently and equit-
ably. We have touched on variants of this argument 
numerous times with reference to oil, so we will only 
reiterate some of the earlier responses briefly. In 
Canada, many other depletable resources are han-
dled by relatively unrestricted markets. Producers of 
natural gas do have a strong profit incentive to take 
likely future market conditions into account and 
therefore do have ‘conservation’ tendencies. Whether 
depletable or not, many people feel that the resource 
should be used where it generates the greatest value 
for Canada, even if that is by means of generating 
foreign exchange on export sales. We have also 
emphasized that exhaustibility of petroleum resources 
is primarily a physical phenomenon, rather than an 
economic one, while production and consumption are 
economic activities. From a dynamic point of view, 
greater sales and higher prices resultant from exports 
will call forth additional supplies and encourage faster 
adoption of any new technologies that have a strong 
‘learning-by-doing’ component. There are a number of 
contentious arguments related to the possible under-
valuing of future consumption needs, but if these 
arguments are accepted they apply to current domes-
tic sales as well as to ex-regional sales. On balance, we 
view the depletability argument as a weak basis for 
petroleum export limitations.
Second, natural gas might be argued an essential 
good for home heating and for many industries. But 
there are substitutes for natural gas in virtually all 
uses, at least in the long run. Moreover, there are many 
‘essential’ goods (e.g., food stuffs) and we neither limit 
the export of these nor would we be very understand-
ing if some other country severely restricted our abil-
ity to buy from them.
Third, natural gas is a continental rather than 
international product and involves very capital- 
intensive transmission and consumption capital; 
therefore, it could be argued that domestic consumers, 
once linked to supplies, need to be assured of con-
tinued accessibility. Economists may argue in response 
that capital intensity is not peculiar to the use of 
natural gas, and that natural gas can be imported or 
produced from other sources such as grain, peat, or 
coal. Moreover, one advantage of well-functioning 
economic markets is exactly that they make gas avail-
able to anyone who ‘needs’ it (and is willing to pay!) 
and that the market facilitates the gradual adjustment 
to changing conditions such as growing scarcity. 
We would reiterate that there are equity effects of a 
decision to follow open markets, with the producers 
of an exported product benefiting at the expense of 
domestic consumers. This has implications for tax-
ation policies, especially those on economic rents, 
but is, in our view, an insufficient reason to impose 
export limitations.
Overall, we are not convinced by the arguments 
that natural gas is somehow special and cannot be 
allocated through traditional economic markets. The 
recent rapid evolution of active and flexible natural gas 
trading institutions provides evidence in this regard.
This section has focused on the export volume 
limitations. The next section considers pricing issues, 
including export pricing.
4. Price Controls and Other Market 
Regulations
This section deals with those government regulations 
that impacted significantly upon the market for nat-
ural gas other than the export surplus rules discussed 
in Section 3. We are primarily concerned with regula-
tions impacting upon natural gas prices. Of necessity, 
some of this material was presented above, in Section 
2C, in the discussion of natural gas prices. This section 
draws upon Helliwell et al. (1989, chap. 4), Plourde 
(1986), Watkins (1977a, 1981, 1987a, 1989, 1991a), and 
Watkins and Waverman (1985).
A.	Market	Regulations
1. Domestic Pricing
As will be recalled, domestic natural gas prices were 
quite stable in the 1960s, and NEB denial of export 
permits commencing in 1970 removed the stimulus 
of growing U.S. demand for gas in the interstate mar-
kets. TransCanada Pipelines (TCPL), the major buyer 
of Alberta gas, was left in a situation tantamount to 
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monopsony. Rising oil prices at the start of the 1970s 
had minimal impact on natural gas prices, which rose, 
on average, from $0.16/Mcf at the wellhead in 1970 to 
$0.17/Mcf by 1972. In 1972, the Alberta government 
began a campaign to increase gas prices by asking 
the ERCB to study field prices, as was discussed in 
Section 2, above. There we noted that gas prices began 
to increase in 1973, and contract provisions moved to 
greater flexibility in prices.
In the spring of 1975, a price of $1.15/Mcf was 
awarded by an arbitration panel in a dispute between 
TCPL and Gulf Oil Canada. This was widely inter-
preted as representing a suitable commodity value for 
gas in line with the sharp increases in oil prices, which 
had taken place since 1972. The sevenfold increase 
over the 1970 natural gas price focused the attention 
of the federal government, much as had rising oil 
prices. The June 1975 budget announced that Ottawa 
and the producing provinces had agreed on a gov-
ernment-fixed price effective November 1, 1975. The 
price would be 85 per cent of the price of crude oil, on 
a Btu parity basis, at the Toronto city gate, rising to 
100 per cent of the crude price over three to five years. 
Initially, the price would be $1.25/Mcf. The Alberta 
border price for natural gas would be the Toronto city 
gate price less transmission charges; the field price 
would be the border prices less the NOVA transmis-
sion charge within Alberta and gas-processing-plant 
charges. Note that the full brunt of any transmission 
cost rises fell on the natural gas producer.
As Table 12.2, shows, Toronto city gate prices were 
increased a number of times by federal and prov-
incial government agreement over the November 
1975 to February 1980 period; the increases followed 
agreed-upon oil price rises and attempted to keep the 
natural gas price at 85 per cent parity with crude oil 
in Toronto. Table 12.3 looks at the Toronto market in 
more detail, including average city gate natural gas 
prices in comparison to the average cost of crude oil 
to refineries for years 1970 through 1987. It can be seen 
that gas prices were well below 85 per cent crude oil 
equivalence in 1970 but had risen close to that level 
by 1973. However, rising oil prices in 1974 and 1975 left 
gas prices behind the standard until the November 
1975 increase.
Government authority to set natural gas prices was 
derived from Ottawa’s 1975 Petroleum Administration 
Act and from Alberta’s Natural Gas Pricing Agreement 
Act (RSA, 1975, chap. 38), which overrode any award 
under arbitration or other price redetermination 
agreement.
As was discussed in Chapter Nine, the inability 
of Ottawa and Edmonton to reach agreement on 
oil prices in 1979 and 1980 led Ottawa to introduce 
the National Energy Program (NEP) in conjunction 
with its October 1980 budget (Energy, Mines and 
Resources, 1980). The NEP noted that
… pricing policy for natural gas must meet 
two needs: provision of adequate incentive 
to production and strong encouragement for 
consumers to use natural gas in preference to 
oil. Producers’ returns from natural gas have 
risen dramatically since the mid-1970s – in 
fact, faster than oil prices, despite a growing 
surplus of gas. (p. 31)
Table 12.3: Relationship between Natural Gas and 
Crude Oil Prices, Toronto, 1970 to 1987 ($/GJ)
	 Refinery	Average	 Acquisition	 Ratio	of	Gas 
 City Gate Gas  Cost Crude to Crude Oil 
 Price (1)   Price (2) (3) = (1) / (2)
1970 0.36 0.56 0.64
1971 0.44 0.56 0.78
1972 0.45 0.56 0.80
1973 0.52 0.64 0.81
1974 0.55 1.05 0.52
1975 0.82 1.32 0.62
1976 1.24 1.52 0.82
1977 1.47 1.81 0.81
1978 1.77 2.15 0.82
1979 1.92 2.40 0.80
1980 2.23 2.91 0.77
1981 2.42 4.52 0.54
1982 2.80 5.46 0.51
1983 3.38 5.93 0.57
1984 3.71 6.01 0.62
1985 3.76 6.25 0.60
1986 3.85 3.43 1.12
1987 2.84* 4.07 0.70
* direct selling price at Toronto, upper scale.
Sources:
(1) 1970–74 – based on ERCB and DataMetrics Limited; 1975–87 – Petroleum 
Monitoring Agency, Monitoring Survey, Annual 1986; Texaco Energy & 
Economic Data Book; and Corpus, Energy Pricing News, 1987 issues.
(2) 1970–73 – wellhead price & IPL tariff – ERCB and IPL Annual Reports; 
1974–87, and Energy, Mines and Resources, Energy Statistics Handbook.
(3) 1970–78 – Industry Source; 1979–87 – EMR Ottawa. Note that 1979–87 
prices are based on Ontario value/volume data.
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The desire to reduce reliance on oil imports also influ-
enced policy under the NEP.
Linking Canadian natural gas prices to world 
oil prices is also unwise, because Canadian 
endowments of oil and gas resources differ: 
we have, judging from evidence thus far, 
abundant supplies of natural gas that could be 
produced at moderate prices, but less certain 
prospects for oil. Linking Canadian prices to 
world prices would keep the price of gas to the 
consumer rising at the same rate as the price 
of oil. This would inhibit the massive-scale 
substitution away from oil that must take place 
if Canada is to achieve energy security.
Increased use of gas would be encouraged by subsidies 
to pipeline extensions east of Montreal to keep city 
gate natural gas prices at the Toronto level (p. 58), and 
consumer grants would encourage substitution away 
from oil to other fuels, including natural gas (p. 56).
Under the NEP, natural gas prices would fall 
somewhat relative to crude oil at the Toronto city 
gate. From 1975 to 1980, every $1/b oil price rise gave a 
$0.15/Mcf gas price increase; under the NEP, for three 
years from 1981 through to 1983, gas prices would 
rise $0.10/Mcf for every dollar per barrel increase in 
domestic oil prices; this meant gas price increases of 
$0.45/Mcf per year for the three years. Alberta border 
prices, however, would not rise for the first year in 
order to make room for a $0.45/Mcf Natural Gas and 
Gas Liquids Tax (NGGLT), “which will be applied 
in lieu of a gas export tax” (p. 31), on all Canadian-
produced natural gas. As can be seen in Table 12.3, the 
price of natural gas in 1981 was at 54 per cent of the 
crude oil price at Toronto, as compared to 80 per cent 
in 1979.
The NEP also set up a “Canadian Ownership 
Account, to be financed by special charges on all oil 
and gas consumption in Canada, to be used solely to 
finance an increase of public ownership in the energy 
sector” (p. 51). City gate gas prices were increased in 
May 1981 by $0.15/Mcf for the Canadian Ownership 
Special Charge (COSC).
Chapter Nine outlined Alberta’s outrage at 
the NEP, and the program of oil output cutbacks 
introduced in protest. The two governments 
reached accommodation in the September 1, 1981, 
Memorandum of Agreement relating to Energy 
Pricing and Taxation. The Memorandum switched 
the geographical bias for pricing from Toronto to 
the Alberta border and agreed upon a new pricing 
schedule in which the price would rise by $0.25/Mcf 
every six months through to the end of 1986 (starting 
on February 1, 1982) (p. 7). The Memorandum fur-
ther specified the intent “to establish the level of the 
NGGLT on domestic sales so that, taking into account 
a range of factors, including gas transportation costs, 
the parity relationship between the wholesale price 
of natural gas at the Toronto city gate and the aver-
age price of crude oil at the Toronto refinery gate 
will be approximately 65%” (p. 9). (Presumably the 
COSC would also fill the gap between the Alberta and 
Toronto prices.) Table 12.3 shows that the Toronto gas 
price had fallen to 51 per cent of the crude cost by 1982 
and rose again to 60 per cent in 1985, the year of crude 
oil price deregulation.
It will be recalled that the domestic oil price sched-
ule in the Memorandum soon proved to be too high, 
as world oil prices began to weaken in 1983. Similar 
problems arose with domestic natural gas prices. The 
upshot was an amendment to the agreement for the 
eighteen-month period starting July 1, 1983. Alberta 
agreed to modify the schedule to the lesser of (i) 65 
per cent of the Btu equivalent of the blended oil price 
at Toronto, less transportation charges and COSC, or 
(ii) the level given by the increases of $0.25/Mcf as 
previously agreed upon. The implication was that the 
NGGLT would gradually decrease as the border price 
rose but was not matched by the rises in Toronto 
city gate prices (i.e., at 65 per cent of crude costs). By 
February 1, 1984, the NGGLT had fallen to zero, so 
that the Alberta border price was governed by the 65 
per cent rule. In fact, from February 1984 on, Alberta 
and Ottawa agreed to keep the Alberta border price 
at $3.00/Mcf, which held until November 1, 1986, and 
gas price deregulation. (The Toronto city gate price 
changed slightly, as Table 12.3 shows, due to changes 
in transmission tariffs and COSC.) The one-year lag 
in deregulating natural gas prices as compared to oil 
prices (November 1986 opposed to June 1985) meant 
that gas prices were above Btu parity with crude in 
Toronto in 1986.
The price regulations in place from 1975 to 1985 
held domestic Canadian natural gas prices below 
natural gas export prices and below Btu equivalence 
with imported (and domestic crude) in central and 
eastern Canada. Within Alberta, prices were held even 
lower for consumers from 1975 through 1995 under the 
Natural Gas Pricing Act. The mechanism in this case 
was not reduced payments to natural gas producers 
but a subsidy from general tax revenues that was paid 
to buyers of Alberta gas (largely to natural gas distri-
bution utilities).
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Section 2 of this chapter provided information 
on the process of natural gas deregulation, which 
occurred November 1, 1986, against a backdrop of 
high gas reserves to production ratios, significant 
excess deliverability with spare capacity both in the 
field and in transmission facilities, and a high degree 
of concentration on the buyers’ side of the market. The 
Alberta government and producers were particularly 
concerned that ‘excess supplies’ and oligopsony would 
force gas prices down to unreasonably low levels. 
There was widespread feeling that the market might 
require considerable guidance if it was to evolve in a 
smooth manner to effective competition; expressed in 
other terms, judicious regulation might be an essential 
ingredient of the transition to a deregulated natural 
gas market.
Naturally, much attention focused on TCPL, which 
had been seen as a near-monopsonist buyer of Alberta 
natural gas in the years immediately before price 
regulation. The opening up of export markets offered 
more competition, and several new large buyers and 
large sellers of natural gas offered potential compe-
tition to TransCanada; these included the Alberta 
Petroleum Marketing Commission, which had been 
set up by the Alberta government to handle the sale of 
the oil and gas from Crown lands during the years of 
regulated prices. Companies such as Pan Alberta and 
ProGas had also been controlling natural gas supplies. 
TransCanada’s decision, at the start of 1986, to separ-
ate transmission and gas trading activities, with the 
creation of WGML as the natural gas buyer and seller, 
helped clear the way to more open access to TCPL 
pipeline facilities.
During the transition year, November 1, 1985, to 
October 31, 1986, direct sales were made at prices 
negotiated between producers and large industrial gas 
users; and several Competitive Marketing Programs 
allowing system gas sales to offer competitive dis-
counts were put in place. (System gas refers to the 
gas bought and sold by a transmission company as a 
demand and supply aggregator.) WGML, the market-
ing arm of TCPL, renegotiated sales contracts with the 
four major natural gas distributors in eastern Canada. 
These two-year contracts offered residential and small 
commercial customers an immediate discount of 
$0.21/Mcf off the $3.00/Mcf frozen Alberta border 
price, followed by price stability over the contract 
term. Price flexibility was provided by allowing dis-
tributors to match direct sale prices in their respective 
industrial markets. These contracts could result in 
substantial discounts off the Alberta border price. 
On the regulatory side, the NEB ruled that the TCPL 
system should be accessible to all users and ordered 
changes to TCPL’s tariffs to open up the pipeline 
(NEB, 1986b).
At the provincial level, as noted above, provisions 
in Alberta’s Gas Resources Preservation Act linking 
the award of removal licences to economic benefits 
accruing to Alberta were removed, only to be replaced 
by new latitude given to the Alberta Energy Resources 
Conservation Board to consider “other matters,” 
including price, in evaluating gas removal applica-
tions. The Alberta Arbitration Act was amended to 
allow arbitrators to consider a much broader range 
of criteria than “commodity value” in redetermining 
Alberta field prices (a commitment made under the 
1985 Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices).
Thus, during the transition period, blocks of gas 
for industrial customers in eastern Canada were sold 
at prices below the prescribed Alberta border price of 
$3.00/Mcf. Indeed, by September 1986, TCPL’s average 
Alberta border netback on domestic sales was already 
$2.64/Mcf.
With deregulation on November 1, 1986, the pre-
scribed Alberta border price for natural gas leaving 
the province was abolished. Domestic (and export) 
gas prices were now negotiated between producers 
and purchasers. Although the environment was com-
petitive, pricing information was not transparent as 
selling prices of Alberta natural gas were generally 
confidential.
Renegotiation of pricing provisions in TCPL’s 
contracts with Ontario and Manitoba utilities resulted 
in creation of funds by TCPL to finance the dis-
counting of gas. These funds distinguished between 
customer-specific funds, operated by WGML, and a 
utility-wide market fund. However, the latter was still 
to be disbursed on the basis of criteria established 
between the distributor and TCPL. There was a strong 
stipulation that the funds not be spread over all cus-
tomers – they were to be devoted to meeting individ-
ual competitive circumstances. In short, they were to 
be used on a discretionary basis. These arrangements 
resulted in price discounts at the Alberta border 
varying from $0.16 for small industrial customers to 
$1.07 per thousand cubic feet for large industrial users 
(Ontario Energy Board, 1986).
Several provincial regulatory bodies developed 
policies concerning the cost of gas purchased by util-
ities under their jurisdiction and the availability of 
transportation services on local distribution systems.
The Ontario Energy Board’s (OEB) decision in 
1986 on the two-year gas-price agreement between 
WGML and Ontario distributors focused on the 
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board’s jurisdictional mandate to determine rates 
for all customers in Ontario. In particular, the OEB 
wanted all natural gas purchased by utilities to be 
delivered to Ontario without being streamed to 
specific customers and customer groups.
As well, in early 1987, the OEB ruled that all natural 
gas consumers had freedom of choice in selecting 
gas supply purchasers; this ruling in effect broke the 
marketing monopoly held by distribution utilities 
(Ontario Energy Board, 1987). While the distribution 
companies retained their franchises on moving gas, 
the decision opened up the entire provincial market 
to increased gas sales competition by allowing pur-
chasing entities, such as school boards, municipalities, 
hospitals, households, and small business co-opera-
tives, to enter into contracts with any supplier. The 
effect of these arrangements would be to shrink dis-
tributor core market requirements for higher-priced 
system gas and to drive gas prices toward the levels 
large industrial users pay, as long as appropriate 
“removal permits” were available from the Alberta 
government and access to transportation capacity 
was enjoyed.
The Manitoba government also objected to the 
segmentation of markets under the 1986 renegoti-
ated gas pricing agreements between WGML and the 
Manitoba distribution utilities.
Thus, downstream authorities do not like 
up stream price discrimination. Partly this is pique – if 
price discrimination were to take place, they would 
rather it be theirs than someone else’s. But also it does 
represent a valid objection – that upstream discrimin-
ation is not consistent with fostering a competitive 
market since the essence of competitive price forma-
tion is that differentials for a homogeneous product 
cannot be sustained.
Producing interests, on the other hand, were very 
much worried that customers would abandon their 
traditional supply sources like WGML, which had 
signed contracts for gas purchase, and enter into new 
contracts at lower prices, effectively displacing the 
gas under long-term contract. This could be a general 
problem in a deregulated environment unless the 
longer-term production contracts were matched by 
longer-term sales contracts by the supply aggregators. 
However, it was a particular concern during the tran-
sition period when the high gas R/P ratio was being 
worked down. In 1988, Alberta’s Minister of Energy 
and Natural Resources wrote to the Ontario Minister 
of Energy indicating that Alberta had no objection 
to “core” gas consumers entering into direct pur-
chases in Alberta, so long as they did so in the form 
of ten- to fifteen-year contracts (APMC, 1988 Annual 
Report). This could be seen as a way of ensuring that 
small-volume customers had access to gas supplies 
that might be essential to them. However, in an effect-
ively deregulated market, it is more accurately viewed 
as a prohibition on small consumers covering their 
needs through an ongoing sequence of spot or short-
term purchases. In the context of the Canadian gas 
market in the late 1980s, it would blunt somewhat the 
downward price pressures.
After deregulation, a wide range of natural gas 
prices at the Alberta border emerged, with spreads 
between short-term and long-term prices in excess 
of $0.50/Mcf (EMR, 1987). This in part reflected the 
degree of market segmentation and volatility that 
existed. But note that price variations do not them-
selves indicate lack of competitive price formation or 
market imperfections. They may simply reflect differ-
ent terms and conditions, such as manner of delivery 
(storage costs), reliability of services (continuous or 
interruptible supply), length of service (short- or long-
term contracts), load factors, and the like. Price dif-
ferences arising from such product variations do not 
constitute price discrimination.
In the late 1980s, TCPL system-gas contacts 
showed appreciable Alberta border price differentials 
between various categories of end users. Such a degree 
of price differentiation was not compatible with a 
competitive market-pricing regime unless sustained 
by variations in the service offered between customers. 
It is unlikely that differences in load factors or other 
service features between customers were sufficient to 
account for the degree of discount differentials shown. 
Moreover, the main basis for the award of discounts 
was the price of competitive fuels, a criterion that has 
little to do with service characteristics. It follows that 
such differentials do demonstrate market power – the 
desire to impose different prices on customers accord-
ing to their ability to pay. In short, they represent 
monopolistic, not competitive, pricing practices. What 
lay behind TCPL’s position?
TCPL occupied a very strong market position 
through WGML. But the dominant supply position of 
TCPL created serious problems for the company, with 
weak gas markets eroding the take-or-pay position of 
Canadian gas purchasers.
The legacy of take-or-pay arrangements was par-
ticularly serious for TCPL since it had entered into 
area-purchase contracts committing the company to 
purchase a proportion of all reserves developed in a 
relatively large geographical area. For example, TCPL’s 
contractual purchase obligations during the 1977 
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contract year totalled 1.3 Tcf. Although the company 
had not signed any new contracts by 1986, contractual 
obligations amounted to some 2 Tcf. The take-or-pay 
wedge developed because gas supplies increased just 
as markets were levelling off. (As Table 12.1 shows, 
Alberta’s production in 1983 was less than in 1978.) By 
the early 1980s, TCPL could not meet its take-or-pay 
obligations, which were then taken over by a con-
sortium of banks. Under the negotiated TOPGas (the 
acronym stood for take-or-pay gas) agreements, the 
principal on monies paid to producers was recovered 
by TCPL through the sale of prepaid gas and trans-
ferred to the TOPGas consortium. Producers enjoyed 
any surplus between the ongoing gas price and the 
(initial) price received under the TOPGas advances. 
However, if the selling price was less than the initial 
price, producers were liable for the difference, and 
TCPL had the right to make up any deficiencies by 
retaining monies from other gas deliveries by produ-
cers. But in the event that producers default on repay-
ments of the principal, TCPL was liable to the TOPGas 
consortium for up to $355 million. Recovery of the 
principal was on a first-incurred/first-recovered basis. 
For example, prepayments for gas made in 1979 were 
recovered before prepayments made in 1980. The 1987 
recovery of prepayments would appear to have been 
based on advances made to producers in the 1979/80 
contract year. These advances were predicated on 
prices of about $1.70/Mcf (at the gas plant gate exit).
The TOPGas prepayment schedule had implica-
tions for netback prices from eastern markets requir-
ing approval by TCPL’s TOPGas producers. Such prices 
will tend to be sticky since producers were liable 
for any deficiencies on the sale of prepaid gas. Thus, 
TOPGas producers and TCPL would be reluctant to 
indulge in price cutting unless compelled, and espe-
cially not in a way that would involve reducing prices 
to all customers – the competitive market solution 
under surplus conditions.
In contrast to the position of system-gas pro-
ducers and TCPL, consuming interests in eastern 
Canada sought non-discriminatory prices, prices at 
the city gate that did not distinguish between end-
use customers except insofar as they reflect different 
terms and conditions of sale. Ontario dismantled the 
gas-marketing monopoly previously conferred on its 
gas utilities. Manitoba initially sought to take action 
by purchase of the provincial natural gas utility and 
delegation of buying and selling gas solely to a Crown 
corporation to provide one city gate price for natural 
gas. After a change in government, these intentions 
were dropped.
As was noted at the end of Section 2, the Alberta 
government conducted a rearguard action to hold up 
prices. The mechanism was the imposition of pricing 
and volume conditions on gas removal permits. A 
‘ghost’ floor price of $1.45/Mcf was said to be held; 
volume restrictions tended to preclude all but large 
individual customers making deals with producers. 
And beginning January 1, 1988, royalties were based 
on reference rather than actual prices, with the inten-
tion of discouraging discount sales and preserving 
reserves. (Under this provision, royalties are assessed 
on the higher of the actual price or 80 per cent of the 
average Alberta field price.) Alberta required long-
term permits for core customers seeking gas-removal 
permits, and such permits were not given for any vol-
umes that displaced TCPL/distributor contracts pre-
vailing before the October 31, 1985, federal–provincial 
Gas Agreement.
The Alberta permit-removal conditions remained 
in place until 1995. In that year, the government also 
moved for the first time to allow domestic Alberta 
core gas users to enter directly into gas-purchase 
contracts with marketers or producers. As argued in 
Section 2, by 1995, Alberta was part of an integrated 
North American natural gas market with a large 
number of gas producers, interacting with many more 
gas purchasers than in the past, and an even larger 
number of potential purchasers. The gas-trading and 
transmission activities of the major pipelines had been 
largely separated (‘debundled’), and access to pipeline 
facilities made more readily available to all shippers. 
Natural gas price exhibited significant flexibility, 
including a large volume of gas traded on a spot basis 
or tied to spot prices with only a month’s lag. As noted 
above, since 1986, there has been a significant growth 
in natural gas storage capacity, both in producing and 
consuming regions. This began to dampen the sea-
sonal swings in natural gas prices and to allow pro-
duction, gathering, processing, and pipeline facilities 
to operate at closer to capacity throughout the year, 
thereby reducing the costs associated with spare cap-
acity. (Higher annual throughput allows fixed charges 
to be written off over more units of output, effectively 
reducing the cost of shipment.)
The change from the rigid long-term contractual 
world of the 1960s could hardly be more complete.
2. Export Pricing
As early as 1907, in the Exportation of Power and Fluids 
and Importation of Gas Act, Ottawa had specified that 
natural gas should not be exported without a licence 
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or at a price lower than it was sold for in Canada 
under similar sales conditions. (See McDougall, 1975, 
chaps. 5 and 6, for a review of gas pipeline and export 
issues prior to 1970.) Section 83 of the 1984 National 
Energy Board Act re-entrenched this concern, giving 
the NEB responsibility to ensure that natural gas 
export prices were “just and reasonable in relation to 
the public interest.” In the gas export applications that 
the NEB approved in the 1960s, the main emphasis 
was put on the surplus tests discussed in Section 2 
above, with the board generally accepting the nego-
tiated prices. In 1967, the Federal Power Commission 
(FPC) in the United States disallowed prices that 
Westcoast Transmission and El Paso Natural Gas had 
renegotiated in a gas-export contract. (Prices charged 
by Westcoast in the original contract of 1957 were 
lower than those charged to Canadian customers; 
McDougall, 1973.) As was summarized in Section 2, 
the NEB in turn enumerated three formal criteria that 
would be applied to judging the reasonableness of 
prices in gas-export contracts (NEB, 1967, p. 3-19):
1. the export price must recover its appropriate 
share of the costs incurred;
2. the export price should, under normal circum-
stances, not be less than the price to Canadians 
for similar deliveries in the same area; and
3. the export price of gas should not result in 
prices in the United States market area materi-
ally less than the least cost alternative source of 
energy.
The first two tests established a floor price; the third 
was more in the nature of a price ceiling or a target 
price. In 1970, the board elaborated on the second 
test, suggesting that the export price should not be 
less than 105 per cent of the price in the domestic 
market area adjacent to the border where the gas was 
sold (NEB, 1970). McDougall (1982) points out that 
in both the Westcoast export case of 1967 and in the 
Alberta and Southern export application of 1970, the 
NEB acknowledged that the third of these tests did 
not appear to be met with alternative energy sources 
costing more to energy users in the export market 
than the Canadian gas.
The contradictions here foreshadow the gas 
pricing issues that became central in the early 1970s. 
The third test clearly points to a commodity value 
pricing criterion. The question of contractual rigid-
ity also enters. For instance, there is obviously no 
guarantee that a contract with a relatively rigid price 
and small escalations will pass the third test after a 
number of years, even if it did when signed. Moreover, 
gas pipeline companies may have been reluctant to 
sign much higher prices on new contracts than old, 
especially if older contacts had most-favoured-nation 
clauses, or if they fed into higher prices as well on 
domestic contracts that domestic consumers and 
public utility boards would have been reluctant to 
accept. There were also regulatory problems in that 
the FPC was reluctant to approve imports to the 
United States at gas prices appreciably higher than 
interstate U.S. gas prices, which had, since 1954, been 
set by the FPC on a ‘cost of service’ basis. By the late 
1960s, however, it was becoming evident that the FPC 
had set such prices too low. (This, of course, helps 
explain why the cost of alternatives to Canadian gas 
might exceed prevailing interstate prices in the U.S. 
natural gas market.)
Tensions with respect to natural gas export pricing 
were becoming apparent by the early 1970s. As with 
so many other energy questions, rising OPEC prices 
brought the issue to the boil. Since the NEB had ruled 
in 1971 that no exportable surplus existed, the ques-
tion was not about the suitability of price in new gas 
export applications being considered by the board. 
Rather, it was what should be done about prices on 
previously approved exports. Contracts were being 
renegotiated, but the Canadian government felt driven 
to take action.
In July 1974, the NEB submitted a report on nat-
ural gas export pricing. This followed from a 1970 
government order that “where in the opinion of the 
Board there has been a significant increase in prices 
for competing gas supplies or for alternative energy 
sources the Board shall report its findings and recom-
mendations to the Governor in Council” (NEB, 1974a, 
p. 2-1); the government could in turn order increases 
in the gas export price. The NEB recommended a gas 
export price of at least $1.00/Mcf, which the govern-
ment ordered on September 20, 1974, effective on gas 
exports January 1, 1975. The same price applied to all 
exports; as the board said “considering that in all cases 
the border price has fallen well below the Board’s esti-
mate of the current value of the gas, it would seem that 
a major increase in price to a uniform border price for 
all export licenses is appropriate to the circumstances” 
(NEB, 1974a, p. 5-28). In determining the value, the 
board looked to “commodity values” in main export 
markets, noting that these values would differ in dif-
ferent markets. “While the Board relies primarily on 
the weighted average estimate of the commodity value 
of the natural gas, it has also used more approximate 
but more readily available measures based on prices 
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of crude oil and no. 6 fuel oil” (NEB, 1974a, pp. 17–18). 
(One small export permit to Minnesota (GL-29) was 
consistently given a lower export price on the grounds 
that the buyer – a pulp mill – would otherwise be 
likely to switch from Canadian gas to coal.)
Until July 1983, gas export prices continued to 
be set at a uniform border price by the Canadian 
government at prices based on recommendations 
by the NEB. Alberta and other producing provinces 
concurred in this arrangement. Unlike crude oil, the 
excess of gas export prices over domestic prices flowed 
back to the producing provinces. After 1975, Alberta 
(the APMC) allocated these funds across all Alberta 
natural gas producers, so that those companies lucky 
enough to have sold gas under contracts destined for 
export markets did not solely benefit from the higher 
export prices. In its March 1975 to April 1977, reports 
on natural gas export prices, the NEB shifted from a 
“commodity value” approach to a “substitution value” 
or “replacement value” emphasis, where the value 
of Canadian gas exports was based on the cost of a 
unit of energy delivered to Toronto in the form of 
imported crude oil (NEB, 1975a, pp. 4–5). The NEB also 
noted (NEB, 1981a) that the U.S. government requested 
that Canada apply uniform border pricing on gas. 
Table 12.2 shows changes in the uniform border price. 
In 1975 and 1976, the price was set in Canadian dollars; 
after that U.S. dollar pricing was utilized.
On September 21, 1979, U.S. Secretary of Energy 
Duncan sent a letter to Canada’s Minister of Energy, 
Mines, and Resources proposing a “discounting 
pricing mechanism.” The NEB argued that this was not 
in Canada’s interest at the time but the NEB was pre-
pared to review the need for discount pricing in the 
future, particularly if export markets became scarce at 
existing prices – a harbinger of later developments and 
perhaps an implicit admission that there is no fixed 
relationship between oil and gas prices.
A gas-pricing agreement called the Duncan-
Lalonde formula was reached March 24, 1980, 
between the U.S. and Canadian governments. Under 
the agreement, the United States accepted the oil price 
substitution formula for the pricing of Canadian nat-
ural gas exports. In return, Canada agreed to certain 
price-increase deferral arrangements. Later in 1980, 
the NEB deferred two increases in the export price of 
gas called for under the substitution formula, amount-
ing in total to some (US)$0.75/106 Btu. This price 
plateau was prompted by a sharp decrease in Canada’s 
natural gas exports to the United States. In April 1980, 
U.S. gas distributors took only about 57 per cent of gas 
available to them; their average take in 1979 had been 
about 90 per cent.
On April 1, 1981, the NEB announced that the 
Canadian border price would rise to (US)$4.94/106 
Btu (see Table 12.2). This was in response to further 
increases in world oil prices but did not impose full 
oil substitution value. Partly induced by depressed 
gas export sales, the federal government waived an 
October 1, 1981, export gas price increase. Other con-
tributing factors were a desire to avoid aggravating 
already-strained energy relations with the United 
States and a desire to maintain momentum to remove 
legislation hampering the Alaska Highway Natural 
Gas Pipeline Project.
In response to declining markets, the Canadian 
government reduced the export price from 
(US)$4.94/106 Btu to (US)$4.40/106 Btu in April 
1983. However, it soon became apparent that this 
decrease was not enough to stimulate export demand. 
Therefore, in July 1983, a volume-related incentive 
price of (US)$3.40/106 Btu was adopted, but the kicker 
was that it could only apply to volumes exceeding 50 
per cent of those authorized under existing licences or 
to volumes exceeding actual 1982 sales, whichever was 
lower. To some degree, the two-tier system was little 
more than a sympathetic gesture, but it did demon-
strate a less rigid attitude on the part of the Canadian 
government.
In July 1984, the Canadian government adopted 
a more flexible policy, allowing negotiated price 
contracts – subject to regulatory approval. Approval 
depended on satisfaction of certain side conditions, 
including: the border price must not be less than the 
Toronto city gate price (then (Cdn)$3.15/106 Btu); 
and the export price must at least equal the price of 
competing fuels in relevant U.S. markets (shades of 
1967 price tests 2 and 3). Under this policy, exports of 
Canadian gas began to recover. By early 1985, about 
95 per cent of existing export contracts had been 
renegotiated, and several long- and short-term new 
contracts had been drawn up under the July 1984 
NEB provisions.
The federal–provincial natural gas pricing agree-
ment of October 31, 1985, contained a new set of 
export price criteria (Canada,The Agreement, 1985, 
p. 4).
1. The price of exported gas must recover its 
appropriate share of costs incurred;
2. The price of exported natural gas shall not be 
less than the price charged to Canadians for 
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similar types of service in the area or zone adja-
cent to the export point;
3. Export contracts must contain provisions which 
permit adjustments to reflect changing market 
conditions over the life of the contract;
4. Exporters must demonstrate that export 
arrangements provide reasonable assurance that 
volumes contracted will be taken;
5. Exporters must demonstrate that producers 
supplying gas for an export project endorsed the 
terms of the export arrangement and any subse-
quent revision thereof.
Of these criteria, the first was straightforward in the 
sense that it reverted to the original 1967 provisions. 
The second criterion effectively replaced the Toronto 
city gate floor price with regionally variable adjacent 
domestic prices. The third criterion repeated the 
earlier July 1984 provision and echoed the flexibility 
demanded by U.S. import regulations. The fourth cri-
terion was delightfully vague but reflected the demise 
of firm take-or-pay arrangements (and repeated a 
July 1984 clause). The fifth criterion was to ensure that 
producers were aware of commitments to which they 
subscribed!
Even more drastic steps towards export price 
deregulation were taken by the Canadian govern-
ment on October 26, 1986. Federal Minister of Energy 
Marcel Masse revoked the specific contractual gas 
export price regulations and terminated the volume- 
related incentive pricing program. In terms of export 
pricing policy, Mr. Masse simply requested the NEB 
to monitor export contracts and prices and to pro-
vide advice. These latest policy changes seemingly 
left export prices wide open. However, genuflections 
were still made towards not exporting Canadian gas at 
prices less than those in domestic markets.
The transition to freer natural gas markets in 
North America at a time when major producing 
regions such as Alberta held excess deliverability 
raised some of the same controversies in export 
markets as in domestic markets. Some of the con-
cerns related to pipeline regulations, where U.S. and 
Canadian approaches often differed. As occurred in 
Manitoba and Ontario, there were also pushes by 
U.S. consuming interests (particularly the California 
Public Utility Commission) to allow core gas users 
and utilities tied into long-term contracts access to 
the lower prices of new spot and short-term contracts. 
Alberta’s permit removal conditions made this difficult 
and potential negotiation between the governments, 
pipelines, and supply and demand aggregators were 
necessary to work out adjustments that largely main-
tained existing authorized export arrangements while 
allowing greater price flexibility.
By 1995, export pricing issues were effectively cov-
ered by the NEB’s market-based procedure, discussed 
above. The board presumably monitors prices and sees 
information on prices as one component of the hear-
ings into long-term (greater than two-year) export 
licences. However, the usual presumption, unless 
there is clear evidence to the contrary, is that freely 
negotiated export prices are “just and reasonable in 
the Canadian interest.” In its 1996 review of changes 
in natural gas markets over the previous decade, the 
board stated (NEB 1996, 9. x) that:
… the current functioning of the Canadian 
natural gas market is consistent with the 
basic premise of the MBP. The market is 
generally working so that the requirements 
of Canadian natural gas buyers are being 
satisfied at fair market prices. There are no 
barriers which would prevent major gas 
buyers from accessing competitively-priced 
supplies from western Canada. The eastern 
Canadian LDCs continue to purchase almost 
all of their gas requirements from western 
Canada even though they have established a 
large import capacity from the U.S. Gas prices 
are set through the operation of competitive 
markets, and gas production and marketing 
are very competitive businesses which provide 
maximum choice to gas buyers. Finally, the 
available evidence indicates that domestic 
gas buyers have been able to obtain Canadian 
natural gas supplies on terms and conditions 
at least as favourable as those available to 
U.S. buyers.
3. Free Trade (FTA and NAFTA)
Chapter Nine, Section 5, reviewed the energy clauses 
of the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement, and the 
successor NAFTA incorporating Mexico into the free 
trade zone. The main provisions relating to natural 
gas were discussed there and will not be repeated. A 
main impact of the FTA and the NAFTA is to commit 
Canada to an integrated North American market for 
natural gas without any discriminatory pricing provi-
sions, except in clearly defined circumstances. Export 
surplus policies for gas are allowable, but subject to 
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the “proportionality” provisions in times of supply 
crises. As discussed in Chapter Nine, these ensure that 
in times of crisis export customers are ensured that 
their access to gas is not unduly restricted, so that they 
have proportionately as much access to supplies before 
and after the crisis on the same commercial terms as 
domestic energy users. (An indication that the pro-
portionality provisions do not apply under normal 
market conditions can be seen in the fact that they did 
not apply between 2007 and 2009 when the U.S. share 
of Alberta natural gas production fell from 53% to 
44%.) As noted above, provincial legislation in Alberta 
allows the government to shift ex-provincial sales 
to Alberta consumers in the event of a market dis-
ruption. It is not clear how this provincial regulation 
would operate under the federally negotiated NAFTA.
In addition, under the free trade agreements, 
national governments retain their jurisdiction over a 
number of matters where they have traditionally exer-
cised power, such as in the authorization of pipelines.
B. Analysis of Natural Gas Pricing Regulations
In this section, the natural gas pricing regulations are 
analyzed. We do not discuss the free trade agreements 
or fiscal take as they apply to natural gas because the 
comments we would make are essentially the same 
as the ones made for crude oil in Chapters Nine 
and Eleven.
1. Domestic Pricing
Formal price regulation began in 1975 and continued 
through 1986 in the domestic market. Throughout this 
time span, domestic prices were held below export 
prices and values, though the differences became 
less pronounced with the adoption of the Volume 
Related Incentive Plan in July 1983 and the abandon-
ment of fixed export prices in November 1984. As a 
first approximation, one might argue that the natural 
gas policy had much the same effect as the oil price 
regulations policy over the same period: by holding 
domestic prices below export prices, and limiting 
export sales by a licensing program, the policy trans-
ferred revenue from domestic producers and foreign 
consumers to domestic consumers. (See Figure 9.1 
for graphical analysis of these effects.) Unlike the oil 
case, the revenue generated by an export price higher 
than the domestic price went to natural gas produ-
cers instead of governments. In efficiency terms, the 
key aspect is that the domestic price was held below 
the free market value of the gas, which would reflect 
the value in U.S. markets where marginal gas values 
were strongly affected by OPEC oil prices. As a result, 
Canadian producers failed to produce some gas that 
had a cost less than the hypothetical market value, and 
consumers used gas that possessed a marginal value to 
them less than this market value.
This initial discussion of the effects of natural 
gas price regulations requires some qualification. 
One difference with the crude oil analogy is that gas 
export controls were in place before price regulation, 
whereas crude oil export volume limitations were an 
integral part of the oil-regulation policy. A second is 
that crude oil price regulation was already in place in 
November 1975 when domestic gas prices were first 
fixed by the government.
We have touched on a familiar point: to assess the 
impact of a policy, it is necessary to specify clearly 
what would have held in the policy’s absence. Our 
preference is to view the natural gas price control 
policy as part of a broader energy policy, which, 
beginning with OPEC price rises in late 1973, elected 
to hold Canadian petroleum prices – for both oil and 
natural gas – below international market levels. The 
general effects of the earlier paragraph would hold.
Alternatively, the natural gas pricing policy might 
be viewed against a backdrop of two other policies – 
the gas export surplus policies discussed in Section 3 
of this chapter, and the oil price and export controls 
that commenced in 1973. It is more difficult to assess 
the natural gas pricing regulations against this back-
drop, but some sort of gas export pricing regulations 
makes sense. Recall that the export surplus require-
ments tended to generate relatively high R/P ratios for 
gas, and fed into an oligopsonistic market situation, 
particularly after 1970 when export permits were 
denied. Partly as a result of the regulatory environ-
ment – the gas export policy plus pipeline and nat-
ural gas distribution utility regulations – natural gas 
domestically was bought and sold under long-term 
contracts with relatively rigid pricing terms. By the 
early 1970s, it was widely accepted that Canadian nat-
ural gas prices were lower than they would have been 
had there been unrestricted access to the U.S. market 
and had contractual terms been more responsive to 
rising prices of oil, which was the main competitor to 
natural gas in many markets. Largely at the instigation 
of the government of Alberta, domestic gas contracts 
were being revised to higher prices and more frequent 
price renegotiation.
Two questions arise. The first is hypothetical: how 
would Canadian gas markets have evolved in the 1970s 
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in the absence of the domestic price regulations? The 
second is what effect the price regulations had relative 
to this hypothetical situation?
If a definite answer to the first question is required, 
it must be that no one knows how gas markets might 
have changed in the 1970s. However, if a more specu-
lative response is allowed, the changes in the early 
1970s could be seen as the first step toward a freer 
more competitive natural gas market; but real com-
petition on the buyer’s side of the market hinged 
on things that had not yet occurred – opening the 
market to U.S. purchasers and removing TCPL as an 
oligopsony buyer-shipper. In the absence of these 
changes, oligopsonistic power remained and price 
renegotiation was being driven mainly by Alberta’s 
insistence on “commodity value.” The domestic price 
controls adopted “commodity value” as a touchstone 
of sorts, with domestic gas prices tied to domestic 
crude oil prices in Toronto, at first with 80 per cent of 
Btu parity, then, after 1980, with 65 per cent. Market 
experience since 1985 suggests that the resultant prices 
overvalued natural gas relative to crude oil. After 1986, 
natural gas prices fell relative to crude and stayed at a 
lower relative level than under price controls until the 
year 2001. (See Table 12.1, Column 10.) That is, natural 
gas was somewhat overpriced during the price-fixing 
era, relative to what freer competitive market condi-
tions would likely have generated. This would have 
been to the advantage of Alberta gas producers and 
the Alberta government and to the disadvantage of 
natural gas consumers. (It is notable that the poli-
cies to fix natural gas prices under the NEP were 
accompanied by measures to stimulate natural gas 
consumption beyond the level that prices generated. 
Ottawa indicated that the delivered price of gas in 
new markets east of Montreal would be held to the 
Toronto city gate price, and Alberta and Ottawa both 
agreed to contribute to a market development fund for 
natural gas.)
In conclusion, we would argue that the impact of 
the price-regulation period was to hold natural gas 
as well as oil prices lower than they would have been 
(assuming that steps were also taken to free up nat-
ural gas exports and increase competition in the gas 
market). However, the price of natural gas was held 
at a relatively higher level under regulation than they 
would have been without the energy price controls.
2. Export Pricing
Prior to 1975, and after 1984, the export price of nat-
ural gas was subject to indirect influence through the 
NEB’s export-licensing procedures, which required 
the NEB to ascertain whether export prices were 
“just and reasonable.” For the most part, the NEB has 
applied this by seeing whether the export price is at 
least as high as the price paid by customers on the 
Canadian side of the border point. McDougall (1973) 
and McDougall (1982) point out that this condition 
was not met in the mid-1950s contract between El 
Paso Natural Gas and Westcoast Transmission until 
the contract was renegotiated in the mid-1960s. More 
problematic was a different pricing criterion, the third 
price test as formalized by the NEB in 1967 – that the 
export price should reflect the cost of alternatives 
to consumers in the export market, a ‘commodity 
value’ criterion. One could argue that the border price 
comparison sets a price floor for export of gas, but 
the alternative fuel comparison sets a price ceiling. 
So long as the ceiling is as great as the floor, the gas 
export should be allowed (i.e., so far as price is con-
cerned), but it is in Canada’s interest to obtain the 
ceiling price amount.
In a well-functioning, effectively competitive 
market, one expects that the two prices will converge. 
High values in the export market will draw incre-
mental suppliers, serving simultaneously to reduce 
the marginal value in the export market, increase 
marginal costs and prices in the supply centre (as 
new sources of gas are tapped), and increase mar-
ginal values in domestic markets (as gas is diverted 
to the export market). This is how deregulated North 
American gas markets evolved after the mid-1980s.
However, this was not true of the North American 
natural gas markets in the earlier period. By the late 
1960s, it was apparent – and recognized by the NEB 
even as it approved specific export licences – that 
the export price was lower than the price of the 
alternative non-gas energy sources in the U.S. market 
(McDougall, 1975, chap. 5). The board argued that the 
exports were in the Canadian interest since the second 
price test (a price higher than the adjacent Canadian 
one) was passed. Why was the third price test not 
insisted on? Three reasons suggest themselves. First, 
while the “commodity” pricing approach appears 
eminently reasonable, it turns out to be very difficult 
to apply and often somewhat ambiguous, for reasons 
discussed above. It is not as easy as one might initially 
assume to determine that export values exceed export 
prices. Second, prices in export contracts apprecia-
bly above prices in purchase contracts for domestic 
sale imply different netbacks for producers and raise 
concerns of fairness. (Which producers are lucky 
enough to get the higher netbacks? Netbacks accrue to 
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producers because the pipeline-purchasers are regu-
lated on a cost of service basis.) Market forces did not 
eliminate the difference in netback values because the 
export surplus regulations blunt the forces of foreign 
demand. (In fact, the purpose of the removal permit 
restrictions is precisely to allow lower domestic than 
foreign marginal values!) Third, Canadian natural gas 
was demanded in the United States in part because of 
the regulation-induced shortages of interstate natural 
gas; customers in California and the U.S. Midwest had 
to turn either to Canadian gas or to more expensive 
non-gas substitutes. But, for political reasons that 
are easy to understand, the FPC was very reluctant to 
admit natural gas imports at prices higher than they 
would give to U.S. producers. Thus, while U.S. custom-
ers may have been willing to pay more for Canadian 
gas, regulatory permission for imports probably would 
not have been forthcoming from the FPC in the 1960s.
As with so much else in the world of energy, the 
OPEC price revolution starting in 1973 led the par-
ties involved to change their mindsets. The potential 
export value of natural gas, in a world of high oil 
prices, was evident to Canadians. The advantage 
of Canadian gas over OPEC oil was apparent to the 
United States (though the price of Canadian gas rela-
tive to OPEC oil was obviously a consideration).
How effective was the Canadian export pricing 
policy for 1975 through 1986? The question has two 
parts. Was the price level selected by the Canadian 
government (on the advice of the NEB) the best one 
for Canada? Was a uniform border pricing policy 
appropriate? The latter question is important because 
the shift to a uniform border price was really an exer-
cise in price discrimination. Readers may wonder how 
charging the same price to foreign customers can be 
price discrimination. The reason is that the cost of 
accessing different border points differs, with lower 
costs to border points nearer the producing region 
(i.e., Alberta). Hence non-discriminatory pricing 
implies lower border prices the closer the export point 
is to Alberta. Uniform border prices implies relatively 
higher prices close to Alberta and relatively lower 
prices further away; given any average export value, 
uniform border pricing discriminates in favour of U.S. 
customers who get their gas from the border points 
more distant from Alberta.
Our evaluation draws extensively on Watkins and 
Waverman (1985), who ask whether the Canadian nat-
ural gas pricing policy appears to have been more like 
monopolistic (oligopolistic) or effectively competitive 
behaviour. They start from the premise that there is a 
potential for monopoly-like profits on Canadian gas 
exports to the United States. In 1983, while Canadian 
gas met only 4 per cent of total U.S. gas use, “in the 
Great Lakes and Rocky Mountain states it reaches 
about 6 per cent, while for the West coast region the 
proportion is as high as 12 per cent” (Watkins and 
Waverman, 1985, p. 416).
Watkins and Waverman assume that Canada could 
act to increase the returns to Canadian gas producers 
(and governments as rent collectors) by a dual price 
system in which export prices are at a higher level 
than Canadian prices. (Note that a dual price system 
is clearly inefficient if Canada does not possess signifi-
cant market power, since lower-valued domestic con-
sumption is then being encouraged at the expense of 
higher-valued export revenues.) Of course, short-run 
market power is often higher than long-run power, 
for example, if competing transmission systems are 
operating at capacity so that more domestic U.S. gas 
cannot readily flow into a market as Canadian gas 
prices increase.
The Canadian gas export pricing policy of 1975–83 
is consistent with monopolistic behaviour by Canada. 
Watkins and Waverman conclude, however, that the 
natural gas policy did not maximize Canadian welfare 
in part because Canadian prices were fixed at arti-
ficial levels domestically and in part because export 
prices did not fully fit a monopolistic model. The latter 
assessment involved a number of comparisons. For 
instance, they note (p. 422) that “a monopoly seller 
would have … aligned export gas prices to the highest 
cost source of gas in the United States market – the 
so-called Section 207 gas under the Natural Gas Policy 
Act (NGPA),” but this was not the criterion used by the 
NEB. (After 1977, it will be recalled, the NEB looked 
at a substitution or replacement value of Btu parity 
with crude in Toronto, though even here the govern-
ment, especially after 1980, did not impose the full 
substitution value.) Moreover, Watkins and Waverman 
find that the pattern of price discrimination implied 
by uniform border pricing does not accord with that 
expected from an effective monopolist. Table 12.4 
includes some relevant information. Watkins and 
Waverman calculated netback values for natural gas 
exports across various border points; these are Alberta 
netbacks equal to the average selling price of gas at the 
export point less transmission costs from the Alberta 
border to the export location. In Table 12.4, these net-
backs are shown as a proportion of the netbacks at the 
Emerson, Manitoba, border point for two years, 1968 
and 1983. The fourth column shows an estimate of the 
elasticity of demand for natural gas by end-users in 
that regional market in the year 1983.
The 1983 netbacks and elasticities are relevant to 
the uniform-border-pricing period. A monopolist 
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exercising effective price discrimination would take 
advantage of variations in demand responsiveness by 
charging relatively higher prices in the markets with 
the lowest price elasticities of demand. (In these mar-
kets, any given price rise generates a smaller percent-
age decline in sales.) However, as Table 12.4 shows, 
there was no tendency for netbacks to vary with the 
elasticity of demand.
Table 12.4 shows that the range of netbacks on 
natural gas exports was much narrower under the uni-
form-border-pricing policy of 1983 than in 1968. The 
wide spread of netbacks in 1968 is interesting. One 
would expect that an effectively competitive market, 
with price flexibility in contracts, would tend to 
exhibit identical netbacks on all sales. (Strictly speak-
ing, the field netbacks should equalize, but, since most 
gas went through one of the straddle plants and NOVA 
used a postage stamp tariff, Alberta border prices and 
field netbacks should exhibit the same differences.) 
The netback variations in 1968 are consistent with an 
oligopsonistic market structure with an overhang of 
excess supply as characterized the market under the 
1960s policies on export removal.
But how would we characterize Canada’s export 
pricing policy from 1975 to 1983 if it was neither mon-
opolistic nor effectively competitive? Watkins and 
Waverman (1985) suggest that some form of oligopoly 
market provides the best fit. Specifically, they sug-
gest that a model with “zero conjectural variations” 
provides a good fit. In this model, the decision-makers 
take other sellers’ prices as fixed. Canadian author-
ities after 1977 (in setting prices for gas exported to 
the United States), focused on Toronto crude prices, 
rather than on U.S. natural gas prices, essentially treat-
ing U.S. gas prices as fixed. In this model, the oligop-
olistic supplier “will absorb transportation costs by 
accepting decreasing delivered prices as the distance 
to market rises (Phlips, 1983, p. 43)” (Watkins and 
Waverman, 1985, p. 422). Uniform border pricing of 
a good such as natural gas, with output concentrated 
in Alberta and Northwest B.C., exhibits just such a 
pricing pattern. Certain other features of uniform 
border pricing may have appealed to the NEb and 
the Canadian government. It was “easily computable” 
and readily changed and did not require detailed 
information on price elasticities; moreover, a uniform 
price “could be sold as ‘non-discriminatory’ (which it 
wasn’t)” to U.S. authorities; and it did generate some-
what higher profits for Canada than sales at domestic 
Canadian prices would have (p. 424).
Overall, Watkins and Waverman give the Can-
adian natural gas export pricing policy a grade of B+ 
(p. 425). Canada could have charged higher prices to 
its benefit in the mid-1970s and probably should have 
charged somewhat lower prices in the early 1980s 
when exports fell to half of authorized levels. But the 
policy did generate higher gas revenues to Canada and 
did so without pushing U.S. authorities into retaliatory 
action.
A residual question remains. If a dual-price 
system for natural gas – low domestic prices and 
high export prices – was in Canada’s interests in the 
1970s and early 1980s, wouldn’t it also be beneficial 
to the country after deregulation in 1986? Expressed 
in other terms, if Canada has some market power 
in U.S. gas markets, isn’t it in the national interest to 
use that power? On the whole, deregulation, NAFTA, 
and the market-based export policy seem to argue 
against such an export pricing policy. In general, the 
exercise of market power in the pricing of a particular 
commodity by one country against a main trading 
partner is economically and politically dangerous 
since the trading partner may retaliate. There were 
special circumstances in the 1975–85 period in natural 
gas pricing that restrained U.S. impulses to retaliate. 
Most important was the wish of the United States to 
reduce reliance on OPEC oil, while seeing the OPEC 
price as setting the opportunity value of energy in 
general. (The confusion in U.S. natural gas markets 
after decades of FPC price regulation left no obvious 
U.S. natural gas reference price.) Accordingly, it was 
quite acceptable to U.S. authorities for Canada to 
Table 12.4: Natural Gas Export Pricing: Netbacks and 
Elasticities
Export U.S.   Alberta Estimated 
Border Markets Netback Relative  Price 
Point Served to Emerson Elasticity
  1968 1983 
of  
  Demand
Huntingdon,	B.C.	 Pacific	N.W.	 0.836	 0.965	 –1.24
Kingsgale, B.C. California 1.005 1.002 –1.31
Aden/Cardston, Alta. Montana 1.202 1.020 –1.02
Monchy, Sask. N. Central n/a 0.984 –1.02
Emerson, Man. Great Lakes 1.000 1.000 –1.02
Fort Francis, Ont. Great Lakes 0.852 0.951 –1.02
Cornwall, Ont. New york 0.623 0.866 –1.02
Phillipsburg, Que. New york 0.585 0.849 –1.07
Notes: Monchy, Saskatchewan, opened as a border point in 1982. The Emerson 
price was $0.183/Mcf in 1968 and $5.09/Mcf in 1983.
Source: Watkins and Waverman (1985), Tables 1 and 2.
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base natural gas export prices on OPEC crude oil 
prices, even while holding domestic gas prices lower. 
This unusual set of circumstances no longer exists. 
Moreover, it is arguable that the effective deregulation 
of U.S. gas markets has served to increase consider-
ably the long-run elasticity of demand for Canadian 
natural gas in the United States, and hence to reduce 
considerably the scope for a dual-price policy.
C.	Fiscal	Take	(Royalties	and	Taxes)
Chapter Eleven reviewed the conceptual basis for spe-
cial taxation provisions governing the crude petrol-
eum industry, as well as the characteristics of various 
types of taxes, royalties, and other mechanisms used 
by governments to capture economic rent or influ-
ence the behaviour of the industry. These conceptual 
arguments will not be repeated here. What follows is a 
brief summary of the major fiscal measures that apply 
specifically to the Alberta natural gas industry. Price 
controls, which may be used to capture and redistrib-
ute economic rent, were discussed above. The corpor-
ate income tax applies to total company operations, 
rather than natural gas specifically, and was discussed 
in Chapter Eleven. Bonus bids for petroleum rights 
cannot generally be ascribed specifically to natural gas 
as the bids are usually for petroleum rights including 
both oil and gas. However, as was noted in Chapter 
Eleven, Alberta has, on occasion, auctioned off leases 
or licences for natural gas alone from a specific forma-
tion. In 2008, the government announced that shallow 
mineral rights, above producing reservoirs, would 
revert back to the government for subsequent sale; this 
seems likely to involve mainly shallow gas deposits. 
The Petroleum and Natural Gas Revenue Tax (PGRT), 
the Petroleum Incentive Payments (PIP grants), and 
the Canadian Ownership Special Charges (COSC) of 
the National Energy Program (NEP) were also covered 
in Chapter Eleven; they applied to both crude oil and 
natural gas and will not be discussed further here. This 
leaves two fiscal measures specific to natural gas to be 
discussed: provincial natural gas Crown royalties and 
the federal Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax (NGGLT) 
of the NEP.
1. Alberta Crown Royalties
The Alberta government assesses a gross ad valorem 
royalty on natural gas produced from Crown leases, 
much as it does for crude oil. There has also been, 
since 1973, a Freehold Minerals Tax, which applies to 
the more minor gas volumes produced from freehold 
leases in Alberta. As for crude oil, the government 
felt that the public, as well as private mineral rights 
owners, should benefit from the tremendous rise in 
the value of petroleum in the early 1970s. Tables 11.1 
and 11.2 set out Alberta government petroleum rev-
enues, including separate natural gas and NGL roy-
alties from 1972 on. Prior to the mid-1970s, crude oil 
royalties were much higher than natural gas royalties, 
but after that gas royalties increased in relative signifi-
cance, reflecting in part the rising value of gas relative 
to oil as seen in Table 12.1. In 1986 and 1988, natural 
gas royalties exceeded conventional oil royalties and 
did so every year except one from 1992 to 2008. In 
large measure, this reflects rising gas production and 
declining conventional crude oil output. By 2003, nat-
ural gas and NGL royalties were over five times higher 
than conventional oil royalties. However, in 2009, 
for the first time, oil sands royalties exceeded natural 
gas royalties and by a widening margin as natural gas 
production and prices fell.
The June 1, 1951, royalty regulations set a 15 per 
cent royalty rate for natural gas, with a minimum of 
$0.0075/Mcf (which would apply if the price received 
for the gas was less than five cents/Mcf).
Effective April 1, 1962, the natural gas royalty rate 
was increased to 16 2/3 per cent, with the same min-
imum royalty as before. In addition, producers were 
allowed a Gas Processing Allowance, which was a 
deduction from the value of the gas to allow for any 
costs involved in processing the gas to remove sulphur 
or natural gas liquids. We shall not summarize all the 
details of regulations covering this Gas Processing 
Allowance, which proved to be rather complicated 
over the years. In effect, the allowance was designed 
to allow recovery of the costs for facilities that pro-
cessed the gas. Most operators effectively contracted 
these processing services from operators of large 
gas-processing plants in the province and would claim 
an allowance on the basis of the costs of these large 
facilities. However, some gas producers built their own 
field processing plants and could claim a deduction on 
the basis of the costs of their plant. The process of cal-
culating allowable gas-processing allowances became 
very complex as the number of processing plants rose 
and gas producers increasingly used a number of 
different facilities. Effective in 1994, Alberta simplified 
the regulations to base the Gas Processing Allowance 
on a provincial average processing cost, thereby 
removing the obligation for producers to file detailed 
statements documenting the various costs actually 
incurred on all the natural gas they produced.
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On January 1, 1974, the province implemented a 
new natural gas royalty, which was a sliding-scale roy-
alty based on the price of natural gas (and anticipating 
the forthcoming oil royalty regulations of March 1974, 
discussed in Chapter Eleven). There was a minimum 
royalty rate of 22 per cent, which applied when the 
price of gas was $0.50/Mcf or less ($17.75/103 m3 or 
less). When the price exceeded this level, the royalty 
rate increased, with the royalty designed to capture a 
specific fraction of the higher revenue. A higher rate 
was assessed on ‘old’ gas, that discovered prior to 1974. 
Initially the royalty formulae were set up to capture 65 
per cent of the ‘additional’ revenue on old gas when 
the average Alberta Market Price is above $0.50/Mcf; 
on ‘new’ gas (gas discovered after December 31, 1973) 
35 per cent of the higher revenue was collected as 
royalty.
The general nature of the natural gas royalty for-
mula was unchanged from 1974 to 2008, but, as with 
crude oil, there were a number of adjustments over the 
years (Alberta Department of Energy, 2003, 2007a,b). 
For example:
(1) the proportion of revenue above the minimum 
price taken in royalties was changed. On old gas 
it was reduced to 50 per cent in 1978, then 45 
per cent effective April 1, 1982, and then to 40 
per cent in June 1985 and 35 per cent in 1992. On 
new gas, the share of incremental revenue going 
to Alberta was cut to 30 per cent in June 1985. 
There were temporary further cuts in October 
1986. Rates vary between 15 per cent and 30 per 
cent and were at an average rate of 20 per cent 
in 2005.
(2) on July 1, 1978, a reduced royalty was introduced 
for low-output non-associated natural gas wells; 
if output was less than 600 Mcf/d (averaged 
over a month; this is 16.9 m3/day), the royalty 
rate was reduced in such a way that the royalty 
fell to 5 per cent as output fell to zero.  In 1994, 
the low-output royalty was extended to associ-
ated gas from low-output crude oil wells.
(3) With deregulation, natural gas pricing became 
much more diverse. As mentioned above, 
Alberta responded by specifying that gas reve-
nue for royalty purposes must at a minimum be 
80 per cent of the average Alberta field price in 
any year (effective December 1987). In 1994, the 
government decreed that a company could value 
all of the gas it sold at the company’s average 
gas price, so long as this was at least 90 per cent 
of the average Alberta field price; if companies 
did not elect to do this, they were to value gas at 
a ‘reference’ price that was the average price at 
the exit of gas plants. These modifications both 
offered some protection to the Alberta govern-
ment in terms of minimum royalty receipts and 
also helped reduce the administrative costs to 
companies of calculating their royalty payments.
(4) As of January 1, 1993, the gas royalty formulae 
were to be modified annually to allow for infla-
tion, as seen in the GDP price deflator.
(5) Effective in October 2002, natural gas also 
began to be assessed NGL royalties based on the 
NGL content of the gas.
(6) In addition to a number of the incentive pro-
grams discussed in Chapter Eleven, there were 
several programs aimed explicitly at natural gas 
activities, in addition to the low-productivity 
allowance set out in (2). These included: a deep 
gas royalty holiday (1985); a royalty waiver on 
solution gas that was not flared (1999); a royalty 
credit for certain sulphur removal investments 
(1999); and a royalty credit on gas used in 
cogeneration projects (2001).
As was the case with conventional crude oil 
(Chapter Eleven), the fairness of the royalty share 
accruing to the province became an issue of con-
cern as natural gas prices rose at the start of the new 
millennium. In 2007, the province commissioned 
a Royalty Review Panel, which issued a Report in 
September of that year. As was the case with crude oil, 
the panel found that Alberta collected a smaller share 
of the economic rent from natural gas than other 
regimes in North America and recommended a sim-
plified royalty regime that would raise the anticipated 
government rent share from 58 per cent to 63 per cent 
(Alberta Royalty Review Panel, 2007, p. 7). The sug-
gested royalty would remove the vintage distinctions 
and the special incentive programs and include a 
two-part royalty with sliding scales based on volume 
and on price, with the royalty rate varying from 2 per 
cent up to 50 per cent. (Alberta Royalty Review Panel, 
2007, pp. 71–73).
In October 2007, the government announced 
its reaction to these recommendations (Alberta 
Department of Energy, 2007b). Effective in January 
2009, there would be a new natural gas royalty that 
sounded close to what the panel had recommended: 
the vintage distinction would be eliminated and the 
royalty formula would have price and volume com-
ponents, with rates ranging from 5 per cent to 50 per 
cent (the highest rate becoming effective at a price of 
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$16.59/Gigajoule), and rates lowered for lower output 
wells. Although it had not been a recommendation of 
the Royalty Review Panel, the government announced 
that it would be implementing lower royalties for 
deep gas wells and ‘lower-productivity’ reserves, 
in recognition of their high costs. As was the case 
for conventional oil, Mintz and Chen (2010) found 
that, under these regulations, Alberta would have a 
‘marginal effective tax and royalty rate’ higher than 
other provinces.
As was noted in Chapter Eleven, the new royalty 
regime occasioned criticism from industry and fur-
ther study by the government. As with conventional 
crude oil, a ‘transitional’ option (up to January 1, 2014) 
for new wells deeper than 1,000 m was announced in 
November 2008, as was, in May 2010, a revised set of 
royalty rates, to be effective January 1, 2011. The new 
rates involved a larger reduction for natural gas than 
for oil. They maintained the 5 per cent minimum rate, 
but the highest rate was reduced to 36 per cent; there 
was, as in the 2007 plan, a separate ceiling of 30 per 
cent on each of the price and output components of 
the royalty. A ‘depth factor’ was incorporated into the 
output part of the royalty, reducing the rate for wells 
deeper than 2,000 m. The government expressed par-
ticular concern about the economic viability of deep 
gas reserves, culminating in a five-year royalty credit 
plan announced in late 2008 for gas wells deeper than 
2,500 m. (This was in addition to the other incentive 
programs briefly outlined in Chapter Eleven.) For 
shallower gas wells, the minimum 5 per cent royalty 
would apply on low-output wells (60 Mcf/d or less) 
for prices as high as $16.00/Mcf. A high-output well, 
of 1,000 Mcf/d, would not hit the ceiling royalty rate 
of 36 per cent until the price of gas was above $6.50/
Mcf. As was the case for crude oil, the new plan 
involved reduced royalties, compared to the pre-2009 
regime, on lower-volume wells (below about 300 
Mcf/d) and at lower prices (below about $5.00/Mcf), 
but higher royalty rates for higher-output wells and at 
higher prices.
The prime impetus for the royalty changes was the 
desire for a new royalty regime as North American 
energy moved into a higher price environment, 
although, as noted in Chapter Eleven, the declining 
government rent share reflected in part the reductions 
taking place in corporate income tax rates. As dis-
cussed above, much higher than historical prices are 
far from certain; this is even more so for natural gas 
than crude oil, given the better geological prospects 
in North America for natural gas than oil, especially 
as large volumes of non-conventional gas prove 
economic at relatively low costs. As seen in Table 12.1, 
natural gas prices in North America fell dramatically 
after 2008. 
2. Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax (NGGLT)
The NGGLT was introduced by the federal government 
in its October 1980 budget as part of the National 
Energy Program. Since the size of the tax was intim-
ately tied to the natural gas pricing provisions of the 
NEP, it was discussed above in the gas-pricing section. 
However, for the sake of completeness, we will briefly 
outline the main features of the NGGLT here, in the 
‘fiscal take’ part of this chapter.
Prior to the NEP, the federal government had no 
specific fiscal measures assessed on natural gas. It did, 
of course, have its corporate income tax and, after 
1974, natural gas royalties paid to provincial govern-
ments had not been deductible as a cost for the federal 
portion of the corporate income tax. (These issues 
were discussed in Chapter Eleven, with specific ref-
erence to crude oil.) Also, since 1973, the discrepancy 
between domestic and export prices for natural gas 
had not been set by an export tax (as was the case for 
crude oil), but rather by Ottawa directly fixing the 
export price.
The NEP introduced the NGGLT, which was to 
apply to all natural gas sales, including exports. (The 
application of the tax to exports was delayed until 
February 1, 1981, to allow the government to meet its 
obligation to the government of the United States to 
give ninety days notice before changing gas export 
prices.) The NGGLT was to be $0.30/Mcf effective 
November 1, 1980, rising in three steps of $0.15/Mcf on 
July 1, 1981, January 1, 1982, and January 1, 1983, to an 
ultimate level of $0.75/Mcf.
In the NEP, Ottawa claimed that the stimulus for 
the NGGLT was the adamant refusal of the natural- 
gas-producing provinces to accept a gas export tax, 
even if Ottawa agreed to split the revenue with them. 
Ottawa argued that “there is no doubt of the federal 
government’s constitutional right to impose export 
taxes on any commodity.” However, it recognized “the 
strong opposition of Alberta and British Columbia to 
the gas export tax,” and “is, therefore, not proceeding 
with a natural gas export tax.” However, Ottawa did 
have to find additional revenues. “The Government 
of Canada lacks the revenues necessary to fulfill its 
national obligations. Some of these obligations flow 
from the same international oil crisis that provides 
growing revenues to the governments of Alberta and 
British Columbia.” (Quotations from the NEP, p. 34.) 
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Hence, in Ottawa’s view, the need for the new federal 
taxes on petroleum, the PGRT (discussed in Chapter 
Eleven) and the NGGLT.
Extensive negotiations between Ottawa 
and Alberta in 1981 led to the September 1981 
Memorandum of Agreement. Alberta and British 
Columbia had been firm in their contention that a 
federal excise tax on natural gas (particularly exports) 
was a discriminatory attack on provincial natural 
resources, amounting to an attempt by Ottawa to 
override the constitutional provisions giving con-
trol of mineral resources to the provinces. In the 
Memorandum of Agreement, Ottawa preserved the 
right to set a natural gas export tax, but agreed to set 
the rate at 0 per cent; that is, the NGGLT was removed 
from natural gas exports. As discussed in the pricing 
section above, the NGGLT on domestic sales of nat-
ural gas would be set at the rate which would allow 
the Alberta border price to attain the levels agreed to 
in the Memorandum, given that the price of Alberta 
gas delivered to Toronto should reflect 65 per cent 
Btu parity there with crude oil. That is, the fixed rate 
NGGLT of the NEP was replaced with a variable rate 
NGGLT that depended on the petroleum pricing 
levels agreed to in the Memorandum and on the inter-
national price of oil. As it happened, by February 1984, 
the NGGLT had fallen to zero as international crude oil 
prices failed to rise to the levels anticipated. (Delivered 
prices of Alberta natural gas, at agreed-upon Alberta 
border prices, equalled or exceeded the 65 per cent 
Btu parity with crude in Toronto, so there was no 
room for a NGGLT.)
With deregulation of the oil market in 1985 (and 
the natural gas market with the 1986 Halloween 
Agreement), the special federal tax provisions of the 
NEP were dropped. Since then, Ottawa’s revenue 
from natural gas production has, once again, derived 
essentially from the corporate income tax. Remember, 
however, that the federal corporate income tax is now 
a more effective rent-collection device than it was 
prior to 1972 since the depletion allowance has been 
phased out. As noted in Chapter Eleven, in 2002, the 
Resource Allowance was eliminated and provincial 
royalties on natural gas are now deductible as a cost.
5. Conclusion
Commercial production of natural gas began in 
the 1880s, when a water-directed well drilled by the 
CPR hit a gas deposit near Medicine Hat. From this 
accidental birth, a major Alberta industry has grown. 
Five periods in the life of the industry can be dis-
cerned, though real-life distinctions are never quite as 
clear as such categorizations suggest.
Period 1. The local market era (1882–1946). The town 
of Medicine Hat began using natural gas in the 1880s. 
By the early 1900s, utility companies were being set up 
to explore for and contract gas from Alberta pools to 
service local markets, most notably, of course, Calgary 
and Edmonton.
Period 2. The by-product of oil era (1947–57). The 
rush of crude oil exploration engendered by the 1947 
Leduc find and subsequent oil boom tremendously 
increased the availability of natural gas. This reflected 
both the output of associated gas produced along with 
crude oil and the discovery of non-associated natural 
gas pools by drillers looking for oil. Local markets 
could not absorb such large volumes of gas, and gov-
ernment regulations limited the ability of companies 
to burn it off (flare it), so increasing amounts accumu-
lated as potentially accessible reserves but with no 
immediate economic value.
Period 3. A market expansion era (1958–71). Long-
distance, high-diameter, high-pressure natural gas 
pipelines were completed, which allowed Alberta 
natural gas to establish itself as a valuable export 
product. TransCanada PipeLines (TCPL) reached the 
Niagara Peninsula in 1958. The decision to build the 
line involved a major political commitment from the 
federal government; it generated the most intense 
political debate of the 1950s and was partly responsible 
for the defeat of the Liberal Party in 1957 after gov-
erning continuously for twenty-two years. Access to 
California markets came with the Alberta & Southern 
and Pacific Gas Transmission lines in 1961, and 
TransCanada built a new link through the U.S. Great 
Lakes area (south of the original all-Canadian line of 
1958), which opened in the late 1960s.
Period 4. A regulated-market era (1972–86). From 
the beginning, the natural gas industry had been more 
regulated than crude oil, including rate regulation of 
the major transmission and distribution companies 
and surplus test requirements for natural gas exports. 
Beginning in 1970, the regulations became even 
more stringent. Export permits for Alberta gas to the 
United States were denied (beginning in 1970) and 
government price regulation was instituted (1975–86). 
The forces of industry attention shifted from active 
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participation in natural gas markets to a more passive 
reaction to the government prices and various polit-
ical and public relations activities designed to influ-
ence government policy. Production stagnated, and 
the industry saw the appearance of regulation-induced 
problems such as TCPL’s take-or-pay difficulties and 
growing shortfalls of actual below authorized exports.
Period 5. A deregulation, “commoditization” period 
(1987–). Government price and market control 
regulations were removed, and Alberta natural gas 
was encouraged to integrate with a rapidly evolving 
North American gas market. The number of active 
buyers and sellers in the market has increased, as 
have such intermediaries as the NYMEX natural gas 
futures market and various computer bulletin boards 
to allow inexpensive rapid exchanges of market infor-
mation. Transmission companies have been shifted to 
common carrier status, spot sales of natural gas have 
mushroomed, and both sellers and purchasers of gas 
under long-term contracts have accepted the inevitab-
ility of frequent price readjustment in light of prevail-
ing market conditions. With the international crude 
oil market, the North American natural gas market 
has been evolving to very flexible market trading 
arrangements like those that characterize many other 
commodities and financial instruments.
Whether the natural gas market will evolve into 
an international one, like the oil market, is very much 
an open question.  In the 2000s two quite different 
avenues to internationalization were suggested. One 
might be called a ‘low availability/high price’ possi-
bility in which reduced supplies of North American 
natural gas drive prices high enough that imports of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) from overseas become 
economic. As natural gas prices rose after 2000, some 
observers saw this as a possibility. However, plum-
meting prices after 2008 suggested another possibility, 
which might be labelled ‘high availability/low price’, 
with low North American natural gas prices stimu-
lating significant LNG exports.  As of final editing in 
spring 2013, a number of LNG export proposals have 
been made to move B.C. and Alberta gas from ter-
minals on the west coast to Asian markets. (In part, 
the appeal of these exports is based on very high gas 
prices in Japan and China where the gas price has 
been tied to international crude oil prices. It seems 
unlikely that this pricing formula would continue 
in the face of large-scale shipments of LNG to these 
markets.) Of course, neither of these cases may mater-
ialize, with North America continuing to function 
as a separate natural gas market with prices too high 
to stimulate LNG exports and too low to induce LNG 
imports. (In this case there might be some small scale 
LNG trade as companies continue to operate previ-
ously-constructed facilities, which they regret having 
built, so long as they can recover operating costs.) 
The various problems that were apparent in the days 
of tighter regulation before 1987, plus the commit-
ments to free markets implicit in the Canada–U.S. FTA 
and NAFTA, suggest that Alberta natural gas will con-
tinue to operate in a deregulated free-market environ-
ment through the indefinite future. The industry is 
adjusting to declining reserves of conventional natural 
gas, and moving into non-conventional resources.
Readers’ Guide: Petropolitics has been significant 
in the petroleum industry in part because the indus-
try makes up an important part of many regional 
economies. In this chapter, we explore the broader 
economic linkages of the Alberta petroleum industry. 
The chapter examines the relative importance of the 
petroleum industry to provincial output and employ-
ment and how its role has changed over time. It also 
looks at related issues such as policies to encourage 
economic diversification in Alberta and to spread the 
receipt and use of government petroleum revenues 
more evenly over time.
1. Introduction
So far, we have emphasized the microeconomic 
dimensions of the Alberta petroleum industry – the 
operation of oil and gas markets and government 
regulations that have affected those markets. However, 
as mentioned several times, the petroleum industry is 
large enough that it may also have noticeable effects 
on the overall economy – macroeconomic impacts. 
This chapter looks at the interrelationships between 
the Alberta petroleum industry and the Alberta econ-
omy, although without any detailed examination of 
other industries, even those such as pipelines, nat-
ural gas processing, and petrochemicals that depend 
directly on crude oil and natural gas. The economic 
linkages generated by petroleum are complicated, 
but a useful distinction can be made between cyclical 
impacts, especially those provoked by petroleum price 
fluctuations, and effects on overall economic growth. 
Our Introduction briefly sets out the main cyclical 
and growth effects. We then turn to the impact of 
petroleum on the size and development of the Alberta 
economy, concluding with consideration of the impact 
of unstable resource revenues on the provincial gov-
ernment and the government’s actions to save some of 
its resource rents through the Alberta Heritage Trust 
Savings Fund.
A. Cyclical Effects
Some of the macroeconomic effects of the petroleum 
industry occur through the consumption side of the 
petroleum market since petroleum is such a signifi-
cant energy source for most countries. When oil prices 
change dramatically, as they are prone to, expendi-
tures on oil by consumers also change significantly, 
with attendant effects on their ability and willingness 
to spend on other goods and services. This effect is 
especially significant in the period immediately after a 
large oil-price change since the demand for oil prod-
ucts is highly inelastic in the short-run, meaning that 
consumption is quite unresponsive to price changes. 
Therefore, a major price rise, like in 1973/74 or 1979/80 
or 1999 or 2006/08, will generate a dramatic increase 
in payments for oil. Economists refer to a changed 
willingness to spend on goods and services in general 
as a change in the quantity of ‘aggregate demand.’ If 
increased expenditures on oil products reduce the 
income left to spend on other things, a decrease in 
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the aggregate demand for goods and services in the 
economy occurs. This typically means a fall in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and higher unemployment.
Inflation is a monetary phenomenon character-
ized by a general rise in price levels. A move in rela-
tive prices, resulting from scarcity or abundance of 
one product, is not inflation. Normally the increase 
in price of a single commodity implies, simply, an 
increase in the cost of this good relative to others, but 
with a negligible effect on the general level of prices 
(i.e., the inflation rate). However, energy prices also 
play a significant role in the price indices used to 
measure inflation in the economy. More importantly, 
higher energy prices may contribute to demands for 
higher wages, which contribute to higher prices for 
goods and services that employ labour. Thus rising oil 
prices may be seen as adding to inflation at the same 
time as they contribute to declining GDP, a situation 
referred to as ‘stagflation.’ (Helliwell, 1981, discusses 
the pathways to stagflation from higher oil prices; 
for examples of a macro model of higher oil prices 
in Canada, see Jump and Wilson, 1975, and Empey, 
1981.) These effects of large oil-price changes would 
be expected to operate in opposite directions for large 
price rises and large price falls; there is some debate 
about whether the macroeconomic effects are sym-
metric in this way. Some analysts have accepted the 
stagflationary impacts of large oil-price rises but have 
questioned whether large price declines do in fact 
generate expansionary and deflationary impulses. This 
lack of symmetry may in part reflect the reduced share 
of oil in total energy use when oil prices fell (1985/86) 
as compared to when they rose in the 1970s and early 
1980s. However, it also may suggest that the macro-
economic effects of oil-price changes are more com-
plicated than in the discussion so far. Two additional 
factors must be considered.
First, it is important to realize that macroeconomic 
effects are the result of both oil-price changes and the 
macroeconomic policy response of the government. 
Appropriate use of monetary and fiscal policies, which 
are largely the responsibility of the federal government 
in Canada, may offset the aggregate demand and infla-
tionary effects of the petroleum-price changes.
Secondly, there are also macroeconomic effects 
from the supply side of the oil market. Higher expen-
ditures on oil by consumers is increased revenue to 
oil producers, and the higher oil prices make addi-
tional investment in oil exploration and development 
attractive. That is, oil-price increases lead to increases 
in aggregate demand in oil-producing regions, and 
therefore to increases in GDP.
There are, therefore, some uncertainties in the 
macroeconomic effects of major oil-price changes. 
The precise macro effects turn out to hinge on two 
important factors, geography and what has usually 
been called ‘recycling.’ Since oil deposits are so 
unevenly distributed beneath the earth’s surface, the 
primary macro effects tend to be opposite in sign for 
regions that produce a lot of oil and those that do 
not and must import oil. It can be appreciated that 
these regional differences are not country-specific; 
within large countries like Canada, Russia, and the 
United States, there are oil-exporting regions and 
oil-importing regions.
The ‘recycling’ problem refers to the uses to which 
oil producers put their increased earnings from 
higher-priced oil. Is the additional money spent on 
goods and services from the oil-consuming region 
that provided the revenue to the oil producer? If so, 
then the aggregate demand effects in the consuming 
region will be minimal. The reduced spending by oil 
consumers is offset by the increased spending of oil 
producers. Of course, the oil producers are better 
off, and the consumers worse off, since some of the 
goods and services that residents of the consuming 
region used to buy are now being exported to the oil 
producers. However, there will be reduced aggregate 
demand in the consuming regions in total to the 
extent that oil producers save some of their increased 
earnings instead of spending them. The increased 
saving, as a supply of financial capital, may drive 
down interest rates, which may in turn stimulate 
more investment spending, but it is widely accepted 
by economists that, in the absence of offsetting gov-
ernment policies, such increases in saving will tend to 
reduce aggregate demand in the economy, at least in 
the short term. Of course, some consuming regions 
could actually see a net stimulus to the economy if 
increased spending in the region by oil producers 
(e.g., OPEC) is higher than the region’s extra payments 
for oil imports.
From this more complete perspective, it is diffi-
cult to offer many generalizations about the macro-
economic cyclical effects of changing oil prices. While 
governments of oil-importing regions have been very 
concerned about the possibility of such effects (and 
they concerned Ottawa in the ‘overt control’ days of 
1973 to 1985), we shall not investigate such cyclical 
economic effects in Alberta in any great detail. In 
part, this is because there are obvious limitations in 
the macroeconomic policy responses of a Canadian 
province, as compared to the federal government in 
Ottawa. It is the federal government that has access to 
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the levers of monetary policy and the main levers of 
fiscal policy. Furthermore, in an open provincial econ-
omy, it may be difficult for the provincial government 
to pursue an effective fiscal policy; cuts in provincial 
income tax rates to spur the local economy may lead 
primarily to an increase in imports into the province 
rather than much additional spending on locally pro-
duced goods and services.
Our main emphasis in this chapter will be on the 
longer-run impacts of the petroleum industry on 
the size and structure of the Alberta economy. The 
income and employment data we assemble will pro-
vide evidence on short-term cyclical performance. In 
addition, later in this chapter, we will consider how 
the provincial government might respond to the pro-
nounced variability in the revenues it generates from 
the petroleum industry.
B. Growth Effects
In the remainder of this chapter, we shall be con-
cerned primarily with the long-term effects of the 
petroleum industry on the economy of an oil- 
producing region, Alberta in particular.
This point seems intuitively obvious to residents 
of Alberta. Those with long memories can look 
back to the end of the Second World War, when the 
economies of Alberta and Saskatchewan bore a close 
resemblance. Populations were under one million in 
both provinces, and agriculture was the predominant 
industry. By July 1, 2012, Alberta had a population of 
almost 3,900,000 million, while Saskatchewan was 
still hovering near the one million mark. The most 
obvious difference between the two provinces is the 
development of the Alberta petroleum industry fol-
lowing the Leduc discovery of 1947. Saskatchewan has 
seen significant oil and gas investments since 1945 but 
not by any means of the same magnitude as Alberta’s.
Thus, a sound working hypothesis is that the pet-
roleum industry has served as a key engine of growth 
for the Alberta economy. Of course, the growth of the 
petroleum industry is not the only difference between 
the two provinces over this period. Alberta has its 
mountains in the west with good tourist potential; 
Saskatchewan has its potash deposits. Albertans often 
express pride in their province’s frontier spirit and 
the individualistic values of its governments. Many in 
Saskatchewan are proud of a tradition of community 
spirit and communitarian government. Moreover, 
we must be careful not to equate increasing size with 
improved welfare. While Alberta’s GDP grew at a far 
faster rate than that of Saskatchewan, there were forces 
in play that kept average living standards closer to one 
another.
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine in 
more detail the role that the petroleum industry has 
played in the economy of the province of Alberta. The 
next part of this chapter will provide a brief overview 
of some of the models and concepts that economists 
have used to study the process of economic growth 
and the contribution of particular industries to the 
economy and its growth. 
2. Models of Economic Growth
A. Concepts
An economy consists of people and their production 
and consumption activities. Analysts are interested in 
three somewhat different characteristics of an econ-
omy: (1) the total levels of production and consump-
tion; (2) the average (per capita) levels of production 
and consumption; and (3) the equality of the distri-
bution of productive activities and consumption. Our 
specific concern is the contribution of the petroleum 
industry to the economy. We will focus mainly on the 
first two characteristics.
Conceptually, our interest lies in anything that 
is perceived as having value to Albertans: How large 
is the value? How was whatever provides value pro-
duced? And what were the costs involved in pro-
ducing it? Did this production process decrease or 
increase other things that Albertans value? It is a big 
step to move from this general conceptual framework 
to meaningful empirical analysis. Neither the concept 
of ‘value’ nor that of ‘Albertans’ is as straightforward as 
one might initially assume. (Here we repeat and elab-
orate on some of the issues that were initially raised in 
Chapter Four in our discussion of ‘welfare economics,’ 
and in the Introduction to Part Two of this book.)
Consider, first, the term ‘Alberta.’ Does this mean 
the productive activities within the geographical 
region (‘domestic’ activities), or the productive activ-
ities undertaken by people with declared residence 
in the region (‘national’ activities)? The two may 
differ because Alberta residents engage in production 
outside of Alberta; for example, an oil worker from 
Edmonton spends six months a year working in the 
Middle East, or a financier in Calgary loans money 
to a manufacturing plant in Nova Scotia. Even the 
notion of Alberta residents is ambiguous. Do we mean 
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all people living here? Or only Canadian citizens? 
Do we mean the people in Alberta prior to a change 
in the economy or those in the province after the 
change? (These differ if changes attract immigrants 
into Alberta or induce people to leave the province.) 
In what follows, we shall follow the main conventions 
and include all Alberta residents (a changing total, 
with interprovincial and international migration) 
and focus on the economic activities that take place 
within the borders of the province (a ‘domestic’ point 
of view).
The concept of ‘value’ has always attracted contro-
versy. As was discussed in Chapter Four, we follow the 
pervasive utilitarian tradition in economics and accept 
that whatever individuals say is of value to them is 
therefore of value to society; the value of something is 
the amount that a person is willing to pay for it. This 
perspective is both individualistic and democratic. 
But it is not unassailable: individuals may be inconsis-
tent in their preferences; they may exhibit weakness 
of will, behaving in ways their ‘better’ self cautions 
them against; and there are any number of reasons 
to question whether what people want is actually in 
their best interest. However, any paternalistic attempt 
to impose a different set of values is likely to be more 
controversial than simply accepting individuals’ own 
evaluations. Hence, we accept the willingness to pay 
criterion of conventional welfare economics. Further, 
the use of money as a measuring rod is convenient 
in an advanced mixed-capitalistic economy such as 
Canada’s since many of the things that people value 
are produced and exchanged through economic mar-
kets, and the dollar values (both positive and nega-
tive) that individuals place on things are provided by 
market prices.
The role of market prices in providing measures of 
value provides the basis for the most common meas-
ure of the size of an economy and its rate of growth: 
Gross Domestic (or Provincial) Product (GDP). We 
shall utilize GDP extensively in the remainder of this 
chapter but must initially provide some discussion of 
what it is (and is not). (More detailed discussion of the 
concept can be found in any introductory economics 
textbook; see also Statistics Canada catalogue #13-
001.) GDP can be measured in two ways, one of which 
draws on the consumption side of the economy, and 
the other which draws on the production side.
From a consumption point of view, we ask: what is 
the total value to consumers of all the goods and ser-
vices produced in the economy? Of course, we cannot 
simply add the value of all the goods that are marketed 
since this would involve much double-counting. (We 
would, for instance, include the cost of the drilling 
rig services sold to an oil exploration company, then 
count it again when the crude oil producer sells its 
crude to a refinery and then again when the refiner 
sells its refined petroleum products to final users.) 
Rather, we want to add up the values of all the ‘final’ 
goods and services that people purchase. Final users 
are normally defined as consumers (who buy durable 
goods such as cars, non-durable goods such as motor 
gasoline, and services such as financial consultations), 
businesses that purchase capital goods to allow pro-
duction of other things through the future (if the 
annual depreciation of these capital goods is deducted 
from GDP, one is left with NDP or Net Domestic 
Product), governments, and foreign buyers. Of course, 
some of the goods bought by local residents may have 
been imported rather than produced locally, so must 
be removed from spending if the size of the local 
economy is to be measured accurately. This generates 
the well-known equation: GDP = C + I + G + X – M. 
(Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is consumption 
spending (C), plus investment spending (I), plus gov-
ernment spending (G), plus export spending (X), less 
imports (M).)
From the production perspective, one wishes 
to measure the value that is produced in the econ-
omy by adding up the contributions of all producers 
(including producers of ‘final’ goods and services 
and of ‘intermediate’ goods and services). This would 
allow assessment of the roles of all the producers in 
the economy. From this point of view, GDP is the 
sum of the ‘values added’ by each producer on top 
of the purchases they make from other producers. 
Thus, for example, the value of the crude oil that an 
oil company sells to refiners includes the cost of pur-
chases from other companies (e.g., the cost of hiring 
a drilling rig from an oilfield drilling contractor), but 
it also includes ‘values’ that the oil company ‘added.’ 
‘Values’ are derived from the amount that people are 
willing to pay for the crude oil (which, in turn, derives 
from the values that final consumers put on the 
refined petroleum products). The ‘additions’ made by 
the crude oil producer (on top of its purchases from 
other businesses) include the oil company’s purchases 
of labour, interest payments it makes on borrowed 
funds, rental payments it makes on land, and the prof-
its it earns. The sum of these values added across all 
industries also measures GDP. For simplicity’s sake, 
we have abstracted from such details as where taxes fit 
into this. In general, since the payments made by final 
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users cover taxes, they are also a part of value added. 
There is a particular problem in the crude petroleum 
industry with the significant payments made by pro-
ducers to governments and private landowners from 
the economic rent earned on crude petroleum. These 
payments are largely in the form of royalties and 
bonus payments. The problem is in deciding which 
industry should be credited with these amounts as 
value added when they seem to lie in the qualities 
of the natural resource in the ground as much as in 
the activities of the crude oil industry. In Canadian 
National Accounts data, royalties and bonus payments 
are credited as value added by the “financial” sector.
In what follows, we will be using value-added 
measures of GDP as our main description of the con-
tribution of the petroleum industry to the Alberta 
economy. Other measures are possible and will be 
referred to as needed. Thus, for example, one could 
also ask what proportion of the Alberta labour force 
is employed in the crude oil industry, or what the 
industry’s share is in the total stock of capital in the 
province. Readers will be aware that the oil industry is 
a ‘capital intensive’ industry with relatively few directly 
employed workers, so its share of the labour force is 
much less than its share of value added, but its share of 
the capital stock is higher.
We shall focus on three main questions: How 
important is the petroleum industry to the Alberta 
economy? How has the petroleum industry contrib-
uted to the growth of the Alberta economy (consid-
ering both total and per capita GDP)? And what has 
been the contribution of the petroleum industry to the 
‘public’ through its impact upon provincial govern-
ment finances? Our view is that dollar values – value-
added measures of GDP, and the financial payments 
by the industry to the provincial government – are 
the best available tool to address these questions. 
Once again, however, it is wise, even when accepting 
this stance, to keep in mind the limitations of GDP as 
a measure of the value of a society’s economic con-
sumption and production since, among other things, 
it excludes certain valuable ‘products’ such as leisure 
time, unpaid activities, and the quality of the environ-
ment. Critics of the concept have also argued that GDP 
includes undesirable elements; for instance, if drilling 
an exploratory well (which adds to GDP) generates 
an undesirable outcome such as a well blowout, the 
expenses to control the blowout will also add to GDP, 
so even bad outcomes may lead to higher GDP. Such 
criticisms need to be considered carefully. After all, 
there can be little doubt that controlling the blowout 
does generate a gain to society; the real question 
is whether the potential environmental costs of oil 
industry activity are adequately recognized.
Possible modification of a country’s National and 
Provincial Accounts to better incorporate natural 
resources such as petroleum is an interesting issue 
(Hartwick, 1990, 1994; Diaz and Harchaoui, 1997; 
Smith 1992). At the conceptual level, one might sup-
pose that the national balance sheet of a country’s 
assets should include the net value of the natural 
resource, which could be estimated as the anticipated 
economic rent from production (the present value 
of the excess of expected revenues above expected 
production costs). Then the annual flow of eco-
nomic activity, as measured by GDP, could include 
the change in the asset value of the natural resource. 
(This is analogous to the change in inventory values 
for conventional businesses included as part of the 
investment component of GDP.) The depletable nature 
of the resources would suggest that the asset value 
should decline as the remaining stock is reduced. At 
the same time, the more dynamic view of resources 
that we have advocated in this volume suggests a 
number of reasons why resource asset values might 
rise, even above and beyond unexpected price 
increases: new knowledge and technology consistently 
add to the volume of recoverable resources and their 
value. The inclusion of natural resources into national 
accounts is very difficult to implement in practice for 
many reasons, including uncertainty about the size of 
the resource base and about future prices and costs 
that are needed to estimate expected future produc-
tion and economic rents. Hence, conventional data 
as used in this chapter do not include values associ-
ated with the changing natural resource base of the 
province; rather, the petroleum industry is assessed 
in terms of its annual production activities. Diaz and 
Harchaoui (1997) provide an interesting analysis of 
Canadian petroleum in which they find that inclusion 
of the asset value of the natural resource would have a 
relatively small impact on Net National Product meas-
ures, but a more significant effect on Net National 
Wealth. We would note that explicit consideration of 
the asset value of petroleum resources provides one 
possible approach to the policy issue of the utiliza-
tion of petroleum revenues. If oil and gas production 
reduce the value of the province’s wealth (including 
the value of petroleum assets in the ground), then it 
could be argued that only part of petroleum revenues 
received by the government should be utilized for 
current expenses. This perspective would suggest that 
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some portion should be invested in capital assets, 
which would provide ongoing revenues to compensate 
for the declining value of the natural resource stock. 
The Alberta Heritage Trust Savings Fund, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter, could be seen as an 
example of such use of petroleum revenues.
In conclusion, GDP is widely accepted as a 
measure of the size of the most obvious part of the 
economic system, that part which operates directly 
through economic markets (including labour mar-
kets). At its most basic level, an increase in real GDP, 
all else being equal, implies that society has increased 
its potential for producing things that members of 
society might value. As a measure of the actual effi-
ciency of the economy in meeting the needs of its 
citizens, GDP is more problematic. Most economists 
regard it as one of the most useful indicators in this 
regard, but only one of them. One might also want 
to consider factors as diverse as the distribution of 
income, the state of the environment, the size of the 
natural resource base, the length of the average work-
ing day, the changing proportion of stay-at-home 
parents, the average health and educational level of 
the population, etc. All else being equal, higher real 
GDP per capita is commonly regarded as signalling 
an improvement in the economy’s performance. We 
accept this conclusion. However, for some critics, the 
concept of GDP is so flawed that even this qualified 
conclusion is not warranted.
Input-output (I-O) tables are an extension of the 
value-added approach to measuring GDP, providing 
a ‘snapshot’ of interindustry connections in a particu-
lar year. They show how aggregate demand is spread 
across imports and different local industries and also 
how the expenditures of each industry are spread 
across other industries and various value-added cat-
egories (labour, profits, etc.). They give an idea of what 
an expansion in production of one industry will mean 
for other industries in the region. At the same time, 
there are limitations in the usefulness of I-O tables. 
For one thing, they reflect the unique features of the 
year in which they were constructed, including con-
strained short-run responses. The tables show the total 
of economic activity in the year and so can be used 
to understand total linkages or average linkages (e.g., 
that $1 of crude oil exports required on average $0.10 
of Alberta well-drilling services). But economists are 
most often interested in marginal changes; unless 
production occurs under constant cost conditions, 
marginal costs and input requirements may differ 
from the average levels shown in I-O tables. Despite 
these limitations, I-O tables provide a useful tool for 
examining the economic role of an industry within 
a region.
B.	Models	of	Growth
In what follows, we present a brief and select review 
of some of the models that economists have used to 
explain the level and growth of GDP in an economy. 
The review draws on the literature on macroeconomic 
growth and on regional economic development.
1. Export Base Models
In these models, the growth of an economy is driven 
jointly by its natural resource base and by the external 
demand for these resources. The underpinnings of this 
model can be found in the “Staples” theory, a theory 
that is largely associated with Canadian economists 
(Innes, 1927; Easterbrook and Aitken, 1956; and M. 
H. Watkins, 1963, for example). In this model, the 
world can be divided into two categories, ‘central’ 
economies, which are populous, industrialized and 
diverse, and ‘peripheral’ economies, which depend 
upon trade linkages with the centre. The central 
economies draw on the peripheral economies for the 
natural resources needed to fuel their industries. A 
peripheral economy’s growth is a function, therefore, 
of its resource base and the demands of the central 
economies. More specifically, growth will hinge on the 
size of export demand, the nature of the production 
technology for the natural resource, and the resource’s 
‘backward’ and ‘forward’ linkages in the local econ-
omy. The production function is important in large 
part because it indicates the local labour requirements 
to produce natural resources in the periphery. Are few 
local residents needed as in the case of fishing (where 
ships can come from the central economy and return 
without even having to land on the shores of the per-
ipheral economy), trapping, and mechanized mineral 
production? Or are there significant numbers of work-
ers needed, as in nineteenth-century agriculture and 
logging or mineral strip mines? Backward linkages 
refer to local producers who service the input needs 
of the staple resource-producing industry. This would 
include the provision of inputs for staple production 
itself (e.g., rafts to move logs to the export port), 
as well as the production of goods and services for 
labourers in the staple industry (clothing and grocery 
stores, saloons, seamstresses, opera houses, gambling 
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establishments, schools, churches, etc.). Forward link-
ages refer to industries that further process the natural 
resource before it is shipped to the central economy; 
sawmills and gas processing plants are examples.
The staples model was devised as a model of pol-
itical economy; it purported to deal with more than 
the implications of production technologies and the 
resultant size of GDP. Inherent in the division of the 
world into central and peripheral economies were a 
host of questions related to political dependency and 
exploitation. Moreover, the demands for staples by 
the central economies and the ways in which they 
controlled production in the peripheral economies 
were also seen as determining cultural, social, and 
political institutions in the periphery. The flavour of 
the staples model lives on in approaches that empha-
size the political significance of the resource industry, 
as in discussions of the ‘petrostate,’ which see the 
levers of government and the local political culture as 
captured by the interests and mindset of the petrol-
eum industry.
The export base model is, in essence, the staples 
political economy model without the politics. That is, 
the primary forces shaping the local economy are the 
export demand for a locally produced good or service 
and the specific production technology and economic 
linkages of that export product. Caves and Holton 
(1959), for example, provide an economic history of 
Canada that is based largely on a succession of natural 
resource staples – first fish, then furs, then forestry, 
then agriculture (wheat), then mining and the petrol-
eum industry.
There are problems with the export base/staples 
theory approach. The dichotomous separation of the 
world into central and peripheral economies seems 
extreme. These roles cannot be fixed forever, but at 
what point does the economy switch from being a per-
iphery (e.g., Upper Canada in the early 1880s) to being 
a centre (e.g., Ontario in the second half of the twen-
tieth century)? And is this an either/or categorization, 
or are there intermediate phases that might last for an 
extended period of time? Moreover, the implicit view 
of the central economies as independent, powerful 
importers driving growth processes in the periphery 
through their export demand is suspect. The central 
economies are exporters as well (and not only of 
manufactured goods); surely their economic structure 
and growth must be affected by the demand for their 
exports and the production technologies involved.
It may, then, be a matter of degree. Some econ-
omies may be natural-resource-rich but have very 
small local markets (due to small populations and/or 
low standards of living). In such economies, growth 
will inevitably be heavily linked to trade, with the 
external demand for the region’s resources determin-
ing the region’s main industry and providing earnings 
for local residents to import the goods and services 
they consume. But as a region grows, even if stimu-
lated by a resource staple, the local market will expand 
and more industries will develop at home to produce 
goods for local consumption. The economy is, then, 
less heavily dependent on the natural resource staple. 
Further, some of the goods manufactured for locals 
may become competitive as export products so that 
even the region’s exports show less dependence on 
immobile natural resources and more on those indus-
tries that could, potentially, be located anywhere in 
the world. In this way, the economy, as it has grown, 
initially under the impetus of a natural resource 
staple, has become more diverse and less dependent 
on staple exports; it has developed a greater degree 
of autonomy. Consequently, the export base model 
would become less valuable as a way of explaining the 
region’s continued growth.
2. Closed Economy Models
The previous paragraph suggests that the true oppos-
ite to the export base economy is not really a Central 
economy but a ‘closed’ economy, one that is com-
pletely self-sufficient so that it has no exports (and no 
part of the economy is ‘based’ on exports). Models of 
closed economies are, of course, unrealistic for the 
modern world, but much of the early development 
in modern macroeconomics and growth theory 
stemmed from simple closed economy models. It will 
be useful to comment briefly on the two most popular 
modelling frameworks. It should also be noted that 
there are open economy models of both types as well.
a. Keynesian Models
Keynesian models stress aggregate demand in the 
economy as the prime determinant of the levels of 
GDP, unemployment, and prices. These models pro-
vide the basis for the short-term cyclical phenom-
enon discussed in the first part of this chapter but 
also introduced concepts that have been applied in 
other modelling frameworks. The basic idea is that if 
aggregate demand is low (below capacity), there will 
be insufficient demand to purchase all that the society 
is capable of producing and there will be involuntary 
unemployment. Should aggregate demand be too 
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high, the economy would produce at potential GDP 
with full employment, but the excess demand would 
translate into rising prices (inflation). One element of 
the low-aggregate-demand case provides an interest-
ing link to the export-base models with their emphasis 
on forward and backward linkages in the economy. 
In Keynesian theory, these linkages translate into a 
‘multiplier effect’ whereby the impact on GDP exceeds 
the initial change in aggregate demand. Consider a fall 
in consumption spending, for example, if consumers 
for some reason decide to save more of their income. 
When consumers spend less, the producers they buy 
less from will in turn cut their workforces and reduce 
their purchasers from input suppliers, and the input 
suppliers and workers who are now unemployed will 
cut their spending, which further reduces demand, 
and so on, until these effects peter out. In many 
Keynesian models, the cyclical aspects of the econ-
omy are heightened by what is called an ‘accelerator 
process,’ where investment demand is driven by the 
change in the level of income. Thus, a rise in income 
stimulates investment, which, through the multiplier 
effect, generates a larger income rise, which stimu-
lates a further increase in investment, accelerating 
the growth; but, as soon as the income growth slows, 
investment demand will decline, drawing the econ-
omy into a downward cyclical phase.
b. Neoclassical Models
Neoclassical models might be contrasted with 
Keynesian models by saying that the neoclassical 
models focus on aggregate supply rather than 
aggregate demand. The emphasis is on the product-
ive potential of the economy and how it changes. 
Neoclassical models essentially assume that the econ-
omy operates at full employment. In the neoclassical 
closed economy model, the level of GDP is a function 
of the quantities of productive inputs in the economy 
and the efficiency with which they are used. GDP can 
increase if the quantity of inputs rises; that is, if there 
are more workers, or if the capital stock rises. The 
capital stock should be interpreted as including capital 
equipment, natural resource capital, and human cap-
ital (the knowledge and skills of the labour force). GDP 
can also rise due to technological change; this is new 
knowledge that increases the efficiency of utilization 
of a fixed quantity of inputs. The neoclassical model 
serves as the basis for ‘general equilibrium’ models 
of an economy, which set out (1) the ways in which 
the economy’s productive inputs (labour, capital, and 
natural resources) generate output; (2) the division 
of this output amongst the inputs as income; (3) the 
consumption and savings behaviour of individuals 
from their various sources of income; and (4) the 
way in which savings generate additions to the capital 
stock (i.e., investment), which allows more production 
in the next period. Obviously this is a complicated 
economic framework, but in recent years economists 
have greatly advanced the construction of empirical 
models (labelled ‘computable general equilibrium’ 
[CGE] models) to describe the operation of national 
and regional economies.
While neither of these closed economy models 
is appropriate to an economy like Alberta’s, which is 
so open to exports and imports, they both have been 
extended in versions for open economies.
3. Open Economy Models
An open economy allows for trade of goods and ser-
vices with other economies and for the import and 
export of financial capital. In addition, it is possible 
to supplement the quantity and quality of local inputs 
with inflows from outside the region, and local inputs 
could elect to leave for elsewhere. It should be noted 
that many open economy models have introduced 
the simplifying assumption that capital is very mobile 
between regions but labour is not. While this assump-
tion about labour may have some validity when 
considering international trade, it is much less appro-
priate for a regional economy like Alberta’s, which is 
part of a single country within which people are free 
to relocate.
At any point in time, the potential (full employ-
ment level) of GDP in the economy is determined 
by the quantity and quality of the inputs available in 
the region. The actual level of GDP will be heavily 
influenced by the level of aggregate demand in the 
economy, of which export demand is an important 
part. For many regions, export demand will consist 
in large part of demand for natural resource staples. 
Low aggregate demand, which might, for instance, 
come from a decline in export demand for the natural 
resource, will be associated with unemployment in the 
region. If this problem persists, it is likely that labour 
and capital will begin to leave the region.
If aggregate demand is excessive, there will be 
upward pressure on local prices, but this tends to be 
limited by the regional mobility of goods and inputs. 
Thus prices of goods and services that move easily and 
cheaply in trade cannot rise very far even in the short 
run because local consumers will turn to imports 
and external customers will stop buying from this 
region. For goods and services that are slow to move 
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in response to higher prices, increases in price can 
be somewhat greater; labour might be an example. 
Price increases can be still larger for non-tradable 
goods and services; housing is a prime example. 
(Non-tradable does not mean goods that cannot be 
exchanged in trade, but goods that are immobile.) In 
the longer run, the increased prices of local goods and 
services stimulate the in-migration of new product-
ive inputs such as workers who are drawn by higher 
local wages and capital to produce those goods that 
have risen in price. Such inflows tend to drive prices 
back down. They also increase the quantity of inputs 
in the economy and hence raise the full employment 
level of GDP. These factors explain why the Alberta 
economy could increase in size so much relative to 
Saskatchewan but without extremely large and per-
sistent difference between per capita GDP levels in 
the two provinces. Expansion of the local market can 
encourage in-migration and development of new 
industries to produce goods for local consumers; often 
these industries exhibit economies of scale so that 
a certain minimum size of the market is necessary 
before producers attain competitive costs. If this hap-
pens, the local economy will become more diversified 
and less trade-dependent.
4. Natural Resource Models
As was noted, export base models typically emphasize 
natural resources, although not all export industries 
need be natural resource producers. In this section, we 
briefly review two models of economic growth that are 
basically natural resource models.
a. Boom and Bust Models
These models are based on the exhaustible nature of 
mineral deposits. If this characteristic of minerals 
is a dominating feature, and if there is only the one 
significant resource available to a region, then one 
would expect the regional economy to follow a path 
of expansion followed by decline, as is seen in many 
mining towns. If this process is not handled carefully, 
the growth cycle may be very rapid (as production 
of the resource grows rapidly to meet large export 
demands) followed by equally rapid economic decline 
as resource deposits are exhausted. This cycle is likely 
to be very inefficient. There are problems in the boom 
phase in providing adequate social infrastructure 
for in-migrating labour; local inflation is likely to 
be high and social relations strained. Social ties are 
severely strained with the ensuing bust, and local 
infrastructure is abandoned long before it is physically 
depreciated. These problems suggest that it would be 
socially desirable to force a more ‘attenuated’ resource 
development policy to smooth out resource produc-
tion and so extend the (milder) boom and following 
(slower) contraction (Scott, 1973, 1976).
However, in many cases, the boom and bust 
model will not be relevant to regional economic 
development. (Nor need it apply solely to natural 
resource production; history is full of stories of once 
booming industries dying due to population move-
ments, taste changes, or technological changes; think 
of blacksmiths and typewriter manufacturers.) The 
model seems to be most relevant to very small regions 
(for example, the isolated single-mine town). It fits 
larger regions less well for two reasons. First, as we 
have stressed in this book, the underlying concept 
of a depletable resource is not straightforward. In 
most oil-producing regions of any large areal extent 
(for example, Alberta or Texas), there is a very large 
resource base that will never be fully exhausted. As 
long as knowledge is generated and new technologies 
are developed, the oil industry may continue pro-
ducing for many, many years. That is, there may be 
a boom, but the bust phase may be delayed almost 
indefinitely. Secondly, for larger regions, the presump-
tion of a single natural resource is less likely to be met, 
and there are increased prospects that the region will 
grow prosperous and populous enough to become 
relatively self-sustaining, especially as agglomeration 
effects occur. Hence, we view the boom and bust 
model as being relatively unimportant for the Alberta 
economy, although it could be of some value in under-
standing economic conditions at a very local level 
(e.g., in a particular town).
b.  Industrial Diversification and the ‘Dutch Disease’
Governments in most regions that rely heavily upon 
a single industry are motivated to try to diversify 
the economy, thereby providing somewhat more 
cyclical stability. This is particularly true if the nat-
ural resource is a depletable one, as the government 
may then have concerns about declining production 
as reserves run out. This desire holds some contra-
dictions because the stronger the single resource 
industry, the higher economic growth in the region 
will be, but the greater the share of GDP contrib-
uted by the extractive resource industry. Thus, 
Middle Eastern OPEC members such as Saudi Arabia 
appeared to have more diversified economies in the 
1990s than the early 1980s in the sense that the relative 
contribution of the crude oil industry to their econ-
omies had fallen after oil prices collapsed. But GDP 
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per capita had also declined. Economic diversification 
may be desirable, but new industries should be com-
mercially viable on their own merits if they are simul-
taneously to diversify the economy and contribute to 
economic growth in a meaningful way. This is not easy 
to accomplish!
The issues here are similar to those associated with 
the well-known ‘infant industry’ argument, that a new 
industry may require protection from imports until it 
has had time to establish itself as commercially viable; 
such viability may hinge on the industry expanding 
enough to realize economies of scale or to operate 
for a sufficient period of time to allow local inputs to 
gain the knowledge and skills required. The argument 
has been controversial. In a world of uncertainty, it is 
very hard for governments to pick ‘winners’; that is, 
it is easy to decide to protect or subsidize currently 
unprofitable businesses but hard to know which 
ones will become competitive in the future. Further, 
from a political economy point of view, virtually all 
producers (business owners and workers) have an 
incentive to claim that they need assistance to become 
more competitive; which of these claims the govern-
ment responds to, and which it ignores, may relate 
more to political influence than to economic merit. 
Finally, it is hard to remove government support once 
it is established. Partly this is ‘political,’ in the sense 
that supported industries made more profitable by 
government assistance also have developed greater 
political power to fight against any removal of sup-
port. Further, the ability to operate under government 
support may have inhibited the necessity to become 
internationally competitive; that is, the government 
support itself allows the industry to remain an ‘infant’ 
requiring support.
The concept of economic diversification ties 
into what is called the ‘Dutch Disease’ (Ismail, 2010; 
Sosa and Magud, 2010). This refers to the economic 
adjustments that may occur in a relatively diversified 
economy when a new natural-resource-exporting 
industry comes into being. The term was applied to 
The Netherlands’ experience with the development 
of the gigantic Groningen gas field in the 1970s. 
Macroeconomic models suggested that development 
of the natural resource would tend to squeeze out 
other traditional export industries (manufacturing, for 
example). This could happen partly through ‘external’ 
economic adjustments if inflows of financial capital 
and growing resource exports increase the exchange 
rate and make it harder for traditional exports to 
compete. Some of the economic adjustments would 
be ‘internal,’ with expanded resource production 
driving up input prices and raising production costs 
for traditional exports and for non-tradable goods 
and services. As a result, capital-intensive resource 
industries expand and traditional labour-intensive 
industries contract. Note that these effects would be 
less if there were relatively easy in-migration of inputs 
to the economy; that is, the ‘Dutch Disease’ argument, 
in the sense of a pathological outcome, has particular 
force in a closed economy. In effect, addition of the 
new resource industry might reduce the diversity of 
the economy. This was seen as a particular concern 
by those who foresaw a sharply peaked production 
profile for the natural resource; then, when depletion 
effects reduce production of the natural resource, the 
traditional export industries are no longer there to fill 
the economic gap, nor, for some reason, are they able 
to redevelop quickly. This presumes an asymmetrical 
response, with manufacturing contracting quickly as 
petroleum production increases, but failing to expand 
when petroleum output declines; reasons to expect 
such asymmetry have often not been clearly set out. 
The Dutch Disease might lead to an extreme result 
often labelled ‘the resource curse’ in which develop-
ment of a large natural resource endowment actually 
leaves a nation worse off; Frankel (2010) provides a 
survey of this literature, while Alexeev and Conrad 
(2009) examine this proposition empirically for oil 
and argue that it is not valid.
In a neo-classical framework, these economic 
adjustments also impact on the distribution of 
income. Thus expansion of a capital-intensive 
resource industry would increase the demand for 
capital relative to labour, generating a decrease in 
the wage rate relative to the ‘prices’ of capital (inter-
est rates, dividend rates, and retained earnings). The 
intersectoral production shifts (expansion of natural 
resource exports and contraction of other export or 
import-competing industries) would also be affected 
by these input price changes. Overall, one would 
expect the share of capital in national income to rise 
and that of labour to fall. The impact of these struc-
tural changes might be mitigated by appropriate gov-
ernment policies, particularly monetary policy, which 
can help to offset (or ‘sterilize’) the interest rate and 
exchange rate effects. However, a subregion such as 
Alberta has no control over monetary policy.
Literature on the Dutch Disease suggested, once 
again, that an attenuated (more drawn out) resource 
depletion path might be optimal, thereby reducing the 
structural shifts in the economy. On the other hand, 
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these broad macro concerns seemed less immediate 
to those who were relatively optimistic about the size 
and expandability of the petroleum resource base. In 
light of this, we prefer the term ‘Dutch Adjustment’ to 
‘Dutch Disease’ to refer to contraction of other sectors 
of the economy to make room for expansion of the 
petroleum industry, unless there is clear evidence that 
this process is pernicious.
We are not of the opinion that the Boom and Bust 
or Dutch Disease models, in their pure forms, are of 
much importance to the Alberta economy, so we shall 
rely on more traditional macroeconomic analysis in 
the material that follows. However, readers should 
keep in mind the general insights of the models in 
terms of the possible impacts of a non-renewable 
natural resource.
3. The Petroleum Industry in the  
Alberta Economy
As preamble, we summarize Eric Hanson’s well-
known research from 1958 arguing that the petroleum 
industry was proving to be a vital export-base, stimu-
lating rapid growth in the Alberta economy. We then 
go on to provide a brief overview of the province’s 
economic development since the 1940s and the role of 
the petroleum industry. Then we turn to several more 
specific topics such as economic diversification, trans-
fers from Alberta to the federal government during 
the years of the National Energy Program, macro-
economic fluctuations associated with the changes in 
the oil market, and the Heritage Trust Fund.
A. The First Ten Years: Eric Hanson’s  
Dynamic Decade
The modern Canadian crude oil industry is normally 
dated from the 1947 Leduc discovery, which stimu-
lated a sequence of significant oil plays. While local 
residents and governments were optimistic about the 
province’s economic future, some economists were less 
enthralled. Thus, for example, in their highly regarded 
economic history of Canada, Caves and Holton (1959, 
p. 215) compared the petroleum industry to other 
historically significant resource staples and argued 
that the impact on the Alberta economy might be 
relatively small. Crude oil and natural gas were nor-
mally exported as raw materials, so forward linkages 
would be minimal, and the capital-intensive nature 
of their production implied a very low demand for 
labour and heavy reliance on imported capital equip-
ment so that backward linkages would also be small. 
The pipelines used to ship oil and natural gas were 
also very capital-intensive and required little labour to 
operate; they could only be used to move petroleum. 
Caves and Holton argue that the contrasts drawn 
with the wheat boom, and associated construction of 
the railways, were marked. (Growing wheat required 
large numbers of farmers; equipment suppliers and 
grain-processing facilities did not exhibit strong econ-
omies of scale so were easily established; the rail links 
necessary to move grain and flour to markets were 
also ideal for bringing people to the region. Owram, 
1982, provides a useful overview of economic develop-
ment in western Canada.)
In 1958, Eric Hanson, an economist at the 
University of Alberta, published Dynamic Decade, 
the first extensive economic survey of the Alberta 
petroleum industry. Hanson included estimates of the 
economic impact of the petroleum industry on the 
Alberta economy, using a Keynesian economic multi-
plier approach as applied to an open economy. In this 
approach, it was assumed that the direct expenditures 
of the industry in Alberta had an income multiplier 
effect of approximately two; that is, $1 in expendi-
tures in Alberta by the petroleum industry would 
generate a $2 increase in Alberta income (Personal 
Income). (Hanson used a multiplier that fell from 2.3 
to 2 over the decade from 1946 to 1956.) Petroleum 
industry expenditures stimulated capital inflows into 
the province, which would not have occurred without 
the development of the industry. In order to estimate 
expenditures in Alberta, Hanson drew upon estimates 
from the Alberta government and information he 
gathered from interviewing oil industry personnel to 
estimate the proportion of direct industry expendi-
tures that flowed immediately out of the province. 
His income multiplier was applied to the residual of 
industry expenditures in the province.
To illustrate the significance of the petroleum 
industry to Alberta, Hanson sets up a counterfactual 
history in which the population of Alberta follows 
a path similar to that of Saskatchewan, starting at 
803,000 in 1946, and falling gradually to 775,000 in 
1956. Alberta’s actual population in 1956 was 1,123,000. 
He then estimates the impact of the petroleum indus-
try on the Alberta economy by deducting the con-
tributions of the petroleum industry (the multiplier 
income contributions) from the actual income levels 
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(Hanson, 1958, p. 271). On this basis, the Alberta econ-
omy would have been 98 per cent of the actual size in 
1946, if the petroleum industry had not been present. 
This percentage fell over time, so that in 1956 Hanson 
estimated that, without the petroleum industry, the 
level of Alberta Personal Income would have been 
only 55 per cent of that recorded. The values for per 
capita income are less dramatic since the growth of 
the oil industry attracted immigrants, but he estimates 
that by 1956 personal income was $275 higher per 
capita (at $1,370, a gain of 20%) than it would have 
been without oil (Hanson, 1958, p. 273).
Hanson’s perspective is consistent with the export 
base model, as suggested by one of his concluding 
paragraphs (Hanson, 1958, p. 293):
The Alberta economy is no longer dependent 
on the export of any one staple. Less than one-
fifth of its income is subject to the vagaries of 
wheat growing. Another fifth or so is derived 
from livestock raising and processing, activities 
which are relatively stable. About one-quarter 
is generated from the land acquisition, 
exploration and development activities of the 
petroleum industry. A fifteenth is provided 
by the producing activities of the petroleum 
industry and by its capital and operating 
expenditures for transportation, refineries, 
natural gas plants and petrochemical plants. 
Finally, there is a miscellany of activities, many 
of which are derived from oil operations, 
providing the rest of the income of the 
province.
Hanson was sceptical about the possibility of Alberta 
moving beyond an export-base economy, with a high 
dependence on natural resource exports, arguing that 
its “location precludes the economical manufacture of 
a great many commodities” (p. 293); presumably this 
also reflects a judgment that the local economy was 
too small to realize economies of scale in the produc-
tion of many manufacturing commodities. He con-
cluded that “the major basis for the development of 
Alberta lies in its potential natural resources” (p. 293), 
although he saw Alberta developing as the centre for 
exports of petroleum services to an expanding north-
ern Canadian petroleum industry.
Dynamic Decade provides a convincing portrayal 
of the petroleum industry as a strong export-base 
growth engine for the Alberta economy in the decade 
following the Leduc discoveries.
B. The Role of the Petroleum Industry
This section will provide some basic statistical infor-
mation about the petroleum industry in relationship 
to the Alberta economy.
1. Background and the Alberta Economy
Obviously, it is very difficult to estimate with reliabil-
ity the contribution of the petroleum industry to the 
economy since we have no way of knowing exactly 
what Alberta would have been like without the indus-
try. While it is possible to use input-output tables to 
see the interindustry linkages of an industry, it is hard 
to determine the full extent of the induced growth 
effects and even harder to assess whether petroleum 
industry activities might have displaced other eco-
nomic activities. Here we look at the most immediate 
measures of the economic activities of the Alberta 
petroleum industry: direct contributions to provin-
cial GDP, capital accumulation, and employment. We 
also provide some comparisons to Saskatchewan and 
Canada as a whole and look at several key economic 
indicators over time. (Emery and Kneebone, 2008, 
look at the differing economic development paths of 
Alberta and Saskatchewan and emphasize the differ-
ences in resource endowments.)
This chapter does not provide a complete survey 
of the Alberta economy and its features in compari-
son to other parts of Canada. Readers can find useful 
surveys in Mansell and Percy (1990), and Polèse 
(1987a, especially the chapter by Mansell), Norrie 
(1986), Richards and Pratt (1979), and a number of the 
Working Papers for the Economic Council of Canada’s 
study of regional economic disparities in the early 
1980s (Norrie and Percy, 1981, 1982, 1983; Owram, 
1982); Melvin (1987) provides an interesting review of 
regional economic differences; Emery (2006) provides 
a survey focusing on the changes following the price 
collapse of 1985. We have not attempted to build an 
econometric model of the Alberta economy so our 
observations are based upon relatively simple obser-
vations about the connections between key variables 
and our knowledge about what was happening at 
various points in time. Therefore, our observations, 
about what is, after all, a complex developed economy, 
should be regarded more as plausible hypotheses than 
established conclusions.
We will begin with some time series data for the 
period since 1947 to provide a broad overview of the 
Alberta economy. Then, we provide a brief review of a 
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number of observations made by other analysts about 
the performance of the Alberta economy relative to 
other parts of Canada. Next, we turn to the relative 
magnitude of the petroleum industry as a part of the 
provincial economy. Following this, we examine a 
number of specific issues that have been raised about 
the role of the petroleum industry.
a. Alberta’s Economic Development, 1947–2012
In this section, we provide information about the 
development of the Alberta economy since 1945, using 
a number of common economic indicators. In some 
cases, comparisons will be made between Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, which were at similar stages of eco-
nomic development at the end of World War II. We 
also include some comparisons to Canada as a whole. 
For the most part, the data are depicted in a graph-
ical manner.
Population. Figure 13.1 shows population growth since 
1947 for Canada, Alberta, and Saskatchewan, with the 
1947 value set at 100. (At that date, Alberta held about 
825,000 people, and Saskatchewan 836,000.) By 2012, 
Alberta’s population had grown to more than 3.8 mil-
lion, an increase of four times, much higher than the 
Canadian average. Saskatchewan still held barely more 
than one million, showing much slower population 
growth than Canada as a whole. Figure 13.2 makes 
the differences between the two prairie provinces 
clear. It shows that the ratio of Alberta’s population to 
Saskatchewan’s rose from about 1 in 1947 to well over 
3 by 2007. Alberta’s share of the Canadian population 
rose from under 7 per cent to more than 10 per cent, 
while Saskatchewan’s share fell. However, it is also 
apparent that the growth in Alberta’s population was 
not constant over this period. Thus, for example, the 
1950s and 1970s saw particularly rapid growth, corres-
ponding to the initial surge in petroleum discoveries 
after Leduc in 1947 and the rapid international price 
rises in the later period. On the other hand, from 1982 
through 1988, population growth was slow; this fol-
lowed the imposition of the National Energy Program 
(NEP) in 1980 and the substantial fall in international 
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Figure 13.1 Population Growth, 1947–2010
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Figure 13.3 shows the 
increase in real GDP for Alberta, Saskatchewan, and 
Canada, with 1951 set at a base value of 100. (Real GDP 
values for all three regions were obtained by applying 
the Canadian GDP price deflator to nominal GDP 
for the region, thus showing the increase in output 
after allowance for inflation.) As would be expected 
from the population trends, since more people nor-
mally generate more economic activity, Alberta’s GDP 
increase exceeded that for the entire country, which 
was, in turn, higher than that for Saskatchewan. 
However, it was not until after 1972, when crude oil 
prices began to rise sharply, that Alberta’s growth in 
GDP began to significantly exceed Canada’s. Figure 
13.3 makes very clear the rapid rise in Alberta’s GDP 
from 1972 until 1980. However, this was followed by a 
period of no growth, then actual decline in GDP, until 
relatively rapid growth commenced again in 1993. As 
mentioned above, this period saw the implementation 
of the NEP, from October 1980 through to mid-1985, 
and the sharp decline in international oil prices in 
1985. It is noteworthy that the mid-1990s did not see a 
sharp rise in the real price of crude oil or natural gas. 
Rather, it looks as though the Alberta economy took 
some time to adjust to the transition from a period of 
high and optimistic oil prices and, perhaps, the ‘exces-
sive’ boom that had been generated. Once ‘on track’ 
again, the economy resumed robust growth, with the 
rise in oil prices after 2003 providing a further boost.
It is difficult to separate out the impacts in the 
1980s of government regulatory programs (such as 
the NEP) and falling oil prices. Helliwell et al. (1984) 
suggest (partly by comparison with the United States) 
that the NEP had an immediate depressing effect on 
oil-industry activity in Alberta (in 1981 and 1982) but 
that this was short-lived, offset by the subsequent 
modifications in the NEP, and that by 1983 the most 
important depressing factor was declining natural gas 
prices. A comparison of Alberta’s falling and static 
GDP after the oil and natural gas price declines of 
1985 with the growth in total Canadian GDP, as seen 
in Figure 13.3, points out the quite different impact of 
lower petroleum prices: the effect is deflationary in a 
petroleum-producing region such as Alberta but has 
a net stimulatory impact on a developed industrial 
economy such as Canada’s. (For a summary of eco-
nomic models assessing the impact of lower oil prices 













1947 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007
YEAR
Alberta as % of Canada Saskatchewan as % of Canada Alberta/Saskatchewan
Figure 13.2 Alberta and Saskatchewan Relative Population, 1947–2010
The Petroleum Industry and the Alberta Economy 421
Unemployment Rates. Figure 13.4 includes the annual 
unemployment rates for Alberta, Saskatchewan, and 
Canada. Prior to 1966, Statistics Canada provided this 
data only for the combined Prairie provinces (Alberta, 
Manitoba, and Saskatchewan), so this value is shown 
for years from 1947 through 1966. It can be seen that 
unemployment was almost always lower in Alberta 
and Saskatchewan than in Canada as a whole, the 
Canadian value, of course, being coloured by the gen-
erally high unemployment rates in Atlantic Canada. 
The rates for the two western provinces generally 
follow movements for the country at large, reflecting 
business cycle trends and structural changes (such as 
modifications in employment insurance regulations). 
The Alberta unemployment rate was usually a little 
higher than Saskatchewan’s, but the reverse was true 
after 1996 and through to 2008, when Alberta’s rate 
rose appreciably more than that of its neighbour-
ing province; by 2012, Alberta’s unemployment rate 
was slightly lower than Saskatchewan’s again. The 
varying size of the difference between the Alberta 
and Canadian unemployment rates indicates that 
unemployment has been more variable across time 
in Alberta. Two periods can be seen in which the 
unemployment rate for the province approached the 
Canadian average: briefly in the early 1970s (just prior 
to the large international oil-price rises) and in the 
decade from 1983 to 1992 (which was marked by stag-
nant GDP, as noted above). The Alberta unemploy-
ment rate actually exceeded the Canadian average 
briefly in the late 1980s, but after 1993 the Alberta rate 
once again fell well below the Canadian average.
Per capita Income. Figure 13.5 shows per capita 
GDP, Personal Income (PI) and Personal Disposable 
Income (PDI) in Alberta and Saskatchewan relative 
to the Canadian average for years from 1947 to 2010. 
(A value greater than 1 obviously means that the 
province exceeds the Canadian average.) Detailed 
definitions of these income measures can be found in 
assorted Statistics Canada documents; we will provide 
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activity in the region; the meaning of the concept 
was discussed in more detail above. Personal income 
differs from GDP largely by the exclusion of depreci-
ation and corporate taxes and retained earnings plus 
reductions for income generated in the region which 
leaves (e.g., payments to non-resident owners) and 
additions for income from outside which flows to 
people in the region (e.g., federal welfare benefits and 
interest payments received from non-resident enti-
ties). Disposable income excludes direct payments to 
governments, including personal income taxes, and 
payments to governments for social insurance and 
pension plans; it is, essentially, the income households 
have to spend on consumption or saving.
As can be seen in Figure 13.5, since 1947 Alberta’s 
per capita GDP has always been above both the 
Canadian average and that for Saskatchewan. (Values 
are available for Saskatchewan only from 1951 on, and 
that province, in most years, had a per capita GDP 
below the Canadian average.) Until 1973, Alberta’s per 
capita GDP was no more than 10 per cent above the 
Canadian average. This was the year in which inter-
national oil prices increased dramatically, and since 
then, Alberta’s per capita GDP relative to Canada’s 
has been much higher, as much as 60 per cent greater 
in the early 1980s and again in 2006/7. The sharp 
fall after 1983 and much lower relative values for the 
next decade (but still higher than before 1974) are not 
surprising in light of the previous comments about 
this period.
Patterns for Personal Income and Personal 
Disposable Income per capita are similar to one 
another but somewhat different than for GDP. The 
Alberta values are almost always higher than the 
values for Saskatchewan, but the differences between 
the two provinces are not as marked as for GDP, 
largely reflecting the exclusion of much corporate 
income. And the Alberta values are much closer to the 
Canadian average than they were for GDP, with per-
sonal income values up to the mid-1970s sometimes 
falling below the Canadian average. As with a number 
of the other economic indicators, a sharp rise is noted 
in the late 1970s, followed by a rapid decline (although 
remaining above the Canadian average), and relative 
stability into the 1990s. In the later 1990s, PI and PDI 
per capita in Alberta once again increased relative to 
the Canadian average.
We would note that, until the mid-2000s, Alberta’s 
relatively lower individual income tax levels did not 
translate into a PDI standing that is noticeably higher 
than that for PI. (The absence of an Alberta sales tax 
would not be evident here.) While Alberta GDP, PI, 
and PDI, compared to the Canadian average, show 
similar time trends, the relatively higher values for 
GDP are evident in Figure 13.5. This may reflect the 
higher capital intensity of the Alberta economy, so 
that depreciation and corporate profits are more 
important. But it may also reflect the importance of 
the petroleum industry. Consider, for example, the 
increased spread, after 1972, between the GDP and the 
personal income values. This began with the sharp 
rise in international oil prices as OPEC became more 
effective and stimulated price increases for substitute 
energy products such as natural gas. Even with the oil 
and natural gas price controls imposed by Canadian 
governments, the sales prices of oil and natural gas 
in Canada moved well above the levels of the 1950s 
and 1960s. Thus the ‘value added’ in petroleum pro-
duction increased, raising per capita GDP. However, 
the increase in personal income (and PDI) was much 
less pronounced since (1) a significant part of the 
increased value of oil and gas went to governments 
in higher royalties and taxes and (2) much of the 
increased profit of the oil companies did not find its 
way into the hands of Alberta residents. That oil-price 
changes are still important is suggested by the decline 
in per capita values in the year 1998/9 and 2001/2, 
and the subsequent rise as international oil prices 
recovered, and as North American natural gas prices 
attained new highs.
Summary. At the end of the Second World War, 
Alberta and Saskatchewan held approximately 
the same number of people and appeared similar 
in economic structure, with agriculture the key 
industry. After the Leduc find of 1947, the eco-
nomic development of the two provinces diverged, 
with Saskatchewan growing much slower than the 
Canadian average and Alberta much faster. We have 
not constructed a formal economic model of the 
Alberta economy, but it seems plausible that this 
difference stems from the growth of the petroleum 
industry in Alberta. In addition, periods of more 
rapid growth in Alberta and times of weaker eco-
nomic performance also appear to be tied to changes 
in conditions in the oil industry, particularly move-
ments in crude oil prices. Finally, this dependence 
on the petroleum industry seems to have led to a 
somewhat more unstable economy in Alberta. Figure 
13.6 compares annual percentage changes in real GDP 
for Alberta and Canada from 1952 through 2011. The 
Alberta economy has tended to show wider swings 
in GDP than Canada as a whole, particularly in the 
1972 to 1992 period and again after 2000. Further, the 
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widest swings are consistent with the interrelationship 
we have been suggesting in this section of a positive 
correlation between Alberta GDP and oil prices.
b. Other Analysts’ Descriptions of the Alberta Economy
The depiction that we have provided of the Alberta 
economy and its relative strength compared to 
Saskatchewan and Canada as a whole in the years after 
1947 is confirmed in other studies such as Hanson 
(1958), as described above, Coffey and Polèse (1987a), 
Lithwick (1977), and Mansell and Percy (1990).
The last of these studies argues that both Alberta 
and Saskatchewan exhibit much greater income 
instability than the Canadian average. Drawing on 
data from 1961 to 1985, Mansell and Percy (1990, p. 72) 
calculate an index of ‘regional economic instability’ 
(REI). They first established a time trend in the rel-
evant series. They then calculated the sum of squared 
differences between actual values and the values 
shown by this time trend; squaring made sure that 
both positive and negative deviations from trend 
were positive values and also assigned greater weight 
to larger deviations. Then the square root of this 
sum was divided by the average value for the series, 
to provide the REI. A higher value denotes greater 
instability. Values of the REI for Canada, Alberta, and 
Saskatchewan for three measures of economic activity 
are shown below.
 Canada Alberta Saskatchewan
GDP 169 2,672 1,000
Personal income 216 1,328 720
Per capita 176 685 793 
 personal income
Both provinces exhibit much greater economic instab-
ility than Canada as a whole or any other province. 
(The NWT and Yukon showed even greater GDP 
instability.)
Mansell and Percy (1990, p. 21) also calculate 
annual employment ‘location quotients’ for Alberta 
















Figure 13.6 Canada and Alberta % Change in Real GDP, 1952–2009
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quotient is the share of employment in Alberta in an 
industrial sector relative to that share for Canada. We 
show values for three years.
 1973 1980 1987
Agriculture 2.45 1.65 1.81
Mining 2.63 3.24 3.66
Construction 1.18 1.65 1.10
Manufacturing 0.41 0.47 0.43
Transportation and Utilities 1.00 1.06 1.01
Trade 1.09 1.05 1.02
Finance 1.06 0.96 0.87
Services 1.03 0.96 1.05
Government 0.96 0.93 1.07
The regional significance of the resource industries 
and lesser significance of manufacturing is clear. 
Construction has been important, as might be 
expected given the capital intensity of the petroleum 
industry and Alberta’s rapid growth.
In conclusion, assorted analysts have found that 
the Alberta economy grew rapidly after the Leduc 
find of 1947 and performed well in relationship to 
the rest of the country. Compared to Canada as a 
whole, the mining and agricultural sectors have 
played dominant roles. Generally speaking, per capita 
income was near or above the Canadian average, 
and Alberta’s unemployment rate has normally been 
lower than average. However, the Alberta economy 
has been much more unstable than those of almost all 
other provinces.
We now turn to a more direct measure of the 
significance of the petroleum industry to the Alberta 
economy.
2. Petroleum’s Contribution to GDP
The direct significance of different industries can be 
measured by looking at the ‘value added’ to GDP. As 
mentioned above, an industry’s value added is the 
sum of wages, rent, interest, and (before-tax) profits 
paid. In essence, it is the value of an industry’s pro-
duction less its purchases of goods and services from 
other industries, and it can be used to measure the 
relative significance of different industries to the total 
economy. As noted above, when added up across all 
industries, it provides as measure of the total value 
of production in the economy. One complication is 
in determining exactly what properly constitutes an 
industry. For example, does the petroleum industry 
include only the crude-oil-producing industry, or does 
it also include pipelines, refineries, petrochemicals, 
oilfield service companies, geological consulting firms, 
etc.? In this regard, the researcher is often constrained 
by the form in which statistics are collected.
We draw on the Alberta Provincial Accounts to 
show value-added shares of different industries for the 
years 1961 to 2001, and from CANSIM for 2002–2008, 
the last data available at the time of revision of this 
volume. Data are unavailable for years prior to 1961. 
A significant change in statistical methodology was 
applied to the statistics for years from 1971 on; def-
initions were changed again with the 2009 data. 
Accordingly, we utilize values for two separate time 
periods, 1961–71 and 1971–2008. The two are not 
strictly comparable, although at the level of aggre-
gation we use they are broadly consistent with one 
another. The ‘Mining’ industry is almost entirely pet-
roleum activities, and, in our data, has been expanded 
to include natural resource royalties (which are 
included in the “Finance” sector in the primary data 
sources). Coal is the other major mineral product 
produced in Alberta, partially for export, but also for 
electricity generation in the province. Bitumen and 
heavy oil upgrading, which are an important part of 
oil sands activities, are included in the mining sector. 
The provincial statistics include “Support activities for 
mining and oil and gas” in the mining sector.
However, as implied by open economy models, 
and discussed by Hanson in Dynamic Decade, the 
contribution of the petroleum industry is likely to go 
far beyond its direct contribution to provincial GDP. 
Mansell and Percy (1990, pp. 17–19) quote a govern-
ment discussion paper that suggested that “in 1981, 
about half of the construction activity and one-quarter 
of the manufacturing activity in the province were 
related to oil and gas.” Moreover, the industry pur-
chases a variety of other services and is a major 
source of revenue to the provincial government. And, 
of course, the incomes generated by these activities 
directly tied to the petroleum industry help fuel the 
demand for assorted other household and business 
goods and services. It also appears that exports of 
petroleum-related goods and services have been of 
increasing importance.
Figures 13.7 and 13.8 include five broad industrial 
groups: mining; agriculture and forests; manufactur-
ing; construction, transportation and utilities; and 
trade, finance, public administration and other ser-
vices. The years 1961–71 are shown in Figure 13.7. In 
this period, the mining industry contributed between 
10 and 15 per cent of Alberta GDP, with the share 
rising slightly to 1968, then falling off slightly. Overall, 
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Figure 13.8 Alberta Industry Shares in GDP, 1971–2008
Source: Calculated from data in Alberta Department of Finance, ASIST Matrix 6106 and CANSIM II Table 3790026.
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agriculture and forestry saw a reduced share, as, less 
dramatically, did manufacturing. Mining and services 
increased shares. A shift away from goods-producing 
industries towards services has been common for 
developed economies in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.
Figure 13.8 shows that more dramatic changes 
in the industrial structure of the Alberta economy 
occurred in the three decades following 1970. From 
1971 to 1985, the share of mining in Alberta GDP rose 
from under 20 per cent to over 35 per cent. It will 
be recalled that this period saw large oil and natural 
gas price rises. (Figure 13.10, which will be discussed 
below, shows the relative changes in oil and natural 
gas production and real prices after 1969.) When 
international crude oil prices fell in 1985, the share 
of the mining industry in GDP also declined, to back 
below 20 per cent by 1988. From then, it varied up and 
down from a low of about 15 per cent in 1998 to just 
over 25 per cent in 2000, after which it rose again to 
over 30 per cent in 2005, before falling back somewhat 
then rising again in 2008. Oil and natural gas prices 
seem to be a major factor in these changes, with the 
natural gas price hitting a high in the year 2005. The 
early 1980s bubble in the mining contribution to GDP 
includes the period of rapid growth in total Alberta 
GDP and per capita GDP discussed above. Obviously, 
a sharp rise in the mining share must be matched by 
declines in the shares of one or more other industrial 
group. This is seen to varying degrees in the 1971–85 
shares for the other sectors, though only minimally so 
for manufacturing, and up to 1982 the construction, 
transportation, and utilities sector largely held its 
share. If the final years are compared to 1971, increased 
shares can be seen for mining, manufacturing, and the 
services group; the other primary industries and con-
struction, transportation, and utilities show reduced 
shares of GDP.
The GDP shares for a broad aggregation of 
manufacturing industries for the years 1971 to 2001 
are shown in Figure 13.9. (CANSIM data after 2002 
included too many missing values, for confidentiality 
reasons, to be used.) One of these categories (petrol-
eum and coal products, chemicals, plastics and rubber, 
which includes oil refining) is closely associated with 
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manufacturing processes typically draw on oil or nat-
ural gas products as feedstock input (i.e., in addition 
to the need to buy energy to heat the manufacturing 
plant and provide process energy). From 1971 to 1988, 
the share of this group in Alberta manufacturing GDP 
increased dramatically, from just over 20 per cent to 
almost 40 per cent. The share of the agriculture and 
forestry-based manufacturing sector fell in a corres-
ponding fashion, from over 45 per cent to about 32 
per cent. This increase in the petroleum-based indus-
tries is similar to the increased share of the primary 
petroleum (mining) sector and reflects at least in 
part the increased value of petroleum in the market-
place. However, the peak for the petroleum products 
manufacturing sector (in 1988) comes after crude oil 
prices had fallen dramatically, and while the share of 
this sector did fall after 1988, and has shown signifi-
cant variability, it maintained a value-added share in 
manufacturing that is some 50 per cent higher than its 
1971 share. In 2009, the latest year for which data are 
available, petroleum-related manufacturing industries 
contributed 32 per cent to Alberta’s manufacturing 
value added, while agricultural and forestry manufac-
turers contributed 28 per cent.
The significance of the petroleum industry to the 
services sector is difficult to determine with preci-
sion. Casual observation of the economy indicates 
that service providers to the Alberta petroleum 
industry have developed export markets, as well as 
meeting the needs of Alberta oil and gas producers. 
A 2001 government survey of the services sector 
(Alberta Departments of Economic Development 
and International and Intergovernmental Relations, 
July 2001) found that, in 1999, oil and gas services 
made up over 20 per cent of services sector revenue 
(for the seven key service sectors surveyed); this was 
second to construction services, which generated 61 
per cent of the revenue. But the survey also found that 
for most non-oil-and-gas service providers (such as 
construction, computers, management consulting, 
and engineering), a part of the services provided were 
petroleum-related activities. 
In summary, the petroleum industry obviously 
plays a major direct economic role in Alberta. In 1961, 
it was the least important of the five industry groups 
into which we separated Alberta GDP. (Mining, 
manufacturing, and agriculture and forestry were 
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Figure 13.10 Indices of Real Oil and Gas Prices and Output, 1947–2011, 1970=1
The Petroleum Industry and the Alberta Economy 429
second, its share having risen from barely 10 per cent 
to almost 30 per cent.
As earlier tables in this book have demonstrated, 
both the volumes of production of conventional oil 
and natural gas and their real prices increased signifi-
cantly since 1947. Figure 13.10 illustrates the import-
ance of these changes since 1947, using 1970 as a base 
year. It can be seen that, prior to 1970, rising output 
of oil and gas was the dominating factor. After that, 
higher prices were of significant importance as was 
increasing natural gas production. (So, eventually, was 
rising oil sands output, which is not shown in Figure 
13.10.) While both output and price could have gener-
ated higher value-added shares for the mining sector, 
the year-to-year variability in share suggests that price 
has played a particularly important role. In Alberta 
manufacturing, there has also been a shift over time 
towards a greater share for the sectors that utilize 
petroleum products as a material input for the good 
produced. The pipeline and construction industries 
obviously depend on the petroleum sector, and some 
manufacturers provide inputs to oil and gas produc-
tion and transmission. Petroleum-related services also 
appear to have been increasing in value; in addition to 
meeting needs of the Alberta petroleum sector, some 
of these services providers engage in export sales, 
so are developing an existence independent of the 
Alberta petroleum industry. Unfortunately, published 
data on value added or revenue by industry is insuffi-
ciently detailed to allow precise estimation of the 
contribution of the petroleum industry to the Alberta 
economy as a supplier of inputs to other sectors and as 
a market for the output of other sectors.
We now turn to another measure of the relative 
size of the Alberta petroleum industry, its share in 
employment. Rather than giving extensive time series 
data, we utilize information from a recent year. (The 
contribution of the highly capital intensive petroleum 
industry to Alberta’s total stock of capital is another 
measure of the significance of the industry, but not 
one about which we possess specific information.)
3. Petroleum’s Contribution to Employment
Oil and natural gas production are capital-intensive 
activities, which do not require many direct workers. 
Of course, the total contribution of the petroleum 
industry to employment in Alberta is difficult to assess 
for the same reasons that its full contribution to GDP 
is hard to determine. (Which workers in other indus-
tries are employed only because they provide goods 
or services to the petroleum industry or because they 
provide goods and services for the use of industries 
and households who reside here only because of the 
petroleum industry?)
In the broad historical context, Alberta, like 
other developed economies, has seen a decline in 
the importance of goods-producing industries, espe-
cially primary industries, relative to services. Thus, 
for example, the Alberta Bureau of Statistics (Alberta 
Provincial Accounts, 1973, p. 139) reported that the per-
centage of the employed labour force in agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing fell from 53 per cent in 1921 to 15 
per cent in 1971, while service sector employment rose 
from 30 per cent to 60 per cent. This study lumped 
together mining, manufacturing, and construction, 
where the share rose from 16 per cent in 1921 to 25 
per cent in 1971, rising markedly from a low of 13 per 
cent in 1941. More recently, in its Facts on Alberta of 
January 1994, the Industry Development Branch of the 
Department of Economic Development and Tourism 
(p. 8) showed ‘fishing, forestry and mining’ as pro-
viding 5.8 per cent of Alberta’s employment (almost 
90 per cent of this in mining, of which the petroleum 
industry provides most). The October 2010 issue of 
the same series (now from the Department Finance 
and Enterprise, p. 25), showed the employment 
share of “Energy” as 6.9 per cent. (Manufacturing’s 
share fell from 7.6 per cent to 6.2 per cent over the 
same period.)
As these numbers make clear, the economic sig-
nificance of the petroleum industry to the Alberta  
economy is not primarily through its direct 
employment.
4. Conclusion
In this section, we have set out broad features of the 
Alberta economy and the relative significance of 
the petroleum industry. The industry itself is highly 
capital-intensive, so that its direct contribution to 
provincial GDP is much larger than its contribution 
to employment. The value added by the petroleum 
industry has been a significant part of the Alberta 
economy, growing strongly after 1947, and especially 
during the period of historically high oil prices during 
the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The importance 
of the oil industry almost certainly is a major factor 
in explaining why, since 1947, growth of both popu-
lation and real GDP in Alberta have been above the 
Canadian average, as has per capita GDP. The capital 
intensity of the industry and the high ex-Alberta 
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ownership and government-take of petroleum profits 
lead to per capita personal income in Alberta closer 
to the Canadian norm than per capita GDP; never-
theless, ever since the early 1970s, Alberta per capita 
personal income and personal disposable income have 
exceeded the Canadian average. Finally, it appears 
that the reliance of the Alberta economy on this single 
industry and the variability of oil and gas prices has 
led to greater instability in the Alberta economy than 
other provinces or Canada at large.
We now turn to five specific topics that relate to 
the role of the petroleum industry in Alberta: the 
degree of diversification of the Alberta economy 
(Section C); macroeconomic ‘costs’ of the NEP, and 
transfers from Alberta to the rest of Canada (Section 
D); the role of migration and price changes as eco-
nomic ‘equalizers’ (Section E); impacts on Alberta 
government revenues and expenditures (Section F); 
and the significance of petroleum resource depletabil-
ity and the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 




It is often taken as obvious that a more diversi-
fied economy is preferable to a less diversified one. 
However, a proposition of this sort requires critical 
consideration. For example, that greater diversifica-
tion is desirable is likely true only under some ‘all else 
being equal’ condition. For example, for any given size 
of the population, attainment of a more diversified 
economy at the expense of a sharp fall in the region’s 
GDP would not be seen as a gain. Or, in an example 
of particular relevance to Alberta, a sharp rise in the 
value of the output in a major sector (e.g., rising oil 
prices from 1973 through the early 1980s) would lead 
to an increase in the contribution of that sector to the 
economy and, probably, a reduction in the industrial 
diversification of the economy; but it is hard to see 
this as necessarily undesirable.
One might suggest, as a tentative hypothesis, that 
a more diversified economy is preferable for any given 
level of GDP in the economy. The question now is 
“Why?” There seem to be two main answers, though 
they are often not made specific.
The first is that a more diversified economy is 
likely to prove to be more stable and resilient. (See, 
for example, Mansell and Percy, 1990, with regard to 
Alberta.) This will hold true if the economic condi-
tions in different industries are not highly correlated 
with one another, as when oil prices and wheat prices 
move largely in response to different factors. This 
argument for diversification would seem to be par-
ticularly strong when applied to regional economies 
from an export-base perspective. The diversification 
in this case relates to the exporting industries, where, 
for example, a collapse in the market for one export 
good will have a less drastic effect on the economy 
if the region has a number of other export goods for 
which market conditions remain strong. A secondary 
hypothesis might be that diversification is even more 
important for economies that depend heavily on 
non-renewable natural resources, which must, at some 
point, exhibit strong depletion effects.
A second possible argument for diversification is 
that a more diversified economy is likely to be more 
self-sufficient and hence less dependent in general 
on the vagaries of external market conditions. This 
argument is less convincing, as it confuses to some 
extent cause and effect and does not seem to focus on 
the most important variables in attaining a degree of 
self-sufficiency. Increased self-sufficiency hinges to a 
large extent on the economy attaining sufficient size 
that it can realize the economies of scale and agglom-
eration effects that make it efficient for producers of a 
wide variety of goods and services to produce for the 
local market rather than importing them. Thus it is 
not that diversification brings more self-sufficiency, 
but that, as a region grows large enough to attain more 
self-sufficiency, diversification follows.
It is important, then, to distinguish between 
diversification as a characteristic of an economy and 
increased diversification as a justification for public 
policy.
Thus, one could argue that greater diversification 
provides more economic stability for people in the 
economy but also that any government steps to raise 
the level of diversification are likely to prove either 
ineffective or more costly than is justified. Proponents 
of this line of argument would suggest that responsib-
ility lies largely with individuals to protect themselves 
from the costs of instability (for example, by building 
up nest eggs in good times), with the government, 
perhaps, providing some economic ‘built-in stabiliz-
ers’ (e.g., unemployment insurance, food banks).
Others have argued that, since more economic 
diversification is desirable, governments should 
pursue an active ‘industrial policy’ designed to 
encourage the development of new industries. It is 
important to recognize that, in a country such as 
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Canada with a relatively mobile population, such 
policies, if successful, would almost inevitably lead to 
an increase in the size of the economy as well. In the 
Canadian context, this has led to speculation that the 
real purpose of such policies is not diversification but 
‘province-building’ (Richards and Pratt, 1979; Pratt, 
1984). This could reflect an interpretation of ‘divers-
ification’ like the second of the two noted above, and/
or the belief by regional politicians that a larger local 
economy is in their more selfish interests (for power, 
prestige, etc.).
Development of an ‘industrial policy’ is necessarily 
controversial since it involves the interplay amongst at 
least three questions.
1. Who benefits? In the real world of individual 
mobility, this is not a trivial question, as was 
noted above. At its most basic, the question is 
whether the policies should be aimed largely at 
those who are currently resident in the region 
(and their children and grandchildren, a ‘gen-
erational’ perspective) or at those who are 
currently and will in the future be residents of 
the region (a ‘successor’ perspective). From a 
‘generational’ perspective, ‘diversification’ mat-
ters as a possible economic stabilization policy. 
As noted above, one way to attain this might 
be to extend the production life of the deplet-
able resource over a longer time period, which 
might both keep the overall size of the economy 
smaller, and also reduce the concentration of 
GDP in the resource sector. In addition, there 
would be some advantages to mechanisms that 
transfer the rents from resource production 
into the hands of current resident households 
(e.g., through lower taxes or royalty trusts). On 
the other hand, from a ‘successor’ perspective, 
‘diversification’ attained through the expansion 
of new industries could appear very attractive, 
generating income for more residents attracted 
to the region. Policies could involve using 
resource rents to help new industries get estab-
lished and to provide additional public services 
available to newcomers as well as existing resi-
dents (which, if an improvement on public facil-
ities in other provinces, could serve to attract 
immigrants).
2. Given that a group has been defined, what are the 
policy objectives? Here, it is common for econ-
omists to assume a ‘public interest’ perspective, 
with goals of efficiency and equity. However, 
readers will recall that economists have also 
applied a ‘public choice’ viewpoint in which it 
is assumed that the policies will be those that 
politicians view as being in their own best inter-
ests, which may or may not correspond with the 
interest of the population at large.
3. If we assume that the objectives of public policy 
are such broad public interest goals as efficiency 
and equity, what specific policies should be 
adopted? While oversimplified, it is useful to 
suggest two general answers to this question. 
The first is that the appropriate ‘industrial 
policy’ is a largely passive, non-interventionist 
one. It is argued that attempts to force devel-
opment of new industries almost always gen-
erate higher costs than benefits, and frequently 
involve permanent subsidization. Given the 
realities of a region’s resources and location, and 
the increasingly globalized world economy, the 
best policy of the government is to ensure a flex-
ible, well-functioning regional economy, with 
as neutral a tax system as possible; labour and 
business will then exploit the economic oppor-
tunities available to the advantage of the region 
and its residents. The second viewpoint argues 
for an interventionist ‘industrial policy,’ on the 
grounds that some corrections are needed in 
the existing system to attain the diversification/
growth goals. A variety of ‘failures’ might be 
cited, including the following three: (1) the 
‘infant industry’ argument, that a new industry 
requires government support until it attains 
sufficient size to realize the economies of scale 
and learning that allow it to compete in wider 
world markets; (2) the ‘knowledge externality’ 
argument, that governments have a responsi-
bility to fund research and development and 
educational activities since they provide benefits 
that accrue to the economy at large; and (3) the 
‘agglomeration’ argument, that the government 
should encourage economic growth to bring 
the economy to the size at which it can real-
ize the widespread benefits of greater size and 
increased self-sufficiency. In addition, advocates 
of an interventionist approach often suggest 
that a non-interventionist policy frequently 
brings unacceptable ‘equity’ costs, for example 
by redistributing income away from workers 
towards owners of capital. Of course, these 
two policy approaches are the extremes; many 
analysts are willing to accept that some degree 
of active government policy is justified, but the 
question is how much.
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We now turn to the specific issue of the petroleum 
industry and economic diversification in Alberta. 
Initially, we will discuss the degree of economic 
diversification of the economy. Then government 
diversification policies will be reviewed briefly.
2. The Extent of Economic Diversification in Alberta
The statistical information provided above allows 
some comments to be made on the question of 
diversification.
First, the expansion of the petroleum industry 
in Alberta after 1947 provided diversification of the 
economy away from agriculture, which did not occur 
to the same extent in Saskatchewan. However, as 
shown above, Mansell and Percy (1990) argue that 
the Alberta economy, from 1961 to 1985, was the most 
unstable provincial economy.
Second, the rise in oil and natural gas prices start-
ing in the early 1970s might be interpreted to have 
reduced the diversification of the Alberta economy 
because the petroleum sector increased its relative 
significance. However, we argued above the impact 
of an increase in the price of an important industry’s 
output is probably better seen as increasing the gross 
production of the economy (GDP) than as reducing 
the economic diversification of the region, unless 
the high prices lead to a continued expansion of that 
particular industry at the expense of other sectors (as 
in the ‘Dutch Adjustment’). The value-added data for 
Alberta industries does not suggest that this occurred 
in Alberta. However, it is likely that instability in 
petroleum prices has been a significant factor in the 
instability in the Alberta economy noted by Mansell 
and Percy. Their measure of instability (the size of 
deviations from a trend line) would obviously be very 
sensitive to the sharp rise in value for many economic 
measures in the decade from 1973 and the fall and flat-
ness for the next decade (as seen in the GDP and GDP 
per capita lines in Figures 13.3 and 13.5). Recall, also, 
that Figure 13.6 shows greater percentage variability in 
Alberta real GDP than Canadian, even after 1993.
Third, following the crude oil price collapse of 
1985, there seems to have been a rise in the share of 
the manufacturing sector in the Alberta economy. 
That sector does appear to show greater diversifica-
tion recently than at the start of the 1960s, largely 
as a result of a decreased share for the agriculture/
forestry-based goods and a rise in petroleum-based 
products. (See Figure 13.9.)
However, the aggregated industrial statistics we 
have presented may hide the actual level of diversifi-
cation. Thus, for example, the energy sector includes 
conventional crude oil, non-conventional oil, natural 
gas, and coal. While there does appear to be a positive 
correlation between the prices of these energy prod-
ucts, the correlation is not perfect, as we pointed out 
in Chapter Twelve, when comparing crude oil and 
natural gas prices. In addition, each energy product 
exhibits its own unique production characteristics; for 
example, depletion effects could differ between con-
ventional oil and natural gas, and the production link-
ages for non-conventional oil differ significantly from 
those for conventional petroleum. Thus it is possible 
that the increased relative shares of natural gas and 
non-conventional oil (relative to crude oil) starting in 
the 1970s provided increased stability to the Alberta 
economy even while the energy sector continued to be 
a major production sector. In another example, Norrie 
and Percy (1981) note that Alberta’s agricultural sector 
is much more diversified than those of the other two 
Prairie provinces.
On the other hand, if the rising share of manufac-
turing comes largely in the form of increased process-
ing of petroleum products, it may not provide as much 
economic diversification as it appears because these 
manufacturing industries may be subject to the same 
instabilities (due to price changes or depletion effects 
or the like) as the crude petroleum industry.
Thus, more detailed modelling is needed to 
address in a meaningful way the impact of the pet-
roleum industry on the functioning of the Alberta 
economy. We will note, briefly, four such approaches, 
although not all specifically address economic 
diversification.
First, as mentioned above, Richards and Pratt (1979) 
and Pratt (1984) see Alberta’s economic development 
in the 1970s as following a model in which (Pratt, 
1984, p. 194)
… the powers and resources of an inter-
ventionist ‘positive’ government are being 
employed to defend the province-building 
interests of an ascendant class of indigenous 
businessmen, urban professionals, and state 
administrators. The objectives of this nascent 
class are to strengthen its control over the 
Alberta economy, to reduce Alberta’s depend-
ence on outside economic and political forces, 
and to diversify the provincial economy before 
oil and natural gas reserves are exhausted.
Obviously, this approach sees economic development 
largely in terms of class interests. It also draws heav-
ily on a ‘staples theory’ perspective, wherein market 
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economies tend to separate into strong diversified 
centralized economies and undiversified, resource-
based hinterland economies. Only through strong 
government policies can the hinterland economy 
(hampered by its distance from the centre’s large mar-
kets and corporate decision-making processes) hope 
to attain some economic independence. Pratt sees 
the Lougheed government’s policies in the 1970s and 
early 1980s as involving a three-pronged process of 
(1) wresting control over the petroleum industry away 
from the federal government after Ottawa’s strongly 
interventionist policies began in 1973; (2) increasing 
economic rents on Alberta-produced petroleum, 
and gathering a higher share of these rents for use by 
the provincial government; and (3) encouraging the 
development of new industries in Alberta, particularly 
the petrochemical industry. Presumably the intent is 
that Alberta’s locational advantage in terms of access-
ibility of petrochemical feedstocks (e.g., ethane) offset 
its locational disadvantage in terms of long distances 
from major consuming markets. We will not review 
Alberta’s policies regarding petrochemicals, but there 
have been suggestions that the policy is likely to 
require continuing subsidies, either direct or indirect 
(e.g., by prohibiting the free sale of potential feed-
stocks in export markets, thereby reserving their use 
in Alberta at lower prices to petrochemical plants).
Within Pratt’s political economy approach, there 
seems to be some doubt about whether a single 
hinterland region can effectively offset the inherent 
locational problems of a capitalist market economy. 
However, the activist government policies are seen as 
reflecting “the anxieties and aspirations of a depend-
ent business community and an ascendant urban 
middle class, neither of which seek the elimination of 
the market economy – merely promotion within it” 
(Pratt, 1984, p. 220). Diversification, then, will require 
an activist approach to support the larger domestic 
economy. Most economists have been unconvinced 
about the inevitability of the centre–periphery econ-
omy dichotomy, arguing that the development of new 
industries and the growth of a larger domestic market 
may occur, allowing a greater degree of local auton-
omy and self-reliance.
Assessment of the extent of economic diversification 
of the Alberta economy, as has been seen, is often 
approached in the context of comparisons with other 
regional economies. In the Canadian context, this 
raises a number of issues that have been discussed in 
the context of regional economic disparities; that is, 
a second avenue of research suggests that the degree 
of economic diversification may be one of the factors 
that contribute to regional economic differences. An 
economic approach to Canadian regional develop-
ment can be found in two reports from the Economic 
Council of Canada, Living Together (1977) and Western 
Transition (1984), and in research undertaken for 
the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and 
Development Practices for Canada, the Macdonald 
Commission, which reported in the late 1980s. 
Mansell and Copithorne (in Norrie, Simeon, and 
Krasnick, 1986), in work for the Royal Commission, 
provide an overview of economists’ thinking about 
Canadian regional economic disparities. They note 
that economists have not reached agreement on the 
explanations for differences in the economic per-
formance of different provinces but that a number 
of factors are commonly implicated, some related 
to differences in economic structure and others to 
differences in the process of economic adjustment. 
They also remark that disparities in output per 
capita exceed disparities in per capita disposable 
income, presumably reflecting a variety of stabiliza-
tion and equalization programs. They also note that 
regional mobility of labour and capital has played a 
role in keeping regional differences from widening. 
Differences in five aspects of an economy are argued 
to be most significant in explaining regional income 
differences: “Capital intensity, labour quality, scale 
and technology, participation rates and unemploy-
ment rates” (Mansell and Copithorne, 1986, p. 31). 
Presumably similar factors, including the nature of 
the key industries, relate to the stability of regional 
income. They note that studies designed to decom-
pose the contribution of various actors to per capita 
income suggest that differences in the capital intensity 
of different industries (higher capital intensity yielding 
a higher capital-to-labour ratio) and in the quality of 
the labour force are major factors affecting regional 
income differences. Thus, Alberta’s relatively high per 
capita output reflects, in part, a well-educated labour 
force and the high capital intensity of the petroleum 
and agricultural industries.
A third line of research involves the neo-classical 
modelling efforts of Copithorne (1979, looking at 
regional economic differences in Canada) and Mansell 
(1975, and 1981, looking at both migration and the 
functioning of the Alberta economy; also Mansell 
and Wright, 1981, and Mansell and Percy, 1990). 
Copithorne’s research suggested that disparities in 
natural resources are not the main basis of Canadian 
interregional economic differences, although the func-
tioning of specific resource industries like forestry in 
British Columbia and the Newfoundland open-access 
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fishery do have lasting structural effects. Rather, his 
model places emphasis on the mobility of capital 
and labour and the degree of flexibility in labour and 
capital markets, with greater rigidity in factor adjust-
ments associated with lower income. Mansell (1975) 
and Mansell and Wright (1981) also found that Alberta 
benefited from a greater degree of labour mobility 
than in some other parts of Canada.
Mansell and Percy (1990, pp. 35ff.) report simula-
tions of the Alberta economy using a large economet-
ric model. Within this model, investment spending 
is found to have been a major driving force (and an 
increasingly important force) behind the growth of the 
economy. This is entirely consistent with petroleum- 
resource booms in the late 1940s and the mid-1970s. 
In the 1980s, starting in 1982, an economic slowdown 
is explained by a fall in petroleum investment (argued 
to be occasioned by the National Energy Program), as 
well as by high interest rates and a large net financial 
transfer out of Alberta to the federal government. 
Throughout, migration into (or out of) Alberta is 
responsive to relative income differences between 
Alberta and the rest of Canada.
Mansell and Percy argue that this model places 
less importance on purely structural aspects of vari-
ous industries and more emphasis on inappropriate 
government policies. From a Keynesian perspective, 
an economy in which investment spending forms a 
significant part of aggregate demand may be particu-
larly prone to instability. Presumably, in Alberta, the 
high role for investment reflects both the capital inten-
sity of key industries and the fact that the province 
has exhibited periods of higher than average growth. 
(The Keynesian ‘accelerator/multiplier’ model exhibits 
just such instability. Investment stimulates economic 
growth, through a multiplier effect on the economy; 
this growth in turn attracts increased investment, 
which accelerates the income growth. However, if any 
factor stops the growth in investment, then the growth 
in income tends to stop, and investment falls, which 
reduces aggregate demand and reduces income, lead-
ing to a further drop in investment, and so on.)
A fourth line of research on the Alberta economy, 
using general equilibrium models, was undertaken 
for the Economic Council of Canada by Norrie 
and Percy (1981, 1982, 1983). A general equilibrium 
approach is designed to capture the wide-ranging 
effects of changing sectoral growth rates or of specific 
economic policies, by explicitly looking at the inter-
connections amongst various sectors of the Canadian 
and provincial economies. (Much of their work posits 
a ‘Western Economy,’ based, for example in the 1982 
paper, on Alberta and Saskatchewan. We shall discuss 
the results as applicable to Alberta.) Norrie and Percy 
(1981) found that, while Alberta expanded relatively 
faster than Central Canada through the 1970s, largely 
due to rising resource prices, there was little evidence 
of significant structural change in the Canadian econ-
omy; for example, little diversification was seen in 
Alberta. Growth through labour migration did have 
some effects, including some labour shortages in 
Alberta, and price effects in markets for non-traded 
commodities (such as housing, with weaker prices in 
regions losing labour, and higher prices in regions like 
Alberta gaining labour).
There is no evidence that Alberta’s expansion came 
at the expense of central Canada. In fact, some ‘Dutch 
Adjustment’ effects are evident, in which skilled 
labour shortages in Alberta make expansion of manu-
facturing and service industries there less appealing, 
and imports from Central Canada more appealing. 
The 1982 paper focuses explicitly on the utilization of 
resource rents by the provincial government. It finds 
that if the province uses the revenue to provide addi-
tional goods and services to residents, as opposed to 
passing the rents through in the form of lower taxes, 
the net benefits to residents on average are reduced, 
but the provincial economy grows in size and certain 
local residents (e.g., property owners) experience a 
net gain. This is a ‘province-building’ strategy, and it 
has greater impact if there are regional agglomeration 
effects.
In conclusion, while the Alberta economy has clearly 
grown faster than the Canadian economy since 1947, 
and appears somewhat wealthier but also somewhat 
less stable, there is little consensus as of yet on the 
exact nature of the underlying growth processes and 
whether the economy has become more diversified 
in the process. Part of the problem is in the difficulty 
in defining ‘diversification’; partly it is in devising an 
adequate measure of diversity for any specific defin-
ition of that term.
Conceptually, the petroleum industry would affect 
the larger Alberta economy in three major ways: 
(1) through an increase in the level of petroleum 
production and associated investment; (2) through 
an increase in the real price of petroleum; and 
(3) through increases in productivity. To some extent, 
all three factors have operated since 1947. Figure 13.10 
provided some information on the relative importance 
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of the first two factors, showing the relative changes 
since 1947 in oil and natural gas output as compared 
to real prices.
•	 The	period	from	1947	through	to	the	early	1970s	
was driven largely by the rising production, 
as can be seen in the tables in Chapter Six for 
oil and Chapter Twelve for natural gas. In this 
stage, the petroleum industry initially provided 
diversification away from the heavy reliance on 
agriculture but left Alberta largely dependent on 
these two industries.
•	 From	1973	to	1982,	rising	energy	prices	were	the	
key factor, as shown in Figure 13.10. The essential 
economic effects of higher prices for oil and 
natural gas are relatively straightforward, although 
the precise impact depends on how the increased 
values are utilized. Initially, there is a significant 
inflow of funds into the province (due to what 
most economists would call an improvement in 
Alberta’s ‘terms-of-trade,’ as petroleum prices 
rise relative to the prices of other goods and 
services). The higher prices and incomes induce 
greater spending on goods and services generally 
and petroleum production in particular. This, in 
turn, increases imports into the region and drives 
up local prices, including prices of the skilled 
labour and other inputs used in the petroleum 
industry. Longer-run effects begin to operate, 
including a rise in the inflow of labour and capital 
into the region, which helps to alleviate the local 
inflationary pressures. However, rising costs of 
local inputs also decrease the attractiveness of 
production for many goods and services. In effect, 
the resources utilized to produce more of the 
increasingly valuable petroleum come from two 
sources: in-migration and resources transferred 
from other production in the region. The latter 
effect is a manifestation of the ‘Dutch Adjustment’ 
and implies an increased economic reliance on the 
petroleum industry or a reduction in economic 
diversification.
•	 International	oil	prices	fell	after	1982,	and	natural	
gas prices followed, as seen in Figure 13.10. While 
petroleum and agriculture have continued to 
be the mainstay of the Alberta economy, many 
observers have expressed the feeling that by the 
turn of the century Alberta had become somewhat 
more economically diversified, at least in the 
sense of having attained a relatively large, robust, 
and growing economy. The sharp fluctuations in 
international oil prices in the late 1990s and early 
2000s seemed to have a somewhat smaller effect 
than similar real price changes had in the 1970s 
and 1980s. In 2003, the Toronto Dominion Bank 
(TD Bank, 2003) issued a report labelling the 
Calgary–Edmonton corridor one of Canada’s four 
high-growth areas (along with Toronto, Montreal, 
and Vancouver), describing it as “the only 
Canadian urban setting to amass a U.S.-level of 
wealth while preserving a Canadian-style quality 
of life” (p. 1). They note the high reliance upon the 
oil and gas sector but suggest that some economic 
diversification has taken place (p. 9):
Oil and gas mining production and explor-
ation activity remains the single largest 
industry in Alberta, at 19 per cent of GDP, 
followed by finance, insurance and real 
estate (16 per cent), manufacturing (10 per 
cent), and construction (8 per cent). How-
ever, the past few decades have seen some 
notable shifts across the sectors in terms 
of relative importance to the provincial 
economy. The real GDP shares of oil and 
gas and public services (including health 
care and education) have both slipped by 
4–5 percentage points since the mid-1980s. 
In contrast, several industries – such as 
forestry, chemicals and machinery and 
equipment, residential construction, 
transportation services and wholesale 
trade – have registered above-average 
growth and rising shares of provincial 
output. Finally, professional, scientific and 
technical services and communication 
services have witnessed among the largest 
jumps in relative importance over the past 
two decades, spurred in part by the surge 
in industrial and consumer demand for 
information-technologies.
Thus, by the start of the twenty-first century, the 
Alberta economy appeared to have become more 
resilient and somewhat less dependent upon the direct 
activities of the petroleum industry than it had been 
over the previous five decades.
In addition, as was remarked in Chapter Seven, 
there have also been changes due to the contraction 
of conventional oil production and the expansion of 
non-conventional oil activities. The mining/upgrading 
approach to the oil sands involves more regionally 
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concentrated (in northeast Alberta) production activ-
ities and different labour skills and equipment than 
conventional oil drilling and lifting. Further, while 
oil sands and heavy oil output expansion may help 
to maintain government revenue as conventional oil 
and gas production declines, the reliance upon prof-
it-sensitive rules for government take may increase the 
instability of this revenue flow.
3. Alberta Government Policies
The Alberta provincial government has long seen 
diversification of the provincial economy as import-
ant. Following the election of the Progressive 
Conservatives in 1971, replacing Social Credit, which 
had been in power since 1935, the government has 
usually been characterized as pursuing a relatively 
activist diversification policy, as captured by the term 
‘province-building.’ A key component of this policy 
was the active encouragement of processing industries 
using petroleum, especially natural gas; petrochem-
icals were the main example and were guaranteed 
access to ethane under favourable conditions.
After the mid-1980s, the official policy has shifted 
to a more passive diversification policy, generally cap-
tured in the phrase the “Alberta Advantage.” Mansell 
(1997) and Emery (2006) provide useful reviews of 
Alberta’s diversification policies. They argue that the 
‘active’ policy pursued by the Lougheed and Getty 
governments through the 1970s and 1980s was not 
successful and involved losses of over $2 billion in 
government funds. The 1991 discussion paper Toward 
2000 Together set out a variety options but signals this 
shift quite clearly: “the Alberta Government is com-
mitted to building a competitive business environ-
ment which encourages private sector growth and 
strengthens the role of market forces in the Alberta 
and Canadian economies” (Alberta, 1991, p. 4). 
While the discussion paper was supposed to allow 
Albertans to discuss various development strategies, 
the government’s preferred approach seemed to have 
been decided already. In the same year, the Alberta 
Department of Economic Development and Trade, in 
an overview of the Alberta economy entitled “Alberta 
Industry and Resources,” under the heading “Alberta’s 
economic strategy,” said:
Alberta sees the role of Government as one of 
providing support to, but following the lead 
of, the private sector. This role serves Alberta 
well in a rapidly changing and competitive 
world, where decisions taken by individual 
entrepreneurs ultimately select the “winners 
and losers.” Once business has established the 
direction, government policy can support and 
enhance its competitiveness and encourage 
further development.
The government has seen the “Alberta Advantage” 
largely in terms of measures to free up markets 
(including those for labour), removing regulatory 
barriers to business activity (partly through fewer, 
but also through transparent and stable, regulations), 
the provision of general infrastructure, which can 
be utilized by any business, and a regime of low 
income taxes (both personal and corporate). The 
Toronto Dominion Bank’s 2003 study of the Calgary–
Edmonton corridor listed three factors as of particular 
importance to the corridor’s economic strength (pp. 
9–14): ‘low costs’ (particularly a low-tax environment); 
‘a young and diverse population’ (including high skill 
levels); and ‘world-class infrastructure’ (including 
transportation, internet communications, and educa-
tional facilities). All three are dependent on provincial 
government policies, but policies of a ‘general’ nature, 
rather than activist policies that try to direct economic 
diversification into specific industries.
Of course, this policy has not been without its 
critics. Thus, for example, the TD Bank study notes 
that the reason for the young and skilled Alberta 
labour force lies largely in the qualities of in-migrants 
to the province. One of their main suggestions is that 
the Alberta government should be doing more for 
education, training, and investment in research and 
development. A second concern of some observers is 
the extent to which economic development in Alberta 
hinges on the ready accessibility of relatively low-cost 
natural gas. This is obviously important for the petro-
chemical industry but also for enhanced oil recovery 
projects for conventional oil and for oil sands produc-
tion; it also underpins the hopes of some that Alberta 
might play a lead role in the development of a ‘hydro-
gen economy.’ The concern is whether a free market 
environment will allow Alberta to maintain abundant 
relatively low-cost natural gas supplies as North 
American gas markets become more integrated and as 
existing low-cost Alberta gas pools are drained. (Also 
see Bradley and Watkins, 2003.) To support the more 
diversified economic structure of the province, while 
allowing continued growth, may require a somewhat 
more activist policy than has been seen recently.
We now turn to very brief discussions of several 
other issues related to the role of the petroleum indus-
try in the Alberta economy.
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D.	The	Macroeconomic	Costs	of	the	National	
Energy Program and Net Provincial Transfers 
to the Rest of Canada
In Chapter Nine, we discussed the ‘overt’ regulation 
of the petroleum industry in the years 1973–85. This 
period generally involved joint agreements between 
the federal government (‘Ottawa’) and the Alberta 
provincial government (‘Alberta,’ and other provincial 
governments). However, the initial regulations were 
introduced unilaterally by Ottawa, first in 1973, and 
then again in October 1980 in the National Energy 
Program (NEP). It will be recalled that amongst 
the regulations were policies to hold the price of 
Canadian-produced oil below world levels, to restrict 
exports of oil and natural gas, and to transfer a greater 
share of the industry’s economic rent to Ottawa. It 
has been argued that these policies had detrimental 
effects on Alberta. Mansell and Percy (1990) note two: 
(1) inducing an economic downturn, and (2) ensuring 
that federal fiscal policy was consistently deflationary 
in Alberta, even during periods of recession when 
fiscal stimulation would be desirable.
It is apparent that the federal overt petroleum 
policies did not consistently depress Alberta GDP, 
since the economy showed strong growth during the 
years immediately after 1973. However, growth would 
have been expected to be even faster had oil prices in 
Canada risen at the same rate as world prices, rather 
than at the slower controlled rate. After 1981, Alberta’s 
real GDP did decline. Mansell and Percy discuss this 
period (pp. 30–41) and, as mentioned above, report 
simulation results of an econometric model of the 
Alberta economy that finds that “the NEP was the 
key factor in initiating the downturn, and its negative 
effects were compounded by the accompanying high 
interest rates” (p. 37). As Figure 13.3 showed, Alberta 
GDP remained flat right through to 1993, long after 
deregulation in 1985. This suggests, as others had 
argued, that the key factor in the poor economic 
performance was less the NEP than plunging inter-
national oil prices, though the major price decline did 
not come until 1985. Mansell and Percy suggest that 
the NEP provoked a recession in Alberta but find that 
it would likely have occurred after 1985 anyway due 
to the lower petroleum prices. The NEP, presumably, 
made the downturn longer than it would otherwise 
have been, though they find that the adjustments the 
economy began to make after 1981 helped somewhat 
in the adjustments to lower prices after 1985.
Mansell and Percy (1990, Appendix A, drawn 
from Mansell and Schlenker, 1988) show Canadian 
“Net Federal Fiscal Balances” by year from 1961 to 
1985. The Net Federal Fiscal Balance (NFFB) is federal 
government revenues collected in a region less federal 
expenditures in that region. This is based on govern-
ment budget numbers from the Canadian economic 
accounts with several adjustments. The most signifi-
cant relates to the oil-pricing policy from 1973 to 1985, 
in which it is assumed that without Ottawa’s policies, 
Canadian petroleum prices would have followed 
world prices; the price controls are therefore seen as 
a federal government tax and transfer scheme, which 
‘taxed’ oil producers on the difference between world 
and Canadian prices and transferred the difference 
to Canadian energy consumers. In Canada (with the 
organizational activities of the federal government 
concentrated in Ottawa-Hull and a commitment to 
the Equalization program, which transfers funds from 
‘have’ to ‘have-not’ provinces), one would expect that 
different provinces exhibit different NFFBs. In the 
1960s, four provinces ran positive NFFBs (revenues 
collected exceeded expenditures) while the other six 
provinces and the two territories had negative NFFBs.
From a macro perspective, a positive NFFB is 
contractionary, and a negative NFFB is expansionary. 
The four ‘have’ provinces in the 1960s – those with a 
positive NFFB – in this regard were Quebec, Ontario, 
Alberta, and British Columbia, with the first two gen-
erally showing the largest NFFBs. However, in 1971, 
the Quebec NFFB turned negative, as did those of B.C. 
and Ontario in 1977; from 1977 to 1985, only Alberta 
had a positive NFFB. Alberta NFFB from 1961 to 1973 
is reported to vary between 1 and 8 per cent of ‘Market 
Income,’ but from 1974 to 1982 the values ranged from 
19 to 52 per cent. (By 1985, the value was back down 
to 8 per cent, although, as mentioned, Alberta was 
still the only province with a positive NFFB.) Clearly, 
the petroleum price controls played a major role in 
the size of the NFFB. Apart from the rising political 
resentments of Ottawa seen in Alberta in the 1970s, 
Mansell and Percy (1990, p. 39) note that the net fed-
eral surpluses in Alberta “produced a strong fiscal 
drag on the provincial economy”; this was particularly 
true in the 1981–85 NEP period, but “in the absence 
of a continued rapid escalation in energy prices and 
energy investment, the exceedingly large federal fiscal 
surpluses with Alberta as early as the mid-1970s began 
to exert substantial deflationary effects on the provin-
cial economy.”
Mansell et al. (2005) provide revised and updated 
NFFB calculations, concluding that “for the period 
from 1961 to 2002 Alberta made a net fiscal contri-
bution of $244 billion, compared to $315 billion for 
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Ontario and $54 billion for B.C.” (p. 2). (Values are 
in 2004 dollars.) Almost 70 per cent of the Alberta 
contribution was credited to the 1970s and 1980s, 
which includes the period when Canadian petroleum 
prices were regulated, with oil prices held below the 
international level. Over the entire period, the relative 
contribution from Alberta is shown as significantly 
more than would be justified by Alberta’s ‘have’ 
status; however, in the 1990s, when oil prices were no 
longer fixed below the world price, this discrepancy is 
not apparent.
In conclusion, from Alberta’s perspective, the overt 
regulation period imposed, not only the efficiency 




Oil and natural gas are highly prized natural resour-
ces, seen by many as a route to wealth and power. 
As discussed above, they served as the prime engine 
for growth in the Alberta economy after 1947. To 
understand the full economic impact of the crude 
petroleum industry, it is necessary to apply a broad 
framework. The economic models we refer to in this 
section generally draw on a long-term, general equi-
librium perspective that emphasizes that increased 
wealth as a result of the exploitation of petroleum calls 
into play dynamic reactions that modify the initial 
wealth-creating effects. In an increasingly ‘globalized’ 
world, these effects operate at the international level, 
but they are particularly potent in a regional economy 
such as Alberta, housed in Canada’s developed market 
economy, where labour and capital are highly mobile.
The short-term and long-term effects on Alberta 
of a rise in the real value of petroleum were suggested 
above. The immediate effect is a rise in the economic 
rent earned on the sale of petroleum. Some of this 
leaves the region in the form of higher payments to 
non-resident resource owners; this may occur directly 
as dividend payments or indirectly as an increase in 
the value of the assets held (e.g., the price of common 
shares in companies). However, some of the increased 
value remains in the region as returns to resident 
owners of the petroleum and as rent collected by the 
provincial government. If the local economy is operat-
ing close to full employment, the immediate increase 
in local incomes must be translated into higher 
expenditures on goods and services produced outside 
the region (that is, imports) or savings (e.g., money 
held in bank accounts, in banks based in Toronto) and 
may also be accompanied by local inflation.
The longer-term adjustments are stimulated by 
two main factors:
First, the increased value of petroleum encourages 
investment in the oil industry. If the economy is close 
to full capacity, the oil industry must attract product-
ive inputs from other sources, which is accomplished 
by increasing the price paid for the input. That is, 
the wages of the labour needed by the industry will 
rise, as will the price of specialized inputs such as 
drilling rigs, steels pipe, etc. These higher prices draw 
the required inputs to the petroleum industry from 
three sources: (1) imports from outside the region, 
including in-migration of workers; (2) the freeing-up 
of local inputs due to reduced production of other 
goods and services in the region as a result of the 
higher costs of hiring labour and purchasing inputs; 
and (3) absorption of any unemployed local resources, 
labour, or otherwise. It is often suggested that these 
effects can be understood somewhat better by divid-
ing the goods and services produced by the economy 
into two broad classes, the tradable (like petroleum, 
agricultural goods, steel pipe, lumber, etc, which move 
easily between regions) and the non-tradable (like 
land and some personal services, which do not move 
easily). For tradable goods and services produced by 
the local economy, the main factor operating is that 
an increase in production costs reduces production 
locally because exports fall and/or imports increase 
(the ‘Dutch Adjustment’ effect). For non-tradables, 
the major effect is that an increase in cost reduces the 
domestic demand for the product.
Second, the way in which the provincial government 
elects to utilize its share of the increased economic 
rent from petroleum will affect the nature of the 
adjustment. The discussion of economic diversifica-
tion, above, suggested two alternative approaches, 
although the provincial government is likely to use a 
mix of both. In an ‘active’ diversification policy, the 
government uses its higher revenue to offer support 
for certain non-petroleum industries in order to 
maintain their competitiveness. This is typically done 
to reduce the decline in the non-petroleum tradable 
good production, and benefits, especially, the produ-
cers of those goods; it also shifts some of the adjust-
ment for higher petroleum production onto the other 
long-term adjustment mechanisms. (These mech-
anisms include the non-tradable goods and services 
sector, larger imports of other goods and services, 
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and more in-migration; as discussed above, the latter 
process is why this use of the higher government rev-
enue is often called a ‘province-building’ strategy). 
Alternatively, the government may transfer the funds 
to local residents, generally through some combin-
ation of lower taxes and more public services. These 
benefit current residents, but also make the region a 
more appealing place to live, therefore attracting more 
immigrants.
If there were a one-time rise in petroleum prices, 
economists suggest that one would expect these long-
term adjustments to continue until a new equilibrium 
is reached. Consider, for example, the in-migration of 
labour. The primary motivation is an increase in real 
wages in the region, which will be enhanced by gov-
ernment programs to offer lower tax rates or a higher 
level of public services than can be found elsewhere 
in the country. As more workers enter the labour 
market in the province, the real wage will tend to fall, 
reducing the incentive to move to the province. The 
precise path to lower real wages is complicated. New 
migrants bring their own demands for housing, food, 
and other goods and services, which puts upward 
pressure on local prices. The tendency of an increased 
labour force to put downward pressure on wages – 
due to diminishing marginal productivity of adding 
more workers – hinges on inflows of additional capital 
resources. An equilibrium would be established (the 
incentive to migrate ceases) where, at the margin, 
the benefits to a worker of moving into the province 
(e.g., higher wages, lower taxes, more public services) 
are just equal to the costs of moving (e.g., dislocation 
costs of leaving an existing home; higher living costs 
in the new location; congestion costs in the rapidly 
growing new location).
We do not explore these factors in any great detail 
for Alberta but will offer some evidence on two ele-
ments. (We must note that the simple graphs we offer, 
illustrating the relationship between several variables, 
do not offer the assurance provided by multivariate 
statistical analysis.)
First, consider population change in the region. 
Recorded changes in population and migration seem 
consistent with the theoretical picture we have just 
drawn. (In the Canadian context, with a particular 
emphasis on Alberta, Mansell, 1975, and Schweitzer, 
1982, are revealing.) One aspect of the model is the 
supposition that an expansion of the petroleum indus-
try (from either the ‘supply’ side, through new dis-
coveries, or the ‘demand’ side through higher prices) 
stimulates economic expansion, which draws in new 
people. Figure 13.11 is a visual presentation of the 
relationship over time between percentage changes in 
Alberta real GDP and population. The correlation is 
not perfect, and GDP exhibits much more variability. 
A part of population change is ‘natural,’ reflecting the 
age structure of the resident population, and is rela-
tively independent of GDP changes. Figure 13.11 does 
not show a clear relation between real GDP growth 
and population change, apart from the fact that posi-
tive growth in production is associated with a rising 
population; that the percentage change in GDP is 
generally higher than the percentage change in popu-
lation reflects, among other factors, increasing pro-
ductivity of the economy over time. The high rates of 
increase in GDP after 1973 did see relatively high, and 
rising, rates of increase in population. And the reces-
sion and slowdown of economic growth beginning in 
1982 also saw population growth fall.
Net migration data, capturing the actual inflows 
and outflows of individuals, are only available for 
years from 1972 on. Figure 13.12, which uses these data, 
hints at a positive correlation between changes in GDP 
and migration into Alberta.
Figure 13.13 shows Alberta population changes 
since 1947 in relation to Alberta per capita GDP rela-
tive to the Canadian average. The discussion above 
suggests that this may be a better measure of one 
of the main factors that motivates migration, an 
improvement in the economic return an individual 
can expect by moving into this region. While the two 
time series do not exhibit a one-to-one relation, the 
connection looks somewhat closer than that of Figure 
13.11. In particular, there are periods in the 1950s and 
1970s in which an increase in Alberta’s per capita GDP 
relative to Canada saw increases in the population 
growth rate; and the levelling off, and subsequent 
decline, in Alberta’s relative GDP starting in the early 
1980s also saw the population growth fall sharply. 
These broad measures, in other words, are consistent 
with the economic model we have been describing of 
the relationships between the petroleum industry and 
the Alberta economy.
A second characteristic of this model is the sugges-
tion that the impacts of rapid growth in Alberta, occa-
sioned by expansion of the real value of petroleum 
production, may be particularly pronounced in the 
prices of non-tradable goods and services. Reflection 
suggests that the concept of ‘non-tradable’ is as much 
conceptual as real, since many immobile goods and 
services have mobile components. Thus, while land 
does not move, many of the things that give value 
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capital improvements). Similarly, many social and 
community services are strongly location-dependent, 
and so not readily tradable across distances, but also 
draw upon labour and materials that are mobile. In 
this context, the main non-tradable may be intan-
gibles, such as a sense of belonging and supportive 
social interaction, which may become scarcer in an 
environment of rapid growth. On the other hand, 
recent research, by Richard Florida (2005) suggests 
that a region’s economic vitality is closely connected 
to its social and cultural diversity, which are likely to 
increase as the region grows and attracts a greater var-
iety of individuals. One of the readily accessible pos-
sible measures of trends in the value of non-tradable 
goods and services is real estate values. Here the 
comparison with Saskatchewan may be revealing. In 
1947, house prices in Calgary and Edmonton were not 
much different from those in Regina and Saskatoon. 
After that, average house prices rose somewhat 
faster in Alberta than in Saskatchewan, especially 
after 1973. For April 2004, the Canadian Real Estate 
Association web site reported the following average 
housing prices: Regina, $110,593; Saskatoon, $135,550; 
Edmonton, $178,777; and Calgary, $220,245. The aver-
age for the two Alberta cities was over 60 per cent 
higher than for the two cities from Saskatchewan. (It is 
not clear whether these values control adequately for 
differences in the characteristics of houses. It should 
also be said that, at that time, average housing prices 
in Victoria, Vancouver, and Toronto were much higher 
than in Calgary. By the time of final revision, in April 
2013, the gap between the Alberta and Saskatchewan 
cities had narrowed to 29 per cent, reflecting in 
part the rapid economic growth in Saskatchewan 
after 2008.)
In conclusion, the development of the petroleum 
industry in Alberta led to economic growth in the 
province. It is hardly surprising that rapid expansion 
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of the volume of oil and natural gas produced during 
the two decades from 1947 brought an increase as well 
in the population of the province to support higher 
activity. However, this occurred even after 1973 when 
the main reason for the GDP growth was not increases 
in the volume of petroleum produced but higher real 
prices for crude oil and natural gas. There were strong 
forces in place that ensured that the higher values of 
petroleum did not simply translate into higher aver-
age incomes in the province. Two of these equalizing 
forces were immigration into Alberta and inflation in 
local prices, especially for goods not easily traded.
F. Government Revenues and Expenditures
As earlier chapters demonstrated, the petroleum 
industry has proven to be the major source of revenue 
to the provincial government, providing in some years 
close to 50 per cent of the total annual government 
expenditures. This has raised several important policy 
issues, some of which we have touched on in other 
parts of this chapter.
How should the petroleum revenues be allocated 
across various possible uses? Earlier, we spoke of the 
basic distinction between using the funds to support 
various industries in the hope of gaining economic 
diversification and using money in a more general way 
to benefit citizens of the province. Examples include 
the provision of a greater level of government- 
produced goods and services (education, health, 
roads, parks, etc.) and reducing taxes. In the 1990s, 
one of the priorities of the Alberta provincial govern-
ment became reducing the provincial debt; this would 
reduce future debt interest costs and therefore allow 
higher government spending or lower taxes in the 
future. Another possibility was for the government to 
save the money; this was the purpose of the Alberta 
Heritage Trust Saving Fund, which will be discussed 
in the next, and last, section of this chapter.
How does the fact that conventional petroleum 
is an exhaustible natural resource affect the govern-
ment’s utilization of petroleum revenues? (We would 
remind the reader that the notion of petroleum as an 
exhaustible resource is not as straightforward as many 
assume, since we do not know for certain the total 
amount of petroleum physically available in a region, 
and the amount that will ultimately be produced is 
constrained not so much by the physical availability as 
by economics and technology.) As mentioned in the 
section above dealing with economic diversification, 
this concern about depletion of petroleum was one 
of the reasons that diversification of the provincial 
economy was assumed to be desirable. The issue at 
hand can be expressed in somewhat different terms. 
The government revenue derived from petroleum can 
be seen as current income received by depleting the 
petroleum asset. This raises the question of how much 
of the income should be used up on current consump-
tion and how much of it should be saved to ‘replace’ 
(in an economic sense) the depleting petroleum. We 
will return to this question in the next section.
Since the provincial government’s petroleum rev-
enues are unstable, how can the government accom-
modate this instability in its public finances? The 
instability in revenues reflects, in part, the variability 
of bonus bids, which fluctuate with the anticipated 
profitability of the mineral rights for sale in that year. 
It also mirrors the instability in oil and gas prices, 
which has been evident since 1972; conventional oil 
and natural gas are assessed royalties based directly 
on the price of the product, and the net profits of oil 
sands output, on which oil sands and bitumen royal-
ties are based, depend heavily on the oil price as well. 
Table 11.2 in Chapter Eleven clearly shows the fluc-
tuations in the revenue the Alberta government has 
derived from the petroleum industry. Bonus bids, for 
example, over the fiscal years from 1979/80 through 
2011/12 varied from over $3.5 billion (2005/6) to as low 
as $167 million (1992/3). The 2002 Alberta Financial 
Management Commission of July 2002 reported that 
(p. 23): “Since 1981/82, annual non-renewable resource 
revenues have ranged from a low of $1.9 billion to a 
high of $10.6 billion. … As a share of the province’s 
total annual revenues over the past ten years, resource 
revenues have varied from a low of 14% of total rev-
enues (in 1998/99) to a high of 41% of total revenues 
(in 2000/01).”
Fluctuating receipts by the government from the 
oil industry pose obvious difficulties for the budget 
process. (For detailed discussion with respect to 
Alberta, see the papers in Bruce et al., 1997; also 
Emery, 2006, and Emery and Kneebone, 2009.) Part 
of the difficulty is in forecasting future revenues and 
expenditures in order to engage in the responsible 
determination of expenditure and tax programs. 
Possible ‘irrationalities’ in the public decision-making 
process may exacerbate the problem. Thus, deci-
sion-makers may be prone to an ‘optimism’ bias, 
in which favourable conditions, such as unusually 
high petroleum revenues, are expected to continue. 
Lobbying efforts by special interest groups for new 
expenditures may be particularly successful in years 
in which petroleum revenues are unusually high but 
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would generate continuing expenditure commitments. 
Some public policy analysts have suggested that gov-
ernments tend to exhibit a ‘spending bias,’ since the 
larger the government, the greater the power and pres-
tige of the legislators and bureaucrats. Larger revenues 
in a particular year, even if not expected to continue, 
may draw forth increased spending, simply because 
the money is there. This tendency may be greater just 
prior to an election!
Instability in petroleum revenues became an even 
more pressing issue after the Alberta government 
adopted a balanced budget requirement in the early 
1990s. (This commitment is currently housed in the 
2009 Fiscal Responsibility Act (RSA 15-1, Section 2. 
The 2013/14 provincial budget proposed a new Fiscal 
Management Act which had not been passed at the 
time of final editing of this book.) We will not engage 
in a detailed assessment of the wisdom of such a 
policy. In brief, the proponents argued that it provided 
protection against the tendencies of the government to 
be more willing to increase expenditures than to con-
trol expenses and/or increase taxes, thereby leading to 
perpetual annual deficits. Opponents suggested that 
the government was giving up its responsibilities for 
fiscal stabilization policy. Requiring a balanced budget 
would be countercyclical, since the government would 
have to reduce its expenditures or raise taxes when 
economic conditions were bad and the economy 
needed stimulation. The government was also said to 
be sacrificing flexibility in its operations and failing 
to recognize that borrowing is an entirely fair and 
reasonable way to finance capital investments; since 
the services of the capital accrue over time, so should 
payments for capital assets.
In part, a government can attempt to manage 
fluctuating petroleum revenues through careful 
longer-term forecasting, rather than basing programs 
solely on current revenue flows. However, much of 
the instability in oil and gas prices is impossible to 
forecast with any degree of accuracy. The key would 
thus seem to lie in basing the fiscal program on rea-
sonable expectations of average petroleum values over 
a number of years and introducing some offsetting 
flexibility in other parts of the revenue or expenditure 
stream. Since government revenue is generally col-
lected under relatively fixed regulations and virtually 
all tax sources are subject to their own variability, the 
required flexibility is more likely to come from the 
expenditure side of the government’s operations. In 
Alberta, three main avenues of expenditure flexibility 
have been proposed. One is to make greater use of 
the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund for revenue 
stabilization purposes. (See the next section.) The 
second, which has played a major role, is to use the 
government’s commitment to debt reduction as the 
major avenue for responding to fluctuating provin-
cial revenues; given various other program-spending 
commitments, the debt could be paid down more or 
less rapidly depending on the vagaries of government 
revenues. By March 2005, the provincial debt (with 
no allowance for the Heritage Fund assets of over $11 
billion) had been reduced to about $3.5 billion, from 
some $23 billion in 1993. In that year, the govern-
ment set up a Debt Retirement Account to pay off the 
remaining debt as it matured; the final payment was 
made on March 1, 2013. However, the March 2013/14 
budget included new borrowing; this budget estab-
lished a formal distinction between a balanced operat-
ing budget and a capital budget, which might rely on 
borrowing with a clear schedule of repayment.
In the 2003 Alberta provincial budget, a third 
way of handling instability in petroleum revenues 
was adopted. This followed the July 2002 report, 
Moving from Good to Great, of the Alberta Financial 
Management Commission, under the Chairmanship 
of David Tuer. The commission had been formed in 
March 2002 with “a broad mandate to explore the 
province’s finances and recommend possible improve-
ments” (p. 14). The 2002 Commission was the second 
such commission.
The previous commission had reported in 1993, 
in response to persistent provincial government defi-
cits. This set in motion a major re-evaluation of the 
Alberta government’s fiscal policy, which included a 
variety of new accounting/accountability measures. 
The changes also tied into the new policy approach 
mentioned earlier, which came to be labelled the 
“Alberta Advantage”; it legislated balanced budgets, 
lower taxes, debt repayment, and reduced government 
spending. We are concerned only with the parts of this 
program that relate to resource revenues. The main 
provisions related to unstable provincial revenues 
included the adoption of a three-year budget-planning 
period, conservative revenue forecasting, and the 
requirement to set aside, in each budget, an ‘economic 
cushion’ of 3.5 per cent of the projected budget rev-
enue. Such a cushion would provide some protection 
against unexpected revenue shortfalls, as well as leav-
ing a source of funds for unexpectedly high expendi-
tures and emergencies. (For general discussions of the 
provincial budgeting process, see Bruce et al., 1997, 
and Kneebone and McKenzie, 1999.)
The Tuer Commission on Alberta Financial 
Management noted (p. 21) that “the province, like all 
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other natural resource owners had consistently had 
difficulty accurately forecasting resource revenues. 
Between 1993 and 2001, the government underesti-
mated resource revenues by a total of close to $12 
billion, or an average of almost $1.5 billion a year.” 
(A significant part of this, some $4 billion, came in 
the 2000–2001 fiscal year.) Underestimation may 
partly reflect a deliberate ‘defensive’ budget policy of 
conservative forecasting, but it seems fair to argue 
that persistent underestimation of resource revenues 
cannot be solely due to instability in the revenues. 
Moreover, persistent errors must either make govern-
ment budgeting less than optimally efficient or suit 
some other political purpose. (The Tuer Commission 
notes [p. 21] the perception among some Albertans 
that it served to rationalize lower spending on a var-
iety of social programs.)
The Tuer Commission made an extensive set of 
recommendations, which relied heavily on changes in 
the role of the Heritage Trust Savings Fund and which 
will be reviewed in the next section. One significant 
change, consistent with the Commission’s suggestions, 
was implemented in the 2003/4 provincial budget. 
A total of $3.5 billion of non-renewable resource 
revenue was to enter into the province’s general rev-
enue. Any revenue above $3.5 billion would go into 
a new ‘Sustainability Fund,’ to be drawn on in later 
years if resource revenues fell below $3.5 billion. The 
Sustainability Fund would be allowed to build up to 
a size of $2.5 billion, after which potential additional 
contributions might be diverted to a number of 
specific uses such as debt repayment or disaster relief 
(but not to general government operating expenses). 
This measure clearly addressed very directly the 
problem of unstable resource revenues. In its budgets 
after 2003, the government increased the amount of 
non-renewable resource revenue that would go into 
the operating budget above the $3.5 billion ceiling. 
In subsequent years, despite transfers for disaster 
relief and to other capital funds, the Sustainability 
Fund grew in size, reaching almost $7.7 billion by 
September 2007, as a third provincial commission was 
looking at the government’s finances. (By this year, the 
amount of non-renewable resource revenue applied to 
general government expenses had risen to $5.3 bil-
lion, with the excess going to the Sustainability Fund 
or other capital funds or capital projects. In 2008, 
non-renewable resource revenue in excess of about 
$6.6 billion would go to the Sustainability Fund.) 
Preserving Prosperity: Challenging Alberta to Save 
was the title of the December 2007 report from the 
Alberta Financial Investment and Planning Advisory 
Commission (under the chairmanship of Jack Mintz). 
The Mintz Commission recommended maintenance 
of the Sustainability Fund but with a cap of $3.5 bil-
lion (in real dollars), which it judged large enough to 
meet its stabilization objectives; the excess capital in 
the fund should be transferred to the Heritage Fund 
(Alberta Financial Investment and Planning Advisory 
Commission, p. 41). The Commission argued that 
the objectives of the Sustainability Fund were too 
broad and undefined, including, as well as provincial 
government budget stabilization, vague goals related 
to natural gas price subsidization for Albertans, 
and meeting the costs of disasters and settlement 
of aboriginal land claims; the Commission recom-
mended that such subsidiary objectives be dropped.
As of the time of final revision to this chapter 
(spring 2013) these recommendations had not been 
acted on. The Sustainability Fund stood at $2.7 billion 
at the end of the 2012/13 fiscal year; it had been drawn 
on in the years 2008–13 to offset government deficits. 
(In 2009, the ‘Capital Account,’ also established in 
2003, had been rolled into the Sustainability Fund.) 
In its 2013/14 budget, the government forecast that by 
March 2014, the value of the sustainability fund would 
be less than $700 million but would increase again 
after that in the form of a new ‘Contingency Account’ 
with a maximum value of $5 billion.
G. The Heritage Fund and Preserving the 
Income from Depleting Capital Assets
As this chapter has implied, the petroleum industry 
makes two quite different contributions to an econ-
omy. First, production requires factors of production 
(labour, capital, supplies, and management skills). 
Second, a resource like petroleum generates economic 
rent, a surplus of revenue above production costs, 
which can be used to the benefit of people in the 
region. These two contributions raise rather different 
economic issues, which the local government must 
somehow reconcile.
With respect to the first issue, production of pet-
roleum normally involves economic growth, with 
both an expansion in population and in real per capita 
incomes in the region. The rate of expansion is deter-
mined in large part by factors outside the control of 
the regional government (demand for oil and natural 
gas, world prices, technological changes). However, as 
discussed in various chapters in this book, domestic 
government policies also affect the levels of industry 
activity and production. There is often pressure to 
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think that ‘more is better’: a larger provincial econ-
omy has more influence at the national level; growth 
allows realization of agglomeration effects and econ-
omies of scale, which bring lower costs and greater 
self-reliance; growth brings a more vibrant and diverse 
community; growth is necessary to maintain the 
demand (especially the investment demand) needed 
to sustain full employment. Against this, however, one 
must balance the costs of growth, such as personal 
adjustment costs, congestion effects, higher local infla-
tion, and environmental degradation. Finding an opti-
mal balance is a chimera, especially since a number of 
the benefits and costs are difficult to measure accur-
ately and because many of the forces affecting the level 
of petroleum industry activity are outside the control 
of the provincial government. In the Alberta context, 
the rate of development of the industry has been 
affected by such ‘market forces.’
The second issue involves an array of factors. 
One is the efficiency with which the provincial gov-
ernment collects economic rent. The main focus of 
provincial government policy has been on devising 
rent-collection mechanisms that transfer a signifi-
cant share of economic rent to the government while 
having minimal impact on the behaviour of the pet-
roleum industry. A second component of this issue is 
that of the ‘use’ to which economic rents might be put. 
As discussed in this chapter, this is not transparent, 
most fundamentally because it is not entirely clear 
who the beneficiaries of the economic rent should be. 
At its most extreme, we suggested that one might take 
a ‘descendants’ view (the prime beneficiaries should 
be the ‘initial’ residents, e.g., Albertans as of 1947 
and their families), or a ‘successors’ view (the prime 
beneficiaries should be whomever happens to reside 
in the province). From a political perspective, the 
reality probably reflects a combination of the two: at 
any point in time, the government is largely concerned 
with the interests of current residents (a descendants 
perspective), but as time passes the population of the 
province changes, so the government’s constituency 
changes (a successors perspective). However, the 
absence of any pronounced policies to control the 
level of petroleum production to one that could be 
handled largely by the current population implies that 
policies have been largely ‘successor’-based. We would 
argue that the ‘successor’ view is the more desirable 
one in a world in which resources must be flexible to 
exploit the most efficient economic opportunities and 
when one values the ability of individuals to make 
choices freely (including the choice of where to live). 
As we suggested earlier in this book, at the theoretical 
level, one of the strongest arguments for a more ‘des-
cendant’-based perspective is for a region heavily 
dependent upon exhaustible resource production, 
where a clear rising-then-falling life cycle of produc-
tion is anticipated and there are minimal prospects for 
other types of economic activity; in this case, policies 
might favour current residents (and their descend-
ants) rather than others who would be expected to 
migrate in for a while and then depart again.
Some analysts have suggested that one might 
provide a better framework for consideration of 
these complex and controversial issues if petroleum 
were explicitly seen as a regional asset, as part of the 
region’s wealth. Higher wealth allows higher con-
sumption, but it is not desirable to consume all the 
wealth in a single year. There are clear analogies to 
the prevailing neoclassical economic model of an 
individual’s consumption. An individual’s life style is 
predicated on prevailing income (from all sources) 
and the yet-to-be-realized return on various assets 
the individual owns or will own. A ‘rational’ individ-
ual would base consumption, not on the maximum 
possible expenditures in the current period (attain-
able by liquidating all assets now), but on a life-time 
consumption-savings plan. If the individual focussed 
solely on his/her own self, this would mean that assets 
are liquidated gradually over time, until they dis-
appear when the individual dies. This simple model is 
not strictly accurate, partly because many individuals 
have ‘self-control’ problems that lead them to consume 
more in the present period than is optimal. In addi-
tion, we would not expect people to run their assets 
down to exactly zero at their deaths. For one thing, at 
the time of death, there is invariably some probability 
that the individual might have lived longer, so some 
assets would still be maintained. More importantly, 
most individuals also exhibit a ‘bequest motivation,’ to 
pass assets on to their heirs. If an individual gives just 
as much weight to his family and other heirs as to his 
own wants, then the individual would be inclined to 
maintain his wealth relatively constant, even at death. 
This situation is similar to that of a government con-
cerned with the well-being of its citizens through the 
indefinite future.
This conceptual approach suggests that, as petrol-
eum is produced, the ‘income’ could be used for cur-
rent consumption purposes, but the ‘principal’ or asset 
value should be saved. In this manner, depletable oil 
and gas will be transformed into other lasting assets 
that yield a return over time. (Habib, 2009, provides 
an interesting perspective on the ethical dimensions of 
spreading natural resource values across generations.) 
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There are numerous problems in actually imple-
menting such a policy. To begin with, since the pet-
roleum resource base is not known with accuracy, and 
since oil and gas prices are constantly changing, the 
‘true’ value of the petroleum asset can never really be 
known. One might take the ‘user cost’ of petroleum 
production as an approximation of the asset value. 
(See Chapter Four. The user cost is the present value 
of the future profits given up by lifting a unit of pet-
roleum today, instead of leaving it in the ground, and 
is therefore a measure of the reduction in the value of 
the resource due to current production.) However, the 
user cost cannot be easily measured. There is also the 
difficulty in building up an alternative capital stock, 
which could take many forms: industrial diversifica-
tion in the region; infrastructure in the region; human 
capital (training, health, and education) in the region; 
private saving by residents of the region; invest-
ments, either direct or indirect, outside the region. 
Presumably funds should be allocated in such a way 
that the (risk-adjusted) marginal rate of return is equal 
in all such uses. This is no easy task!
The literature in ‘political economy’ also touches 
on this issue. In particular, there may be a lack of 
long-term perspective and financial responsibility 
on the part of governments with a particular inter-
est in shorter-term (electoral) popularity. Politicians 
may find it hard to resist the temptation to spend 
unexpectedly large revenue inflows immediately, 
although prudence would suggest restraint and 
retaining some revenues for future times when the 
inflow of funds is reduced. A savings plan might 
reduce these temptations to spend more when rev-
enues surge.
It is clear that the uses to which Alberta has put 
its petroleum revenues have aspects of both cur-
rent consumption and saving, but one particular 
use ties directly to investment. In 1976, the province 
created the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund, 
which was designed with four objectives in mind 
(Alberta Financial Management Commission [Tuer 
Commission], 2002, p. 27):
•	 To	function	as	a	savings	account	that	would	offset	
declining resource revenue in the future;
•	 To	provide	additional	leveraging	opportunities	for	




a fund that could help diversify the economic 
activity of the province.
Alberta was not the only petroleum-producing region 
to create such a fund. Davis et al. (2001), with the 
International Monetary Fund, have studied some 
such funds, although not Alberta’s. They suggest that 
governments have set up the funds for two some-
what different purposes: savings funds and stabiliz-
ation funds. The Heritage Fund is an example of the 
former. (The Stabilization Fund that Alberta created 
in 2003, discussed above, is an example of the latter.) 
Davis et al. are not strongly impressed by the con-
ceptual arguments for establishing these funds. They 
view them as necessary primarily to offset the faulty 
decision-making of governments who otherwise 
would fail to handle natural-resource revenues cor-
rectly; but if governments would make bad decisions 
without these funds, they must surely expect that 
governments, who have sovereign power, would also 
utilize the funds badly! Davis et al. admit that some 
countries have made good use of natural-resource 
funds. Both Norway and Alaska are often seen as 
examples. In Alaska, for instance, the government has 
ensured that the fund receives petroleum revenues on 
an established basis, regulations regarding investment 
of the funds are carefully set out, part of receipts are 
reinvested in the fund to maintain its real value in 
the face of inflation, and the main use of the remain-
ing return on the fund is rebates to Alaska citizens 
rather than to the state government (Anderson, 2002).  
Warrack and Keddie (2000) compare the Alaska and 
Alberta funds.
The Alberta Heritage Fund commenced oper-
ations in fiscal year 1976/77, with a contribution from 
petroleum revenues of $2.1 billion. Thirty per cent of 
the province’s non-renewable resource revenues were 
to go into the fund. (These values are drawn from 
p. 13 in the Alberta Heritage Trust Fund 2003 Annual 
Report. A 1980 special issue of Canadian Public Policy 
investigated the Heritage Fund. See Collins, 1980.) 
Contributions out of petroleum resource payments 
to the Alberta government continued, at lower levels, 
for another decade; in the early 1980s, the govern-
ment reduced the share of resource revenues going 
into the fund to 15 per cent. A final contribution of 
$216 million was made in 1986/87. With falling oil 
prices in 1986, the government decided that all pet-
roleum revenues would go into general government 
revenues. In all, in this first decade, a total of just over 
$12 billion built up in the Heritage Fund. Beginning 
in mid-1982, the government withdrew, into general 
government revenues, virtually all the net income 
earned by the fund. (Until that date, earnings were 
retained, increasing the value of the fund.) This meant 
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that, from 1984 and for over two decades, the size of 
the fund was stable at about $12 billion. Only in 2005 
did the province begin to contribute to the fund once 
again. (In that year, the government also contributed 
a special $1 billion to the fund in an ‘Access to the 
Future’ account meant to finance advanced education 
investments.) The 2002/3, 2007/8, and 2008/9 fiscal 
years were the only ones in which the fund earned a 
negative return, as did most North American invest-
ment funds. As of December 31, 2012, the value of the 
fund was $16.4 billion, down from its peak of about 
$17 billion in spring 2008.
The general investment objectives of the fund 
have changed over its life, consistent with the change 
noted above in Alberta’s industrial policy. Initially, a 
prime purpose of the fund was to aid actively in the 
economic diversification of the Alberta economy. This 
could be done by direct funding of key infrastructure 
projects in the province and by giving priority to loans 
to Alberta entrepreneurs for promising projects. The 
latter mandate probably reflected a presumption that 
Canadian capital markets focussed on central Canada 
and discriminated unfairly against projects in the 
periphery. From 1976 through 1995, the fund spent a 
total of $3.5 billion on direct capital investments. From 
its inception, the Heritage Fund maintained a general 
investment portfolio with a broad mix of investments, 
including loans to other provinces. (In the politically 
charged regulatory environment of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, when the federal government con-
strained Alberta’s oil and gas prices, and Alberta was 
arguing for higher prices, such loans may have been 
one way of persuading other provinces that their 
interests were allied to some extent with Alberta’s. 
Mumey and Ostermann, 1990, and Smith, 1991, pro-
vide assessments of the investment strategies of the 
Heritage Fund.)
As we discussed above, Alberta government policy 
changed in the 1990s from an active diversification 
strategy to a more neutral emphasis on the ‘Alberta 
Advantage.’ Consistent with this, a revision of the 
Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Act became 
effective at the start of 1997. Under this act, the object-
ive of the Heritage Fund is “to provide prudent stew-
ardship of the savings from Alberta’s non-renewable 
resources by providing the greatest financial returns 
on those savings for current and future generations of 
Albertans.” This clearly establishes the fund’s role as an 
investment fund, rather than an economic diversifica-
tion fund.
The government’s strong commitment to the 
Heritage Fund was in the period of high oil and gas 
prices from the late 1970s through to the mid-1980s. 
For the next two decades, its value was pretty well 
constant in nominal dollars, so its real value fell. (In 
contrast, the Alaska Fund is designed to reinvest part 
of its earnings, in order to retain its real value, before 
any payouts are made to Alaska citizens.) During its 
establishment period, the government appears to have 
felt that an activist policy was needed to help preserve 
the ‘asset’ value of Alberta’s petroleum. In part, this 
reflected the perceived necessity of a government-led, 
and active, diversification policy. It may have also 
reflected some mistrust in more neutral investment 
and savings procedures. For example, the government 
is always under political pressure to spend public 
funds on current projects, and a commitment to spin 
some revenue off to a special fund may reduce this. 
It has also been argued that private decision-makers 
may be excessively myopic and save less of any income 
gains than is socially desirable, so a government 
‘forced savings’ plan like the Heritage Fund is prefer-
able to transferring the money to the private sector.
The more passive role for the Heritage Fund after 
1995 cannot be taken as evidence that the government 
has lost interest in an objective of maintaining capital 
assets in the province as petroleum resources are run 
down. In fact, the government argues that the ‘Alberta 
Advantage’ is designed to make Alberta unusually 
attractive for new private-sector investment. Instead, 
the policy change with respect to the Heritage Fund 
reflects a change in policy: a much greater trust in 
the efficiency of relatively unregulated markets and a 
greater disbelief in the necessity for government pro-
grams to offset inefficiencies or inequities in market 
outcomes. From this perspective, the surprising fact 
is not that the government has chosen to treat the 
Heritage Fund in a relatively passive manner, letting 
its value decline through the effects of inflation. It is 
that the fund has been retained at all: for example, 
running down the fund over a period of years would 
permit even lower tax rates and could have been 
employed for debt reduction, increasing the ‘Alberta 
Advantage.’ Maintenance of the fund during this 
period seems to be due less to a commitment to 
the principles of such a fund and more to the fact 
that numerous opinion polls demonstrated that a 
majority of Albertans want to see the Heritage Fund 
maintained.
In April 2002, the government released The 
Savings Question: A Discussion Paper, which sug-
gested that most analysts see a desirable role for a 
special government savings plan when non-renewable 
resources are a major source of government revenue. 
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A number of possible uses of the savings that were 
mentioned included more activist project funding and 
more passive debt repayment and tax reduction possi-
bilities. None of these were specifically endorsed.
The July 2002 Report of the Alberta Financial 
Management (Tuer) Commission recommended (p. 
51):
1. The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund should 
be retained, strengthened, allowed to grow, and 
renamed the “Alberta Heritage Fund” with four 
new purposes:
•	 To	stabilize	the	impact	of	volatile	resource	
revenues on the province’s budget;
•	 To	manage	the	orderly	pay	down	of	existing	
debt as it comes due;
•	 To	address	the	backlog	of	deferred	capital	
projects in the short term; and
•	 To	serve	as	transition	to	the	time	when	
resource revenues decline and as an integral 
part of the province’s strategy for achieving a 
sustainable economic vision for the future.
2. To provide stable and predictable funding, 
the Commission recommends that all non-re-
newable resource revenues should go into the 
renewed Alberta Heritage Fund on an annual 
basis. All year end surpluses should also go 
into the Heritage Fund. A fixed and sustainable 
amount of resource revenues should be drawn 
out each year to support the government’s 
budget.
With respect to the part of resource revenues that 
would be drawn into the general government budget 
each year, the Commission recommended that: “This 
fixed amount should be set at a conservative and 
sustainable level. We recommend the lesser of $3.5 
billion (the historical average over the past 20 years 
excluding the spike in revenues in 2000–2001) or the 
average of resource revenues for the previous three 
years.” We would note that if several exceptionally 
good years occurred close together (like 2000–2001 
and 2002–2003 or 2005–2008), there could be a sig-
nificant difference between these two approaches. The 
Commission expected (p. 53) that the Heritage Fund 
might, under this policy, more than double its cur-
rent value by the year 2025. These recommendations 
would, as the Commission notes, mean a complete 
change in the role of the Heritage Fund, which would 
become a key player in the province’s finances, and 
the mechanism through which all petroleum revenues 
received by the government are managed. The gov-
ernment did not adopt these recommendations, and 
the Alberta Heritage Trust Savings Fund continued 
to operate as it had over the past fifteen years, as a 
relatively passive investment fund with a fixed size of 
about $12 billion.
Beginning in the 2005/2006 fiscal year, the prov-
ince began (under the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust 
Fund Act) to reinvest a portion of the fund’s annual 
earnings (or transferred funds from the Sustainability 
Fund) to offset annual inflation (Alberta Heritage 
Savings Trust Fund, 2008, p. 319). (From 1996 on, 
there had been some partial compensation for infla-
tion.) In addition, in the years 2006/7 and 2007/8, 
the provincial government made additional transfers 
into the fund as petroleum revenues substantially 
exceeded forecast amounts due to higher than antici-
pated prices.
The role of the Heritage Trust Savings Fund 
was a major concern of the Mintz Commission in 
its December 2007 report. The Commission noted 
that if one compared the change in the provincial 
government’s net financial position with its resource 
revenues, just over 30 per cent of resource revenues 
had been saved on average each year from 1994 to 
2007 (Alberta Financial Investment and Planning 
Commission, 2007, pp. 26–27). Much of this saving 
came in the form of reductions to the province’s 
debt, with relatively little coming in the form of 
the increases in the size of the Heritage Fund after 
2004. The Commission suggested that the province 
was saving too little and doing so in an unsatis-
factory ‘ad hoc’ manner (p. 31). The report, in a 
‘province-building’ framework, argued (p. 3) that 
government saving was important:
The government’s financial investment and 
planning policies are extremely important 
to the long-term stability and growth of the 
Alberta economy. To put it in clear terms, 
Alberta’s non-renewable resources should pro-
vide significant benefits not just to Albertans 
today, but also for our children and grand-
children. When Alberta sells its resources, it 
has given up wealth that can either be spent 
today or saved for the future. When our 
stock of non-renewable resources dwindles, 
Alberta’s economy will need to rely only on its 
people – not its natural resources – to create 
wealth. The government itself will have to 
rely on investment income from the financial 
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assets that it has accumulated and taxes paid 
by future Albertans to fund essential public 
services needed by a growing and aging popu-
lation. Alberta should not look like a ghost 
town in the next century when the resources 
are depleted. Instead, Albertans want to have 
a dynamic economy attracting people from 
around the world to enjoy Alberta’s advan-
tages long after the resources are used up. For 
those reasons, our Commission is proposing 
a new approach to savings. The approach is 
designed to simplify the current approach, to 
make savings a clear and deliberate objective 
with tangible targets, to provide the necessary 
fiscal discipline, and to encourage proper stew-
ardship of Alberta’s savings to maximize the 
benefits to Albertans. It is intended to capture 
Albertans’ interest and attention, to renew 
their commitment to savings, and to hold the 
government accountable.
The Commission examined Alberta’s long-run fiscal 
position and recommended that the provincial 
government undertake an active and large savings 
program, preferring this to an approach that paid 
‘dividends’ to Alberta citizens and let them decide 
how much to save individually. (Reduced taxes 
to ‘give away’ any government revenue surpluses 
would be equivalent to such a dividend.) The Mintz 
Commission (agreeing with the Tuer Commission) 
recommended that the ‘Alberta Heritage Savings Trust 
Fund’ be replaced by a reconstituted ‘Alberta Heritage 
Fund.’ The Heritage Fund would incorporate most 
existing government savings programs and would be 
increased in size annually, to a total of $100 billion by 
the year 2030. (As discussed above, the Commission 
recommended continuation of the Stabilization Fund, 
but with a ceiling size of $3.5 billion, indexed for infla-
tion, solely for the purpose of stabilizing the govern-
ment budget as fluctuating revenues might require. A 
‘Heritage Capital Fund’ would also exist separately.) 
To attain this target, the Commission recommended 
that the government commit to set aside a fixed pro-
portion of revenues each year for the Heritage Fund 
(pp. 33–34), to contribute at least 75 per cent of any 
budget surpluses (after topping up the Sustainability 
Fund, if needed) to the Heritage Fund (p. 40) and to 
draw on only 4.5 per cent of the value of the Heritage 
Fund each year for the government’s budget (p. 37).
As of April 2013, the government had not acted 
on these recommendations but the 2013/14 budget 
incorporated several proposals with respect to the 
Heritage Fund. Firstly, starting in fiscal 2014/15, a 
higher share of the fund’s earnings would be retained 
and reinvested, with 100 per cent of earnings retained 
by the 2016/17 fiscal year. Secondly, again commencing 
with fiscal year 2014/15, regular contributions to the 
fund would be made out of non-renewable resource 
revenues; the amount of investment would start  at 5 
per cent of the government’s resource revenues up to 
$10 billion in revenue, then 25 per cent of the next $5 
billion and 50 per cent of any resource revenues over 
$15 billion.
4. Conclusion
The economic development of the Alberta economy 
since 1947 is intimately tied to the development of 
the petroleum industry. Many economists see this 
connection from an ‘export base’ or ‘staples’ point of 
view. The external demands for petroleum products 
are an essential force driving the process of economic 
growth, while the form that growth takes is affected 
by the backward and forward linkages of the petrol-
eum industry. The petroleum industry can be seen as 
affecting the local economy through three mechan-
isms, which operate jointly: changes in the volume of 
production; changes in the real value of the products; 
and increased productivity. The precise dependence 
of the economy on a specific industry is difficult to 
measure. Other export industries may have initially 
developed based on the demands of an export-base 
industry, and the viability of industries producing 
largely for the local market may hinge on the growth 
in demand stimulated by the export-base industry.
Starting in 1947, for the next two decades or so, 
the levels of petroleum output (crude oil and natural 
gas) increased dramatically, while prices were rela-
tively stable. This attracted new productive inputs to 
the economy and reduced Alberta’s dependence on 
agriculture. Gross production in Alberta grew more 
rapidly than the Canadian average, as did employment 
and the population. Per capita income also rose, but, 
over much of the period to the early 1970s, remained 
quite close to the Canadian average. Alberta depended 
heavily upon two export industries, petroleum 
and agriculture.
Beginning in the early 1970s, the real prices of oil 
and natural gas began to rise dramatically, spurring 
increased economic growth through to the early 1980s. 
The higher real value of petroleum increased the rela-
tive share of the petroleum industry in the Alberta 
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economy (which some saw as reduced economic 
diversification); migration into Alberta increased, and 
the prices of local goods and services were put under 
upward pressure; even with the in-migration, per 
capita Alberta incomes rose above the Canadian aver-
age. However, oil prices began to soften in the world 
market after 1981 and then fell dramatically, ushering 
a period of relative income stagnation in Alberta. 
Unemployment rose, population growth slowed, and 
Alberta GDP per capita fell close to the Canadian 
average. The relative contribution of the petroleum 
industry to the Alberta economy fell.
Starting in 1993, Alberta population and GDP, in 
total and per capita relative to the Canadian average, 
began to increase once again, although still fluctuating 
as the prices of oil and natural gas changed. There is 
a feeling that the dependence of the economy on the 
petroleum industry has lessened somewhat, reflecting 
such factors as new export industries, import sub-
stitution, and agglomeration effects. There has been 
increased production by sectors of the economy other 
than the petroleum industry, including manufacturing 
and a variety of services, such as information tech-
nologies and petroleum service companies that sell 
to customers outside the province. In addition, as the 
population has grown from barely 800,000 in 1947 
to almost 3.9 million by 2013, agglomeration effects 
and economies of scale have been easier to realize, 
allowing more varied industrial production for both 
domestic and export customers.
At the level of economic policy, the desirability of 
economic diversification has been a persistent focus 
of attention. On the whole, the process of economic 
growth has been what naturally occurred in response 
to market forces. Especially in the later 1970s and 
early 1980s, the provincial government used some of 
the resources it gained from the high prices of crude 
oil and natural gas to actively encourage expansion 
of new industries, concentrating on those like petro-
chemicals that further processed crude petroleum. 
Beginning in the later 1980s, and up to the present, 
the government’s approach has been more neutral, 
emphasizing lower taxes and the high quality local 
infrastructure. As mentioned in the previous para-
graph, most analysts think that the economy has 
gained a greater degree of diversification and stabil-
ity over the past decade. It is important to note that 
the Alberta economy is still highly dependent on oil 
and gas prices. And high oil prices are essential to 
the growing oil sands and heavy oil industry, which 
provide an increasing share of Alberta’s liquid hydro-
carbons as conventional production declines. Indeed, 
by 2002 oil sands output exceeded that from conven-
tional sources. Higher natural gas prices also bring 
higher government revenues, but some analysts have 
expressed concern that continued economic growth 
(especially in industries like petrochemicals and oil 
sands, which use energy-intensive production pro-
cesses) may prove difficult if natural gas prices become 
too high. Accessibility to natural gas may prove an 
important issue in the future although the fall in 
prices after 2008 has alleviated immediate concerns.
The petroleum industry has been the key factor 
underlying the economic development of the Alberta 
economy for the past four decades. It will continue to 
do so for the foreseeable future.
Readers’ Guide: In the final chapter, we briefly explore 
the relevance of Alberta’s experience with petroleum 
to other jurisdictions. This chapter does not involve 
any empirical comparisons between Alberta and the 
rest of the world but does offer thoughts on the treat-
ment of the petroleum industry. In addition, it makes 
some final assessment of the general effectiveness 
of government regulation of the Alberta petroleum 
industry.
1. Introduction
Even in this shrinking, increasingly integrated world, 
the petroleum industry stands out for the scope and 
breadth of its regional interconnections. In part, this 
reflects the uneven geographical distribution of the 
underlying natural resource. The geological realities of 
the distribution of oil and natural gas in nature bear 
little relationship to the concentrations of population 
and economic power that drive energy consumption. 
As a result, many regions or sub-regions of the world 
find themselves in a position similar to that of Alberta, 
rich in petroleum with limited domestic requirements. 
How is this valuable resource to be developed so as 
to provide maximum benefit to the region? The pur-
pose of this brief concluding chapter is to examine the 
Alberta experience with an eye to the possible lessons 
it might offer to other parts of the world. We do not 
attempt an empirical comparison of developments in 
Alberta with those elsewhere. Rather we draw upon 
the experience, problems, and regulations in Alberta, 
as discussed in previous chapters of this book, in order 
to offer suggestions that we feel could be usefully 
pondered by decision-makers elsewhere in the world. 
Because this discussion is based on the previous chap-
ters, no references are cited in this chapter. The dis-
cussion and suggestions are divided into three broad 
categories: factors related to the ‘physical’ realities of 
petroleum; factors related to the operation of petrol-
eum markets; and factors related to economic rents.
The petroleum industry within a region does not 
arise in a pristine historical and institutional environ-
ment. Hence, several specific characteristics of the 
Alberta situation need review. First, Alberta is fortun-
ate in being a modern economy, part of the developed 
western world. Thus the birth of Alberta’s oil and nat-
ural gas industry occurred within an established and 
stable political and legal environment. Alberta was 
ready to participate immediately in the development 
of petroleum. Industry and government could draw 
upon a well-educated local population, established 
business firms, and a responsible and well-trained 
civil service. Not all petroleum-bearing regions are 
so fortunate; in war-torn regions such as Sudan or 
Angola, or in countries such as those of the former 
Soviet Union undergoing fundamental economic and 
political transformation, a multitude of problems must 
be resolved before decision-makers can even begin 
to consider most of the issues that were important 
for Alberta.
Second, special problems are created by Alberta’s 
status as part of a federated political system, where the 
province of Alberta shares jurisdiction with the federal 
government in Ottawa. Some parts of the world do 
not have this set of problems to consider (e.g., Qatar), 
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and in others the division of powers are quite different 
than in Canada, so the responses to interjurisdictional 
conflicts may also have to be different.
Third, the conventional petroleum industry in 
Alberta is smaller than that in a number of other parts 
of the world, small enough that we have generally 
been satisfied to treat Alberta as a price-taker in the 
oil market. Thus the issue of the best way to exercise 
market power, which has been of vital concern to 
countries belonging to OPEC, has not attracted much 
attention in Alberta.
Fourth, the majority, although not all, of the pet-
roleum ‘in the ground’ in Alberta has been under the 
ownership of the provincial government (the ‘Crown’); 
this has been true in much of the world, but not every-
where at all times. With initial government ownership 
of petroleum rights, the interactions of the govern-
ment with the private-sector petroleum industry are 
in its role as ‘landowner,’ as well as the governing rep-
resentative of the people.
2. Factors Related to Physical  
Aspects of Petroleum
Oil and natural gas typically lie in segregated deposits 
(pools or reservoirs), invisible from the surface, deep 
within the earth. Pools differ, not only in the volumes 
of hydrocarbons held, but in the chemical make-up 
of the hydrocarbons present and the characteristics 
of reservoir rock and reservoir pressure. In addition, 
petroleum is a depletable natural resource in the sense 
that oil and natural gas do not naturally regenerate 
themselves within anything like the human time span, 
nor are they recyclable, like aluminum, after use. 
It is accepted that socially optimal development of 
petroleum calls for a government regulatory frame-
work that recognizes the unique characteristics of the 
resource. Many of the desirable regulations relate to 
the environmental impact of the industry and have 
not been dealt with in this book; this includes such 
regulations as those regarding the disposal of water 
produced in conjunction with petroleum, the flaring 
of natural gas, safety in drilling, sealing of abandoned 
wells, the environmental impacts of fossil fuel use, 
etc. We would note that Alberta seems to have a good 
reputation in many of these areas, especially those 
related to petroleum engineering, and that many of 
the regulations have been overseen by the Alberta 
Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB), which 
is also responsible for a number of the programs that 
we have discussed in this book. In this section, we 
will discuss three main issues related to the ‘physical’ 
nature of petroleum: uncertainties about reservoir 
existence and location; the reservoir as a single pres-
sure system; and the meaning of ‘depletability’ of the 
natural resource.
A. Uncertainty and Exploration
Estimates may be made at any time of the size of the 
petroleum resource base within a region, but such 
estimates, especially in the early days of exploration 
in a region, are subject to a very wide margin of error. 
From an analytical perspective, little has been done 
in economics to integrate five essential components 
of a theoretical model of petroleum exploration: the 
extremely wide range of possibilities for the resource 
base; the precise nature of a social welfare function 
in such an uncertain setting; the open access nature 
of the exploration process (where investors may be 
motivated to undertake rent-destroying early explor-
ation to capture mineral rights); the ‘option value’ of 
delaying exploration (waiting until others explore, 
or exploring more slowly, is likely to reduce the geo-
logical uncertainty the investor faces, allowing more 
profitable investment later); and the joint product 
nature of exploration (today’s exploration activity 
generates knowledge of significance to both oil and 
natural gas discoveries, now and into future time 
periods). To suggest, as has been common in many 
theoretical models of exhaustible resources, that the 
key social issue is that of defining the ‘optimal deple-
tion path’ for the resource, seems to be putting the 
policy cart in front of the information horse. Rather, 
we would suggest that one of the key policy issues in 
a newly developing petroleum region has been to find 
an efficient way of generating new knowledge in face 
of the extreme uncertainty involved.
From the early days of industry activity in Alberta, 
the government elected to address this through a 
combination of competitive private exploration and 
careful mineral rights issuance. We think that there 
is much to be recommended for such an approach, 
that efficiency arguments favour a reliance on private 
industry. Since most of the mineral rights are owned 
by the Crown, it would have been feasible to under-
take exploration through a single government-owned 
‘national’ (i.e., provincial) petroleum company. 
However, it is doubtful that a single company would 
have been as efficient in generating knowledge 
within the very uncertain geological environment 
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that characterizes the petroleum industry. Allowing 
exploration to be undertaken by competing private 
firms allows for maximum testing of varying geo-
logical opinions, something that is likely to be hard 
for a single company, regardless of its interest in the 
‘public welfare.’ In addition, experience in other parts 
of the world suggests that it is often difficult for a 
public petroleum company to generate the level of 
exploration investment it desires since the government 
often uses its ownership to appropriate a large share of 
any ‘excess’ funds in the company. Possible disadvan-
tages of a reliance on the private sector for all explor-
ation activities must, however, be acknowledged. 
The main one is the possibility that a large portion of 
mineral rights will be transferred to private companies 
with relatively little return to the government. If access 
to mineral rights is relatively low-cost, or if risk-averse 
companies are willing to pay little up front for access, 
or if petroleum discoveries ex post (after the fact) turn 
out to be exceptionally large, or if there is a lack of 
sufficient competition, the government will find that 
the majority of the economic rents accrue to the pri-
vate sector.
Alberta handled this problem in several ways. 
Issuing mineral rights through competitive bonus 
bids, in a setting in which a large number of firms 
were active, ensured that a significant portion of 
anticipated (ex ante) rents would go to the govern-
ment. Including rental and royalty provisions in the 
mineral rights meant that the government would 
share in ongoing rents from successful exploration. 
Drilling requirements helped to ensure that compan-
ies would not sit on land indefinitely and that geo-
logical knowledge would be generated. Dissemination 
of this knowledge was aided by the requirement 
that companies lodge well core samples with the 
ERCB, with the samples made public after a period 
of time (usually one year). Finally, checkerboard 
relinquishment provisions ensured that, as explora-
tion determined which lands were of most value, the 
government retained an interest (for later sale) in the 
regions found to be of highest value. An argument 
might be made for one additional activity in the early 
stages of the petroleum industry in a region: given 
the very high initial uncertainty, the government 
might undertake, at its expense, an initial exploratory 
well-drilling program with the results made public 
knowledge. However, for many countries this would 
require considerable public expenditure from a rela-
tively poor government (before any revenue flows 
from petroleum taxation occur). Alberta did not 
undertake such government drilling; it did, however, 
allow companies only a short period of time (typically 
one year) in which the results of their drilling could be 
retained privately.
It is desirable, from the beginning of petroleum 
industry activities in a region, to establish policies that 
are stable, efficient, and equitable and allow important 
geological knowledge to be generated quickly and 
made public. Alberta met these standards well.
B. The Reservoir as a ‘Natural’ Unit
Petroleum production is a deliberate economic act, 
but it must follow nature’s constraints. Private pet-
roleum producers will, of course, be aware of the 
limitations nature imposes, but this need not ensure 
that their production practices (investment, output 
levels, and production techniques) will be socially 
optimal. Hence governments may be motivated to 
regulate aspects of petroleum production practices. 
Many of these regulations relate to producers’ uses of 
‘environmental amenities,’ the capabilities of land, air, 
and water, which are not priced and sold in economic 
markets and hence are overutilized by profit-oriented 
companies. As has been mentioned, this book does 
not deal with such environmental aspects of Alberta 
petroleum production.
A typical conventional petroleum reservoir 
is a connected volume of porous rock (bounded 
by impermeable rock) holding hydrocarbons and 
water under pressure higher than surface pressure. 
Production of crude oil and natural gas draws upon 
the pressure differential between the reservoir and 
surface. In physical terms, the reservoir is a ‘natural’ 
unit of production, and it is sometimes useful to see 
production as the ‘production’ of reservoir pressure 
changes. Depending on the reservoir itself and the 
number, type, and location of wells, their output rates, 
and the location and volume of fluids (natural gas, 
water, CO2, etc.) injected back into the reservoir, the 
time path of pressure in the reservoir (and the output 
of oil and natural gas) will vary. Since oil companies 
are interested in maximizing the present value of the 
profits received from the reservoir, one would expect 
that they would be vitally interested in the responsible 
management of reservoir pressure. However, they may 
not develop reservoirs in a socially efficient manner.
Within North America, the most obvious reason 
for this derived from the sharing of reservoirs by 
companies and the incentives of the ‘rule of capture,’ 
which said that the ownership of oil and gas went to 
the party that lifted them to the surface. Companies 
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and land owners were often not willing to go to 
the expenses of time, money, and effort involved in 
negotiating and monitoring a joint agreement to 
‘unitize’ the reservoir and lift from it as single produ-
cer. Instead, there was an incentive to produce com-
petitively to capture petroleum before neighbouring 
companies could do so. This meant rapid declines 
in reservoir pressure and output, a smaller reservoir 
recovery factor, large numbers of wells with high 
expenses, and a reluctance to invest in pressure main-
tenance or enhancement. The economically preferred 
solution would be a compulsory unitization pro-
gram. Alberta did not adopt this solution, although 
in certain circumstances (where obvious damage to 
reservoirs took place) the provincial regulatory board 
could order it. Instead, Alberta drew on U.S. regula-
tions, with a mix of well-spacing rules (limiting the 
number of wells that could be drilled), maximum 
output rates (to avoid undue pressure decline), and 
‘market-demand prorationing’ for crude oil, which 
limited output to the level that the market was willing 
to accept (at prevailing prices). Market-demand pror-
ationing was not introduced for natural gas reservoirs. 
Here the excesses of the rule of capture in Alberta 
were reduced by the prevalence of long-term contracts 
that slowed the rate of reservoir depletion.
However, market-demand prorationing brought 
its own inefficiencies. By controlling output, it blunted 
the operation of market forces, an impact that was felt 
at the North American level since the program oper-
ated in many of the most important producing regions 
(especially Texas). It also increased oil production 
costs by prorating controlled output across all pro-
ducers, therefore restricting production of low-cost 
oil in order to make room for higher-cost oil. Finally, 
regulations often induced producers to drill incre-
mental wells to gain higher output quotas even when 
existing wells were capable of lifting more; successive 
revisions of prorationing meant that this incentive was 
pretty well eliminated in Alberta by the mid-1960s. 
Market-demand prorationing became gradually less 
significant in Alberta from the mid-1970s and was 
entirely removed in the later 1980s. Well-spacing and 
maximum rate regulation continued, and the advan-
tages of unit operations were now well known to com-
panies, so the excesses of the rule of capture have been 
blunted to a considerable extent.
In many parts of the world, the rule of capture is 
not operative, if only because single companies fre-
quently control entire reservoirs. In many of these 
countries, a different type of insecurity of ownership 
of oil reservoirs may induce companies to exploit the 
oil excessively rapidly. This is the case if there is a fixed 
life of the mineral rights, with oil reservoirs reverting 
back to the government at the end of the agreement; 
companies then have no incentive to consider the 
impact of today’s pressure decline on output past 
the end date of the contract. From the viewpoint of 
economic efficiency, the most direct way to address 
this problem would be to allow continuation of the 
mineral rights until the producer decides to abandon 
the reservoir, as has been the case in Alberta. Should 
governments be unwilling to do so (perhaps because it 
is regarded as politically impossible), then a ‘conserva-
tion’ regime of well-spacing and maximum output rate 
limitations might be well advised. Here, the Alberta 
experience might prove instructive, particularly the 
decision to rely heavily upon a quasi-judicial regula-
tory board with a highly qualified technical staff and 
open procedures.
It has been suggested (for instance by some apolo-
gists for OPEC) that the petroleum industry always 
requires market-demand-prorationing regulations 
for ‘conservation’ reasons to limit an inducement to 
excessively rapid production. This argument does 
not acknowledge the fact that market-demand pro-
rationing arose out of the specific setting of a North 
American industry in which the rule of capture held 
in common law and mineral rights holdings covered 
very small surface areas. In Alberta, in contrast to the 
continental U.S., where private ownership of initial 
mineral rights was common, the majority of Alberta’s 
mineral rights are Crown-held, but the government 
typically issued production leases for relatively small 
areas. These conditions simply do not hold in much of 
the world. For most economists, therefore, there is no 
obvious justification for prorationing as a ‘standard’ 
petroleum policy; rather, it appears that those desiring 
high oil prices are attempting to find a justification for 
their exercise of market power.
C.	The	Significance	of	Depletability
Conservation of petroleum use is another possible 
reason to limit current production, and is normally 
justified by reference to the limited resource base for 
conventional petroleum. It has been suggested that, 
unless action is taken soon, resource limitations will 
translate into catastrophic future shortages, although 
many analysts are quite vague about exactly what the 
nature of this crisis will be.
Readers of this volume will know that the authors 
are not sympathetic to this line of argument. There 
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is great misunderstanding about the ‘exhaustible’ 
nature of petroleum resources since it is primarily an 
economic phenomenon, not a physical one. That is, 
we will ‘run out’ of crude oil or natural gas when they 
become too high in cost, relative to market value, to 
continue with production. In economic terms, as the 
world turns to more and more costly petroleum, rela-
tively less energy-intensive activities and alternative 
energy sources will become more attractive, reducing 
the consumption of petroleum. There is a strong 
presumption amongst most economists that market 
forces will, if allowed, handle this transition relatively 
smoothly, particularly since producers and consumers 
have a strong incentive to anticipate such an outcome 
and begin to take action prior to significant price 
increases. If this is correct, the transition to other 
energy forms will be relatively smooth and will have 
resulted from the ‘economic’ (not physical) exhaustion 
of our petroleum resources. Not everyone accepts this 
argument since many feel that economic markets fail 
to understand the fundamentally limited nature of the 
underlying resource base. OPEC representatives have 
often justified their production restraint by a pre-
sumed need to conserve scarce resources. However, 
economists have tended to view this rationale with a 
high degree of scepticism, since it is clearly in OPEC’s 
immediate interest to force oil prices to high levels.
It is of interest that, in the case of Alberta, there 
has been a persistent tendency for the relevant gov-
ernment agencies to underestimate future petroleum 
production and reserves. This is not surprising and is 
common in studies of other regions as well since fore-
casts of petroleum availability are necessarily based 
on current knowledge and future geological plays, 
economic conditions, and production technologies 
are impossible to forecast with accuracy. Many studies 
attempt to make allowance for these uncertainties, but 
there seems to be a persistent tendency to underesti-
mate their effect on future reserves additions. There is 
obviously no guarantee that past underestimation of 
future petroleum producibility will continue through 
the indefinite future. However, the historical evidence 
suggests that economists who argue that economic 
markets adequately recognize the depletability of pet-
roleum are more justified in their argument than those 
who fear sudden and catastrophic exhaustion.
Those who argue in favour of restricting current 
petroleum production to generate higher supplies for 
a future energy supply crisis must recognize the com-
plexity of such a policy. Clearly the approach rejects 
the idea that petroleum is a product like other prod-
ucts that one is willing to trade in economic markets. 
The key question is why this is the case. As suggested, 
it normally reflects a belief that current market forces 
fail to reflect the future value of petroleum. It also 
implies that government regulators are better able to 
determine this future value. (Given the wide range 
of oil prices over the past fifty years, it seems disin-
genuous to simply say that the socially optimal value 
is always higher than observed prices.) The Canadian 
experience suggests that this faith in regulators may 
be misplaced: official estimates of future oil and gas 
prices have been notoriously inaccurate. (So, we 
should note, have been most private forecasts!)
Prohibition or limitation of exports is often rec-
ommended as a way to preserve resource supplies, as 
was done by Canada from 1973 to 1985. This generates 
contradictions. After all, the argument is that we are 
all using the resource stock too quickly, not simply 
that foreigners are using too much. By itself, restrict-
ing exports forces greater supply onto the domestic 
market, lowers the domestic price, and encourages 
greater consumption of petroleum at home. Thus 
we ourselves are using up the natural resource more 
quickly. It also requires the expense of an effective 
regulatory program to ensure that domestic petrol-
eum does not leak into the higher-priced foreign 
market. There is also the contradiction that we usually 
expect to be able to import, at prevailing international 
prices, the resources that we ourselves do not possess 
in abundant quantities. Why should we expect this 
to continue while our country cuts back petroleum 
sales to other nations? It is also curious to note that 
export limitations may appear to generate precisely 
the outcome that was feared. Reserves additions will 
be inhibited, but this is not because markets have 
underestimated the availability of petroleum resources 
but because lower prices make reserves additions less 
profitable. Lower domestic prices, as a result of export 
limits, also induce earlier abandonment of reservoirs, 
reducing the recovery ratio, and inhibit techno-
logical innovations that increase the recoverability 
of petroleum.
If concerns about resource availability are legit-
imate, this would suggest that the appropriate policy 
is to force domestic prices higher to inhibit resource 
use. Exports would disappear, as domestic supply 
would be priced out of the international market, and 
consumption at home would fall. The easiest way 
to do this would be through a tax on oil that would 
raise prices to consumers and reduce prices for pro-
ducers. However, the difficult part of such a policy is 
determining exactly when and how the future dire 
scarcities of petroleum will occur and how, at that 
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time, incremental petroleum will be made available 
to domestic users. As noted, the essence of this argu-
ment is that markets fail to recognize the exhaustible 
nature of petroleum and that at some future date a 
massive energy crisis is going to occur in the world. 
Presumably, at that time, this nation would prohibit 
exports and increase petroleum production; pet-
roleum prices would move below world prices and 
domestic petroleum users would benefit. Economies 
elsewhere would suffer from energy shortages, but this 
country would be protected, at least to some extent. 
There are, of course, ethical and political implications. 
Could we justify reserving petroleum use for ourselves 
alone when people in other parts of the world are 
going short? Would other powers allow us to withhold 
supplies of petroleum?
But our main objection to this line of argument 
is that we view the entire scenario as unlikely and 
betraying a failure to appreciate the essentially eco-
nomic nature of resource limitations and the ability 
of economic markets to signal resource scarcity and 
induce compensatory actions. Our inclination is to see 
the essential problem as one of risk (and insurance) 
rather than resource exhaustibility. Since perfect fore-
sight is impossible, it may be that petroleum resource 
scarcity will occur faster and more dramatically than 
is generally expected. It might be judged desirable to 
have some ‘insurance’ in the event of this outcome; the 
insurance could take the form of current subsidization 
of alternative energy forms and energy conservation, 
that is, of those activities that will play a prominent 
role in any smooth adjustment to petroleum deple-
tion. It might take the form of ‘strategic petroleum 
reserves’ (SPRs), that is government-owned reserves 
set aside for later use as needed. This differs signifi-
cantly from intervention with petroleum sales to 
retain scarce petroleum assets for domestic use.
3. Factors Related to Petroleum  
Markets
The discussion in the previous section illustrated a 
commonly expressed concern: that petroleum mar-
kets fail to function in an appropriate manner so that 
governments are justified in interfering with prices 
or trade flows. Experience in Canada and Alberta 
has illustrated many possibilities in this regard. Thus, 
both Alberta and Canada imposed domestic require-
ment limitations on natural gas exports; oil imports 
into Canada were limited from 1962 through 1972, 
allowing domestic oil to sell at prices in excess of the 
international level; oil and natural gas export sales 
were limited from 1973 to 1985, and domestic prices 
were fixed at levels below those in external markets. 
We have generally been critical of such policies on the 
ground that they impose economic efficiency costs on 
the economy, without clear offsetting gains. Thus, for 
example, setting prices above the prevailing market 
level stimulates production of petroleum that costs 
more than the price of imports and penalizes domes-
tic consumers. Holding prices below the prevailing 
market level means that higher utilization of oil is 
stimulated in uses that have a lower value than the 
amount that foreign buyers are willing to pay for that 
petroleum, and domestic production is inhibited. The 
obvious question is whether some additional factor 
justifies these efficiency losses.
In addition to the arguments related to resource 
exhaustibility discussed above, several other possible 
reasons for interfering in the operation of petroleum 
markets will be briefly discussed, including: second-
best considerations; providing a fairer distribution 
of the benefits and costs of petroleum; generating 
improved macroeconomic stability and adjustment; 
and encouraging regional development.
A. Second-Best Considerations
The efficiency advantages that economists see accru-
ing from competitive free markets can be guaranteed, 
economic theory tells us, only if they are part of an 
entire system of ‘complete and perfect’ markets. If the 
market for one product is effectively competitive, but 
other associated markets are not, we move from our 
‘perfect (‘first-best’) world to a ‘second-best’ world, 
and we do live in a second-best world. This does not 
necessarily mean that we should interfere with the 
operation of markets, but it may mean that there are 
efficiency gains that could be attained from such inter-
ference. Thus, for instance, we argued in Chapter Nine 
that the Alberta oil industry was tied in the 1960s to 
the large U.S. oil market where oil prices were main-
tained above international levels by the joint operation 
of state-run market-demand prorationing regula-
tions and the federal oil import quota program. The 
Canadian National Oil Policy divided the Canadian 
oil market at the Ottawa River valley, allowing the 
western part to access the U.S. market at prices 
above the international level. This benefited western 
Canadian oil producers at the expense of oil consum-
ers and might normally have been expected to give 
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an efficiency loss. However, if account is taken of the 
incremental oil export earnings, due to U.S. oil regula-
tions, then the policy generated net gains to Canada.
However, the world oil market currently shows 
few if any similar examples since pretty well all major 
participants now operate in the market in a free 
manner. It is possible that other second-best situations 
exist, but each of these requires a clear demonstration 
that there is a gain to be made from interference with 
petroleum prices or trade flows. We would also sug-
gest that the most plausible of these market failures 
(such as the failure to adequately ‘price’ environmental 
amenities) are more likely to be addressed by tax/sub-
sidy schemes that operate through the market rather 
than by direct interference in petroleum markets.
B. Fairness
Petroleum price changes impact differently on dif-
ferent individuals in the economy. Oil price rises, for 
instance, hurt oil users but benefit owners of private 
oil companies, petroleum industry input suppliers, 
and governments in oil-producing regions. One of the 
main reasons that the Canadian federal government 
fixed oil prices below international levels from 1973 
to 1985 was to ensure that the benefits of the increas-
ingly valuable oil was spread across all Canadians, 
rather than concentrated in the western producing 
regions, with most other Canadians feeling mainly 
the higher prices. However, the justification for the 
policy was less a desire to shelter oil users than it was 
a reflection of the difficulty in deciding in a federal 
system what is a fair interregional distribution of the 
gains (to an oil-exporting economy) from higher 
oil prices. Moreover, the policy of holding oil prices 
down had the effects of encouraging more use of oil, 
discouraging production of oil, and necessitating an 
increasingly convoluted set of regulations limiting and 
taxing exports to ensure that foreign consumers did 
not benefit from the low Canadian prices.
It should be noted that the Canadian evidence 
does not offer much support for the argument that 
rising petroleum prices are highly regressive in their 
impact. Petroleum takes a relatively low propor-
tion of people’s income and does not take a much 
higher share for the poor than the rich. Should such 
income-distribution effects be of concern, the more 
appropriate policy would be to combine an effective 
rent-collection program (see below) with modest tax 
reform; that is, extra government revenue from the 
increased profits on higher-priced petroleum could be 
used to lower personal tax rates on the poor or pro-
vide social programs that benefit the less-well-off.
It is tempting for oil-exporting countries to set 
domestic prices low to ensure that citizens benefit 
from ‘their’ petroleum, and many governments have 
found that such programs become very difficult to 
remove once in place. Our view, however, is that the 
argument of the previous paragraph holds for most 
nations. In fact, in very poor nations, income distri-
bution is often more unequal than in Canada, and the 
very poorest use little petroleum so benefit very little 
from low oil prices. Moreover, many of these coun-
tries have relatively inefficient public administration 
systems, so the ability to control illicit trade in sub-
sidized oil is weak. We suspect that it would be more 
effective to help the poor by exporting more petrol-
eum at higher world prices and using the government 
revenue gained on programs aimed directly at the 
poor. In other words, unfairness of the distribution of 
income is a general societal problem, not best tackled 
by subsidization of the prices of individual goods 
or services.
C.	Macroeconomic	Stability
Rapid changes in petroleum prices, especially, it 
seems, rapid rises, impose adjustment costs on an 
economy, particularly an oil-importing economy. 
Many, but not all, economic analysts assign rising 
world oil prices a significant role in the ‘stagflation’ 
starting in the mid-1970s. (Stagflation is the combin-
ation of a sluggish economy, or recession, with high 
inflation.) One of the justifications for the Canadian 
oil and natural gas price freezes of 1973 was that 
Canada, as a net oil exporter, could use this policy 
to reduce macroeconomic adjustment problems. If 
the oil price rises were temporary, as some expected 
in 1973, Canada could wait out the blip in prices, 
and if they were permanent, Canada could make the 
required adjustments more gradually. However, subse-
quent economic analysis has cast doubt on this argu-
ment. For example, two of the major oil-importing 
nations (West Germany and Japan) weathered the oil 
price rises of the 1970s very well. Not all large pet-
roleum price rises seem to have generated strongly 
stagflationary effects, and some models have suggested 
that the problem is not so much higher oil prices as 
the macroeconomic policy response to the higher 
prices. Further, simulations with several Canadian 
macroeconomic models did not find much differ-
ence in levels of such key economic indicators as the 
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unemployment rate and the Consumers Price Index 
between cases with immediately higher oil prices and 
those with more slowly staged price increases. Thus 
our conclusion is that the macroeconomic benefits 
from holding petroleum prices below market levels are 
not likely to offset the efficiency losses of such a policy.
D. Regional Development
A final justification for interfering in the operation 
of free market forces in oil and natural gas markets is 
that such a policy might generate regional economic 
gains by encouraging resource-using industries to 
establish in the region; that is, export limitations and/
or regulated lower prices could generate higher eco-
nomic growth. It is not an easy argument to assess. 
This is particularly true if the focus of analysis is on 
individuals and appropriate attention is given to our 
personal mobility: the government of Alberta might 
see a clear benefit in having a petrochemical plant 
located in the province, but an individual worker may 
be less concerned about whether the plant is located in 
Edmonton or Vancouver.
There is also the question of whether the policy 
instrument (e.g., lower prices that benefit all users) 
is appropriate to the objective (to support a specific 
industrial user who otherwise would not locate here). 
More specialized subsidies might cost less and would 
be more transparent than intervention in the oper-
ation of the petroleum market. Also, policy-makers 
must recognize that it is difficult for governments 
to know exactly which new industries to encourage. 
Presumably this is made easier if there is a temporary 
factor inhibiting an industry from moving into the 
area; short-term subsidies then can be designed to last 
until the new industry establishes itself. For example, 
if the industry outside the region is dominated by oli-
gopolists not willing to build in the region, despite the 
ready resource availability, then temporary govern-
ment support for a new company might be reasonable 
while it breaks into the market. Or, if the problem is 
the lack of skilled local labour, temporary encourage-
ment of the new industry could be attractive while the 
requisite training occurs.
We find little reason to suppose that a policy of 
holding down petroleum prices or prohibiting profit-
able exports is justifiable as a way to support regional 
economic development, given the known inefficien-
cies of such a policy and the possibility of introducing 
more finely tuned measures that specifically address 
the problems inhibiting development.
4. Factors Related to the Sharing of 
Economic Rent
Issues of taxation are inevitably controversial. 
Petroleum taxes might be imposed in order to change 
behaviour in petroleum markets; an example would be 
a ‘carbon tax’ designed to reduce utilization of pet-
roleum in order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. 
However, the most significant reason for governments 
to assess charges on the petroleum industry is to 
capture for the public purse a high proportion of the 
economic rent generated by the production of oil and 
natural gas. Economic rent is attractive as a revenue 
source for governments since it is excess to necessary 
production costs, so it can, in theory, be taken with-
out inhibiting production. The government incentive 
to capture economic rent is particularly pronounced 
where the mineral resources are initially publicly 
owned. In a region such as Alberta, there are two 
main sources of this economic rent. First, petroleum 
reservoirs vary greatly in quality. In a well-functioning 
market, price must be high enough to cover the costs 
of the highest-cost supply necessary to meet demand, 
so higher ‘quality’ petroleum (in the sense of more 
productive lower-cost supplies) will earn profits 
in excess of costs. Second, because oil is seen as a 
non-renewable resource, most oil and natural gas will 
command an excess of price above production cost 
reflecting this general scarcity factor. (In economic 
theory, this premium is called a user cost, as discussed 
in Chapter Four.) A third source of profits on pet-
roleum is the deliberate exercise of market power, as 
has been done by OPEC in the crude oil market. For a 
region such as Alberta, which takes the price of oil as 
given by the world market, this means that more oil is 
commercially viable and oil profits (economic rents) 
are higher.
Governments typically claim a right to a signifi-
cant portion of these petroleum rents, often because 
the underlying natural resource that generates the 
rents is seen as the property of the people of the 
region. In the Alberta context, this perception has 
legal standing because, in over 80 per cent of the area 
of the province underlain by sedimentary rocks, the 
petroleum rights are held and issued by the provin-
cial government. Beyond this, economic rent is an 
appealing source for government revenue from an 
‘ability to pay’ principle of taxation since it represents 
a surplus of revenues above the essential expenditures 
to produce the resource. This often leads to the recom-
mendation that governments should ‘maximize’ their 
share of economic rents. We have suggested the more 
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modest objective of governments attaining a ‘high’ 
share of the rents. Partly this is because it is impossible 
to define an actual rent-collection scheme that touches 
only (and 100% of) the rent. At a more abstract level, 
it seems unlikely to us that there is a clearly defined 
absolutely ‘pure’ economic rent (i.e., revenue in excess 
of necessary production costs) that plays no role 
whatsoever in encouraging efficient, cost-minimizing 
production. A ‘perfectly effective’ government 
rent-collection scheme, which left no rent in the hands 
of private companies, would leave little incentive to 
keep costs to a minimum except on the highest-cost 
projects, particularly if benefits to the private owner 
could be disguised as ‘costs.’
The task of gathering economic rents for the 
government is very much complicated by the great 
uncertainties associated with petroleum industry 
activities. In our earlier discussion, we framed this in 
terms of the difference between ex ante (expected) and 
ex post (actual) economic rents. It can also be seen in 
terms of the risk-sharing. Thus, for example, a govern-
ment might be effective in capturing 100 per cent of 
anticipated rents, leaving all the risk with the private 
sector. However, unless the government is highly risk-
averse, this would not be seen as desirable. Many have 
argued that private investors are more risk-averse than 
governments, implying that the value they place on 
anticipated economic rents may be less than the value 
the government places on them. Governments, then, 
would wish to collect much of their share in the form 
of ongoing payments as rents actually accrue. It is also 
noteworthy that early estimates of ultimate recover-
able reserves for the world’s main petroleum-pro-
ducing regions have been shown to be conservative; 
hence estimates of anticipated economic rents when a 
region is under initial exploration typically fall below 
actual earned rents. Finally, there are advantages (in 
terms of economic planning and self-discipline) in a 
government spreading its petroleum revenues rela-
tively evenly over time. For reasons such as these, gov-
ernments have generally focussed on gaining a high 
share of actual rents rather than expected rents.
To capture a share of rents in an economically effi-
cient manner, the methods of raising revenue should, 
ideally, be neutral with respect to industry activity. 
Specifically, it would be desirable that the methods of 
rent-extraction should not: (1) discourage investment 
in exploration or development; (2) induce earlier 
abandonment of reservoirs; or (3) change the time 
path of petroleum production. It has been suggested 
that this could be accomplished by a ‘resource rent 
tax,’ that is a tax upon profits earned (including an 
allowance for the required return on capital as a cost 
of doing business). However, the practical implemen-
tation of such a tax is difficult. Allowance for explor-
ation costs for individual projects is almost inevitably 
somewhat arbitrary, and an emphasis on earned prof-
its often entails the notion that the government would 
not receive any payments until after full ‘payout’ of 
costs has occurred. In the 1990s, Alberta introduced 
a ‘generic’ tax for oil sands and heavy oil projects that 
was explicitly based upon an accounting definition of 
profits, although a minimum ad valorem royalty pro-
vision was also included. This was largely motivated 
by the high cost of this oil, with the associated vulner-
ability to low oil prices.
However, for conventional petroleum industry 
activities, Alberta has long utilized a mix of rent- 
collection mechanisms, including competitive bonus 
bids, royalties, land rentals, and a corporate income 
tax (applied to all companies, with regulations largely 
set by the federal government in Ottawa, but with 
Alberta receiving a portion of the revenue). A royalty 
has been the traditional method for North American 
land owners to obtain a share of oil revenues, so was 
an obvious instrument to use as the government 
of Alberta issued Crown mineral rights. This is an 
example of how private landowner leasing arrange-
ments may have affected Crown mineral rights pro-
visions. A major disadvantage of a traditional royalty 
(based on the gross revenue from oil) is that it fails to 
distinguish between lower- and higher-cost oil; thus, if 
set at a level high enough to earn significant revenue, 
it inhibits oil production. The government of Alberta 
introduced a variation on traditional flat-rate royalties 
by setting the royalty rate higher for higher-output 
wells, which were presumed to have lower per unit 
costs of production. Under reasonably competitive 
conditions (there have been many private companies 
active in the province), the bonus bid can be expected 
to capture a significant portion of expected rents after 
companies make allowance for the rentals, royalties, 
and income tax that they expect to pay.
This approach seemed to work well until the 
rapid rise in world oil prices (and North American 
natural gas prices) starting in the early 1970s, when 
two problems became apparent. First, actual profits 
on petroleum surged far beyond what anyone had 
expected, and, under existing royalty regulations, the 
largest share of the profit increase went to the private 
sector. Secondly, as economic rents surged, the issue of 
the appropriate division of rents, particularly between 
the provincial and federal governments, became red 
hot. This was particularly critical because the main 
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rent-collection devices that were used by Alberta 
(competitive bonus bids and royalties) were deductible 
as costs for the main rent-collection tool of Ottawa 
(the corporate income tax); Ottawa feared that Alberta 
would pre-emptively gather all the rent increases 
before it had a chance to generate more revenue itself.
This complex situation led to a period of political 
and regulatory instability from 1973 to 1985, character-
ized by increasingly complex government regulation. 
Alberta moved to raise royalty rates substantially by 
making the royalty rate a positive function of the 
price of petroleum; since higher royalties are a disin-
centive to production, the government retained the 
sliding-scale rate based on output. (For example, the 
royalty rate on oil fell towards zero as output from a 
well fell to nil.) It also set lower royalty rates on new 
production which required new investment. Ottawa 
moved to fix petroleum prices below world levels, to 
make royalties and bonus bids non-deductible for the 
(federal) corporate income tax, and, starting with the 
National Energy Program in 1980, introduced several 
exclusively federal taxes. (These federal taxes, and 
price controls, were removed with deregulation in 
1985/6.)
Alberta’s experience in rent collection offers useful 
lessons to other jurisdictions. First, it is important in 
federal government systems that the various levels of 
government work cooperatively to determine fair rent 
shares. Second, there is much to be said for Alberta’s 
use of a number of rent-collection mechanisms so 
that the governments can give weight to a number of 
different objectives: ensuring a flow of income across 
time (i.e., with royalties and income taxes); differ-
entiating among heterogeneous projects (i.e., with 
competitive bonus bids and sliding-scale royalties); 
and allowing the government a suitable share in risky, 
fluctuating rents (i.e., with royalties and income taxes 
that vary with earnings). Third, by electing to use 
gross royalties and land rentals that are not directly 
tied to profits earned, Alberta has found it necessary 
to introduce rather complicated measures, such as 
sliding-scale royalties and a number of incentive 
schemes, so as not to unduly inhibit investment in 
new, higher-cost projects. Rent-collection instruments 
more directly attuned to private company profits (such 
as have been used for oil sands ventures) might be 
somewhat less complex administratively. On the other 
hand, it is somewhat harder than might be thought to 
set up a well-balanced and effective profit tax on pet-
roleum because (except for projects such as those in 
the oil sands) it is not possible to define separate pro-
jects clearly (since exploration costs, in particular, are 
of a joint-product nature, rather than tied to any one 
project), and it is very difficult to set up regulations 
that are equitable across different types of companies 
(e.g., established companies with existing cash flow 
from which this year’s costs can be deducted as com-
pared to new companies with no or low cash flow who 
must carry current expenditures forward until they 
have sufficient cash flow to claim them).
On balance, the Alberta petroleum rent-collection 
scheme in place after the mid-1980s for conventional 
petroleum seemed to strike a good balance among the 
objectives of gathering a high share of rent, ensuring 
some stability in revenue flow to the government, 
sharing risk with the private sector, and providing 
stable and relatively low-cost administration. The 
main difficulties have been in designing a system 
that is sensitive to sudden increases in profitability 
due to surges in world oil prices, as had been seen 
in 1973 and 1980 and occurred again in 2005–2008, 
and one that minimizes the disincentive effects of ad 
valorem royalties.
5. Conclusion
Alberta has been most fortunate in its petroleum 
endowments, with extensive conventional oil and 
natural gas resources plus large volumes of the 
less-conventional, higher-cost resources (e.g., oil 
sands and coal bed methane), which are expected to 
play an increasing role in the future. These resources 
have spurred rapid economic growth in Alberta and 
have been the key input in making it the wealthiest 
of Canadian provinces. The role of government (both 
the province of Alberta and the federal government 
in Ottawa) in generating benefits from the petroleum 
industry has been controversial. The Alberta experi-
ence certainly offers a wealth of experience in different 
types of government programs. Our view is that cer-
tain forms of government regulation have been very 
effective in the Alberta case, others less so.
In Alberta, governments have been effective in 
establishing a relatively stable and well-defined system 
of property rights, which encourages risk-taking 
and long-term planning on the part of petroleum 
producers. To help offset the negative effects of 
specific market failures in the operation of petrol-
eum reservoirs, the Alberta government established 
an independent and powerful regulatory board 
(now known as the ERCB, the Energy and Resources 
Conservation Board), which has a well-earned 
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international reputation for careful and honest regu-
lation with respect to the technical aspects of oil and 
gas production. This board has powers related to 
many environmental matters (gas flaring, safe drill-
ing and well operation, control of well blowouts, well 
abandonment, and closures), which are an inevitable 
part of the physical process of exploring for and lifting 
petroleum. In addition, it has managed the day-to-day 
problems associated with the insecurity of property 
rights over petroleum in the ground generated by the 
‘rule of capture.’
However, in more recent years the ERCB has 
been subject to criticism with respect to the fairness 
and effectiveness of its hearings and judgments with 
regard to broader health and environmental issues and 
whether it is giving appropriate attention to the ‘public 
interest.’ The decision, in 2012, to transfer many of the 
board’s regulatory powers to a new energy regulator 
may, in part, reflect these concerns. In this study, we 
have not considered such important environmental 
issues as pollution and global warming.
The government of Alberta has also been quite 
successful in its rent-collection regulations. It has 
succeeded in establishing regulations that ensure a 
relatively high proportion of economic rent, both 
expected rents and unexpected rent changes, accrues 
to the government, without significantly inhibiting 
petroleum production. 
However, it took an extended period of time for 
a regulatory regime to be established in Alberta that 
recognized two key factors. One was largely political, 
establishing a stable and efficient regulatory frame-
work within the context of a federal state, when both 
the provincial government and the federal govern-
ment might reasonably exercise some claim on the 
benefits from the petroleum resource. As might be 
expected, these disputes came to a head in the 1970s 
when world oil prices soared and the value of Alberta’s 
oil and natural gas resources increased dramatically. 
The eventual resolution, in the mid-1980s (which was 
undoubtedly aided by falling world oil prices), essen-
tially recognized the primacy of the province and the 
acceptance of market forces in determining the values 
of oil and natural gas. The controversial policies of the 
period from 1973 through 1985 had lead to changes 
that somewhat increased the rent-collection efficiency 
of the corporate income tax (accruing largely to the 
federal government).
A second important factor was devising a 
regulatory regime that recognized the inevitable 
uncertainties and risks attendant to the petroleum 
industry. This included, not just the geological risks 
of exploration and reservoir performance, but also 
the economic (and political) uncertainties of the 
operation of global energy markets. This is very 
important for rent-sharing; if governments are to 
capture a large share of the actual rents that accrue, 
the rent-collection mechanisms must be flexible to 
changing geological and economic circumstances. 
A variety of mechanisms have been used, including 
competitive bonus bids, relinquishment provisions on 
mineral rights tracts, and royalties that are sensitive to 
output levels and prices.
It took some time for Canadian governments to 
agree to adapt to the variability of international energy 
markets, rather than imposing regulations to ‘protect’ 
either Canadian oil producers or consumers from 
the impacts of uncertain and variable prices. Since 
the mid-1980s, and with the free trade agreements 
with the United States and, later, the United States 
and Mexico, Canada seems willing to allow market 
forces to establish prices for both oil and natural gas. 
Previous experiments with price and trade regulations 
had made it evident that governments were no more 
successful than the private sector in forecasting future 
prices, so temporary ‘bridging’ policies to allow grad-
ual adjustment to price changes were not possible. 
Policies to control prices interfered with desirable con-
sumption and production adjustments; holding prices 
below the international level, for instance, encouraged 
more oil use and inhibited consumption, therefore 
raising the possibility of increased dependence on 
expensive imported oil. It was also apparent that the 
regulations would likely become very complicated. For 
example, if international oil prices changed frequently, 
then so must various regulations; holding domestic 
prices down required limitation on exports of petrol-
eum and/or export taxes; the level of taxes would have 
to recognize quality differences, etc.
Thus there was an extended period in Alberta in 
which a distrust of the operation of petroleum mar-
kets led to considerable controversy and to experi-
mentation with regulatory programs that entailed 
real economic inefficiencies. Since the mid-1980s, 
there has been a willingness to accept the operation 
of petroleum markets. This is well-justified from an 
economic point of view. But a part of this desirabil-
ity stems from the existence by then of a stable and 
relatively effective regime for sharing economic rents 
and controlling many of the production externalities 
generated by the activities of an industry operating in 
a physical world. In this respect, Alberta can serve as a 
good example for the rest of the world.
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There is no other book which reviews the complete history of the 
Alberta petroleum industry and related economic and energy 
policy and institutional development.… a valuable source for 
engineering, business, and public policy.
– Dr. Gerry Angevine, Centre for Energy Studies, The Fraser Institute
Petropolitics explores the complex interplay between the 
economic realities of producing energy for a global market 
and the role of government in regulating and structuring the 
extraction, production, and delivery of petroleum products. 
This study approaches the economic history of the petroleum 
industry in Alberta within the framework of economic 
development and public policy analysis. It provides a detailed 
examination of the operation of the markets for Alberta oil 
and natural gas and the use of governmental regulations to 
balance and support economic development. The analytical 
tools used within this case study are applicable to oil and gas 
industries throughout the world and would be of interest to 
anyone studying comparative petroleum policies.
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